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HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN 1789,

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN 1815.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.,

ADVOCATE.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

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"BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scripturum; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit: et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt"—LIV., *lib.* 21.

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Slow but steady growth of the Russian Empire.

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, which had thus repelled the most formidable armament ever arrayed against the liberties of mankind, and defeated the whole forces of Western Europe, led by the most consummate commander of modern times, is a state of such vast strength and boundless resources, that it is obviously destined to make a great and lasting impression on human affairs. Its progress has been slow, but it is only on that account the more likely to be durable. It has not suddenly risen to greatness—like the empires of Alexander in ancient, or Napoleon in modern times—from the force of individual genius, or the accident of casual fortune; but has slowly advanced, and been firmly consolidated during a succession of ages, from the combined influence of ambition skilfully directed, and energy perseveringly applied. It received its greatest development from the French Revolution—the experience acquired, and the spirit called forth during the contest for its existence, doubled its power; and the cloud which had hitherto overshadowed in obscure and gloomy grandeur the North of Europe, now emerged, like the genie in the Eastern fable, an armed giant, from the stroke of Napoleon.

Analogy in this respect of the physical and moral world.

There is no example in the annals of the world of an empire thus slowly and steadily advancing to greatness, which has not long endured, and left indelible traces of its power on the monuments of history. The probable length of life may be anticipated with tolerable certainty to national, not less than individual existence; it is in the duration of growth and adolescence that the measure of future maturity and decay is to be found. Experience proves that this is not a mere fanciful analogy, suggested by the obvious resemblance of the growth of communities to that of single men, but a fixed law of nature—a part of that mysterious unity of design which runs through every part of creation, and blends together the minutest object in the material, with the sublimest combinations in the moral world. If we compare the winged insect, which is called into perfect being with the first rays of the summer's sun, and runs through its brilliant span of existence before his orb has set in the West, with the majestic growth of the oak, which beholds successive generations of men expire under its increasing boughs, and stands forth after the lapse of seven centuries a still undecayed remnant of the olden time, we shall have a lively image of those ephemeral dynasties which glit-

ter a while in the rays of fortune, "a moment bright, then lost forever," contrasted with those more durable powers—like Rome in ancient, or Britain and Russia in modern times—which slowly, but steadily advancing, through a long course of ages, derive only additional strength from prosperous, and increased fortitude from adverse times.

Extent and statistics of the Russian Empire.

The extent and fertility of the Russian territory are such as to furnish facilities of increase and elements of strength which no other nation in the world enjoys. European Russia, that is, Russia to the westward of the Ural Mountains, contains 150,400 square marine leagues, or about 1,500,000 square geographical miles, being above sixteen times the surface of the British islands, which contain 91,000. Great part, no doubt, of this immense territory is covered with forest, or lies so far to the northward as to be almost unproductive of food; but no ranges of mountains or arid deserts intersect the vast extent, and almost the whole, excepting that which touches the arctic snows, is capable of yielding something for the use of man. The boundless steppes of the south present inexhaustible fields of pasturage, and give birth to those nomade tribes, in whose numerous and incomparable horsemen the chief defence of the Empire, as of all Oriental states, is to be found: the rich arable plains in the heart of the Empire produce an incalculable quantity of grain, capable not only of maintaining four times its present inhabitants, but affording a vast surplus for exportation by the Dnieper, the Wolga, and their tributary streams, which form so many natural outlets into the Mediterranean Sea; while the cold and shivering plains which stretch towards Archangel and the shores of the White Sea are covered with immense forests of oak and fir,* furnishing at once inexhaustible materials for shipbuilding and supplies of fuel, which, for many generations, will supersede the necessity of searching in the bowels of the earth for the purposes of warmth or manufactures for the inhabitants of the Empire.†

Surprising variety of climate and extent of latitude in Russia.

It is stated by Humboldt, and the fact gives us almost an overpowering idea of the extent of the savannas of the New World, that, while one end of the pampas of Buenos Ayres is charged with the snows of the antarctic circle, the other is overshadowed by the palm-trees of the tropics.‡ The dominions of the Czar, even in Europe, afford an example of a boundless extent of almost level surface, stretching over an equally broad space of the globe. While, in its northern extremities, the cold is so intense, and vegetation, in consequence, so stunted, that a birch-tree, full grown and of perfect form, can be carried in the palm of the hand; in its southern latitudes, the richest fruits of the vine, the apricot, and the peach, ripen on the sunny slopes of the Crimea, and fields of roses, which perfume the air for miles around, flower in luxuriant beauty on the shores of the Danube. In the northern provinces, corn withers, pasture is scanty, and the marshy meadows yield only a crop of mosses and rushes; trees dwindle to shrubs, and at last entirely disappear on the steril plains; the plants are stunted, and the whole of vegetable nature proclaims the vicinity to the pole. Farther to the south, vast forests of pine overspread the surface of the earth, but "winter still lingers in the lap of spring." Masses of ice in caves, or under the shade of rocks, diffuse a perennial chill around; innumerable lakes and marshes render the soil cold and unfruitful even in the height of summer; and the earth, hidden from the sun over nineteen twentieths of its surface by the dark shade of the fir, can hardly be made to bring scanty crops of oats and barley to maturity.*

Luxuriant riches of the Crimea and southern provinces.

It is only on approaching the latitude of Moscow that grain crops are universal, and the country, as far as the eye can reach, exhibits a noble, unbroken sheet of luxuriant harvests. Still farther to the south, immense steppes of verdant turf afford rich pasturage, even to the foot of the Caucasian snows; while in the southern extremity of the Crimea, along the southern front of the Taurida range, the climate hardly differs from the opposite shores of Anatolia and Asia Minor. Winter is there hardly felt: the primrose and the crocus appear above the earth in the month of January, and the oak retains its green foliage through the whole year; the ever-verdant laurel grows beside the olive, the fig, and the date-tree, brought in former times to these mountains by the Greek colonists; the walnut, the peach, the nectarine, and apricot flourish in the hanging woods, or, rather, natural gardens, in the valleys; the wild vine reaches the tops of the highest trees, and, descending again to the ground, forms, with the viburnum, festoons and garlands. "High hills, masses of rock, streams and cataracts, verdant fields and woods, and the sea that bounds the landscape, render the scene," says Pallas, "equal to any imagined or described by the poets. The simple life of the good Tartars, their cottages cut in the solid rock, and concealed by the thick foliage of the surrounding gardens; the flute of the shepherd, his flocks scattered on solitary hills, remind the traveller of the golden age. The traveller leaves the people with regret, and envies the destiny of mortals ignorant of war, the frauds of trade, and luxury accompanied with all its vices."†

Capabilities of Russia for future increase.

The productive powers of a country of such extent, and so diversified in natural advantages, may be considered as almost inexhaustible. Russia in

* Malte Brun, vi., 638, 639. Hassel's Tables of Russian Empire.

† The extent of the forests in the northern provinces of Russia is almost inconceivable. From actual measurement, it appears that, in the three governments of Vologda, Archangel, and Olonitz alone, there are 216,000,000 acres of pine and fir, being about three times the whole surface of the British islands, which contains 77,000,000. In one government alone there are 47,000,000 acres of forest. It appears, from M. Hermann's calculations, that there are in thirty-one governments in the north of Russia 8,195,295 firs, well adapted for large masts, each being above thirty inches in diameter: a number more than sufficient for a long supply of all the fleets in the world, besides 86,869,000 fit for building houses. In twenty-two governments only there are 374,804 large oaks, each more than twenty-six inches in diameter, and 229,570,000 of a smaller size.—See *Trans. de l'Academie Imperiale de St. Petersburg*, viii., 172-184; and MALTE BRUN, vi., 632; and BREMNER'S *Russia*, ii., 31.

‡ Humboldt, vi., 67.

* Malte Brun, vi., 443, 444, 457.

† Pallas, Tableau Physique de la Tauride, 37. Malte Brun, vi., 389.

Europe contains a twenty-eighth part of the terrestrial surface, and numbers among its subjects a fifteenth part of the human race.* If its European territory were peopled as Germany is, it would contain 150,000,000 souls; if as densely as Great Britain, which, considering the great proportion of Scotland which is mountain waste, is perhaps not beyond the bounds of possibility, it would contain 311,000,000.† The population of the whole Empire, in Asia as well as Europe, at present (1840) about sixty millions, adds nearly a million of souls annually to its number, and doubles in somewhat above half a century.‡ Thus, before the year 1900, Russia will, to all appearance, contain 120,000,000 inhabitants; and by the year 1950, nearly 200,000,000: a rate of increase which, how great soever, appears by no means incredible, when the prodigious extent of fertile land still uncultivated is taken into consideration, and the corresponding and still more rapid increase of the Anglo-Saxon race in the savannas of the New World. Nothing more is requisite to demonstrate the ascendency which these two great families of mankind have acquired, or the durable impress which they have communicated to human affairs.◊

Vast extent and capabilities of Asiatic Russia.

Dominions so vast, resources so boundless, might appear sufficient even for the greatest monarchy on earth. But, great as they are, they are inconsiderable when compared with the extent and capabilities of the Asiatic possessions of the Empire. These amount to no less than 5,250,000 square miles, or above an eighth part of the whole surface of the terraqueous globe, and are thinly peopled with 11,000,000 of souls, being only at the rate of *two* inhabitants to the square mile.‖ Setting aside two thirds of this immense region as steril and unproductive, there will remain about 1,700,000 square miles capable of being cultivated and yielding food to man. If these 1,700,000 miles were peopled as Scotland is, they would support nearly 200,000,000 of inhabitants; if as densely as the whole British isles, above 500,000,000, or about half the whole present inhabitants of the globe. Without supposing that so immense a portion of the earth is to be permanently retained under one dominion, or that Europe is to be ever threatened with subjugation by a second irruption of barbarians from that great *officina gentium*, it is at least worth while to contemplate the vast room here afforded for the future expansion of the species, and interesting to inquire into the power which, even at present, retains the cradles of so many future nations under its sway.*

Future capabilities of Siberia.

From the chilly and desert character of more than half its extent, and the melancholy associations connected with the whole, as the scene of European exile and suffering, we are apt to regard Siberia as a region of perpetual night and desolation, incapable of being ever converted into the habitation of happy and industrious man. But, though this is doubtless true of a large portion of its surface, yet there are districts of immense extent in its southern provinces, watered by large and navigable rivers, which equal a great part of Europe in the fertility of their soil, and exceed it in the grandeur and sublimity of their scenery. Thus, the stupendous rocks which enclose the spacious waters of the Lake of Baikal, the romantic range of the Altai, Mountains approaching the Alps in elevation and beauty are hardly excelled by the most celebrated scenery in Europe; while the immense plains which stretch to the eastward, along the banks of the Amour, are capable of containing all the nations of Christendom in comfort and affluence. Traces are not wanting of a much more dense population having formerly inhabited these remote regions than is now to be found in them; but the extreme difficulty of crossing the boundless steppes by which they are separated from the other abodes of man, and the circumstance of the greater part of their numerous rivers flowing into the Frozen Ocean, have hitherto prevented the human species from spreading in any considerable number into these vast reserves of humanity. It is steam-navigation which is destined to effect the transformation. The River Amour, which flows from the mountains of Mongolia into the ocean of Japan, by a course twelve hundred miles in length, of which nine hundred are navigable, in a deep channel, shut in on either side by precipitous rocks, or shaded by noble forests, is the real outlet of Eastern Siberia; and, though the Chinese are still masters of this splendid stream, it is as indispensable to Asiatic as the Wolga is to European Russia, and ere long it must fall under the dominion of the Czar, and constitute the principal outlet of his immense Oriental provinces.†

Character of the people, and their universal thirst for conquest.

Formidable as the power of Russia is, from the boundless extent of its territory, and the great and rapidly-increasing number of its subjects, it is still more so from the military spirit and docile disposition by which they are distinguished. The prevailing passion of the nation is the love of conquest; and this ardent desire, which burns as fiercely in them as Democratic ambition does in the free states of Western Europe, is the unseen spring which both retains them submissive under the standards of their chief, and impels their accumulated force in ceaseless advance over all the adjoining states. The energies of the people, great as the territory they inhabit, are never wasted in internal disputes; domestic grievances, how great soever, are overlooked in the thirst for foreign aggrandizement; in

* The globe contains 37,000,000 square geographical miles of territorial surface, of which Russia in Europe alone occupies 1,500,000, or about an eight-and-twentieth part.—Malte Brun, vi., 628.

† In Great Britain there are acres:

England	32,342,400
Wales	4,752,000
Scotland	19,738,930
	56,833,330

of which 22,000,000 at present are wastes, and 13,000,000 irrecoverably so.—See Porter's *Prog. of Nations*, i., 177.

‡ Mr. Tooke states that, in his time (1796), the population of the Empire was doubling in forty-nine years. Dupin now states it as doubling in sixty-seven years. Probably the medium of fifty-four or fifty-five years is about the mark.—See Tooke's *Russia*, ii., 146, and Dupin, *Tour Commerciale de la France*, i., 36.

◊ Malte Brun, vi., 638, 643, 628. Hassel's Stat. Tables of Russia, 1823. Balbi's Tables.

‖ Hassel's Tables, 1823. Malte Brun, vi., 638.

* Malte Brun, ii., 387, 388.

† Malte Brun, ii., 489, 490. Cochrane's Travels in Siberia, ii., 236, 260.

the conquest of the world the people hope to find a compensation, and more than a compensation, for all the evils of their internal administration. Revolutions of the most violent kind have frequently occurred in the palace, and the order of succession, as in all Eastern dynasties, has been often turned aside by the bloody hand of the assassin; but no republican spirit has ever animated any considerable part of the population. The troops who returned from Paris in 1815 brought with them a strong admiration for the institutions of Western Europe; and a large part of the officers who led the victorious armies of Alexander were engaged for ten years afterward in a dark conspiracy, which imbittered the last days, and perhaps shortened the life of that great monarch, and certainly convulsed the army and the capital on the accession of his successor. But the nation were strangers to that political movement: the private soldiers who engaged in it were entirely ignorant alike of political rights or the forms by which they are to be exercised;* and the authority of the Czar is still obeyed with undiminished Oriental servility in every part of his vast dominions.

Universal belief in Russia that it is one day to conquer the world.

If the belief in the ability of one Englishman to fight two Frenchmen is universally impressed upon the British peasantry, and has not a little contributed to the many fields of fame, both in ancient and modern times, where this result has really taken place, it is not less true that every Russian is inspired with the conviction that his country is one day to conquer the world, and that the universal belief of this result is one of the chief causes of the rapid strides which Russia, of late years, has made towards its realization. The passion for conquest, the thirst for aggrandizement, are among the strongest natural propensities of the human mind: they need neither the schoolmaster nor the press for their diffusion; they are felt even more strongly in the rudest than in the most advanced and civilized ages, and have, in almost every age, impelled the wave of conquest from the regions of poverty over those of opulence. The North is, in an especial manner, the seat of this devouring ambition, and the fountain from whence it floods mankind; for there are to be found at once the hardihood which despises danger, the penury which pants for riches, and the churlish soil which denies them but to the sword of conquest. The meanest peasant in Russia is impressed with the belief that his country is destined to subdue the world; the rudest nomade of the steppes pants for the period when a second Timour is to open the gates of Derbend, and let loose upon Southern Asia the long-pent-up forces of its northern wilds. The fearful strife of 1812, the important conquests of 1813 and 1814, have added immensely to this natural disposition; the march through Germany, the capture of Paris, the overthrow of Napoleon, have spread, on grounds which can hardly be denied to be just, the idea of their invincibility, while the tales recounted by the veteran warriors of the deeds of their youth, the wines of Champagne, the fruits of Lyons, the women of Paris and Italy, have inspired universally that mingled thirst for national elevation and individual enjoyment which constitutes the principal element in the lust of conquest.

Rank depends on military employment or the emperor's gift.

The institutions and government of Russia are calculated in an extraordinary manner to foster, in all ranks, this ambitious spirit, and turn it in a permanent manner to the purposes of national elevation. Though property is hereditary in its descent, and titles follow the same destination, *rank* is personal only, and depends entirely upon military grade or the emperor's employment. Thus, a general of the emperor's creation takes precedence of a prince or count by birth; and the highest noble, if he has not a commission in the army, finds himself without either a place or consideration in society. This curious combination of the European principle of the hereditary descent of honours, with the Asiatic maxim that all rank is personal only, and flows from the gift or office under the sovereign, leads, however, to hardly any of the embarrassments in practice which might, *a priori*, be expected; for, as the necessity of military office for personal rank is everywhere known, and, from the warlike turn of the people, cordially acquiesced in, it is universally sought after, and no one thinks of aspiring to any place in society who is not either actually, or by the emperor's gift, in the imperial army. The necessity of this real or fictitious military rank creates a multiplication of military honours and designations which is not a little perplexing to foreigners, and sometimes excites a smile even in the Russians themselves;* but it is admirably calculated to foster a warlike spirit in the people, and, by keeping alive the feeling that distinction is to be won only by military honours, to coin for the nation the reality of military success.†

Military spirit at the imperial palace.

In consequence of this universality of the military spirit, and all-prevailing sway of military ambition, the whole energies of the nation are, to an extent which appears almost incredible to one of the Democratic states of Western Europe, absorbed in the profession of arms. From the emperor's son to the peasant's child, the career of ambition lies in the same channel: the same objects of desire inflame and animate the heart. In the first years of infancy, the mind of the young Cæsarowitch is warmed

* At the time of the conspiracy to put Constantine on the throne, in 1825, which Nicholas only stemmed by extraordinary courage and presence of mind, the cry of the party in the army who supported him was, "Constantine and the Constitution." Some of the soldiers being asked what was meant by the "Constitution," replied they knew perfectly well. "It was the *new carriage* in which the emperor was to drive."

* "There is another distinction in Russia, the frequency of which puzzled us not a little—that of *general*. We had heard several people, distinguished neither by warlike looks nor dress, spoken of as generals, some of whom were treated by the young officers with very little deference. One proved to be the *director of a theatre*, who held the office by gift of the emperor, as many do who have never been in the army. It is lavished in a way which makes it perfectly worthless. We heard of an apothecary who is a general, and the empress's accoucheur may be lieutenant-colonel. A penniless lieutenant, with his epaulettes on his shoulders, will get horses instantly in travelling, when a merchant who has thousands must wait for hours, so universal is the respect paid to military rank."—BREMNER'S *Russia*, i., 210, 211. These are trifles, but they are straws which show how the wind sets; and Europe will find it a pretty stiff northeast wind which has set in from the plains of Muscovy.

† Bremner's Russia, i., 210, 212.

by the recital of the exploits of his father's warriors; the long series of Russian victories is ever present to his mind; his earliest feeling of exultation, his proudest day in life, is when he is first arrayed in the mimic garb of the invincible grenadiers, who have carried the Muscovite standards in triumph to Paris, Erivan, and Adrianople.* He grows up under the influence of the same feelings; the troops salute him, not with the title of emperor, but "father;" and his familiar and uniform appellation to them is, not soldiers, but "children."† The Empire, in the opinion of the Muscovite peasant, is a vast family, of which the Czar is the head; the chief interest of all its members is to enlarge the possessions and extend the glory of the domestic circle; and their first duty to obey the imperial commands and sacrifice themselves or their children, when required, to the imperial will.‡

Its general adoption through the Empire.

When such is the tone of mind which pervades the palace and the peasantry, it may be readily believed that the spirit of all the intermediate classes, and, in effect, of the whole Empire, is essentially military, and that their energies are almost exclusively devoted to warlike pursuits. In truth, this object entirely occupies their thoughts, and everything else is comparatively neglected. Commerce, though flourishing,◊ is held in little estimation, and is for the most part engrossed by the merchants of the English factory. Agriculture, though not less than in the American States the main source of the national strength, is left to the boors, who prosecute it as their fathers did before them, and, in consequence, make little advance in improved methods of cultivation. Judicial or other civil employments, save diplomacy, are held in utter contempt:* the whole youth of the Empire, who aspire to any station in society, are bred for the army. One hundred and eighty thousand young men, the flower of the Empire, comprising ten thousand officers, among whom are found almost all its talent and energy, are constantly at the public seminaries,† where military education is taught in the very best manner, and the whole knowledge communicated is of a kind to be available in warlike pursuits. Europe has much need to consider well how the pressure of sixty millions of men, doubling every half century, directed by the whole talent of the nation, educated at such seminaries, is to be averted; and those who believe that a pacific era is arising, that commercial interests are to rule the world, and one great deluge of Democracy to overwhelm all other institutions, would do well to contemplate the spirit and institutions of this state, which now possesses an eighth part of the whole surface of the globe.‡

Universality of decorations to all persons in civil and military employment.

As a natural consequence of this warlike spirit, and of the military institutions in the Empire, military honours, badges, and other insignia are universal, and distributed, both to civil and military servants, with a profusion which, to an Englishman, appears injudicious, and materially lessens their real value as a badge of merit. In the midst of these numerous decorations, however, there is one which none can wear but those who really earned it, which cannot, by its nature, be prostituted to unworthy objects, and of which the emperor is more proud than of the English order of the Garter—the medal given to all the soldiers who had served in the campaign of 1812. With this exception, however, and notwithstanding the numerous attempts to create distinctions by classes in the orders, they appear, at least to an English eye, exceedingly common; and Talleyrand expressed this feeling with his usual felicity when, on seeing, at a Russian party, the English ambassador enter the room in a plain blue coat amid the galaxy of stars with which he was surrounded, he exclaimed, "Ma foi! il est bien distingué!"◊

Military forces of Russia.

The military strength of the Empire is proportioned to its vast physical resources, and the strong warlike disposition which distinguishes its inhabitants. It consists at present (1840), according to the in-

* "In the interior of the *salle blanche* of the imperial palace at St. Petersburg, on each side of the door, were placed two of the finest grenadiers of the regiment, measuring at least six feet two or three inches. When we had passed these in the outer hall, to our amazement, we beheld the two little grand-dukes standing as sentinels, and dressed with minute exactness as privates of the regiment, with their knapsacks, greatcoats, and haversacks all in marching order. To the inexpressible amusement of everybody, the emperor himself then put the little princes through the manual and platoon exercises, which they both did incomparably. The universal delight, from the oldest general to the lowest subaltern of the guards, was something I cannot describe."—LONDONDERRY'S *Tour to Russia*, i., 248. The author has the satisfaction of giving an entire confirmation to this statement, if any were wanting, from the evidence of his highly-respected friend, General Tcheffkine, aid-de-camp to the Emperor Nicholas, and chief of the mining engineers of Russia, who has frequently seen the little grand-dukes on mimic duty on these interesting occasions.

† "The troops do not salute, but, as every division passes, the emperor hails them with the accustomed cheer of 'How are you, *my children?*' To which they reply, in enthusiastic roar, 'We thank you, *father.*' The corps having defiled, the emperor again touches his hat to all the officers, saying, 'Adieu, messieurs;' and then, walking from the regiment, he exclaims, 'I am satisfied with your zeal and conduct, my children.' 'We'll do better next time,' is then the cry from the battalions; and in the midst of this shout, his imperial majesty, accompanied by the little Cæsarowitch, mounts his little open phaeton and drives off."—LONDONDERRY'S *Travels in Russia*, i., 244. The first time that the author heard these striking expressions used by the Czar and his troops was at Paris in May, 1814, when Alexander reviewed his guards on the road from the barrier of Neuilly to St. Cloud. He will never forget the impression which these words, repeated by thirty thousand voices, in accents of rapturous enthusiasm, produced on his mind.

‡ Lond., i., 198, 208. Brem., ii., 360, 361.

	1835.	1836.
◊ Exports of Russia,	107,033,563	129,601,862 rubles.
Imports	165,686,702	180,913,929 do.

—LOND., ii., 145.

* "Nothing astonishes the Russian or Polish noblemen so much as seeing the estimation in which the civil professions, and especially the bar, are held in Great Britain. The judicial profession, and the whole class of legal practitioners, are everywhere despised and wretchedly paid; and, as a natural consequence, the taking of bribes is all but universal."—BREMNER, i., 344, 350. A young Polish nobleman once energetically expressed to the author how much he had been "effrayé" when he heard Sir Walter Scott was an *avocat;* and if these pages should fall under the eye of any similar military youth, he will probably be not less horrified at finding the author has been bred to the profession of Cicero and Demosthenes.

† Military pupils at military schools under Grand-duke Michael..... 1836. 8,733
Pupils at Navy-board schools 2,224
Pupils at schools under the minister at war .. 169,024
179,981

—KRUSENSTERN, 79; LOND., ii., 158.

‡ Krusenstern's Instruction Publique en Russie, Warsaw, 1837. Lond., ii., 156, 159. Marmont, Voyages.

◊ Slade, Russia in 1838, 174.

formation of Marshal Marmont and the Marquess of Londonderry, who had access to the best sources of information, of six corps, or separate armies of the line, comprising seventy-two regiments of infantry, twenty-four of light cavalry, ninety batteries of foot, and twelve of horse artillery. Each regiment of infantry consists of seven battalions of a thousand men each; of which six are always on active service, and the seventh at the depôt in the interior; so that the infantry of the line musters, at least on paper, above five hundred thousand men. In addition to this, there are twelve regiments of infantry and twelve of cavalry, twelve batteries of foot, and four of horse artillery, in the guards; twelve regiments of grenadiers on foot, four on horseback, and seventeen grenadier batteries. There are also twenty-four regiments of heavy reserve cavalry, and twelve batteries of reserve horse artillery; and the corps of the Caucasus, of Orenburg, of Siberia, Finland, and the interior, which number among them no less than a hundred battalions of a thousand men each, forty regiments of horse, and thirty-six batteries of artillery. In addition to these forces, the emperor has at his disposal one hundred and forty-six regiments of Cossacks, each eight hundred strong, and of which fifty-six come from the steppes of the Don, and are superior to any troops in the world for the service of light cavalry. If these immense bodies of men were complete, they would number above 850,000 infantry and 250,000 horse. But the ranks are far from being complete: innumerable officers in every grade have an interest in representing the effective force as greater than it really is, as they draw pay and rations for the whole, and appropriate the allowances of the men of straw to themselves; and in no service in the world is the difference so considerable between the muster-rolls of an army on paper, and the real number of sabres and bayonets it can bring into the field. Still, after making every allowance for these well-known deficiencies, it is not going too far to assert that Russia, without weakening her establishments in the fortresses and the interior, can produce 400,000 infantry, 100,000 horse, and 50,000 artillerymen, for offensive operations beyond her frontier, though it would require more than one year to bring even the half of this immense force to bear on any point in Europe or Asia.*

Revenues of the Empire, and small cost of the army.

The total revenues of the Empire at this moment do not exceed £14,000,000 (140,000,000 florins), and are derived from a capitation-tax, to which alike every individual in the Empire, whether serf or free, is subjected; a tax on the capital of merchants; the crown domains, which yield a large part of the public income, and proceed from the *obrok*, or personal duty paid by the peasants of the crown, and the rent of the lands which they cultivate; the custom-house duties; the tax on the sale of heritable property, which is rated at five per cent.; the duty on spirits; the salt monopoly; and the produce of the imperial mines. It may appear surprising how forces so immense can be maintained by revenues so inconsiderable; but the marvel ceases when the extremely small sums which suffice for the pay of the troops are taken into consideration. Dr. Johnson's celebrated saying, "that eggs are a penny the dozen in the Highlands, not because eggs are many, but because pence are few," was never more strongly exemplified. The cost of a foot-soldier for a year in Russia is little more than a third of what it is in France, and a fifth of his cost in Great Britain; in the cavalry and artillery the difference is still more striking.* The nominal pay of the soldier—nearly a ruble (or about 8*d.*) a day—is not inconsiderable; but so much of it is stopped off by rations and other deductions, some of which go to enrich his officers, that he has not *half a farthing per diem* to spend on his own comforts: a pittance, small as it is, which is nearly double of what is enjoyed in the sea service. The Cossacks receive 8*s.* 6*d.* of clear pay annually, out of which they are obliged to furnish themselves with starched neckcloths. As some compensation, however, for the limited amount of his pay, every Russian soldier becomes free on entering the army; and he is entitled to his discharge after twenty years' service, on which occasion he receives four or five hundred rubles (£16 or £20) to stock a farm assigned to him on the crown domains.†

Slavery of the peasantry.

Predial slavery, as all the world knows, is general in Russia, with the exception of the crown domains, and the territories of the Cossacks and Malo-Russians in the south, where personal freedom has been long established. This sullen line of demarcation, however, is much less strongly marked there than in many other countries, from the custom which prevails of the master allowing the serfs who have a turn for commerce or the arts to engage in such lucrative employments, and realize their gains for themselves, upon paying him a certain *obrok*, or capitation-tax, annually: a practice which almost lets in to the industrious slave the blessings of freedom. Even to those who remain at their pristine occupations of the axe and the plough, the bond which attaches them to the soil, though often felt as galling at one period of life, proves a blessing at another: the labourers on an estate constitute, as they formerly did in the West Indies, the chief part of its value; and thus the proprietor is induced to take care of his slaves by the same motives which prompt him to do so with his buildings or cattle. Relief in sickness, care of orphans, maintenance of the maimed, or in old age, are important advantages to the labouring classes even in the most favourable circumstances; and with all the facilities for rendering themselves independent, which the habits of civilized life, and the power of accumulating and preserving capital arising from the interchange

* Marmont, Voyages, i., 184, 189. Malte Brun, vi., 635.

		Francs.	£.	s.
* Cost of a foot soldier for a year in	Russia,	120 or	5	0
"	" in Austria,	212 or	9	8
"	" in Prussia,	240 or	10	0
"	" in France,	340 or	14	6
"	" in England,	538 or	21	14

The magnitude of this disproportion is not to be alone explained by the difference in the value of money in each of these states when applied to the purchase of the necessaries of life; for between some of them, especially France and Great Britain, this difference is inconsiderable. Much more is owing to the difference in the habits of enjoyment and good living in the working classes in the European states; and in this respect the British soldier, as well as citizen, stands far ahead of all the rest.—See MARMONT, *Voyages*, i., 189, 190.

† Marmont, Voyages, i., 189, 190. Bremner, i., 368, 371.

of commerce, afford—in rude periods, when these advantages are unknown, and the means of providing during the vigour for the weakness of life do not exist, they are of inestimable value. The long want of such maintenance and care for the poor is the true secret of the misery of Ireland: it would be a real blessing to its inhabitants, in lieu of the destitution of freedom, to obtain the protection of slavery.* Stripes, insults, and compulsory labour are no light evils; but they are as nothing compared to the wasting agonies of famine, the violence of ill-directed and ungovernable passions, which never fail to seize upon prematurely emancipated man. The servitude and forced industry of the serf fill up the interval, the long and important interval, between the roving independence of the savage, who lives by the chase or the milk of his herds, and the voluntary toil of the freeman, around whom artificial wants have thrown the unseen but riveting chains of civilized life. But for its existence, this wide chasm could never have been passed, for man will never labour voluntarily till he has acquired the habits and desires of an advanced stage in society; and those habits, when generally pervading the community, can exist only from the effect of previous centuries of compulsory labour.†

Mode of levying the troops.

The army is kept up by a compulsory levy of so many per hundred or thousand, levied by government under the authority of an imperial ukase. In general, five in a thousand is the annual quota which is required; but on pressing occasions two or three per hundred are demanded, and on occasion of the French advance to Moscow, ten in that number were voluntarily voted by the Russian nobles. Each proprietor is obliged, in addition to the man, to furnish his outfit to government, amounting to thirty-three rubles (£1 5*s.* 10*d.*). The day of drawing the men on the several estates is one of universal mourning and lamentation: the conscript leaves his paternal home, with scarce a hope of ever seeing it again; his mother and sisters make the air resound with their shrieks; chains are often necessary to secure his appearance at the appointed place of muster, and his companions, in tears, accompany him for miles on the road to his destination. In this, however, as in other cases, where a separation from old habits is induced by irresistible necessity, the human mind bends to the force of circumstances: with his military dress and the first use of arms, the young soldier puts off the recollection of former days; a new career of ambition, fresh rewards, hitherto unknown desires, stimulate his mind; he feels the dignity of a freeman, the elevation of a superior profession, and not unfrequently the most painful moment in life is afterward found to have been the nativity of a more elevated state of existence. In one instance only, the natural feelings of grief at the separation of the young conscript from all that are dear to him, were overcome by a still holier feeling. When the regiments were raised in pursuance of the great levy which followed the French advance to Moscow, tears were shed in abundance when those on whom the lot had fallen took their departure; but they were tears of joy and exultation upon the part of their relatives, not of sorrow; and the only houses in which real grief was felt were those whose sons were not called on to join their comrades in the sacred duty of defending their country.*

Military colonies.

Vast as are the military resources which this system of regular conscription, in a country so immense, and containing a population so rapidly increasing, places at the disposal of the Russian emperor, they form by no means the whole of those on which he has to rely. Whole nations of soldiers are contained in the Muscovite dominions, and are ever ready to start into activity at a signal from the Czar. The MILITARY COLONIES constitute an important and rapidly-increasing part of the imperial possessions, and furnish no small addition to the warlike strength of the Empire. They owe their origin to the Emperor Alexander, who, being struck with the advantages which similar establishments on the frontiers of Transylvania† had long afforded to the Austrians in warding off the incursions of the Mussulman horse, resolved, in 1817, to establish them on a great scale in different parts of his dominions; and the same system was extended and enlarged under the guidance of the able General De Witt, in the southern provinces, in 1821. Several divisions of cavalry were colonized in this manner, and a floating population of seventy thousand wandering tribes located on the districts allotted to them, to furnish recruits to the troops. The holders of these lands, which they receive from the crown, are bound, as the only payment they make for them, to lodge and maintain a soldier, and to labour for forty-four days in the year for the public works in progress in the country. There are already in the military colonies twelve thousand men, constantly ready and equipped, as a depôt for the twenty regiments which are distributed in this manner; and the warlike spirit of the youth from whom the recruits are furnished is perpetually kept alive by the recital of glories, perils, and plunder, which they hear from the veterans who are settled on the lands. The military spirit thus comes to animate the entire population: the *esprit de corps* is felt, not by regiments alone, but the whole flourishing colony by whom

* "I have no hesitation in saying that the condition of the peasantry in Russia is far superior to the same class in Ireland. Provisions are plentiful, good, and cheap; good, comfortable log-houses are to be seen in every village; immense droves of cattle are scattered over unlimited pastures; and whole forests of fuel may be had for a trifle. With ordinary care and economy, the Russian peasant may become rich, especially in those villages situated between the two capitals. In Siberia, scarcely any full-grown man is to be found among the convicts who has not two or three horses and as many cattle; and they yield him, from the price paid for their labour at the government prices, a sum adequate to the purchase of a pound and a half of meat and three of bread daily, in addition to the produce of the land allotted to the convicts."—COCHRANE'S *Travels in Russia and Siberia*, i., 79 and 190. It would be a happy day for the Irish peasantry, the slaves of their own heedless and savage passions, when they exchanged places with the Siberian convicts, subjected to the less grievous yoke of punishment and despotism.

† Clarke's Travels, i., 90 and 170. Cox's Travels, iii., 183. Heber in Clarke, i., 170. Tooke's Russia, b. iv., c. 1.

* Bremner, 370. Ségur, ii., 90. Bout., ii., 117, 118.

† See, for the Austrian frontier military colonies, MARMONT'S Voyages, i., 226–228; WALSH'S Constantinople, 287; and CLARKE'S Travels.

they are surrounded. As the experiment has met with entire success, and there is no limit to the extent of waste land which may be appropriated in the Muscovite dominions to these purposes, it is difficult to see any bounds to the addition which may thus be made to the power of the Czar, by a system which superadds to the military tenure of the feudal ages the regular organization and powerful control of modern government.*

The Cossacks. Their territory, character, and manners.

The Cossacks are another race of colonized warriors, who all hold their lands by military tenure, and are able, when occasion requires, to furnish the whole male population capable of bearing arms for the service of the state. The Cossacks of the Don inhabit a territory of immense extent: it spreads over no less than 57,600 square geographical miles in extent: a surface nearly two thirds of that of the whole British islands, and incomparably more level and fertile. Some part of it is as fruitful as the Ukraine, and it is all destitute of hills; but a considerable portion, though covered with a velvet carpet of turf, is probably destined to remain forever, from the want of rivers or brooks, inhabited only by nomade herdsmen. Unlike the peasants of the greater part of Russia, the people of this district are entirely relieved from the fetters of servitude. "Free as a Cossack" is a common proverb through all the south of the Muscovite dominions; their political privileges, even in the midst of the Russian Empire, approach to those of Democratic equality; and the active roving habits of the race are strongly exemplified even in those situations where they are fixed in one situation, and permanently engaged in the labours of agriculture. Though their industry there is very conspicuous, the villages clean and thriving, the houses white and comfortable, and the produce of their fisheries on the Don very considerable,† yet the dispositions of the people are still those of their Scythian forefathers. Horses comprise their chief, often their only luxury; equestrian races or games their great delight; five hundred or a thousand stallions constitute the studs of the great, three or four are possessed by the poor; boundless pastures furnish to all the means of ample subsistence; and all are alike ready, at the call of their beloved hetman, to follow his fortunes to the scenes of European plunder or glory.‡

Description of the Ukraine, and the character of its inhabitants.

Under a pure and cloudless heaven are spread out the boundless steppes of the Ukraine, of which it was long ago said that "the sky is ever serene, and storms and hurricanes are unknown." One who has been accustomed to the gloomy forests, dark clouds, steril lands, and marshes of the north of Russia, can hardly figure to himself the boundless fields waving with corn, the valleys strewed with the fresh down of blooming vegetation, the meadows whose luxuriant covering conceals from the eye the waters of the streams. Still less can the habitations of the people in Great Russia convey an idea of the cottages in the Ukraine, built of carved trees covered with whitewashed clay, with smooth, polished earthen floors. The dirty peasant of Great Russia, with his long tangled hair, bespeaks the Tartar rule; while the villager of the north, with his clear blue eyes and light brown hair, attests the Sclavonian blood. But in the Ukraine, the serious, reflecting countenance of the man, his tall figure, half-shaven head, long mustaches, and abrupt speech, discover the mingled descent of the ancient Russian and savage Asiatic. His dress bears marks of the Lithuanian and Polish rule of four centuries. He is slow, taciturn, and of few words; but shrewd, intelligent, and rigorous in the observance of promises, both given and received. While the one lives entirely in the present, the other dwells chiefly on the past. Remind the Cossack of his former glories, his recent historical achievements, and you have found the passport to his heart: his countenance will brighten, his eye kindle, you will hear the song of the steppe, and be astonished at the cheerfulness of his disposition.*

Incredible devastation of the Tartar tribes in Southern Russia in former times.

The origin of this singular people accounts in a considerable degree for their peculiar character. Nature and man have stamped an impress upon their minds which never can be effaced. Placed on the frontiers of Europe and Asia, they have always dwelt in the plains which, from the earliest ages, have been the highway by which Scythian violence passed on to civilized plunder. Amid tombs which, rising on either hand amid the boundless wastes, marked the bloodstained passage of the multitudinous nations whose names, as Chateaubriand has said, "are known only to God;" amid walls raised by unknown hands, and cemeteries whitening with the bones of Russians, Hungarians, Lithuanians, and Poles, the Tartar still discerned the tracts which led from his far-distant steppes to the seat of civilized man. Flights of rapacious birds announced their approach, and the mournful omen was confirmed by the glowing sky that reddened as their torches consumed the villages. The barbarian hordes, in their sudden attacks, overpowered the inhabitants, and seized the fruits of their toil before the warlike proprietors could assemble from their castles for their defence. Prompt in aggression, prompter still in flight, they dragged into captivity the youth of both sexes, driving off the herds, and leaving behind them only the silence of ashes and the corpses of the slain. Notwithstanding this ceaseless havoc, the population still sprang up afresh upon that beautiful soil: cut up, as it was, says a Sclavonian poet, "by the tramp of horses, fertilized by human blood, and white with bones—where sorrow grew abundantly."†

Origin of the Cossacks in these disasters.

It was amid the misery and from the effects of this constant devastation, which continued for several centuries, that the Cossack nation took its rise. Two corners of land, overlooked in the great streams of conquest to the south-west, remained as places of refuge for the fugitives: one beyond the Don, towards the Sea of

* Marmont, Voyages, i., 193, 215.

† The export of fish and caviare from the country of the Don Cossacks is no less than 500,000 rubles, or about £25,000 annually: a sum equivalent to at least £100,000 a year in this country.—MALTE BRUN, vi., 402.

‡ Malte Brun, vi., 402. Bremner, ii., 428, 446.

* Polewoy, Hist. of Russia, ii., 317.

† Gnorowski, Insurrection of Poland in 1830–31, 47, 48.

Azoff, and the other beyond the islands of the Dnieper, towards the Black Sea; and these were the cradle of this singular people, as the Lagunæ of the Po were, from a similar cause and at the same period, of the Venitian Republic. About sixty miles below Kiow, the Dnieper forms a variety of islands, upward of seventy in number. The banks of the river, here fringed with wood, there steep or marshy; the deep caverns in the rocky islands, concealed by spreading trees or tangled thorn-bushes, offered a favourable place of refuge when the open country was overrun by the barbarians. At the epoch of the first general invasion of the Tartars, and again during the Lithuanian wars, many persons found shelter here; and their number was subsequently increased by the arrival of adventurers, guided by necessity or the love of change; by deserters from the Lithuanian, Polish, Hungarian, and Wallachian ranks; by fugitives from Tartar bondage, or by serfs escaping from the oppression of their lords. The motley crew was at first held together, and prevented from overstepping its limits, by a rule enforcing, during the common calamity, celibacy, fishing, and hard labour. Gradually, as the danger rolled away, these restrictions were forgotten, and they ventured upon secret excursions to the neighbouring plains, which, by degrees, extended down the Dnieper, and along the shores of the Black Sea, to the very walls of Constantinople. In more peaceable times, they spread over the adjoining plains, fed vast flocks on the steppes, and cultivated the earth; and then, in huts built of clay, they led a rude life, mindful only of the subsistence of the moment. But they retained the character imprinted on them by their origin, their necessities, and their situation: fishing in the Don and the Dnieper ever remained, and still continues, a favourite occupation of the people, and a principal source of their wealth; the necessity of flight to existence was constantly felt; and the nation, true to its origin, still looked for its riches in prosperity, its refuge in adversity, to the swiftness of its steeds. "Let the flame of invasion," said they, "consume our huts: in a week we shall plant new hedges, fill up our ditches with earth, cover our thorns with reeds; soon others shall arise. Sooner shall the foe be wearied with destruction than we with restoration." Independence, amid a world of serfs, gave charms to this precarious existence; freedom sweetened the toils and lightened the dangers of these unfettered rovers. Their own industry, the spoils of others, brought them plenty; mounted on swift chargers, free as the wind of the steppes, they enjoyed their liberty; and generations grew up amid the clashing of swords and the song of battle. Singing the airs of his native wilds, the Cossack of former days left his home on a cruise to Azoff, Sinope, or Constantinople; a beautiful captive often became his wife, the richest stuffs his attire, his enemies' best weapons his arms. He returned home with his trophies, distributed his spoils, and took no charge of the morrow; but the trophies of his prowess were religiously preserved; his children played with his sword, or arrayed themselves in the panoply of his enemies. These habits still continue, though the objects and scene of his warfare are changed; and the Cossack youth point to the cuirasses of the French horsemen, or the standards of the Imperial Guard, preserved in their churches, and honour these prizes of recent valour, as their ancestors did the trophies of Trebizond or the spoils of Constantinople.*

Influence of the victories in Germany and France on the Cossacks.

Nearly the whole Cossacks of the Don capable of bearing arms attended the standard of Platoff to the neighbourhood of Moscow, and, by their indefatigable activity as light horse, mainly contributed to the astonishing results of the campaign; and nothing now arrests so certainly the volatile youth of the plains of the Don as the recital, by the old warriors, of their exploits on the fields of Germany and France, the marvels of Paris, the wines and the women of the south. The shining armour of the cuirassiers of the Imperial Guard, the trophies of the hard-fought field of Eylau,† the eagles and standards which were won amid the cannonade of Leipsic, hang, the objects of universal veneration, in the Church of Tcherkask, the principal town of their country; and, though their institutions are so free as almost to rival the ruinous Democracy of Poland, the turbulence of pastoral Republicanism is gradually yielding to the seductions and the address of the imperial court, and on all important occasions it is effectually drowned in the indelible passion for warfare and plunder.‡

Their appearance, manners, and mode of fighting.

Above a hundred thousand Cossacks, distributed in one hundred and sixty-four regiments, are now to be found in the Muscovite armies; their physical force, and the vast influence which they exerted in the later years of the war, render them an object of serious importance and interest to all the European states. The word "Cossack" means a volunteer or free partisan:◊ their whole service is voluntary; one of their most highly valued privileges is, that they cannot be chained, when enrolled and on the march to the military stations, as the other conscripts of Russia are, when they prove refractory. They hold their lands by military tenure; and, in consequence of it, every individual is obliged to serve four years in the Russian armies, and this they do, in time of peace, for a mere nominal pay. This service is to them rather an amusement and delight than a duty. Trained from early childhood to the use of the lance and sword; familiarized to the management of the small, but active horse, which can undergo almost any fatigue, and seldom falls even in the roughest country, the young Cossack joyfully mounts the playfellow and companion of his infancy, and wends his way, exulting, to the unknown but oft-imagined scenes of distant plunder. At home he is kind, gentle, and domestic in his habits; but when called to foreign warfare, he assumes at once the ferocious habits of his Scythian ancestors. Pillage is their principal object, and the whole produce of their marauding which will admit of being carried, is stowed away between the saddle and the girths; so that, after a long campaign, they sit fully a foot above the backs of their horses. They seldom, in former wars, gave quarter; but in the campaign of 1812, and the subse-

* Gnorowski, Poland, i., 74, 75. † *Ante*, ii., 484.
‡ Malte Brun, vi., 402, 403. Bremner, ii., 425, 436. Clarke's Travels, i., 283, 296. ◊ Karamsin, vi., 476.

quent years, Alexander promised them a ducat for every French prisoner they brought in, which soon produced a plentiful harvest of captives.*

Their mode of fighting and habits in war.

Like other Asiatic horsemen, to whom they belong by descent, if not by birth, the Cossacks do not attack in a close body like the European cavaliers, but in a *swarm*, or loose charge, where each man selects his individual antagonist; and, with a loud *hourra*, they bear furiously down upon their opponents. In the course of the war in Germany, however, in 1813, they came to act in a more regular and systematic manner; and both then, and in the campaign in the following spring in France, frequently and successfully charged squares, and performed all the duties of regular cavalry. But it is chiefly in the service of light troops that the Cossacks are seen to advantage, and then their services are invaluable. Never had an army such eyes as they furnish; none ever possessed a host capable of drawing such a screen before the observation of the enemy. Mounted on their hardy little horses, they have frequently been known to march a hundred miles in twenty-four hours, loaded with arms and plunder; and in their heaviest marching order they plunge into rivers, thread morasses, explore thickets, and cross the most fearful deserts, whether parched by the heats of summer or charged with the snows of winter. No army with the Cossacks in its front need fear a surprise; none with them heading the pursuit can be secure against it. Their velocity, activity, and courage render them peculiarly dangerous to a retreating, often fatal to a flying enemy. When the rear-guard halts, and a respectable force collects to oppose their incursions, they never hazard an attack, but fly without hesitation, like the Parthians of old, till a more favourable opportunity of renewing the pursuit occurs; and when the enemy again retires, they press upon his retreating columns, inundate the country on all sides of his line of march, and are frequently to be seen a hundred miles in advance of the pursuing force.†

Naval force of Russia.

The naval force of Russia, though far from being inconsiderable, and now an object of well-founded and serious alarm to Great Britain, is not the direction which the national spirit naturally takes, nor in which durable danger to other states is probably to be apprehended. At present, the Emperor Nicholas has thirty ships of the line and twenty-two strong frigates at Cronstadt, besides sixteen of the line and twelve frigates in the Black Sea. It has been maintained nearly at that level for the last thirty years; and what renders it peculiarly formidable to England is, that this large force is not distracted by the defence of any colonies or distant possessions; that it is kept constantly on the war establishment, and with stores and provisions on board ready for immediate operations; that the Baltic fleet in summer manœuvres for some months with thirty thousand men on board; that, though extremely deficient in nautical skill, the Russian sailors are admirably trained to the practice of gunnery, and stand with devoted resolution to their pieces alike in naval as military war;* and that, under protection of the bastions of Cronstadt, and the castles of the Dardanelles, they possess alike, in the north and the south, impregnable places of refuge.†

General disinclination of the nation to the navy.

Still, though the danger to England is doubtless great while such a force lies within a fortnight's sail of London, with hardly any fleet at the disposal of the British government to protect the English shores,‡ it is evident that it is not from the naval power of Russia that the liberties of Europe are permanently to be endangered. The spirit of the nation is essentially military: territorial conquest, not commercial extension or distant colonization, is her destined path; the despotic nature of the government, the closing of the Baltic by ice during half the year, and of the Euxine by the gates of the Dardanelles during the whole, are alike inconsistent with naval greatness. If England were animated with her ancient national spirit, and her government were of sufficient strength to direct a part of her vast maritime resources into the public service, she might behold with contempt the plaything of the Czar performing its mimic evolutions on the Baltic. In the words of Demosthenes to the Athenian people, to whose situation in regard to Philip, that of Britain to Russia in these times bears a striking, even a fearful resemblance: "It is your weakness which is his strength; and he owes his present increase of power infinitely more to your indolence than to his own exertions."§

Want of coal in the Empire, and its important effects.

There is one remarkable peculiarity of the Russian Empire, which, to the people of the British isles, is a subject of particular interest and importance. Rich as her territories are in agricultural productions, there is one mineral, without which she can never attain to manufacturing greatness, which is almost altogether wanting. Coal is scarcely to be found to the west of the Ural Mountains; at least, where it is discovered, it exists in such inconsiderable strata as to be not worth working. The lid of the box in which this valuable mineral is found in the British islands is there; the bottom of red sandstone is there also; but the intermediate seams of coal and ironstone are very rarely found.‖ The latter occurs, indeed, in some places, and at Toulon extensive iron-works exist for the internal supply of the Empire; but without coal she can never compete, in the supply of great manufactories, with those of countries where fuel is supplied from the spontaneous bounty of nature in the mineral regions of the earth. Thus, the destinies of England and Russia are as clearly traced out by the

* Personal observation. Scott's Napoleon, v., 363. Bremner, ii., 432, 440.

† Personal observation. Scott's Napoleon, v., 364. Sir R. Wilson's Camp. of 1807 27, 28. Brem., ii., 437, 446.

* "Lay yourself alongside a Frenchman, but outmanœuvre a Russian."—NELSON. † Brem., i., 375, 376.

‡ "It is a mistake to say that Great Britain is utterly unprotected. She has *three ships of the line and three guardships* afloat, to protect the shores of England."—*Speech of* SIR CHARLES ADAM, *Lord of the Admiralty, House of Commons, March* 8, 1839, *Parl. Debates.*

§ Demost., Phil. 2d. Bremner's Russia, i., 375, 376.

‖ This important fact I had from my highly-valued friend Mr. Murchison, president of the Geological Society of London, whose recent travels in Russia have elicited so much valuable information in regard to the mineral riches of that empire.

hand of nature, in the physical peculiarities of the two countries, as they are in the moral character and disposition of their respective inhabitants.

They are obviously intended for greatness in different lines; they are calculated to grow with each other's growth, and strengthen with their strength. The world is large enough for both; and each will discharge its duty, and perform its mission best, by avoiding interference with the path of the other. Destitute of coal, and scantily supplied with iron-stone—with its principal harbours blocked up half the year by ice, and the greater part of its population far removed from the ocean in the midst of vast agricultural or pastoral plains—the people of Russia are as manifestly disqualified from attaining commercial or manufacturing greatness, as they are calculated by their vast numbers, enduring valour, and submissive obedience to their chief, to attain the summit of military greatness. Abounding with coal, richly endowed with iron-stone—encircled by the storms of the German and the Atlantic Ocean, placed midway between European civilization and American increase—Great Britain is as clearly marked out by nature to be the workshop of the world, as she is evidently fitted, by the industrious habits, active character, and independent spirit of her inhabitants, to perform the great work of maritime colonization throughout the globe.

Venality of justice in the Russian dominions.

Justice is venal throughout the whole Muscovite, as all Oriental dominions. The judges are numerous, and abundant means of appeal, ostensibly calculated to check injustice, are provided; but the one thing needful is everywhere wanting—a conscientious spirit, strict discharge of duty on the bench, and public respect for their functions. This is the natural consequence of the military spirit of the people, and the almost exclusive direction of the national resources to warlike preparations. The salaries of the judges of all grades are so miserably small, that they are driven, almost by necessity, to eke them out by presents from the suiters; and so low is the judicial office held in common estimation, that this is considered at once natural and unavoidable in such functionaries. Nothing surprises the Russians so much as to find that it does not equally stain the English ermine. An equal and impartial administration of justice is the appropriate and peculiar blessing of a free government: it can neither exist in a despotic monarchy nor a Democratic Republic;* for, in the first case, there is nothing to counterbalance the frowns of the sovereign; in the second, to withstand the passions of the people.

Great ability of the Russians in diplomacy.

But, for the same reason, the Russian monarchy is, in the general case, greatly superior to the British in external negotiation; and the diplomacy of the cabinet of St. James or the Tuileries has seldom proved a match for that of St. Petersburg. This is the obvious result alike of the independence of the government of popular control, the strong ambitious spirit by which the nation is animated, and the concentration of nearly the whole of its civil talent in this one department. No seats in Parliament are there to be won, no votes in the peers secured by promoting titled frivolity or influential imbecility over the head of unconnected talent or diplomatic address. The cabinet feels that territorial aggrandizement is the principal bulwark of the throne, and that a reign which steps from acquisition to acquisition is never likely to feel the want of popularity; while the nobles, aware of the absolute necessity of abilities to secure these advantages, overlook the elevation of merit, even from the humblest ranks, to situations where they may thus advance the national fortunes. It is the constant practice of the imperial ministers to promote young men of distinguished talent from the military or ecclesiastical schools into the civil offices; and as almost the whole youth of the Empire who receive any education are to be found at one or other of these seminaries, and their number exceeds two hundred thousand, it is not surprising that a vast mass of talent is thus brought to bear upon the destinies of the state. The example of Maria Theresa, whose discerning eye discovered a future Thugut in the clever answers of a boy of fourteen in a public hospital at Vienna, has found many imitators in the Muscovite rulers; and in the search of talent they are limited to no localities, and willingly draw diplomatic ability from foreign states, or even the ranks of their enemies.

It is the comparatively unrestricted power of doing this which constitutes one great source of the strength of absolute monarchies: it is the necessity of sacrificing talent to influence, in ordinary times, in almost every department of the state, which is the chief cause of the acknowledged inferiority of the public servants, whether civil or military, in constitutional monarchies. But, for the same reason, the rulers of a free government, when public danger or the necessities of the times have compelled them to overlook the ordinary sources of influence, and seek for talent wherever it is to be found, have an incomparably wider field to search, and, in general, will in the end bring a greater and more wide-spread mass of talent to sustain the national fortunes. In the first case, the foresight and energy of government supply the want of vigour and animation in the inferior ranks of society; in the latter, the ability and information of the middle and lower classes compensate, in the end, the weakness and vacillation of government. In the first instance, the government forces greatness upon the people; in the latter, the people force greatness upon the government. Hence the despotic state will be generally successful, if a contest occurs, in the outset; but the Democratic community, if it withstands the shock, is more likely to prove victorious in the end; and hence a nation which, like the Roman in ancient, or the British in India in modern times, unites the foresight of patrician direction with the vigour of Democratic execution, can hardly fail to obtain the Empire of the world.

Universal corruption which prevails in the inferior authorities.

But, while the steady, persevering policy of the imperial cabinet, joined to the remarkable succession of able sovereigns, who, from the time of Peter the Great, have swayed the Russian sceptre, has, hitherto at

* Bremner, i., 272, 284. Malte Brun, vi., 378.

least, drawn forth talent in a surprising manner, both in the civil and military career, from the inferior ranks in the state; yet a latent, but almost incurable source of weakness is to be found in the all but universal corruption which pervades inferior functionaries in every part of the Empire. Doubtless there are some exceptions even in humble stations; and in the dignified situations of governors of provinces or fortresses, or high commands in the army, many of the most upright, patriotic, and honourable men in Europe are to be found. But these are the exceptions, not the rule. Generally speaking, corruption is universal in all but the higher officers of government, and even among them it is far from being unusual. The vast extent of the Empire; the helpless condition and ignorance of the great majority of its inhabitants; the habits of abject submission to authority which they have imbibed from their religion, or derived from their Eastern origin; the viceregal pomp in which the governors of the principal provinces live; the distance of their governments from the central power; and the boundless authority which they enjoy, all conspire to render abuses easy, detection difficult, and punishment dangerous. The salaries enjoyed by the persons in authority are in general small, and their expenses considerable: it is perfectly understood, what is almost universally practised, that they make up the difference in perquisites, presents, or fees, which soon degenerate into absolute corruption. The denunciation of crime is often followed by the discovery and punishment of the criminal, seldom by restitution or redress to the injured party; the official robber comes in place of the private depredator, and the last state of the injured party is often worse than the first.*†

Efficacy of the secret police, and of the emperor's vengeance.

In every country, however, except the most degraded, and those bordering on immediate ruin, there is, practically speaking, some check on the abuses of government. This check, which in Turkey was long found in the religious sway of the ulema, or the armed terrors of the janizaries, who, though no small abuse themselves, were the chief restraint on abuses in others, has hitherto in Russia been found in the unwearied activity, moral courage, and impartial severity of the emperors. A secret police is established through all parts of the Muscovite dominions: they are to Russia what the Lion's Mouth was to Venice, and, in a certain degree, supply the want of that perpetual check upon all but Democratic corruption, which the unfettered press of free countries occasions. The members of this police are known to every one, and are, in an especial manner, an object of apprehension to persons in authority. They collect information, receive secret complaints, accumulate evidence, and are in constant correspondence with the emperor, by whom the stroke of justice is to be dealt out. When a victim is selected, against whom the evidence is clear, and whose enormities loudly call for a public example, an order suddenly arrives for his seizure, degradation from office, and dismissal to Siberia; or, if he is of so high rank or station as to render such punishment difficult or dangerous to subordinate functionaries, the emperor himself sets out in his britchska, travels post, with almost railway speed, a distance of a thousand or two thousand miles; calls the delinquent out at the head of his troops; and not unfrequently the terrible example is exhibited of a governor, holding almost royal dignity and authority, being seized unexpectedly, when surrounded by his soldiers, his epaulettes torn from his shoulders, his head shaven, and himself sent off, in the dress of a convict, to the fortresses of Poland or the mines of Siberia. Alexander, notwithstanding his natural gentleness of disposition, and, still more, the present Emperor Nicholas, whose moral courage no dangers can daunt, have been particularly remarkable for the vigour, celerity, and impartiality with which they exercised this awful but necessary attribute of sovereignty.*

Evils and dangers of this system.

This system, however, though it may and does establish an important check, at least upon the higher class of functionaries, when carried into execution by the justice of an Alexander or the energy of a Nicholas, who do not hesitate to travel from one end of the Empire to the other to inflict punishment on a powerful delinquent, is attended with obvious hazard and liability to abuse. Personal, and, still more, moral courage, cannot always be reckoned on on the throne: the dissolute days of the Empress Elizabeth may return, and the functionaries of the Empire may be delivered over to impunity or connivance, to enable a voluptuous monarch to continue undisturbed the pleasures of the court or the seraglio at St. Petersburg. It is impossible to contemplate, without shuddering, the probable condition of the Empire if such a state of things should arise; if a modern Sejanus were to wield the powers of the secret police, only to denounce the virtuous or induce the confiscation of the wealthy; if the numerous spies throughout the Muscovite dominions were to be employed as the infamous informers whom the pen of Tacitus has consigned to the execration of ages, in ransacking the provinces for worth to oppress or iniquity to reward; and the obedient millions were, as then, to hail alike a Trajan or a Nero. Reflections of this kind arise unbidden in the mind upon the contemplation of the Russian Empire; they recall at every step the mournful recollection, that in its annals, if a Caligula may be succeeded by a Nerva, an Antoninus may give place to a Commodus; and they are fitted to inspire a deeper thankfulness for those institutions which, in the free states of Western Europe, amid all their concomitant evils, establish public prosperity on a broader basis, and strengthen the forces with which virtue combats the inroads of wickedness.

Extraordinary influence of religion in Russia.

In this eternal conflict between the principles of good and evil, there is one, and one only, sheet-anchor to which Russia has to trust, and it constitutes the grand distinction between

* Slade's Russia in 1838, p. 370, 371. Bremner, i., 344, 350.

† Informations as to crimes are often avoided, from their only superadding the vexation of a prosecution, to no purpose, to the loss already sustained. It is seldom that stolen property, though often recovered, reaches the private sufferer. The head of the police at Odessa, on a salary of £250 a year, makes £3000.—SLADE's *Germany and Russia in* 1838-9, 385-389. BREMNER, i., 346.

* Slade, 370, 373. Bremner, i., 350, 351.

European and ancient civilization.—Religion is all-powerful with the bulk of the nation; it forms the true national bond of the Empire; the foundation at once of the authority of the throne and the morality of the people. When Alexander, amid the terrors of the French invasion, issued proclamations, breathing devout confidence in Almighty protection, and invoking the prayers of the Church to the Throne of Grace to aid the warriors in the deliverance of their country, he appeared to the astonished French to have gone back to the days of the Crusades, and to utter an incomprehensible jargon of mysticism and superstition. He spoke the language, however, of all others the most calculated to rouse the national efforts; he touched a chord which vibrated alike in the hearts of the rich and the poor; he inspired that lofty spirit, that sublime patriotism, which, looking for its reward in another world, is superior to all the dangers and temptations of the present. Nor was his policy mistaken, even with reference to worldly success. The lever was well worth the wielding which broke the power of Napoleon; the enthusiasm not to be despised which fired the torches of Moscow.

State of the Church and the clergy.

The Greek, as is well known, is the established Church of Russia, and to which nineteen twentieths of the people adhere. Its doctrines coincide in the main with those of the Romish persuasion, and the mass constitutes the chief part of their public worship; but it differs from the Church of Rome in two essential particulars—the marriage of the parish priests and the spiritual authority of the pope. The first is enjoined, instead of being prohibited; the second denied, instead of being obeyed. The worship of figures, statues, or graven images of any kind, is unknown; but ample amends is made in the innumerable crosses which are, on almost every occasion, made on the breast, and the devout adoration bestowed on painted or other *flat* representations of our Saviour or their favourite saints. Among the dignified clergy are many men of profound learning and enlightened piety; but the great mass of the parochial priests are little, if at all, elevated above the peasants by whom they are surrounded, whose labours they share, and to whose manners they are generally assimilated. Drinking and other gross vices are very frequent among them, and not a few are to be found among the convicts of Siberia, suffering the just punishment of their crimes. Still, the elements of incalculable usefulness are to be found among the Russian clergy. They are all supported by land of their own, which renders them independent, at least so far as subsistence is concerned. The profession of the clergy is in a manner hereditary, the sons of serfs not being permitted by their landlords to enter a profession which would deprive them of their services as labourers; and they are looked up to with unbounded veneration by their flocks. The most pernicious doctrines of the Romish Church, purgatory, dispensations, indulgences, as well as predestination, election, and other doubtful Calvinistic tenets, are unknown. In the gradual elevation and cultivation of this established body of spiritual labourers the true secret of Russian amelioration is to be found. All the efforts of its government should be directed to this object. Doubtless, in the present age, much that may be turned by unbelief into ridicule is to be found in their customs; but the experienced observer, versed in the ways of human wickedness, surrounded by the profligacy of civilized heathenism, and acquainted with the necessity of impressing the mass of men by considerations or acts which strike the senses, will not slight even the countless crossings on the breast and bowing to the ground of the Russian peasantry. He will acknowledge, in these rites, the invaluable marks of spiritual sway which are thus testified by an illiterate people; he will hope that an antidote to the temptations of the senses may thus be provided, and expect more from a people thus impressed than from the orgies of infidelity or the altars of the Goddess of Reason.*

Peculiar political system of the Russian cabinet.

The policy of the Russian cabinet, from the earliest time that the Muscovite power has stood forth an object of alarm to the surrounding nations, has been governed by one ruling principle, which differs widely from that of any people who have hitherto made a great impression on human affairs. It is neither founded on the haughty maxim of the Romans, to spare the submissive and subdue the proud, nor the more politic system of the English, whether in Europe or Asia, to support the weak against the strong. It rests on a combination of physical strength with diplomatic address, of perseverance in object with versatility in means, which was never before exhibited on the theatre of the world. Its leading characteristic has been explained, perhaps, with more candour than prudence, by the eloquent Russian historian, Karamsin: "The object and the character of our military policy has invariably been to seek to be at peace with everybody, and to *make conquests without war*; always keeping ourselves on the defensive, placing no faith in the friendship of those whose interests do not accord with our own, and to lose no opportunity of injuring them without ostensibly breaking our treaties with them."† The slightest survey of Russian history must be sufficient to show that this character is well founded; and that, formidable as the military power of the state is, it has prevailed, in every age, rather from pacific encroachments than warlike subjugation.

Its immense physical advantages for such a system.

It has been observed that Russia can hardly fail, in the end, to obtain the victory over all her enemies, for she has two powerful allies always on her side—*time* and *space*. Relying with well-founded confidence on the inaccessible nature of the Muscovite territory; secured from attack on the north and east by the ices of the Pole and the deserts of Tartary; open to attack from the European powers only on the frontier of Poland, and capable there of wearing out even the greatest armies of the Western World, by simply retreating until the invader is enveloped in clouds of Asiatic horse, or finds his winding-sheet in the snows of an arctic winter, the cabinet of St. Petersburg has the means, without material danger to itself, of

* Bremner, ii., 118, 129.

† See Bjornsjerna on the Brit. Emp. in the East, 244.

profiting by the weakness and dissensions of its enemies, and, by never provoking war till a favourable opportunity occurs of prosecuting it to advantage, of marching, without ever receding, from one acquisition to another. The Russians never originate a contest, but are always ready to carry it on. Passion never makes them anticipate the period of action; success never relaxes the sinews of preparation. So formidable is their weight, when fairly roused to exertion, that the powers with whom they are engaged in war, despairing of making any durable impression on such a colossus, are generally glad, even after victory, to purchase a respite from hostility by a cession of territory; and, surprising to say, Russia has reaped greater advantages from her defeats than other nations from their victories. Even the defeat of Friedland was immediately followed by an important acquisition of territory, and the conferences of Tilsit brought her frontiers to the mouth of the Danube and the head of the Gulf of Bothnia. He must be little read in European annals, who is not aware how steadily this system has been pursued by the Russian cabinet, and how signal has been the success with which it has been attended. Never, since the god Terminus first receded with the Roman eagles in the provinces beyond the Euphrates, has so steady and uninterrupted an advance been made by any empire towards universal dominion; and it is hard to say whether it has prevailed most by the ability of diplomatic address or the vigour of warlike achievement.

Successive conquests of the Russians in their early history.

When Peter the Great mounted the throne of Russia in 1689, she had no seaport but the half-frozen one of Archangel; and his first naval effort was the construction of two small vessels, which were floated down the Don to the Sea of Azoff. Secluded in boundless solitudes, the Muscovite territory was hardly known to the European nations, and the Muscovite power estimated as nothing by the European cabinets. His successes over the Swedes gave him the first harbour which Russia possessed on the Baltic, but Smolensko was still the frontier town towards Poland; and Moscow, dimly descried through the haze of distance, was imperfectly known by having been twice taken and once burned by the victorious squadrons of the Lithuanians. The battle of Pultowa and treaty of Neustadt first gave the Russians the province of Livonia, and the site where Cronstadt and St. Petersburg now stand; the disasters of the Pruth did not permanently check the progress of the Empire; the partition of 1772 brought its frontier on the side of Poland to the Dwina and the Dnieper; by the treaty of Kainardgi, the Muscovite standards were brought down to the Crimea and the Sea of Azoff; vast acquisitions from Tartary, larger than the whole German Empire, next spread their dominion over the boundless tracts of Central Asia; the ukase of 1783 extended their sway over the Crimea, and the vast plains which stretch between the Euxine and the Caspian, as far as the foot of the Caucasus; the treaty of Jassy advanced their frontier to the Dniester, and brought the now flourishing harbour of Odessa beneath their rule; the infamous spoliation of 1793 gave them the command of Lithuania; the conquests of Suwarrow, in 1794, extended their frontier to the Vistula, and the provinces embracing nearly half of the old kingdom of Poland; even the disasters of Friedland, and the treaty of Tilsit, rounded their eastern frontier, by no inconsiderable province, at the expense of their ally Prussia.*

Aug. 30, 1721. 1773. 1774. 1781. 1781 to 1783. 1792. 1793. 1794.

Great and alarming as these encroachments were, they yet yield in magnitude and importance to the prodigious extension which subsequent events have given to the Russian Empire. By the conferences at Tilsit she acquired the liberty of pursuing, without molestation, her conquests over the Swedes and Turks; and the treaties of Stockholm in 1809, and Bucharest in 1812, gave her, in consequence, the whole of Findland, as far as the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, and extended her southern frontier to the Pruth, so as to confer the inestimable advantage of including the mouths of the Danube in her dominions. The astonishing victories of 1813 and 1814, and her formidable attitude at the close of the war, secured for her, at the Congress of Vienna, not only a recognition of these important conquests, but the still more valuable acquisition of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, which brought her frontier to within a hundred and eighty miles of both Berlin and Vienna, without the intervention of any defensible frontier to either: various conquests over the Circassians and Persians carried the Muscovite eagles, between 1800 and 1814, across the Caucasus, and added the beautiful province of Georgia to their dominions, while that of Turkaman Chai, in 1828, brought the bastions of Erivan and the peak of Ararat within their grasp, and rendered the waters of the Araxes the southern frontier of their Asiatic territories. If the war so imprudently provoked by the Turks, in 1828, has not ostensibly added to the dominions of Russia, it has done more: it has given security to, and rendered unassailable, those which she already enjoyed. Wallachia and Moldavia are now her tributary subjects; the Danube is, in reality, her southern European boundary; her eastern provinces almost encircle the Black Sea; while, by the infatuation of England in refusing the Turks aid against Mohammed Ali, a few years after, she has acquired the exclusive command of the Dardanelles: the Euxine can be navigated only by her vessels of war; and her navy in the South has acquired the immense advantage of possessing a vast inland lake, where navigation is difficult, and seamanship may be acquired, while access to enemies is excluded, and foreign attack may be defied.†

Their progress in later times.

Sept. 17, 1809. June 1, 1812. 1815. Ukases. 1800, 1803, 1805, 1806, 1814, 1828. 1829. 1834.

It is impossible to deny, and fruitless to attempt to disguise, that an empire of such extent and resources is in the highest degree formidable to the liberties of Europe, and from its rapid increase of numbers is daily becoming

Napoleon's account of the power of Russia.

* Martens, Sup., v., *voce* Russia.

† Progress of Russia in the East, i., 164. Lond., 1838.

more so. What Macedonia was to Greece, that Russia is to Europe: happy if it could be said that the resemblance stopped there, and that the inconstancy, *imprévoyance*, and impatience of taxation in the Athenian people, bore no resemblance to the similar characteristics by which the Democracy in the British islands is now distinguished. Napoleon has left a graphic and warning picture of the capability of Russia to repel alike foreign invasion and conduct external aggression, if led by an able and enterprising chief. "Backed," said he, "by the eternal ices of the pole, which must forever render it unassailable in rear or flank, it can only be attacked even on its vulnerable front during three or four months in the year, while it has the whole twelve to render available against us. It offers to an invader nothing but the rigours, sufferings, and privations of a desert soil, of a nature half dead and frozen, while its inhabitants will ever precipitate themselves with transport towards the delicious climates of the South. To these physical advantages we must join an immense population, brave, hardy, devoted, passive; and vast nomade tribes, to whom destitution is habitual and wandering is nature. One cannot avoid shuddering at the thought of such a mass, unassailable alike on the flanks and rear, which can at any time with impunity inundate you, while, if defeated, it has only to retire into the midst of its snows and ices, where pursuit is impossible and reparation of loss easy. It is the Antæus of the fable, which cannot be overcome but by seizing it by the middle and stifling it in the arms; but where is the Hercules to be found who will attempt such an enterprise? We could alone attempt it, and the world knows what success we have had. Show me an Emperor of Russia, brave, able, and impetuous—in a word, a Czar who is worthy of his situation, and Europe is at his feet. He may begin his operations at the distance only of one hundred leagues from the two capitals of Vienna and Berlin, the sovereigns of which are the only obstacles he has to apprehend. He gains the one by seduction, subdues the other by force, and he is soon in the midst of the lesser princes of Germany, most of whom are his relations or dependants. A few words on liberation and independence will set Italy on fire. Assuredly, in such a situation, I should arrive at Calais by fixed stages, and be the arbiter of Europe."*

Description of St. Petersburg.

St. Petersburg, the capital of this boundless dominion, is not less surprising as a work of art than the empire of which it is the head is as the growth of nature. Little more than a century ago the site of this noble metropolis was a salt-marsh, lying between the Lake Ladoga and the Baltic Sea, in which the natural sterility of the north was enhanced by unhealthy swamps and a wretched soil. It is now one of the most splendid capitals in the world, containing three hundred thousand inhabitants, and excelling any metropolis in Europe in the grandeur of its design and durability of the materials of which its public edifices are composed. The discerning eye of Peter the Great first appreciated the commercial advantages of its situation; and, at an enormous expense of life and treasure, his despotic power overcame the formidable obstacles of nature, and amid the marshes of Livonia erected a noble gateway to European civilization. Vessels of heavy burden, indeed, cannot come up to St. Petersburg, but its outwork of Cronstadt possesses a spacious harbour, where fifty sail of the line can lie in safety, defended by stupendous and impregnable bulwarks from external assault; while the vast power of the Czars, guided by European skill, but inspired by Oriental imagination, has constructed the metropolis of their empire on a scale of solidity and magnificence to which no parallel is to be found in modern times.*

Its public edifices.

More than any other capital in Europe, its public edifices are built in a style which seems to aim at eternal duration: the Russian emperors have ransacked all the parts of their immense dominions to obtain the most costly materials for its construction. The granite which is scattered in huge masses through the marshes of Livonia, the marble which lies buried in the mountains of Taurida, compose the columns which decorate the exterior of these edifices; while the malachite of Siberia, the lapis lazuli of the Lake Baikal, and the porphyry of the Ural Mountains, confer a matchless lustre on their interior apartments. The level surface on which it stands must ever prevent St. Petersburg from vying with Rome, Moscow, Naples, Edinburgh, or Constantinople, in the beauty of its situation, or the imposing character of its distant aspect; and the construction of the greater part of the private buildings of brick is a bar to the metropolis acquiring that historic interest which arises from the sight of the dwellings of many successive generations, standing side by side, like the shadows of the dead, to impress the living; but the sublime public edifices, which the magnificence of successive sovereigns has erected in different reigns, will remain eternal monuments of the vast power and great achievements of the Czars. The quays of granite will forever attest the prophetic conceptions and far-seeing sagacity of Peter the Great;† the imperial palace, the façade of the Admiralty, the colonnade of the Church of Cazan,‡ are durable monuments of the lofty spirit and grand ideas of Catharine; while the Church of Isaac, destined to rival, if it cannot equal, St. Peter's itself in magnitude and splendour,◊ and the noble pillar, which exceeds the columns of Trajan and Antoninus in elevation, and will equal the obelisks of Egypt in durability, seem destined to convey to the latest generations‖ a faithful image of

* Nap. in Las Casas, iv., 81, 82.

* Lond., i., 182. Malte Brun, vi., 510.

† These quays, built of vast masses of solid granite, are, beyond all doubt, the finest in Europe. All the principal buildings in the metropolis are assembled on their sides—the winter palace, the admiralty, the English quay.—Bremner, i., 82, 83.

‡ The dome of this noble church resembles that of St. Peter's at Rome, and it has a splendid converging colonnade in front, like its great prototype, of one hundred and thirty-two pillars. The interior rests on fifty-four beautiful pillars of gray granite, each of a single stone.—Bremn, i, 98.

◊ The columns which support this gigantic cathedral are to be fifty-eight feet long, each of a single stone of polished granite. There are also to be forty-eight stairs of the same polished material. These columns are exactly the size of the celebrated ones, so well known to travellers, in the interior of the baths of Dioclesian at Rome.—See Londonderry, i., 92.

‖ This column is one hundred and fifty-four feet high,

the warlike achievements and religious character which have secured immortal celebrity for the name of Alexander.*

Importance of this sketch of Russia.

The preceding sketch of the Empire which has arisen to such an extraordinary eminence in recent times, will not be deemed misplaced by the reflecting reader, even in a work of general history; and it becomes the more appropriate, as it will be followed, in a future chapter, by a similar description of the progress and institutions of the Anglo-Saxon race in America: exhibiting thus, in the close of the wars of the French Revolution, portraits of the two mighty families of mankind who have risen to exalted destinies during the strife, and which, for good or for evil, have now, in an indelible manner, affixed their impress upon the history of the species.

Arrival of Napoleon at the Tuileries.

Almost outstripping even his couriers in speed, the Emperor Napoleon traversed Poland and Germany in fourteen days, and regained the capital of France before the imperial government was even aware that he had quitted the army. On the 5th of December, in company with Caulaincourt, he quitted Smorgoni in Lithuania;† on Dec. 10. the 10th, as already mentioned, he passed through Warsaw, and had his celebrated conversation with the Abbé de Pradt;‡ Dec. 14. on the 14th he was at Dresden, and wrote to the Emperor of Austria "that, in spite of his great fatigues, his health was never better," and urging him to augment his auxiliary force to sixty thousand men; and on Dec. 18. the 18th of December, at eleven at night, he arrived at the Tuileries. He had written frequently to the empress, but without ever announcing his return, and he was totally unexpected, insomuch that, in his humble equipage, he had some difficulty in getting the gates opened. Melancholy and dejected, the empress had just retired to rest, and her attendants were about to do the same, when the voices of men were heard in the antechamber, and immediately after two figures, wrapped in travelling-cloaks, entered. The maid of honour in attendance instantly rushed forward to secure the door which led to the empress's apartment, when Caulaincourt drew aside the cloak of the foremost of the strangers, and the emperor was recognised. A cry of astonishment from the lady made the empress aware that something extraordinary was passing in the antechamber, and she had just leaped out of bed when the emperor caught her in his arms. Their interview was tender and affectionate; and although Duroc and Count Lobau, who had left Smorgoni a few hours later than the emperor, did not arrive with his papers for two days after, yet, early next morning, he commenced his labours in the cabinet, and a new impulse was communicated to every branch of the administration.*

Universal consternation at Paris on the news of the retreat, and the emperor's arrival being received.

At nine o'clock a levée was held, and, as the news of the emperor's unexpected arrival had spread like wildfire through the metropolis, it was very numerously attended. The 29th bulletin, containing the account of the disasters of the retreat, had not yet arrived, though it had left the army before the emperor, and no other feeling than that of surprise at his sudden return was felt by the persons present. In the course of the forenoon, however, it came, and was immediately published. No words can paint the feelings of stupor, consternation, and astonishment which pervaded the metropolis when the disastrous news was promulgated. The calamity, great as it was, and truly as it had been revealed in that celebrated paper, was exaggerated by the public terror: it was thought that the old system of concealment had been pursued on this as on all previous occasions; that the army had been totally destroyed; and that the sudden return of the emperor was owing to his being, literally speaking, the sole surviver of his followers. Gloom and disquietude, accordingly, pervaded every countenance at the levée on the morning of the succeeding day, which was attended by all the principal officers of state; and the utmost anxiety was universally felt to hear what details the emperor himself might furnish as to the extent of the calamity. Napoleon appeared, however, calm and collected; and, so far from seeking to evade the questions which all were so anxious to put, he anticipated the wishes of those present, and himself began the conversation on the disasters of the retreat. "Moscow," said he, "had fallen into our power; we had surmounted every obstacle; the conflagration, even, had in no degree lessened the prosperous state of our affairs; but the rigour of winter induced upon the army the most frightful calamities: in a few nights all was changed; cruel losses were experienced; they would have broken my heart if, in such circumstances, I had been accessible to any other sentiments but the welfare of my people."†

Restoration of public confidence throughout the Empire.

The undisguised admissions and intrepid countenance of the emperor had a surprising effect in restoring public confidence and dissipating the impression produced by the greatest external disasters recorded in history. The old confidence in his fortune returned; his star appeared to emerge from the clouds by which it had been obscured, and again to shine forth the lord of the ascendant. His words, eagerly gathered and repeated, were soon circulated in the public journals through the Empire; addresses, containing assurances of undiminished loyalty and unshaken confidence, were speedily presented by all the public bodies in Paris, and followed by similar ones from the chief towns of France; and soon the whole cities of the Empire approached the

including the figure at the top, and its diameter is fifteen feet. It is composed of mottled red granite, like that at Peterhead in Scotland, but susceptible of a higher polish. The column in the Place Vendôme is one hundred and forty feet, that in St. Andrew Square, Edinburgh, with the figure, one hundred and fifty-two feet. The column of Alexander stands on massy blocks of granite, and is distinguished by its severe and awful simplicity. The shaft of the stone is eighty-four feet high, and on its top stands a statue, not of Alexander, *but of Religion*, blessing the surrounding city. It has a pedestal and capital of bronze, made from cannon taken in the war of 1828 and 1829 from the Turks. —BREMNER, i., 88.

* Bremner's Russia, i., 82, 84. Lond., i., 92, 93. Malte Brun, vi., 504, 507. † *Ante*, iii., 000. ‡ *Ante*, iii., 000.

* Mad. Durand, 173. Fain, MS. de 1813, i., 1, 9. Napoleon to Francis, Dec. 14, 1813.

† Moniteur, Dec. 20, 1812. Fain, i., 8, 10

throne with eloquent protestations of eternal loyalty and unchangeable devotion. The cities of Rome, Milan, Florence, Hamburg, Amsterdam, and Turin, particularly distinguished themselves by the fervour of their enthusiasm on this occasion.* Their addresses would be worthy of the highest admiration, as indicating a dignified constancy in misfortune, if the praises of servitude were not always suspicious; and if the subsequent conduct of the same functionaries, when the winds of adversity reached them, had not demonstrated that their present overflowing loyalty was rather the result of anticipation of future and prosperous than of superiority to past and adverse fortune.†

But, though not insensible to these striking marks of devotion, and fully alive to the necessities of his situation, it was neither by the one nor the other that the attention of the emperor was now riveted. It was treason at Paris which occupied his thoughts: it was on THE CONSPIRACY OF MALET that his eyes were fixed.

Conspiracy of Malet.

This extraordinary event, of which the emperor received intelligence shortly before he left the army in Russia, might well arrest his attention; for it placed beyond a doubt the sandy foundation on which, amid so many protestations of fidelity and devotion, his authority, and the prospects of succession in his family, were rested. An obscure but most able man, of the name of Malet, whose restless and enterprising character had caused him to be detained four years in custody at Paris, had conceived, in the solitude of his cell, the project of overturning the imperial dynasty; and, what is still more extraordinary, he all but carried it into execution.‡ He had, with two accomplices—Lafon, an old abbé, a prisoner with himself, and Rateau, a young corporal on guard in the place of detention—for long been preparing the means of effecting his object; and the whole rested on a fabricated story of the death of the emperor. To support this assertion, he had forged a decree of the Senate, by which the imperial government was abolished, General Malet created governor of Paris, and a provisional government established; and various orders on the treasury were also prepared, calculated to dispel the doubts or shake the fidelity of the chief persons to whom the train was to be first applied. Having taken these precautions, Malet with ease eluded the loose surveillance under which he was detained, and, dressed in his uniform of general of brigade, presented himself at the gate of the barracks of the 2d regiment and 10th cohort, and being refused admittance till the colonel, Soulier, gave orders, he repaired to the house of the latter, which was not far distant, and announced to him that the emperor had been killed on the 7th of October, before Moscow; that the Senate had taken its measures, and that he himself had been appointed governor of Paris. The forged decree of the Senate was well calculated to deceive even the most experienced, from the precision with which it was drawn, and the apparent authenticity of the signatures appended to it; but Malet had not trusted merely to these supports, for it also contained an appointment of Soulier as general of brigade, and a treasury order for 100,000 francs (£4000) for his use. Deceived or won, that officer gave into the snare, and accompanied Malet into the barrack-yard.*

Oct. 22.

The chief difficulty in the enterprise was here to be surmounted, and in the way in which he overcame it Malet gave proofs of a vigorous character. He instantly assumed a decided tone: ordered the gates to be opened; mustered the soldiers by torch-light; announced the emperor's death; and commanded the drums to beat, that the cohort should assemble to hear the decree read which announced the emperor's death and the abolition of the imperial government. Yielding to the habit of obedience, suspecting no deceit, and habituated to similar changes during the Revolution, the soldiers obeyed without a murmur; the acquiescence of the chief of the battalion was already secured by the order on the treasury for 100,000 francs, delivered at the time, with the promise of future gratifications; the common men were paralyzed by the fatal intelligence of the emperor's death, and knew not how to resist orders apparently emanating from such elevated functionaries. Malet instantly ordered a strong body to march with him to the prison of La Force, which they forthwith did; and he there liberated Generals Lahorie and Guidal, who were sturdy Republicans, of a bold character, and who had long been confined by order of Napoleon. They immediately set out with him, and took the command of the troops; and before daylight three columns had marched in different directions, under the command of Malet, Lahorie, and Guidal, to gain possession of the principal posts in the city.†

Progress and great success of the conspiracy.

They were all successful beyond what their most sanguine hopes could have anticipated. Lahorie made straight for the hotel of Savary, the minister of police, forced his way into the house, surprised the great functionary in bed, made him prisoner, and, after some altercation, carried

Extraordinary success of the conspiracy.

* "Our kingdom, sire! is your handiwork: it owes to you its laws, its monuments, its roads, its prosperity, its agriculture, the honour of its arts, and the internal peace which it enjoys. The people of Italy declare, in the face of the universe, that there is no sacrifice which they are not prepared to make to enable your majesty to complete the great work intrusted to you by Providence. In extraordinary circumstances extraordinary sacrifices are required, and our efforts shall be unbounded. You require arms, armies, gold, fidelity, constancy. All we possess, sire! we lay at your majesty's feet. This is not the suggestion of authority, it is conviction, gratitude; the universal cry produced by the passion for our political existence."—*Address from Milan, 27th Dec.*, 1812, FAIN, i., 12.

† Fain, i., 11, 12. Moniteur, Dec. 25, 1812, to Jan. 20, 1813.

‡ Malet was born on the 28th of June, 1754, at Dole, and passed his early life in the army, where he commanded one of the first battalions of the Jura at the commencement of the Revolution. He was afterward implicated in some illegal exactions at Civita Vecchia, in the Roman States, and was, in consequence, deprived of his command, and sent before a commission of inquiry at Paris, in July, 1807; and, in virtue of their sentence, he was confined in a house of detention till the affair blew over. In 1808, when he was still a prisoner, and the emperor was in Spain, he conceived the first idea of his extraordinary project; but the sudden return of Napoleon to Paris disconcerted the design at that time, and it continued fermenting in his mind till the emperor's longer absence in Russia gave an opportunity of renewing the design under more favourable circumstances, and when the conspirator had regained so much liberty as to be able to elude his guards.—FAIN, i., 14, 15.

Aug. 24, 1807.

* Soulier's Declaration, Fain, i., 145, 147. Thib., ix., 156. Savary, vi., 18, 19.

† Thib., ix., 157, 158. Savary, vi., 19, 21. Fain, i., 144, 147.

him off to the prison of La Force, where he was received and lodged in safety. Guidal, in like manner, made prisoner Pasquier, the prefect of police, and lodged him in the same place of security. Soulier, the colonel of the 10th cohort, who had been gained by the bribe above mentioned, made himself master of the Hôtel de Ville, and stationed a strong force in the small square in front of that building; while another detachment, under Malet in person, took possession of the Place Vendôme. Frochot, the prefect of the department of the Seine, was riding into town from his country house at a quarter past eight in the morning, when he was met by one of his servants on horseback, in great agitation, with a note from the Hôtel de Ville, on the outside of which were written the ominous words "*Fuit Imperator.*" On arriving at the Hôtel de Ville, he found the front occupied by the National Guards, and received a despatch from Malet, styling himself governor of Paris, ordering him to prepare the principal apartment in the building for the use of the "provisional government." Frochot was a man of probity and honour; but, like many others of a similar character, he wanted the resolution necessary to carry him through such a crisis. Instead of simply discharging his duty, by declaring his adhesion to the young Napoleon, and endeavouring to induce the soldiers to abandon the blind enterprise in which they were engaged, he at once acquiesced, and even went so far as to desire the officers at the Hôtel de Ville to arrange the tables and apartment for the provisional government.*

Success of Malet, who seizes the Governor of Paris.

While the inferior leaders of the conspiracy were achieving this astonishing success, its chief was not less fortunate in obtaining, almost without resistance, the command of the principal military authorities in the city. He despatched forged orders, addressed to the commanders of two regiments of the paid guard of Paris, similar to those which had corrupted or deceived Soulier, and met from both with implicit obedience. By means of the one he gained possession of the whole barriers of Paris, which were closed, with positive orders to let no one go out or in; so that no messengers could be sent to the country for assistance. With the other he occupied the bank, in which, at that period, there was a large treasure in specie, the treasury, and the principal public offices. The chief himself, meanwhile, moved along the Rue St. Honoré, with a detachment of only fifty men, twenty-five of whom he directed to station themselves in front of the office of the Etats-Major of Paris. The possession of this post was of the highest importance, as it was the headquarters of military authority in Paris. To effect this object, he sent a package to the Adjutant-general Doucet, of a similar tenour with those given to Soulier and the other colonels, and containing his nomination as general of brigade, and a treasury order for 100,000 francs. Doucet lost his presence of mind; and, seeing the troops before the hotel, obeyed his orders so far as to send for Laborde, whom he had been ordered to put under arrest. Meanwhile, Malet himself went to the hotel of General Hulin, the governor of Paris, with the other twenty-five men. He entered his hotel, accompanied by a captain of the regiment which followed him; and having asked to see Hulin in private, shot him with a pistol in the face when desired to show his orders, and left him severely, but not mortally wounded, weltering in his blood. After this extraordinary scene, Malet repaired to the Adjutant-general Doucet's office, still accompanied and obeyed by the officer and detachment, who were so fascinated by his audacity, that they saw nothing extraordinary or reprehensible in the apparent murder of their general before their eyes. Nothing was wanting but the command of the adjutant-general's office to give him the entire direction of the military force of Paris, of the telegraph, and with it of all France, which, it was well known, would never shake off its submission to the central authority of Paris, by whomsoever wielded; and it was accident alone which prevented this consummation, after every real obstacle had been overcome.*

His subsequent seizure and overthrow.

It so happened that, when Malet, with his detachment, came to the hotel of the adjutant-general, Laborde was coming down the stair to go home and yield to the arrest, and Pasques, the inspector-general of the minister of police, entirely ignorant of what had occurred, was at the door, to make some inquiries about an Englishman whom he had arrested at Passy by orders of Savary. Malet's detachment stopped him agreeably to their orders; but Laborde called to them to let him in; and the men, accustomed to obey his voice, allowed him to enter. This functionary, who had had the charge of Malet in his place of detention, and had seen him there only the day before, no sooner saw him in the room conversing with Doucet, than he exclaimed, "This is my prisoner; how the devil has he made his escape? M. Malet, you had no permission to leave your house without my leave." And, immediately turning to Doucet, he said, "There is something here I don't understand; arrest him, and I will go and inform the minister of police." Malet immediately put his hand on the pistol which he had in his pocket; the gesture was observed in a glass opposite; and before he could draw it, Laborde and Doucet sprang upon him, threw him back on the floor, and disarmed him. The arrest of its chief disconcerted the whole conspiracy: Laborde went out to the soldiers, informed them of the deceit which had been practised on them, and told them the emperor was not dead. They immediately shouted "Vive l'Empereur!" and, ashamed of the extraordinary plot into which they had been drawn, returned with perfect docility to their barracks. By nine o'clock the minister of police was delivered from his prison; all was over; and with so little bloodshed, that it might have passed for a melodrame, had it not been followed by a real tragedy, in the death of Malet, Guidal, Lahorie, and eleven others, who were shot next day on the plain of Grenelle, by orders of the government: an unnecessary piece of cruelty when applied to such a number, which Napoleon, had he been present, would certainly not have permitted. Malet behaved with great

* Sav., vi., 27, 29. Fain, i., 17, and Declaration of Count Frochot, i., 157. Thib., ix., 159.

* Sav., vi., 24, 25. Thib., vi., 158. Fain, i., 17, 18.

fortitude in his last moments, and had the generosity to exculpate his companions in misfortune, by declaring that he alone imagined the conspiracy, and that he had no associates. When brought before the judge examinators, his intrepidity was such as to excite even awe among those whom professional indifference had rendered callous to such scenes. "Who are your accomplices?" said Dejean, the president. "All France," replied he, "if I had succeeded, and you yourself at their head. When you attack openly a government by force, the palm is your own if you succeed; if not—death." The president turned pale, and asked no more questions. On his way to the plain of Grenelle, with an intrepid step, haranguing the soldiers in the masculine language of the Revolution, he said, "I fall, but I am not the last of the Romans." Most of the others lamented loudly their fate, at being sentenced, along with a person whose very name they knew not two days before, and for accession to a treasonable plot, of the objects of which they were entirely ignorant.*

Effect which this conspiracy produced in Paris and on Napoleon.

When the news of this extraordinary conspiracy spread in Paris, it excited a prodigious sensation, but rather tending to ridicule than fear, as, before it was generally known, the danger was over. The ladies, in particular, were highly diverted at the ease with which their old tormentor, the minister of police, had been shut up in prison; and the saying made the tour of all the saloons in Paris, that "the Duke of Rovigo had better keep his eye on the barracks, instead of prying into our boudoirs." But those better acquainted with the real hazard which had been incurred, made no secret of the narrow escape which the imperial authority had made. "But for the singular accident," says Savary, "which caused the arrest of the minister of war to fail, Malet, in a few moments, would have been master of almost everything; and in a country so much influenced by the contagion of example, there is no saying where his success would have stopped. He would have had possession of the treasury, then extremely rich; the post-office, the telegraph, and the command of the hundred cohorts of the National Guards of France. He would soon have learned, by the amount of estafettes, the alarming situation of affairs in Russia; and nothing could have prevented him from making prisoner of the emperor himself if he had returned alone, or from marching to meet him if he had come at the head of his troops."† Nor is there any solid foundation for the obvious remark, that the success of such a conspiracy, founded on falsehood, could have been only of an ephemeral duration; for we have the authority of Thibaudeau for the assertion, that, to his personal knowledge, the conspiracy had ramifications in the provinces. It was set on foot by Barras and the old Jacobin party; and it is impossible to say what would have been the effect of a sudden overthrow of the government, occurring at the very time of the promulgation of the news of the Moscow disasters.‡

Napoleon's opinion on the subject in the Council of State.

But, if the narrow escape which the imperial government had undergone excited anxious disquietude in the breasts of all classes,* tenfold deeper was the impression which it made on the far-seeing mind of Napoleon. One only idea took possession of his imagination: that in this crisis the succession of the King of Rome was, by the common consent, set aside. One only truth was ever present to his mind: that the imperial crown rested on himself alone. The fatal truth, well known to the world in historic lore, but hitherto concealed even from his piercing eyes by the effulgence of his glory, had now been demonstrated: that the Revolution had destroyed the foundations of hereditary succession; and that even the greatest achievements by him who had won the diadem, afforded no security that it would descend to his progeny. These reflections, which seem to have burst upon Napoleon all at once, when the news of this extraordinary affair first reached him in Russia, weighed him down more than all the disasters of the Moscow retreat. They constituted the secret reason for his leaving the army; they incessantly occupied his mind during his long and solitary journey; and they found vent in impassioned and mournful expressions, when, a few days after his arrival, he convened the Council of State on the subject. "Gentlemen," said he, "we must no longer disbelieve in miracles; attend to the report of M. Real on Malet's conspiracy." The report being read, he resumed: "This is the consequence of the want of habit and proper ideas in France on the subject of succession. Sad effects of our revolutions! At the first word of my death, at the first command of an unknown individual, officers lead their regiments to force the jails, and make prisoners of the highest authorities. A jailer quietly encloses the ministers of state within his doors. A prefect of the capital, at the command of a few soldiers, lends himself to the preparation of his great hall for the assembly of I know not what factious wretches! And all this while the empress is on the spot; while the King of Rome is alive; while my ministers and all the great officers of state are at hand. *Is a man, then, everything here? Are institutions nothing; oaths nothing?* It is to idæology that we are to attribute all these misfortunes: it is the error of its professors which necessarily induced, and, in fact, brought on, the reign of blood. Who proclaimed the principle of insurrection as a duty? Who cast adulation before the people, in elevating them to a sovereignty which they were incapable of exercising? When one is called to regenerate a state, it is principles diametrically the reverse which require to be followed. History paints the human heart: it is in history we must seek for the mirror of the advantages or evils of different species of legislation. Frochot is an honourable man: he is

* Sav., vi., 24, 25. Thib., ix., 160, 162. Fain, i., 17, 18. Capefigue, ix., 397, 398.

† Sav., vi., 27, 31. ‡ Thib., ix., 163, 164.

* Above all, they were struck with the facility with which the conspirators had persuaded the troops of the death of the emperor, without its ever having entered into the head of one of their officers to assure themselves whether it was true, or to bestow a thought on his son. These very soldiers suffered themselves to be led against the persons in possession of power, and without a murmur saw the Governor of Paris, their general, struck down before their eyes, without a motion being made for his defence. It was in vain to disguise that such a state of things presaged many misfortunes.—Savary, vi., 28.

attached to the Empire; but his duty was to have devoted himself to death on the steps of the Hôtel de Ville. A great example is required for all functionaries. The noblest of deaths would be that of a soldier on the field of honour, if that of a magistrate perishing in defence of the throne and the laws were not more glorious still." These words gave the tone to all the public bodies to whom the examination into the affair was intrusted, and they unanimously reported that the prefect of the department of the Seine should be dismissed. This was accordingly done, and the urban guard of Paris was suppressed; but the matter was pushed no farther, it being justly deemed inadvisable to make it known with what facility the regular soldiers had been misled, and with what ease the imperial authority had been all but overturned.*

Reflections on this event.

In France, during the monarchy, the people had for their rallying cry "The king is dead! Long live the king!" On this occasion, however, when the report of the emperor's death was spread and believed, no one exclaimed "Long live the emperor!" The fact is memorable: it was the first indication of the effects, not only of a new dynasty on the throne, but of a new era in the social history of France. The period of hereditary succession, with its stability, its security, its loyalty, its recollections, had passed away: personal qualities had become the sole title to distinction. In the effort to effect this change, all Europe had been convulsed to its centre; but the alteration had been made, and it could not be undone. Now, then, was seen the effect of the shock on one of the most momentous of national events, the demise of the sovereign filling the throne. It, too, had become elective: personal qualities were alone the passport to power; the principle of hereditary succession had been destroyed. Even the greatest and most splendid qualities in the founder of a new dynasty, and the most unheard-of success attending his arms, could not, it was found, ensure the succession of his own son, or shake the inextinguishable passion for a rotation of rulers, which had arisen from the principles of the Revolution. The effects of that great convulsion were already unfolding themselves: the throne had become, in effect, elective; all power depended upon office; all office on the support of the military; the support of the military on the suffrage of the Prætorian Guards at Paris. European had been exchanged for Asiatic civilization, and the dream of perfectibility had terminated in the institutions of the Byzantine Empire.

Device concerning the French regency.

Though Napoleon acquired the melancholy conviction, from this event, that the stability of his dynasty and the hopes of his son's succession rested on a sandy foundation, yet he resolved to leave nothing undone which might, for the present at least, guard against the dangers with which they were threatened. With this view, he resolved to fix at once, by an act of government, the cases in which a regency was to ensue, and the persons in whom the nomination was to be vested. By a *senatus consultum*, early in February, the right of appointing a regent was in the first instance vested in the emperor; if he had not made a nomination, the right of doing so devolved on the empress, failing her, on the first prince of the blood; and in default of him, on the great dignitaries of the Empire. The same decree fixed, in the most minute manner, the duration and extent of the regent's power, the formation of his council, the oath to be taken to the empress if regent, the administration, during the continuance of the interregnum, of the royal domains, the forms for crowning the empress regent and the King of Rome. The object of the emperor in this curious enactment obviously was to arrange everything for the transmission of the imperial authority, in the event of his absence or death, to the proper depositary, and to leave nothing to chance or the inclinations of the military who happened to be in the capital at the time, forgetting that the real and only security for hereditary succession in the throne is to be found in the reverence with which it is regarded by the people; that this reverence can neither be acquired in a single lifetime, nor be ingrafted on revolutionary changes; and that, to seek to establish it in a state which has destroyed its hereditary ranks, and the descent of private property, can give no greater stability than casting anchor in a moving quicksand.*

Feb. 5, 1813.

Great conscription of 350,000 men voted by the Senate.

Well aware that the losses of the preceding campaign made a great effort necessary, Napoleon resolved to take advantage of the first moments of alarm and excitement consequent on the promulgation of the disasters, to demand ample levies of men from the Senate. "Great measures," said Regnaud St. Angely, the orator of government, "are necessary: what suffices to-day may not be adequate to-morrow; the insolence of the conquerors of Louis XIV., the humiliation of the treaties of Louis XV., seem again to threaten us; we are called to save France from these ignominious days." Amid the tumult of feelings produced by these alarming revelations, the supporters of government demanded the immediate addition of three hundred and fifty thousand men to the armies, which were instantly and unanimously voted by the Senate. The execution of the decree was intrusted to the war minister, and the conscripts were zealously furnished by the people. Some of the principal cities of the Empire, particularly Paris, Lyons, and Turin, even went beyond these immense levies, and voted regiments of volunteers to be raised and equipped at their own expense. Never did the patriotic and warlike spirit of the nation appear with more lustre, nor was the firmness of government ever more warmly seconded by the generous devotion of the people. Yet, amid all the enthusiasm, the allocation of the conscription demonstrated how nearly the military strength of the Empire had been exhausted by the efforts which had already been made. The whole youth who arrived at the age which rendered them liable to the conscription in 1813 (from nineteen to twenty), had already been drained off by the

June 9, 1813.

* Thib., ix., 166, 167. Fain, i., 168, 195. Pièces Just., &c., 20, 21. Audience of Dec. 20, 1812.

* Decree, Feb. 5, 1813. Moniteur, and Thib., ix., 203. Mont., vii., 183.

great levy of the preceding year;* and, accordingly, a hundred thousand of the conscription was ordered to be taken from the first ban of the National Guard of 1812, a hundred thousand from the classes liable to conscription in the four preceding years, and no less than a hundred and fifty thousand from those arriving at the legal age in 1814; that is, who were then only from eighteen to nineteen years of age.†

Nov. 5.

Dec. 2.

Dec. 18.

The multiplied disasters of the Moscow campaign made the emperor feel the necessity of at length bringing to an accommodation his long-continued differences with the Holy See. With one half of Europe openly in arms against him, and the other but doubtfully arrayed under his banners, he could no longer afford to brave the hostility of the head of the Church. It has been already mentioned‡ that, after the violent seizure of the pope by the officers, and with the consent of Napoleon, and his passage of the Alps in July, 1809, he was brought to Grenoble; from thence he was shortly after transferred to Savona, where he was rigorously treated, and forcibly severed from the society of all those, among the cardinals or their servants, who were suspected of being hostile to the interests of France.◊ As this situation was not deemed sufficiently secure after the emperor had departed from Paris on the Moscow campaign, he was at that time removed to Fontainebleau, where he was kept in confinement, indeed, but a more dignified and respectable captivity. Though a prisoner, he had a handsome suite of apartments, was respectably entertained at table, and permitted to walk in the gardens of the palace, although he was still debarred from the society of his most esteemed attendants, lest they should encourage him in his resistance to the imperial authority. His occupations here were of the meanest description: age and long-protracted confinement appeared to have in a great degree weakened his mind, and the hands of the supreme pontiff were not unfrequently engaged in the humble occupation of darning a stocking or hemming a garment.*

Napoleon arranges his differences with the Church.

In bringing the pope so near to the French capital, and removing so studiously all those who were suspected of being of an independent temper, or hostile to the imperial interests, from approach to his person, Napoleon was not actuated merely by the spirit of oppression, or jealousy of a rival, and inflexible authority: he had great views, which were well matured, on the subject of the Holy See—its more intimate connexion with the French government—the influence which he might acquire over its members, and the more extended base on which, by such means, he might establish his own power. He not only had no jealousy of, but he cordially approved of every institution which tended to bring the minds of men into a state of due subjection to constituted authority; all he required was, that all these institutions should be placed under his immediate influence and control.† With this view, he meditated the translation of the papal government to Paris, the extinction of its temporal dominion, its entire dependance on the French Empire for revenue, and the consequent subjection of its chief to his own control; but, having effected this, he had no wish to impair its spiritual authority; on the contrary, he was rather desirous to extend it. Like the Roman emperor, he was anxious to found his own authority not merely on temporal power, but religious influences; to adorn his brows not only with the diadem of the conqueror, but the tiara of the pontiff; and as the forms of the Church prevented the actual union of both offices in his own person, he conceived that the next best system would be to have the pope so situated, that he should be irrevocably subjected to his control. Napoleon says, "he wished to establish the spiritual authority of the pope in France: he neither wished to profit by accidental circumstances, to create a patriarchship, nor to alter the belief of his people; he respected spiritual affairs, and wished to rule them without touching them or mingling in their concerns; he wished to make them pliant to his will, but by the intervention only of temporal influences." There were persons at Rome who saw through his policy. They said, "It is his

Napoleon's hidden designs regarding the pope and the Catholic Church.

* *Ante*, iii., 000, 000.

† Senatus Consultum, Jan. 11, 1813. Moniteur and Edinburgh Review, vi., 19.

‡ *Ante*, iii., 284.

◊ The following is an instance of the treatment to which the pope was subjected. He had issued, in November and December, 1810, three briefs on the subject of the institution of ecclesiastics to bishoprics in the French Empire without the sanction of the Holy See. Napoleon was irritated beyond measure at this resistance to his authority, especially from a captive, and he gave vent to his indignation in measures of the utmost severity. Cardinals Pietro, Gabrielli, and Opozzoni were immediately conveyed from Samur, which had been assigned as the place of their detention, to the Castle of Vincennes; the intrepid Bishop of Gregorio, and Fontaria, the chief of the Barnabites, the principal ornaments of the Church, were immured in the same prison; the Bishop Doria, who had hitherto constantly been in attendance on his holiness, was sent to Naples, and many of his most faithful servants made to share the captivity of Cardinal Pacca in the Castle of Fenestrelles, amid the snows of the Savoy Alps. No one was permitted to visit the pope without the authority of the prefect of the department: he was interdicted in the most rigorous manner from any communication with his subjects in Italy, accompanied with a threat of a public trial and deposition in the event of contumacy. The state prisons of France were filled with a crowd of ecclesiastics who made resistance to the violent encroachments of Napoleon on the jurisdiction of the Holy See; and to such contemptible shifts was the imperial government reduced to break the courageous spirit of the captive pontiff, that not only were his whole papers seized, and many carried off one day when he was absent from home, walking in his little garden with Berthier, the governor of his establishment, but he received intimation that the whole household, including himself, were to be put on the reduced allowance of five paoli (*twopence-halfpenny*) a day; a measure of severity, however, which was only carried into execution for two weeks, as it was found that the good Catholics of Savona supplied the deficiency of the imperial treasury, by themselves furnishing to the pontiff provisions in abundance.—See ARTAUD, *vide* Pope Pius VII., ii., 289; and CARDINAL PACCA, i., 37.

* Sav., vi., 49, 50. Artaud, ii., 302, 313. Pacca, Mem., ii., 37, 39.

† "Don't be alarmed, bishop," said Napoleon to the Bishop of Nantes: "the policy of my government is intimately bound up with the maintenance of the spiritual authority of the pope. I require that he should be more powerful than ever; he will never have as much influence as my policy requires he should possess." The bishop was astonished, and seemed to doubt the sincerity of the emperor, but he spoke his real opinion. By translating the seat of the papal government to Paris, he expected to acquire the entire direction of this formidable power; and he would willingly have augmented the awful character of the thunder of the Vatican, when he held in his own hand the means of directing its bolts.—See NAPOLEON *in Montholon*, i., 161.

mode of carrying on war: not daring to assault it in front, he has turned the Church as he turned the Alps in 1796, or Melas in 1800."*

His plans for making Paris the head of the Church.

For this end, he relied entirely on the judgment of the Bishop of Nantes: whenever that learned prelate said, "That attacks the Catholics and the Church," he paused in his career. He felt assured of ultimate success, with the aid of time and the vast influence which he possessed. "In 1813," says Napoleon, "but for the events in Russia, the pope would have been Bishop of Rome and of Paris, and lodged at the archbishopric of the latter city; the sacred college, the penitentiary, the office of propaganda, the archieves, would have been around Nôtre Dame and in the isle of St. Louis. Rome would have been in the ancient Lutetia. The establishment of the court of Rome at Paris would have been fruitful in great political results; its influence on Spain, Italy, the Rhenish Confederacy, and Poland, would have drawn close the bonds of the Great Nation; and that which the chief of the Church had over the faithful in England, Ireland, Russia, Prussia, Cambria, Hungary, and Bohemia, would have passed into the hands of the Emperor of France." So impressed was he with these ideas, and the immense addition to his influence which the papal authority would have given him, that he would have done everything in his power to extend the Romish propagandism, the foreign missions, and to increase the power of the clergy. Already he had established the cardinals as the chiefs of the state: they took precedence at the Tuileries of all the world; all the dependants of the pontifical court were to have been magnificently endowed, so as to give them no cause to regret their past existence. "It was with this view, as he himself has told us, that the emperor was unceasingly occupied with the amelioration and embellishment of Paris. He was so, not merely from the love of the arts, but in consequence of his system of government. It required that Paris should be a unique city; beyond all comparison with other capitals; the *chefs-d'œuvre* of science and art, the finest museums, all that had adorned and rendered illustrious former ages, should be there assembled; that the churches, the palaces, the theatres, should be beyond any elsewhere in existence. Napoleon regretted only that he could not transport to it the Church of St. Peter's at Rome. He was mortified with the bad taste of Nôtre Dame."†

But the disasters of the Russian campaign cut short these splendid projects, and awakened the emperor to the necessity of immediately, and at all hazards, depriving his enemies of the powerful subject of invective which arose from his contention with, and open imprisonment of the head of the Church. Within a fortnight after his arrival at Paris, he commenced the attempt by sending to congratulate his holiness on the beginning of the year: Cardinal Doria was despatched from Fontainebleau, to return the compliment. This led to an interchange of civilities, and the renewal of the negotiations between the two courts. The Bishop of Nantes was intrusted with its direction on the part of Napoleon, and the Cardinals Doria and Dugnani on that of the pope. When the negotiations were deemed sufficiently advanced to render the personal presence of the emperor desirable, he appeared suddenly at Fontainebleau with the Empress Marie Louise, and immediately hastened to the apartments of the captive pontiff. Appearing to forget altogether that there had been any difference between them, he immediately embraced him, and, without touching on matters of business, spent the remainder of the evening in the most agreeable and varied conversation. No man possessed the art of fascination, when he chose to exert it, in a higher degree than Napoleon, or was more capable of dazzling the minds of his hearers by the charms of a seductive and entrancing discourse; and if these powers had acquired the mastery at Tilsit of a young and able Czar in the plenitude of his power, it is not surprising that they proved more than a match at Fontainebleau for an aged pontiff, whose intellectual faculties had been weakened by a long captivity and protracted misfortunes. No violence was either required or employed:* the pope and his attendants, charmed with this unexpected change in their fortunes, speedily fell into the snare which was so skilfully decked with flowers; and, six days after his arrival, the emperor had the satisfaction of seeing the signature of his holiness to a concordat, which settled the principal points in dispute between the court of the Tuileries and the Holy See.††

Commencement of the conferences with the pope at Fontainebleau.

Jan. 1, 1813.

Jan. 19.

The emperor testified, as well he might, the

* Napoleon in Montholon, i., 159.
† Napoleon in Montholon, i., 161, 162.

* "Chauteaubriand has alleged, in his celebrated pamphlet of 'Bonaparte and the Bourbons,' that Napoleon, in a transport of rage, seized the pope by the locks, and maltreated him grievously. But the pope, often interrogated on that subject, has invariably answered that it was not true; nevertheless, it was easy to perceive, from the strain of the emperor's conversations which he repeated, that he had assumed a high tone with him, and even went so far as to tell him he was not adequately versed in ecclesiastical matters."—*Mémoires de* CARDINAL PACCA, ii., 87. Jan. 25.

† Thib., ix., 197, 198. Pacca, ii., 81, 85. Artaud, ii., 315, 321.

‡ By this celebrated instrument, it was provided, 1. That the pope shall exercise his pontifical functions in France and the kingdom of Italy, in like manner as his predecessors have done. 2. His ambassadors, ministers, and chargés d'affaires shall enjoy the same immunities and privileges as the members of the diplomatic body. 3. The domains of his holiness, as yet unalienated, shall be exempted from all sorts of taxes; those already alienated shall be replaced till their revenue amounts to two millions of francs (£80,000). 4. In the six months which shall follow the notification of a nomination of a bishop by the emperor, the pope shall give the necessary induction to the bishopric. In the event of no such induction being given by his holiness during that period, the archbishop of the district, whom failing, the senior bishop within its limits, shall proceed to give the necessary induction, so that in no event shall any bishopric be vacant more than a year. 5. The pope shall appoint, both in France and Italy, to certain sees, to be afterward fixed upon by the contracting parties. 6. The six suburban dioceses shall be restored, and put at the disposal of his holiness. 7. The holy father, in regard to bishoprics in the Roman States, from which the incumbents are absent by the force of circumstances, shall exercise his right of nomination *in partibus*. 8. The emperor and pope shall concert measures, at the proper time, for the reduction of the bishoprics in Tuscany and the Genoese States, as well as for those to be established in Holland and the Hanseatic departments. 9. The offices of propagandism, of the penitentiary, and the archives, shall be established in the residence of the holy father. 10. The emperor awards a free pardon to the cardinals, bishops, priests, and laity, who have incurred penalties from past events. 11. His holiness consents to these conditions, from the confidence which he has in the good dispositions of his Articles of the concordat.

Extraordinary joy of Napoleon at this conclusion of the treaty.

most extraordinary satisfaction at the conclusion of this concordat, which not only tacitly ceded to him the whole ecclesiastical states in Italy, by stipulating nothing for their restitution, but in effect decided in favour of the civil power in France the long-disputed question as to the ecclesiastical *veto* on the appointment of bishops by the temporal authority. Next morning, decorations, presents, and orders were profusely scattered among the chief persons of the pope's household; the joyful intelligence was communicated to all the bishops; Te Deum was chanted in all the churches of France; all the restrictions upon the personal freedom of the pope removed; mass allowed to be freely celebrated in the palace of Fontainebleau; a numerous body of cardinals soon after joined his holiness from their different places of exile; the concordat was solemnly published as one of the fundamental laws of the state; the emperor loaded the pope, and all the members of his court, with that gracious and insinuating kindness which, when it suited his purposes, he could so well assume; and in the exuberance of his satisfaction gave orders for the liberation of his indomitable antagonist, Cardinal Pacca, from his long and painful confinement amid the snows of Savoy.*†

Rapid changes in the opinion of the pope and his council.

But, while Napoleon was thus flattering himself that he had surmounted all his difficulties in this interesting particular, and that the whole weight of the Church would be thrown into the scale in his favour, a great and important revulsion was going forward in the papal cabinet. The able members of the ecclesiastical body who returned to Fontainebleau at once perceived that the pope had been overreached in the transaction; that the penetration of an old man had been blinded by the specious arguments of the emperor, and his firmness shaken by the rigours of a protracted confinement; and that, at the very moment when the fortunes of Napoleon had begun to hang doubtful in the balance, he had had the address to elicit from his august captive greater advantages than he could ever have hoped for in the plenitude of his power. Shortly after the concordat was signed the pope repented of the step he had taken, and his grief was so profound that, when Cardinal Pacca arrived, he was strongly affected by his haggard and emaciated appearance. To the expressions of admiration uttered by the cardinal, upon the constancy with which he had borne his long captivity, the frail pontiff replied, "But we have dishonoured ourselves at its close: these cardinals drew me to the table and forced me to sign it." It was long and anxiously debated, in the secret councils of the Church at Fontainebleau, what course should be adopted in this emergency; and at length it was determined that the pope should solemnly retract his signature of the concordat, in a letter to the emperor, and ascribe his acquiescence to the weakness of the flesh. Such a letter was in secret prepared by the aged pontiff, in terms suied to the solemnity of the occasion. Without attempting to exculpate his weakness or palliate his fault, he confessed its enormity, and implored the divine forgiveness; and, at the same time, March 24. fully and unequivocally retracted his consent to the concordat. No sooner was this resolution taken* than he recovered all his wonted serenity of mind and cheerfulness of manner, though both he and the whole conclave fully expected some acts of extreme violence from the ebullitions of the emperor's wrath.†

Moderate and prudent conduct of Napoleon on this retractation.

In these expectations, however, the pope and his councillors were in a great degree disappointed. Though mortally offended, Napoleon took the more prudent part to dissemble his wrath. He did not deem it prudent to push matters to extremities with the Church when he was so soon to have Europe on his hands on the Rhine. Feigning, therefore, to disregard entirely this untimely retractation, he acted, and not without reason on his side, as if the matter were irrevocably concluded. On the very day after he had March 25. received the pope's letter, he published the concordat as a law obligatory on all archbishops, bishops, and chapters; cognizance of all cases known by the name of "appeals on abuses," hitherto confined to the ecclesiastical tribunals, as well as of all delinquencies arising from infractions of the concordat, was committed to the ordinary courts of the Empire; and the "great judge" was directed to draw up a form of process for such questions. At the same time, an entire amnesty was published to all individuals of the departments of Rome and Trasymene, who had incurred civil penalties by refusing to take the oath of allegiance to the emperor, provided they did so within thirty-five days; and the latter promoted to the rank of

majesty to the numerous wants of the Church, in the time in which we live."

* Thib., ix., 199. Artaud, ii., 325, 326. Pacca, ii., 87, 88.

† "I extorted from the pope," said Napoleon, "by the single force of my private conversation, that famous concordat of Fontainebleau, by which he renounced the temporal power of the papacy. He had no sooner signed it than he repented of what he had done. On the day following he was to have dined in public with me, but he feigned sickness, and did not appear. Immediately after I quitted him, he fell into the hands of his old councillors, who made him retract all he had done. If we had been left alone, I would have made him do whatever I pleased. He was truly a lamb: a real good man, whom I esteemed and loved, and who regarded me, I am well assured, in some degree, with similar sentiments."—Las Casas, v., 334, 335.

* See the Concordat in Martens, Sup., i., 552; and in Artaud, ii., 323.

* Pacca, ii., 87, 124. Artaud, ii., 34, 330, 347.

† "As we have done wrong," said the pope, in this touching manifesto, "we will imitate our illustrious predecessor, Pascal II., in 1117: we confess we have done wrong, and, with the aid of the Lord, we desire that it should be altogether annulled, in order that no damage may thence arise to the Church, or injury to our own soul. The concession made in one of these articles is unjustifiable in the sight of God and man. What regulation can be admitted which infringes so deeply on the original constitution of the Church of Jesus Christ, who established the primacy of St. Peter and his successors, as that which subjects our power to that of a metropolitan, and permits him to give induction to bishops named whom the supreme pontiff, in his wisdom, has deemed unworthy of induction; rendering thus judge of the head of the Church an inferior functionary, beneath him in the hierarchy, and himself subjected to his authority?"—Pius VII. *to* Napoleon, 24*th March*, 1813. Artaud, ii., 342. The reflecting reader, aware how exactly identical are the effects of similar passions and interests upon mind in all ages and circumstances of the world, will compare this violent collision of the civil government in France, during the reign of Napoleon, with the papal power, with the parallel contest between Thomas-à-Becket and Henry II. in the early days of English history, and the conflict of the rights of the patrons with the Democratic pretensions of the Church and a portion of the laity in Scotland, in 1840.

senators the Cardinal Bayonne, and Bourlier, bishop of Evreux, who had been mainly instrumental in bringing about the concordat. The only act of severity on Napoleon's part which followed the pope's retractation was the removal from Fontainebleau of Cardinal Pietro, who was seized early in April and conducted to Auxonne, where he remained in detention till the fall of Napoleon. At first, the emperor was inclined to measures of rigour when he heard of the retractation, and he said, in the Council of State held on the subject at Paris, "If I do not cut off the heads of some of those priests at Fontainebleau, I shall never settle the affair;" and councillors were not wanting who urged him, like Henry VIII., to break altogether with the see of Rome, and declare himself the head of the Church; but, on reflection, his better judgment prevailed, and he replied, in familiar but expressive words, "No, that would be to break our own windows."*

His reasons for this moderation.

It was from no apprehension of any revulsion in France itself against such a final rupture with the Church, that Napoleon, on this important occasion, was so guarded and lenient in his measures towards the ecclesiastics at Fontainebleau: it was by a well-founded dread of the effect it would produce in foreign nations, especially Spain, Italy, and the southern states of Germany, that his conduct was regulated. In France religious impressions of all sorts had been so completely obliterated by the cessation of public worship and instruction during the Revolution, and the education of a generation ignorant of the very elements of belief, that the dispute with the pope excited very little attention, and the authority of the Church of Rome might with ease have been thrown off at that period. Except in a few old women and devout ecclesiastics, indifference in regard to religion was general among all classes, at least in the urban and influential population. The churches, little frequented by any, were seldom entered except by women; labour, buying and selling, went on on Sundays and fast-days as on other days; the sacraments of the Church, even at the entrance or the close of life, were rarely sought after.† Fatal effects of a revolution! To extinguish the only durable bond which can hold men together, by voluntary union, during the agitations of an ancient and corrupted society; to destroy the basis of self-government, by weakening the strength of the moral restraints which can alone supply the place of those of force; and render liberty impossible, by leaving in the ruling classes in the state no power which can repress the sallies of wickedness but the empire of the sword.

Napoleon's speech to the Legislative Body.

But other cares than these disputes with the Church now occupied the emperor, and preparations were necessary for a graver contest than that with a captive pontiff and his enthralled cardinals. Russia was approaching; Prussia was preparing to shake off the yoke; the fermentation in Germany presaged an awful contest on the Rhine. Napoleon prepared to meet it with a gravity, resolution, and candour which are worthy of the highest admiration. The Legislative Body met early in February, and the speech of the emperor made no attempt to disguise the losses of the Moscow campaign, or the imminence of the present dangers. "Success the most brilliant," said he, "in the first instance, attended our arms; but the excessive rigours and premature approach of winter brought frightful calamities on the army. In a few nights I beheld everything changed; I have experienced great losses; it would have broken my heart if, in such circumstances, I could have been alive to any other considerations than the interest, the glory, and the future destiny of my people. The agents of England spread among all our neighbours the spirit of revolt against their sovereigns; England would wish the entire Continent to become a prey to the horrors of civil war, but Providence has determined that she shall be the first victim of the passions she would spread among others. The joy of our enemies, and, above all, of England, has reached its height; but misfortunes have proved the strength of the Empire: the energy of my people has brought them back to a more just appreciation of things. My differences with the pope have been happily terminated by a concordat; the French dynasty reigns, and will reign in Spain. I desire peace: it is necessary. On four different occasions, since the rupture of the peace of Amiens, I have solemnly made offer of it to my enemies; but I will never conclude a treaty but on terms honourable and suitable to the grandeur and interests of my Empire."* Feb. 14.

Important statistical details with which it was accompanied.

This ingenuous and intrepid address was accompanied by such a detail of the statistical and financial situation of the Empire as almost justified the confident tone of the emperor, notwithstanding the disasters of the Russian retreat. According to the *exposé* published by M. Montalivet, minister of the interior, the population of that part of the Empire which embraced the territory of Old France was 28,700,000 souls, an amount not materially different from what it was at the commencement of the Revolution:† a remarkable result, when the vast consumption of human life which had since taken place from the internal bloodshed and external wars of the Revolution is taken into consideration, but which hardly warranted the assertion of Montalivet, singularly ill-timed amid the universal mourning produced by the Moscow retreat, that "the conscription itself, which every year made the *élite* of the youth rally round the standards of the Empire, had contributed to the increase of the population, by multiplying the number of marriages, and favouring them, because it fixed forever the lot of the young Frenchman who had obeyed the law on this subject." It *had* fixed their lot, it was universally observed, for it had consigned them to their graves. In other respects, however, the report exhibited a more gratifying and less questionable picture of the growing wealth and increased productions of the Empire;‡ and the details are curious and interesting, as presenting a singular example of

* Artaud, ii., 343, 355. Pacca, ii., 109, 136. Thib., ix., 200, 201. † Pacca, ii., 142. Thib., ix., 201, 202.

* Moniteur, Feb. 14, 1813. Thib., ix., 204, 205.

† It was estimated at 25,000,000; but no correct enumeration of the inhabitants had been made, and there was reason to believe that this supposition was considerably below the real numbers of the people.

‡ Thib., ix., 205, 206. Moniteur, Feb. 15, 1813.

the extent to which a great expenditure by government, accompanied by a strong internal administration, a tolerable protection to property, and the stoppage of external competition, can increase the industry of a country, even in the midst of the most unbounded system of foreign hostility.*

Surprising magnitude of the sums expended by Napoleon on public improvements.

In one respect, the report of the minister of the interior contained authentic details, in which the government of Napoleon is worthy of universal imitation. It appeared that, during the twelve years which had elapsed since he ascended the consular throne, the sums expended on public improvements, such as roads, bridges, fortifications, harbours, public edifices, &c., amounted to the enormous sum of a thousand millions of francs, or £40,000,000, of which seven hundred millions, or £28,000,000, was the proportion belonging to Old France. When it is recollected that an expenditure so vast, on objects so truly imperial, amounting to nearly £3,500,000 a year, took place during a period of extraordinary warlike exertion, and almost unbroken maritime and territorial hostility, it must be confessed that it demonstrates an elevation of mind and grandeur of conception on the part of Napoleon, which, as much as his wonderful military achievements, mark him as one of the most marvellous of mankind. It would be deserving of unqualified admiration, were it not deeply sullied by the recollection that sums so vast could be drawn from the imperial treasury only because nearly half the expenses of government were laid on the conquered or allied states ;† that it was the maintenance of three hundred thousand French veterans in Spain, at the expense of the wretched people of the Peninsula, and two hundred thousand in Germany, at the cost of the impoverished inhabitants of Prussia, which alone enabled the emperor to direct so considerable a portion of his revenue to the internal improvement of his dominions ; and that France was embellished by works of utility and magnificence, and Paris adorned with the splendour of decoration, because wo unheard of desolated the Peninsula, and oppression unbearable had roused an unconquerable spirit of revenge in the German provinces.‡

Cost of the public edifices at Paris.

In one particular, unconnected with military or political events, but deeply interesting to the lovers of the fine arts, this report contains details of the utmost value. The cost of all the public edifices in Paris, as well as of the great roads over the Alps, and noble harbours constructed by Napoleon at Antwerp, Cherbourg, and other places, is given so far as actually expended, with the estimates of the total cost to bring them to completion. To the traveller who recollects the unbounded admiration which these public works and edifices have awakened in his mind, it is an object of interest to ascertain the cost which they have severally occasioned ; and he will find, with surprise, that they have in great part been reared at an expense not exceeding that of edifices of little or no excellence in his own country, even although the charges of building are not materially different in the two countries. So true is it, that the most essential elements in architectural beauty, genius and taste in the architect, are beyond the power of mere wealth to command ; that it is not money to construct beautiful buildings, but the mind to conceive them, which is generally wanting ; and that it is to the pure taste and noble conceptions of the artists of Southern Europe, rather than any great excellence in the materials at their command, or the wealth of which they have the disposal, that their remarkable superiority to those of this country is to be ascribed.*

Finances of the French Empire at this period.

The financial and military resources which this memorable report unfolded as being still at the disposal of the French government were immense, and strongly indicated the magnitude of the colossus which combined Europe had still to combat, even after the Russian armament had been swept away. The estimated revenue of 1812 of the whole French Empire was 1,030,000,000 francs, or £41,500,000 ; and the sum actually realized, 992,000,000 francs, or £39,968,000. The expenditure, so far as drawn from the French treasury, had been 980,000,000 francs, or £39,600,000 ; but, as already more than once observed, no opinion can be formed of the real cost of Napoleon's government at this period, or for six years before, as at least half of the French army was laid as a burden for all its expenses, including food, clothing, pay, and lodging, on the countries in the Peninsula, Germany, or Italy, which it occupied ;† so that a very large sum, probably nearly a half of this ample revenue, must be added as drawn from the contributions on the allied or conquered states. Of the enormous and almost incredible amount of these contributions ample details have already been given, and more will occur in the prosecution of this work.‡

Military strength of the Empire.

With respect to the military and naval resources of the Empire, the report contained information that could more implicitly be relied on. The population of the French Empire, augmented as it now was by Belgium, Holland, the Hanse Towns, and Roman States, amounted to forty-two millions, of which twenty-eight millions seven hundred thousand belonged to Old France. Nor were the military and naval resources of the Empire on a scale inferior to the numerical amount of its inhabitants ; on the contrary, they greatly exceeded them. The horses it contained were three millions and a half, and consumed as much food as thirty millions of peo-

* See note A, in Appendix.

† See reports in Fain's Camp. de 1813, i., 80, 81 ; and Goldsmith, Recueil, vi., 77 ; and Moniteur, Feb. 15, 1813.

‡ The expenditure from 1800 to 1812 was thus classified in the report of M. Montalivet :

	Francs.	Pounds.
Imperial palaces	62,000,000 or,	2,480,000
Fortifications	144,000,000 ..	5,760,000
Maritime harbours	117,000,000 ..	4,680,000
Roads	277,000,000 ..	11,150,000
Bridges	31,000,000 ..	1,240,000
Canals and draining	123,000,000 ..	4,920,000
Embellishment of Paris	102,000,000 ..	4,080,000
Public buildings in the provinces	149,000,000 ..	5,960,000
Total	1,005,000,000	40,270,000

—Goldsmith's *Recueil des Traités, Actes, &c., de Napoleon*, vi. 100.

* See note B, in Appendix.

† Report by Montalivet, Feb. 25, 1813. Goldsmith, vii., 144, 145.

‡ See note C, in Appendix.

ple. The army numbered, in all, eight hundred thousand infantry, a hundred thousand cavalry, and a hundred thousand artillerymen and engineers; in all, a million of men in arms:* a force, if the quality, as well as number of the combatants, and their admirable state of equipment, are taken into consideration, unparalleled in any former age or country of the world. But it was altogether disproportioned to the resources, vast as they were, of the state: it was more than double of that which Rome, at its highest point of elevation, maintained out of three times the number of inhabitants, and larger than China supports out of a territory ten times, and a population, according to the lowest estimate, four times as large as those of the French Empire. In a word, it implied the permanent absorption of one in forty of the whole population in the profession of arms; whereas it has never been found, by experience, that an empire, how powerful soever, can for any length of time flourish with more than one in a hundred engaged in such pursuits.†

And of its navy.

Notwithstanding the great losses which the French marine had sustained since the commencement of the Revolutionary war, it had again, by the indefatigable exertions of Napoleon, been raised to a most formidable state; such a state, indeed, as clearly indicated the perseverance of the emperor in his grand design of ultimately combating England hand to hand on her own element, and terminating the war, in his own words, by a battle of Actium. From fifteen to twenty ships of the line had, for several years past, been launched annually at the different dockyards of Antwerp, Brest, Cherbourg, Toulon, Flushing, Genoa, and Venice; and the naval force of the Empire had by this means been increased to one hundred and four ships of the line and fifty frigates. As the commercial navy of France was entirely ruined, this large fleet was manned by means of the maritime conscription, which, levied in the principal maritime departments of the Empire, furnished annually twenty thousand recruits for the sea service, who were sedulously trained to their duties in the roadsteads and harbours of the principal seaports, by which means nearly a hundred thousand sailors were constantly maintained in the service of the state.‡

Dangers with which it threatened the British islands.

Though it was, doubtless, but a slight apprenticeship to the duties of seamanship which could thus be learned, yet the perseverance of the emperor in this great design of gradually raising up his navy to a level with that of England, and avoiding all encounters till this was done, marks the decision and energy of his character, and indicates the serious nature of the ultimate struggle which awaited the British Empire, if the prosecution of this project had not been interrupted by the disasters which occasioned his fall. And though England, with a fleet of two hundred and forty sail of the line, and eight hundred frigates and smaller vessels,* which at that period bore the royal flag, might well disregard even these considerable efforts, yet experience has proved that, with a popular constitution, no permanent reliance can be placed on the dominant multitude possessing foresight and self-denial sufficient to keep up a naval force adequate to the exigencies of so vast an empire. And it will, probably, not be deemed by future ages the least remarkable facts of the fifty eventful years which followed the French Revolution, or the least characteristic of the influence of government on the national fortunes, that, while the navy of France, through the multiplied and unceasing disasters of the war, was increased by the vigour of the executive from seventy-two ships of the line at its commencement,† to one hundred and four at its termination; and while that of England rose, amid her gigantic expenditure, during the same period, from one hundred and fifty-four at the first epoch, to two hundred and forty-four at the last,‡ it sunk, during the twenty-five years of unbroken peace and unparalleled commercial prosperity which followed the termination of hostilities, to *ninety* ships of the line, or little more than a *third* of its former number, though the amount of the British trade, and the necessities of the British colonial empire, had, during the same period, more than doubled.§‖

Remarkable failure of the powers of the conscription at this period.

But while the physical resources of France were thus immense, and such the energy with which they were wielded by its chief, there was one appalling source of weakness, hitherto little attended to, lurking in its bosom, but of which the effects now fell with decisive force upon the wasted realm. Notwithstanding the prodigious consumption of men which had taken place during the wars of the Revolution, it had not hitherto been found that the conscription was less productive in filling the ranks than it had formerly been; and the French government, not aware of the reason of this remarkable circumstance, flattered themselves that the powers of population in the Empire were literally inexhaustible. But about this time a new and alarming deficiency was observed in the produce of the emperor's levies, and for the first time since the commencement of the war the number of young men whom the conscription could rally round the imperial standards proved not a half of that on which the minister of war, on apparently authentic data, had calculated, and which the experience of former years justified him in expecting.¶ This evil went on increasing to such a degree,

* This force was thus distributed:

	Men.
20 regiments of the Guard	60,000
152 do. of infantry	640,000
37 do. of light infantry	84,000
15 do. of artillery	68,000
30 battalions of wagon train and heavy artillery	32,000
80 regiments of cavalry	100,000
15 foreign battalions	12,000
	996,000

—FAIN, i., 93.

† Rome, in the time of Augustus, with a population of 120,000,000, had an army of 450,000; Russia at present, with 60,000,000, has 710,000 in arms; China, with 170,000,000, a nominal force of 914,000; but more than half of this immense body are mere militia, like the Prussian *landwehr*, who are only occasionally imbodied, and are not permanently withdrawn from the labours of agriculture.—See GIBBON'S *Rome*, ch. i.; BALBI'S *Géographie Universelle*, 637 and 822.

‡ Fain, Guerre de 1813, i., 95.

* Balbi's Geog. Univ., 633. James's Naval History, vol. vi., App. No. 4.

† *Ante*, chap. vii.

‡ James's Naval History, i., 404; and vi., 511.

§ Barrow's Life of Anson, App., 424.

‖ *Ante*, iii., 329.

¶ Sav., vii., 237–9.

that, before the war terminated, the levies ordered by the Senate were little more than nominal, and it became apparent that the powers of life in the class from which the conscription was drawn had been exhausted.

Reason of this circumstance.

The reason, though not apparent at first sight, when once stated is quite satisfactory. By Napoleon's uniform system, the conscription of each year was taken from the male population who in the course of it attained a certain age, which varied from twenty-one in his earlier years to eighteen in his last. As long, therefore, as the levy fell on the class who were born before the war commenced, a fresh and undiminished harvest was yearly offered to the scythe of the conscription. But in 1811 and 1812, the young men who were conceived in 1793 for the first time became liable to be drawn, and then the effect of the immense conscription of twelve hundred thousand men in that year, and the vast consumption of life occasioned by its bloody campaign, was rendered apparent. The conscription suddenly became unproductive to an alarming degree: the destruction of the former generations told at once, with fearful force, upon the numbers of the present, for the levy had reached those youths who were begotten in the year when the first dreadful chasm in the population had taken place. The military strength of the Empire was nearly exhausted; but the effect of this did not appear, as superficial observers would have supposed, in the absence of men for the cultivation of the fields, for they were still found in sufficient numbers in the elder part of the male population born before 1793, but in the experienced necessity of bringing the conscription down to persons of younger years and inferior stature, wholly unable to bear the fatigues of a campaign. Hence the practice, so usual in the latter years of the Empire, of levying the conscription, not on those who arrived at the age of liability in the year when it was ordered, but who would arrive at it in two or three years after; that is, of anticipating the human supplies of future years, and assembling round the standards boys of seventeen or eighteen years of age, who, before six weeks were over, for the most part whitened the fields with their bones, or encumbered the hospitals with their diseases. Unnoticed by ordinary observers, this circumstance had a material, and, in the end, a decisive effect upon the fortunes of the war; and it affords an interesting example of the way in which vaulting ambition overleaps itself, and of the impassable barrier opposed by nature to its farther progress, if it should survive the generation in which it arose, and dip into the future races of mankind.*

Diminution in the age and standard of height as the revolutionary wars advanced.

In another particular, the effect of the continued drain of the conscription on the French population was evinced in a matter equally curious and decisive. As the wars of the Revolution advanced, and the conscription reached the children of the generation of whom the most robust and vigorous had perished in the earlier campaigns, not only did it become necessary to fix the levy on young men of more tender years, but to lower the standard of height at which those drawn would be admitted into the ranks. In 1804 the levy was from those who had attained the age of from twenty years and three months to twenty-one and three months; but in 1810 it was found no longer possible to restrict the levy to those who had attained this comparatively advanced age, and it was enforced against those who were from eighteen to nineteen, and the same age continued to 1813 and 1814, when it was practically brought closer to seventeen than eighteen, by the conscription being levied on those who attained the legal age in the succeeding year.* Nor was this all: the same necessity compelled the government to lower the standard of height for admission into the army; and so low did it latterly descend, that in 1810 it was reduced to five feet two, and in 1813 it had sunk to little more than five feet one inch.† The evil thus existing was not confined to a single generation, it trenched deep upon the hopes and the strength of the next: the children of the diminutive parents who survived the bloody wars of Napoleon inherited the weakness of those from whom they sprung; and the appalling fact, that from 1825 to 1833 nearly *one half* of the persons drawn or recruited for the army were rejected from smallness of stature or physical defects, though the standard was only five feet two inches, demonstrates how fearfully the dreadful wars from 1805 to 1813,‡ when they were born, had operated on the vigour and population of the French Empire.◊

* Sav., vii., 240, 241.

* The way in which this was done was by authorizing a conscription of those who should attain the legal age in the succeeding years to that in which the levy took place. Thus, the conscription of 1813 was allocated as follows:

1. 350,000 men drawn from the conscription of 1812 and 1813, and from 1810 to 1813.
2. 180,000 men drawn from the conscription of 1814.
3. 120,000 from that of 1814.
   160,000 from that of 1815.
4. 300,000 from that of 1811 to 1815.

—See *Senatus Consultum*, 11th January, 1813, 3d April, 1813, 10th October, 1813, and 15th November, 1813. *Moniteur*, and GOLDSMITH'S *Recueil*, vi., 19–24, 271, 517, and 546.

† The following table indicates the progressive degradation of the standard of height for the French army during the progress and from the effects of the wars of the Revolution:

	Minimum height of Conscripts.			
	Metres.	Feet.	Inch.	English.
From 1799 to 1803	1.598 or	5		1⅝
In 1804	1.544 or	5		1¼
1818	1.570 or	5		1½
1830	1.540 or	5		1¼
1832	1.560 or	5		1⅝

From 1809 to 1814 the standard was merely nominal, as the conscripts, if not labouring under some other defect, were admitted into the ranks, how diminutive soever their stature might be, and often when under five feet in height.—D'ANGEVILLE, *Statistique de la Population Française*, p. 72.

‡ Essai sur la Stat. de la Population Française, par le Comte d'Angeville, 74, 79.

◊ The average height of the conscripts in the years 1804 and 1810, in the following six departments of France, stood as follows:

	Average height, 1804. Metres.	Average height, 1810. Metres.
Hautes Alps	1.623	1.587
Cantal	1.660	1.627
Creuse	1.598	1.567
Ile et Vilaine	1.658	1.570
Landes	1.614	1.574
Vierne	1.613	1.589

All under five feet two inches English.

It may truly be said that this table speaks volumes as to the cruel effect of the wars of Napoleon on the physical well-being of mankind. And the learned author from whom these extracts are made correctly ascribes to the same cause the continued lowering of the standard in the next generation. "Les calculs de mon troisième tableau prou-

Great losses of the French in military stores in Prussia.

The extraordinary losses of the campaign of 1812, great as they had been, were materially aggravated by an accidental circumstance. A severe frost set in over all Europe on the 29th of December, 1812, and continued, without intermission, till the first week in March. In the north of Germany the cold was peculiarly intense: all the canals and navigable rivers of Prussia were frozen; and the whole reserve stores and artillery of the French army, with the exception of the small portion which the receding columns could drag with their wearied array, were locked up in boats by the ice. The cavalry and artillery horses were almost destroyed; the wreck of the Grand Army could hardly muster thirty thousand bayonets. Meanwhile, the Russian troops were rapidly advancing; the dispositions of Prussia, as will speedily appear, were more than doubtful; and it was easy to foresee, from the intense national spirit which burned beyond the Rhine, that the defection of the court of Berlin would be followed by an immediate crusade from the whole warlike and robust population of the north of Germany. In these circumstances, an extraordinary effort was necessary to provide resources against the danger, and nothing but the utmost vigour in the emperor, and patriotic spirit in the French people, could furnish the means of preserving the national independence. The receipts of the year 1811 had fallen 27,000,000 francs (£1,080,000), those of 1812, 37,000,000 francs (£1,450,000), short of their estimated amount. The taxes, both direct and indirect, had reached their maximum: the experience of the last two years having proved that an increase of taxation produced no corresponding augmentation in the receipts of the exchequer. The extinction of commercial wealth had rendered the raising supplies by loan impossible. It was with a sinking revenue, therefore, a taxation which had reached its limits, an exhausted military population, and a ruined credit, that France had to make head against the hostility of combined Europe.*

Napoleon's vigorous measures to repair these losses.

The energy with which the French people repaired these terrible disasters, and the fortitude with which the emperor bore up against them, are worthy of the highest admiration. His first care was to restore the cavalry and artillery horses; a sufficient number of pieces of cannon existed in the arsenals; and, as the French Empire contained 3,500,000 horses, it was not found a difficult matter, by offering high prices, to put on an effective footing these essential branches of the public service, though the want of skill in the riders rendered them but ill qualified to contend with the numerous and veteran cavalry of the allies. To repair the chasms occasioned in the ranks, and make head against the hourly-increasing force of the enemy in the north of Germany, 180,000 men, *in addition* to the great levy of 350,000 already ordered,* were placed at the disposal of the minister of war: viz., 80,000 of the first ban of the National Guards, who had already been imbodied, disciplined, clothed, and put on permanent duty in the frontier fortresses during the Russian war; 90,000 conscripts drawn from those liable to serve in 1815, and 10,000 guards of honour. Now were seen the good effects of the sagacious foresight which had prompted Napoleon, at the commencement of the campaign of 1812, to call into active service so large a portion of the first ban of the National Guard, drawn from the classes liable to the conscription from 1807 to 1812; nearly 100,000 men of mature years and confirmed strength, ready disciplined and equipped, were in arms in the fortresses on the Rhine, to recruit the army in Germany; and to their exertions the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen are mainly to be ascribed. Very different were the young conscripts, drawn from those liable to serve in 1814, who constituted the remainder of the infantry force added to the standards. Called into active service a year before they had arrived at the legal age, and torn from their parental homes before they had acquired either the steadiness or the strength of manhood, they were wholly unable to withstand the iron veterans who had, in the Russian bands, survived the campaign of 1812. Great numbers of them disappeared from the ranks, or sank into the hospitals, before they reached the Elbe; and in the confusion and disorganization which pervaded the army before it even saw the enemy, was to be found too sure an indication that the Empire had reached the limits of its physical strength, and approached its fall.†

April 3, 1813.

Levy of the gardes d'honneur, and maritime conscripts.

To give consistency to this brave but motley array of young troops, the emperor drew from Spain the four remaining regiments of the Imperial Guard which were still there, a legion of veteran gendarmerie, and a considerable body of Polish light horse. In addition to this, the skeletons of a hundred and fifty battalions, consisting of the most trusty and experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, were despatched from the Peninsular legions to the Rhine; and, without materially weakening the forces in Spain, they proved of inestimable importance in conferring efficiency upon the new levies. In addition to this, two extraordinary measures were adopted to repair the wide chasms in the artillery and cavalry forces. By the first, forty thousand sailors or naval gunners were drafted from the marine service, and transferred to the artillery of the land-forces, while their place was supplied by the young seamen whom the maritime conscription rigorously levied from the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of the seaports. By the second, a corps of ten thousand horsemen was raised on

vent que pour avoir 1000 reserves pendant la periode de 1825 à 1833, on a du prononcer, dans toute la France, 926 *exemptions pour causes physiques de toute nature.* Ce résultat serait alarmant, si l'on ne savait que les jeunes gens des classes qui ont servi de base à nos calculs étaient nés de 1805 à 1813, epoque ou *les grandes guerres de l'Empire entrainaient la population valide hors de territoire.* La longue paix enfantû par les malheureux evènemens de 1815, et le bien-être progressive du peuple qui en est resulté, nous promettent pour l'avenir des résultats plus satisfaisans."—D'ANGEVILLE, p. 84. I am indebted for these interesting details regarding the effect of the wars of Napoleon on the physical resources of the French population, and the stature of the race in that country, to the kindness of a distinguished friend, a well-known member of the English bar, H. Merivale, Esq., of the Inner Temple.

* Thib ix., 207, 208. Fain, i., 28, 29. Sav., vi., 40, 41.

* *Ante*, iv.

† Senatus Consultum, April 3, 1813. Moniteur, April 4. Sav., vi., 41. Goldsmith, vi., 273.

an entirely new plan, from the flower of the population of the Empire. Both officers and privates, who were alike drawn from the higher classes of the people, were to be equipped, dressed, and mounted at their own expense. In return for such sacrifices, they obtained the pay of the chasseurs of the guard, and, after twelve months' service, the rank of a sub-lieutenant; and when the campaign was concluded, such of their number as were most distinguished were to be formed into companies of the body-guards, a corps in an especial manner intrusted with the personal attendance on the emperor. In this way Napoleon succeeded in obtaining at little expense, and by the prospect rather of future distinction than present advantage, a body of ten thousand horse, raised exclusively from the more opulent classes of his subjects. In this measure he had, however, a secret object of still greater importance in view, which was effectually attained. These young men were so many hostages for the fidelity of their parents and relations, occupying for the most part important situations in the country, upon whose adherence to his dynasty he could not securely rely in the crisis which was approaching. They behaved, when brought into the field, with the usual gallantry of the French character; but the youths, for the most part inexperienced, and riding on horses as raw as themselves, were little qualified for the rude encounter of the Muscovite or Cossack horseman; the fatigues of the campaign speedily proved fatal to their unformed constitutions; and before the allied standards approached the Rhine, more than three fourths of this noble force had sunk under the sword of the enemy, or the contagion of the hospitals.*

Force thus collected by Napoleon for the campaign.

In addition to these extraordinary measures, the greatest efforts were made to bring forward the conscripts, and enlist voluntary recruits: every man capable of bearing arms was forwarded from the depôts in the interior to their respective regiments; a large body of marines were formed into a division of infantry; and the second ban of the National Guards, called into permanent duty in all the frontier provinces, replaced their comrades of the first ban, who had now taken their place as regular soldiers in the ranks of the Grand Army. Two thousand of the gendarmerie in the interior were distributed among several new regiments of cavalry, which were formed from the sons of the postmasters and the forest guards throughout France, and a re-enforcement of seven thousand horse thus obtained for the army. The same measures were pursued with extraordinary activity in the kingdom of Italy, under the able direction of Eugene Beauharnois; and Piedmont rivalled France in the zeal with which it fulfilled or anticipated all the demands of the emperor. The princes of the Rhenish Confederacy received the most pressing orders to complete and forward to the general point of rendezvous, in the north of Germany, their respective contingents; and such was the vigour of the emperor, and the zeal with which he was seconded in every part of his vast dominions, that by the middle of April, not only were the preparations on all sides in a great state of forwardness, but six hundred pieces of cannon, two thousand caissons, and above two hundred thousand men, were converging from the Rhine and the Alps to the banks of the Elbe.*

Seizure of the property of the communes for the public treasury.

These prodigious exertions, however, entailed a vast expense upon the already exhausted French treasury, and seemed to render the resource of loans indispensable, in a country where commercial credit was extinguished, and the powers of capital unknown. On the most moderate calculation, 232,000,000 francs, £9,240,000, required to be raised without delay; and neither by increase of taxation, nor any other method, did it seem practicable to raise a third of the sum. To meet the exigencies of his situation, Napoleon fell upon an expedient, which, though it savoured much in appearance of revolutionary spoliation, was yet essentially distinguished from the measures of the Constituent Assembly and Convention, by the compensation which it provided for the parties whose property was seized. Justifying the proposal by the necessities of the public situation, the minister of finance, Count Molé, proposed that a public law should authorize the sale of all the heritable property belonging to the municipalities, public hospitals, and communes: the treasury receiving the price, and the incorporated bodies interested being inscribed, for the amount of the price received, as creditors in the books of the public funds. Landed property was to be exposed at the rate of twenty, houses of fifteen years' purchase. So considerable was the corporate property still existing in the Empire, that it was calculated its sale would produce the large sum of 370,000,000 francs, or nearly £15,000,000. To encourage intending purchasers, one sixth of the price only was to be paid down at the purchase, another sixth in three months, and the remaining two thirds at remote periods. The orator, in making this proposal, compared Napoleon to Charlemagne, "ordering the sale of the useless herbs in his gardens, when his hand was distributing to his people the spoil of conquered nations." But, lest any unpleasant inquiries should be instituted by a refractory Legislature into the produce of these sales, or the distribution of these spoils, it was announced that "the deputies of all the provinces of the Empire should come to the capital to receive, *every three years*, the accounts of the public revenues:" indicating thus, in no equivocal manner, that the legislative functions of the Chamber of Deputies were to cease, and that they were to be assembled only at the interval of years to give a formal sanction to the public expenditure. Molé concluded, after a review of the flattering condition of the Empire, with these words: "If a man of the age of the Medicis, or of Louis XIV., were to revisit the earth, and at the sight of so many marvels, ask how many ages of peace and glorious reigns had been required to produce them, he would be answered, twelve years of war and a single man."†‡

* Senat. Cons., April 3, 1813. Moniteur. Thib., ix., 237, 239. Sav., vi., 41, 42. Fain, i., 35, 37.

* Jom., iv., 256, 258. Sav., vi., 41, 42. Thib., vi., 238, 239. Fain, i., 36, 38.

† Molé's Report, Feb. 5, 1813. Moniteur, and Goldsmith, vi., 141, 142. Thib., ix., 209, 210.

‡ Count Molé's speech contained some details regarding the progress of the great work of forming a *cadastre*, or gen-

A small proportion only, however, of the funds calculated upon from the sale of this corporate property, was actually realized. The whirlwind of disaster in which the French were involved at the close of the year, and the invasion of the allies in the spring following, both prevented the completion of the sales, and the collection even of the ordinary revenue, in a great many provinces. By successive decrees of the 11th and 16th of November, 1813, large additions were made to the indirect taxes, particularly on salt and the *droits reunis*, as also thirty additional centimes were added to the direct taxes. The produce of these different sources of revenue was estimated at 190,000,000 francs, £4,440,000; but the burden was merely nominal: little, if any of it, was actually levied. All sorts of violent expedients were adopted to raise money; and, by the admission even of the partisans of Napoleon, the imposition of arbitrary and illegal taxes became usual.* The overthrow of the imperial arms in Spain and Germany, and the refluence of its legions over the Rhine and the Pyrenees, at once prostrated the financial affairs of the Empire; for they threw the troops upon the resources of France itself, and, by putting an end to the requisitions on foreign states, and the system of making war maintain war, at once revealed the total disproportion between its financial capabilities and its military establishment.†

Failure of the financial measures and arbitrary exactions.

The national resources of the French Empire, as they were developed in these memorable reports, and evinced in these strenuous exertions, are the more worthy of attention, that this was the LAST EXPOSITION of them which was made to the world: this was the political testament of Napoleon to future ages. The disasters which immediately after crowded round his sinking Empire, and the extraordinary difficulties with which he had to contend, prevented anything of the kind being subsequently attempted; and when order and regularity again emerged from the chaos, under the restored Bourbon dynasty, France, bereft of all its revolutionary conquests, and reduced to the dimensions of 1789, possessed little more than two thirds of the territory, and not a fourth of the influence, which it had enjoyed under the emperor. To the picture exhibited of the Empire at this period, therefore, the eyes of future ages will be constantly turned, as presenting both the highest point of elevation which the fortunes of France had ever attained, and the greatest assemblage of national and military strength which the annals of modern times have exhibited.

Lasting interest of this last *exposé* of the Empire by Napoleon.

Wonderful, however, as its strength was, and worthy as the efforts made by France at this period to repair the disasters of the Russian campaign, and assert the national independence, are of the highest admiration, and clearly as they will ever rank this among the brightest eras of its long and glorious annals, to the sober eye of historic observation it was already apparent, what the event soon demonstrated, that, though overflowing with the martial passions, and not yet wholly drained of the physical strength of war, the Empire was almost destitute of that durable resolution, that disinterested ardour, which, springing from a sense of moral obligation, independent of individual ambition, prepares men to discharge their duty alike in the shade of adverse as in the sunshine of prosperous fortune. The forces of the French Empire, however vast and unprecedented, were stimulated by no other passions but those of temporal ambition; the power of the emperor, immense as it was, owed its ascendency entirely to the influence of worldly success. While victory attended their efforts, the hosts of warriors who clustered round the imperial eagles were faithful to their sovereign, brave in arms, indefatigable in exertion; but it is not while "fanned by conquest's crimson wing" that the real motives of human conduct can be made apparent. Ambition then often produces the same effects on external conduct as devotion, selfishness as patriotism, the passion for distinction as the heroism of duty. It is adversity which is the real touchstone of mortality; it is the breath of affliction which lays bare the human heart. The inhabitants of France, since the Revolution, have ever been unable to stand this searching ordeal; that dreadful event closed the fountain from which alone the strength to endure it could have been derived. Resplendent when glittering in the sunshine of victory, invincible when fanned by the gales of conquest, the Empire of Napoleon withered and perished under the grasp of misfortune. The high resolves, the enduring constancy, the heroic self-denial of patriotic resistance, were wanting in its vast and varied inhabitants. No Saragossa there showed that courage can supply the want of ramparts; no shepherds of Tyrol, that patriotism can inspire the rudest breasts with heroic devotion; no flames of Moscow, that the splendour of civilization can coexist with the energy of the desert. All the springs which the world can furnish to sustain the fortunes of an empire were in full activity, and worked with consummate ability; but one was wanting, without which, in the hour of trial, all the others are but as tinkling brass—a belief in God, a sense of duty, and a faith in immortality.

Moral weakness of the Empire, notwithstanding its immense physical resources.

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eral valuation of the lands of the Empire, to regulate the public assessments which Napoleon had so much and so justly at heart. It was begun in 1808; but such was the immensity of the labour with which the work was attended, that in 1813 little more than a fifth of the territory of the Empire was completed. The progress already made, however, showed clearly the importance of the undertaking, the weight of the French direct taxes, and the frightful inequalities which, from its want, existed in the collection of the revenue. "Out of 47,000 communes," says the report, "10,000 have been measured, and of these 10,000, 6000 valued. The *cadastre* has already proved, that the land-tax does not exceed an *eighth part of the nett revenue* of the properties; and, nevertheless, one proprietor pays a *third*, and another not *a fifteenth*: an incredible disproportion, which the *cadastre* is intended to rectify."—Count MOLE'S *Report*, February 5, 1813. *Moniteur*.

* "It was at this period that the commencement of imposts, plainly illegal, took place. It was about the same period that measures were adopted which were not less arbitrary in other departments; but the difficulties of the crisis rendered them unavoidable."—SAVARY, vi., 40.

† Thib., ix., 213, 214. Sav., vi., 40, 41.

CHAPTER LXIX.

RESURRECTION OF GERMANY.

ARGUMENT.

Immense Sensation produced in Europe by the Moscow Campaign.—Unbounded Transports in Prussia and Northern Germany.—Cruelties inflicted on those engaged in Schill's Conspiracy.—Enormous pecuniary Exactions levied by the French in Prussia.—Great Impression which the Moscow Campaign produced in that Country.—Convention of General D'York.—Embarrassments of the King, and his Disavowal of the Convention.—Progress of Events in Prussia.—Measures of D'York to gain Time.—Retreat of the French Army through Lithuania to Prussia.—Continued Retreat to the Oder.—Abandonment of the Army by Murat.—Able Measures of Eugene to arrest the Evil.—The Russians pass the Oder and occupy Berlin, and the French retire across the Elbe.—Death of Kutusoff, and Occupation of Berlin by the Russians.—Departure of Frederic William from Berlin, and great Levy in his Dominions.—Universal and noble Outbreak of patriotic Spirit in Prussia.—Extraordinary Rapidity with which the Army was Recruited.—Admirable Organization in Prusia, which turned this Spirit to the best Account.—Continued Difficulties, and Indecision of the King.—Manner in which Napoleon received the pacific Advances of Prussia.—Treaty of Kalisch.—Energetic military Measures adopted by Prussia.—Progress of the Negotiation between that Country and France.—Real Motives of the War in Hardenberg's Proclamation.—Answer of Maret on the Part of France.—Additional Conventions at Kalisch.—Ineffectual Attempts to induce Saxony to join the League against France.—Failure of all Attempts of the Allies to gain over Saxony.—Negotiations with Austria.—First Measures of Austria after the Moscow Retreat.—Secret Negotiation between the Cabinet of Vienna and England.—Austria begins to arm, to give Weight to her Mediation.—Announcement by Austria of an armed Mediation, and Arrival of Count Narbonne.—Austria more decidedly inclines to the Coalition.—Remonstrances of Napoleon against the Austrians, and Metternich's Reply.—Negotiations with Sweden and Denmark.—Treaty of Orebro between England and Sweden.—Accession of Denmark to the Side of Napoleon.—Negotiations between the Allies and Murat.—Energetic Measures of Prussia in Support of the War.—Fermentation on the Left Bank of the Elbe.—Formation of the Landwehr and Landsturm in Prussia.—Positions of the French on the Elbe when the Russians crossed it.—Disposition and Numbers of the French Troops in the Fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder.—Disposition and Strength of the Prussian Forces.—Forces and Position of the Russians.—Occupation of Hamburg by the Allies.—Insurrection in Bremen, and Defeat of Morand at Lunenburg.—General Insurrection between the Elbe and the Weser.—Advance of the Allies to the Elbe.—Wittgenstein's Approach to that River.—Combat of Mockern, and Retreat of Eugene across the Elbe.—Napoleon's Measures before setting out for the Army.—His Arrival at Mayence, and great Preparations there.—Napoleon's Efforts to augment his Forces at that Point.—Bad Condition of the Cavalry and Artillery.—Forces of Napoleon at this Period.—Inferiority of the Allies at the Opening of the Campaign.—Aspect of the Russian Troops which entered Dresden.—Appearance of the Prussian Troops there.—Noble Spirit by which they were animated.—Habits of the Emperor and King at Dresden, and Respect which they both paid to Religion.—Confusion and Disorder on the French Line of March.—Approach of the two Armies to each other.—Position and Measures of the Allies.—Combat at Posarna, and Death of Marshal Bessières.—Movement and Position of the French.—Allied March and Plan of Attack.—Battle of Lutzen.—Commencement of the Action, and Success of the Allies on the Right.—Napoleon's Measures to repair the Disorder.—Counter Movements of Wittgenstein.—Napoleon hastens to the Right to restore the Battle.—Prodigious Efforts of both Parties at the decisive Point.—Conflict of the Berlin Volunteers and French Conscripts.—Final Charge of the French Guard.—Night Attack of the Allied Horse on the French Line.—Aspect of the Field of Battle.—Loss on both Sides, and Reflections on the Battle.—Retreat of the Allies to Dresden.—Beautiful Appearance of that City on the Approach of the French.—Entry of Napoleon into Dresden.—His Preparations for the Passage of the Elbe.—A Passage is effected at the Capital.—Return of the King of Saxony to Dresden, and his final Adherence to the Cause of Napoleon.—Alarming State of the Negotiations with Austria.—Mission of Count Bubna to Dresden, and Stadion to Bautzen.—Napoleon's secret Proposals to Russia at this Period.—Forces of the opposite Armies at Bautzen.—Description of their Position there.—Reconnoisance of Napoleon, and Disaster of Ney's Wing on his Left.—Balanced Success of the French there.—Disposition of the Allied Army in their Position.—General Aspect of their Position.—Passage of the Spree, and Commencement of the Action.—Severe Combat on the French Right.—Violent Battle in the Centre.—Result of the first Day's Fight.—Battle on the 21st.—Success of the Russians on the Right.—Progress of the Battle in the Centre and on the Left.—Great Effects of the Movement of Ney on the Left.—Pritzlez is taken by Blucher, and Ney checked.—Grand Attack of Napoleon on the Allied Centre.—The Allies resolve to retreat.—Sublime Spectacle when the Allied Army retreated and the French pursued.—Napoleon's Proposal for a Monument on Mont Cenis to commemorate this Epoch.—Admirable Conduct of the Emperor Alexander during the Battle.—Loss on both Sides.—Combat of Reichenbach.—Death of Duroc.—Mournful Scene at Night around the Tent of Napoleon.—General Despondence of the French Generals.—Retreat of the Allied Armies towards Leignitz.—Combat and Defeat of the French at Hainau.—Continuance of the Retreat to Leignitz and the Oder.—Reasons which induced the Allied Sovereigns to desire an Armistice.—Great Satisfaction of Napoleon at the State of Affairs.—Reasons which, nevertheless, induced him to desire an Armistice.—Important Partisan Successes in the French Rear.—Attack on the French Depôt at Leipsic.—Capture of Hamburg by the French.—Progress towards an Adjustment of an Armistice.—Difficulty in arranging its Terms as to the Line of Demarcation.—The Line is at length fixed on.—Conditions of the Armistice.—Perfidious Attacks on Lutzow's Corps, and Wound of Körner.—Great Talent displayed by Napoleon in this Campaign.—Ruinous Effects of this Armistice on the Fortunes of Napoleon.—Singular Manner in which it arose out of the Austrian Alliance.—Sublime Spectacle exhibited by Germany at this Period

Immense sensation produced in Europe by the Moscow campaign.

FUTURE generations of men, living under the shadow of their own fig-trees, engrossed in the arts of peace, and far removed from the excitements and miseries of war, will hardly be able to credit the contemporary accounts of the sensation produced in Europe by the result of the Moscow campaign. The calamity was too great to be concealed; the blow too dreadful not to resound throughout the world. Napoleon himself, enamoured of powerful impressions, and strongly excited by the awful nature of the disaster he had sustained, revealed its magnitude in his twenty-ninth bulletin in its full proportions: his subsequent arrival in Paris demonstrated to the world that he regarded his army as virtually destroyed, and that all his hopes were centred in the new host which he was about to collect in the French Empire. The broken bands and woful crowds which, bereft of everything, in tattered garb, and with haggard visages, traversed the Prussian territory rather like ghosts or suppliants than armed enemies, gave confirmation strong of the extent of the calamity. A universal thrill was felt over all Europe at this awful catastrophe, which, commencing with the flames of Moscow, and terminating with the waves of the Berezina, seemed to have been sent by a special messenger of the Almighty to break the arm of the oppressor, and strike off the fetters of a captive world. In England, especially, the sense of deliverance gave rise to unbounded trans-

ports: the anxieties, the burdens, the calamities of twenty years' warfare were forgotten; and even the least sanguine ceased to despair in a cause in which Providence itself appeared to have at length declared against the aggressor, and the magnitude of the disaster he had sustained was such that it seemed to be beyond the power of human exertion to repair.

Unbounded transports in Prussia and Northern Germany.

But if these were the feelings with which the inhabitants of Europe, who had known the war only by its excitements and its burdens, regarded this portentous event, what must have been the feelings with which it was regarded in Prussia and the north of Germany? In Prussia, yet prostrated by the thunderbolt of Jena, and groaning under six years of subsequent bondage — which mourned its dead queen, its lost honour, its halved territory; and which, as the last degradation in the cup of the vanquished, had been compelled to wear the colours and serve in the ranks of the oppressor, and strive to rivet on others the same chains by which itself was enthralled; in Germany, in which every noble heart and every intrepid arm had been long enrolled in the secret bands of the Tugendbund, and where nothing was wanting but a leader and royal standard to occasion a general and irresistible outbreak against French oppression. Ever since the abortive attempt at liberation in 1809, the severity of the imperial rule had been materially increased in the states of Northern Germany. Mutual distrust prevailed. The French authorities, aware of the profound hatred with which they were universally regarded, sought, by additional acts of cruelty, to strike terror into the vanquished. The Germans, seeing no end to their miseries, sought refuge in deeper and more wide-spread conspiracy, and submitted to present suffering in the anticipation of approaching vengeance.*

Cruelties to those engaged in Schill's conspiracy.

Abominable acts of cruelty had added a yet deeper hue to the general feelings of execration with which the government of Napoleon was regarded, from the never-ending weight of the military contributions. Twenty citizens of Vienna had been shot before the French armies evacuated the town, to repress the general effervescence; and eleven officers of Schill's corps, all belonging to the first families at Berlin, had been executed for their adherence to his cause: they died, after embracing each other, singing patriotic hymns. But their fate, deplorable as it was, became soon an object of envy to their companions in that heroic enterprise, whose lives had been spared: all the volunteers in the queen's regiment, the noblest youths in Prussia, were conducted with a chain about their necks, to the great depôt of galley slaves at Cherbourg, and there employed in common labour in the convict dress, with a four-and-twenty pound bullet fastened round their ankles, amid the common malefactors, without being permitted any communication with their parents, or their even knowing whether they were dead or alive; while the never-ending demands of Count Daru and the French military authorities still exhibited claims to the amount of nearly a hundred millions of francs (£4,000,000) for unpaid arrears of the war contributions of Prussia, to the account of which they refused to ascribe upward of ninety-four millions of vouched payments, or furnishings in kind, extracted at the point of the bayonet from that unhappy country in the course of the Moscow campaign.*†

Enormous pecuniary exactions levied by the French in Prussia.

The pecuniary exactions which had been made from Prussia, and the requisitions in kind which had been extracted from its unhappy inhabitants during the last year, would exceed belief, if they were not attested by contemporary and authentic documents. From these it appears that no less than 482,000 men and 80,000 horses had traversed Prussia in its whole extent in the first six months of 1812, and that more than one half of this immense force had been quartered for above three months in the Prussian provinces. By the convention of the 24th of February, 1812, the furnishings made for its support were to be taken in part payment of the arrears, amounting still to nearly a hundred millions of francs, which remained unpaid of the great military contributions of 640,000,000 francs (£24,000,000) levied on Prussia after the battle of Jena.‡ But though the French authorities, with merciless rapacity, made the new requisitions, they never could be brought to state them, in terms of the treaty, as a deduction from the old ones. The French host, like a cloud of locusts, passed over the country, devouring its whole subsistence, plundering its inhabitants, and wrenching from them, by the terrors of military execution, the whole cattle, horses, and carriages within their reach. The number of the former carried off, before September in the single year 1812, in East Prussia alone, amounted to 22,700; of the cattle, to 70,000; while the carts seized were 13,349. The weekly cost of Junot's corps of 70,000 men, quartered in Lower Silesia, was 200,000 crowns, or £50,000, and all the rest of the army in the same proportion. These enormous contributions were exclusive of the furnishings stipulated to be provided by the state by the treaty of February 24, 1812, which were also rigidly exacted,◊ and of the arrears of the great contribution of 1806, the collection of which had become, from the total exhaustion of the country, altogether hopeless.‖

So early as the 20th of December, the mag-

* Capefigue, Hist. de l'Empire, viii., 248, 249. Hard., vii., 12, 15.

* Capef., Hist. de l'Empire, viii., 248, 249. Hard., Report, March 16, 1813. Fain, ii., 246.

† The eleven noble Prussians thus unworthily sacrificed to the jealous apprehensions of Napoleon, were in the first instance brought to Verdun as prisoners of war, but from thence they were speedily conducted to Wesel, where they were delivered over to a military commission, and sentenced to be shot. The judgment was pronounced at noon; but before six in the morning their graves had been dug in the fosses of the citadel. When the executioners were about to bind one of the victims, named Widelle, to his brother, he exclaimed, "Are we not already sufficiently bound by blood, and the cause in which we are engaged, to be spared this last act of insult?"—See *Defense des Officiers de la Troupe de Schill, par M. J. N. Pirwez, leur defenseur, Liege*, 1814, p. 29.

‡ *Ante*, ii., 244.

◊ These furnishings were as follow: 200,000 quintals of rye; 24,000 of rice; 48,000 of dried vegetables; 2,000,000 bottles of brandy; 2,000,000 of beer; 400,000 quintals of wheat; 650,000 of hay; 750,000 of straw; 6,000,000 pecks of oats; 44,000 oxen; 15,000 cavalry horses; 6000 quintals of powder; 3000 of lead; 3600 wagons, harnessed, with drivers; hospital and field equipage for 20,000 sick.—See SCHOELL, ii., 279.

‖ Exposé de la Conduite du Gouv. Fran. envers la Prusse, Schoell, Recueil, ii., 277, 2.9.

Great impression which the Moscow campaign produced in Prussia.

nitude of the disasters which the Grand Army had sustained was known at Berlin; and the king, apprehensive for the fate of his troops in the general ruin, had sent full powers to General D'York, their commander, to act according to circumstances. Meanwhile, the agitation in the capital daily became more violent: every successive arrival from the army brought fresh accounts of the accumulated disasters it had undergone; and at length the appearance of the wo-stricken fugitives who entered, the precursors of the deathlike, mutilated bands who followed, left no doubt that an unheard-of catastrophe had occurred.* Augereau, who commanded there, was so much alarmed by the sinister reports which these scattered fugitives diffused among the inhabitants both of the metropolis and its garrison, that he wrote to the emperor that it would be expedient, in order to be able at once to stifle any insurrectionary movement, to establish a powerful cordon of troops in the principal towns on the Oder. In the midst of the general agitation, however, Frederic William and his able minister Hardenberg continued perfectly tranquil; and both Augereau and the French ambassador Saint Marsan wrote to the emperor that they had no reason to complain of their conduct, and that the cabinet of Berlin would remain firm to the French alliance.† But the stream of events was soon too violent to be withstood, and Prussia was impelled into the career of honour and danger, despite the prudent caution of its court, by one of those circumstances which defeat all the calculations of human wisdom.

December 22, 1812.

It has been already noticed,‡ that when the retreat and overthrow of the Grand Army uncovered the right flank of Marshal Macdonald's corps, who was engaged in the blockade of Riga, he began his retreat towards the Niemen, closely followed by the Russians under General Diebitch, who harassed his flank and rear in the most distressing manner. After marching several days in this manner, Diebitch, by a skilful manœuvre, interposed a small body of troops between the Prussians and the remainder of Macdonald's corps, and immediately sent a flag of truce to inform the commander of the former, D'York, that he was entirely cut off, and proposing to enter into a convention for the safety of his corps. D'York, deeming it his first duty to secure in the general wreck the Prussian corps under his command, who were fifteen thousand strong, entered into secret negotiations with Diebitch, in order to secure the unmolested retreat and safety of these auxiliary forces; and, after repeated conferences, a convention was concluded between the two commanders at the mill of Potcherau, on the 30th of December, 1812, by which it was stipulated that the Prussian troops should remain for two months in a state of neutrality, even in the event of the government directing them to resume operations with the French armies; and that, if the convention was not ratified by the Emperor of Russia or the King of Prussia, the Prussian corps was to be at liberty to follow the destination which might be assigned to it. On the other hand, the Russian commander agreed to restore to the Prussian general all his stragglers, and the whole cannon and *matériel* of every kind which might fall into his hands. This convention, which was justified in General D'York's letter to Marshal Macdonald by the critical situation of his troops, which left him no alternative but to "lose the greater part of his troops, and the whole *matériel* and provisions of the army, or to conclude a convention which might save them both," was in reality founded on ulterior and more important views. Of their existence D'York betrayed a secret consciousness; and it was plain that he was aware he was throwing either for the crown of a patriot or the scaffold of a traitor, when he used the expression, in his letter announcing the convention to Marshal Macdonald, "Whatever judgment the world may pass on my conduct gives me little uneasiness. My duty towards my troops, and the most mature reflection, have dictated this step; motives the most pure, whatever appearances may be, have alone guided me." What these motives were was revealed in the following passage of D'York's despatch to the King of Prussia announcing the event, which was suppressed in the copy furnished to the French ambassador: "Now or never is the time for your majesty to extricate yourself from the thraldom of an ally whose intentions in regard to Prussia are veiled in impenetrable darkness, and justify the most serious alarm. That consideration has guided me: God grant it may be for the salvation of the country!"†

Convention of General D'York.

Dec. 30, 1812.

Never was a monarch more embarrassed by a step on the part of a lieutenant than the King of Prussia was on this occasion. His first words were "Here is enough to give one a stroke of apoplexy!" It was not merely the extreme hazard and incalculable consequences of the event which

Extreme embarrassment of the king, and his disavowal of the convention.

* "On Sunday forenoon last I went to one of the gates, and found a crowd collected round a car, in which some wounded soldiers had just returned from Russia. No grenade or grape could have so disfigured them as I beheld them, the victims of the cold. One of them had lost the upper joints of all his ten fingers, and he showed us the stumps; another looked as if he had been in the hands of the Turks—he wanted both ears and nose. More horrible was the look of a third, whose eyes had been frozen, the eyelids hung down rotting, the globes of the eyes were burst, and protruding from their sockets. It was awfully hideous; but a spectacle more horrible still was to present itself. Out of the straw in the bottom of the car, I now beheld a figure creep painfully, which one could scarcely believe to be a human being, so wild and distorted were the features; the lips were rotted away, the teeth stood exposed: he pulled the cloth from before his mouth, and grinned on us like a death's head; then he burst out into a wild laughter, gave the word of command in broken French, with a voice more like the bark of a dog than anything human, and we saw that the poor wretch was mad—mad from a frozen brain! Suddenly a cry was heard, 'Henry! my Henry!' and a young girl rushed up to the car. The poor lunatic rubbed his brow at the voice, as if trying to recollect where he was; then he stretched out his arms towards the distracted girl, and lifted himself up with his whole strength; but it was too much for his exhausted frame—a shuddering fever fit came over him, and he sunk lifeless on the straw. Such are the dragon teeth of wo which the Corsican Cadmus has sown."—FORSTER *to* KORNER, *January* 14, 1813. *Erinnerungen aus dem Befreiungskriegen in briefen gesammelt von* FRIEDRICH FORSTER, *Stutgard*, 1840.

† Augereau to Berthier, Dec. 22, 1812, and St. Marsan to Napoleon, Jan. 4 and 12, 1812, Hard., xii., 12, 13.

‡ *Ante*, iii., 395.

* Convention, Dec. 30, 1812. D'York to Macdonald, Dec. 30. Fain, ii., 202, 203. Hard., xi., 459, 460.

occasioned the difficulty: in the breast of Frederic William a tempest of contending emotions and opposite considerations instantly arose, almost sufficient to overturn the strongest head. Deeply impressed with the sanctity of his existing treaties with France, and feeling, as every man of honour would, that the obligation to maintain them inviolate was only rendered the more stringent by the disasters which had overwhelmed the imperial armies, he yet could not forget the cruel indignities to which he had been subjected: his insulted queen; his halved territory; his oppressed people; and he saw clearly that the agitation in his dominions was such, that it was not improbable that the people would, ere long, take the matter into their own hands, and, whatever the government might do, join the Russians as soon as they advanced into the Prussian territory. In this dilemma the king remained, though with a heavy heart, faithful to his honour and the French al-
Jan. 5, 1813. liance: orders were immediately despatched to supersede General D'York in his command, which was conferred on General Kleist; the former was put under arrest, and ordered to Berlin to stand his trial, while the latter was directed to conduct the Prussian contingent as rapidly as possible to the headquarters of the Grand Army. Meanwhile, Hardenberg, desirous to turn to a good account the present extraordinary crisis, and to regain for Prussia some part of its ancient splendour in return for its fidelity to its engage-
Jan. 12. ments, submitted to the French ambassador at Berlin, with the approbation of the king, a proposal for a still closer union between the two states, to be consolidated by the marriage of the Prince Royal of Prussia with a princess of the family of Napoleon, and to raise the Prussian contingent in the emperor's service to sixty thousand men.*

There can be no doubt that these proposals on the part of the Prussian cabinet at this period were sincere; and, accordingly, there appeared, a few days after, a proclamation in the Berlin Gazette formally condemning D'York's convention, and ordering him to be delivered over to a council of war. In truth, the court were still dazzled by the lustre of the emperor's power; they conceived that Austria, restrained by the marriage of Marie Louise, would remain firm in the French alliance, and that France, far from being overthrown, would soon rise more powerful than ever.† Napoleon, however, very naturally recollecting the injuries which Prussia had received at his hand, and supposing that the protestations on the king's part were entirely hypocritical, and that the convention had been concluded agreeably to his secret instructions, did not accede to these propositions; but, regarding the die as already cast, immediately on

Progress of events in Prussia.

the receipt of the intelligence of D'York's defection, ordered the great levy of three Jan. 13.
hundred and fifty thousand men, which has been already mentioned;* and meanwhile the march of events in Prussia was so rapid as to defeat all human calculation, and whirl the government, willing or unwilling, into the dangers and the glories of war.†

D'York, whose firmness of character was equal to the hazardous part which he had to play, while his prudence was adequate to its delicacy, had no sooner received a copy of the Prussian Gazette of the 19th, containing the king's formal disavowal of the convention, and his own dismissal from the command, than he published a counter proclamation, in which he declared that the aid-de-camp, Natzmer, who was said in the Gazette to have been sent with these orders to Kleist, with directions himself to enforce them, had not arrived either at the headquarters of that general, nor at his own; and that, as he could not recognise the authenticity of a printed gazette, he would continue his command till formally superseded. In this resolution he was unanimously supported by his troops, who remained inactive under his orders within the Russian lines; and the non-appearance of the aid-de-camp with the formal orders made it probable that the king was now at length preparing to take a decided part, and that the defection of D'York would possibly become the prelude to an abandonment by the cabinet of Berlin of the French alliance.‡

Measures of D'York to gain time.

Jan. 27.

In truth, such had been the magnitude of the French overthrow, and the rapidity with which the Russians had advanced in their pursuit, that the northeast of Germany was almost denuded of their troops, and amid the exulting shouts of the inhabitants, the Russian advanced guards were already appearing among them. Such had been the havoc which had been made in the French array,◊ that, out of

Retreat of the French army through Lithuania and Prussia.

* *Ante*, iv., 26.

† Hard., xii., 14, 15. Proclamation of Jan. 19, 1813. Fain, i., 217.

‡ D'York's Declaration, Jan. 27, 1813. Fain, i., 219.

◊ The details of the survivers of the wreck of the Grand Army, when compared with those who entered the Russian territory, are very curious: they are as follow:

Troops which entered from first to last, *vide Ante*, iii., ...		647,158
Deduct Schwartzenberg's corps	34,148	
Macdonald's ditto	32,497	
		66,645
Grand Army of Napoleon, properly so called....		580,513
Recrossed the Niemen.		
1. French.		
Imperial Guard.....	800	
Remains of the Moscow army....	9,000	
Grand Jean's division.....	5,000	
Durutte's ditto.....	3,000	
Franzisko's ditto.....	1,000	
Total French.....	——18,800	
2. Allies.		
Saxons.....	6,000	
Bavarians, including 3,000 in Thorn.....	7,000	
Westphalians.....	1,900	
Wirtembergers.....	1,000	
Baden and Hessians.....	1,500	
Poles, without the garrisons of Zamosc and Modlin.....	6,000	
	——23,400	
Total who escaped....	42,200	42,200
Lost in the Moscow campaign		538,313

—See SCHOELL, x., 179; and PLOTHO., *Camp. de* 1813 and 1814, ii., 437; and FAIN, i., 64.

* St. Marsan to Duc de Bassano, Jan. 5 and 12, 1813. Fain, i., 207, 212. Hard., xii., 13, 14.

† "The King of Prussia at this time was far from regarding France as overthrown: he believed, in spite of secret assurances to the contrary, that Austria would remain firm in the French alliance. He resisted only any farther pecuniary sacrifices, which had become impracticable; but promised, if he got money, to raise 50,000 or 60,000 men for the service of the emperor, announcing, at the same time, that, if his country became the seat of an insurrection, it would speedily extend to all Germany."—HARDENBERG, xii., 13, 14.

six hundred thousand combatants who, from first to last, had entered the Russian territory with the Grand Army, only forty-two thousand had recrossed the Niemen, of whom not nineteen thousand were native French. Murat, whom the emperor had left in command of the army, led back those shattered bands through Lithuania to Königsberg and Dantzic; while Schwartzenberg retired by a diverging line to Pultusk, in order to regain the Austrian frontiers, so that, both by position and subsequent policy, the two imperial hosts were irrevocably separated from each other. Wittgenstein, with the advanced guard of his corps, crossed the Niemen, and entered the Prussian territory in the middle of December;* and it was his advance—while cutting off the communication between Macdonald's corps, which was blockading Riga, and the remains of the Grand Army, retiring towards Dantzic—that rendered necessary the retreat of the former, and gave rise to the convention with D'York already mentioned, which led to such important results.

Dec. 12. Dec. 15. Dec. 30.

The French generals were at first hopeful that they would succeed in maintaining the line of the Vistula; but the defection of the Prussians, and the just apprehensions which that occasioned as to their communications with France, joined to the exhausted and demoralized state of the troops, soon rendered it apparent that this was impossible. In truth, the activity of Wittgenstein gave them no leisure for preparation. On the 15th of January his vanguard crossed the Vistula, spreading everywhere, as he advanced, proclamations calling upon the inhabitants to take up arms and join in the great work of liberating the world from the thraldom of the oppressor.† Wittgenstein's troops marched in two columns, the one by Königsberg and Elbing on Berlin, the other by Friedland and Tilsit on the same capital. Pillau, with a garrison of twelve hundred men, capitulated to these troops early in February, and they continued their march without opposition, everywhere received with enthusiasm as deliverers, through Old Prussia. The second column, composed of Platoff's Cossacks and some light cavalry, moved to the left of the former, straight on Dantzic, where it arrived on the 24th of January, and immediately commenced the blockade of that important fortress. The third, under the orders of Tchichagoff, advanced through East Prussia, and arrived in the middle of January at Marienburg. The fourth, under Tormasoff's command, were with the headquarters of the Emperor Alexander, and the commander-in-chief Kutusoff, recently and worthily invested with the title of Prince Kutusoff Smolensko: it arrived at Plozk early in February, having advanced from Wilna through Lithuania. The fifth, under the direction of Miladowitch, Sacken, and Doctoroff, followed a diverging line to the southward, moving by Grodno on Jalowke, following the footsteps of Regnier and Poniatowski, who retired towards the Upper Vistula; while Schwartzenberg, unable to contend against such an inundation of hostile forces, concluded a separate convention, in virtue of which Regnier was allowed to retire towards Saxony, and the Austrians, in like manner, were permitted to withdraw, without disturbance, into Galicia. The whole force of these five columns comprised originally a hundred and ten thousand men; but such was the reduction of numbers in the Russian main army, from the ravages which fatigue and the severity of the climate had made in their ranks, that not more than thirty-five thousand men could be assembled round the headquarters of the Emperor Alexander, which arrived at Kalisch in the end of February, and remained there till the beginning of April.*

Continued retreat to the Oder.

Jan. 15. Feb. 7. Jan. 24. Jan. 15. Feb. 5. Jan. 17. Feb. 24.

It would have been a difficult matter even for Moreau or Turenne, at the head of the mutilated and discouraged remains of the French army, to have maintained their ground on the Vistula against a victorious, though grievously reduced body of enemies, advancing over an extended line of above two hundred miles in breadth; but Murat was totally inadequate to the task. Brave as his own sword in the field, and gifted with the eagle eye which could seize with advantage the most favourable direction for a charge of horse, he was utterly destitute of the moral courage, extensive combination, and enduring patience requisite for a general-in-chief intrusted with an important command. Disaster succeeded disaster during the brief period of his direction. The advanced guard of Wittgenstein surprised Marienwerder near the Vistula on the 16th of January, where Prince Eugene had his headquarters, and with such success, that the prince only succeeded in cutting his way through by desperate efforts, and with the loss of six hundred killed and wounded, and a thousand prisoners. The line of the Vistula, thus broken and menaced by the doubtful temper of the Prussian people in rear, could no longer be maintained. Six thousand men were hastily thrown into Thorn, eight thousand into Modlin, and four thousand into Zamosc; while a motley group of stragglers, hardly a half of whom were in a condition to bear arms, crowded into Dantzic, where they sought refuge behind formidable ramparts, and were brought into some sort of order under the stern rules of its governor, Rapp. Meanwhile, Murat, who had retired to Posen, in East Prussia, more than a hundred miles in the rear, despairing of the salvation of the army, and conceiving the time was come when every one in the wreck of the emperor's fortunes should look to his own interest, suddenly threw up his command, and set out by post for his own dominions in the south of Italy. Napoleon justly stigmatized this desertion of his

Retreat and abandonment of the army by Murat.

Jan. 16. Jan. 17.

* Schoell, x., 183, 184. Jom., iv., 220, 221. Fain, i., 63, 64.

† "The Russian warriors have avenged the infamous invasion of their territory: they have annihilated the enemy who inundated it, and they are now engaged in pursuing the scattered remains of that immense army which has been sacrificed to the insatiable thirst for conquest which characterized the tyrant. Worthy neighbours, we cross your frontiers solely in order to pursue the flying remains of the common foe, the enemy of the human race. We have no other object but to conquer a desirable and honourable peace. We do not enter your territory as enemies, but as friends. Property shall be sacred, and the most exact discipline preserved."—WITTGENSTEIN'S *Proclamation, Jan.* 13, 1813. SCHOELL, *Recueil*, i., p. 11, 12.

* Jom., iv., 223, 224. Schoell, x., 185, 187. Fain, i., 64, 67.

post by the commander-in-chief at such a crisis as a decisive indication of his want of moral resolution* and gratitude to his benefactor. "I suppose," said he in a letter to Murat, "that you are among the number of those who think that the Lion is dead: if so, you will find that you are mistaken. You have done me all the mischief in your power since my departure from Wilna; your elevation to the throne has turned your head. If you wish to preserve it, conduct yourself properly."†

Able measures of Eugene to arrest the evil.

Eugene, upon whom the command was thus reluctantly forced at this perilous crisis, did all that coolness and resolution could suggest to stem the torrent of disaster. His first care was to fix the headquarters at Posen, and keep them there for three weeks, in order to give an opportunity to the stragglers to come in, and communicate a certain degree of order to the retreat, which was daily more rapidly turning into a flight; but the mischief already done by the dislocation of the army was irreparable, and the forces under his command, after the loss of those left in garrison on the Vistula, were so Feb. 12. inconsiderable, hardly amounting to fifteen thousand men, that he was, in the end, compelled to fall back to the Oder. Nor did the garrisons left on the Vistula effect in any degree the desired object of retarding the enemy: notwithstanding the number of men, little short of thirty thousand, who were under his command in Dantzic, such was the misery and destitution of their condition, that Rapp was unable to attempt any external operations to retard the enemy. Thorn and Modlin were merely blockaded by the Russian reserves under Barclay de Tolly. A sufficient number were assembled before Dantzic to keep its garrison in check. Warsaw was, early in February, evacuated Feb. 7. by the Austrians, who retired from the whole grand-duchy of Lithuania, which was immediately occupied by the Russians; while the main body of their force still pressed on with unconquerable vigour, though in the depth of winter, towards the Oder. Winzingerode, with a large detachment of Russian horse, Feb. 13. soon after overtook Regnier and his Saxon infantry at Kalisch: a sharp conflict ensued, which terminated in the overthrow of the Saxon foot, who were irrevocably separated from their horse, the former being driven back in the direction of Glogau on the Oder, while the latter were forced to an eccentric retreat by the fort of Czentoschau towards the southern parts of Poland, where they sought protection under the shelter of the retiring Austrian columns. Eugene, perceiving from these disasters that he could no longer maintain his posi-
tion at Posen, broke up from thence on Feb. 12. the 12th, having, by his resolute stand there, restored a certain degree of order to his troops, and gained time for the first columns from France and Italy to arrive on the Elbe and the Oder. On the latter stream, where he arrived on the 18th, he met the corps of Gen- Feb. 18.
eral Grenier, fifteen thousand strong, which had come up from Italy. This re-enforcement raised Eugene's forces to thirty thousand infantry, besides a thousand horse; and with this respectable body he hoped, with the aid of the strong line of fortresses on its banks, which were still in the hands of the French, to be able to make head against the Russians until the arrival of the great re-enforcements which Napoleon was raising in France.*

The Russians pass the Oder and occupy Berlin, and the French retire across the Elbe.

The line of the Oder, however, notwithstanding all these advantages, proved as little capable of being made good as that of the Vistula had been. Early in March the advanced guard of Wittgenstein's column, under the command of Prince Repnin, passed the Oder at Gustebuzé Zellin, between Stettin and Custrin, while Winzingerode at the same time crossed it near Glogau. It was no longer possible either to maintain the line of the river, thus pierced through in all directions, or to retain possession of Berlin, now in an alarming state of fermentation. Eugene, accordingly, evacuated that capital on the March 2. night of the 2d of March, and, after throwing three thousand men into the strong fortress of Spandau, in its vicinity, withdrew all his forces in the direction of Wit- March 10.
tenberg, and cantoned them behind the Elbe. Supported by the strong fortresses of Torgau, Magdebourg, Wittenberg, as well as the intrenched camp of Pirna, so famous in the Seven Years' War, and the feebler ramparts of Dresden, it was hoped they might at length make a stand, the more especially as the Russians necessarily left behind a number of men during their rapid advance, and not more than twenty thousand of their troops had yet penetrated into Prussia. There, accordingly, Eugene collected his forces, and terminated his long and mournful retreat from the Niemen, a distance of nearly four hundred miles; while, by drawing to his standard the whole troops in Pomerania, as well as all the Saxons and Bavarians who were within reach, he contrived to muster nearly forty thousand men for the defence of the great military barrier of the Elbe, even after deducting the garrisons left in the fortresses on the Oder.†

Death of Kutusoff, and occupation of Berlin by the Russians.

Meanwhile, the Russians, though severely weakened by their prodigious march, and the necessity of blockading so many fortresses, advanced with extraordinary vigour and expedition. While Alexander still remained at Kalisch, Kutusoff, following on the traces of the retreating enemy, advanced his headquarters to Buntzlau; but there that gallant veteran, whose sword had delivered Russia in the extremity of its peril, and achieved the overthrow of the mightiest armament of which history has preserved a record, terminated his eventful career. His constitu-
tion, already almost exhausted by the March 6.
hardships and fatigues of the campaign, there sank under an attack of the malignant typhus

* "The king, your husband, abandoned the army on the 16th. He is a very brave man on the field of battle, but he is weaker than a woman or a monk when he does not see the enemy. He has no moral courage."—NAPOLEON *to his sister* CAROLINE, *queen of Naples, 24th of January*, 1813. FAIN, i., 65.

† Napoleon to Murat, Jan. 26, 1813. Fain, i., 65, 66. Hard., xii., 80. Thib., ix., 195

* Fain, i., 70, 72. Schoell, x., 186, 187. Jom., iv., 223, 225.

† Jom., iv., 261, 262. Fain, i., 72, 73. Schoell, x., 186, 187.

fever, which, springing, as usual, from the effects of famine and misery, had hung upon the traces of the retreating French army, and already begun to spread out in that frightful epidemic, which proved as fatal to their ranks as the snows of Russia, and for the next four years visited and spread its ravages through every kingdom in Europe. The Emperor of Russia was much embarrassed in the choice of his successor: the claims of Barclay de Tolly, whose immortal retreat from the Niemen to Borodino had gained for him the admiration of every military man in Europe, while his generous and unabated zeal in the public service, under the orders of Kutusoff, had proved that his patriotic spirit was equal to his military ability, being balanced by the distrust which the soldiers entertained of him as a foreigner, who had not yet been rendered illustrious by any signal victory, and whose principal achievement had been that of retiring before the enemy. Moved by these considerations, Alexander, though with reluctance, relinquished his desire to reinstate him in the supreme command, and conferred it on Count Wittgenstein, whose gallant stand on the Dwina had contributed so powerfully to the success of the campaign, and whose recent exploits on the Berezina had inspired the soldiers with that confidence which brilliant triumphs, if accompanied by tolerable conduct, seldom fail to produce. His first steps were eminently calculated to increase this favourable disposition. Following up the retiring French columns, he approached the Prussian capital: the Cossack advanced guard traversed Berlin, on the 4th of March, amid the enthusiastic shouts of the inhabitants; and on the 11th the headquarters of the whole army were transferred to that city, while Cara St. Cyr, with all the troops he could collect on the Lower Elbe, threw himself into Hamburg: the whole right bank of that river was evacuated by the French troops, and Magdebourg and Wittenberg became the principal pivots on which the viceroy's army, charged with the defence of the upper part of its course, rested.*

March 11.

It was impossible that this rapid and uninterrupted course of success, inducing, as it did, the liberation of the whole Prussian monarchy from the grasp of the enemy, with the exception of a few blockaded fortresses, should not have had an immediate and powerful effect on the dispositions of the Prussian cabinet. The first indications of the disposition of Frederic William to set himself free from the fetters with which he had so long been enchained, was evinced by his sudden departure from Potsdam, where he then resided, on the night of the 23d of January, for Breslau, where he arrived on the 25th. The motive of this journey, however, was not by any means to break at once with France; on the contrary, the vehement sallies against that country, which were breaking out on all sides, were repressed by order of the court, and every effort made to restrain the open declaration of the national feeling, now become so excited as to be almost incapable of repression. The real object of the monarch and his cabinet was, to place himself in a situation where he was no longer exposed, as at Berlin, to the danger of seizure by the French generals; and where, in a place of at least temporary security, he could pursue those measures which, by putting Prussia in a respectable posture of defence, might enable it to take advantage of the present crisis to recover a portion of its lost territories and fallen consideration in Europe. The king individually, however, still inclined to the French alliance, from a sense of personal honour; and Prince Hatzfield, who had been despatched to Paris on the first intelligence being received of D'York's convention, reiterated the offers on which the cabinet of Berlin was still inclined to draw more close the bonds of connexion with the French emperor, and bring to his support a powerful army of sixty thousand men. But in order to support these offers, and put Prussia in a condition to stipulate advantageous terms with either party to which it might ultimately incline, warlike measures of the most decisive kind were adopted by the government. By a royal decree, dated Breslau, February 3, an appeal was made, on the preamble that the country was in danger, to young men of all ranks, from the age of seventeen to twenty-four, not subject to the legal conscription, to enter the army, in order to form companies of volunteers, to be annexed to the regiments of infantry and cavalry already in the service; declaring, at the same time, that no young man between these years, who had not served in the ranks in one or other of these ways, should obtain any honour, distinction, or employment from the government; while, by a still more urgent appeal on the 9th of the same month, all grounds of exemption from the legal service in the army were declared suspended during the continuance of the war. By an edict on the day following, it was declared that, though the previous decree had fixed the age from seventeen to twenty-four as that in which service was in this manner required, yet it was not thereby intended to limit the right of enrolment to those who, being above the age of twenty-four, might still be desirous to serve their country: so that, in effect, the whole youth of the kingdom were summoned round the royal standard.*

Jan. 11.

Feb. 3.

Feb. 9.

Departure of Frederic William from Berlin, and great levy in his dominions.

Jan. 23.

But no denunciations of royal displeasure if backwardness was evinced, no exhortations to stand by their country in the hour of peril, were needed to make the Prussian youth fly to arms. Though the intentions of government were not yet authentically known, and a degree of uncertainty, in fact, at that period pervaded the councils of the cabinet of Berlin which the nation little suspected, yet many facts had occurred which conspired, with the unanimous wish of the people, to render the belief universal that a breach with France and an alliance with Russia were in contemplation. The convention of D'York, which, though formally disapproved of by the king, had not yet practically led to his being deprived of the command of his corps; the unresisted

Universal and noble outbreak of patriotic spirit in Prussia.

* Aperçu de la Camp. de 1813, 27, 28. Jom., iv., 262. Schoell, x., 186, 187.

* Decrees 3d and 4th Feb., 1813, Schoell, x., 192, 193. Hard., xii., 27, 28.

march of the Russian troops across the whole Prussian territory; the transports of joy with which they had been received in the principal cities;* the general fermentation which pervaded all ranks of the people, from an undefined sense of approaching deliverance; the direction of the king's journey from Potsdam to Breslau, where he was in the line of the Russian advance, instead of Magdebourg, where he would have been in the centre of the French power; joined to the invitation to the whole youth of the kingdom to rally round the national standard, on the solemn announcement that the country was in danger—all conspired to spread a universal belief that the disasters of Jena and Auerstadt might yet be effaced, and that the last stake for national salvation was about to be thrown. Incredible was the ardour which this conviction excited among the Prussian youth. The young men of all classes, brave, ardent, and impetuous as their ancestors in the days of Arminius and Witikind, had been excited to the very highest degree of indignation by the unbounded license and rapacity which, under the imperial banners and by the imperial authority, French cupidity had so long exercised in every part of the country. Now was the appointed time; now was the day of salvation. And nobly did the Prussian youth on that crisis discharge their duty to their country and mankind. Could old Frederic have risen from his grave, he might well have been proud of his people; and the patriots of every future age will recur to it as one of the brightest spots in the annals of history.†

Extraordinary rapidity with which the army was recruited.

On all sides, and in every directien, there was one unanimous cry for arms. Such was the rapidity with which the volunteers crowded in, that the government functionaries, so far from being in a condition to serve out to them military weapons, were not even able, for a considerable period, to inscribe their names. Nine thousand enrolled themselves in Berlin alone, in the first three days: a city not, at that period, containing above a hundred and eighty thousand inhabitants.‡ The same spirit prevailed in every part of the country. Universally, the villages were filled with robust multitudes crowding in to enrol their names as volunteers; the schoolhouses in the rural districts, the offices of the municipality in the burghs, were surrounded, from morning till night, with dense masses, demanding arms to save their country. The generous ardour burned with peculiar vehemence in the youth at the universities, a very numerous class in Germany, and among whom the associations of the Tugendbund and the Burchenschaft had spread far and wide the utmost enthusiasm in the cause of their country, and the most unbounded hatred of French domination.* The ministers of state —Stein, Hardenberg, Dohna, and Scharnhorst —were secretly allied to these associations, and did their utmost to emancipate the mind of the king from the bonds by which he still conceived himself tied to the alliance with Napoleon; while their agents — Professor Jahn, Ficht, Arndt, and Massenbach—more openly fanned the patriotic flame,† and produced that unbounded enthusiasm which made Prussia rise as one man at the call of the fatherland.

Admirable organization in Prussia, which turned this spirit to the best account.

But patriotic ardour and devotion, however important elements in military strength, are not of themselves capable of creating an army: discipline is necessary, training is required; previous organization and preparation must come to the aid of present courage and enthusiasm. In these vital particulars, without which their utmost efforts at the moment would, in all probability, have proved entirely unavailing, Prussia already stood pre-eminent; and the wisdom of her government had provided both the framework in her army, and the practical experience among her people, capable of at once turning the whole strength of the nation to warlike achievement. The admirable system has already been mentioned,‡ by which the Prussian cabinet, under the direction of Stein and Scharnhorst, taught wisdom in the salutary school of adversity, though restricted by the treaty of Tilsit to an army of forty-two thousand men, had contrived, in reality, to have a hundred and twenty thousand on foot, by limiting the period of service which each individual was bound to serve to two or three years, and maintaining a number of volunteers ready to enter the regular army on the first vacancy, who, though not formally enrolled, were already instructed in the rudiments of the military art. The young men thus selected were the flower of the nation; no rank, wealth, or station were taken as an excuse: three years' military service, beginning with the musket on the shoulder, were as indispensable to the sons of the king as to the offspring of the humblest cottager in the land. To adapt the army to the feelings and habits of the elevated classes who thus, without exception, passed through its ranks, the severe laws of German discipline had been abrogated; the old system of promoting only according to seniority relaxed, in order to make way for the advancement of talent and ambition, and numerous institutions established, calculated to awaken the sentiment of honour in the breast of the soldier, and make him consider the loss of it as his greatest humiliation. Nor had less care been bestowed upon the *matériel* of the army than the composition

* On the 10th of February the ladies of the town of Newstettin, where the Prussian general, Bulow, had his headquarters, gave a ball to the gay and adventurous young Russian general, Chernicheff. Two days afterward, Bulow's cantonments were opened to afford a passage to the light troops of the enemy across the Oder.—FAIN, i., 69.

† Schoell, x., 193. Hard., xii., 34, 35.

‡ "No sooner was the king's proclamation known than every man straightway hastened to clap his 'heart' on his breast: the next day not a single person was to be seen in the streets without the national symbol. Our colours, indeed, are not brilliant—white and black; but the white shall express the purity of our cause—the black our mourning for the fatherland, and our stern determination to avenge it. We shall add red when we return triumphant from the combat; from out of blood and death freedom shall grow."—VON B. *to* FORSTER, *Berlin, 17th March*, 1813. FORSTER, 108.

* "Germany is up; the Prussian eagle awakens in all hearts the great hope of German, at least Northern German, freedom. My muse sighs for her fatherland; let me be her worthy disciple. Yes, dearest father, I have made up my mind to be a soldier; I am ready to cast away the gifts that fortune has showered upon me here, to win myself a fatherland, were it with my blood."—THEODORE KÖRNER *to his Father, Vienna, 10th of March*, 1813. *Deutche Pandora*, 87.

† Hard., xii., 34, 35. Schoell, x., 193. Cond., Camp. of 1813–14.

‡ *Ante*, ii., 567.

and extension of its ranks. By purchases made in Austria, or manufactories of their own recently established, they had succeeded in procuring a hundred and fifty thousand muskets in excellent condition; the fieldpieces, which had been almost entirely lost in the disastrous campaign of 1806, had been restored by melting down the bronze cannon in the fortresses, and replacing them by substitutes of iron; eight fortresses, still in the hands of the national troops, had been put in a respectable posture of defence, and a train of artillery and caissons, adequate for a hundred and twenty thousand men, was already prepared. Add to this, that the losses of the Prussians in the last campaign had been by no means in the same proportion as those of the French, or of the contingents of the other German states; the snows of Russia had only swallowed up two batteries of horse artillery, which Napoleon had accidentally met in Russia, and forced, contrary to the treaty, to accompany him to Moscow; and D'York's convention had preserved his corps from those disasters which had proved so fatal to the other divisions of the army.* Thus it was that Prussia, even though reduced to half her former territory and population by the treaty of Tilsit, was able to reappear with such distinction on the theatre of Europe, and that previous wisdom and foresight of her government enabled her to turn to such marvellous account the present burst of patriotic enthusiasm among her people.

Continued difficulties and indecision of the king.

But, while these efforts were made by the Prussian people, in the fond belief that the part of their government was decidedly taken, and that the war of liberation was at hand, the king was still undecided to which side he should incline; and it required all the efforts of his own ministers, and all the obstinacy of Napoleon, to throw him into the arms of Russia. Not that the monarch was ignorant of the spirit which pervaded his subjects, or felt less keenly than in former years the innumerable injuries and insults he had received from France; but he had a serious dread of violating a subsisting treaty of alliance, for the rupture of which no new cause of adequate magnitude could be assigned; and he was strongly attached to that system of temporizing which had so long been the ruling policy of Prussia, which is, perhaps, necessarily the resort of the weaker state when exposed to collision with the stronger, and which had only been abandoned, on the eve of the battle of Jena, to precipitate the state into the abyss of misfortune. His views in the beginning of February were still essentially pacific, and were directed to establish Prussia in a state of armed neutrality between France and Russia, on condition that the fortresses on the Oder should be restored to his arms, and that the former power should withdraw its forces behind the Elbe, and the latter behind the Vistula.† Such a measure would have been highly advantageous to Napoleon, by enabling him to recall to his standards above fifty thousand veteran troops, now blockaded in the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder, and to recommence the contest in Germany, if an accommodation proved impossible, with many additional chances in his favour. At the same time, Hardenberg reiterated to Saint Marsan, the French ambassador, the most solemn assurances that "the system of the king had undergone no alteration; that no overtures, direct or indirect, had been made to Russia; that he awaited with unequalled anxiety a reply from Paris; because, in the present posture of affairs, if the emperor approved the steps he had taken to secure the neutrality of Silesia, and would give some pecuniary assistance to Prussia, the alliance would be contracted more closely than ever; and that nothing but despair would throw him into the arms of Russia."*

Feb. 5.

There can be no doubt that these protestations on the part of the Prussian monarch were sincere, and that it only lay with Napoleon, by giving him some pecuniary assistance, and repaying a portion of the enormous war contributions, amounting to 94,000,000 of francs (£3,650,000), which had been levied on his dominions in the preceding campaign, to secure the cabinet of Berlin in the French alliance, and gain an auxiliary force of sixty thousand men to aid him in defending the course of the Elbe. It was to these points, and, above all, assistance in money, which, in the exhausted state of Prussia, was an indispensable preliminary to any military efforts, that all the exertions of Frederic William were directed.† But Napoleon was inexorable. He was firmly convinced that these protestations of fidelity on the part of the Prussian monarch were mere devices to gain time; that the policy of the court was determined, and even that, if it were not, such was the vehemence of the national feeling, that it would ere long force the cabinet into the Russian alliance. He deemed it, therefore, useless to dissemble any longer, and told General Krusemarck, who had been sent from Breslau to conclude the negotiation, that he was not disposed to furnish arms to his enemies; and that he would give Prussia no pecuniary assistance nor relief whatever.‡ This refusal, concurring

Manner in which Napoleon received these advances from Prussia.

* Hard., ix., 467, 467, and xii., 34, 35. Schoell, x., 190, 192.

† "The king has conceived the idea that nothing would contribute more powerfully to advance the great work of peace than a truce, in virtue of which the French and Russian armies should mutually retire to a certain distance, and leave the intermediate country unoccupied between them. Would the Emperor Napoleon be disposed to enter into such an arrangement? Would he consent to restore the fortresses on the Oder, and that of Dantzic, to the Prussian troops jointly with the Saxons, and to retire his army behind the Elbe, provided the Emperor Alexander withdrew his beyond the Vistula?"—HARDENBERG'S *Note*, 15*th February*, 1813, HARDENBERG, xii., 32.

* St. Marsan to Berthier, 15th February, 1813. Fain, i., 235 and 239. Hard., xii., 32.

† "Tell the emperor, that, as to pecuniary sacrifices, they are no longer in my power; but that, if he will give me money, I can raise and arm 50,000 or 60,000 men for his service. I am the natural ally of France: by changing my system of policy I would only endanger my position, and give the emperor grounds for treating me as an enemy. I know that there are fools who regard France as struck down; but you will soon see it present an army of 300,000 men, as brilliant as the former. I will support all the sacrifices required of me to secure the prosperity and future welfare of my family and people."—FREDERIC WILLIAM'S *words*, *in* Saint MARSAN *to* Duke of BASSANO, 12*th January*, 1813. FAIN, i., 213.

‡ "The refusal, on the emperor's part, of any pecuniary aid to the account of his claims for war contributions; the noise made about the affair of D'York; above all, the refusal to agree to his proposal, that he should negotiate for the neutrality of Silesia, have awakened anew all the king's alarm, and persuaded him that his ruin was resolved on. It

with an active correspondence which at the same period was going on between Hardenberg and Kutusoff, after the arrival of the Emperor Alexander at Kalisch, relative to the neutrality of the Prussian States, on which the king was so anxiously bent, gave great additional weight to the numerous party in his council who were inclined to the Russian alliance; and at length, with great difficulty, they obtained his consent, but only the evening before it was signed, to the TREATY OF KALISCH, the foundation-stone of that grand alliance which so soon after accomplished the overthrow of Napoleon and deliverance of Europe.*

Feb. 28, 1813.

By this treaty, an alliance, offensive and defensive, was established between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia for the prosecution of the war with France; and, in order to carry it on with vigour, it was stipulated that the former should bring a hundred and fifty thousand men into the field, the latter eighty thousand, independent of the garrisons of the strong places. Neither of the contracting powers was to conclude either a peace or a truce without the consent of the other; they were jointly to make efforts to induce the cabinet of Vienna to join their alliance, and to lose no time in treating with England, in order that Prussia might obtain those subsidies of which she stood so much in need to complete her armaments. The treaty was to be kept secret for two months, but, in the mean time, privately communicated to England, Austria, and Sweden. Such were the public articles of this important treaty; but the secret conditions were still more material to the future interests of the Prussian monarchy. By these, the Emperor of Russia engaged never to lay down his arms until Prussia was reconstituted, in all respects, statistical, financial, and geographical, as it had stood not only anterior to the war of 1806, but with such additions,† especially in the way of uniting the old provinces to Silesia, as should give it more consistence, and render it an effectual bulwark of the Russian Empire.

Treaty of Kalisch ratified, March 1.

Frederic William, who was only brought to accede to this treaty with the utmost difficulty,‡ was well aware that his political existence was thenceforth wound up with the success of Russia in the German war. His first words, after agreeing to the alliance, were, "Henceforth, gentlemen, it is an affair of life and death." Great pains, accordingly, were taken to conceal the treaty from the knowledge of the French ambassador; but, notwithstanding every effort, its existence soon transpired; and

Energetic military measures adopted by Prussia.

was a report he received of an intention on the part of the French to carry him off, which originated with a French officer, which occasioned his departure from Potsdam to Breslau." "If the emperor conceives it for his interest to preserve Prussia, and will do a little for it, he will have no difficulty in gaining his point; it will be very easy to retain the king in the line he has hitherto followed."—Saint MARSAN *to* MARET, *15th February*, 1813. FAIN, i., 236, 237.

* Saint Marsan to Maret, Feb. 15, 1813. Fain, i., 235, 237. Jom., iv., 261. Hard., xii., 32, 33.

† See the Treaty in Martens, Sup., iii., 234, and Schoell, xii., 548.

‡ "The King of Prussia," said Napoleon, "in his private character, is a good, loyal, and honourable man, but in his political capacity he was unavoidably forced to yield to necessity. You were always the master with him when you had force on your side and the hand uplifted."—LAS CASAS, ii., 365.

Alexander having arrived at Breslau from Kalisch in the middle of March, the terms of intimacy on which the two monarchs lived could no longer be concealed, and it was justly thought unnecessary to dissemble any longer. Two days afterward, accordingly, the conclusion of the treaty was intimated to the French ambassador, Saint Marsan, at Breslau, and on the same day to the minister of foreign affairs at Paris. Shortly before, a royal edict had appeared, which declared the conduct of Generals D'York and Massenbach entirely free from blame in the convention with the Russian general Diebitch; and these steps were followed, on the 19th of the same month, by one more decisive, which pointed to the formidable national war which was about to be raised against the French in Germany. By this convention it was stipulated between Russia and Prussia, "1. That they should forthwith issue a proclamation, to announce that they had no other object but to rescue Germany from the domination of France, and to invite all lesser princes to concur in that great undertaking, under pain of losing their states. 2. To establish a Central Council of Administration, composed of a delegate from each power, in order to govern provisionally the conquered districts, and divide the revenue between Russia, Prussia, and the Regency of Hanover. 3. To organize all the countries between Saxony and Holland, with the exception of the possessions of the house of Hanover and the ancient Prussian provinces, into five great sections, each with a civil and military governor at its head; and, lastly, to organize in these provinces both an army of the line and a levy *en masse*. Four days afterward, the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine was announced by a proclamation of Prince Kutusoff, one of the last acts of his glorious career; and the Duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin gave the first example of patriotic devotion, by publicly renouncing his connexion with that league, into which he had been one of the last and most unwilling to enter.*

March 14.

March 16.

March 11.

March 19.

March 23.

When acts of hostility so decisive were in progress on both sides, and injuries so deep had been inflicted on the one hand, and were preparing on the other, it is of little moment to recapitulate what were the ostensible grounds of complaint put forth by the respective cabinets. These, as usual in diplomatic manifestoes, did not contain the real grounds of hostility; inconsiderable causes of dissension were put forward to conceal more serious ones, too deeply felt to be mentioned. Prussia, on her part, independently of the innumerable vexations and injuries inflicted on her people since the peace of Tilsit, rested on three recent grounds of complaint: the refusal by the French government to enter into any accounting for the immense furnishings in kind, amounting to 93,000,000 of francs, made by her provinces during the last campaign, or admit them as articles of charge against the arrears of contributions, or advance any part of the pay due by France for the Prussian contingent; the refu-

Progress of the negotiations between Prussia and France.

* Mart., xii., 565. Schoell, Recueil, iv., 335. Hist. des Trait., x., 195, 196.

sal on their part, also, to recognise, or sanction, in any form, the neutrality of Silesia, for which the King of Prussia had so anxiously contended, and which was established by the convention of the 24th of February, 1812; and the arbitrary assumption of command taken over Bulow's corps, which, without the consent of the king, had been placed under the orders of Marshal Victor. In reply, the French government, without denying that the accounting for which the cabinet of Berlin contended was well-founded in principle, maintained that the accounts of furnishings, for which they claimed credit, were not accurately nor sufficiently vouched; that the exemption from the passage of troops, which the convention of the 24th of February, 1812, secured for a part of the Silesian province, could not be construed as importing an entire neutrality; and that the Prussians had little cause to complain of Bulow's corps having been put under Victor's orders, when, during the alliance between the two countries, his corps had previously admitted a passage through its ranks to the Russian troops on their route to the Oder. On these mutual recriminations, it seems sufficient to observe that the Prussian complaints seem well founded on the first head, and the French on the last two; for it is clear that the cabinet of Berlin had as good cause for insisting that the enormous requisitions levied on their people should be taken into account in settling the arrears of pay and war contributions, as that of the Tuileries had for representing the passage of the Russians through Bulow's corps as an infringement of the alliance, and the much-sought neutrality of Silesia as an unwarranted extension of the article in the former treaty, concerning the passage of troops through that province. But it is superfluous to enter into any lengthened detail on the subject, when the ostensible grounds of complaint on both sides were so widely different from, and immeasurably inferior to, the real causes of the war. Prussia struck for the delivery of Germany, France for the preservation of her European dominion.*†

Two additional conventions were signed at Kalisch, immediately after the declaration of war, for the farther regulation of the vast interests of insurgent Germany, with which the Russian and Prussian monarchs were now charged. By the first, Count Kotzebue and Baron Stein were appointed members of the administrative council created by the Convention of Breslau, on the part of Russia, and Shoen and Rediger on that of Prussia. These functionaries were directed to proceed forthwith to Dresden, and assume the administration of the whole countries lying on the right bank of the Elbe;* while, by the second, minute directions were laid down for the provisioning, billeting, and marches of the Russian armies, as long as they should remain in the Prussian territories.

Additional conventions at Kalisch, April 4 and 7.

The open adhesion of Prussia to the Russian alliance, and the advance of their united armies in all quarters to the shores of the Elbe, had immediately the effect of rendering the insurrection universal on its right bank; but Saxony was still undecided, and though the ferment was almost as vehement in its provinces as the Prussian States, yet no symptom of approbation of it had yet been given by the government, and it was well known that the vast benefits the king had received from the French emperor had bound him to his interests by very different bonds from those which retained the other states of the Rhenish Confederacy in their allegiance. The reputation, however, which the King of Saxony had justly acquired for justice and probity rendered it of great importance to obtain the moral weight of his adhesion to the Germanic league, and his states lay so immediately in the theatre of war, between the two contending armies, that it was

Ineffectual attempts to induce Saxony to join the league against France.

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* See Prussian Manifesto, March 16, 1813. Fain, i., 243, 249, and Moniteur, 1813, No. 95.

† The real motives and reasons of the war were summed up in a clear manner in the concluding paragraph of Prince Hardenberg's declaration of war: "The king, in his political conduct since the peace of Tilsit, has had mainly in view to secure to his people a state of tranquillity, in order to give them the means of raising themselves from the abyss of misfortune into which they had been precipitated. With that view he has submitted, with the resignation which circumstances rendered imperative, to the arbitrary exactions, the enormous burdens, the vexations without end, to which he has been subjected. The circumstances in which Prussia has been placed since the conclusion of the last campaign are known to all the world. Reduced to its own resources—abandoned by the power to which it was bound, and from which it could not obtain even common justice—with two thirds of its provinces exhausted, and their inhabitants reduced to despair—it was compelled to take counsel for itself, and to find in its own people the means of salvation. It is in the fidelity and patriotism of its subjects, joined to generous sympathy of a great power which took compassion on its situation, that the king could alone find the means of extricating himself from his difficulties, and regaining the state of independence which can alone secure the future prosperity of the monarchy."

Real motives of the war in Hardenberg's proclamation.

To this it was replied by M. Maret, on the part of the French government: "As long as the chances of war were favourable to us, your court remained faithful to its engagements; but scarcely had the premature rigours of winter brought back our armies to the Niemen, than the defection of General D'York excited the most serious suspicions. The equivocal conduct of your court in such a serious conjuncture, the departure of the king for Breslau, the treachery of General Bulow, who opened to the enemy a passage to the Lower Oder, the publication of ordinances, calling a turbulent and factious youth to arms, the assembly at Breslau of the well-known leaders of the disturbing sects, and the principal instigators of the war of 1806, left no doubt of the intentions of your cabinet; the note of the 27th of March has given us no surprise. His majesty prefers an open enemy to an ally always ready to abandon him. What can Prussia now do? It has done nothing for Europe; it has done nothing for its ancient ally; it will do nothing for peace. A power whose treaties are considered as binding only so long as they are deemed serviceable, can never be either useful or respectable. *The finger of Providence is manifest in the events of last winter;* it has produced them, to distinguish the true from the false friends of his majesty, and to give him power to reward the one and punish the other. His majesty feels for your situation, M. Baron, as a soldier and a man of honour, on being obliged to sign such a declaration."—*Vide* HARDENBERG'S *Note, 16th March*, 1813, and MARET'S *Reply, 1st April*, 1813. FAIN, i., 243, 260, and 265.

Answer of Maret on the part of France.

It was stated in Krusemarck's final note of 27th of March, 1813, that "during the last campaign, while the state exhausted all its resources to provide in the public magazines the stipulated furnishings in kind, the French armies lived at free quarters on the inhabitants. The French authorities insisted upon *both* the literal performance of the treaty and the daily support of the troops. They carried off, by main force, the sacred property of the inhabitants, without giving them either any account or indemnification; and in this way Prussia has lost 70,000 *horses and above* 20,000 *chariots*." Baron Fain does not deny these exactions, but only alleges that they were unavoidable, and that they would have been carried to the credit of the arrears of contributions due by Prussia.—See FAIN, i., 260.

* Schoell, x., 198, 199. Martens, Sup., v., 566, 569, and Schoell, x., 551.

of the last importance to secure without delay the support of his forces in the field, and the protection of the strong fortresses which he held on the Elbe. The allied sovereigns, accordingly, from the very first, spared no efforts to induce him to join the league; but nothing could shake the firmness of Frederic Augustus, and he declared he would share the fortunes of his benefactor, whatever they might be. While history must remark with admiration the fidelity of this upright monarch to his engagements,* which seemed to increase with the disasters which had dissolved those of so many other states, it must yet lament the unhappy combination of circumstances which thus put his private honour at variance with his public duty, and rendered it impossible for him to adhere to his engagements without sacrificing the interests of his country.

Failure of all attempts to gain over Saxony.

The advance of the Russian troops towards Dresden, in the end of February, rendered it no longer possible for the king to remain in that capital, and he accordingly abandoned it on the 24th of February, after issuing a proclamation, in which he declared his resolution never to separate his cause from that of his tried benefactor and powerful ally.† On the 9th of April the King of Prussia addressed a letter to the King of Saxony, in which he expressed "a hope that all the German princes will seize with eagerness an opportunity, which will certainly not again present itself, of shaking off the chains of France, by which they are fettered, and which have so long plunged these once flourishing countries in misery and ruin."

April 9.

April 16. Frederic Augustus, however, returned for answer that "he was guided solely by a regard for the good of his dominions, and respect for the engagements which he had contracted;" and thenceforward all negotiations between the parties ceased, and Saxony remained permanently attached to the fortunes of Napoleon.‡

Negotiations with Austria.

Important as these negotiations were, they yet yielded in magnitude and interest to those which at the same period took place between the cabinets of St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna, with a view to detach Austria from the French alliance; and which, in their ultimate effects, came to exercise a decisive influence upon the issue of the war.

First measures of Austria after the Moscow retreat.

It may readily be believed that the unparalleled disasters of the Moscow campaign produced as powerful a sensation at Vienna as elsewhere in Europe; and that the strong party there, who had always been hostile to the French alliance, deemed the time at last arrived when Austria might regain her lost provinces, and resume her wonted station on the theatre of Europe. The earliest letters of M. Otto, the French ambassador there, accordingly, after the Moscow catastrophe was known, contained the most vivid pictures of the vehemence of the public feeling, and of the loud declarations that the power of France was irrevocably broken; that all Germany would speedily rise to assert its independence; and that Austria would deservedly perish if, at such a crisis, she so far forgot what was due to herself, as the ancient head of the Germanic Empire, and her obvious present interests, as to adhere to the withering alliance of the French emperor. So powerful and general was this feeling, that it required all the firmness of M. de Metternich to withstand the torrent; and he was exposed to no small obloquy by attempting to moderate it.* But his line of policy, from the first, was decidedly taken. Aware that Austria, placed midway between the two, had as much to fear from the colossus of Russia as that of France, his great object was to improve the present juncture in such a way as to make it turn as much as possible to the advantage of his own country, and give her the means of maintaining her independence in the midst of the terrible contest which was approaching, and was likely soon to shake to its foundation every European monarchy. With this view, while he protested, with perfect good faith, that Austria would not take part against the French Empire; that she was sincerely devoted to its interests; would not open a negotiation with England without its privity; and would make use of the great influence which circumstances had given her to dictate a general and durable peace, he, at the same time, made no secret of his perfect acquaintance with the magnitude of the disasters the Grand Army had undergone; of the vast league, at the head of which Austria, if so disposed, might now place herself; and of the loud clamour which was now raised by fifty millions of men for her to assume that station.†‡

* Schoell, x., 199. Proclamation of the King of Saxony, Feb. 23, 1813, ibid., p. 200.

† "Faithful to our alliance, we reckon with confidence on the success which, if our wishes for peace are not heard, will await us from the aid of our powerful ally, the active succour of the confederated princes, and the approved valour of our brave soldiers."—*Proclamation of* FREDERIC AUGUSTUS, *Feb.* 23, 1813, SCHOELL, x., 200.

‡ Schoell, x., 201, 202.

* "In their fury against France, the war faction has never ceased to attack, in every possible manner, the first partisan of the French alliance, Count Metternich. Not a day passes without some new device being fallen upon to discredit him, and it is currently reported by them that he will be replaced by M. de Stadion."—COUNT OTTO *to* MARET, 28*th Dec.*, 1812. Fain, i., 292.

† M. Otto to Maret, Dec. 28, 1812, and Jan. 8, 1813. Fain, i., 290, 295.

‡ "'If Austria,' said Metternich to me, 'were now to take another line, she would soon have 50,000,000 of men on her side: all Germany and Italy would join her' It is evident that he wishes to make a merit of not joining against us at a moment when they suppose us less powerful than the Russians, and when the most flattering offers—Italy, the Illyrian provinces, and the supremacy in Germany—are made to induce them to join the Russian league. Nevertheless, he does not underrate our advantages, for yesterday morning he said to me, 'Russia is too deeply implicated with England to be in a condition to treat alone. You may believe what I say; we have a thousand ways of arriving at the truth which are not open to you. Cajoled, as they imagine, by all your enemies, we easily elicit from them their most secret thoughts. We will not open any direct communication with England without your authority; and we will do so in the manner you wish, assuming the air of a power which acts spontaneously. What have you to fear? We will compromise the English ministry in the eyes of the nation, and take upon ourselves the whole blame of failure. Despite your last reverses, your position is still highly brilliant: it is not the Emperor Napoleon who has the greatest need of peace. If he could bring himself to act on the defensive, he might with ease remain two years on the Vistula: never would the Russians cross that barrier. You will easily preserve the attitude which you had assumed before the war; but it is Germany, Prussia, Poland, and, above all, Austria, which will suffer from such a state of things. It is natural, therefore, that we should, with loud

Secret negotiation between Austria and England.

The intelligence which soon after arrived of the defection of D'York, and the ambiguous attitude of Prussia, augmented the embarrassment of the cabinet of Vienna. Not only were confidential communications made from the foreign office at Berlin and M. Hardenberg, but England came forward with the most generous offers, and even tendered a subsidy of ten millions sterling, to put the imperial armies on a war footing, if the cabinet of Vienna would accede to the European league—a temptation peculiarly difficult to be withstood by a power which, from the result of repeated disastrous wars, and constant diminutions of territory, found its finances in the most deplorable condition. The intelligence from Prussia, however, and the general ferment which it produced throughout Germany, awakened new alarms in the breast of the cautious and far-seeing Austrian minister, lest the Russian influence should be unduly extended during the first transports of German deliverance, and the Revolutionary spirit revived in Europe in the course of the last throe of the struggle for its extinction.* He deemed it most prudent, therefore, to make separate overtures to the cabinet of London, with a view to a general pacification; and although this was done with the knowledge and approbation of the French ambassador, yet his proposals were intended to lay the foundation of separate measures; while, in order to give them the appearance of coming secretly from the Austrian cabinet, he sent M. Wessenberg, the agent employed, by the circuitous route of Copenhagen and Gottenburg, as if by stealth to conceal his motions from the knowledge of the French authorities, though at the same time his whole movements and instructions were communicated by the French ambassador at Vienna to Napoleon. Wessenberg was the bearer of a letter to Lord Castlereagh, in which the mediation of Austria was proposed to put a period to the calamities which desolated Europe; a friendly intervention was all that was yet announced, although Austria was underhand arming, and preparing to throw her weight in the field into the scale against any power which might resist her demands. So completely, however, was the double intrigue thus carrying on by the imperial cabinet concealed from those not immediately in the secret, that Wessenberg was arrested by the French authorities at Hamburg, and only allowed to proceed on his destination after his papers had been examined: a slight which gave great umbrage to the court of Vienna, and threw a sensible chill over the friendly nature of the relations between the two cabinets.†

Meanwhile, the Emperor of Russia sent a confidential agent, M. Stakelberg, to Vienna, in order to sound the imperial cabinet on the project of a European alliance against France: this proceeding was ostensibly quite secret, while Metternich, without making known their real tenour, ostensibly revealed his whole confidential communications to M. Otto, who daily transmitted accounts of them to Paris.* The efforts of Metternich, however, in all this maze of diplomatic intrigue, of which alone he kept the thread, and in which he made all parties believe he was confidential with them alone, were uniform and consistent—to increase the weight of Austria in the estimation of all the powers, by representing her mediation as too important to be rejected, and her aid too powerful to be withheld. To improve the great advantages, however, which circumstances had thus put at his disposal, the Austrian minister added seventy thousand men from the landwehr, or militia, to the regular army: still holding out to the French ambassador, that the object of the armament was to give such weight to the Austaian intervention as to render Russia unable to withstand it.† In order still farther to lull the apprehensions of Napoleon, Metternich lost no opportunity of displaying to the courts of London and St. Petersburg every *apparent* proof of the cordial union subsisting between his cabinet and that of the Tuileries; reiterated the most flattering assurances to the French ambassador of the cordial union, founded on mutual interest, which subsisted between the two powers; and announced his intention of sending Prince Schwartzenberg to Paris still farther to improve it; while in secret he was lending a ready ear to the overtures of both Russia and Prussia, and maintaining a correspondence, veiled in profound mystery, with Hardenberg at Breslau.‡◊

Austria begins to arm, to give weight to her mediation.

Jan. 24.

Feb. 15.

cries, call out for peace.'"—OTTO *to* MARET, *Jan. 3d and 8th*, 1813. FAIN, i., 291, 295.

* "D'York's defection," said Metternich to M. Otto, "affords an instance of what I have so often directed your attention to, the *græca fides* of the Russians, and the embarrassing situation in which, in consequence, the greater part of sovereigns are placed, in respect to their troops and their subjects. Metternich appears to me to labour under the apprehension that the defection of the Prussian troops may become the signal of a revolution, in consequence of which the Russians will profit with their ordinary astuteness, by the first impression which it may create in Poland and Germany."—COUNT OTTO *to* MARET, 11*th of Jan.*, 1813. FAIN, i., 296, 297.

† Otto to Maret, Jan. 21, 1813. Thib., ix., 227, 228.

* After listening to Stakelberg's enumeration of the great advantages gained by Russia, and its disposition to come to the aid of other powers, especially Austria, and enable it to recover its lost provinces, Metternich said, "Listen, my dear Stakelberg; you are like a man who sees the light for the first time, after having been shut up six months in a dark room: the radiance of day dazzles you. Believe me, we see more clearly. The system of the emperor is immovable: it is to think nothing of territorial aggrandizement, which would be too dearly purchased by the expense of a single campaign: he wishes only a general peace, and anxiously desires that you should concur in it."—OTTO *to* MARET, 26*th of Jan.*, 1813. FAIN, i., 301.

† "This first advance of Russia," said Metternich to Otto, "is a great point gained. Rely upon us: we will let nothing slip, absolutely nothing; for we are not less interested in doing so than you. Everything depends on our attitude being imposing. The emperor has ordered 100,000 men to be added to the regular army, including the auxiliary corps. If we had added only 30,000, we should have exceeded the contingent provided by the treaty, and given Russia ground to refuse our intervention. Hitherto the war has not been *Austrian*. If it should become so in the end, it is not with 30,000 men, but the whole forces of the Austrian monarchy, that we will attack the Russians. Meanwhile, they will see us, without disquietude, augment our armies in Galicia, and take good care not to provoke us."—OTTO *to* MARET, 26*th Jan.*, 1813. FAIN, i., 303.

‡ Hard., xii., 64, 65. Otto to Maret, Jan. 25 and Feb. 15, 1813. Fain, i., 303, 305.

◊ "Your alliance with Russia," said Metternich to Otto, "was monstrous: it had no foundation but a most precarious basis—that of the exclusion of the English commerce. It was an alliance resulting from war, and commanded by the conqueror; it could not possibly be of long duration. Ours, on the contrary, is founded on natural and permanent grounds of mutual interest: it ought to be as eternal as the mutual necessities from which it has arisen. It was ourselves who sought it, and we had reflected well before we did so. Could we retrace our steps, we would not deviate

Napoleon, more clearsighted than his ambassador, was not altogether satisfied with his diplomatic relations at Vienna; and, in particular, entertained a not unnatural jealousy of the friendly mediation of a power which, at the moment it professed such cordial feelings of attachment, was adding seventy thousand men to its troops of the line. This feeling of uneasiness was not diminished by the declaration issued by Austria in the middle of February, which announced that her intervention was to be that of an "*armed* mediation;" and called upon the nation to submit to new burdens to enable the government to maintain that station, and "transport the war from its own frontiers." The ominous nature of this declaration was not materially removed by the reiterated assurances of Metternich to the French ambassador, that it was against Russia that all these preparations were directed, and that the most earnest desire of the cabinet of Vienna was to maintain unchanged its amicable relations with France. The emperor began to entertain serious apprehensions that Austria was only dissembling to gain time to complete her preparations; that a good understanding between her and the northern courts was already laying the foundation of a more formidable coalition than France had yet encountered; and that M. Otto had been the dupe of the superior finesse and dissimulation of Metternich. In order to get to the bottom of the affair, he recalled Otto, and sent Count Narbonne to Vienna, to endeavour to penetrate the real intentions of the Austrian cabinet. The polished manners and diplomatic talents of the new ambassador were well calculated to gain the confidence of the aristocratic circles at the imperial capital; but he himself had a presentiment that the case was hopeless before his arrival, and said, on setting out, "When the physician pronounces the case hopeless, they send for the quack."*

Announcement by Austria of an armed mediation, and arrival of Narbonne at Vienna.

Feb. 17.

Count Narbonne arrived at Vienna on the 17th of March. Schwartzenberg, on the Austrian side, did not leave that capital till the 29th, and was only to present his credentials at the Tuileries on the 13th of April, two days before Napoleon set out for the army. Though the new ambassador was received with the most studied attention by the Austrian court, yet circumstances ere long occurred which demonstrated by deeds, more truthful than words, that there was a secret understanding between the cabinet of Vienna and the allied powers. Intelligence of the treaty of Kalisch between Russia and Prussia was received about the same time; and Metternich, finding that the league was every day becoming more formidable, began to be more independent and resolute in his language, while the magnitude and energy of his military preparations clearly evinced that, incline to what side she might, Austria was resolved to act no subordinate part in the strife. Those preparations, and the continued retreat of the Austrian army in Galicia, were the result of the secret understanding between the cabinet of Vienna and that of St. Petersburg, which led, in the end of March, to an accommodation between their respective forces, of which Napoleon justly complained as highly prejudicial to his interests. By this convention it was stipulated that the Russian corps should push out light troops on both flanks of the retreating Austrians; that the Russian general should denounce the termination of the armistice to their commander, assigning, as a pretext, the impossibility of leaving on his own flanks and rear the flame of insurrection, excited by the Polish army under Prince Poniatowsky; that the Russian corps should then advance with a force at least equal to that of the Austrians, and General Frimont, commanding in the absence of Prince Schwartzenberg, should retire along the right bank of the Vistula; that, as soon as this retreat was concluded, a new armistice should be agreed to, without any limit in point of time, to be terminated only on a notice of fifteen days, and during which the Austrians should preserve the towns of Cracow, Sandomir, and the post of Opatowin, with a *tête-du-pont* in front of each of their respective bridges; and "that the present transaction between the two imperial courts shall *remain forever secret, and shall not be communicated, by the one party or the other, but to the King of Prussia alone.*" Shortly after, a convention was concluded between the Austrian and Saxon commanders, which provided for the passage of the Saxon troops, about five thousand in number, which had fallen back to the Galician frontiers, with Schwartzenberg's corps, through the imperial territories. The latter convention was immediately and officially laid by Schwartzenberg, at Paris, before the cabinet of St. Cloud, while the former was religiously preserved a secret; but along with the document there was presented the ominous declaration, "His imperial majesty regards the present moment as that which must decide the fate of Europe, by fixing that of the intermediate powers. Neither France nor Russia run any considerable risk: it is Austria and Prussia which are really endangered. The Emperor of Austria will remain faithful to his character: he will not limit his proceedings in favour of the cause which he feels himself bound to support, that of peace, to mere words; and if the exaggerated ideas which possibly may arise in some of the coalesced cabinets should prevail over the reason and moderation which he himself will never cease to profess, his imperial majesty will, without hesitation, cast an imposing force into the balance *of the power which he may regard*, without respect to the immense complications of the moment, as his most natural ally."*

Austria more openly inclines to the coalition.

March 18.

March 29.

April 8.

April 21.

Notwithstanding all the pains which were taken to conceal the important convention of Kalisch from the knowledge of the French diplomatists, its effects were too important to permit it to remain

Remonstrances of Napoleon against the Austrians, and Metternich's reply.

in one iota from what we have already done. We are going to send Prince Schwartzenberg to Paris, in the double view of explaining to the emperor our real views, and to give to Europe a decisive proof of our friendship, by sending to his court the commander of the auxiliary corps in his service."—OTTO *to* MARET, *15th Feb.*, 1813. FAIN, i., 305.

* Otto to Maret, 20th March, 1813. Fain, i., 311. Thib., ix., 235, 236. Hard., xii., 75, 76.

* Schwartzenberg's Note to Maret, April 22, 1813. Fain, i., 465, and Convention, March 29, 1813. Ibid., i., 474, 482.

long a secret; and, in particular, the continued retreat of the Austrian auxiliary corps under General Frimont, and continuation of the armistice between it and the Russians, appeared the more extraordinary to Napoleon, that it occurred at the very time when he himself was setting out for Mayence to renew hostilities of a decisive character on the banks of the Elbe. It was made, accordingly, the subject of immediate and bitter complaint by Count Narbonne to Metternich, accompanied by a demand that the Austrian auxiliary corps should forthwith resume hostilities, or, at all events, maintain the positions assigned to it by the convention of the 12th of January.* It was no easy matter for the Austrian diplomatist to evade so obvious and reasonable a demand, the more especially as Napoleon had previously announced that, in the beginning of May, he was to be on the Elbe at the head of three hundred thousand men, and had urged the cabinet of Vienna to April 7. second his operations, by debouching from Bohemia at the head of a hundred thousand, and at the same time denouncing the armistice, and resuming hostilities with at least fifty thousand on the side of the Vistula. Metternich, therefore, contented himself simply with replying, that "if, contrary to his April 9. most ardent hopes, the return of peace should not crown his efforts, Austria, from her mediatorial attitude, and the geographical situation of her empire, could no longer take part in the war in the quality of a merely auxiliary power; and that, in consequence, the stipulations regarding succour contained in the treaty of the 14th of March, 1812, *had ceased to be applicable to existing circumstances*. To denounce the armistice and resume hostilities with the Russians, in these circumstances, would be neither expedient as a measure of war nor of peace. In the former view, it is not with an army of thirty thousand men that the emperor should appear in the field: in the latter, it would be highly unbecoming in a mediating power to be the first to revive hostilities. The emperor is thoroughly persuaded, as his majesty the emperor of the French has frequently admitted, that the most effectual means of supporting the part of a mediator will be by the development of the most imposing forces, all directed towards one object—a general peace. But it must be such a development as will leave no doubt that the mediating power is prepared, if her efforts fail, to appear on the scene as a principal party, and to give to its words the necessary support."†

Negotiations with Sweden and Denmark.

While the cabinet of Vienna, veiling its preparations under the specious guise of a wish to support with effect the part of a mediator, which was with some plausibility represented as in a manner forced upon it, was thus gradually, but perceptibly extricating itself from the restraints of the French alliance, and preparing to appear, at no distant period, with decisive effect on the theatre of Europe, negotiations of a more conclusive character had taken place with the court of Stockholm. Russia, in the first instance, had taken the lead in these communications; and even so far back as the close of 1812, made overtures with a Dec. 29, 1812. view to obtaining the more active accession of Sweden to the cause of the confederacy, on condition of her obtaining the cession of Norway, which, since the loss of Finland, had become almost indispensable to her existence as an independent nation. The success of this important negotiation was much facilitated by the arrogance with which, at the same period, Napoleon continued to treat Bernadotte in his diplomatic intercourse: an arrogance more suitable to the victor of Wagram than the fugitive from Russia. So keenly did the Jan. 7. old French marshal feel this treatment, that not only did he publish a report by his minister, Engestroom, setting forth the ruinous consequences to Sweden of the alliance with France, but, in the end of March, he March 23. addressed a letter to Napoleon, offering his mediation for the conclusion of a general peace, and containing expressions indicating the indignation felt at the unworthy treatment of two hundred Swedish vessels and their crews, captured by France before war had begun between the two powers, the crews of which were still detained in prison, while their cargoes had been confiscated.*†

Views of Denmark at this period.

The consent of Denmark to the sacrifice of Norway was attempted to be gained by holding out the prospect of an indemnity on the side of Germany; and, on this condition, it was earnestly pressed on the cabinet of Copenhagen to join its forces to those of Russia and Prussia. It was difficult to see where this indemnity was to be found; for the Hanse Towns, which lay nearest to the Danish Continental territories, would, on account of their commerce, be taken, it was foreseen, under the protection of Great Britain; Westphalia, carved out of the old provinces of Prussia, was already reclaimed by its sovereign; and Mecklenburg belonged to a prince united by the ties of blood to the imperial house of Russia. In these circumstances, the negotiation was not likely to lead to any satisfactory issue, though it was prosecuted at Copenhagen with much earnestness by the agents both of the cabinets of St. Petersburg and St. James; and so far did it proceed, that at length Count Moltke and Count Bernstorff were sent to Kalisch, with ample powers to signify the accession of Denmark to the European alliance, provided the fleet taken at Copen-

* "His majesty the emperor," said Narbonne, "will experience extreme satisfaction if the views of Austria in favour of a general peace should be accomplished; but he has never yet heard that such a wish could annul the explicit provisions of an existing treaty. That treaty expressly provided for an auxiliary corps, under the orders of the emperor: if it does not obey his instructions, what conclusion is he entitled to draw?"—NARBONNE *to* METTERNICH, 21*st April*, 1813. FAIN, i., 468.

† Narbonne to Metternich, 21st April, 1813, and Metternich to Narbonne, 22d April, 1813. Fain, i., 465, 474.

* Hard., xii., 45, 46. Schoell, Recueil, i., 28.

† In that letter Bernadotte added, relative to the Moscow campaign: "From the moment that your majesty plunged into the interior of that empire, the issue could not be doubtful; the Emperor Alexander and King of Sweden foresaw, in the end of August, its immense results; all the military combinations announced that your majesty would be made prisoner. You have escaped that danger, sire, but where is your army? The *élite* of France, Italy, and Germany no longer exist. There lie, without sepulture, the remains of those brave men who saved France at Fleurus, who conquered in Italy, survived the burning climate of Egypt, and chained victory to the imperial standards at Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland."—See the *Letter in* SCHOELL'S *Recueil*, i., 28.

hagen, with all the Danish colonies conquered by the English during the war, were restored; Hamburg and Lubeck made over to them; six hundred thousand pounds paid as an indemnity for their losses during the bombardment of Copenhagen; and all their European possessions, particularly Norway, guarantied to the Danish crown.*

Treaty of Orebro with Sweden, March 3, 1813.

These extravagant demands were not calculated to promote the conferences, the more especially as they had a tendency to throw a chill over the negotiations with Sweden, whose forces, under the able direction of Bernadotte, were much more likely to interpose with effect in the approaching conflict in the north of Germany. It was justly determined, therefore, by the British cabinet, that they were altogether inadmissible; and, without attempting the hopeless task of appeasing the resentment, or satisfying the demands of the Danish government, diplomatic relations were more closely drawn with the court of Stockholm. They terminated in a treaty, by which the accession of Sweden to the grand alliance was openly secured. By it Sweden engaged to employ an auxiliary corps of thirty thousand men, to be placed, with the forces of Russia in the north of Germany, under the command of the Prince-royal of Sweden; while England promised to cede Guadaloupe to Sweden, and grant her a subsidy of a million a year, payable monthly; and received, in return, a promise that for twenty years the British merchants should enjoy the right of an *entrepôt* in the harbours of Gottenberg, Carlsham, and Stralsund. The cession of Norway to Sweden was not openly recognised in this treaty; but it was indirectly sanctioned by a clause, in which, on the narrative that the existing engagements between Russia and Sweden had been communicated to the British government, provided that England "not only should oppose no obstacle to the perpetual annexation of Norway to Sweden, but should facilitate in that respect the views of the King of Sweden, not only by good offices, but by employing, if necessary, a naval co-operation, in concert with the Swedish and Russian troops." It was provided, however, that "force should not be employed to effect the union of Norway and Sweden, unless the King of Denmark had previously declined to join the alliance, on terms consistent with the existing engagements between the courts of St. Petersburg and Stockholm; and that, in the proposed junction, every possible regard should be paid to the happiness and liberty of the people of Norway."†

Accession of Denmark to the side of Napoleon.

After this overt act of hostility, or, rather, of pacific spoliation, had been determined on, it was not to be expected that Denmark was to preserve the semblance even of pacific relations with the allied powers; and, accordingly, before long, the cabinet of Copenhagen was openly arrayed in the French interest. It endeavoured, however, still to preserve relations with the northern powers, and promised to furnish twenty-five thousand men to aid their armies, while at the same time it was secretly negotiating with the French the means of delivering to them Hamburg. But Russia could not promise them any adequate compensation for the loss of Norway; and although Sweden offered to relinquish all claims on that kingdom, provided she were secured in the bishopric of Drontheim, yet the Danish government refused to accept Pomerania in exchange, and the negotiation came to nothing. The Danish troops, in consequence, marched out of Altona, and ranged themselves under the orders of Marshal Davoust, and both parties prepared to solve their differences by the sword. Thus the system of disposing of the territories of others, so long practised by Napoleon, was openly adopted by his opponents; and Mr. Ponsonby, it must be confessed, had too much reason for the caustic remark which he made on the subject in the British Parliament: "Napoleon consented to the conquest of Finland, which did not belong to him; Russia indemnified Sweden for the loss of it by the cession of Norway, to which it had no sort of title; and England offered Demark an equivalent in Lower Saxony, still in the occupation of France."‡* It must be observed, however, to the honour of England, that it alone, in this train of aggression, abstained from the spoliation of allied or neutral powers, and sought for the indemnities which it offered in the dominions of its enemies.

Negotiations between the allies and Murat.

An important negotiation, but which did not, at the time, lead to the same important results, took place between the allied powers and the King of Naples. Murat, whose desertion of his post at the head of the army on the Oder, in January, had sufficiently evinced his disposition, if he could find an opportunity, of making his peace with the allies, lent a willing year to the insinuations of the cabinet of Vienna—that now was the time, by declaring himself openly, to secure his throne on a solid foundation; but, desirous of saving that of Napoleon, he wrote, early in April, to the emperor, urging him, in the name of humanity, and from a due regard to his own safety and glory, "to put a period to a war, disastrous at once to France and Europe, and particularly ruinous to Naples, where the Carbonari, instigated by the English, were perpetually on the verge of revolt." Neither this letter, nor others which he wrote at the same period to Marie Louise, met with any answer; but Murat, still uncertain of the line which the cabinet of Vienna were to adopt, and desirous of seeing the issue of the approaching campaign before he took a decided part, deemed it prudent, in the mean time, to adhere to the French alliance, though the seeds of distrust were irrevocably sown between him and his imperial brother-in-law.†

April 3.

Energetic measures of Prussia in support of the war.

While Europe, shaken to its centre by the dreadful catastrophe of the Moscow campaign, was thus breaking up into new alliances, and separate interests were beginning to alienate from each other the members of the great war confederacy, which had sprung from the military triumphs of the French Revolution, Prussia, which, placed in the front of the battle, had both drawn the sword and thrown away the

* Hard., xii., 97, 98.
† See the Treaty in Martens, Sup., v., 231, and Fain, i., 283, and in Ann. Reg., 1813. State Papers, p. 489.

* Hard., xii., 97, 101. Schoell, x., 204, 207. Parl. Deb.
† Hard., xii., 78, 83.

scabbard, was straining every nerve to augment her military force. Already a proclamation from Prince Kutusoff had announced the dissolution of the Confederacy of the Rhine, and called upon all the members of it to join in the great league formed for the deliverance of Germany.* To increase the general fervour, Frederic William at the same time instituted a new order, called that of the *Iron Cross*, to reward his subjects for the sacrifices which they were called on to make in behalf of their country; and invited all classes to pour their gold and silver ornaments into the public treasury, where they would receive iron ones, fashioned in the same form, to preserve in their families: a monument at once of past wealth and succeeding patriotism; and shortly afterward a proclamation was issued to the former subjects of Prussia, who had been wrested from her by the treaty of Tilsit, inviting them to take up arms for the independence of Germany; and that proclamation, secretly circulated by the members of the Tugendbund, was received with avidity and read with transport. The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia immediately appeared in public, decorated with the new order, which was placed on the breast of the former beside the medal of 1812. The scholars of the universities, the professors, the burghers, alike took up arms; the cares of interest, the pursuits of science, the labours of education, were forgotten. Art was turned only to warlike preparation; genius to fanning the universal ardour; industry to forging the implements of destruction. Körner gave vent to the general enthusiasm in strains of immortal verse, which were repeated by thousands and tens of thousands as they joyously marched to the points of rendezvous; while the women universally sent their precious ornaments to the public treasury, and received in return similar bijoux, beautifully worked in bronze, which soon decorated their bosoms, bearing the simple inscription, "I gave gold for iron, 1813." In a short time none but old men and boys were to be met in the streets; not an ornament, but those of iron, was to be seen either in dress or in the shops. Thence has arisen the famous order of the Iron Cross in Prussia, and the beautiful Berlin bronze ornaments, so well known and highly prized in every country of Europe. It must be confessed that chivalry cannot boast of a nobler fountain of honour, nor fashion of a more touching memorial of virtue.†‡

March 19.

March 12.

April 6.

As long as the French troops maintained their footing on the left bank of the Elbe the general fermentation there was limited to a sort of passive resistance, which, nevertheless, proved extremely embarrassing to the French authorities. The people did not openly take up arms or resist their present sovereigns, but they did all in their power to avoid their exactions. The peasants fled to the woods to shun the conscription; and not a few upon whom the lot had fallen, secretly in the night, by devious ways, crossed the Elbe, and joined the patriotic ranks of Germany. When the allies, however, had passed that river, and the continued advance of the Russians inspired general confidence in the firmness and constancy of the Emperor Alexander, these feelings could no longer be suppressed. Insurrections ensued in many places, particularly Bremen and various parts of Westphalia; and the light bodies of Russian horse who traversed the sandy plains of Northern Germany were swelled by crowds of volunteers, who followed their standards and greatly augmented the Prussian ranks. At the same time, the officers of the states in the Rhenish Confederacy, who had been made prisoners in the Moscow campaign, with the consent of the government of St. Petersburg, formed themselves into a legion; declared traitor to his country every German who should bear arms against his brethren; and bound themselves by a solemn oath to combat Napoleon even unto death. The Tugendbund was the soul of this vast conspiracy, the ramifications of which were so extensive, its proceedings so secret, and its influence so great, that it would have been in the highest degree dangerous, if it had not been directed in its principal branches by exalted wisdom, and inspired in all by devoted patriotism. A Cromwell or a Napoleon would have found in its impassioned bands the ready elements of revolutionary elevation; but none such appeared in the fatherland; and the streams of popular enthusiasm, directed by, not directing, the rulers of the land, instead of being wasted in the selfishness of individual ambition, were turned in one overwhelming flood against the enemies of the state.*†

Fermentation on the left bank of the Elbe.

The wisdom and foresight of the Prussian government turned to the very best account this astonishing outburst of national enthusiasm.

* "The motto of Alexander and Frederic is, 'Honour and our country.' Every German worthy of the name should unite with us, and second with his blood, and his whole worldly goods, the efforts making for the liberation of Germany. Every one who shall prove himself a traitor to the cause of the fatherland, deserves to be annihilated by the force of public opinion, and the power of the arms taken up in its holy cause."—PROCLAMATION, 19*th March*, 1813. HARD., xii., 41, 42.

† Hard., xi., 42, 43. Pizarro's Letter to Madrid, Nov. 12, 1813. Ibid., xii., App. A.

‡ "It is impossible," said an eyewitness, "not to be electrified on beholding the ardour with which the people give vent to the national enthusiasm, so long stifled under the yoke of an ignominious policy, or overawed by the terrors of the French legions. The king's sister has sent all her ornaments to the public treasury; and at this instant, all the women, sacrificing their most precious objects, are hastening to send theirs, down to the minutest articles, for the same patriotic purpose. When I say *all* the women, I in no degree exaggerate; for I do not believe you can find a single exception, save in the most indigent class, who do not possess a single golden ornament. All the marriage ornaments have been laid on the altar of the country, and the government has given them in exchange others of iron, with the inscription, 'I gave gold for iron, 1813.' These ornaments, so precious from the moral interest of their origin, have already acquired a certain intrinsic value from the beauty of their workmanship, which exceeds that of any other people. These iron ornaments cannot, as yet, be purchased: they are obtained only in exchange for gold. The streets are filled with nothing but women, old men, and children; not an unwounded man, capable of bearing arms, is to be seen. A barren land of sand, covered with pines, exhibits the astonishing spectacle of 200,000 men in arms."—PIZARRO'S LETTER, 12*th November*, 1813. HARD., xii., 565, 567.

* Hard., xii., 52, 57. Schoell, x., 191, 195

† Some statesmen, not without reason, apprehended serious ultimate danger from the ungovernable impulses of this popular enthusiasm; but Stein rightly foresaw that it would soon be absorbed, and turned into the right channel, amid the tumult of war. He replied to their representation, "Die kanonen und die trompeten wird das schon zuricht blasen." "The cannon and the trumpets will soon blow that right."—MAURICE ARNDT *to* FREDERIC ARNDT, 24*th April*, 1813. *Deutche Pandora.*

Formation of the Landwehr and Landsturm in Prussia.

It was not suffered to evaporate, as in Spain, in detached efforts or ill-directed expeditions: undisciplined courage was not, as there, brought up to be slaughtered by experienced prowess; ages of corruption had not paralyzed years of enthusiasm. Previous preparation, prophetic wisdom, had prepared the fit channels for the national fervour. In addition to the great augmentation made to the regular army by the decrees of the 9th and 12th of February, already mentioned,* still more decisive measures were taken, as soon as the alliance with Russia was resolved on, to draw forth the whole military power of the state. By a royal decree of the 14th and 19th of March, the LANDWEHR and LANDSTURM were everywhere called out: the former being a sort of militia, which was for the time put on permanent duty, and soon became nearly equal to the regular soldiers; the latter, a levy *en masse* of the whole male population capable of bearing arms. The former speedily produced a hundred and twenty thousand men, who did good service, not only in recruiting the ranks of the regular army, but by relieving them of the duty of blockading fortresses, watching prisoners, and guarding convoys, which otherwise might have occasioned a serious diminution in the forces which they could bring into the field against the enemy. This body was, in a peculiar manner, serviceable to Prussia, in consequence of the number of her important fortresses which still remained in the hands of the French. By its means, with the aid of a comparatively small body of Russians, a hundred thousand Prussian landwehr kept seventy thousand French veterans blockaded and useless in the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder. An animated proclamation by the king, on the 19th of March, roused to the highest degree the military spirit of his people. "Victory," said Frederic William, "comes from God. Show yourselves worthy of His protection by your discipline and the exemplary discharge of your duties. Let courage, patience, and discipline ever distinguish you. Imitate the example of your ancestors; show yourselves worthy of them, and think of your posterity. Rewards are secured for those who distinguish themselves; shame and punishment await him who neglects his duty. Your king will never quit you; the princes of his house will be with him, and combat in the midst of your ranks; the whole nation will join in your efforts. We have for an ally a brave people, who have achieved their independence by their valour, and have now come to give it to you. They had confidence in their sovereign: in his just cause, in his power; and God gave them victory. Imitate them; for we also combat for liberty and our country. Trust in God: courage and patriotism are inscribed on our banners."†

14th and 19th.

Encouraged by so many concurrent circumstances, which facilitated their progress and promised them support, the Russian and Prussian generals soon deemed it safe to cross the Elbe. The positions which the French army occupied along the course of that river, from Dresden to Hamburg, were as follows: Davoust, with the 11th corps, occupied Dessau, and the adjoining banks of the Elbe from thence to Torgau; Victor, with the 2d corps, lay between the Elbe and the Saale; Grenier, with his as yet untouched Italians, was a little in the rear, at Halle; while Regnier, with the remains of the Saxons and Durutte's division, occupied the important post of Dresden, and stretched to the foot of the Bohemian Mountains; the extreme left wing, under Vandamme, with its headquarters at Bremen, still occupied Hamburg and the mouth of the Elbe. The earliest re-enforcements from France, under Lauriston, drawn from the first ban of the National Guards, twenty-four thousand strong, arrived at Magdebourg in the end of March, and raised the centre of the army, grouped around that fortress, to nearly fifty thousand combatants; while twenty thousand were in the neighbourhood of Dresden, and fifteen thousand on the Lower Elbe. In addition to these imposing forces, Ney and Marmont each commanded a corps of reserve, which was forming on the Rhine,* and Bertrand's corps was in march from Italy by the route of the Tyrol, its leading columns having already reached Augsburg in the Bavarian plains.

Positions of the French on the Elbe when the Russians crossed it.

March 29.

Forces, important from their numerical amount, though far removed from the theatre of action, and confined in strongholds where they could contribute little to the issue of the conflict, still belonged to France, in the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder. Their number, in all, was little short of seventy thousand; five-and-thirty thousand were shut up in Dantzic alone; and those in Thorn, Modlin, Zamosc, and Graudentz, on the Vistula, and in Spandau, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, on the Oder, were at least as numerous. But their condition was so miserable, and they were composed of such disjointed wrecks of the army which had gone through the Russian campaign, that not only were they wholly unfit for operations in the field, but they bore in themselves the seeds of contagion and mortality more terrible than the sword of the enemy. The garrison of Dantzic, composed of the wreck of above a hundred regiments, of two-and-twenty different nations, was in such a state of moral and physical debility, that, notwithstanding its imposing numerical amount, it could not perform any military operation without its walls; and all the other garrisons were in a similar condition. Typhus fever, the well-known and invariable attendant on human suffering, soon began to make frightful ravages in the ranks; and such was the fatigue of the soldiers, that, though they were destitute of beds, bandages, linen, and comforts of every kind in their hospitals, yet it was indispensably necessary to leave them to repose. There they remained, accordingly, blockaded by inferior bodies of the allied troops, ravaged by pestilence and fever, till famine or dejection induced them to surrender: a woful monument at once of the misery which Napoleon's ambi-

Disposition and number of the French troops in the fortresses on the Vistula and Oder.

* *Ante*, iv., 43.
† Schoell, Recueil, iv., 323. Hard., xii., 42, 44.

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 16, 17. Jom., iv., 262, 263. Schoell, Hist., x., 208, 209.

tion occasioned among his subjects, and of the extraordinary magnitude of the calamities consequent on his headstrong military policy, which had thus severed from him so large a portion of his followers when every sabre and bayonet was required on the banks of the Elbe.*

Dispositions and strength of the Prussian forces.

The positions and forces of the allies at this period were as follow: in Silesia, twent-five thousand Prussian regular troops, comprising two thousand five hundred horse, were collected under the command of General, afterward Marshal Blucher. This was in addition to the garrisons of the fortresses, and nearly twenty thousand men whose organization was not yet completed. The corps of D'York, which was coming up from East Prussia, was fifteen thousand strong, but six thousand sick, the sad bequest of the Moscow campaign, encumbered his ranks, so that not more than nine thousand could be relied on for immediate operations. In addition to this, Bulow, near Berlin, was at the head of ten thousand, and five thousand lay in Pomerania; so that, without drawing any of the garrisons from the fortresses, Frederic William could bring fifty thousand combatants into the field. In addition to this, there were thirty-five thousand men in such a state of forwardness in the rear as to be able to blockade the fortresses on the Oder, still in the hands of the enemy, or to act as a reserve to the armies in the field; and this body was constantly receiving accessions of force from the new levies, both of the line and the landwehr, which were in progress in every part of the kingdom;† so that when hostilities commenced, in the beginning of May, Prussia would bring an accession of at least eighty thousand well-disciplined troops to the Russian standard, and this force, if the campaign lasted a few months longer, might be expected to be raised to a hundred and fifty thousand.

Forces and position of the Russians.

The Russian armies at this period, from the effect of the great levies and unbounded enthusiasm of 1812, were much more considerable; but the battles and hardships of its dreadful campaign had thinned the ranks of the veteran soldiers, and the new levies, how extensive soever, were in great part drawn from provinces so remote that they could not be expected to make their appearance on the theatre of war till a very late period of the campaign. At the advanced posts in Germany, therefore, where the contest was to commence, their forces were by no means great, and, such as they were, scattered over an immense extent of country. Count Wittgenstein himself was at the head of thirty-six thousand men, between Berlin and Magdebourg, while thirty-three thousand more, under the command of Tettenborn, Chernicheff, Woronzoff, and Milaradowitch, were scattered in detached parties along the course of the Elbe, from the neighbourhood of Dresden to the environs of Magdebourg. Twenty thousand more, under Barclay de Tolly, were engaged in the blockade of Dantzic, Zamosc, and Thorn, on the Vistula; and a great reserve, seventy thousand strong, was forming in Poland, under the orders of Sacken; but they were still far distant, and could not possibly reach the banks of the Elbe before the end of July. Thus, seventy thousand Russians were the very utmost that could be relied on for immediate operations in Saxony; and if to them we add fifty thousand Prussians, the whole allied force might be one hundred and twenty thousand strong;* but, as thirty thousand would be required to blockade the important fortresses of Magdebourg, Wittenburg, Torgau, and Koenigstein, on the Elbe, it was doubtful whether more than ninety thousand could be relied on for offensive operations on the Saxon plains.

Occupation of Hamburg by the allies.

The first blow of importance in this memorable campaign was struck in the neighbourhood of Hamburg. The fermentation in that important mercantile emporium had been very great during the whole Russian retreat, and it was only by extraordinary rigour and vigilance that General Cara St. Cyr, who commanded the French garrison, three thousand strong, had been able to maintain his authority amid a hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, all but insurgent, by whom he was surrounded. After Wittgenstein, however, had established himself in Berlin, Tettenborn, an active and indefatigable partisan, was detached towards the Lower Elbe with three thousand foot and three thousand Cossacks; and at his approach General Morand, who was stationed at Neustadt, retired towards Hamburg, which latter town was evacuated by the whole French forces on the following day. On the 18th, Tettenborn, at the head of the advanced guard of his indefatigable Cossacks, approached the town amid the acclamations and astonishment of a countless multitude of spectators. About half a mile from the city, the Russian videttes were met by the greater part of the citizens in a body, who filled all the houses, gardens, fields, and lanes around. A tremendous hurrah accompanied their progress through this dense array, while the Cossacks sang their merry national airs. At the gate of the city the magistrates appeared with its keys, while thirty maidens, clothed in white, strewed wreaths of flowers before the victors. Shouts of unbounded acclamation now arose from the countless multitude: the enthusiasm was such that the very heavens seemed to be rent asunder by the sound. "Long live the Russians! Long live Alexander! Long live Old England!" burst from tens of thousands of voices; the old steeples trembled with the acclamations; the roar of artillery and the loud clang of bells gave vent in louder notes to the universal transports; numbers wept for joy; friends and strangers alike embraced, and wished each other joy to have lived to see such a day.

March 11. March 12. March 18.

"Men met each other with erected look,
The steps were higher that they took;
Friends to congratulate their friends would haste,
And long inveterate foes saluted as they pass'd."

The worthy Hamburgers, in the first transports at their deliverance from the burdensome yoke which they had borne for seven years, were never weary of expressing their astonishment at the handful of men, not more than six

* Fain, i., 63. Hard., xii., 113, 114.
† Schoell, Recueil, ii., 290, 291; and Hist., x., 209. Jom., iv., 263.

* Précis de la Guerre, 1813. Schoell, Rec., ii., 290, 291, and Hist., x., 210, 211. Jom., iv., 263.

hundred strong, by whom it had been effected; and it was not a little increased when they beheld these hardy children of the desert—Calmucks and Bashkirs—disdaining the civilized luxuries of houses and beds, pile their arms, and lie down beside their steeds in the squares of the city, with no pillow but their saddles, and no covering but their cloaks.*

Insurrection in Bremen, and defeat of Morand at Lunenburg, April 2.

To these transports of joy, however, there speedily succeeded the chill of disappointment and the terrors of disaster, when the re-enforcements which Tettenborn had so confidently announced did not make their appearance, and it was known that Morand lay at Bremen, at no great distance, with three thousand men, meditating vengeance against the revolted patriots. Extraordinary efforts, ever since the arrival of the Russians, had been made to raise a burgher force, and put the city in a posture of defence; but the preparations were still miserably incomplete: there were no guns on the ramparts, the volunteers could hardly yet handle their muskets, and the utmost anxiety prevailed lest the French, stimulated by the thirst for plunder, and the desire of intimidating the insurrection by a blow at so great a community, should return and take a signal vengeance on the unhappy Hamburgers. From this calamity they were saved by an incident so extraordinary that it wears the aspect of romance. An English detachment March 21. of two hundred men from Heligoland had recently landed at the mouth of the Weser, and made themselves masters of the batteries of Bloxen and Bremerlehe at that point. Encouraged by this event, which was magnified by report into the landing of a powerful British force in the north of Germany, the people of Lunenburg, a small fortified town twenty miles from Hamburg, on the left bank of the Elbe, rose against the French authorities, and expelled their feeble garrison. Morand in- April 1. stantly set out at the head of three thousand men and six pieces of cannon, with which he quickly overcame the resistance of the yet unarmed Lunenburgers. The gates were forced, the principal inhabitants seized, and condemned to be shot next day at noon in the principal square of the city. On April 2. the following morning they were drawn out for execution, in number twenty-seven, and already the unhappy men, amid the tears of their fellow-citizens, and in presence of the French general, had put on the fatal bandage, when a sudden hurrah was heard, and a violent discharge of musketry at the gates announced that succour was at hand. Alarmed by the unlooked-for onset, the whole French troops hastened from the place where the execution was to have taken place to the ramparts, and the prisoners were left, with their eyes bandaged and their arms bound, in the middle of the square. With speechless anxiety, they and their families listened to the increasing din and tumult at the gates: for a short time the quick rattle of musketry showed that a serious action was going forward; soon the receding throng, and numbers of wounded who were brought into the square, gave hope that the allies were prevailing, and at length a loud shout on all sides announced that the town was carried, and deliverance was at hand. Instantly the brave Russians rushed into the centre of the square; the prisoners were delivered and restored to their weeping families; while two thousand French prisoners, in addition to a thousand killed and wounded, graced the first triumph of the arms of freedom in Germany. It was Chernicheff, Benkendorff, and Doernberg, who had united their Cossacks and light troops, and, by a forced march of fifty miles in twenty-four hours, had arrived just in time to effect this marvellous rescue. Morand, mortally wounded, was thrown down at the gates, and died next day. The prisoners whom he had ordered to be shot passed him, as he was carried along weltering in his blood, in the first moment of their deliverance.*

General insurrection between the Elbe and the Weser.

Immense was the effect which this moving incident produced in the north of Germany. The romantic character of the adventure; the rapid punishment of the oppressors; the sudden destruction of so considerable a body of the enemy—all contributed to swell the general enthusiasm, and soon rendered the rising as general between the Elbe and the Weser as between the latter stream and the Oder. Monbrun arrived, indeed, on the day following, with the division Lagrange; and April 3. Chernicheff and his partisans being in no condition to oppose such considerable forces, withdrew from Lunenburg; but this reverse was not of long duration; Lagrange's division was soon after recalled to Magdebourg, and the whole country between the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser evacuated by the enemy. The insurrection immediately became general in all that district: the whole Hanse Towns took up arms and expelled the French authorities; while all those portions of the electorate of Hanover which were evacuated by the French immediately proclaimed their beloved sovereign the King of England, and a regency was formed of Hanoverian noblemen, with their headquarters at Hamburg, to direct the efforts of the newly-recovered territory. The universal cry was for arms, to the desire for which the unnecessary cruelties of the retreating French columns, especially in the neighbourhood of Bremen, powerfully contributed. This desire met with a responsive echo in the British heart: the English government made the most extraordinary efforts to forward muskets, ammunition, and all the muniments of war, to those points on the north of Germany where they were required; and so well was their zeal seconded by the efforts of the authorities at Woolwich and the manufacturers at Birmingham, that, in the short space of two months after the intentions of Prussia were first known, there were landed on the coast of Germany, for the use of the Russian, Prussian, and Swedish governments, the entire military equipments of a hundred and fifty thousand men; while the Elbe, crowded with the pendants of all nations,† had already

* W. to R. 19th March, 1813. Deutche Pandora, 72. Lond., German Camp., 4, 5. Year of Liberation, 65, Vict. et Conq., xxii., 17, 58.

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 22, 23. Schoell, Hist., x., 210, 211. Year of Liberation, 68, 79.

† Lond., p. 8, and App. No. 1. Ann. Reg., 1813, 119. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 22, 23.

resumed its place as one of the principal commercial estuaries of Europe.*

Advance of the allies to the Elbe.

While the Hanse Towns, and the maritime portions of Hanover, the favourite thirty-second military division of the French Empire, were thus gliding away from the grasp of Napoleon, both parties, having to a certain degree concentrated their forces, were preparing to strike redoubtable blows on the plains of Saxony. In the end of March, Wittgenstein broke up from Berlin and moved towards the Elbe in two columns: one, under himself in person, directing its steps towards Wittenburg; the other, under Bulow, advancing towards Dessau; at the same time Borstel, with fifteen thousand Prussians, formed the blockade of Magdebourg; and Blucher and Winzingerode, with the army of Silesia, twenty-five thousand strong, and ten thousand Russians, advanced towards Dresden from the side of Breslau. The King of Saxony, in no condition to withstand forces so considerable, entered into a convention for the evacuation of his capital; and Davoust, who commanded the French garrison, after blowing up, to the great grief of the inhabitants, an arch of their beautiful bridge over the Elbe,† retired with his forces in the direction of Leipsic. On the day following, the allies entered, with drums beating and colours flying, amid the enthusiastic acclamations of an immense crowd of spectators; for, though the court of Dresden remained faithful to its engagements with Napoleon, the Saxon people, who had suffered immensely from the long-continued presence and passage of the French troops, were almost unanimously ranged on the opposite side, and their hearts beat as high as any in Germany for the deliverance of the fatherland.‡◊

March 29.

March 26.

Wittgenstein's approach to the Elbe was preceded by numerous proclamations, in which he called on the Saxons to join the great effort now making for the freedom of Germany. The tone of these popular addresses is well worthy of attention: they show how completely the principles of the contest had changed sides; how thoroughly military despotism had ingrafted itself on Democratic ambition; and that the French Revolution was henceforth to be combated, in a great measure, with its own weapons.* They produced an extraordinary impression in the Saxon provinces. In proportion as the French troops evacuated the villages, they instantly rose and joined the invaders; everywhere the Tugendbund had in secret paved the way for their reception; and almost before the banners of Napoleon were out of sight, the landwehr and the landsturm were organized, and a fearful patriotic warfare was springing out of the sufferings and indignation of the people. If the French columns remeasured their steps, or the chances of war again threw the insurgent villages into the hands of the enemy, the inhabitants fled at their approach; the flour and grain were destroyed; barrels of every sort of liquor pierced and run out; the mills and boats burned and scuttled; and the proclamations of the allied sovereigns met with as ready obedience in the territories of the princes of the Rhenish Confederacy as in their own dominions.†

Wittgenstein's approach to the Elbe.

Previous to finally withdrawing across the Elbe, Eugene, in order to oblige the enemy to concentrate his forces, that he might thus obtain an accurate idea of their amount, took post at Mockern, a little in front of Magdebourg, and there stood firm. Wittgenstein, accordingly, collected his troops, and on the 4th of April attacked the French with great vigour between Mockern and Leitzkau. It was rather an affair of advanced posts than a regular battle; for no sooner were the French tirailleurs, who, as usual, behaved with the greatest gallantry, driven in, than the main body of their army began to retire. In this movement, however, they felt severely the superiority of the allied horse: two French regiments of lancers, who strove to protect the retreat, were thrown into confusion, and for the most part made prisoners; and it was only by the fortunate occurrence of nightfall that a total rout was pre-

Combat of Mockern, and retreat of Eugene across the Elbe.

April 4.

* The military stores landed from March 18th to May 18th, 1813, in Northern Germany, were as follows:

Field-pieces complete, with carriages and caissons	218	Blankets	114,000
		Linen shirts	58,000
		Gaiters	87,190
Muskets and bayonets	124,119	Sets of accoutrements	90,000
Swords	34,443	Knapsacks complete	63,457
Suits of uniform complete, with great-coats, &c.	150,000	Caps and feathers	100,000
		Pairs of stockings	69,624
		Pounds of biscuits	702,000
Boots and shoes	175,000	Do. of beef and pork	691,000

—See *Official Statement in* Prince HARDENBERG'S *Report, 29th Sept.*, 1813, *in* LONDONDERRY'S *War in Germany*, Appendix, No. I., p. 366.

† A proclamation of the French marshal had announced that, at the signal of three guns being fired, all the inhabitants should keep their houses; some, nevertheless, attracted by curiosity, repaired to the banks to witness the work of destruction. On the train being fired, a serpentine light wound round the undermined buttress, and immediately after the whole was enveloped in smoke: a dazzling light next rose out of the cloud, followed by a burst of fire, which ascended to the heavens; the arches adjacent were soon seen to gape, rise a little, and instantly fall into the waves beneath, with a crash louder than the loudest thunder. This beautiful bridge, so well known to travellers, was begun in 1344; but it was brought to perfection in 1737 by Augustus II. It is 550 feet long, resting on seventeen buttresses and sixteen arches, with an iron balustrade and broad foot pavement.—See *Témoin Oculaire des Evénemens à Dresde en* 1813, p. 80, 81. ODELEBEN, ii., 80, 81.

‡ "On the 26th of April, a Saxon battalion, which had surrendered in Thuringia, and to which, at Altenburg, its arms and artillery had been restored, defiled, with drums beating and colours flying, before the hotel of the King of Prussia, and was reviewed by the two allied monarchs."—*Recit de ce qui s'est passé à Dresde en* 1813, *par un Témoin Oculaire*, p. 112.

◊ Vict. et Conq., xxii., 23. Odeleben, ii., 80, 81. Témoin Oculaire, 80. Fain, i., 121.

* "Germans," said he, "we open to you the Prussian ranks; you will there find the son of the labourer placed beside the son of the prince; all distinction of rank is effaced in these great ideas—the king, liberty, honour, country! Among us there is no distinction but that of talent, and of the ardour with which we fly to combat for the common cause. Liberty or death! These are the rallying-words of the soldiers of Frederic William. Saxons! Germans! From the great era of 1812, our genealogical trees will count for nothing; the exploits of our ancestors are effaced by the degradation of their descendants. The regeneration of Germany can alone produce new noble families, and restore their lustre to those which before were illustrious. He who is not for liberty is against it; choose between our fraternal embrace and the point of our victorious swords. Rise, Saxons! Free your king from his fetters; exterminate the stranger from the land; and may you soon have a free king, and may he reign over a free people!"—WITTGENSTEIN *to the* SAXONS, 23*d and* 30*th March*, 1813. SCHOELL, *Recueil*, i., 352 and 357.

† Fain, i., 107, 108. Schoell, Recueil, i., 352, 357.

vented, and the troops succeeded in making good their way to Magdebourg. Next April 5. day Wittgenstein continued the pursuit, and leaving Bulow's corps to blockade that fortress, and Kleist with his Prussians before Wittenburg, took post himself at Dessau. Meanwhile, Winzingerode, having merely passed through Dresden, pushed on to Halle, April 7. which he occupied in strength; upon which Eugene, to preserve his communications with Frankfort and the great road to the Rhine, concentrated his troops on the Upper Saale, leaving only a portion of his army at Magdebourg. The conduct of General Thielman, who commanded the Saxon garrison of Torgau, was at this period the subject of great anxiety. Distracted between duty to his sovereign and to his country, he did not openly join the allies, but refused to admit Regnier with a French garrison, sent to replace him, and waited behind his formidable ramparts for the instruction of ulterior events. But, though the line of the Elbe was broken through at its two extremities at Dresden and Hamburg, and doubt existed as to the fidelity of the Saxon garrisons, Eugene boldly maintained his ground in the centre, and, resting on the strong fortress of Magdebourg, still made good his post, undismayed alike by external calamity and internal defection.*

What mainly contributed to support the spirits of the French soldiers, amid the multiplied disasters with which they were oppressed, was the prospect of being speedily joined by the emperor, and the powerful re-enforcements which he was bringing up from the Rhine. In effect, Napoleon, who, in his address to the Legislative Body on the 23d of March, had announced his speedy departure for the army, had recently completed all the arrangements requisite before setting out for the theatre of war.

Napoleon's measures before setting out for the army.

March 30. Letters patent were addressed to the empress, conferring on her the office and dignity of regent, with the seat of president of the Council of State, and the power of pardon consequent on that exalted station, but without the right of sanctioning any decree of the senate or proclaiming any law. On the same day she was invested with the elevated office with great pomp, and received the homage of the principal dignitaries of the Empire. It was Napoleon's intention to have set out immediately after this imposing ceremony, but the importance of the negotiation with Austria, and the incomplete state of the preparations on the Rhine and the Elbe, retarded his departure for a fortnight longer.

April 15. At length, on the 15th of April, he bade adieu to the empress and King of Rome, and set out for the Rhine, having previously thus explained his views of the approaching campaign to the Austrian ambassador, Prince Schwartzenberg: "I set out, and I will send orders to your Lieutenant-general Frimont, at the same time, to denounce the armistice. I will be in person, on the first days of May, with three hundred thousand men, on the right bank of the Elbe. Austria may increase her forces at Cracow, at the same time, to a hundred and fifty thousand, and assemble thirty or forty thousand in Bohemia, and the day that I arrive at Dresden we will debouch all at once on the Russians. It is thus we shall succeed in pacifying Europe."*

Napoleon arrived at Mayence at midnight on the 16th, and remained there eight days. They were anything, however, but days of rest to the indefatigable monarch; everything immediately assumed a new aspect, and his ardent mind communicated its energy to all the subordinate authorities by whom he was surrounded. The fortifications of the fortress were repaired with extraordinary vigour during the whole of April, and crowds of labourers from the whole neighbourhood collected for that purpose: those from the left bank of the Rhine received pay; those from the right, or German side, nothing. Great, however, as were the efforts made to put this frontier fortress in a respectable posture of defence, they were as nothing compared to the exertions at the same time going on to collect and forward troops to re-enforce the army. The accounts from Thuringia and the banks of the Saale were daily becoming more alarming: the Elbe had been crossed at many points; the enemy's light troops were advancing in all directions; Leipsic and Nuremburg were in their hands; Erfurth itself was menaced; terror, the forerunner of disaster, had already brought, in imagination, the Russians down to the Rhine. Nor was the political horizon less gloomy. Austria had assumed a position more than doubtful. Even the offer which Napoleon had made to the cabinet of Vienna, to restore Silesia to the imperial crown, had been refused, on the ground that they could consent to no aggrandizement at the expense of Prussia; while the King of Saxony, distracted between a conscientious regard to his engagements, and the daily increasing enthusiasm of his subjects and troops to the allied cause, had recently repaired to Prague, where there was every reason to apprehend that his policy would be determined by that of the cabinet of Vienna.†

Arrival of Napoleon at Mayence, and great preparations there.

In these critical circumstances, when every day and hour was not only of importance to withstand the allied forces actually in the field, but to prevent the accession of new and still more formidable powers to their league, the energy of Napoleon seemed to rise with the difficulties against which he had to contend, and to acquire an almost supernatural degree of vigour. In every direction officers were despatched to hasten the march, and collect the still unformed bodies of the conscripts, who, before they were able to handle their muskets, were hurried off to the Rhine; while the emperor, seated on the bridge of Mayence, seemed to count the numbers of even the smallest bodies of men who were passed over, and endeavoured to inspire the young novices in arms with a portion of his own ardent and unconquerable spirit. But this searching inspection demonstrated how much was yet to be done to restore the efficiency of the French military establishment, and told but too clearly that the Grand Army had irrevocably sunk amid the disasters of Russia. Notwithstanding the most strenu-

Napoleon's efforts to augment his forces there.

* Fain, i., 120, 123. Schoell, Hist., x., 211. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 24, 26.

* Fain, i., 125, 127, and 315. Pièces Just. Thib., ix., 245.
† Odel., i., 27. Thib., ix., 254. Schoell, x., 212.

ous efforts to augment that important branch of the service, the number of cavalry which crossed the bridge of Mayence had not yet exceeded four thousand; and when it was recollected how completely the ranks of the horse had been swept away during the Moscow campaign, and how powerful the allies were in that arm, this circumstance afforded a melancholy presage as to the issue of the contest which was impending. Nor was the condition of the greater part of the infantry and artillery more encouraging. Though strong in numbers, and animated with courage, they were weak in all the other qualities which constitute the strength of an army. The youths who had been torn from their homes to recruit the armies hurried forward to the frontier by forced marches which surpassed their strength, and, emaciated by the scanty and unwholesome food which they had received on the way, presented, in great part, the most miserable aspect; and before they ever saw the enemy their ranks exhibited nearly as woful an appearance as those of the veterans who had survived the horrors of the Moscow campaign. The "uniformity of ills" so well known in armies, and of such sinister presage when not surmounted by extraordinary mental vigour, or a sudden tide of success, was already visible; and though the patriotic ardour of the young conscripts carried them in a surprising manner through their difficulties, and they evinced extraordinary enthusiasm when passing the emperor, yet it was but too evident that they were unequal to the fatigues of the approaching campaign; and that, though they might possibly prove victorious in regular battles, they would melt away under the effects of dripping bivouacs or the horrors of military hospitals.*

Bad condition of his cavalry and artillery.

The condition of the cavalry and artillery, with the exception of that of the guard, was still more deplorable. The unfortunate quadrupeds which were harnessed to the guns, or placed beneath the unskilled riders who had been pressed into the ranks, felt none of the enthusiasm which supported the human conscripts; and the accumulated evils of forced marches, bad provender, and cold beds on the ground, fell upon them with unmitigated severity. So strongly had the evils of a long line of detached carriages been felt in Russia, that they now went into the other extreme. Strict orders had been given to keep the guns, vehicles, and columns close to each other: wherever the ground permitted it, they spread the columns over the fields adjoining the road; and the cavalry, infantry, artillery, staff, and wagon train, all marched pellmell, and often in the most frightful confusion, while the constant cry repeated by the officers, "Close up, close up," occasioned a perpetual shake and agitation in the ranks. Such enormous assemblages of men in so narrow a compass soon consumed the whole provisions which could be extracted from the inhabitants on the roadside: pillage, in consequence, became unavoidable in the adjoining districts with the succeeding columns; and the army, thus speedily collected together without adequate previous preparations, suffered nearly as much before arriving on the Elbe as they had done in the preceding campaign from the march through Lithuania.*

Forces of Napoleon at this period.

Napoleon left Mayence on the 24th, and arrived at Erfurth the succeeding day. The army, which by extraordinary efforts he had there collected, though without any adequate cavalry or artillery, was extremely formidable in point of numerical amount. His whole forces were divided into fourteen corps, besides the Imperial Guard and reserve cavalry; and their total amount was little less than four hundred thousand men.† This was the force, however, upon which the emperor had to rely for the whole campaign, and in every part of Germany. A considerable portion of it, though all collected in the depôts of the interior, had not yet reached the theatre of action; and three corps were swallowed up in the garrisons of Dantzic, and on the Oder, and on the Lower Weser or Elbe. The corps, however, which were under his immediate command, or so near as to be available even at the outset of the campaign—viz., those of Ney at Weimar, of Marmont at Gotha, of Bertrand at Saalefield, and of Oudinot at Coburg, with the guards and reserve cavalry—amounted to a hundred and forty thousand effective men, independent of forty thousand under Prince Eugene, which were still in the neighbourhood of Magdebourg. The strength of this immense host, however, consisted in its infantry; it had, as yet, only three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, though that number was doubled before the close of the campaign, and could only muster six thousand horse: a poor set-off to nearly thirty thousand superb cavalry, which glittered in the ranks of the enemy.‡

Inferiority of the allies at the opening of the campaign.

Although the forces which the allies brought into the field in the latter part of the contest, when Austria had joined the alliance, were much more considerable, and, even in its opening stages, more powerful in cavalry and veteran troops, yet at this period they were decidedly inferior in numbers to their opponents. So distant were the resources of the Russian, so incomplete, as yet, the preparation of the Prussian monarchy, that, at the opening of the campaign, they could only collect a hundred and ten thousand regular troops, of which forty thousand were absorbed in blockading the fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder, leaving not quite seventy thousand to meet the shock of battle in the plains of Leipsic.◊ In these circumstances, it appeared to many a hazardous and imprudent step to cross the Elbe, of which the whole fortresses were still in the hands of the enemy, and venture into the Saxon plains in presence of Napoleon, who had the command of a force twofold more numerous; and there were not wanting those who called to mind the fatal effects of a similar advance over the same ground, previous to the battle of Jena, seven years before. But, on the other hand, the circumstances of the two armies at these two periods were essentially different. Napo-

* Odel., i., 17, 19. Témoin Oculaire, 300, 301. Schoell, Recueil, ii., 300.

* Odel., i., 18, 24. Fain, i., 323, 324.
† See App., A, chap. lxix.
‡ Jom., iv., 270, 272. Fain, i., 323, 325. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 33, 34.
◊ See App., B, chap. lxix.

leon was then at the head of a veteran and victorious—he now led on a newly-raised, or beaten army; the Prussians, then advancing singly to the shock, were now supported by experience, and animated by the presence of the Russian conquerors. Seven years of oppressive rule had united every heart and upraised every hand in the north of Germany; the superiority of the allies in cavalry removed every reasonable ground for apprehending total defeat; and even though the forward movement might be attended with some peril, it was worth incurring, in the hope of determining the hesitation of the court of Dresden, and stimulating the favourable tendencies of the cabinet of Vienna. Influenced by these considerations, the advance of the allies continued. Leaving the viceroy, whose troops were concentrated between Magdebourg and the Saale, to the right, Wittgenstein crossed the Elbe in force at Dessau, and, concentrating his troops with those which had passed at Dresden, advanced to Leipsic, while his right wing occupied Halle and the adjoining villages; and Alexander and Frederic William, leaving the headquarters, where such important diplomatic arrangements had been concluded, at Kalisch, moved on to Dresden, and established themselves there on the 8th of April.*

Aspect of the Russian and Prussian troops which entered Dresden.

If the confused and motley array of worn-out veterans and youthful conscripts which crowded the road from Mayence to Erfurth was descriptive of the last efforts, though still unbroken spirit of the French Empire, the hardy warriors, savage horsemen, and enthusiastic volunteers who composed the Russian and Prussian ranks, were still more characteristic of the varied nations, from the deserts of Asia to the centre of civilized Europe, who were now roused to resist them. Unbounded was the astonishment of the citizens of Dresden when the Cossacks and Calmucks, the forerunners of Winzingerode's corps, first appeared among them. The uncombed beards and shaggy dress of many of these nomade warriors; their long lances and hardy steeds; and, above all, the piles of plunder which they bore between their saddles and horses' backs, at first excited no small degree of terror in the minds of the citizens, which was increased rather than diminished when they beheld these Asiatic warriors, singing Oriental airs, pile their arms in the streets, strew a little straw on the pavements, and lie down to rest beside their steeds, picketed to the walls, which had accompanied them from the Volga and the Don. By degrees, however, these apprehensions wore off: the uncouth warriors were found to be kindly and sober; a copious supply of brandy, bread, herrings, and onions, always put them in good-humour; and soon they were to be seen carrying the children in their arms for hours together, and teaching them to speak and sing in Russian. Shortly after, these rude hosts were followed by the more regular columns of the Russian army: infantry, cavalry, and artillery succeeded each other, without intermission, in the finest possible state of discipline and equipment; and when the Emperor Alexander and King of Prussia, at the head of their respective divisions of guards, defiled over the bridge and entered the city, all the spectators were lost in astonishment at the aspect of the troops, which, after undergoing the fatigues of so dreadful a campaign, appeared in all the pomp and majesty of unsullied war. Garlands of flowers were everywhere strewed on their approach, the windows were filled with rank and beauty, and the monarchs entered the town between a double rank of damsels clothed in white, bearing baskets loaded with all the beauty of spring.* April 24.

But if the long columns of the Russian army, and the varied appearance of their troops, were descriptive of the vast extent of their empire, and the prodigious force of that enthusiasm which had brought the military force of such distant regions into the heart of Europe, still more interesting, in a moral point of view, was the aspect which the patriot bands of Prussia wore. The chasseurs of the guard, in particular, excited general attention, and conveyed a lively idea, both of the sacrifices which her people had made to deliver their country, and of the heroic spirit with which they were animated. A thousand young men, almost all of the best families, marched in the ranks with ardour to battle, where more than two thirds of their number found an honoured grave. The bands of volunteers, clothed in black, were much more numerous. Many different provinces had contributed to form them; and a large proportion were composed of the young men at the universities, who now took the field under the direction of the same men, as officers, to whom they had formerly listened with reverence in the professors' chairs. Many distinguished members of the universities, in particular Jahn and Staffens, appeared with a warlike air, and surrounded by a numerous band of followers. These distinguished bands, however, though overflowing with courage, and burning to signalize themselves, scarcely appeared broke in to a discipline sufficiently strict for the arduous duties upon which they were about to enter; and many of them were still of such tender years as to be obviously unequal to the fatigues of a campaign. Numbers of these gallant youths, too young to be admitted into the ranks, and hardly able to carry a musket, followed the regiments, supplicating to be allowed to join their elder comrades. One boy of ten years was to be seen entreating the officers of different regiments, with tears in his eyes, to receive him in the ranks of volunteers, if not as a private, at least as a drummer; while another, only nine, was reclaimed by his parents at Breslau, by advertisement in the public newspapers.† Appearance of the Prussian troops.

These noble bands took the field, under the sanction, and impressed with the liveliest feelings, of religious duty; it was from that holy spring that the spirit destined to combat, and ultimately conquer, the worldly passions of the French Revolution, took its rise. "We marched," says one of the volunteers, the poet Körner, Noble spirit by which they were animated.

* Jom., iv., 273, 274. Fain, i., 324, 325. Schoell, Recueil, ii., 290, 291.

* Témoin Oculaire, 85, 86, 109. Odel., ii., 85, 110.
† Tém. Ocul., 94. Odel., ii., 93, 94.

"in parade from Zoblen to Rogau, a Lutheran village, where the church, with great simplicity, but also with great taste, had been decorated for the convention of the volunteers. After singing a hymn of my composition, the clergyman of the parish delivered an address, full of manly vigour and public enthusiasm. Not a dry eye was to be seen in the whole assembly. After the service he pronounced the oath before us, for the cause of humanity, of fatherland, of religion, to spare neither substance nor soul—to conquer or die for the right. We swore! He then fell on his knees, and besought God for a blessing on his champions. It was a moment when the present thought of death kindled flame in every eye, and beat heroism in every heart. The oath, solemnly repeated by all, and sworn on the swords of the officers, and Luther's hymn, 'Eine feste burg ist unser Gott' (It is a stronghold that is under God), concluded the ceremony, upon which a thundering *vivat* burst from the congregation of champions for German freedom, while every blade leaped from its scabbard, and gleams of warlike light shone through the sanctuary. The hour was so much the more impressive, that most of us went out with the conviction that it was the last time we should ever meet."* With such holy rites did the champions of German freedom prepare themselves for the fight. The moral world was shaken to its foundation: again, as in the days of Michael, Duty, based on religion, was arrayed against Talent destitute of God.

Habits of the emperor and king at Dresden, and religious spirit by which they were animated.

The emperor and king lived at Dresden with the utmost simplicity, and won the hearts of all classes by the affability of their demeanour, and the readiness with which they were at all times accessible to the complaints, not only of their own troops, but of the Saxon people. Both appeared in public without guards, or ostentation of any sort. Alexander, in particular, frequently walked out attended only by an aid-de-camp, and seemed to take a pleasure in the crowds who thronged around him, in so much that no small difficulty was sometimes experienced in making his way through.† But it was chiefly in the respect paid by themselves and their followers to the rites of religion that the difference appeared between the allied sovereigns and the French authorities by which they had been preceded. The day after their entry was Easter Sunday, and it was celebrated from daybreak by the soldiers of both armies with extraordinary solemnity. The whole troops appeared in their very best and neatest attire. Everywhere the Cossacks were to be seen buying stained eggs to present to their comrades; wherever the Russians met, from the highest to the lowest rank, they gave the salute, "Christ is risen," to which the reply was, "Yes, he is risen indeed."* The emperor was the first to set this devout example; and having, after the preceding midnight, assisted at the solemn service of Easter in a little Greek chapel established in one of the apartments of the Bruhl palace, he immediately addressed that expression to every one of his officers present. Divine service was performed by the chaplains, or "popes," as they are called, of all the different Russian regiments quartered in Saxony; and this was succeeded by a splendid review, in which a noble body of seven thousand cavalry, headed by the Archduke Constantine, who had just arrived from Pilnitz, paraded before the sovereigns at Dresden. Superficial readers may consider these incidents as trifles, but they are straws which show how the wind sets; and the reflecting observer will not deem it the least interesting incident in this memorable year, that the sovereigns and armies which at length delivered Europe were bound together by the common ties which unite man to his Creator; and that, after all human powers had failed in combating the forces of the Revolution, victory was at length brought back to the arms of freedom, when they went forth to the fight with the ancient war-cry of the warriors of the Cross on their banners, "In this sign you shall conquer."†

Confusion and disorders on the French line of march.

During his stay at Erfurth, Napoleon put the last hand to the organization of his army: gave directions for strengthening the two citadels of the town, and putting them in a posture of defence, and established hospitals for six thousand men. Meanwhile, Eugene, firm in his position between the confluence of the Saale and Elbe, and Magdebourg, quietly awaited the approach of the emperor, who left Erfurth early on the morning of the 28th, mounted on horseback, and commenced the campaign. The conscripts, as the long and brilliant cortège of the emperor passed through their ranks, gazed with delight on the hero who had filled the world with his renown; and the cheers with which he was saluted were almost as loud and general as in the most brilliant period of his career. But these cheering signs died away when Napoleon had passed; and the first day's march was sufficient to convince every observer that the ancient discipline and order of the army were at an end, and that the admirable precision of the soldiers of Ulm and Austerlitz had been buried with the Grand Army in the snows of Russia. The emperor slept that night at Eckartsberg, having passed in his journey over the field of Auerstadt, already immortalized in the annals of French glory. During the whole march, the imperial cortège was obliged to force its way, with almost brutal violence, through the dense crowd of infantry, cannon, horsemen, and wagons which encumbered the highway; pillage had already commenced on all sides; and the disorders of the troops not only inflicted on the unhappy inhabitants all the miseries of war, but evinced, even under the eyes of the emperor, the relaxed discipline and imperfect or-

April 28.

* Körner to Caroline Von Pickler, 30th of March, 1813. Deutche Pandora, 128.

† He inhabited the beautiful Bruhl palace in the suburbs of the city, the shady walks of the garden of which had been for long the favourite resort of the children of the better classes. Strict orders had been given, in the first instance, to close the gates against these noisy intruders; but no sooner was the emperor informed of the privation to which they had been exposed, than he gave directions to have them admitted as usual, and often walked out to divert himself with the sportive happiness of his little allies. The King of Prussia did the same at the royal palace of Racknitz, which formed his residence.—*Témoin Oculaire*, 213. ODEL., 113.

* "Christos woskres.—Istinnoe woskres."

† Odel., ii., 111, 112. Tém. Ocul., iii.

ganization of his army. Under the very windows of the hotel which he inhabited a vast crowd of disorderly soldiers was collected, who, with loud shouts and dissonant cries, continued during the whole night to feed a huge fire by throwing into it the furniture, beds, and property of the wretched inhabitants, into whose houses they had broken, and who, by a single day's presence of the imperial headquarters, found themselves deprived of their whole movable effects.*

Approach of the two armies to each other. April 29.

The direction of Napoleon's march was determined by the important consideration of effecting a junction with the viceroy towards the mouth of the Saale; and with this view he advanced next day to Naumberg, while Ney reached Weissenfels, after having driven back the Russian videttes, which now, for the first time, began to show themselves on the road. Meanwhile, the viceroy, to facilitate the junction, ascended the course of the Saale, and on the same day arrived at Merseberg, so that the two armies were now not more than twenty miles distant. Eugene's forces consisted of three corps, Victor's, Lauriston's, and Macdonald's, and mustered full forty thousand combatants, besides those left in garrison in the fortresses on the Elbe; already the thunder of their artillery was heard in the distance, and soon an aid-de-camp from the viceroy announced the joyful intelligence to the emperor that his troops had passed the Saale by the bridge of Merseberg, and that a junction had been effected between the two armies. The young conscripts in Ney's corps, which formed the head of the advance, gazed with wonder on the veterans, many of them mutilated, who had survived the Moscow campaign; while they, reanimated by the sight of the dense columns which were hourly thronging to their support, forgot the horrors of the retreat, and fondly hoped that the glorious days of the Grand Army were about to return. Joyfully the united host moved towards the enemy, who occupied Halle, Naumberg, Leipsic, and all the adjacent roads, while the advanced guards proceeded on the road to Weissenfels.†

April 30.

Position and measures of the allies.

No sooner were the allies aware of the approach of the enemy in such strength than they took measures to concentrate their forces; but the situation of their troops was such as to afford the most serious ground for disquietude. Not more than eighty thousand men were scattered along the line of the Elbe, from the Bohemian Mountains to the sea, without any other point of support than Dresden, a town which could not be said to be fortified. The bridges of Meissen, Muhlburg, and Rosslau, by which they had passed, were not yet even covered by *têtes-de-pont*; Dessau alone had a tolerable bridge-head; and the reenforcements in their rear were all absorbed in blockading the fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder. Thus, it was impossible to give battle to the enemy with anything approaching to an equality of force; yet was retreat still more hazardous, as it would weaken the moral influence which their advance had produced in Germany, and, by renewing its terrors, might revive all the vacillations of the cabinet of Vienna, and even induce it to throw its forces into the opposite scale. Nor were the chances of battle so unequal as they at first sight appeared; for, though Napoleon was greatly superior upon the whole, it was by no means certain that his forces would all be concentrated upon one field; the quality of the allied troops was undoubtedly better than the conscripts by whom they were to be opposed; and, above all, the great superiority of their cavalry, which was nearly twenty-five thousand strong, while that of the French was not five thousand, both precluded the possibility of total defeat, and promised the most brilliant results in case of success.*

Combat at Poserna, and death of Marshal Bessières.

These considerations having induced the allied sovereigns to risk a battle, it was no sooner ascertained that Napoleon had passed the Saale, near Weissenfels, on the 30th of April, than the Russian and Prussian forces were moved forward with all imaginable expedition to prevent his advance to Leipsic, give him battle in the plains of LUTZEN, and drive him back, in case of success, into the marshes formed by the Pleisse and the Elster. The Prussian army was concentrated, on the 1st of May, at Roethe; Wittgenstein, with the main body of the Russians, was at Zwenkau; while Winzingerode and Malaradowitch, more in advance, observed the movements of the enemy on the roads of Naumberg and Chemnitz. It was in crossing the defile of Grünebach that the head of the French column first encountered the allies, who were strongly posted with six guns on the heights of Poserna, on the opposite bank, to defend the great road which, after descending into the valley of that name, and passing the village of Reppach, ascends the opposite steep to enter upon the great plains of Lutzen and Leipsic. The inferiority of Napoleon's forces in cavalry rendered it necessary to approach this advanced guard with caution, and the French infantry moved on in squares, as at the battle of the Pyramids in Egypt. Marshal Bessières, duke of Istria, colonel of the Imperial Guards, was among the foremost of the horsemen who advanced to reconnoitre the enemy's position, when a cannon-shot killed the brigadier of his escort. "Inter that brave man," said the marshal; and hardly had the words passed his lips when a second cannon-ball struck himself on the breast and laid him dead on the spot. His body was immediately covered with a white sheet to conceal the calamity from the soldiers, and no one spoke of the event even at the imperial headquarters: an ominous practice, which commenced during the calamities of the Moscow retreat, and was continued in this campaign, from the rapid consumption of men of the highest rank and consideration by which it was characterized. Great confusion prevailed for some time at the attack of the defile on the opposite side, from the want of precision in the movements of the troops, and three hundred men were struck down in the squares without the enemy being dislodged; but at length twenty pieces of the artillery of the Guard were brought up, and under cover of their fire the leading square got through, and the allied vanguard retired, leaving open to the

* Odel., i., 36, 37. Fain, i., 337. Jom., iv., 275.
† Fain, i., 339, 341. Jom., iv., 275. Odel., i., 39.

* Précis de la Camp. 1813. Schoell, ii., 298, 301. Fain, i., 339, 341.

enemy the entrance of the plain of Lutzen.* The French army occupied Lutzen and the adjacent villages, where they slept; the young guard bivouacked round the tomb of Gustavus Adolphus; sentinels were placed to preserve from destruction, during the night, the trees which shaded the grave of the hero of the North.†

Movements and position of the French.

Next morning the French troops, being aware that they were in presence of the enemy, advanced in close order towards Leipsic, ready at a moment's warning to form square, to resist the formidable cavalry to which they were opposed. General Lauriston, with his corps, the advanced guard of Eugene's army, moved on the road from Merseberg; he met with no resistance till he arrived at Lindenau, the western suburb of Leipsic; but there the streets were barricaded and the houses loopholed; and, as a serious resistance was expected, the troops halted, and the fire of artillery commenced. Macdonald's corps followed on the same line, and neither of these were engaged in the subsequent action. On the great road from Lutzen to Leipsic, the main body of the French army, under Napoleon in person, advanced in a dense array of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and chariots, crowding the road from Weissenfels to Lindenau; and it seemed hardly possible for any efforts to restore order to the prodigious accumulation of men and carriages which were there assembled. Marmont's corps formed the vanguard of the array; next to him, Bertrand brought up his Italians from Nossen; behind them, between Naumberg and Weissenfels, came Oudinot's men; while the Imperial Guards and reserve cavalry were still farther in the rear, and Ney's dense columns covered the flank of the huge array as far as Lutzen.‡

Allied march and plan of attack.

On the other hand, the allied sovereigns, who had taken the field on the 29th of April, and put themselves at the head of their respective armies, were resolved to give battle in the plains of Lutzen. Not that they were insensible of the risk which they ran in combating Napoleon at the head of superior forces, especially in the thickly-studded villages of Saxony, where their magnificent cavalry would be of little avail; but political considerations of the highest importance, connected with the courts of Vienna and Dresden, forbade them to recede or act on the defensive at this particular juncture. They crossed the Elster, therefore, near Pegau, early on the morning of the 2d, and advanced with all their forces, directing their march towards Jena, and threatening the enemy's right, so as to keep up the communication with Bohemia and the forces of the Austrian monarchy. The plan of attack was to refuse their own right, and make no considerable effort in the centre, but endeavour to force back the enemy's right, turn it, and cut him off from the Saale, and then inundate his rear with a numerous cavalry, to which he had no corresponding force to oppose. Blucher's Prussians were in front; next came Wittgenstein's Russians; Winzingerode's Russians, with the Russian and Prussian guards, and the cavalry of both armies, formed the reserve. In this order the troops, after having enjoyed an hour and a half's rest, advanced to the attack at one o'clock in the afternoon.* May 2.

Battle of Lutzen.

The hostile armies thus approached each other in a very peculiar manner; for both were in open column, and actually under march, and they came into collision like two men-of-war attempting to pass each other on opposite tacks. Napoleon, aware that the enemy were not far distant, but ignorant of their intentions, and not expecting them to stand firm that day, had been on horseback since nine in the morning; and he had passed the monument of Gustavus Adolphus, when he was first roused to a sense of his situation by the sound of artillery on his extreme left at Lindenau. He immediately halted with his suite, and surveyed the distant combat with his telescope, after which he remained half an hour in meditation, directing the troops merely to continue their march, with their ranks as close as possible. Suddenly a tremendous cannonade arose in rear of his right, in the direction of Great and Little Görschen; while his telescope, still directed towards Lindenau, showed him the inhabitants peaceably posted on the roofs of the houses, and no enemy's force deployed beyond the extremity of the buildings.† He instantly perceived that the attack was to be expected on the other side, and Marshal Ney, observing that his corps was assailed, set off at the gallop to put himself at its head. May 2.

Commencement of the action, and success of the allies on the right.

In truth, matters had assumed a serious aspect, from the very first, in that quarter. The French infantry there occupied the village of Gross Görschen, Klein Görschen, Rahno, and Kaia, which lie near each other, somewhat in the form of an irregular square, in the plain between Lutzen and Pegau. The plain is there traversed by the deep channel of a rivulet, called the Flossgraben, which was crossed by the whole combined army in small compact columns, and formed a support to the right after these columns had deployed. Emerging from behind the heights, where they had taken their rest, entirely concealed from the

* Ever since the campaign of Italy, in 1796, Marshal Bessières had, in different ranks, commanded the guard which accompanied Napoleon in his battles. He was one of his most esteemed lieutenants; and he deserved the emperor's regard, as well by his military experience and ability, as by his talent for civil affairs and his fidelity to his interests. His body was embalmed, and arrived at the Hôtel des Invalides, at Paris, on the 20th of May, where it was interred; and the emperor wrote the following touching letter to his widow, who was inconsolable for his loss: "My cousin: Your husband has died on the field of honour. The loss which you and your children have sustained is doubtless great, but mine is still greater. The Duke of Istria has died the noblest death, and without suffering; he has left a reputation without spot, the best inheritance he could bequeath to his children. My protection is secured to them; they will inherit all the affection which I bore to their father." When the author visited Paris in May, 1814, the lamps were burning night and day in the mausoleum of the deceased, by the pious care of his widow, who still daily visited and spent some time in his tomb. The King of Saxony erected a monument to Bessières on the spot where he fell. —See Fain, i., 344, 345; and Las Casas, vi., 45.

† Souv. de Caulaincourt, i., 163. Fain, i., 341, 343. Odel., i., 46. Jom., iv., 275, 276. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 31, 32.

‡ Fain, i., 248, 249. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 32, 33. Jom., iv., 276, 277.

* Précis de la Camp. 1813, Schoell, Recueil, ii., 305, 306. Lond., 20, 21. Odel., i., 47, 49.

† Odel., i., 49, 50. Fain, i., 350, 351. Précis in Schoell, Recueil, ii., 305, 306.

enemy's view, the allied army, eighty thousand strong, moved on in four deep black columns, with a powerful artillery in front, which immediately commenced a heavy concentric fire upon Gross Görschen, which the French infantry in the village sustained with admirable intrepidity. Soon, however, it was assailed by two Prussian brigades, under General Ziethen, with such vigour, that, after a gallant resistance, Souham's division, which was charged with its defence, was driven out and pursued to some distance. The brave Prussians, burning with ardour, followed up their success with the utmost impetuosity: Klein Görschen and Rahno were also carried amid deafening cheers; both villages were speedily wrapped in flames; black volumes of smoke enveloped the whole right of the field of battle, and aid-de-camp after aid-de-camp was despatched to Napoleon, pressing for re-enforcements, or all was lost in that quarter.*

Napoleon's measures to repair the disorder.

The emperor's resolution was instantly taken. "We have no cavalry," said he. "No matter: it will be a battle as in Egypt; the French infantry is equal to anything, and I commit myself, without alarm, to the inherent valour of our young conscripts." Orders were immediately despatched to Macdonald, who was on the left, near Lindenau, to retrace his steps, and direct his march to the point of attack on the right; the viceroy, gifted with the true eye of a general, had already stopped his advance on hearing the cannon to the right, and enjoined him to incline in that direction; orders were simultaneously sent to Marmont to hasten across the fields in the same direction; Bertrand was instructed to advance, as quickly as possible, on the other side; while the whole troops on the road between Lutzen and Leipsic were at once halted, and wheeled into line by a movement to the right. Napoleon himself set off with his suite in the same direction, directing his rapid course to the point where the smoke was thickest and the cannon loudest; but, before these various succours could arrive, disasters, well-nigh attended with fatal consequences, had ensued in that direction.†

Counter movements of Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein, overjoyed at the success of his first attack, which had answered his most sanguine expectations, resolved to support it to the utmost of his power, and direct his principal forces in that quarter, while, at the same time, he distracted the enemy's attention by a furious onset upon his centre. He brought up, therefore, his second line, and a part of his reserves, which had now become necessary; for Ney, having moved forward the divisions Brenier, Gérard, and Marchand, to the support of Souham, which advanced in squares, as at the battle of the Pyramids, had, by a brilliant charge with the bayonet, regained the lost villages, and driven back the allies almost to the ground they occupied at the commencement of the action. A few words addressed by the Prussian generals to their men when the second line came up, restored their confidence, and they returned to the attack of the burning villages with redoubled ardour. Nothing could withstand their impetuosity. The French columns, driven out of the houses, were charged in the intervening open ground by the allied horse, and thrown into confusion. Several regiments of conscripts disbanded and fled; the plain was covered with fugitives, and dismay overspread the whole French right. Seeing his attack thus far successful, Wittgenstein brought up his reserves of the Russians and Prussians to decide the victory; these noble troops advanced in the finest order, through a driving tempest of cannon-shot from the French batteries, and, pressing incessantly forward, carried the villages of Klein Görschen and Hahalali by assault, and drove the enemy beyond Kaia, the key of the French right, which became the prey of the flames, and remained burning furiously, unoccupied by either party. The French whole line, in the centre and on the right, retired five or six hundred paces, abandoning also the village of Starsiedel, which the allies, however, were not in sufficient strength to occupy. It was now six o'clock: the battle seemed gained; the French right, driven back a mile and a half, had not only been expelled from the five villages which formed its strongholds, but in great part thrown into disorder.* Half an hour's farther advance would bring the allies upon the line of Bertrand's march forward, and cut him off from the remainder of the army; while their numerous and magnificent cavalry were already forming in dense and menacing masses to sweep along the open plains, in the rear of the whole enemy's centre and left, and complete his destruction in a quarter, and by a force to which he had nothing to oppose.

Napoleon hastens to the right to restore the battle.

No sooner were these disastrous tidings brought to Napoleon, than he set out at the gallop to restore affairs by his own presence at the scene of this terrible conflict. On approaching the right wing, clearer evidence appeared at every step of the imminence of the danger. The plain was covered by conscripts flying from the dreadful fire of the Russian artillery; the columns, which still held together, were retreating, closely followed by the allied infantry; and the threatening clouds of their horse were preparing to deluge the field the moment that the last villages were passed. Yet, even in these circumstances of alarm, the emperor received the most touching proofs of the devotion of his troops: the broken crowds of conscripts re-formed in haste at the sight of the imperial staff, and endeavoured, by forming little knots or squares, to arrest the disorder; numbers rejoined the ranks, which still held together; the wounded, which were carried past in numbers, every minute increasing, never failed to salute the emperor with the wonted acclamations—cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" broke from lips soon about to be silent in death, and a faint expression of joy illuminated the countenances of the dying youths when the well-known form of Napoleon flitted before their eyes. Never had the French army displayed more devoted valour—never did the generals and officers evince a more heroic spirit—and never, except, perhaps, at Wagram,

* Lond., 22, 23. Précis, Schoell, Rec., ii., 306, 307. Odel., i., 50. Fain, i., 350, 351.

† Vict. et Conq., xxii., 36, 37. Fain, i., 351, 352. Lond., 23.

* Fain, i., 355, 356. Précis, Schoell, Recueil, ii., 307, 309. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 38, 39. Lond., 23.

had the emperor exposed his person more than at that awful crisis. But he was deeply impressed with the danger of his situation: orders were already given for a retreat; and when an aid-de-camp brought the intelligence, as he came up, that Ney's second attack on Kaia had failed, he received the news with a terrific exclamation—"Ha!"—accompanied by a look to Berthier and Caulaincourt, which froze every heart around him with horror.*†

Prodigious efforts of both parties at the decisive point.

Both parties, perceiving that the decisive point of the battle was to be found in the ruins of Kaia, strove, by accumulating forces upon it, to secure to themselves so important an acquisition: like two skilful players at chess, who successively bring up all their forces to support the attack or defence, towards the close of the struggle, of often an inconsiderable piece on the board. Napoleon, placing himself at a short distance behind the village, arranged the broken remains of Ney's divisions, which had been already engaged, preceded by the division Ricard, with his aid-de-camp Count Lobau at their head, for a fresh attack. These gallant troops advanced with cool intrepidity; and, being now decidedly superior in number to their opponents, they drove them back behind Kaia, and into the neighbourhood of Klein Görschen. Blucher's Prussians of the reserve, however, issued with the utmost vigour from that village: a furious combat ensued in the plain between the two; Gérard and Brenier both fell severely wounded, at the head of their troops, the former exclaiming, "Soldiers, the moment is arrived when every Frenchman who has the feelings of honour in his bosom should conquer or die." Nor would the Prussians recede an inch: the Berlin volunteers melted away under the fire, but stood immovable; both parties kept their ground with undaunted resolution, and, as the shades of evening began to creep over the field, the flashes of the musketry on either side appeared fixed to one spot, and almost close to each other.‡

Conflict of the Berlin volunteers and French conscripts.

This obstinate conflict, however, gained for Napoleon what he alone required to wrest their hard-earned successes from the allies—time. While the combat was raging between Kaia and Klein Görschen, the other corps of the French army came up: the Imperial Guard was now assembled close behind Kaia in reserve, with Napoleon at its head; Bertrand's forces were on the one side, Marmont's infantry issued from the willow thickets, which adjoined the Flossgraben, on the other. Seventy thousand French infantry pressed upon the allies, who at that point had not more than forty thousand to oppose to them. As a last effort, Wittgenstein ordered the artillery of General Winzingerode to march forward and take the enemy, combating between the villages, on their left flank, while his infantry advanced to the support of the now almost exhausted Prussians. This able manœuvre had at first a surprising success: one of his divisions debouched from Eisdorf, beyond the Flossgraben streamlet, and drove back Marchand's division of Marmont's troops; while another re-enforced the Prussians between the villages, and, with the aid of the guns on the enemy's flank, a third time, with loud shouts, drove him out of Klein Görschen and Kaia, and back to the Imperial Guard of Napoleon. An interesting yet melancholy incident took place in the contest for the burning villages: the volunteers of Berlin and the young conscripts of Paris met amid the ruins; both made their first essay in arms, but both fought with the courage of veteran soldiers, hand to hand, body to body, heart to heart; these gallant youths struggled with invincible obstinacy amid the flames, and nearly a half of each found there an untimely grave.*†

Final charge of the French Guards.

Napoleon now saw that the decisive moment had arrived: all his reserves within reach, except the Imperial Guard, had been engaged. He forthwith drew out that formidable host, which had so often decided the fate of European fields. Sixteen battalions of the young guard were drawn up in a close column, preceded by sixty pieces of its incomparable artillery, commaned by Drouot, and followed by the whole reserve cavalry. This weighty column soon made its way through the crowd of fugitives which lay in its line of advance. Nothing could withstand the swift and deadly fire of Drouot's guns, which seemed absolutely to be discharged as they moved along: Kaia was regained, and the allies forced back, still facing about and firing, to Klein Görschen. The Prussian battalions were now so much reduced by eight hours' incessant fighting, that they formed little more than a line of tirailleurs, which was obliged to fall back behind that village to reform. There, however, the fight was renewed: Mortier had a horse shot under him; Dumoustier fell by his side; while on the Prussian side Scharnhorst was mortally wounded, the Prince Leopold of Hesse Homberg and Prince Mecklenberg Strelitz killed; but the guard, enveloped by clouds of dust and smoke, still steadily advanced, and the receding sound of their artillery and light of their guns showed that the enemy was in retreat on the right. At the same time the viceroy, who at this critical moment came up from Lindenau, fell on the extreme right of the Prince of Wirtemberg, and

* Odel., i., 51, 52. Jom., iv., 281, 282. Lond., 23. Schoell, Rec., ii., 309.

† "The moment was very critical: the emperor called me to his side, and asked where were the treasure and equipages. 'I have executed,' replied I, 'the orders of your majesty: they are at Lutzen.' 'Lose not a moment, then,' said he, 'to move them back to Merseberg; it is our rallying-point in the event of retreat.' The whole baggage immediately took the road for Merseberg, where I arrived at night, and found it occupied by a division of Eugene's corps, which had been detached in the utmost haste to occupy, during the alarm, that important point."—*Souvenirs de* DUMAS, iii., 499.

‡ Vict. et Conq., xxii., 38, 39. Jom., iv., 282, 283. Précis in Schoell, Recueil, ii., 309, 310.

* Fain, i., 359, 360. Guil. de Vaud Camp. de 1813, 81. Jom., iv., 282, 283. Précis in Schoell, Recueil, ii., 311, 312.

† "I had nothing," said Ney to General Mathieu Dumas, after the battle, "but battalions of conscripts; but I had good reason to congratulate myself on their conduct. I doubt if I could have achieved as much with the grenadiers of the guard. I had before me the best troops of the enemy, including the whole Prussian Guard; our bravest warriors, after having twice failed, would probably have never carried the villages; but *five times* I led back those brave youths, whose docility, and, perhaps, inexperience, have served me better than the most veteran valour; the French infantry can never be too young."—*Souvenirs de* DUMAS, iii., 499.

drew off his batteries from the flank of the columns engaged among the villages; and it was only by great exertions, and the admirable steadiness of the Prussian troops, that the prince was able to maintain himself in his position, without prosecuting the attack which, in the first instance, had been attended with such important effects. The fire of the artillery continued with the utmost violence along the whole line till darkness closed in the scene, and several charges of the allied horse upon the French squares were followed by brilliant success; but although they retained the greater part of the ground they had won, on the right and in the centre, it was evident they were overmatched at the decisive point: the Russian and Prussian guards, who were impatiently expected, had not yet come up; a re-enforcement of two divisions of Russian grenadiers, under Konownitzen, which Wittgenstein hurled at the very close of the day against Ney's corps on the right, was assailed in the flank by the viceroy, at the head of Macdonald's three fresh divisions, and so rudely handled that they were obliged to retreat, and evacuate the village of Eisdorf; while, on the extreme left of the allies' line, Bertrand's corps was debouching by Gosserau and Pobles, and threatened early next morning to assail the disputed villages in flank. In these circumstances, the allied sovereigns gave orders for a retreat on the following morning: they themselves retired for the night to Lobstadt; the right was concentrated in and around Gross Görschen, where it sunk to sleep amid the smoking ruins; and Napoleon despatched couriers to Paris, Cracow, Rome, Vienna, and Constantinople, to announce that he had gained the victory.*

Night attack of the allied horse on the French line.

Strict orders had been given by the emperor that no pursuit should be attempted: he was well aware of his inferiority in cavalry, and, having observed that a considerable part of the allied horse had not been engaged, he feared some surprise during the night. To guard against such a danger, fires were directed to be kindled along the whole front of the French position, and the men were ordered to lie down in squares. It soon appeared how necessary these precautions had been. As Napoleon was riding, at nine at night, across part of the field of battle towards Lutzen, where headquarters were to be established, he was suddenly assailed by a fire of musketry from behind a hedge, followed by the irruption of a huge mass of horse, which advanced, in close order and at a steady pace, through the squares, almost to the imperial escort. Had they pushed on two hundred paces farther, they would have taken the emperor, with all his suite. As it was, the alarm was so great that all his followers dispersed: Napoleon himself disappeared for some minutes, and the anxious question was asked by them all, when they reassembled, "Where is the emperor?" Some squares having now come up, and poured in a close fire on both sides, the allied horse got entangled in the darkness in a ravine, and at length the body which made this irruption, consisting of eight squadrons, retired to their own position, and the combat at all points ceased in this sea of blood.*

Aspect of the field of battle.

At daybreak on the following morning, Napoleon left Lutzen, and, according to his usual custom, rode over the field of battle. It afforded ample subject for meditation, and evinced clearly the obstinate and nearly balanced nature of the conflict in which the French Empire was now engaged. Between the village of Kaia and Gross Görschen the whole surface of the ground was covered with the slain, of whom above two thirds were French. The dead on their side were about six, the wounded twelve thousand.† The youthful visages and slender figures of a great proportion of the corpses on both sides presented at once a melancholy and an interesting spectacle, and showed at once how war had strained the military strength of both monarchies, and what ardent passions had mutually inspired their people. Many of the dead bodies were those of the Prussian landwehr and landsturm. The French gazed with astonishment on the long hair, rough mien, and coarse garments of these rural combatants, most of whom were not yet in uniform, but lay on the field in their dress from the plough; but Napoleon viewed them with very different feelings, and mused long on these decisive proofs of the universal spirit which had drawn forth in Prussia "the might that slumbers in a peasant's arm." The troops saluted him with their accustomed acclamations, and appeared to have lost none of their wonted enthusiasm. Nothing appeared so extraordinary to his attendants as the immense army which had, in a manner, sprung out of the earth at his summons, and the admirable spirit with which it was animated.‡

Loss on both sides, and reflections on the battle.

The battle of Lutzen must always be considered as one of the most striking proofs of Napoleon's military abilities. Though the success gained was far from being decisive—the allies having retreated next day in admirable order, without the sacrifice either of prisoners, standards, or cannon, and with a loss of only fifteen thousand men, while the French were weakened by eighteen thousand, of whom nine hundred were prisoners—yet a most important advantage had been gained by the first success in the campaign, and the restoration of the credit of their arms in the eyes of Europe, by having forced the veteran bands of Russia to retreat, with an army for the most part composed of young conscripts. Although, also, the superiority of numbers, upon the whole, was decidedly on the side of the French, yet this was far from being the case with the forces actually engaged until a late period of the day. The allies selected their own point of attack: their movements were so admirably screened from the enemy by the numerous light horse which covered their movements, that, though they bivouacked within two leagues of the French

* Prussian Official Account. Schoell, i., 44, 48. Fain, i., 361, 362. Précis in Schoell, Rec., ii., 312, 313. Jom., iv., 2o3, 284. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 39, 40. Lond., 24.

* Odel., i., 57, 58. Fain, i., 366, 367. Lond., 24. Précis in Recueil by Schoell, ii., 313, 314.

† Ney's corps alone lost twelve thousand men and five hundred officers, killed and wounded. The number of wounded was so great, that the generals accused the young conscripts with having injured themselves to escape the fatigues and dangers of the campaign.—JOMINI, iv., 285.

‡ Odel., i., 59, 62. Fain, i., 367, 369. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 42, 43.

right on the night preceding, their vicinity was not even suspected; and when the attack on Gross Görschen commenced at ten o'clock on the morning of the 2d, Ney's corps alone was at hand to resist it, while the remainder of the army was spread over a line thirty miles in length, from the gates of Leipsic to the banks of the Saale. Surprised in this manner in a scattered line of march by the unforeseen onset of the enemy in concentrated masses on his right and centre, Napoleon ran the most imminent hazard of seeing his army pierced through the middle, and severed in twain by an enemy whose superiority in cavalry would have enabled him speedily to convert such a disaster into total ruin. Had Wittgenstein had his reserves better in hand, and followed up the capture of Klein Görschen and Kaia at the moment with adequate forces, there can be little doubt that this result would have taken place. It was the highest effort of the military art, therefore, in Napoleon to restore the battle after such an advantage had been gained and such a surprise incurred; to arrest the enemy's advance by obstinate resistance in the only situation where, from the proximity of the villages, it could be attempted, and prolong the combat till the concentration of his forces from both sides enabled him to assume the offensive with superior strength.*

Retreat of the allies to Dresden.

During the action, Bulow had carried the town of Halle by assault, and taken six guns; but the turn which affairs had taken on the plain of Lutzen rendered this advantage, which otherwise might have been important, of no avail. The allied army retired slowly, and in admirable order, towards Dresden, which the main body reached on the 7th, and, passing on without halting, took the road of Silesia, where a strong intrenched position had for some time been prepared at Bautzen. Notwithstanding the methodical arrangements, however, and short marches of the retreat, considerable confusion soon ensued: ten thousand chariots, more than half of them loaded with wounded, retiring on a single road, necessarily occasioned great embarrassment. In many places the road was blocked up, and nothing but the unconquerable firmness of the rear-guard imposed on the French, and prevented the most serious disasters. The retreat was conducted in two columns: the Russians retired by Chemnitz and Freyberg, followed by Bertrand and Oudinot; the Prussians by the great road from Leipsic to Dresden, pursued by Lauriston, Marmont, Eugene, and the Imperial Guard; while Ney moved upon Torgau and Wittenberg to menace Berlin. Ney, with his corps, which had suffered so severely in the battle, was at first left to rest some days on the field, in order to bury the dead and reform its ranks. The emperor, however, intended that, while the bulk of his army followed the allied sovereigns into Silesia, that gallant marshal should receive a recompense for his valour, by being sent against Berlin; and thither, accordingly, he was soon directed. Severe combats with the rear-guard took place at Etidorf, Nossen, and Wilidruf; but the French obtained no advantage, and Milaradowitch, who commanded the rear-guard, after cutting the arches of the bridge of Dresden,* which had been restored in a temporary manner, took post in force among the houses on the right bank.

April 7. May 5. May 6. May 7.

Beautiful appearance of Dresden on the approach of the French.

When the French army approached Dresden, even the meanest soldiers were struck by the beauty of the spectacle which presented itself. Its lovely encircling hills, crowned with villas, gardens, and orchards, divided by the noble stream of the Elbe, which at all seasons awaken the admiration of the traveller, were then in their highest beauty, decked in the first green and flowers of spring. The ascending sun glittered with dazzling brightness on the steeples, domes, and palaces of the city; calmness and peace seemed to have marked it for their own; no sound of alarm or sign of devastation was yet perceptible in its smiling environs. But war in its most terrible form was about to prey upon this devoted capital; for six long months it was to be the scene of combats, of suffering, and of blood; and already, amid all the luxuriance of opening nature, the symptoms, as yet brilliant and majestic, of military preparations were to be seen. In those orchards, the glitter of bayonets could be discerned; on every height of those hills, artillery was planted; two black columns of smoke announced the burning of the temporary bridges, above and below the city, which the Russians had erected, while occasional cannon-shot from the right bank, still in the hands of the allies, mingled with the clang of the bells which announced the approach of Napoleon on the left. The few remaining Cossacks swam their horses across the Elbe after the bridges were destroyed; and Dresden, wholly evacuated by the allies, but in the deepest terror and anxiety, awaited the arrival of the conqueror.†

Entry of Napoleon into Dresden.

To deprecate his wrath, which the decided favour the inhabitants had shown to the allied cause gave them every reason to apprehend, the magistrates waited upon Napoleon a mile and a half from the city, on the road to Freyberg. "Who are you?" said he, in a quick and rude tone. "Members of the municipality," replied the trembling burgomasters. "Have you bread?" "Our resources have been entirely exhausted by the requisitions of the Russians and Prussians." "Ha! it is impossible, is it? I know no such word; get ready bread, meat, and wine. I know all you have done: you richly deserve to be treated as a conquered people; but I forgive all, from regard to your king: he is the saviour of your country; you

May 8.

* Knowing of what vital importance success at Lutzen was to arrest the torrent of misfortune which threatened to submerge his empire, Napoleon made the most extraordinary efforts to animate the spirit of his troops. Shortly before, he had for some fault degraded from his rank the colonel of a battalion, who, being a very brave man, was much beloved by his soldiers: when the regiment was to charge under Count Lobau to regain Kaia, he rode up to the front of the battalion, and replaced him in his station, after addressing him a few words. The shouts of joy from the battalion resounded over the field: the cry spread from rank to rank, and was heard even above the roar of the artillery; and the battalion, heading a column, soon was to be seen mounting in the most gallant style a height behind Starsiedel.—See Odeleben, i., 55.

† Lond., 25, 26. Fain, i., 370, 373. Jom., iv., 287. Odel., i., 63, 66.

† Odel., i., 66, 67. Temoin Ocul., i., 120, 123. Odel., ii., 120. Fain, i., 373, 375. Personal observation.

have been already punished by having had the Russians and Prussians among you, and being governed by Baron Stein." With these words he turned aside from the city, and, directing his horse towards the suburbs of Pirna, traversed the ramparts of the town, as far as the road which leads to Pilnitz; he there dismounted, and walked on foot, accompanied only by Caulaincourt and a page, to the banks of the river, at the point where the Russians had constructed their bridge of boats. The viceroy soon after joined them, and the emperor and he advanced alone to the water's edge, while the Russian guns were still occasionally firing from the opposite side. Having completed his observations, without injury, in that quarter, and made himself master by inquiry of the whole particulars attending that vicinity, he proceeded to the other side of the town, beyond Fredericstadt, where the bridge of rafts near Ubigau was still for the most part standing, not more than one third having been consumed by the fire which the Russians had applied to it. Some light horsemen threw themselves into boats, approached the burning pile, extinguished the flames, and drew nearly two thirds of the bridge in safety to the left bank. Having secured this important acquisition, his next care was to reconnoitre the banks still farther down; and having discovered a place near Preisnitz, where the heights on the left bank overtopped those on the right, and a curve in the stream broke the force of the current, he gave orders for the construction of a bridge of rafts there with all possible expedition.*

Napoleon's preparations for the passage of the Elbe.

Disquieting intelligence having been received in the evening from Torgau, where the governor not only still persisted in refusing to admit a French garrison, but alleged in his vindication the express orders of his sovereign, a special messenger was despatched to the King of Saxony to know whether he still adhered to the Confederation of the Rhine, accompanied by an intimation, that, "if he did not forthwith return to his capital, he should lose his kingdom." On the following morning, Napoleon was on horseback by daybreak, urging on in person the preparations for the passage of the river under the heights of Preisnitz. The engineers had made extraordinary efforts during the night: the bridge of rafts was speedily repaired; the marines from Brest had powerfully seconded the land engineers; and two battalions of light troops had already been crossed over to the right bank, where they were spread out as videttes, both to keep off the enemy and acquire information. These preparations, however, had not escaped the notice of the allies, who sent in the night a considerable body of troops, accompanied by fifty pieces of cannon, to the bank opposite Ubigau. Already the dropping fire of the tirailleurs was to be heard on both sides of the river, and the deep booming of the Russian cannon, at intervals, showed that a serious resistance was intended. No sooner did Napoleon see the preparations of the enemy, than he called out, in a voice of thunder, to General Drouot, "A hundred pieces of cannon!" and posted himself on an eminence, at a short distance in the rear, to direct their disposition. The artillery of the guard quickly came up at the gallop, and Drouot disposed them on the heights of Preisnitz, and at the extremity of the alley of the Ostra, where they commanded the enemy's guns on the opposite bank; but such was the impatience of the emperor for the success of the operation, which did not immediately succeed, that, when he returned to him to give an account of his proceedings, he vented his displeasure upon him in a manner at once unseemly and ludicrous.*†

A passage is effected at Dresden.

Drouot was right, however: the guns were well placed, and this speedily appeared in the tremendous fire which they opened upon the Russian batteries. For some time the cannonade was kept up with great vigour on both sides, and several of the enemy's balls fell close to the emperor, whose head was struck by a splinter which one drove from a piece of wood close to him. "If it had struck me on the breast," said he, calmly, "all was over." It soon, however, appeared that the French artillery was superior, both in number and position, to that to which they were opposed; and as the object of the Russians was not to defend the passage of the river, which they well knew against such a general and army was impossible, but only to delay his crossing, they drew off their guns in the afternoon, and the passage was left unopposed. New obstacles of a still more serious nature now presented themselves: heavy rains and the melting of the Bohemian snows had raised a flood in the Elbe; anchors, cables, and grappling-irons were wanting, and, after two days of unprofitable labour, the undertaking was abandoned. It was deemed easier to restore, in a temporary manner, the two arches which had been cut in the bridge of Dresden. By the indefatigable exertions of the French engineers, the preparations were pushed forward with such activity, that, by ten o'clock on the morning of the 11th, all was ready even for the passage of the artillery; and the whole corps of the viceroy, Marmont, and Bertrand were crossed over. They found the opposite suburb entirely evacuated by the enemy, who

May 11

* Odel., i., 68, 70. Fain, i., 379, 380. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 43, 44.

* Odel., i., 70, 71. Fain, i., 380, 381. Jom., iv., 287. Lucches., iii., 421.

† He was in such a rage, that he took him by the ears and pulled them; but the general preserved his presence of mind, and replied calmly, but firmly, that the guns could not be better placed. Napoleon, upon this, recovered his good-humour, and the thing passed off with a laugh. Such sallies of temper were very frequent with the emperor, especially in his latter years; but they were not of long endurance, and, when the first burst of fury was over, he usually recovered himself. Drouot, the well-known commander of the artillery of the guard, was a very remarkable man. He always had a small Bible with him to read, which constituted his chief delight, and he avowed it openly to the persons in the imperial suite: a peculiarity not a little remarkable in that staff, and the admission of which required no small degree of moral courage. He was not without a certain shade of superstition; for, as Napoleon usually brought him forward at the most hazardous moment, and he was always at the head of his troops, his situation was full of peril; and he was careful on such occasions to array himself in his old uniform of general of artillery, as he had long worn it and never received an injury. When near the enemy he always dismounted from horseback, and advanced on foot in the middle of his guns, and, by a most extraordinary chance, neither himself nor his horse was ever wounded. His modesty was equal to his knowledge, his fidelity to his courage; and he gave a shining proof of the latter quality by accompanying Napoleon to Elba, amid the general defection by which the more exalted objects of the emperor's bounty were disgraced.—See ODEL., i., 131, 132.

were in full retreat to the great intrenched position, where they intended to give battle, at Bautzen. Such was the impatience of the emperor for the completion of the passage,* that he promised a Napoleon to every boat which was ferried across; and during the whole of the 11th he remained seated on a stone bench on the bridge, listening to the shouts of the young conscripts as they passed over, and feasting his eyes with the long trains of artillery, which seemed to be destined to hurl to the right bank of the Elbe all the horrors of war, which had hitherto devastated the left.

Return of the King of Saxony to Dresden, and his final adherence to the cause of Napoleon.

On the following day, the King of Saxony gave a clear proof of the terror which Napoleon's success had inspired, by arriving in person at Dresden, to place himself and all his resources at the disposal of the French emperor. This proceeding was in the highest degree gratifying to Napoleon, who thus not only saw secured the adherence of an important ally and valuable army, in possession of fortresses of vital consequence in the campaign, but beheld himself restored to the rank which he most coveted—that of the arbiter of the destinies and protector of the thrones of sovereigns. So anxious was he for his arrival, that, for two days before he came, the troops had been posted to a considerable distance on the road to Prague, expecting his approach. The motives which led to this resolution on the part of Frederic Augustus were very apparent. Austria, though evidently inclining to the side of the allies, was not yet prepared to take the field, and a considerable time must elapse before her forces could join those of the allies; and, meanwhile, Napoleon was in possession of his capital and dominions, and if they were treated as conquered countries, the most frightful miseries awaited his subjects. Influenced by these considerations, and by that regard to rectitude and the obligation of treaties which is so rare in crowned heads, the King of Saxony, who had for some time been forced to temporize, in expectation of seeing what line Austria was likely to take, and had actually ordered General Thielman, when the first inaccurate accounts of the battle of Lutzen were brought, to shut his gates against the French troops,† now adopted a decided course, and threw his crown and fortune into hazard with Napoleon. His arrival was preceded by a peremptory order to General Thielman forthwith to surrender the fortress of Torgau to Marshal Ney, who took possession of it on the 13th, and commenced the passage of the river; while the Saxon troops, fourteen thousand strong, including some regiments of excellent cavalry, were anew placed under the orders of Regnier, and formed the seventh corps of the army. General Thielman, whose communications, by his sovereign's orders, with the allies had for some time been well known, and who was indignant at the adherence of his sovereign to the oppressor of Germany, and the contradictory orders which, within the last few days, he had received, quitted his colours, and entered into the service of the Emperor of Russia. Meanwhile, the King of Saxony was welcomed with extraordinary pomp by Napoleon, at Dresden; the Imperial Guards lined the road from the chateau to the city; the cavalry, which met him near the camp of Pirna, formed his escort to the gates of the town; while Napoleon, who received him on one of the little bridges of the road leading to Perria, and attended him to his palace amid discharges of artillery, ringing of bells, and the acclamations of the soldiers, enjoyed the satisfaction of giving the most decisive proof to Europe of the reality of his success at Lutzen, by thus restoring to his capital and throne the first of his allies who had suffered by the events of the war.*

Alarming state of the negotiations with Austria.

But if the arrival of the King of Saxony at Dresden was thus a source of the highest gratification to Napoleon, the advices and intelligence which he brought from Prague, in regard to the intentions of Austria, were of the most disquieting kind. It was no longer doubtful that the court of Vienna was only temporizing to gain time to complete its preparations, and there was too much reason to apprehend that its armaments would ultimately be turned to the advantage of the allies. Prince Schwartzenberg, at Paris, had already let fall some hints that an alliance which policy had formed policy might dissolve;† the light troops of the army had intercepted some correspondence of the cabinet of Vienna with the members of the Rhenish Confederacy, which breathed a hostile spirit towards France;‡ and the King of Saxony, fresh from Prague, not only confirmed these alarming advices, but communicated the intelligence that the Emperor of Austria had either contracted, or was on the eve of contracting, positive engagements with the allied powers.§ Napoleon, therefore, saw that there

* Odel., i., 72, 74. Fain, i., 383, 384. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 44.

† "I have seen, with entire satisfaction, the conduct you have pursued at Torgau, regarding the conferences proposed to you by the allied generals, as well as before you left Dresden, and it has entirely justified my confidence in you. To allow some pieces of artillery to go out of your walls for the siege of Wittenberg (then in the hands of the French) would be altogether contrary to my relations with Austria, which are positively determined."—KING OF SAXONY *to* GENERAL THIELMAN, *30th April*, 1813. FAIN, i., 485.

"My order, as expressed to you in my letter of the 19th of April, is, that the independence of Torgau should be maintained with the utmost care, and that its gates should be opened to no one without my express order, in concert with the Emperor of Austria. I now add, to prevent misunderstanding, that, if the fortune of arms should bring back the French forces to the Elbe, you are to conduct yourself in the same manner; and, as a necessary consequence, that Torgau should not be opened to the French troops."—KING OF SAXONY *to* GENERAL THIELMAN, *5th May*, 1813. FAIN, i., 486.

* Odel., i., 76, 78. Fain, i., 388, 390. Jom., iv., 288, 289. Hard., xii., 149, 150.

† "Ah! the marriage," said Schwartzenberg to Maret, at Paris, "the marriage! Policy has made it; but—"—See FAIN, i., 390, note.

‡ "Austria is gradually unmasking herself in all her relations with our allies. She assumes the attitude towards Denmark, Saxony, Bavaria and Wirtemberg, Naples and Westphalia, of the friend of peace and of France, who desires nothing for her own aggrandizement. But, at the same time, she recommends to them to set on foot no useless armaments, not to exhaust themselves by giving succours to France, which would serve no other purpose but to render the emperor more untractable, and which, besides, would be without an object, as Austria has 150,000 men ready to cast in the balance against whichever of the two parties should wish to continue the war."—STAKELBERG, *Envoy Russe à Vienne à Salons*, *28th of May*, 1813. *Rapport de* M. LE DUC DE BASSANO, *20th Aout*, 1813. *Moniteur*.

§ "Before the battle of Lutzen, the Emperor of Austria

was no time to lose in striking terror into the cabinet of Vienna: on the very day, accordingly, of the King of Saxony's arrival, he wrote to his minister at that capital, aspersing the character of Metternich, who, he said, mistook intrigue for politics; boasting of his own forces, which he stated at eleven hundred thousand men, of which three hundred thou- May 12. sand were already on the Elbe; desiring Narbonne to allude to the intercepted letters, which gave the emperor an ample title to desire him to demand his passports, but declaring his willingness to forget all, and renew pacific relations on reasonable terms. The letters contained an injunction not to commit himself in regard to Silesia, and *not to mention the Bourbons*, as they were entirely forgotten in Europe —a phrase which sufficiently proved that they were anything rather than forgotten by himself.*†

Mission of Count Bubna to Dresden, and Stadion to Bautzen.

Two days afterward, Count Bubna arrived at Dresden from the cabinet of Vienna, and at the same time M. de Stadion was despatched from the same court to the headquarters of the allied sovereigns at Bautzen, earnestly pressing upon both an accommodation. In this attempt Metternich at this period was perfectly sincere, for he was seriously alarmed by the result of the battle of Lutzen, and dreaded nothing so much as that Russia and France would accommodate their differences by a treaty on the drum-head, and that Napoleon would be left at liberty to take vengeance at leisure on the German powers which had incurred his displeasure. M. Bubna had several long interviews with Napoleon, in the course of which he made the emperor acquainted with the expectations of his court in regard to the concessions by France, and accession of territory to themselves, which were hoped for. These were, that Austria should have the Illyrian provinces, an increase of territory on the side of Poland, and some also on the Bavarian frontier, and that the Confederation of the Rhine should be dissolved. Without committing himself either one way or other in regard to these demands, Napoleon contented himself with declaring that he would agree to an armistice, on condition that the allies retired behind the Oder, and he himself behind the Elbe, with a view to a congress at Prague, at which England and America should be invited to attend; and M. Bubna having set out for Vienna with this ultimatum, the emperor took his departure for his advanced guard in Silesia.‡

Napoleon's secret proposals to Russia at this period.

Before finally committing his fate to the chances of war, Napoleon made the very attempt which Metternich so much dreaded, that of opening a separate negotiation with one of the allied powers, in the hope of detaching it from the rest. On the day on which May 18. Bubna set out for Vienna, he secretly despatched Caulaincourt to the headquarters of the Emperor of Russia. The object of this mission was to induce the cabinet of St. Petersburg to accommodate its differences with France, at the expense of Austria; and, well knowing that the great object of its jealousy was the existence, and probable increase, of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, he proposed to extend the Confederation of the Rhine to the Oder, to increase Westphalia by 1,500,000 souls, and to give to Prussia, in exchange for the territory thus lost, the whole Grand-duchy of Warsaw and the territory of Dantzic, with the exception of the Duchy of Oldenburg, by which means she would acquire an increase of between four and five millions of souls, and be restored to the rank she held before the battle of Jena. Her capital was to be Warsaw, and the great advantage held out was, that three hundred leagues, and an independent power, in possession of all the fortresses on the Vistula, would be thus interposed between France and Russia.* Alexander, however, was proof against these seductions: he received Caulaincourt but in presence of the ministers of England, Austria, and Sweden, as well as of the King of Prussia, and expressed, in their joint name, his anxious wish for the termination of hostilities, but remained firm to his engagements with the allies and the cause of European independence. Nothing, however, can paint Napoleon better, or evince more clearly his invariable policy to sacrifice honour, probity, and resentment to present expedience, than the tenour of these proposals. At the very time that he was making so striking a parade, in the eyes of Europe, of his firm regard for, and inviolable fidelity to the King of Saxony, who had risked his crown in his cause, he was secretly proposing to Russia to despoil him of all his acquisitions, by tearing from his brow the grand-ducal crown of Poland; at the moment that he was urging the Poles, by every consideration of patriotism and honour, to abide by his banners, as the only ones which could lead to the restoration of their lost nationality, he was himself suggesting its total destruction, by incorporating the Grand-duchy of Warsaw with the Prussian monarchy, and making Warsaw the Prussian capital;† and while he was loudly denouncing the perfidy of Prussia, in abandoning his alliance, as naturally leading to its erasure from the book of nations, he was prepared to augment it by nearly five millions of Poles, provided, in so doing, he threw it towards the Russian frontier, and secured the extension of

had already contracted secret engagements with the allies, and was on the eve of declaring himself. For this reason, Napoleon sent Eugene into Italy to reorganize an army. Before the campaign commenced Austria had opened negotiations with all the powers of the Rhenish Confederacy."—GUICCIARD., p. 129, 131.

* Napoleon to Narbonne, May 12, 1813. Fain, i., 393, 394. Hard., xii., 155, 156.

† "As to the Bourbons, be sure never to speak of them; no one in France or in Europe thinks of them; they are forgotten even in England."—NAPOLEON *to* NARBONNE, *12th May*, 1813. HARDENBERG, xii., 154.

‡ Count Bubna to Stadion, May 18, 1813. Fain, i., 395, 396. Hard., xii., 155, 158 Jom., iv., 289, 292.

* The preamble to Caulaincourt's instructions bore: "The emperor's intention is to negotiate with Russia a peace which may be glorious to her, and which may make Austria pay for her bad faith, and the false policy which she pursued in exasperating France and Russia against each other. The Emperor Alexander will easily rebut these arguments, by insisting on the radical evil of the existence of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw; and that will naturally lead, after abundance of mystery and diplomatic reserve on both sides, to the propositions which we make, which, on condition of secrecy, you are to propose as follows." Then follow the conditions stated in the text.—NAPOLEON'S *Instructions to* CAULAINCOURT, *18th May*, 1813. JOMINI, iv., 296.

† Jom., iv., 297, 299. Plotho. Guerra, 1813, i., 204. Lucches., iii., 425. Hard., xii., 159.

Westphalia as far as the Oder to his brother Jerome.

While these important negotiations were in progress at the French headquarters, the allied sovereigns had retired to the superb position, which they had selected and fortified with care, on the heights around Bautzen. Considerable re-enforcements had there reached the army: several new corps of Prussians, under Kleist, burning for the liberation of the fatherland, had arrived; and Thorn having capitulated, on the 17th of April, in consequence of the miserable state of the garrison, two thousand strong, and the accidental explosion of the principal powder-magazine, Barclay de Tolly, who commanded the besieging force, had immediately broke up from the banks of the Vistula, and marched with such diligence, that he reached the allied headquarters in Silesia on the 15th of May, bringing with him a powerful re-enforcement of fourteen thousand veteran soldiers. These, with other Russian detachments which had come up from the rear, amounted, in all, to twenty-five thousand men; and after deducting the loss at Lutzen, and the subsequent combats, made the army nearly ninety thousand strong—full ten thousand more than it had been in the last battle. But, on the other hand, the forces of Napoleon had increased in a still greater proportion; and it was already evident at the allied headquarters, that till the great re-enforcements, under Sacken and Benningsen, came up from the interior of Russia, they had no chance of combating the French with any prospect of success, but by the aid of strong intrenchments. Not only were the Saxon troops, fourteen thousand strong, including three thousand excellent cavalry, now added to Napoleon's army, and their fortresses on the Elbe converted into a secure refuge in case of disaster, but the Wirtemberg contingent, eight thousand good troops, had arrived; the heavy cavalry of Latour Maubourg, the Italian horse of General Fresia, and the second division of the young guard, under Barrois, had also joined the army. Altogether, Napoleon's forces, under his own immediate command, were now raised to a hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom sixteen thousand were admirable cavalry.* The allies, therefore, were now overmatched in the proportion of nearly two to one; and it was evident that, whatever the strength of the position at Bautzen might be, it was liable to be turned and rendered untenable by an enemy having such superior forces at his command.†

Forces of the opposite armies at Bautzen.

April 17.

May 15.

The allies had availed themselves of the ten days' respite from active operations, which they had enjoyed since the evacuation of Dresden, to strengthen the position they had selected in a very formidable manner. Their principal stronghold was placed on the famous knolls of Klein Bautzen and Kreckwitz, where Frederic the Great found an asylum after his disaster at Hochkirch, and where the strength of his position enabled him to bid defiance to the superior and victorious army of Count Daun. The ground which the allied army now occupied was an uneven surface, in the middle of a country in the hollows of which several small lakes were to be found; while its eminences terminated, for the most part, in little monticules or cones, forming so many citadels, where artillery could most advantageously be placed, commanding the whole open country at their feet. The position in this uneven surface, which they had chosen for their battle-field, was composed of a series of heights, running from the great frontier chain of Bohemia to the neighbourhood of the little lakes of Malschwitz and the village of Klix, behind which the right was stationed, in a situation difficult of access. The Spree ran along the whole front of the position, and it was difficult to approach it in that direction, as well on account of the broken nature of the ground, and the variety of ravines, with streamlets in their bottom, by which it was intersected, as of the number of villages, constituting so many forts, occupied by the allies, contained within its limits, and the hills planted with cannon, which commanded the whole open country. The principal of these villages were Klein Bautzen, Preititz, Klix, and Kreckwitz. This was the first line of defence; but behind it, at the distance of three miles in the rear, was a second line, strengthened by intrenchments more contracted than the former, and still more capable of a protracted defence. This position, commencing at the village of Hochkirch on the one flank, extended through Bautzen, and the three villages of Baswitz, Inckowitz, and Kubchitz, and then fell back behind the marshy stream of the Kayna, terminated at the heights of Kreckwitz, which overhang the Spree.*

Description of the position of Bautzen.

The first design of Napoleon was to make his principal attack on the left wing of the allies, which rested on the mountains which separate Saxony from Bohemia. After a minute reconnoissance, however, he was diverted from this design, by observing the depth and intricacy of the wooded ravines and dells which intersected the slope of the mountains in that direction, and which might altogether obstruct the advance of his cavalry and artillery in that quarter. He continued his reconnoitring, therefore, along the whole line, and at eight at night advanced to the village of Klein Wilke, almost within musket-shot of the outposts of the enemy, and then his plan of attack was formed. Orders had some time before been despatched to Ney, who had passed the Elbe at Torgau with his own corps and that of Victor and Lauriston, to incline to his right, and, instead of moving on Berlin, as originally intended, to cut across the country, and come up so as to form the extreme left of the army in the great battle which was expected near Bautzen. These orders reached Ney on the 17th, and he immediately commenced his cross march, and had already arrived in the neighbourhood of the army on the evening of the 19th. It was on his wing, which was fully sixty thousand strong, that Napoleon relied for his principal effort, and placed his chief

Reconnoissance of Napoleon, and his general plan of attack.

* "The new arrivals, with the troops who fought at Lutzen, presented a total at the emperor's command of 150,000 combatants."—*Vict. et Conq.*, xxii., 48.

† Vict. et Conq., xxii., 48. Précis, Schoell, Rec., ii., 317. Fain, i., 398, 399. Jom., iv., 299.

* Fain. i., 403, 404. Odel., i., 86. Jom., iv., 300. Précis, Schoell, ii., 320, 321.

hopes of success, in attacking the enemy's position.*

Disaster of Bertrand, and balanced success on the French left.

Ney, however, advanced in echelons, Lauriston in front, next his own corps, then Victor with the Saxons, in the close of the array. The country through which his march lay, when he approached Bautzen, was in great part covered with woods, and this led to a very serious check being experienced in that quarter. To open up the communication with Ney, Napoleon detached Bertrand's corps towards the left, which soon got involved in the woods, in which the marshal was already entangled. The allies having received intelligence of the approach of this double body of the enemy, despatched Kleist with his Prussians to meet the first, and Barclay with the Russian veterans to encounter the second. Various success attended these different divisions. Bertrand's Italians leisurely reposing in loose order after dinner, without any proper look-out, in a wood near Konigswartha, were surprised and totally routed by Barclay de Tolly, with the loss of two thousand prisoners and eleven pieces of cannon. The whole division dispersed, and it was only by taking refuge in the neighbouring neutral territory of Bohemia that the great bulk of them, above twenty thousand strong, escaped. During the action, the village of Konigswartha took fire, and was reduced to ashes. D'York at the same time encountered the whole corps of Lauriston near Weissig, and being unexpectedly assailed by superior forces, he was unable to keep his ground, though his troops fought with the most determined bravery: he was worsted with the loss of above two thousand men, so that success and disaster were nearly balanced on the left of the army.†

May 19.

Distribution of the French allied army in these positions.

The main position on which the allies intended to give battle, and on the strength of which they relied to counterbalance the vast numerical superiority of the enemy, was the second line from Hochkirch to Kreckwitz. Though it was not intended to abandon the first line along the banks of the Spree without a struggle, yet this was only with a view to take off the first edge of the enemy's attack by resistance there, and it was in this concentrated position in the rear, which was strongly fortified by redoubts, that the real stand was to be made. The allied army, for this purpose, was a good deal scattered over the ground on which it was to combat, and on the morning of the 20th occupied the following positions: On the left, Berg and D'York were stationed from Jenkowitz to Barchutz, with ten thousand Prussians. The plain from thence to Kreckwitz was not occupied by any infantry in the first line: it was thought to be sufficiently protected by the superb regiments of Prussian cuirassiers, which were stationed at its upper extremity in the second line, and by the heights of Kreckwitz, crowned with Blucher's guns, which commanded its whole extent. Blucher's infantry, about eighteen thousand strong, extended from Kreckwitz to Pliskowitz; and farther on, beyond the little lakes, Barclay was stationed with fourteen thousand Russians near Gleina. Milaradowitch, with ten thousand Russians, was placed in front of the whole, in Bautzen and its environs, with Kleist and five thousand Prussians near him on the heights of Berg. The second line consisted of the Russian Guards and reserve, sixteen thousand strong, who were about a mile in the rear, behind the left and centre; and near them were the magnificent Russian cuirassiers, eight thousand in number, who seemed more than a match for any French horse which could be brought against them.*

May 20.

General aspect of the allied position.

The whole line of the allies, which thus formed a sort of semicircle, convex to the outside, was somewhat above two leagues in length. But the chain of mountains on the Bohemian frontier, on which its left rested, required to be in part occupied itself, which rendered it necessary to extend the line above half a league farther in that direction. These mountains very nearly resembled those which flanked the extreme left of the English army at the battle of Talavera, and their natural strength was much increased by batteries skilfully disposed. The marshes in the centre were a serious impediment, and the villages there were strongly intrenched, while the numerous guns placed on the summit of the conical hills on the right centre, commanded the whole plain in that direction; but the country beyond this was open and intersected by roads in all directions, and the Russian extreme right was therefore removed, and, in a manner, detached from the rest of the army, so that there was no obstacle to the enemy's passing round the flank of the allies in that quarter; and it was easy to foresee, as well from the disposition he was making of his troops as the known skill of the emperor, that it was there that his principal effort would be made.†

Plan of Napoleon's attack.

On the morning of the 20th, Napoleon made his disposition for the attack at all points. Wisely judging that the right wing of the allies was the vulnerable point, he accumulated forces in that direction, so as to put at Ney's disposal nearly eighty thousand men. Lauriston, commanding the army on the left, received orders to pass the Spree and move upon Klix, and from thence press on around the right flank of the enemy towards Wurschen and Weissenberg, so as to appear in their rear when the engagement in front was hottest. On the right, the allied positions in the mountains were to be assailed by Oudinot, near Sinkowitz; to his left, Macdonald was to throw a bridge of rafts over the Spree and assault Bautzen; half a league to his left, Marmont was directed to throw another bridge over the same river, and advance to the attack in the centre; the whole of the corps there were put under the direction of Soult, while the reserves and the Guards were in the rear, on the great road leading to Bischoffswerda, behind Bautzen, ready to succour any point that might

May 20.

* Jom., iv., 301, 302. Fain, i., 412, 413. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 46, 47.

† Odel., i., 87, 88. Fain, i., 403, 405, 412. Jom., iv., 300, 303. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 46, 47. Lond., 39.

* Précis in Schoell, ii., 321, 322. Jom., i., 302, 303. Lond., 43, 44. Kausler, 869.

† Lond., 42, 43. Précis in Schoell, ii., 323, 324. Odel., i., 91.

require assistance. In this way the emperor calculated that, while the allies along their whole front would be equally matched, and possibly hard pressed, an overwhelming force of sixty thousand men would suddenly appear in their rear and decide the victory: an able conception, which his great superiority of numbers enabled him to carry completely into execution, and which bore a close resemblance to the famous circular sweep of Davoust, which led to such brilliant results at Ulm, and the corresponding march of Blucher from Wavre to La Belle Alliance, which proved so fatal to Napoleon at Waterloo.*

Passage of the Spree, and commencement of the action.

At nine o'clock on the following morning the emperor was on horseback; but such was the distance which the greater part of the columns had to march before they reached their destined point of attack, that it was nearly eleven o'clock before the passage of the Spree commenced. A powerful array of cannon was, in the first instance, brought up by the emperor, and disposed along every projection which commanded the opposite bank; and the fire, as far as the eye could reach, looking from the heights near Bautzen, both to the right and left, became very violent; for the enemy's batteries answered with great spirit, and the vast extent of the line of smoke, as well as the faint sound of the distant guns, gave an awful impression of the magnitude of the forces engaged on both sides. Under cover of this cannonade, the bridges in the centre were soon established, and then a still more animating spectacle presented itself. The emperor took his station on a commanding eminence on the banks of the Spree, near the point where Marmont's bridge was established, from whence he could see over the whole field of battle, direct the movements of the troops, and enjoy the splendid spectacle which presented itself. And never, in truth, had war appeared in a more imposing form, nor had the astonishing amount of the forces at the disposal of the French emperor ever been more conspicuous. On all sides, the troops, preceded by their artillery, which kept up an incessant fire on the banks of the river, advanced rapidly towards the stream: at first the plain seemed covered with a confused multitude of horses, cannon, chariots, and men, stretching as far as the eye could reach, impressive only from its immensity; but gradually the throng assumed the appearance of order. The cavalry, infantry, and artillery separated and defiled each to their respective points of passage,† and the marvels of military discipline appeared in their highest lustre.

Severe action on the French right.

The French artillery, however, was superior to that of the allies on the banks of the river, and it was not there that preparations for a serious resistance had been made. Generally speaking, therefore, the passage was effected without much opposition: Bautzen, being no longer tenable as an isolated advanced post in the midst of the enemy, was evacuated by the allies, who withdrew the troops that occupied it to the other side of the river, and taken possession of by Macdonald, who immediately caused his men to defile over its arch over the Spree; while Marmont threw four bridges across below the town, over which his whole corps was speedily transported, and Oudinot crossed without difficulty near Grubschutz, and immediately began to advance towards the heights at the foot of the Bohemian Mountains, on which the left of the allies was posted. By five o'clock in the afternoon the river was passed at all points, and the troops were moving towards the eminences occupied by the enemy; but it was already evident, from the distance at which their principal forces were stationed, that no serious conflict would take place till the following day. On the French right, however, the action soon became extremely warm: Oudinot there pressed with indefatigable activity up the hills which form the Bohemian frontier, and which rose like an amphitheatre to bound the field of battle in that direction. The ascending line of smoke and flashes of the artillery among the overhanging woods soon showed the progress he was making, while the Bohemian echoes rolled back the roar of the artillery, and the glancing of the musketry was to be seen through the shadows of the woods, now darkened by the approaching night. Prince Wirtemberg, however, and St. Priest's divisions of Milaradowitch's corps, maintained themselves with invincible resolution in these woody fastnesses; and when the Emperor Alexander, who commanded the Russians in person, saw that they were obliged to fall back, and were beginning to be overmatched, he re-enforced them by three brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, under General Diebitch, which restored the combat in that quarter, and the Russians maintained themselves for the night in the villages of Preilitz, Mehltheuer, and Falkenberg, still keeping possession of the crest and commanding points of the mountains, while the French were far advanced in the valleys which furrowed their sides.*

Serious conflict in the centre.

While this obstinate conflict was going on among the hills on the allied left, a still more serious attack was made on Kleist's Prussians on the heights of Burg, and the remainder of Milaradowitch's corps, under himself in person, on the eminences in the rear of Bautzen, to which the Russians had retired after the evacuation of that town. At noon General Milaradowitch was violently assailed by Campans's division, followed by the whole of Marmont's corps, while Bonnet advanced towards Nieder Kayna, and commenced an attack on Kleist. The resistance, however, was as obstinate as the attack; and Napoleon, deeming it essential to his plan to make a great impression in that quarter, in order to withdraw attention from the grand movement he was preparing on his left, brought forward the whole of Bertrand's corps, still, notwithstanding its losses, above twenty-four thousand strong, with Latour Maubourg's formidable cuirassiers, to support Marmont and Macdonald. Above fifty thousand combatants were thus accumulated in the centre, supported by a powerful artillery; and the allies, being not

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 48, 49. Jom., iv., 303, 304. Fain, i., 405.

† Fain, i., 405, 406. Odel., i., 89. Lond., 44, 45. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 48. Kausler, 870.

* Kausler, 871. Fain, i., 407. Précis in Schoell, ii., 325, 326. Lond., 45.

more than half the number at that point, were constrained to retire. This was done, however, in the finest order: the troops halting and facing about, by alternate companies, to fire, as they slowly withdrew towards the intrenched camp, their artillery keeping up an incessant discharge on the pursuing columns. The French centre, meanwhile, steadily advanced, and, as soon as they reached it, assaulted Kleist's troops on the heights of Burg with great gallantry. Despite all their efforts, however, the brave Prussians maintained their ground with undaunted resolution: their young ranks were thinned, but quailed not beneath the enemy's fire; and, seeing that they could not carry the position by an attack in front, the assailants attacked the village of Nieder Gurkau, on its right, in order to threaten it in flank. Here, however, they experienced so vigorous a resistance from Rudiger's men of Blucher's corps, some regiments of which had been detached, under Ziethen, to occupy that important post, and the fire from Blucher's guns, on his commanding heights immediately behind, was so violent, that, after sustaining immense losses, they were obliged to desist from the attempt; and it was not till seven at night that, by bringing up the celebrated 10th regiment of light infantry to the charge, the village was at length carried. Then the whole allied centre slowly retired over the plateau of Nadelwitz to their intrenched camp in the rear;* but Blucher still retained his advanced position on the heights of Kreckwitz, from the summit of which his artillery never ceased to thunder, as from a fiery volcano, in all directions, till utter darkness drew a veil over the field of battle.

Results of the first day's battle.

By the emperor's orders, the French troops bivouacked in squares on the ground they had won with so much difficulty; but, though the Spree was passed at all points, and the right and centre considerably advanced over the ground occupied in the morning by the enemy, yet the enormous losses they had sustained proved the desperate nature of the conflict in which they were engaged, and inspired the troops with melancholy presages as to the issue of the battle on the morrow. Kleist and Ziethen's Prussians in particular, though in great part young troops, who had seen fire for the first time that day, had evinced the most heroic bravery: no ground had been won from them but by the force of overwhelming numbers, and above ten thousand French or Italians lay weltering in their blood around the heights, from which the Prussians had drawn off every gun, every chariot, every wounded man. Napoleon, however, who was aware where the decisive blow was to be struck, was little concerned for the frightful carnage in his centre: his object had been gained by ground having been won, and the enemy compelled to concentrate their forces in that quarter; and the sound of distant cannon on his extreme left, as well as the light of burning villages, which illuminated that quarter of the heavens, told how soon Ney would be in action in that direction. In effect, that marshal had crossed the Spree near Klix; and, though Barclay de Tolly still held that village, and lay in strength between it and Malschwitz, yet he was entirely ignorant of the strength of the enemy to whom he was soon to be opposed, and altogether unequal to the task of preventing the right of the allies from being turned by the immense masses by whom he was surrounded on the following day. Napoleon, therefore, highly satisfied with the result of the first day's engagement, retired for the night to Bautzen, having first despatched orders to Oudinot to renew the combat by daybreak on the following morning, among the hills on the right, in order to fix the enemy's attention on that part of the line, and prevent any adequate succour being sent to avert the tremendous stroke he was to deliver on his left.*

Battle on the 21st. Success of the Russians on the right.

By five o'clock on the morning of the 21st; the fire began with unwearied vigour in the wooded recesses of the Bohemian Hills, and the echoes rang even to the summit of the Kunewald. The Emperor Alexander, however, had sent such considerable reenforcements during the night to that quarter, that Milaradowitch was enabled not only to repulse the attacks on his position on the heights of Mehltheuer, but to drive the enemy back to a considerable distance beyond Binowitz. Napoleon, alarmed at this unexpected turn of events on that side, immediately ordered up Macdonald's corps to the support of Oudinot; and, at the same time, immense masses, above forty thousand strong, were deployed in the centre, in front of Bautzen, to arrest the attention of the enemy, but still out of cannon-shot, as it was not his intention to expose his troops to the murderous fire of the allied artillery on the heights of Kreckwitz, from which they had suffered so much on the preceding day. Before Macdonald, however, could get up to his assistance, Oudinot was so hard pressed that he was unable to maintain his ground: step by step, the Russian tirailleurs gained upon the Bavarian sharp-shooters in the woods;† and at length he was fairly driven out of the hills, and forced to assume a defensive position in the plain at their feet, where the arrival of Macdonald enabled him to stop the progress of the enemy.

Progress of the battle in the centre and left.

Though much disconcerted by this ill success on his right, Napoleon was only desirous to gain time, and maintain his ground in front of Bautzen in the centre, as the progress and great superiority of Ney on the left rendered it a matter of certainty that, ere long, the allies would be turned on their right, and forced to retreat. Marmont and Bertrand's batteries, accordingly, were brought up to the foremost heights occupied by the French in that part of the field, and soon engaged in a tremendous cannonade with that of the allies; though the latter, placed on higher ground and fully better served, maintained its superiority, and rendered any attack by the masses of infantry in that quarter too perilous to be attempted. Meanwhile, the emperor listened anxiously for the sound of Ney's cannon on the extreme left, as that was the

* Précis in Schoell, ii., 324, 325. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 49, 50. Fain, i., 407, 408. Kausler, 872, 873.

* Kausler, 872, 874. Jom., iv., 304. Fain, i., 407, 409. Odel., i., 90. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 49, 50.

† Kausler, 876, 877. Odel., i., 91, 92. Précis in Schoell, ii., 327, 328. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 51

signal for which he waited to order a general attack in the centre to favour that decisive operation. In effect, that marshal, at the head of his own corps and those of Lauriston, had early in the morning advanced against the position of Barclay, near Gleina, while Victor's corps and Regnier's Saxons were directed, by a wider circuit, to turn his extreme right by the wood and heights of Baruth, and get entirely into the rear of the allies. Barclay's veterans were advantageously placed on the heights of Windmuhlenberg, near Gleina; and the strength of their position, joined to the admirable fire of the artillery on its summit, long enabled these iron veterans of the Moscow campaign to make head against the superior numbers of the enemy. At length, however, the approach of Regnier and Victor's corps turned the position in flank, and Barclay was obliged to fall back, fighting all the way, to the heights of Baruth. There Kleist was detached to his support; but his corps, reduced to little more than three thousand men by the losses of the preceding day, could not restore the action in that quarter; and at eleven o'clock, Southam, with the leading division of Ney and Lauriston's corps, made himself master of the village of Preilitz, near Klein Bautzen, behind Blucher's right, and between him and Barclay.*

Great effect of the movement of Ney on the left.

This important success promised the most momentous consequences; for not only was Preilitz directly in the rear of Blucher's position, so that the right of the allies was now completely turned, but it communicated with Klein Bautzen, through which, or Kreckwitz, lay the sole communication of that general with the remainder of the army, so as to render it a matter of certainty that he must either follow the retrograde movement of Barclay, and uncover the whole right of the allies, or be cut off. Ney's orders, communicated by General Jomini, his chief of the staff, were to march straight on the steeples of Hochkirch, while Lauriston moved by Baruth and Belgern in the same direction. In this instance the inspiration of genius had anticipated the orders of authority; for Napoleon's instructions, written in pencil on the morning of the 21st, were only to be at Preilitz by eleven o'clock, whereas Ney was within half a mile of it by ten. The emperor was lying on the ground in the centre, under the shelter of a height, a little in front of Bautzen, at breakfast, when the sound of Ney's guns in that direction was heard. At the same time, a bomb burst over his head. Without paying any attention to the latter circumstance, he immediately wrote a note in pencil to Marie Louise, to announce that the victory was gained; and, instantly mounting his horse, set off at the gallop with his staff to the left, and ascending a height near Nieder Kayna, from whence he could descry the whole field of battle in the centre, directed Soult, with the four corps under his orders, to assault with the bayonet the numerous conical knolls crowned with artillery, which formed the strength of the allies in that quarter, in order to distract their attention, and prevent them from sending succours to Blucher on their right.*

Preilitz is retaken by Blucher, and Ney checked.

Blucher, who was fully alive to the importance of the village of Preilitz, immediately made a great effort to regain it. Kleist was detached with the whole remains of his corps; and several Russian regiments of infantry, with two regiments of Prussian cuirassiers, were sent in the same direction. The arrival of these fresh troops, who vied with each other in the ardour of their attack, enabled the allies to regain the village, and drive out Souham, who was routed with great slaughter, and thrown back on the remainder of his corps in a state of utter confusion; while twenty of Blucher's guns, playing on the flank of Ney's dense columns, did dreadful execution, and caused him to swerve from the direction of the steeples of Hochkirch, and establish himself on some heights behind Klein Bautzen, from whence his artillery could reply on equal terms to that of the enemy. This check probably saved the allies from a total rout, by causing Ney to pause and vacillate in the midst of his important advance until his reserves came up, and Victor and Regnier had arrived abreast of his men; whereby the allied sovereigns had time to take the proper measures to ward off the danger, by sending every disposable man and gun in that direction, where they had never hitherto apprehended any serious attack, and preparing for a general retreat. It was not till one o'clock in the afternoon that Ney deemed himself in sufficient strength to resume the offensive, and by that time the season of decisive success had passed away: the chaussée through Hochkirch, in the rear of the whole allied army, could no longer be gained, and the victory, at best, would be barren of results.†

Grand attack of Napoleon on the allied centre.

Napoleon, however, made a vigorous effort, by a combined attack on the centre and left of the enemy, to effect a total overthrow. Seeing the allied centre in some degree bared of troops by the powerful succours which had been sent to the right, he ordered Soult to make a general attack with the four corps under his command in the centre; while, at the same time, the terrible artillery of the guard was brought up to reply to the enemy's batteries on the heights of Kreckwitz. These orders were promptly obeyed. Marmont, Mortier, Bertrand, and Latour Maubourg, put themselves at the head of their respective corps of cavalry and infantry; while the Imperial Guard, in deep array, advanced in their rear to support the attack. Eighty thousand men, in admirable order, moved against the redoubtable heights, the guns from which had so long carried death through the French ranks; while a hundred pieces of cannon, disposed on the highest points of the ground which they traversed, kept up a vehement fire on the enemy's batteries. This grand attack soon changed the fortune of the day. Blucher, now assailed in front by Marmont, in flank by Bertrand, and in rear by Ney, was soon obliged to recall Kleist and the

* Jom., iv., 304. Précis in Schoell, ii., 328, 329. Kausler, 878, 879. Fain, i., 413, 414. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 50, 51.

* Odel., i., 92, 93. Kausler, 878. Jom., iv., 304, 305. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 51.

† Odel., i., 92, 93. Précis in Schoell, ii., 331, 332. Jom., iv., 306, 307. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 51, 52.

other re-enforcements which he had sent to the assistance of Barclay de Tolly; and, in consequence, Ney, whose reserves had at length come up, was enabled not only to retake Preilitz without difficulty, but to spread out his light troops over the whole level ground as far as Wurschen. The allied right was thus entirely turned; and any advantage which Blucher and Barclay de Tolly might gain, would only increase the danger of their position, by drawing them on towards the Spree, while a superior force of the enemy was interposed between them and the main body of their army.*

The allies resolve to retreat.

In these critical circumstances, the allied sovereigns resolved to retreat. They might, indeed, by bringing up the reserves, and the Russian and Prussian guards, have without difficulty regained the ground they had lost on the right, and again advanced their standards to the Spree; but as long as Lauriston and Regnier were in their rear, such success would only have augmented their ultimate danger: just as a similar success on the left of the British at Waterloo would have enhanced the perils of Napoleon's position, when Blucher, with sixty thousand Prussians, was menacing the chaussée of La Belle Alliance. It had, from the outset of the campaign, also been part of their fixed policy never to place themselves in danger of undergoing a total defeat, but to take advantage of their numerous cavalry to cover their retreat, whenever the issue of an action seemed doubtful: being well aware that the superiority of their physical resources and moral energy would thus in the end, especially if the accession of Austria were obtained, secure to them the victory. Orders were given, therefore, to both Barclay and Blucher to retreat; and the whole allied army, arrayed in two massy columns, began to retire, the Russians by the road of Hochkirch and Lobau, the Prussians by Wurschen and Weissenberg.†

Sublime spectacle when the allied army is retreated.

Then was seen in its highest lustre the admirable arrangements of modern discipline, and the noble feelings with which both armies were animated. Seated on the summit of the Hohenberg, near Neider Kayna, from whence he could survey a great part of the field of battle, Napoleon calmly directed the movements of his army; and the mighty host which he commanded, now roused to the highest pitch, and moving on in perfect array, pressed at all points upon the retiring columns of the enemy. It was at once a sublime and animating spectacle, when, at the voice of this mighty wizard, a hundred and fifty thousand men, spread over a line of three leagues in length, from the Bohemian Mountains on the right to the forest of Baruth on the left, suddenly started, as it were, into life, and moved majestically forward, like a mighty wave, bearing the light and smoke of the guns as sparkling foam on its crest. The greater part of this vast inundation poured into the valley of Neider Kayna in the centre, and the declining sun glanced on the forests of bayonets, and the dazzling lines of helmets, sabres, and cuirasses, with which the level space at its bottom was filled; while the heights of Kreckwitz, yet in the hands of the enemy, thundered forth a still increasing fire on all sides, like a volcano encircled by flame. Soon the receding line of fire, and the light of the burning villages, told that the consuming torrent was rapidly advancing through the valley; and at length the cannonade ceased on the summits of Kreckwitz, and Blucher's columns, dark and massy, were seen slowly wending their way to the rear. In vain, however, the French cuirassiers, eight thousand strong, were now hurried to the front, and endeavoured by repeated charges to throw the enemy into confusion, so as to convert the retreat into a flight; the Russian cavalry was too powerful, the allied array too perfect, to permit any advantage being gained. A hundred and twenty French guns preceded the line of the pursuers, and thundered on the retiring columns of the enemy; but the Russian and Prussian artillery were equally powerful, and, taking advantage of the numerous eminences which the line of retreat afforded, played with destructive effect on the advancing masses, while their numerous and magnificent cavalry repulsed every attempt to charge which the French horsemen made. Gradually the fire became less violent as the allies receded from the field; the intrenched position was abandoned on all sides; and at length the cannonade entirely ceased, and night drew her veil over that field of carnage and of glory.*

Napoleon's proposal for a monument on Mont Cenis, to commemorate this epoch.

Napoleon's tent was pitched for the night near the inn of Klein-Burchwitz, in the middle of the squares of his faithful guard; while Ney established himself at Wurschen, where the allied sovereigns had had their headquarters the night before. It was from the former place that the emperor dictated the bulletin of the battle, as well as the following decree, which all lovers of the arts, as well as admirers of patriotic virtue, must regret was prevented, by his fall, from being carried into execution: "A monument shall be erected on Mont Cenis; on the most conspicuous face the following inscription shall be written: 'The Emperor Napoleon, from the field of Wurschen, has ordered the erection of this monument, in testimony of his gratitude to the people of France and of Italy. This monument will transmit from age to age the remembrance of that great epoch, when, in the space of three months, twelve hundred thousand men flew to arms to protect the integrity of the French Empire.'"†

Admirable conduct of the Emperor Alexander during the battle.

The Emperor Alexander commanded the allied armies in person at Bautzen, the ill success at Lutzen having weakened the confidence of the soldiers in Wittgenstein, and the jealousies of the generals rendering the appointment of any inferior officer a matter of great difficulty. With the King of Prussia by his side, he took the entire direction of the movements, and displayed a judgment in council and coolness in danger which excited

* Jom., iv., 308, 309. Odel., i., 92, 93. Fain, i., 414, 415. Kausler, 880, 881. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 52, 53.
† Précis in Schoell, ii., 35. Jom., iv., 308, 309. Odel., i., 93, 94. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 52, 53.

* Fain, i., 415, 417. Kausler, 882, 883. Odel., i., 94, 95. Précis in Schoell, ii., 332, 333. Jom., iv., 309, 310. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 53, 54. † Fain, i., 417, 418. Odel., i. 97.

universal admiration. It was with difficulty that the entreaties of those around him could prevent him from advancing too far into the fire for the duties of a commander-in-chief; as it was, he incurred the greatest danger, and near Bautzen narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the enemy. The conduct of the retreat, in the face of the immense force which thundered in pursuit, was a model of skill and judgment: every eminence, every enclosure, every stream, which offered an opportunity of arresting the enemy, was taken advantage of with admirable ability; and such were the losses which the French sustained in pressing on the unconquerable rear-guard, that, at daybreak on the following morning, the Russians still held the heights of Weissenberg, within cannon-shot of the field of battle.*

Losses on both sides in the battle.

The loss of the French in the battle of Bautzen was considerably greater than that of the allies: an unusual circumstance with a victorious army, but which is easily explained by the carnage occasioned in Napoleon's masses by the Prussian artillery, in position on the numerous eminences which commanded the field of battle, and by the perfect order with which the retreat was conducted. The allies lost in the two days 15,000 men killed and wounded; and the French took 1500 prisoners, most of them wounded, but neither cannon nor artillery graced their triumph; and their own loss was fully 19,000 killed and wounded on the field alone, independent of those on the previous day; insomuch, that 20,000 wounded were lodged, two days after the battle, at Bautzen, and the villages in its environs, while 5000 were killed outright on the field of battle.† A great number of the wounded were slightly hurt only in the hands and feet: an ominous circumstance, which had been observed also in the campaign of 1809 on the Danube, and bespoke the anxiety of the conscripts to escape from these scenes of carnage. The Saxon peasants displayed unbounded kindness to these unhappy sufferers: without regard to side, nation, or language, they received them into their cottages, and did all in their power to mitigate their distresses; and, not contented with waiting till the sufferers were brought into their dwellings, themselves issued forth to seek them on the field. On all sides were to be seen men, women, and children carrying litters, pushing wheelbarrows, or drawing little carts, laden with wounded men; Russians were laid beside French, Prussians beside Italians; the women tended the dying, and bandaged the wounds alike of friend and foe: all the animosity of the contest was forgotten; and at the close of one of the bloodiest battles recorded in modern times, was to be seen the glorious spectacle of Christian charity healing the wounds and assuaging the sufferings equally of the victors and the vanquished.*

Combat of Reichenbach. May 22.

By daybreak on the following morning the French army was in motion, and Napoleon, who had hardly allowed himself any rest during the night, in person directed their movements. They soon came up with the rear-guard of the enemy, who had marched all night, and now stood firm on the heights behind Reichenbach, in order to gain time for the immense files of chariots, cannon, and wounded men to defile by the roads in their rear. Milaradowitch had the command; and the veterans of the Moscow campaign were prepared to defend the position to the last extremity; while forty pieces of cannon were admirably placed on the summit, and a large body of cuirassiers on the slopes seemed intentionally situated for an opportunity to come to blows with the horsemen of the French. Struck with the strength of this position, as well as the determined countenance of the allied force which occupied it, Napoleon paused, and engaged only in a cannonade till the cavalry of the guard came up. Reichenbach itself, in front of the allied position, occupied by the Russian light troops, was only abandoned after an obstinate conflict; and when the French columns showed themselves on the opposite side, they were torn in pieces by the pointblank discharge of the enemy's batteries from the heights behind. The Russian general sent some of his regiments of cavalry into the plain, where they were immediately charged by the red lancers of the French guard; but the latter were defeated, with considerable loss. Napoleon, upon this, brought up Latour Maubourg, with the whole cavalry of the guard, six thousand strong, and at the same time made dispositions for outflanking and turning the enemy. These measures were attended with the desired effect, and, after several brilliant charges on both sides, the allies retired to Gorlitz, but in the best order. Enraged at seeing his enemy thus escaping, Napoleon hastened to the advanced posts, and himself pressed on the movements of the troops, insomuch that the rays of the setting sun gleamed on the sabres and bayonets of fifty thousand men, accumulated in a front of a mile and a half in breadth, and closely advancing in pursuit. But it was all in vain. The enemy, proud of the resistance they had made against such superior numbers, retired in admirable order, without

* Lond., 46. Odel., i., 97, 98. Michaud, Biog. Univ., Sup., i., 176. Fain, i., 414. Kausler, 883.

† "Twenty-two thousand were brought into the hospitals of the Grand Army, from the 1st of May to the 1st of June, 1813, without counting those of the enemy."—Baron Larrey, iv., 177. And this return embraced only the serious cases. So great was the number of persons slightly wounded, who were not admitted to the hospitals, that it was strongly suspected at the time that many, especially of the Italian conscripts, had intentionally wounded themselves slightly in the hand, in order to avoid, at least for a time, the dangers and fatigues of the campaign. The number so wounded was no less than two thousand six hundred and thirty-two. The emperor strongly inclined to the same opinion, and was preparing a severe decree on the subject, when he was diverted from his design by the humane and politic Larrey, who proved, by actual experiment, that inexperienced troops, firing three deep, were extremely apt to injure the hands of the front rank; and in this report the emperor deemed it prudent to acquiesce.—See *Souvenirs de* Caulaincourt, i., 170, 172; and Larrey, iv., 171, 179. But General Mathieu Dumas, who saw great numbers of these wounded at Dresden, has recorded a clear opinion that many of these wounds were self-inflicted: "I observed," says he, "with keen regret, many of the wounded but slightly hurt; the greater part young conscripts, who had recently joined the army, and who had not been injured by the fire of the enemy, but had themselves mutilated their feet and hands. Such accidents of bad augury had also been observed during the campaign of 1809. The emperor interrogated me closely on the subject, and, as I made no concealment of the truth, he ordered an inquiry. The report of the commission, however, was opposed to my too well-founded observations; and the emperor believed, or feigned to believe, those who, to pay their court to him, disguised the truth on a painful, but important subject."—*Souvenirs de* Dumas, iii., 507.

* Précis in Schoell, ii., 334. Fain, 96, 97. Odel., i., 96. Lond., 49. Kausler, 884.

leaving anything behind: guns, wounded, caissons, were alike conveyed away, and all the genius of the emperor, which never shone forth with brighter lustre in directing the movements, could not extract one trophy from their rear-guard. Napoleon could not conceal his vexation at beholding the unbroken array of the allied troops thus eluding his grasp, and the skill with which they availed themselves of every eminence to plant their guns and arrest his progress. "What!" said he, "after such a butchery, no results? no prisoners? Those fellows there will not leave us a nail; they rise from their ashes. When will this be done?"*

Death of Duroc.

The balls at this moment were flying thick around him, and one of the emperor's escort fell dead at his feet. "Duroc," said he, turning to the grand-marshal, who was by his side, "fortune is resolved to have one of us to-day." Some of his suite observed with a shudder, in an under breath, that it was the anniversary of the battle of Essling, and the death of Lannes.† The melancholy anticipation was not long of being realized. The enemy retired to a fresh position, behind the ravine of Makersdorf; and Napoleon, who was anxious to push on before night to Gorlitz, himself hurried to the front, to urge on the troops who were to dislodge them from the ground which they had occupied to bar the approach to it. His suite followed him, four abreast, at a rapid trot, through a hollow way, in such a cloud of dust that hardly one of the riders could see his right-hand man. Suddenly a cannon-ball glanced from a tree near the emperor, and struck a file behind, consisting of Mortier, Caulaincourt, Kirgener, and Duroc. In the confusion and dust, it was not, at first, perceived who was hurt; but a page soon arrived and whispered in his ear that Kirgener was killed, and Duroc desperately wounded. Larrey and Ivan instantly came up, but all their efforts were unavailing: Duroc's entrails were torn out, and the dying man was carried into a cottage near Makersdorf. Napoleon, profoundly affected, dismounted, and gazed long on the battery from whence the fatal shot had issued; he then entered the cottage, and ascertained, with tears in his eyes, that there was no hope. "Duroc," said he, pressing the hand of the dying hero, "there is another world, where we shall meet again!" Memorable words, wrung by anguish even from the child of Infidelity and the Revolution! Finally, when it was announced, some hours afterward, that all was over, he put into the hands of Berthier, without articulating a word, a paper, ordering the construction of a monument on the spot where he fell, with this inscription: "Here the General Duroc, duke of Friuli, grand-marshal of the palace of the Emperor Napoleon, gloriously fell, struck by a cannon-ball, and died in the arms of the emperor, his friend."‡

Mournful scene around the tent of Napoleon.

Napoleon pitched his tent in the neighbourhood of the cottage where Duroc lay, and seemed for the time altogether overwhelmed by his emotions. The squares of the Old Guard, respecting his feelings, arranged themselves at a distance, and even his most confidential attendants did not, for some time, venture to approach his person. Alone he sat, wrapped in his gray greatcoat, with his forehead resting on his hands and his elbows on his knees, a prey to the most agonizing reflections. In vain Caulaincourt and Maret at length requested his attention to the most pressing orders. "To-morrow—everything," was the only reply of the emperor, as he again resumed his attitude of meditation. A mournful silence reigned around; the groups of officers, at a little distance, hardly articulated above their breath; gloom and depression appeared in every countenance, while the subdued hum of the soldiers, preparing their repast, and the sullen murmur of the artillery wagons as they rolled in the distance, alone told that a mighty host was assembled in the neighbourhood. Slowly the moon rose over this melancholy scene; the heavens became illuminated by the flames of the adjoining villages, which had fallen a prey to the license of the soldiers; while the noble bands of the Imperial Guard played alternately triumphal and elegiac strains, in the vain hope of distracting the grief of their chief. Could the genius of painting portray the scene, could the soul of poetry be inspired by the feelings which all around experienced, a more striking image could not be presented of the mingled woes and animation of war, of the greatness and weakness of man, of his highest glories, and yet nothingness against the arm of his Creator.*†

General despondency of the French generals.

The loss of Duroc, Kirgener, and General Bruyères, who also fell on the same day, as well as the firm countenance and admirable array of the allies, who retired after a bloody battle, in which they had been worsted, without the loss of cannon or prisoners in the pursuit, and with no considerable diminution of baggage, occasioned the most gloomy presentiments in the French army. It was plain that the days of Austerlitz and Jena were past: a great victory had been gained without any result, and the victors, in the pursuit, had sustained both a greater and more serious loss than the vanquished. Little hopes remained of subduing an enemy who thus rose up with renewed vigour from every disaster: with truth might Napoleon have said, with Pyrrhus, "Another such victory, and I am undone." Murmurs, regrets, expressions of despair, were heard even among the most resolute; the flames, which rose on all sides as the villages were taken possession of, at once bespoke the obstinacy of the resistance and the determination of the inhabitants; and even the bravest sometimes exclaimed, on beholding the univer-

* Fain, i., 424, 425. Odel., i., 97, 100. Lond., 50. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 54, 55. Souv. de Caulaincourt, i., 174.

† *Ante*, iii., 211.

‡ Souv. de Caul., i., 176, 179. Odel., i., 100, 101. Fain, i., 427, 429.

* Odel., i., 101, 103. Fain, i., 427, 429. Souv. de Caul., i., 177, 179.

† Napoleon at the time, to testify his regard for Duroc, consigned two hundred Napoleons in the hands of the owner of the house, jointly with the clergyman of the parish, for the purpose of erecting a monument to his memory. The monument, however, was never erected; and by an order of the Russian état-major, dated the 1st of April, 1814, the money was reclaimed by the allies, and not applied to its destined purpose: an unworthy proceeding, forming a striking contrast to the noble conduct of the Archduke Charles, in 1796, regarding the French tomb of General Marceau.—See *Order of* BARON ROSEN, *1st of April*, 1814, *in* FAIN, i., 430, and *Ante*, i., 436.

sal spirit with which the people were animated, "What a war! we shall all leave our remains here." Napoleon was no stranger to the feelings of despondency which were so common even around his headquarters, and he gave vent to his spleen by cutting sarcasms against his principal officers. "I see well, gentlemen," said he, "that you are no longer inclined to make war: Berthier would rather follow the chase at Grosbois; Rapp sighs after his beautiful hotel at Paris. I understand you: I am no stranger to the pleasures of the capital."*

Retreat of the allies towards Leignitz.

On the 23d the allied army continued to retreat, still in two columns, after having broken down the bridges over the Neisse: the right column moved upon Waldau, the left upon Lobau. At nine o'clock, the Saxon advanced posts appeared before Gorlitz, and finding the bridge broken down, after some delay and warm skirmishing, forced the passage of the river, and by hastily erecting five new bridges, soon crossed over so large a force as rendered the town no longer tenable by the allies. The emperor arrived at Gorlitz a few hours after, and rested there the remainder of that and the whole of the next day, shut up with Caulaincourt in his cabinet, and constantly occupied with diplomatic arrangements. Meanwhile the allies continued their retreat, and the French pressed the pursuit in three columns: the right skirting the Bohemian Mountains, and following Wittgenstein; the centre following Blucher and Barclay de Tolly on the great road to Leignitz; the left marching upon Glogau, the garrison of which, now blockaded for above three months, anxiously expected their deliverance. Although no attempt was made to defend any positions, yet the French cavalry frequently came up with that of the allies, and some sharp encounters took place between the horse on both sides; but the dragoons of Napoleon, for the most part cased in cuirasses, or heavily armed, were no match in this desultory warfare for the nimble children of the desert, and the pursuers suffered more under the lances of the Cossacks than the retreating cavalry did from the French sabres.†

Combat and defeat of the French near Hainau.

No attempt was made by the allies to defend the passage of the Queisse, the Bober, or the Katsbach, although their rocky banks and deeply-furrowed ravines offered every facility for retarding the advance of the enemy. The Emperor Alexander was making for an intrenched camp prepared near Schweidnitz, and was desirous of avoiding any serious encounter till it was reached. On the 26th, however, May 26. an opportunity occurred of striking a considerable blow, near Hainau, upon the advanced column of Lauriston's corps. After the troops under Maison had passed that town, and were traversing the valley of the Theisse without having explored the surrounding heights, a signal was suddenly given by setting fire to a windmill, and before the French had time to form square the enemy's cavalry, consisting of three strong Prussian regiments, were upon them. The French dragoons, who were at the head of the column, instantly fled back to Hainau, leaving the infantry to their fate. They were speedily broken, and the whole artillery of the column, consisting of eighteen pieces, taken, with four hundred men made prisoners, besides an equal number killed and wounded, although, from the want of horses, only twelve of the guns could be brought off. This affair, which cost the life of Colonel Dolfs, the Prussian commander, who gloriously fell in the midst of the enemy's squares, would have been still more decisive but for the uncontrollable impatience of the Prussian dragoons, whose ardour made them break into a charge before the proper moment had arrived; as it was, however, it was one of the most brilliant cavalry actions which occurred during the war, and may justly be placed beside the splendid charge of the heavy German dragoons on the French infantry, on the 23d of July, in the preceding year, the day after the battle of Salamanca.*†

Continuance of the retreat to Leignitz and the Oder.

Napoleon was severely mortified by this check, not so much from the amount of the loss he had sustained, which, in such a host, was a matter of little importance, but from the decisive proof which it afforded, in the eyes of both armies, of the undiminished spirit and unbroken array of the allied forces. On the very day following, however, his arms had their revenge. General Sebastiani, at the head of the cavalry of Victor's corps, which was advancing by forced marches towards Glogau to relieve the garrison, fell in, near Sprottau, with a Russian convoy which was moving, unaware of the victory that had been gained, up to the main army, and captured the whole, consisting of twenty-two pieces and sixty tumbrils, with the guard of four hundred men. In other quarters, however, from being longer accustomed to the vicinity of the enemy, the allies were better on their guard. Eight squadrons of Russian cavalry, on the same day, attacked, near Gottesberg, twelve squadrons of Napoleon's cuirassiers, and defeated them, with the loss of four hundred prisoners; a partisan corps captured a considerable park of artillery, while Woronzoff's cavalry fell in with a large body of the enemy's cavalry near Dessau, on the Elbe, put them to the rout, and made five hundred prisoners. Meanwhile, the main body of the allies retired, without farther molestation, by Leignitz, to the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz, where the intrenched camp had been constructed, and where it was intended that a stand should be made.‡ May 27.

Reasons which induced the allied sovereigns to desire an armistice.

These partial successes, however, determined nothing; and the progress of the French arms, as well as the position of their forces, had now become such as to excite just disquietude in the breasts of the allied sovereigns. The great line of communication with Poland and the Vistula was abandoned; the blockading force before Glogau withdrew on the approach of the enemy; and the garrison,

* Rapp, Mém., 166. Fain, i., 433. Odel., i., 107.
† Fain, i., 437, 439. Odel., i., 106. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 55, 56.

* Lond., 51, 52. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 36, 37. Odel., i., 106, 107. Fain, i., 440.
† *Ante*, iii., 484.
‡ Lond., 52, 53. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 56, 57. Odel., i., 112, 113. Fain, i., 449.

which had nearly exhausted its means of subsistence, was relieved, amid transports of joy on both sides, on the 29th. All the allied forces were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz, or between Leignitz and that place; and although the intrenched camp, resting on the former fortress, was of great strength, yet it could not be disguised that it was close to the foot of the Bohemian Mountains; and that if Austria, in reliance on whose ultimate co-operation this direction had been given to the allied forces, should prove unfaithful to the cause of Europe, they would find it next to impossible to regain their communication with the Oder and the Vistula. Great re-enforcements, indeed, were on their march from Russia—full fifty thousand effective men—and an equal force was in progress in Prussia; but some weeks, at the least, must elapse before the most forward of them could reach the allied headquarters; and if the diverging march to the extremity of Upper Silesia were much longer to be pursued, the French might interpose between the allied main army and the succours on which they relied. The Russians, by the morning state on the 27th of May, were only thirty-five, the Prussians twenty-five thousand effective soldiers: ill success and retreat had produced its usual effect in diminishing the number of available men, and the abandonment of the line of communication with Poland had occasioned great difficulty in turning aside the convoys from the road they were pursuing, one of which, as before mentioned, actually had already fallen into the enemy's hands.*

Great satisfaction of Napoleon at this state of affairs.

With reason, therefore, Napoleon regarded the present state of affairs as highly auspicious to his arms, and the soldiers participated in his satisfaction from the ample supplies of everything which they obtained in the rich agricultural districts of Upper Silesia: exhibiting a marked contrast to the extreme penury, almost amounting to famine, which they had experienced in the wasted fields of Saxony and Lusatia. Delivered, by these favourable circumstances, from the melancholy forebodings which the death of Duroc and the imperfect success at Bautzen had occasioned, the emperor recovered all his former serenity of mind: he was constantly with the advanced posts, and directed their movements with extraordinary precision; while the gayety of his manner, which appeared in the multitude of the questions which he asked, and the French and Italian songs which he hummed as he rode along, bespoke the hopes with which he was inspired as to the issue of the campaign. A gleam of sunshine shone for a brief period upon his career, and recalled, midway between the disasters of Moscow and the overthrow of Leipsic, the triumphs of his earlier years. Again, as in former days, the allied armies were recoiling before his arms: province after province was overrun by his followers; and already one half of the prophecy which he had uttered to the Abbé de Pradt, at Warsaw, had been accomplished:† "Success will render the Russians bold: I am going to raise three hundred thousand men: I will deliver two battles between the Elbe and the Oder, and in six months I shall be on the Niemen."*

Reasons which, nevertheless, induced Napoleon to desire an armistice.

Although, however, appearances were thus favourable at headquarters, and in the Grand Army under the immediate command of Napoleon, yet this was far from being the case universally; and many circumstances, both in his military and political situation, were calculated to awaken the most serious apprehensions. Though his infantry and artillery were in great strength, and had, for the most part, surpassed his expectations, the cavalry of the Grand Army was still extremely deficient; and this want both rendered it impossible to obtain decisive success in the field, and, even if an advantage was there obtained, made any attempt to follow it up more hazardous to the victorious than the vanquished party. This weakness was the more sensibly felt by Napoleon, that he had, in his previous campaigns, made such constant and successful use of this arm; and that the vehemence and rapidity of his operations savoured rather of the fierce sweep of Asiatic conquest than the slow and methodical operations of European warfare. The same cause had exposed him to great inconveniences in his rear, where the allied partisans had in many places crossed the Elbe, and carried the enthusiasm of their proclamations, and the terror of their arms, far into the Westphalian plains. But, most of all, he had reason to apprehend the armed mediation of Austria. Facts more convincing than words here spoke with decisive authority as to the thunderbolt which might, ere long, be expected to issue from the dark cloud that overhung the Bohemian Mountains. The forces which the cabinet of Vienna had already accumulated on that frontier range, little short of a hundred thousand men, enabled its ambassador, Count Stadion, who was still at the allied headquarters, to speak almost with the tone of command to the belligerent powers; while the direction which the allied armies had now taken upon Leignitz, Schweidnitz, and Upper Silesia, to the entire abandonment of their great line of communication with Poland, and their own resources, seemed to leave no doubt of a secret understanding with the Austrian government, and an intention to base their future operations on the great natural fortress of Bohemia.†

Important partisan successes in the French rear.

The accounts from the rear at this period were of so alarming a description, that it is not surprising they exercised a predominant influence on the mind of the emperor: the more especially as the recent experience of the Moscow campaign had vividly impressed on his mind the dangers of a general interruption of his communications in that direction. General Bulow, who had the command of the forces around Berlin and in front of Magdebourg, being relieved of all apprehensions for the capital by the direction of Ney's corps to Silesia, had pushed his partisan bodies in all directions, and kept the enemy in continual apprehension for his detached parties and communications.

* Lond., 55, 56. Odel., i., 109, 110 St. Cyr, Hist. Mil., iv., 50, 51. † *Ante*, iii., 593.

* Fain, i., 444, 445. Odel., i., 110, 112. St. Cyr, Hist. Mil., iv., 50, 51. Lond., 55.

† St. Cyr, Hist. Mil., iv., 50, 51. Jom., iv., 313, 314. Fain, i., 434, 435. Lond., 54, 55.

Independent of the brilliant success of Woronzoff's cavalry near Dessau, which has been already mentioned,* General Zastroff, who commanded the Prussian landwehr, had made the greatest exertions, and not only afforded the most efficient aid to the desultory warfare beyond the Elbe, but prepared a large body of men ready to join the allied army in regular battle. General Chernicheff left the Lower Elbe, and having learned, while lying between Magdebourg and the Havel, that the Westphalian general, Ochs, was at Halberstadt, on the left bank of the Elbe, with a convoy of artillery, he resolved to surprise him. Having forthwith crossed the river with his indefatigable hussars and Cossacks, on the evening of the 29th of May, he marched all day and night, and at five on the following morning reached the enemy, thirteen German, or nearly fifty English miles distant. The surprise was complete; and although a desperate resistance was made, it terminated in the capture or destruction of the whole enemy's detachment, twelve hundred strong, with fourteen pieces of cannon. The ammunition-wagons were all blown up by the French, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. Nor was Marshal Oudinot, who, after the battle of Bautzen, had been detached from the Grand Army to oppose Bulow in the neighbourhood of Magdebourg, more fortunate. The Prussian general took post at Luckau, with twelve thousand men, where he threatened the French line of communications, and strengthened himself, as well as circumstances would admit, by means of loopholes and barricades. Oudinot attacked him there on the 4th of July; but such was the vigour of the Prussian defence, that, though the assailants succeeded in carrying the suburbs, which they set on fire, they could not penetrate into the town, and retreated at night, leaving five hundred prisoners and three guns in the hands of the victors, besides above fifteen hundred killed and wounded during the engagement. Immediately after this success, which diffused extraordinary joy over the neighbouring territory of Prussia, Bulow was joined by Generals Borstell, Borgen, and Harps, which raised his troops to nineteen thousand men, and their united forces threatened a most powerful diversion in the rear of the enemy.† May 30.

Attack on the French depôt at Leipsic.

This brilliant success, and the evident inferiority of the French to the allies, both in the number and activity of their light troops, encouraged the gallant partisan leaders of the latter to attempt a still more important enterprise. Chernicheff, who had recrossed the Elbe after the affair at Halberstadt, having learned that General Arrighi was at Leipsic with five thousand men, besides an equal number of wounded, and considerable magazines, communicated with Woronzoff, who commanded the Russian blockading force that lay before Magdebourg, and they agreed to make a joint attack on that important depôt. With this view, Chernicheff took up a position with some parade at Bernberg, so as to withdraw the enemy's attention from the real point of attack; and Woronzoff having, meanwhile, advanced to Dolitch, in the neighbourhood of Leipsic, Chernicheff, by a forced march of nine German, or thirty-two English miles, in one day, joined him under the walls of the town. The French were so completely taken by surprise, that they had scarcely time to assume a position at Zaucha, in front of the town, when the Russian horse were upon them. The few cavalry they had were routed in a moment; and although their infantry opposed a more formidable resistance, yet they, too, were broken, and driven back into the town before half of the allied force had come up. Just as they were entering into action, and the united force was advancing to complete their victory, news arrived of the armistice, which, after an examination of the documents produced by Arrighi, proved to be correct; and the Russian generals were robbed of their well-earned success, and obliged to content themselves with the six hundred prisoners they had already taken. About the same time, Captain Colon, a Prussian partisan, who had remained in Saxony after the Grand Allied Army retreated, incessantly annoying the enemy in the remote parts of Saxony and Franconia, having heard of the expected arrival of twenty pieces of cannon and a large train of ammunition-wagons, on the road between Hoff and Leipsic, formed an ambuscade, and attacked the enemy with such success, that the whole artillery was destroyed and the ammunition blown up. Colon was afterward joined by Major Lutzow, with six hundred horse, and a great number of partisans; and their united force having established themselves in the mountains of Vogtland,* maintained a harassing and successful warfare, which was only terminated by the conclusion of the armistice. June 6. June 7. June 8.

While the operations of the allies on the rear of the French in Saxony were thus far successful, and were exposing the enemy to losses, almost daily, even greater than those which had proved so fatal to their arms in the preceding autumn, when they lay at Moscow, a very considerable calamity was experienced, and a loss, attended with unbounded private suffering, undergone on the Lower Elbe. The battle of Lutzen, and withdrawal of the allied armies to the right bank of the Elbe, exercised an immediate and fatal influence on the situation of Hamburg. Tettenborn, Dornberg, and all the partisan corps on the left bank of the river, shortly after fell back to that city itself. Vandamme, acting under the orders of Davoust, shortly after appeared before the town, on the left bank; and several gallant attacks of Tettenborn on his forces led only to the capture of the island of Wilhelmsberg, in the Elbe, not far distant from Hamburg. The French besieging force, however, was soon increased to ten thousand men; and with this array, which was double the strength of the whole regular force to which he was opposed, Vandamme carried the island of Wilhelmsberg, and all the islands of the river opposite to the city, which put him in a situation to commence a bombardment. This was, in consequence, begun the

Capture of Hamburg by the French. May 6. May 19.

* *Ante*, iv., 79.

† Lond., 63, 65. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 60. Jom., iv., 315.

* Lond., 64, 66. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 61, 62.

very next day. The dubious conduct of the Danish gunboats in the river for a few days suspended the fate of this unhappy city; but the court of Copenhagen, having at length taken a decided part, and joined the French emperor, the Russian generals were unable to withstand the united forces of both, and reluctantly compelled to intimate to the Hamburg authorities that they must depend on their own resources.* With speechless grief the patriotic citizens learned that they were to be delivered over to their merciless enemies; but the necessities of the case admitted of no alternative, and on the 30th General Tettenborn evacuated the city, which was next day occupied by the enemy, the French entering by one gate and the Danes by the other. The French general immediately levied a contribution of 4,000,000 marks (£250,000) on the city, which was rigidly exacted. Without doubt, the acquisition of this great and opulent commercial emporium, commanding the mouth of the Elbe, and hermetrically sealing it against the enemy, was a great advantage to Napoleon, and well calculated to revive the terror of his arms in the north of Germany; and yet, so oppressive was the use which he made of his victory, and so unbounded the exasperation excited by the endless exactions to which the unfortunate Hamburgers were subjected, that it may be doubted whether he did not, in the end, lose more by this moral reaction than by all the material resources which it placed at his command.*

When both parties had such need of a respite in military efforts to complete their preparations, and draw closer the diplomatic ties which connected, or were about to connect, them with the states from which they respectively hoped for succour, there was little difficulty in coming to an accommodation for such a measure came from Napoleon, who on the 18th of May, when setting out for the army, had, as already mentioned,† despatched a proposal, nominally for an armistice, but really designed to detach Russia from the coalition, and lead the Emperor Alexander into separate negotiations with himself. This letter arrived at the allied headquarters on the eve of the battle of Bautzen; and though it was received and considered in full council, in presence of the Austrian minister, Count Stadion, and the answer determined on, yet it was deemed expedient to delay the messenger bearing the answer till the issue of arms had been tried. The result of that experiment, however, by demonstrating the vital importance to the allies of gaining time for their great re-enforcements to come up, and their present inability to cope with Napoleon, rendered them more tractable; and the messenger was despatched with the answer from Stadion, bearing, "that the allied sovereigns were prepared to enter into the views of the Emperor Napoleon; too happy if these first overtures on his part should be followed by others leading to an object which his august master, the Emperor of Austria, had so much at heart." Napoleon, however, who, above all things, desired to open a separate negotiation with the Emperor Alexander, and was not without hopes, if it were agreed to, of regaining the ascendency of Tilsit and Erfurth, again, three days afterward, despatched a letter requesting a personal interview with that monarch; but this proposal, like the former one, was eluded by an answer, that Count Schomouloff was intended, on the part of Russia, to repair to the French advanced posts, which would save his imperial majesty the trouble of a journey for that purpose. Finding, therefore, that he could not succeed in this object of a separate negotiation, and feeling the necessity of yielding to the strongly-expressed wishes of Austria for a general conference, Napoleon returned an answer that he agreed to the armistice;* and the village of Pleswitz, in the circle of Streigau, was declared neuter, for the purpose of carrying the consequent arrangements into effect.

Progress towards the adjustment of an armistice.

May 18.

May 19.

May 22.

May 25.

May 29.

Even after this preliminary and important point had been agreed to, it was no easy matter to bring the opposite views of parties regarding the armistice to a definite bearing. The times were widely changed from those when Napoleon, after launching forth the thunderbolts of Marengo, Austerlitz, or Friedland, dictated the terms to the vanquished on which he was willing to admit of a cessation of hostilities. He had gained, indeed, two great battles, and Europe again beheld the allied armies receding before him. They retired, however, unbroken and undisgraced: no dislocation of masses, or cutting off of columns, had followed his victories; no troops of captives, or files of cannon, had graced his triumphs. The want of cavalry had marred his success, and rendered many of his best-conceived enterprises abortive: the superiority of the enemy in light troops had frequently converted incipient triumph into ultimate disaster. Above all, the fascination of his name on other nations was at an end: Europe no longer awaited, in breathless anxiety, to receive his mandates; Austria, dark and ambiguous, was gradually rising from the attitude of a mediator into that of a commander. But the necessities of the allies were at least as great: their re-enforcements were still far distant; the victorious French legions pressed on their rear; the march to Schweidnitz had abandoned their great line of communication with their own resources; and though they had reason to believe that Austria would join them if Napoleon refused to make peace on reasonable terms, yet six weeks, at least, were required to enable her to complete her preparations.† Both parties thus felt the necessity of a respite, but neither was sufficiently humbled to evince, by their conduct, their sense of this necessity; and this circumstance had wellnigh proved fatal to the negotiations.

Difficulty of arranging the armistice as to the line of demarcation.

Napoleon at first insisted on the line of the Oder as the demarcation between the two armies, but to this the allies positively refused to agree; and the fall of Breslau, the capital of Silesia,

The line of demarcation is at length fixed on.

* Lond., 62, 63. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 63, 64. Year of Liberation, i., 201, 261.

† *Ante*, iv., 70.

* Fain, i., 400. Napoleon to Caulaincourt, May 18, 1813. Hard., xii., 161, 167. Schoell, x., 224, 225.

† Hard., xii., 165, 169. Schoell, x., 225. Fain, i., 436, 446, 448.

which was occupied by the French army, without resistance, on the 30th of May, rendered it less important for Napoleon to insist on that limit. At the same time, intelligence was received of the occupation of Hamburg by the united armies of Denmark and France. He ceased to contend, therefore, for the line of the Oder, took his stand on the principle of *uti possidetis*, and insisted that his troops should retain the ground which they actually occupied; and this basis was contended for so strenuously by his plenipotentiaries, that it had wellnigh proved fatal to the negotiation, for the Russian and Prussian ministers were not less resolute that the whole of Silesia should be abandoned. The commissioners on both sides, unable to come to an agreement, had separated, and hostilities were on the point of being resumed, when the firmness of Napoleon, for the first time in his life, yielded in negotiation; and he agreed to abate so far in his demands as rendered an accommodation practicable. He brought himself to abandon Breslau, to relinquish the line of the Oder, and to draw back his army to Leignitz. Conferences were resumed at Poischwitz, near Jauer, and on the 4th of June an armistice for six weeks was signed at that place between all the contending powers.*

Considerations of the armistice. June 4.

By this convention the line of demarcation between the hostile armies was fixed as follows: Poischwitz, Leignitz, Goldberg, and Lahn remained in the hands of the French; Landshut, Rudelstadt, Bolkershagen, Streigau, and Canth were restored to, or continued to be possessed by the allies. All the intermediate territory, including the fortress of Breslau, was declared neutral, and to be occupied by neither army. From the confluence of the Katsbach and Oder, the line of demarcation followed that river to the frontiers of Saxony and Prussia, and thence to the Elbe, which formed its course to its mouth. If Hamburg was only besieged, it was to be treated as one of the blockaded towns; Dantzic, Modlin, Zamosc, Stettin, and Custrin were to be revictualled, at the sight of commissioners employed on both sides, every five days; Magdebourg, and the fortresses on the Elbe, to enjoy a circle of a league in every direction, which was to be considered as neutral. The duration of the armistice was to be six weeks from its signature, or till the 28th of July, and six days' notification of the intention to break it was to be given by either party. This convention was concluded solely by the superior authority of the allied monarchs; for their plenipotentiaries, irritated at the continued hostilities of the French troops, were on the point of breaking off the conferences, when they were overruled, and the signature ordered by their sovereigns' express directions.†

Perfidious attack on Lutzow's corps, and wound of Körner. June 14.

One deplorable engagement took place after the signature of the armistice was known, which Europe has had much cause to lament, and of which France has too much reason to be ashamed. Under pretence that the armistice applied to the regular troops, but not to the irregular bands who had crossed the Elbe, a considerable time after the armistice was known on both sides, and when Lutzow's corps, five hundred strong, were returning to Silesia, they were attacked by three thousand men under General Fournier, when totally unprepared, and relying on the faith of the treaty at Ketzig, near Zeitz in Saxony, and in great part cut to pieces or taken. Among the rest was the poet Körner, whose patriotic strains had rung like a trumpet to the heart of Germany, and who advanced to parley with the French general, along with Lutzow, before the attack commenced, and assure them that they were relying on the faith of the armistice. But the perfidious, barbarian leader, exclaiming, "The armistice is for all the world except you!" cut him down before he had even time to draw his sword. Körner's friends, by whom he was extremely beloved, instantly rushed in and rescued him and Lutzow from the hands of the enemy; and the poet was raised from the ground, weltering in his blood, to a neighbouring wood, from whence he was conveyed to a peasant's cottage, and ultimately taken in secrecy to Dr. Windler's house in Leipsic, who, with generous devotion, received the sufferer under his roof at the hazard of his own life. Körner recovered the wound, but his immortal spirit quitted its worldly mansion on the 26th of August, 1813, when bravely combating the French army under the walls of Dresden. Such was the indignation excited by this treacherous act in Leipsic, that it was only by the presence of a very large French garrison that the people were prevented from breaking out into open insurrection; and though policy compelled the allied sovereigns at the time to suppress their resentment, and not avail themselves of the just cause thus afforded for breaking off the armistice, yet it sank deep into the heart of Germany, and increased, if possible, the universal horror at French domination, which so soon led to its total overthrow. "Armistice be it," was the universal cry, "but no peace: revenge for Körner first."*

Great talent displayed by Napoleon in this campaign.

No period in the career of Napoleon is more characteristic of the indomitable firmness of his character, as well as resources of his mind, than that which has now been narrated. When the magnitude of the disasters in Russia is taken into consideration, and the general defection of the north of Germany which immediately and necessarily followed, it is difficult to say which is most worthy of admiration, the moral courage of the emperor, whom such an unheard-of catastrophe could not subdue, or the extraordinary energy which enabled him to rise superior to it, and for a brief season again chain victory to his standards. The military ability with which he combated at Lutzen—with infantry superior in number, indeed, but destitute of the cavalry which was so formidable in their opponents' ranks, and for the most part but newly raised—the victorious veteran armies of Russia, and ardent volunteers of Prussia, was never surpassed. The battle of Bautzen, in the skill with which it was conceived, and the admirable precision with which the different corps and reserves were brought into action, each at

* Fain, i, 449, 451. Hard., xii., 168, 173. Schoell, x., 226. Martin's Recueil, xii., 582.

† Martin, xii., 582. Schoell, x., 227, 229. Fain, i., 488.

* Deutche Pandora, Von Friedrich Kolle, Erlebtes Von Jahr 1813, 413. Biog. Univ., Sup., Voce Körner.

the appropriate time, is worthy of being placed beside Austerlitz or Jena. If it was less decisive in its results than those immortal triumphs, and partook more of the character of a drawn battle than a decisive victory, it was from no inferiority on his part in conception or combination; but because the allies, animated by a higher spirit, taught by past misfortune, and invigorated by recent success, now opposed a far more obstinate resistance to his attacks; and the want of cavalry rendered him unable, as he was wont, to follow up European tactics and discipline with the fell sweep of Asiatic horse. Nor should due praise be withheld from the energy and patriotic spirit of France, which, unbroken by a calamity unparalleled in past history, again sent forth its conquering legions into the heart of Germany, and reappeared with two hundred thousand victorious conscripts on the Elbe, within a few months after four hundred thousand veterans had left their bones, or sunk as captives, on the plains of Russia.

Ruinous effects of this armistice on the fortunes of Napoleon.

The armistice of Pleswitz, or Poischwitz, has been pronounced, by no mean authority, the greatest political fault of Napoleon's life.* By consenting to it in the circumstances in which he was then placed, he openly yielded to the influence of Austria; inspired her with a sense of her importance which she had not previously possessed; accelerated rather than retarded the period of her declaration against him; and lost the only opportunity which fortune afforded him, after the catastrophe of Moscow, of re-establishing his affairs. It is more than probable that, if he had pursued a bolder course, refused to treat at all with the allies at that period, directed the weight of his forces on the Oder towards Glogau, so as to cut them off from their base and re-enforcements, and thrown them back, destitute of everything, on the Bohemian Mountains, he would have succeeded in intimidating the cabinet of Vienna, and inducing it, if not to join his ranks, at least to observe real neutrality. It is difficult to see, in such a case, how the allied armies, cut off from their own resources, and driven up against a neutral frontier, could have avoided the Caudine Forks.

Singular manner in which it arose out of the Austrian alliance.

Even if Austria, linked to their fortunes, as perhaps she was, by secret treaties, had admitted them within her dominions and openly espoused their cause, she would have done so to much less advantage than she afterward did at the expiration of the armistice: it is one thing to join the fortunes of a defeated and dejected, it is another, and a very different thing, to adhere to the banners of a recruited and reanimated host. Her own preparations were then incomplete: her army not prepared to take the field, and that of the allies unable singly to maintain its ground; whereas, if hostilities were to be resumed after the armistice had expired, it might easily have been foreseen, what actually occurred, that the allied forces, acting in the midst of an enthusiastic and numerous population, would be recruited in a proportion twofold greater than the French, and the apprehension of Austria allayed by the vast accession of strength arrayed around the banners of Russia and Prussia. In agreeing to an armistice by which he lost ground, and gained nothing, under such circumstances, Napoleon was evidently actuated by a desire to propitiate the cabinet of Vienna, upon whose secret good-will he conceived himself, not without reason, since his marriage, entitled to rely; but, nevertheless, it reft from him the whole fruits of the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen, and brought upon him the disasters of the Katsbach and Leipsic: a striking proof of the truth of what he afterward so often asserted, that that apparently brilliant marriage, by causing him to adventure upon an abyss strewed with flowers, proved his ruin; and of the mysterious manner in which due retribution is often, by Supreme direction, provided in this world for the career of iniquity, even in the unforeseen consequences of the very circumstances which appeared, at first sight, most effectually to secure its triumph.

Sublime spectacle exhibited by Germany at this period.

The resurrection of Germany, at this period, to throw off the oppression of French domination is the most glorious and animating spectacle recorded in history. Not less heart-stirring in its spirit, not less entrancing in its progress, than the immortal annals of ancient patriotism, it was spread over a larger surface, and fraught with more momentous results. Wider civilization had extended the interests of the contest; a broader basis of freedom had swelled the ranks of patriotism; a purer religion had sanctified the spirit of the victor. No trains of captives attended his steps; no sacked cities were the monuments of his ferocity; no pyramids of heads marked where his sabre had been. Nations, not citizens, now rose up for their deliverance; continents, not empires, were at stake on the battle; the world, not the shores of the Mediterranean, was the spectator of the struggle. Freedom inspired the arm of the patriot in both; but the Cross, not the Eagle, was now to be seen upon its banners, and the spirit of Christianity at once animated the resistance of the soldier and stayed the vengeance of the conqueror. The efforts of France, in 1793, were inspired by equal fervour, distinguished by equal intrepidity, followed in the end by equal triumphs; but the intermixture of worldly motives sullied the purity of the strife; the want of religion let loose the passions of vice; the lust of conquest, the selfishness of cupidity, were mingled with the ardour of patriotism; and the triumphs of the Empire terminated in the ordinary atrocities of massacre, extortion, and devastation. Very different was the spectacle which the efforts of combined Europe now afforded. For the first time in the annals of mankind, the devotion of the citizen was now sustained by the constancy of the martyr; the valour of the soldier ennobled by the purity of the patriot; the ardour of the victor restrained by the sanctity of the cause for which he combated; and the result proved the difference between the influence of worldly ambition and the obligations of religious duty. No massacre of Mytilene disgraced the laurels of the modern Salamis; no flames of Carthage drew tears from the modern Scipio; the smiling village and the protected fields were to be seen alike in the rear as in the front of the British host, and Moscow burned was avenged by Paris saved.

* JOM., iv., 314.

CHAPTER LXX.

FROM THE ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ TO THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR.

ARGUMENT.

Importance of personal Anecdote in the Delineation of Character.—Rich Materials, in this respect, which exist regarding Napoleon.—General Character of his Mind.—Singular Combination of good and bad Qualities which he possessed.—Clew which is afforded to his Character by his bad Qualities.—Intermixture of great and good ones.—Sketch of the general Features of his Character.—Mixed good and bad Qualities which he possessed.—It arose partly from the Vices and Irreligion of the Revolution.—Inconceivable Peculiarities of his Character.—Despotic Nature of his System of Government: which naturally flowed from the Revolution.—His often contracted Policy, and repeated Injuries to his own Fortunes.—His personal Littleness. — Great Military Errors which he committed, especially in Germany in 1813.—The Glories of his last Campaign in France.—His marvellous Sway over the Minds of his Soldiers.—Examples of this Power.—Distribution of the Crosses of the Legion of Honour, and instant Promotion.—Frankness in which he indulged his Soldiers on these Occasions.—His violent Temper, but frequent Forgiveness.—Extraordinary Power of judging of Enemies in the Field.—His Habits at the bivouac Fires.—Evil Consequences which resulted from the Emperor's decided Opinion and Conduct, and his impetuous Temper and Habits.—Excessive Obstinacy of his Disposition.—Early Appearance of this Peculiarity in his Character.—His low Opinion both of Men and Women.—His extraordinary Powers of Mental Exertion.—Habits during a Campaign. —His Travelling-carriage, and Habits on the Road and on Horseback.—His Impetuosity in Travelling, and during a Campaign.—Custom in Passing through Columns of Troops.—Receipt of Despatches on the Road.—His Antechambers during a Campaign.—Habits and Labours in the Cabinet.—Habits in Writing and Dictating.—The Military Portfolio and its Keeper.—His occasional Acts of Humanity and Generosity.—His generous Conduct to some English Sailors.—His Habits at Paris and St. Cloud.—His Conduct at St. Helena.—Importance of the preceding Details.—Character of Murat.—His Military Abilities and civil Weakness.—His Appearance and Dress, as contrasted with that of Napoleon.—His extraordinary Gallantry and Conduct.—Character and History of Marshal Ney.—His overflowing Courage and simple Character.—His Military Qualities.—Inefficiency in separate Command. — Moral Weaknesses.—Character of Berthier.—Diplomatic Relations at this Period. — First Convention between Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia.—Treaty of Reichenbach between these Powers.— Convention of Peterwaldau and of London regarding the issue of Paper Money.— Treaty of Stockholm with Sweden.—Alliance of France with Denmark.—Importance of the Position which Austria now held.—Views of the Cabinet of Vienna at this Period.—Commencement of the Negotiation with the Belligerent Powers.—Interview between Napoleon and Metternich.—Remarkable Speech of the Former.—Metternich's Answer.—Napoleon's Reply.—Calm Conduct of Metternich.—Convention between Austria and France for a Mediation.—Intelligence is received by both Parties of the Battle of Vittoria.—Vast Influence it exercised on the Issue of the Negotiations.—Soult is sent with extraordinary Powers to Spain.—Napoleon's Preparations for War in Germany.—His Plan for the Campaign, and Measures for the Defence of Dresden.—Works around that Capital and on the Elbe.—Strength of his Line on that River.—Murmurs against these Plans in the French Army.—Napoleon's Reply to them.—His Forces at the Conclusion of the Armistice, and new Measures to force on the Conscripts to the Army.—Aspect of Dresden at this Period.—Disposition of Napoleon's Force in Germany.—Deplorable Condition of the Garrisons in his Rear.—Preparations of the Allies during the Armistice.—Plan of the Campaign fixed at Trachenberg.—Reflections on the admirable Wisdom with which it was conceived.—Determination of the Cabinet of Vienna to join the Allies.—Doubts regarding Bernadotte.—Composition of his Army.—Army of Silesia. —Character of Blucher.—Character of General Gneisenau. — The Austrian Army at Prague. — Character of Prince Schwartzenberg.—Total of the Allied Forces in Action on the Elbe.—Forces of both Sides on the Bavarian and Italian Frontiers.—Cordial Spirit and Unanimity with which the Allied Powers were animated.—Slow Progress of the Negotiations at Prague.—Difficulties which arose regarding the Forms of the Conference.—Real Views of the different Powers at this Period.—Napoleon's Journey to Mayence to meet Marie Louise.—Ultimatum of Austria to France.—Napoleon's Answer, which declines these Terms.—Manifesto of Austria.—Reply of France.—Reflections on this Debate, and on the subsequent Manifesto of Austria.—Early History of Prince Metternich.—His Character as a Statesman.—His private Honour and patriotic Spirit, and Principles of Government.—His own Account of his Policy at this Period.—Universal Joy in the Allied Army at the Junction of Austria.—Last Review of Napoleon at Dresden. — Interview of Napoleon with Fouché at that City.—Fouché's secret Interviews with Metternich at Prague.—Arrival of Moreau in Europe.—His Reception at Stralsund by Bernadotte.—His Journey to, and reception at, Prague.—Contention about the Appointment of a Commander-in-chief to the Allies.—Disinterested Conduct of the Allied Generals in regard to the Command.—Great Influence of Wellington's Success on the Allied Cause at this Period.

Importance of personal anecdote in the delineation of character.

HISTORICAL narrative, how important or interesting soever the events may be which it embraces, is not the composition which gives the best insight into the character of the principal actors in the scenes it records. General causes are there wound up, too much wound up, with individual agency; the stream of human transaction is too vast, its floods too overwhelming, to permit the salient points of private disposition to be adequately developed, even in those who have been chiefly instrumental in directing its current. It is private incident which portrays the real man; it is the habits of domestic life which are the true touchstone both of the greatness and the weakness of humanity. The common maxim, that no man is a hero to those with whom he is familiar, indicates the universal concurrence of all ages in this truth; and the characters in public life, accordingly, which are most deeply engraven on the memory of mankind, are not those by whom the most important changes in history have been wrought, but those of whom the most graphic and touching incidents have been recorded by writers of capacity sufficient to discern their value. The heroes of antiquity, after the lapse of two thousand years, still seem present to our imagination; but if we examine the elements of which the still living phantoms are composed, we shall find that, while their great and important exploits are recollected only in a sort of shadowy grandeur, it is the incidents of their private life, the generosity of their individual actions, which are really enshrined in our memory; and that it is not so much even the pictured pages of Livy, Xenophon, and Quintus Curtius, as the Lives of Plutarch, which have given them immortality. In modern times, it is the Richard III. and Henry VIII. of Shakspeare, not those of history, who recur to every mind when our kings of the olden time are thought of; it is the Johnson of Boswell, not the author of the Rambler, or the learned lexicographer, who is present to every mind; and so feeble is the impression produced by real generalities, in comparison of fictitious details, that even the valour of Richard Cœur de Lion, the beauty of Queen Mary, and the tyranny of Louis XI., are present to our recollec-

tion chiefly in the enchanting colours in which their characters have been drawn by the imaginative pencils of Schiller and Sir Walter Scott.

Rich materials, in this respect, which exist regarding Napoleon.

Perhaps there is no illustrious man, ancient or modern, of whom such ample details exist in these respects as of Napoleon; and though they have been disfigured, in too many instances, by the enthusiastic partiality or interested flattery of one set of writers, and the coarse invective and profound hatred of another, yet it is not impossible for an attentive observer to distinguish the true from the false, even in these exaggerated statements. An experienced draughtsman will have no difficulty in separating sketches from nature from imaginary conceptions, even of scenes which he has never himself visited; and those who have made themselves familiar with the peculiar and strongly-marked traits of that wonderful man's character, will seldom be at a loss to distinguish the real from the fictitious anecdotes which have been preserved concerning him. The reader, therefore, will probably not regret, nor deem the pains misplaced, if advantage is taken of the pause in military operations which resulted from the armistice of Pleswitz, to throw together some of the most graphic and characteristic anecdotes which exist, detailed by eyewitnesses, of a man whose name will ever occupy the most conspicuous place in the annals of modern times.

General character of Napoleon's mind.

What renders the traits of Napoleon's character improbable, and at times almost incredible to an ordinary observer, is the opposite and apparently irreconcilable features of disposition to which they point. Those who are familiar, on the other hand, with the leading principles and ruling objects of his mind, and have arrived at the secret clew which reconciles those seeming inconsistencies, will regard them as in a peculiar manner characteristic, and find additional evidence of the authenticity of anecdotes descriptive of such a character, in the very variety which appears at first sight so perplexing. He united, to a degree which was perhaps never before equalled, the ardent and impassioned temperament of Southern, with the cool judgment and intellectual force of Northern Europe; and it is hard to say whether he was most distinguished by the admirable knowledge which he possessed of the grand and elevated in human conduct, and by the heart-stirring use he could at all times make of appeals to the most generous feelings of our nature, or by the total disregard of every moral obligation or disinterested virtue, which he invariably displayed when his own interest appeared to be in any degree thwarted by a due observance of them. He was not by disposition a cruel, nor by nature a bad man; that is, the wicked principles of humanity were not in any extraordinary degree developed in his character: it was by the entire absence of any moral control that he was principally distinguished.

Yet this absence did not by any means render his life a mere tissue of bad actions, nor was it inconsistent on many occasions with noble deeds, humane feelings, and beneficent intentions. He was too clearsighted not to perceive that such conduct was, in the general case, the most judicious; he knew well that vindictive cruelty usually defeats its own object, and that the only solid foundation for the attachment of subjects to a sovereign is to be found in a sedulous protection of their interests. But the grand and peculiar characteristic of his mind was, that all this was done, not because he felt it to be right, but because he saw it to be expedient: his ruling principle was interest invariably followed, not duty sedulously performed; and, accordingly, whenever he perceived, or thought he perceived, a conflict between these rules of conduct, he never hesitated an instant to give the preference to the selfish considerations; or, rather, his mind was so entirely governed by their influence, that he never experienced, on such occasions, any mental conflict at all. He often said that Corneille was the only man who understood the art of government, and that, if he had lived in his age, he would have made him a privy councillor;* and the reason was, that, while he thoroughly understood, and has nobly expressed, the most elevated sentiments, he always assigned the superior place to reasons of state policy: in other words, considerations of real or supposed expedience.

Singular combination of good and bad qualities which he possessed.

This distinction, which never, perhaps, was so clearly defined in any human being before his time, furnishes the true key to the otherwise inexplicable character of Napoleon; and demonstrates that there is much truth, both in the obloquy which has been thrown upon him by his enemies, and the eulogies which have been pronounced on him by his admirers. If we contemplate him in one view, never was any character recorded in history more worthy of universal detestation. We behold a single individual, for the purposes of his own ambition, consigning whole generations of men to an untimely grave, desolating every country of Europe by the whirlwind of conquest, and earning the support and attachment of his own subjects by turning them loose to plunder and oppress all mankind. In the prosecution of these objects we see him deterred by no difficulties, daunted by no dangers, bound by no treaties, restrained by no pity: regardless alike of private honour and public faith; prodigal at once of the blood of his people and the property of his enemies; indifferent equally to the execrations of other nations, and the progressive exhaustion of his own. We perceive a system of government at home based upon force and resting upon selfishness, which supported religion only because it was useful, and spoke of justice only because it passed current with men; which at once extinguished freedom and developed talent; which dried up the generous feelings by letting them wither in obscurity, and ruled mankind by selfish—by affording them unbounded—gratification. We see a man of consummate abilities wielding unlimited powers for the purposes of individual advancement; straining national resources for the fostering of general corruption; destroying the hopes of future generations in the indulgence of the pres-

Clew which is afforded to his character by his bad qualities.

* Las Casas.

ent; constantly speaking of disinterested virtue, and never practising it; perpetually appealing to the generous affections, and ever guided by the selfish; everlastingly condemning want of truth in others, yet daily promulgating falsehoods among his subjects, with as little hesitation as he discharged grapeshot among his enemies.

And his good and great qualities.

If we regard him in another view, however, we shall be led to form a very different estimate of his character. Never were talents of the highest, genius of the most exalted kind, more profusely bestowed upon a human being, or worked out to greater purposes of good or of evil. Gifted at once with a clear intellect, a vivid imagination, and a profound judgment; burning with the fervent passions and poetic glow of Italy, and yet guided by the highest reasoning and reflecting powers; at once an enthusiastic student of the exact sciences, and a powerful mover of the generous affections; imbued with the soul of eloquence, the glow of poetry, and the fire of imagination, he yet knew how to make them all subservient to the directions of sagacious reason and the dictates of extensive observation. He was not merely illustrious on account of his vast military achievements, but from his varied and often salutary civil efforts. He was not a great man because he was a great general: he was a great general because he was a great man. The prodigious capacity and power of attention which he brought to bear on the direction of his campaigns, and which produced such astonishing results, were but a part of the general talents which he possessed, and which were not less conspicuous in every other department, whether of government or abstract thought. It was hard to say whether he was greatest in laying down strategetical plans for the general conduct of a campaign, or in seizing the proper direction of an attack on the field of battle, or in calculating the exact moment when his reserves could be most effectually employed. And those who are struck with astonishment at the immense information and just discrimination which he displayed at the council-board, and the varied and important public improvements which he set on foot in every part of his dominions, will form a most inadequate conception of his mind, unless they are at the same time familiar with the luminous and profound views which he threw out on the philosophy of politics in the solitude of St. Helena. Never was evinced a clearer proof of the truth which a practical acquaintance with men must probably have impressed upon every observer, that talent of the highest order is susceptible of any application; and that accident or supreme direction alone determines whether their possessor is to become a Homer, a Bacon, or a Napoleon.

His general character.

It would require the observation of a Thucydides, directing the pencil of a Tacitus, to portray, by a few touches, such a character; and modern idiom, even in their hands, would probably have proved inadequate to the task. Equal to Alexander in military achievement, superior to Justinian in legal information, sometimes second only to Bacon in political sagacity, he possessed, at the same time, the inexhaustible resources of Hannibal, and the administrative powers of Cæsar. Enduring of fatigue, patient of hardship, unwearied in application, no difficulties could deter, no dangers daunt, no obstacles impede him; a constitution of iron, a mind, the ardour of which rendered him almost insensible to physical suffering, enabled him to brave alike the sun of Egypt and the snows of Russia; indefatigable in previous preparation, he was calm and collected in the moment of danger; often on horseback for eighteen hours together, and dictating almost the whole night to his secretaries, he found a brief period for slumber during the roar of the battle, when the enemy's balls were falling around him.* Nor was peace a period of repose to his genius, nor the splendour of courts a season merely of relaxation. Though not insensible to their attractions, though often indulging for a moment in their vices, he was never the slave of their pleasures; female charms exerted only a transient sway over his passions, and never clouded his reason; and when surrounded by the pomp of a king of kings, he was unceasingly employed in conducting the thread of interminable negotiations, or stimulating the progress of beneficent undertakings. "Has tantas viri virtutes ingentia vitia æquabant: inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plus quàm Punica; nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deorum metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla religio." Brave without being chivalrous; sometimes humane, seldom generous; vehement in anger, yet often forgiving on reflection; implacable in political hatred, but not insensible to hostile esteem; inexorable in general measures, yet susceptible of individual pity; wound up in his own elevation, yet ever identifying it with the glory of France; regardless alike of crime or suffering in the path of ambition, yet not addicted to either if uncalled for by private interest or state policy—he could at once call his conscripts food for cannon, and boast that he could afford to spend ten thousand of them a day, and yet bind up the wounds of individual suffering, or sacrifice his carriages to wounded valour. In one respect only he was altogether implacable, and that was towards persons whose services to himself threatened to interfere with the supremacy of his achievements, or whose enmity had proved an impediment to his ambition. He never forgave Moreau the victory of Hohenlinden, which saved France; nor Kellerman the charge at Marengo, which fixed himself on the consular throne; nor Wellington the determined opposition which at last destroyed him. Generosity with him was often admirably assumed, but self-forgetfulness was never really felt; where the object of the acting had ceased, egotism never failed to reappear in undiminished ascendency, and dispelled in a moment the pleasing illusion. He was

Mixed good and bad qualities of his character.

* At the battle of Bautzen, Napoleon, who was extremely fatigued by the exertions of the two preceding days, and almost entire want of rest during the night, more than once fell asleep when seated on an eminence overlooking the field, which the enemy's cannon-balls frequently reached. He said nature had her rights, which could not be violated with impunity, and that he felt more cool to give fresh orders, or consider the reports he received, when awakening in this manner from a transient slumber.—ODEL., i., 90, 91, and LAS CASAS, ii., 409. FAIN, i., 411.

capable of the heroic but politic self-denial of Alexander, which, by pouring the untasted cup on the sands of Arabia, assuaged the thirst of a whole army; but the designless magnanimity which put the draught to the lips of the Macedonian hero, when the physician was reading the denouncing letter, was beyond his reach. He could imitate Themistocles in surrendering himself, as he himself said, to "the greatest, the most powerful, and the most persevering of his enemies;" but he would never, like him, have swallowed poison to avoid being called on to elevate himself at the expense of his country. The man who shunned death at Waterloo, after he had himself told his army that "the hour had arrived when it behooved every Frenchman who loved his country to conquer or die," had no hesitation in bequeathing a legacy in his testament to the assassin who had attempted the life of the Duke of Wellington. He condemned the execution of Louis because it was a political error, but he hesitated not to murder the Duke d'Enghien because it seemed a political advantage. He loudly denounced the alleged perfidy of the English attack on a neutral power at Copenhagen, but he scrupled not to seize the whole fortresses and royal family of Spain, in defiance of a strict alliance, when it gave him a throne; and his character cannot be so well summed up as in the words which profound reflection has enabled genius to ascribe to Satan: "He was the perfection of intellect without moral principle."*

It arose partly from the vices and irreligion of the Revolution.

Great part, however, of the selfishness which formed so important a feature, and damning a blot, in the character of Napoleon, is to be ascribed not so much to himself as to the age in which he lived, and the people whom he was called upon to rule. Born and bred in the most corrupt society of Europe, during the irreligious fanaticism, general license, and universal egotism of the Revolution, he saw no other way of governing his subjects but by constantly appealing to their selfishness; and was led to believe, from what he saw around him, that it was the prime mover and universal spring of mankind. That it is so in the long run at all times, and among all people, to a great degree, no one experienced in the ways of men will probably doubt; but religious truth reveals the simultaneous agency of higher principles, and historical observation loudly proclaims that many of the most important changes in human annals have been brought about in direct opposition to its dictates. It was ignorance or oblivion of those counteracting agencies which was the grand error of Napoleon's life, and beyond all doubt brought about his fall. The Revolution misled him by establishing the fatal principle, that no other test is to be applied to human actions but success; the prevailing irreligion of the age misled him by spreading the belief that worldly prosperity is at once the chief good in life, and the only rational object of human pursuit. To rouse exertion by the language of virtue, and direct it to the purposes of vice, was the grand principle of the Revolution, and the immediate cause of its triumphs; the emperor felt that he had at no time a chance of success but by yielding to its impulse; and at all times he could almost command events by wielding it for his advantage. Instead, therefore, of considering Napoleon as an individual man, and striving to reconcile the opposite qualities of his character, or harshly condemning its darker features, it is more consonant both to historic truth and impartial justice to regard him as the personification of the principles which at that period were predominant in his country—as the INCARNATION OF THE REVOLUTION; and perhaps no Avatar, sent on such a mission, could be imbued with fewer vices. In this view we may look upon the contest in which he was engaged as the same in sublunary affairs with that awful struggle darkly shadowed forth in Revelation, to which the pencil of Milton has given the form and pressure of terrestrial reality; and may view his fall as demonstrating the same Supreme direction of events which, permitting for a season, for inscrutable purposes, the agency of sin, doomed to final ruin the Prince of the Morning.

Inconceivable peculiarities of his character.

Yet, even after making every allowance for the demoralizing influence of these circumstances, there are some peculiarities in the character of Napoleon which are almost inexplicable, and which demonstrate the justice of Johnson's observation, that no man ever rose from an inferior station to the government of mankind in whom great and commanding qualities were not blended with certain meannesses that would be inconceivable in ordinary men. Great as was his penetration, profound the sagacity of his political reflection, he yet deliberately based his throne upon the systematic oppression of all other nations by one, and seriously believed that he needed not disquiet himself about the results, so long as, under the stimulus of glory and victory, he let loose his own subjects to plunder and insult every people over whom they ruled. He could survey past events with an eye seldom equalled in the justice of its observation, yet he throughout life acted upon the principle that falsehood was not only no crime, but no error; that mankind could be permanently misled by the reiterated assertions of bought mendacity, and truth finally extirpated by the ruled bayonets of despotic power. That salient energy, that living principle, which had hitherto always enabled Europe at length to dispel the illusions which had benighted, or throw off the oppression which had crushed it, never appears to have entered into his calculations: that Retributive Justice, which so often, in this world, dooms enormous sin to work out its own punishment, never crossed his imagination. Though he committed, in the course of his career, many great crimes, and still more evident faults, he appeared to the very last to have been altogether insensible both to the one and the other; and repeatedly said, at St. Hel-

* An expression of my highly-esteemed friend, the Rev. Robert Montgomery, rector of St. Jude's, Glasgow, whose genius as a poet conveys an inadequate idea of his eloquence as a preacher and fervour as a minister of religion, in a depraved manufacturing community, where Christian zeal has so wide a field for exertion, and who has unconsciously, but graphically portrayed, in the character of the Prince of Darkness, in his noble poem of "Satan, or Intellect without God," much of what historic truth must ascribe to the ruling principles and leading characters of the Revolution.

ena, that, with the exception of the invasion of Spain, he never fell into a political mistake, and on no one occasion was ever guilty of a political delinquency. His conduct and language regarding himself would lead us to suspect, at times, that he had been born without a conscience, or that its voice had been entirely extinguished by the effects of early education, did not his measures on various occasions prove that he was not insensible to humane and elevated sentiments, and his language on all afford decisive evidence that no man was better qualified to detect the slightest deviation from rectitude in the conduct of his opponents.

The despotic nature of his system of government.

Though his capacity in forming political designs, and even more so in carrying them into effect, was seldom surpassed, yet in his general views of policy he was far from being guided by enlarged principles, and still farther from acting consistently in the measures requisite for their execution. Self, there as elsewhere, formed the ruling principle and great blot in his character. Universal empire was the avowed object to which his life was devoted; but, supposing such a design practicable, he adopted the means of all others the least fitted to carry it into effect. The magnanimous, yet wise policy of consulting the interests and bending to the prejudices of the conquered states, by which the Romans obtained the empire of the world in ancient, and the English the supremacy in Hindostan in modern, times, never entered into his imagination. To concentrate the world in Europe, Europe in France, France in Paris, and Paris in himself, was the perpetual object of his ambition. Nor was it only over the bodies and properties of men that he proposed to establish this extraordinary dominion: chains still more durable, because less immediately galling, were prepared by him for their minds and thoughts. He laboured assiduously to transfer the seat of the papal power to Paris, in order to gain possession of the vast influence which it still possessed over the faithful in every part of Europe; while, by a deep-laid and comprehensive system of secular education, he strove to mould according to his will that far more powerful portion of the people in his own country who looked only to temporal advancement, and were swayed by nothing but temporal ambition. Thus, while he professed, and perhaps believed himself to be the man of the age, and the child of the Revolution, he ran directly contrary to the tenets of its supporters; or, rather, he worked with perfect sagacity, to its natural result and termination, a system which, based exclusively on the selfish passions, was liable to be destroyed by their gratification, and which, subverting the influence of moral principle, left no other regulator for mankind but the government of force.

His despotism naturally flowed from the Revolution.

The oppressive government and centralized despotism of Napoleon, therefore, were so far from being a deviation from his character, or a divergence from the principles of the Revolution, that they were the obvious completion of both, and the natural termination of intellect set free from the restraints of principle. The previous convulsion had prepared the field for his dominion, and left him no other means of maintaining it but that which he adopted: the destruction of property had terminated the sway of aristocracy; the ruin of religion subverted the authority of conscience; the vices of Democracy rendered intolerable the government of numbers. The character which he figured for himself, and the mission on which he often declared he was sent—that of closing the gulf of the Revolution—were, in fact, nothing but the direction of its principles to their inevitable end—the subjection of mankind to private selfishness and public slavery. And although, in the later years of his life, after the European alliance, founded upon religion and directed by aristocracy, had accomplished his overthrow, he again reverted to the language of Democracy, and sought refuge in the arms of liberalism from the indignation of experience; yet this was a forced and unnatural union, suggested by interest, brought about by misfortune, and which could not, in any event, have subsisted longer than the mutual necessities which gave it birth.

His often contracted policy.

But although we may discover in the vices by which Napoleon was surrounded, and on the impulse of which he was elevated to greatness, as well as in the necessities of his situation when placed there, an apology for the principles of his government, none can be found for the narrow views on which his policy was often based, and the littleness by which his private life was sometimes disfigured. In the prosecution of his favourite design of universal dominion, he neither displayed the enlargement of a great, nor the views of a benevolent, mind. When he had the power to remodel the European commonwealth almost at pleasure, and distribute its different governments according to the physical necessities or durable interests of their inhabitants, he appears to have been, in general, directed by no other principles but temporary convenience, national vanity, or family aggrandizement. Conceding to him the merit of unconquerable perseverance in the war against England, whose overthrow was indispensable to the completion of his designs, and admitting that he evinced extraordinary ability in the military and naval enterprises which he set on foot for her subjugation, there is nothing in his foreign policy on Continental Europe which evinced enlarged capacity, or bespoke aptitude for universal dominion. The fatal preponderance of self marred everything which he attempted out of the pale of France itself. He conceived and executed the noble design of levelling the inhospitable ridges of the Alps; yet, instead of forming, as he might have done, the whole Italian Peninsula into the vast monarchy which nature has so clearly intended, and antiquity had so well prefigured, he cut it, in the most arbitrary manner, into shreds and patches, to form appanages for his family, or gratify the Parisians by the subjection of Rome to their government, and thereby lost the great moral support which he might have derived from the revived national spirit of the Italian people. He boasted, with justice, that he had realized the dream of Louis XIV., and that under his sway there were no longer any Pyrenees; yet he subsequently marred, by selfish aggrandizement, that great enterprise; converted an obsequious ally into a mortal ene-

my; substituted popular hatred for courtly subservience; and re-erected the Pyrenees, bristling with hostile bayonets, and reeking with the blood of slaughtered nations.

And repeated injuries to his own fortunes.

He repeatedly had the destiny of the German Empire in his hands, and, by the lustre of his victories, had not only obliterated the feeling of Gothic nationality, but converted the Confederation of the Rhine into the firmest outwork of his empire; yet he voluntarily threw away that splendid acquisition; cut up the fatherland into kingdoms for his brothers, or strange offshoots of the great Empire; irritated Prussia beyond forgiveness, at once by insult and injury; alienated the affections, without weakening the strength, of Austria; and purchased the applause of France by the merciless severity of requisitions which drained away the resources and exasperated the hearts of Germany. He more than once touched on the still vibrating chord of Polish nationality, and, by a word, might have added two hundred thousand Sarmatian lances to his standards; but he did not venture on the bold step of re-establishing the throne of Sobieski; and, by the half-measure of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, permanently excited the jealousy of Russia without winning the support of Poland. No one felt more strongly, or has more clearly expressed, the necessity of providing, by a firm European alliance, against the encroachments of the Muscovite army, or made greater efforts to resist them; but he himself gave them their strongest development: for, by unheard-of treachery on his own part, he converted the hereditary religious hatred of the Ottomans into their ally; while, by intolerable arrogance, he not only stilled the long-established jealousy of Sweden, but threw his own lieutenant, its ruler, into their arms. He was desirous of planting his family on all the adjoining thrones, and boasted that his dynasty would soon be the oldest in Europe; and yet he rendered his government unbearable even to his own brothers; made the eldest resign his crown of thorns in Spain; drove the second to seek refuge in Great Britain to avoid his persecution; compelled a third, by his arrogance, to abdicate the throne of Holland; and precipitated a fourth into sensuality at Cashel to forget his indignities. No one was more sensible of the sway of religion over the human mind, or more desirous of securing its co-operation as an instrument of government; yet he voluntarily threw away, in later years, the immense advantages which his earlier and wiser policy had given him in that respect; converted the pope from a warm ally into a mortal enemy, for the gratification of calling Rome the second city of his empire; and exhibited the scandal to all Christendom of the head of the Roman Church, bereft of his dominions, and detained in captivity, praying for the triumph of heretical arms for his deliverance. The grand object of his life was the destruction of the influence and overthrow of the maritime power of England, and yet no one ever contributed so much to its extension; for, by the rigours of the Continental system, he made all the people of Europe sigh for the return of unrestrained enjoyment from her commerce; while, by the vexations of his domination, he arrayed all its forces in dense and burning battalions under her sway. The children of this world may be wiser in their generation than the children of light, but it is during that generation only.

His personal littleness.

These flagrant errors may be traced, in a great degree, to the insensibility to moral reaction, and Supreme superintendence, which formed such a striking feature in the character of Napoleon; but there are other peculiarities which will not admit of the same explanation, and which demonstrate that he had the full share of the littleness as well as the greatness of mortality. With unconquerable perseverance and merciless rigour, he enforced the Continental system, during the greater part of his reign, in all the countries subject to his authority; yet he himself was the first to set the example of evading his own decrees, for the sake of temporary profit to himself; and while he was shooting in the maritime departments wretched shopkeepers who smuggled a pound of sugar, and heading a crusade of Western Europe against Russia to enforce its observance, he himself was daily amassing treasure in the vaults of the Tuileries, by selling licenses to deal in contraband goods, to an extent which defeated the whole object of his policy in that vital particular. He was well aware of the support which the fidelity of his marshals and chief dignitaries gave to his empire, and his extraordinary knowledge of the human heart gave him unbounded sway over the affections of his soldiers; yet he alienated the attachment of all in authority, but a few devoted personal followers, by the occasional rudeness of his manner, and the repeated fits of ill-humour with which he received any ill success, or the slightest deviation from his commands. Great as he was, he evinced an unpardonable littleness in the envy which he felt at celebrity in others, and the tenacity with which he clung to the externals of power in himself. He outshone the military glories of Sylla, but he could not, like him, have laid down his power, and returned to the walks of private life; his exploits were greater than those of Cæsar, but he could never have refused the proffered crown even when he enjoyed its power. When seated on the throne of Charlemagne, he was afraid of the talents of Madame de Staël, and envious of the beauty of Madame Recamier; and the emperor who had borne, with noble equanimity, a fall from the greatest throne in Europe, often found his serenity overturned at St. Helena by the English sentinels addressing him, in obedience to their orders, by the title of general.

Great military errors which he committed.

If the military capacity of the emperor on most occasions was without an equal in modern times, his recklessness and obstinacy at others were not less remarkable; and, accordingly, if history can hardly find a parallel to the achievements which he effected, it can produce none to the disasters in which they terminated. He repeatedly committed faults as a general, for the least considerable of which he would have made his lieutenants lose their heads. The imprudence of delivering a pitched battle with inferior forces at Aspern, with the Danube traversed only by two bridges, shaking under the swollen torrent, in his rear, was equalled only

by that of risking his crown at Leipsic, in a situation where, while combating a greatly superior force in front, he had no line of retreat but a single chaussée, traversing an otherwise impassable morass a mile and a half broad; and the gross violation of all military principle in both is strongly illustrated by his own observation, that the first duty of a commander is never to fight with a strait or defile in his rear.* His imprudence in lingering so long at Moscow, surrounded by a hostile population and superior cavalry, was soon, if possible, outdone by that of relinquishing, without any adequate cause, the Kalouga road, and, when the Russians were actually abandoning it, throwing back his army on the wasted line of the Smolensko advance. The unheard-of calamities of that campaign itself are mainly to be ascribed to his extreme imprudence in advancing, contrary to the advice of his most experienced generals, to Moscow from Witepsk, without either force adequate to subdue Russia, or any sufficient preparation for retreat in the event of disaster; and the simultaneous loss of Spain was chiefly owing to the uncalled-for temerity of rushing into the Russian contest while the Peninsula, a devouring ulcer, was still unsubdued in his rear.

Especially in Germany in 1813.

When hard pressed by the troops of coalesced Europe in Germany, and unable to array an adequate force to combat them, he sacrificed the best troops in his empire, a hundred thousand strong, in the fortresses on the Elbe and the Vistula; and when reduced to fifty thousand combatants on the plains of Champagne, he lost, by his obstinate adhesion to the fortresses on the Rhine, a force which would have enabled him to drive the invader beyond that barrier stream. In these, and many similar instances, especially in the later stages of his career, it was evident that Napoleon was either infatuated by his long-continued and extraordinary success; or, what is more probable, that his vision as a general was obliterated by his necessities as an emperor, and that his favourite maxim, that the first movement in retreat was the commencement of ruin, rendered him insensible to all the present dangers of his situation.† And, perhaps, it is well for the liberty of Europe that these numerous and glaring errors were committed by the French emperor in his warlike career; for such was the profound ability which on other occasions he exhibited in his designs, and the matchless skill with which on all he carried them into execution, that if it had been otherwise—if his prudence had been equal to his genius, or his foresight to his combination—and if revolutionary passion in France had not compelled him frequently to sacrifice ultimate safety to present dazzling of the multitude—it is doubtful whether he would not have attained universal dominion, and the independence of nations been permanently crushed, as in ancient times, under the yoke of military power.

The glories of his last campaign in France.

It is pleasing, where so many and such serious faults have been committed, to have some redeeming actions to record; and they, in Napoleon's case, are of such a kind, and occurred at such a time, as almost to demonstrate that it was the pressure of political considerations, the experienced necessity of keeping in constant excitement the passions of the Revolution, which drove him so often into blameable actions. His last campaign in France exhibits, if the military operations of the general and enduring fortitude of the emperor are at once taken into consideration, a model of heroic courage and military ability. Disdaining to submit, even to the forces of combined Europe, but feebly seconded by a large portion of his subjects; heading an array depressed by unparalleled disasters, and an empire exhausted by unexampled efforts, he found in his own genius a counterpoise to these accumulated difficulties; and by the depth of his combinations, the vigour of his execution, the skilful use of an interior line of communication, and the incomparable rapidity which he infused into his followers, long held the fate of Europe balanced, even against forces four times superior, and a moral energy, roused by long previous oppression and recent victory, which it seemed impossible to resist. It is on that memorable campaign, and the immortal one which early laid the foundation of his fortunes on the Italian plains, that his great fame as a general will ultimately rest; for in both he was destitute of the advantages of numbers which in the intermediate periods he in general possessed, and found in his individual resources a power which in the first instance conquered, and in the last all but conquered, the most rigorous fortune. And if sound political judgment must condemn the pride which made him so obstinately refuse the conditions offered to him at Chatillon, and throw all, even in that extremity, upon the hazard of war, yet it must be admitted that there was something magnanimous in his resolution to run every hazard rather than sit down on a degraded throne; and to those who weigh well the peculiarities of his situation, wielding a revolutionary sceptre, and supported by revolutionary passion, it will probably appear that he had, in reality, no other alternative, and that submission would have led him, by a process slower, indeed, but equally certain, to destruction.

His marvellous sway over the minds of his soldiers.

Perhaps no general, in ancient or modern times, ever possessed so unbounded a sway over the minds of his soldiers, or had created among the inferior ranks of the army such a devotion, it might almost be said idolatry, towards his person. This was very far, indeed, from being the case among the marshals and superior officers, a great proportion of whom were in secret alienated from him by the occasional rudeness of his manner, his frequent sallies of temper, the interminable wars in which he plunged them, and the rigour with which he exacted success as the sole condition of obtaining favour, or even justice, at headquarters. As little was it occasioned, as was so often the case with the captains of antiquity, by the generous self-denial with which the emperor shared

* "The first requisite of a field of battle *is to have no defiles in its rear.* The injudicious choice of the field of battle at Waterloo by Wellington rendered all retreat impossible."—IX. *Book of* NAPOLEON'S *Memoirs*, 207.

† This, accordingly, was the opinion of his ablest marshals: "Napoleon," says Marshal St. Cyr, "did wrong, knowing better than any one in the world that he was doing so, but overruled by a fatality which he felt it impossible to resist."—ST. CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iii., 4.

the bed and partook the fare of the common soldiers: occasionally, indeed, he visited the bivouacs, and during the Moscow retreat he relinquished his carriages to the wounded and marched on foot in the middle of his staff; but these were the exceptions, not the rule; and, in general, the personal comforts of the emperor during a campaign were studied with the most scrupulous attention, and attained to a degree that almost appears inconceivable. His carriage, in which he always travelled, except when in presence of the enemy, was roomy and luxurious; a portable library of choice authors was at hand to amuse his leisure moments; his table, served up with the utmost nicety, exhibited always the best cookery. Porcelain and gold plate of the finest description were constantly made use of, and the same etiquette and distinctions were observed in his campaign tent, or temporary lodging, as at the palace of St. Cloud.* It was the pains which he took to seek out and distinguish merit and talent among the private men or inferior ranks of the army, joined to the incomparable talent which he possessed of exciting the enthusiasm of the French soldiers by warlike theatrical exhibitions, or brief heart-stirring appeals in his proclamations, which constituted the real secret of his success; and if the use of proper words, in proper places, be the soul of eloquence, never did human being possess the art in higher perfection than Napoleon.

Examples of this power.

Various instances of the skilful use of this method of electrifying his troops have already been given in this history; but it was always done so admirably, and, generally, with such effect, as to call for particular attention. The distribution of the eagles to the regiments, of the crosses of the Legion of Honour to the most deserving, and the instant promotion of extraordinary merit on the field of battle, were the usual occasions on which these heart-stirring exhibitions took place. They were, in general, arranged after the following manner: On the day fixed for the distribution of the eagles, the emperor, followed by a splendid staff, entered the square of the regiment, which was drawn up on three sides facing inward, the fourth being occupied by his suite. At the word given, all the officers fell out and approached the emperor. He was alone on horseback, in his ordinary dark-green surtout, on the dun-coloured stallion which was his favourite charger during his campaigns. The simplicity of his attire offered a striking contrast to the dazzling brilliancy of the uniforms of his attendants. Berthier then approached the emperor on foot; the drums beat, and he took the eagle, with which he advanced to his side. Napoleon then raised his left hand towards the eagle, holding the reins, according to his usual custom, with his right. He then said, in a deep and impressive voice, "Soldiers of the —th regiment, I intrust to you the French eagle: it will serve as your rallying-point; you swear never to abandon it until death! You swear never to permit an affront upon the honour of France! You swear to prefer death to dishonour! You swear!" the last words were pronounced in a solemn tone, with inconceivable energy. The officers raised their swords, and the men repeated, "We swear!" with unbounded enthusiasm. The eagle was then delivered to the colonel of the regiment. With such impressive solemnities were the eagles presented to three regiments at once on the plains of Leipsic on the 15th of October, the very day before the fortunes of France were overthrown on that memorable field.*

* Odel., i., 159, 160, 194, 196.

Distribution of crosses of the Legion of Honour, and instant promotion.

The distribution of the decorations of the Legion of Honour, and the promotion of distinguished soldiers, furnished other occasions, of which the emperor eagerly availed himself to renew these enthusiastic impressions, and spread abroad the belief, which, in truth, was well founded, that the career of distinction was open alike to all, of whatever grade, and that a private soldier might reach the marshal's baton through the portals of the bivouac. It may readily be conceived that these theatrical exhibitions were got up by no small amount of careful preparation; that the apparent recognition by the emperor of a veteran of Arcola or the Pyramids was in general the result of previous inquiry; and that a minute report by the officers of the regiment was the basis on which the seeming extempore rewards or promotions of the great chief were, in reality, founded. Still they were admirably calculated to rouse the emulation and excite the ambition of the soldiers of a great military Republic, of which the emperor was the chief; and they were, above all, founded on a perfect knowledge of the temperament, at once vehement and excitable, of the French soldier. When a regiment had performed, or was about to perform, any shining action, the men were drawn up, and the aspirants from each of its battalions were led up to the emperor in front of the line; and the lieutenant-colonel presented the names and services of each on little tablets to him, and the selection was made. On these occasions, a freedom of speech was indulged to the soldiers, which savoured strongly of a military Republic, and offered a wide contrast to the studied servilities in the ordinary case of imperial etiquette.

Frankness in which he indulged his soldiers on these occasions.

Frequently officers, and even private soldiers, whose claims had been unsuccessful, remonstrated in firm, though respectful terms, with the emperor, and, if they had reason on their side, their efforts were not unfrequently successful. "Sire, I have deserved the cross!" was the usual commencement of the remonstrance. "How so?" replied the emperor, smiling: the battles in which the aspirant had been present, and the services he had performed, were then recounted; and if the officers present confirmed the statement, the request was at once granted. Napoleon was far from being displeased at the military frankness with which these requests were sometimes urged, and which would not have been for an instant tolerated in a civil functionary: the vehemence with which he himself addressed his officers seemed to provoke and justify a similar style in the reply: "F—," said he once to Sebastiani, contrasting the limited exploits of his horse with those of Latour Maubourg's cuirassiers, "act like them: you command a troop of blackguards,

* Odel., i., 173, 174.

not soldiers." "I do not command blackguards, sire," said Sebastiani, in a firm, but respectful tone, at the same time representing rapidly the reason which prevented his troops from achieving more. Macdonald supported him, and together they succeeded in reducing the emperor to silence; but his indignation broke out in violent invectives against all Sebastiani's officers, as their regiment defiled before him, while he loaded those of Latour Maubourg with eulogiums.*

His violent temper, but frequent forgiveness.

Such was the violence of the emperor's temper, especially in the later periods of his career, that he not unfrequently struck the generals or high functionaries who were near him.† This infirmity was well known to those who were habitually about his person—in particular, Berthier, Caulaincourt, and Duroc; and, to avoid the scandal of such scenes, they usually endeavoured to remove the by-standers, and not unfrequently took an opportunity of throwing the victim of the emperor's wrath in his way some time after, when his humour had subsided, when he was often forgiven. It was a common saying, accordingly, among those who knew him best, that, though fearfully violent, he was not rancorous in his disposition;‡ and numerous instances occur in his life of his total oblivion of passing subjects of anger. But if his durable interests, or those of his empire, had been affected, either by services which eclipsed his own, or by disasters which could not be retrieved, he was altogether inexorable, and retained an Italian's jealousy or hatred to the hour of his death.§

Extraordinary power of judging of enemies in the field.

By long experience, joined to great natural quickness and precision of eye, he had acquired the power of judging, with extraordinary accuracy, both of the amount of the enemy's force opposed to him in the field, and of the probable result of movements, even the most complicated, going forward in the opposite armies. The roar of artillery, the smoke and rattle of musketry, even the falling of balls around him, were alike unable to divert his steady gaze or disturb his accurate judgment. Never was he known to be mistaken in the estimate which he formed on the distance or approach of the fire of the enemy. Even on the farthest extremity of the horizon, if his telescope could reach the hostile columns, he observed every movement, anticipated every necessity, and from the slightest indications drew correct conclusions as to the designs which were in contemplation. No sooner had he ascended a height, from whence a whole field of battle could be surveyed, than he looked around him for a few minutes with his telescope, and immediately formed a clear conception of the position, forces, and intentions of the whole hostile array. In this way he could, with surprising accuracy, calculate in a few minutes, according to what he could see of their formation, and the extent of ground which they occupied, the numerical force of armies of sixty or eighty thousand men; and if their troops were at all scattered, he knew at once how long it would require for them to concentrate, and how many hours must elapse before they could make their attack. On one occasion, in the autumn of 1813, some of Napoleon's generals expressed an opinion that he might expect an attack on the side of Bohemia. "From what I can see," said he, calmly closing his telescope, "the enemy have there two corps of sixty thousand men: they will require more than one day to concentrate and be ready to attack; we may pursue our march."*

His habits at the bivouac fires.

When circumstances obliged the emperor to remain for some hours, either in the morning or evening, in the open air, the first care of the chasseurs in attendance was to make ready a good fire. This fire was always alimented by an extraordinary quantity of wood, and for this purpose large logs or pieces of furniture were heaped upon it. Berthier alone remained near his person, all the others keeping at a respectful distance, as they would have done from the emperor's table. While waiting there, the emperor walked about alone, with his hands behind his back, till he heard the guns or other signals of which he was in expectation. When he began to get tired, he took large doses of snuff, or amused himself by pushing the flints or pebbles under his feet about, or thrusting wood into the fire. He could not remain a moment quiet without doing something; and if news of an exciting or disquieting kind was received, he not unfrequently poured the whole snuff out of the snuff-box into the hollow of his hand, and shovelled it all at once up his nostrils.†

Evil consequences which resulted from the emperor's decided opinion and conduct.

This power of judging by his eye of the distance, numbers, and designs of the enemy, was of peculiar value to Napoleon in the campaign of 1813, in consequence of the great deficiency of light troops on his own part, as well as the extraordinary skill and dexterity of the numerous bands of them in the service of the enemy. The peasantry, too, even in Saxony, were all hostile, and communicated intelligence as readily to the allies as they withheld it from him; so that he could obtain little information, either from his own troops, or the inhabitants of the country in which the operations were conducted. His turn of mind was essentially mathematical, and he applied the ordinary rules of geometry and trigonometry, with surprising quickness and accuracy, to the march and distance of troops, by a sort of intuitive mental operation, without the aid of either diagrams or calculations. Nevertheless, this turn of mind, though of immense service in the field, and in presence of the enemy, was not without its inconvenience; and it contributed to bring about some of the great-

* Odel., i., 169, 171.

† "Napoleon was subject to terrible fits of passion and ill-humour. When he was at a loss for a good reason to oppose to those who contradicted him, he gave vent to his indignation by a short, dry answer; and if any farther resistance was made, he proceeded to rude extremities. To avoid the scandal of such scenes, which my character was little fitted to bear, I cut the matter short by taking a grave and respectful leave. During the campaign at Moscow, I had a quarrel with him which lasted three days, and I had actually resigned my situation, and petitioned for a command in Spain. He sent for me, however, at the end, and said, 'I won't send you to be killed in Spain; you know we are two lovers, who can't live without each other.'"—CAULAINCOURT, i., 318, 319.

‡ "Croyez moi il n'est pas mechant disaient ses officiers superieurs à son égard quoique ce penchant a une colère excessive était connu."—ODEL., i., 171.

§ Odel., i., 141, 171, 172. De Pradt, Varsovie, 44. Caul., i., 317, 318.

* Odel., i., 165, 166. † Odel., i., 164, 165.

est disasters in which the detached corps of his army, at the later periods of the war, were involved. The emperor, being accustomed to consider everything with geometrical precision, and to estimate human strength and capacity at its highest average, calculated upon the march of his different corps as he would have done on the result of an arithmetical calculation, and was as much surprised when the one failed him as he would have been if the other had done so. Knowing, by experience, that men could march, when in good spirits, ten leagues a day, and often combat after it, he too often reckoned on their being always able to do so, and took not the smallest account of the exhaustion arising from bodily fatigue, want of shoes, mental depression, or scanty rations.*†

The bad effects of his impetuous temper and habits.

Indefatigable himself in the pains which he took to provide subsistence for his troops, and accurately calculating the period when the supplies ordered should arrive at their several points of destination, he invariably acted on the supposition that they had done so; and was deaf to all representations that the troops were starving, because he had given directions sufficient, if executed, to have prevented such a calamity. He never took into consideration the many cases in which the commissariat were physically unable to execute his orders, especially for the feeding of the enormous multitudes which were latterly assembled under his banners, or the still more numerous ones in which their faithful performance was eluded by the negligence or cupidity of inferior functionaries. Thus he was constantly exacting from his officers and soldiers services which they were altogether unable to perform; and gave vent to the most violent sallies of ill-humour against his generals, which alienated them not a little from his person, when, in consequence, battles were lost, or corps failed to reach the prescribed point at the appointed time. Yet such was the terror produced by the vehemence of his temper, and such the experienced benefit of falling in with his opinions to the personal interests of those around him, especially in his later years, that few had the moral courage necessary to withstand the ebullition consequent on the disclosure of unexpected and unpleasant truths, and fewer still the virtue to resist the prospects of fortune and promotion consequent on chiming in with his opinions. His conceptions were so vivid, his temper so ardent, his mind so vehement, that he became, after his accession to the Empire, almost incapable of bearing contradiction or hearing painful truths; and to such a length did this arrive, that his generals ceased to report their losses at headquarters, for fear of being deprived of their commands; or the details, if transmitted, produced no impression, and he prescribed attacks to them,* on the supposition that their effective men were double of those actually present with the eagles.†

Excessive obstinacy of his disposition.

This vehement and untractable character of Napoleon's mind, which exercised so great an influence at every period over his fortunes, long sustaining them in critical circumstances by the force of indomitable resolution, and involving him in the end, from the effects of obstinacy, in unheard-of calamities, was in some measure, doubtless, owing to the impatience of control, which is, in every instance, and in the most reasonable men, the consequence of the enjoyment of long-continued power; but it arose, also, in a great degree from original temper, and characterized more or less every period of his career. His genius was vast, but it was after the manner of the Orientals rather than the Europeans: he followed neither the dictates of truth nor the lessons of experience, but the vivid pictures and vehement suggestions of his own fervent imagination. Such was the intensity of these impressions, that they made him entirely forget reality: he reasoned and acted upon them, after the manner of insane persons, as if they had been actual existences. Ideas with him instantly led to desire: his incipient thought was already a passion, and his chief endeavours afterward were directed to conquering the difficulties or overcoming the obstacles which opposed its execution. Thence the complaint, so commonly made against him, especially in his later years, that he had an instinctive aversion to truth, and that no one could secure his favour but by anticipating and confirming his preconceived opinions. It was not that he had a repugnance towards truth in the abstract, but that he resisted everything which deranged or unsettled the existing current of his ideas. From the same cause, he never was known to change his opinion on any subject; nor did he ever admit, except in one

* Odel., i., 129, 130.

† "The precision with which he was accustomed to see the marches he ordered executed by his generals, led him to believe that it was easy to provide for the wants of an army. His dictatorial tone appeared to him as sufficient to procure bread and meat, as it was to assemble his corps at a given point. He was too much occupied with his mathematical or geographical calculations to pay much attention to the tedious operation of providing for his troops. He detested that part of the service, as continually thwarting his projects. Daru, from the fear of irritating him, did not, on such matters, frequently venture to represent the greatness of the danger. Napoleon thought he had sufficiently provided for that department by ordering that a great quantity of provisions should be sent from France. Every one knew how these supplies were intercepted, by the negligence or cupidity of inferior agents, but no one had the courage to tell him so; or possibly they allowed the evil to go on, that necessity might at length divert him from his system of continual warfare. For long the private soldier had become a merchandise of no value."—ODELEBEN, i., 13.

* De Pradt, Ambassade à Varsovie, 8, 9, and 94. Dumas, Souv., iii., 502, 503.

† "I had received orders," says General Mathieu Dumas, "to assemble the municipality of Dresden, and to exact from them large supplies of provisions; but the passage, and, above all, the disorders following the retreat of the allied army, had so completely exhausted that unfortunate city, that my requisitions, my efforts, and my menaces were alike incapable of making them good but with the utmost difficulty. Despite its natural fertility, that country was exhausted; and yet it was necessary to put the army immediately in a condition to pursue the enemy, and march for several days. The emperor showed, with great injustice, much ill-humour because I could not conquer impossibilities: he never admitted any obstacle of time, or the nature of things, as a bar to his will; he was resolute to attack the enemy and push on, and insisted for the supplies. 'I wish to make Dresden,' said he, 'with its double *tête-du-pont*, the centre and pivot of my army; but I must have resources for my troops during their marches and operations beyond the Elbe. Do you understand me?' I answered respectfully, but firmly, that I did not see how it was possible for Dresden to become such a dopôt. I went too far, doubtless, for the emperor addressed to me some severe expressions, and sent for Duroc. 'You commit the same fault perpetually,' said Berthier to me when the scene was over: 'you insist upon answering the emperor.'" Dumas was never forgiven: he was dismissed from his employment at headquarters, and left in a subordinate situation at Dresden.—See *Souvenirs de* DUMAS, iii., 503.

or two flagrant instances, such as the attack on Spain, that he had done wrong or committed a mistake in his life. His ideas were conceived in the vivid imagination of the East, and much more frequently founded on abstract conceptions than practical observation; but they were developed with the strictness of geometrical demonstration, and engraven on his mind in characters more durable and unalterable than the sculptures on Egyptian granite.*

Early appearance of this peculiarity in his character.

It was very early in life that Napoleon secluded himself, as it were, from other men, and became impressed with the lofty objects to which he appeared to be destined. He himself has told us, that it was after the storming of the bridge of Lodi, in 1796, that he first conceived he was to do great things;† and we have the authority of Duroc for the assertion, that even at that early period he kept his generals as much at a distance as he afterward did in the court of the Tuileries. Shortly after his entry into Milan, in the same year, some one hinted to him that, with his vast reputation, it would be no difficult matter to establish himself permanently in that duchy. "There is a finer throne than that vacant," replied the future successor of Charlemagne. "There are two tottering thrones which I am about to prop up," said he in 1794, when out of employment after the siege of Toulon—"those of Constantinople and Persia." To overthrow the Turkish Empire, and establish himself on the throne of Constantine, was the real object of his expedition to Acre in 1799; and even after he had seized the consular sceptre, he still looked to the East as the appropriate scene of his glory, and the only theatre of great achievements. "There has been nothing to be done in Europe for two hundred years," said he in 1804: "it is in the East only that great things are to be done." All his ideas of universal empire in the West tended to, and were designed as, preparations for that one favourite object of Oriental ambition; it was to prepare the way for its accomplishment that he pursued England with such persevering hostility, and incurred all the hazards of the Peninsular contest; and his secret design in advancing to Moscow was less to plant his standards on the walls of the Kremlin than to prepare the way for the seizure of Constantinople, and follow in the footsteps of Cyrus and Alexander.‡

His low opinion both of men and women.

He had a very low opinion of human nature: an opinion which will be probably shared with him to the end of time by all persons in authority who are witnesses to the baseness and servility with which they are surrounded. "Tacitus," said he, "wrote romances; Gibbon is a declaimer; Machiavel is the only author really worth reading."◊ It must be admitted he put in practice many of the maxims of the Florentine sage, and doubtless saw enough around him to justify the view he took of mankind. His opinion of women was still lower: he never could be persuaded to converse with them seriously on any subject, or regard them as anything but playthings or objects of pleasure;* he felt, with Bacon, their value to young men as mistresses, to old as nurses, but utterly denied their utility even to middle life as companions.† It was his favourite position that the Orientals understood much better how to dispose of the female sex than the Europeans; that the harem was the true scene both of their respectability and their usefulness; and that, if it were not for the object of having a family, no man of sense would ever marry. His well-known answer to Madame de Staël, when asked by that celebrated wit, "Whom do you consider the greatest woman that ever existed?" "She that had the greatest number of children," was not a mere casual repartee, but the felicitous expression of his deliberate opinion.‡ His amorous propensities, nevertheless, were violent, and his infidelities frequent; but none of his fancies ever influenced his conduct or affected his judgment in other matters, and they were generally of very short duration. There was a brusquerie and precipitation in his manner towards women, both in public and private, which his greatest admirers admit to have been repugnant to every feeling of female delicacy. He had hardly any conversation to address to them in the saloons of St. Cloud, and still less in the privacy where his passing intrigues were carried on; he thought, and often found, that they should yield as fast as a beleaguered fortress did to the assault of his grenadiers. He never got the better, as hardly any one ever does, of the want of the society of elegant women early in life; and on occasion of his marriage with Marie Louise, in 1810, he accosted her rather as a grisette, who had been won by a three weeks' fidelity, than the daughter of the Cæsars, who had been the prize of a hundred victories.◊‖

His extraordinary powers of mental exertion.

No words can convey an adequate idea of the indefatigable activity of the emperor, or of his extraordinary power of undergoing mental and bodily fatigue. He brought to the labours of the cabinet a degree of industry, vigour, and penetration, which was altogether astonishing. Those who were most in his confidence were never weary of expressing their admiration at

* De Pradt, Introd. à l'Amb. à Varsovie, ix., xiii., 94.
† Las Casas, i., 71.
‡ De Pradt, Varsovie, 17, 18. Odel., i., 11.
◊ De Pradt, Varsovie, 17.

* "Love," said Napoleon, "is the occupation of an idle man, the amusement of a busy one, and the shipwreck of a sovereign."—Las Casas, ii., 15.

† The emperor, who knew men so well, was ignorant of women. He had not lived with them, and did not understand them; he disclaimed so futile a study. His sensations, entirely physical in regard to them, admitted no influence from liveliness, intelligence, or talent; he had an aversion to their being learned or celebrated, or emerging from their ordinary domestic sphere. He placed them in the social order, at the lowest scale, and never could admit that they should have any influence over the will. A woman was in his eyes an agreeable piece of creation, a pretty plaything, an amusing *passe-temps*, but nothing more. Attempts have been made to give a romantic character to his ephemeral amours; but the truth is, that he never was the weakest in these *liaisons*; he never felt the delirium when the intoxicated heart gives more than is sought of it. "Love," said he, "is a foolish preoccupation, and nothing more, be assured of that."—Caulaincourt, i., 158.

‡ Las Casas, v., 242.

◊ De Pradt, Varsovie, 17. Capefigue, Histoire de Nap., viii., 352.

‖ He jumped into the carriage, when she drove up to the post-town where he met her, in his greatcoat, wet with rain; embraced her with the ardour of one-and-twenty; ordered the postilions to drive at the gallop to Compeigne, where he asserted the conjugal rights before any marriage ceremony had been performed.—See Bausset, *Mémoires de Napoleon*, ii., 45, 46, and Capefigue, *Histoire de Napoleon*, viii., 352, 353.

the acuteness, decision, and rich flow of ideas which distinguished his thoughts when engaged in business. When he received despatches, the first step was to call in the officer who brought them, and question him minutely as to all the particulars not specified in the writing; and not unfrequently his secretaries, or the officers in attendance, had to undergo similar interrogatories as to the places and distances which were the theatre of action. Having acquired the requisite information, he at once took his decision, and it was only on very particular occasions that he adjourned the consideration of anything to the day following. No one better understood, or more thoroughly practised, De Witt's celebrated maxim, the justice of which is probably well known to all engaged extensively in active life, that the great secret of getting through business is to take up everything in its order, and do only one thing at a time. During a campaign, he set no bounds to the fatigue which he underwent. Often, after reading despatches, or dictating orders to one set of secretaries during the whole day, he would commence with another relay at night, and, with the exception of a few hours' sleep on his sofa, keep them hard at work till the following morning. The fervour of his imagination, the vehemence of his conceptions, seemed to render him insensible to the fatigues of the moment, which were felt as altogether overwhelming by his attendants, less wrapped up than him in the intense anticipation of the future.*

His habits during a campaign.

If, in the course of a campaign, he met a courier on the road, he generally stopped, got out of his carriage, and called Berthier or Caulaincourt, who sat down on the ground to write what the emperor dictated. Frequently then, the officers around him were sent in different directions, so that hardly any remained in attendance on his person.† When he expected some intelligence from his generals, and it was supposed that a battle was in contemplation, he was generally in the most anxious state of disquietude, and not unfrequently in the middle of the night called out aloud, "Call D'Albe (his principal secretary); let every one arise." He then began to work at one or two in the morning, having gone to bed the night before, according to his invariable custom, at nine o'clock, as soon as he had dined. Three or four hours' sleep was all that he either allowed himself or required; during the campaign of 1813, there was only one night—that when he rested at Gorlitz, after the conclusion of the armistice—that he slept ten hours without wakening. Often Caulaincourt or Duroc were up with him hard at work all night. On such occasions his favourite mameluke, Rustan, brought him, frequently, strong coffee, and he walked about from dark till sunrise, speaking and dictating without intermission, in his apartment, which was always well lighted, wrapped up in his nightgown, with a silk handkerchief tied like a turban round his head. But these stretches were only made under the pressure of necessity: generally he retired to rest at eight or nine, and slept till two; then rose and dictated for a couple of hours; then rested, or more frequently meditated, for two hours alone; after which he dressed, and a warm bath prepared him for the labours of the succeeding day.*

June 10, 1813.

His travelling carriage was a perfect curiosity, and singularly characteristic of the prevailing temper of his disposition. It was divided into two unequal compartments, separated by a small low partition on which the elbows could rest, while it prevented either from encroaching on the other: the smaller was for Berthier, the larger, the lion's share, for himself. The emperor could recline in a *dormeuse* in front of his seat, but no such accommodation was afforded to his companion. In the interior of the carriage were a number of drawers, of which Napoleon had the key, in which were placed despatches not yet read, and a small library of books. A large lamp behind threw a bright light in the interior, so that he could read without intermission all night. He paid great attention to his portable library, and had prepared a list of duodecimo editions of about five hundred volumes, which he intended to be his constant travelling companions; but the disasters of the latter years of his reign prevented this design from being carried into complete execution.†

His travelling carriage, and habits on the road.

Napoleon was extremely fond of exercise on horseback, and both a daring and indefatigable rider, but he was far from being a good horseman. He generally rode entire horses, and, as he frequently had them little under command, those near him were sometimes thrown from their saddles by the effects of his awkwardness. Eight or ten horses for his private use accompanied the carriage, but the favourite was a beautiful Arab bay, with a black tail and mane. When he mounted on horseback to survey a country, two officers of his suite preceded him, and his own steed followed at a quick trot those which went before it. He usually held the reins in his *right* hand, and incessantly agitated the bit in the horse's mouth: peculiarities contrary to all the rules of the *manège*, but not a little characteristic of the incessant fervour of his mind. His restlessness of disposition was such that he could not sit still, even when carried at the gallop on horseback. The officers who rode before had come, by long habit, to know so well what he wanted, that he had rarely to direct their course, but his own horse followed mechanically the direction which they took. He was passionately fond of riding across the country, through fields or woods, and over heaths; and, in a difficult path, where riding was hazardous, and the whole party was obliged to dismount and lead their horses, the emperor was always in spirits. If he came to any place where a disaster had been incurred, or which was associated with painful recollections, he pushed on at the gallop, and fell into a perfect fury if anything then checked his progress. On one occasion, in the autumn of 1813, he had occasion to pass a place where seventy caissons, of great importance to the army, had been blown up the day before by the Cossacks. On seeing the ground covered with the fragments,

His habits on horseback.

* Las Casas, vi., 213. Odel., i., 4, 181, 182.
† Las Casas, i., 357.

* Odel., i., 183, 185. Bausset, ii., 213.
† Personal observation. Odel., i., 184, 185.

he immediately set off at the gallop, to get over it as fast as possible; and a litte dog having followed his horse, barking, he was seized with such a fit of fury that he drew one of his pistols, fired at the animal, and, having missed, dashed the pistol itself at it, still hastening on with breathless speed, while Rustan, who was no stranger to such scenes, quietly fell behind and picked up the weapon thus thrown away by his infuriated master.*

His impetuous habits in travelling, and during a campaign.

The unceasing restlessness and indefatigable activity of his disposition were strongly evinced in the irregular hours during which different things were done, and the rigorous manner in which, nevertheless, instant obedience was enforced to his commands. Often the march of headquarters was delayed for some hours, or half a day, beyond the time fixed, while the emperor was dictating or reading despatches; and at the last word he would call out, "The carriage—to horse!" These words acted like an electric shock to his attendants, who straightway mounted, the carriage was instantly at the door, and the whole set off at the gallop. Caulaincourt generally rode on the right of the carriage, General Guyot on the left; and the officers on service, pages, attendants, and grooms, with the led horses, rattled on as hard as they could drive, followed by a squadron of the guards on horseback. The whole pushed on at a quick trot, or the gallop, often for a day or a night without halting; and where the road was narrow, or a defile or copse was to be traversed, the vehemence with which they rode drove them against each other, at the imminent hazard of their legs and necks. If the emperor halted to make an observation, he immediately mounted one of the led horses, and four chasseurs, with fixed bayonets on their carbines, formed a square around him, which advanced, always keeping him in its centre. If a distant object was to be examined, a page brought up the telescope, a very fine one being always at hand; the maps were frequently called for and spread out on the ground, and the emperor, lying down upon them, was soon as completely absorbed in his plans as if he had been in his cabinet at St. Cloud.†

Custom in passing through the troops.

When the emperor passed through a division of the guards, all the bands of the regiments came to the front, the troops fell back, and formed line on either side, and great pomp was observed: the cortège passing through slowly, and saluting the officers. But no such ceremony was observed in traversing the ordinary corps of the army; and the passage through them was often forced at the gallop, under circumstances almost amounting to violence. The imperial suite, like a whirlwind, swept through the columns too fast for the men either to fall into the ranks or present arms; and before the astonished crowd could find time to gaze on their beloved chief, the cortège was disappearing in the distance. Room, however, was always cleared; the outriders loudly called out to make way, and at the magic words "The emperor!" infantry, cavalry, and artillery were pellmell hurried to the side, often in frightful confusion, and with fractures of legs and arms. Loud cheers never failed, to the very last, to greet his passage through the divisions of the guards, by whom he was enthusiastically beloved, and whose wants were sedulously attended to; but though the young conscripts, in the beginning of the campaign of 1813, were prodigal of the same acclamations, yet hardship, disaster, and suffering sensibly cooled their ardour, and before its close the imperial suite often traversed long columns of the army without a single cheer announcing its presence.*

Receipt of despatches on the road.

When despatches overtook the emperor, as they often did, on the road, Duroc or Caulaincourt, who rode at the side of the carriage, received and opened the bag, and presented the letters to the emperor without stopping. Directly a number of envelopes were seen falling from the windows of the imperial carriage; and it was evident, from the rate at which they were tossed over, that the letters were devoured with the rapidity of lightning. The useless despatches and covers were cut to pieces, and thrown out in the same way, often in such quantities as to strew the track of the wheels with little fragments, which, trodden under foot by the horses, or crushed under the wheels of the succeeding carriages, made a white line along the road. Napoleon generally cut these despatches to pieces with his own hands, or, if not so employed, worked incessantly with the window-sash or carriage-door: he could not remain a moment at rest. If there were no despatches or morning states to read, he had recourse to the Paris journals, or the last publications of the day, with which the drawers of the carriage were always stored; but they generally shared the fate of the unimportant despatches, being thrown out of the windows after a few pages had been cut up. In such numbers were these discarded literary novelties thus tossed overboard, that the officers of the suite generally contrived to collect no inconsiderable stores of diverting trifles, by picking them up on the traces of his carriage. The emperor was insatiable for something new, and opened with avidity every fresh publication; but his taste was for solid and well-informed writings, not amusing trifles; and he had an incredible tact in discovering, from a few pages, whether there was anything worth reading in a book, so that, in his hands, the ephemeral literature of the day disappeared almost as fast as it was introduced.†

Antechambers of Napoleon during a campaign.

The antechambers of Napoleon during a campaign—whether in his tent, in the field, or in the apartments of farm-houses, or even cottages, which were dignified for the time with the appellation of "the palace"—presented the most extraordinary spectacle. No one could form an idea of the fatigue there undergone by the whole attendants, from the grand esquire Caulaincourt to the lowest of the valets. Duroc and he were themselves indefatigable, and, by unwearied exertion and extraordinary activity, had introduced the utmost degree of regularity into the imperial household; but it was no easy matter for the strength of any others in

* Odel., i., 186, 189.
† Odel., i., 163, 164.
* Odel., i., 174, 175.
† Bausset, ii., 214. Odel., i., 145, 146.

attendance to stand the rigorous services which were exacted. Persons of illustrious birth or the highest rank, such as Count Narbonne or Caulaincourt, were obliged to wait there night after night, sleeping on straw or stretched out on chairs, ready at any moment to be called in by the emperor. Now and then the scene was enlivened by a young and handsome actress in the last Parisian costume, who, amid the din of war and the smoke of the bivouacs, waited to be called in to divert the emperor for a few minutes amid his more serious cases.* Frequently he roused his attendants eight or ten times in the night, when despatches requiring instant attention were received. All who were there on service slept habitually on straw, wrapped up in their cloaks, ready, at a moment's warning, either to mount on horseback and ride twenty or thirty miles without halting, or to take their turn, the moment the emperor's voice was heard, in the not less fatiguing duty of answering his despatches or writing to his dictation. So crowded was his antechamber in general with attendants, that it was not inaptly compared, by those inhabiting it, to the inside of the wooden horse at Troy. The faithful Rustan, whom he had brought from Egypt, usually slept near the door; he dressed and undressed the emperor, and when he rode out was constantly at hand to bring the telescope, or provide the cloaks or umbrellas which might be required for protection from the weather.†

His habits and labours in the cabinet.

The true scene of Napoleon's glory, and the most characteristic of the ruling passion of his mind, was his cabinet. This apartment was never wanting even in the worst accommodation: the ingenuity of his attendants supplied every defect; and if no room could be got, his tent was always at hand, which was arranged for the purpose in the middle of the squares of the Old Guard. Although this important apartment was overloaded with maps, military states, and despatches, the most remarkable and uniform regularity was observed in its arrangement; and it was so managed, that, though the emperor so often moved his headquarters, everything was in the same place one day as another. In the middle stood a large table, on which was extended the best map of the theatre of war;‡ and on it were stuck pins, with heads of different colours, to represent his own and the hostile columns. It was the duty of the director of the topographic bureau to have the map with these pins laid down the moment that headquarters arrived at any place; and almost always the first thing which Napoleon did was to call for the map when he arrived, for he held to it more strongly than any other want of his existence. During the whole night the map was surrounded by twenty or thirty wax candles constantly burning, and a fine compass stood in the middle of them. So frequently did the emperor call for the map when out on horseback, that Caulaincourt had a portable one, which he kept constantly tied to his button across his breast; and he often was required to unfold it ten or fifteen times in the course of a forenoon.*

His habits of writing and dictating.

At the corners of the cabinet were four lesser tables, at which the secretaries of Napoleon were engaged in writing; and sometimes Napoleon himself, and the chief of the topographic department, were to be seen there likewise. The emperor usually dictated walking about in his green surtout and great boots, with his hat upon his head, precisely as he was interred in the grave at St. Helena. As his ideas flowed with extraordinary rapidity, and he spoke as rapidly as he thought, it was no easy matter for his secretaries to keep pace with his allocution. To facilitate the expression, a certain number of hieroglyphic symbols were established by him to signify certain things; and they were not a little curious, as affording an index to the light in which these things were regarded by him. Thus, the tail of a dragon signified the French army; a whip, the corps of Davoust; *a thorn, the British Empire; a sponge, the commercial towns.* It was the duty of the secretaries afterward to decipher this chaos, and extend it in proper sentences, which was often a work of no small difficulty; but the emperor had a singular facility in making it out, as the symbols had been established by himself. Often there were two despatches to which answers were to be dictated at the same time: one from Spain, and another from a distant quarter of Germany; but the complication and variety of objects to be considered made no confusion, on such occasions, in the steadiness of his mental gaze. The moment that a despatch was read, and its bearer questioned, an answer to it was commenced; and not unfrequently, while the secretary in one corner was making out orders of the most important kind for the war in Spain, the one that sat in another was drawing a diplomatic note, a third busy with the orders for twenty brigades, and the fourth with an A B C for the King of Rome.† Nothing could exceed the distinctness with which the threads of all these varied subjects were preserved in his mind; and although the orders which he gave for the direction of distant operations were often unfortunate or erroneous, from the impetuosity of his mind leading him to decide without sufficient information, and their effect was still more frequently marred by the neglect or incapacity of inferior functionaries, yet they were always founded on an able and lucid conception on his part: and the very errors they contained, which sometimes were of the most serious kind, gen-

* Odel., i., 146.

† Odel., i., 134, 135. Bausset, ii., 167.

‡ For the campaign in Saxony in 1813, he made use of the admirable map of Petri, of which he had felt the value in the campaign of 1806, and occasionally of that of Blackenberg. —ODELEBEN, i., 137.

* Odel., i., 135, 137.

† It is frequently said, from several secretaries being engaged in the room at once, that Napoleon could dictate to three clerks at a time. This, however, is a mistake, as all those who have really been so hard pressed as to require to attempt it will readily believe. It is quite possible to dictate a serious paper to one secretary, and write a letter with your own hand, or dictate short notes, requiring little attention, at the same time, the eye giving the sense of what is written, while the memory retains the import of what has been dictated; but it is altogether impossible to dictate at the same time two serious papers on different subjects, much less three. Nevertheless, a man with an active mind may frequently be seen in a room with three secretaries, and keeping them all constantly employed, but in such a case the real mental strain is with one only; the others are making out letters from hints furnished, or writing routine despatches of little moment, or copying what is put into their hands, with, possibly, the addition of a sentence at the beginning and end.

erally arose from the intensity of that conception rendering him blind to the opposite set of considerations.*

The military portfolio and its keeper.

One of the most important officers in the military household of Napoleon was the keeper of the portfolio: a functionary who supplied the place of the whole tribe of registrars, keepers of archives, and state-paper officers in ordinary governments; and who, though a simple Swiss porter, in the rank of a superior domestic, was intrusted with the keeping of papers of inestimable value. His duty was of the simplest, but at the same time, for a long continuance, of the most exhausting kind: it was to be constantly at his post, and thoroughly acquainted with the place, arrangement, and look of all the papers under his charge; night and day he required to be at the door of the cabinet; no excuse but severe illness could be taken for even a minute's absence. The emperor had, with great pains, collected a magnificent set of maps, the finest, probably, in existence, which was his constant companion in the campaigns of Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and Aspern; but it was lost during the Moscow retreat, and its place was never afterward adequately supplied. The collection, however, though of a secondary character, which was made for the campaign of 1813, was very considerable, and two officers of approved talent and fidelity were constantly in charge of it, and at hand. So peremptory were the orders of the emperor that they should be constantly near his person with their portfolios, that they were never more than a few yards distant either from his cabinet, his carriage, or his charger; and, being well aware of the importance of their functions, and the numerous occasions on which they were required to produce their treasures, they rode over, without ceremony, everything that came in their way. With such minute attention to details were the operations of this wonderful man conducted; and so vast the variety of information which required to be taken into account in the formation of designs, which, to a superficial observer, appeared to emanate from the conceptions of original genius.†

Napoleon's occasional acts of humanity and generosity.

Although no man in modern times has occasioned such a destruction of the human species, Napoleon was often susceptible of pity for individual suffering; and as he rode, according to his constant custom, over the fields of his victories after the carnage had ceased, he frequently made some of his suite stop to stanch the wounds, or alleviate the sufferings of the maimed, of whatever nation. On one occasion in Silesia, when riding in this manner over a field strewed with the wounded and the slain, he made his own surgeon dismount to bind up the wounds of a Russian who still gave some signs of life: "If he is saved," said he, "there will be one the less to hate me as the cause of his death."‡ At a fire in Verdun in 1805, some English sailors exerted themselves strenuously to extinguish the flames: no sooner had this come to the knowledge of Napoleon, than he ordered them to be sent home to their own country, with money to carry them from his privy purse. After the battle of Bautzen, he had occasion to pass through the town of Bischoffswerda, which had become a prey to the flames during the preceding contest. The smouldering ruins, and starving inhabitants striving to rescue some of their effects from the devastation, presented a most melancholy spectacle, with which the emperor was deeply affected; and, having ascertained that the fire had been occasioned by the wantonness of his own soldiers, he promised to give the sufferers indemnification, and actually fixed 100,000 francs (£4000) for that purpose; but having failed to provide the requisite funds from the military chest, the payment of this sum fell as a burden on the King of Saxony.* When he arrived at Buntzlau in Silesia, where his old antagonist, Kutusoff, had breathed his last, he inquired if any monument existed to his memory, and being informed that there was none, he ordered one to be raised at his own expense: an honourable design, which the misfortunes of the close of the campaign prevented from being carried into execution.†

His generous conduct to an English sailor

Heroic conduct, whether in his own troops or those of his enemies, seldom failed to arrest his attention. On one occasion, at Boulogne, he received intelligence of a young English sailor who had escaped from his place of confinement in the interior of France, and made his way to the coast near that town, where he had secretly constructed a skiff of branches and the bark of trees, with which he was about, when seized, to brave the tempests of the Channel, in hopes of making his way to one of the English cruisers, and regaining his native country. Struck with the hardihood of the project, Napoleon ordered the young man to be brought into his presence, and himself questioned him as to his motives for undertaking so perilous an adventure, for the bark seemed incapable of bearing the weight of a human being. The sailor persisted in his having intended to embark in it, and besought the emperor to permit him to carry his design into execution. "Doubtless," replied Napoleon, "you must have some mistress to revisit, since you are so desirous to regain your country?" "No," replied the young man, "I only wish to see my mother, who is old and infirm." "And you shall see her," rejoined the emperor; and immediately gave orders that the young man should be equipped anew, and sent with a flag of truce on board the first cruiser with the British flag, adding a small sum for his mother, who must, he added, be no common person to have so affectionate a son.‡

His habits at Paris and St Cloud.

Although the campaigns were the great scene of Napoleon's activity, yet peace was very far, indeed, from being a season of repose to his mind. He was then incessantly engaged in the maze of diplomatic negotiations, projects of domestic improvements, or discussions in the Council of State, which filled up every leisure moment of the forenoon. He rose early, and was engaged in his cabinet with his secretary till breakfast, which never lasted above half an hour. He then attended a parade of his troops, received audiences of ambassadors, and transacted other official business till three o'clock, when he gen-

* Odel., i., 139, 141. † Odel., 142, 144. ‡ Odel., i., 81.

* Odel., i., 85. Fain, i., 401. † Fain, i., 441.
‡ Las Casas, vii., 78, 79

erally repaired to the Council of State, or rode out till dinner, which was always at six. When engaged in business, or at the council-board, his activity, as in his campaigns, was incessant: he could not rest a moment idle; at the head of the table of the Council of State, he was constantly cutting the chair on which he sat with his penknife;* and on his favourite desks at St. Cloud, Fontainebleau, and the Elysée Bourbon, where all his great designs were matured, the deep and innumerable indentations of his penknife are still to be seen.† If he could get nothing else to work with, he bit his own nails to the quick till the blood came. Dinner occupied exactly forty minutes; the emperor conversed a great deal unless his mind was much preoccupied, but never indulged in the slightest convivial excess. Coffee succeeded at twenty minutes to seven, unless some special occasion required a longer stay at table; and the remainder of the evening, till eleven, when he retired to rest, was engaged in discussions and conversation with a circle of officers, ambassadors, scientific or literary men, artists of celebrity, or civil functionaries. In their society he took the greatest delight. On such occasions, he provoked discussion on serious and interesting topics, not unfrequently morals, political philosophy, and history; and never failed to astonish his auditors by the extent of his information, and the original views which he started on every subject that came under discussion. A little talent or knowledge, doubtless, goes a great way with an emperor; and suspicions might have been entertained that the accounts transmitted to us by his contemporaries of the ability of his conversation were exaggerated, did not ample and decisive evidence of it remain in the memorials of St. Helena, and the luminous speeches, superior to any other at the council-board, which are recorded by Thibaudeau and Pelet in their interesting works on the Council of State during the Consulate and Empire.‡

His habits as a husband and a father.

In domestic life, Napoleon was exempt from the habitual influence of most of the vices which so often consume the time and destroy the usefulness of persons in his exalted station. Though not a faithful, he was a kind husband, and his transient amours neither estranged him from the empress, nor afforded any ground for public scandal. In early life, he indulged for a brief season in the dream of romantic love; and though his marriage with Josephine was suggested by motives of ambition, her attractions soon acquired a powerful hold of his heart; his letters to her during the Italian campaigns breathe the ardour of devoted attachment; and to the end of his life, even after her divorce, she possessed a large share of his affection, and he in secret believed that her destiny was in some mysterious way interwoven with his own. Female blandishments never either absorbed his time or clouded his judgment. He was subject to terrible fits of jealousy, for which the levities and extravagance of Josephine afforded too much foundation, but he was not unforgiving in his disposition; and, though his moody temperament was wrought up on such occasions to the most violent pitch of wrath, yet he was not inaccessible to returning reason or forgiveness. His divorce of her was suggested by the ruling principles of his life—state policy and ambition—and the pain which it cost him was greater than could have been expected from one who was habitually guided by views of a general nature; while its ultimate disastrous effects afforded a signal proof that durable advantage, even in this world, is not to be purchased by harsh or iniquitous measures.* Though the Empress Marie Louise was little more than an amiable nonentity, and she proved herself, in the end, altogether unworthy of being his wife, yet he was kind and considerate to her during the few years that she shared his fortunes; and towards the King of Rome he invariably felt the warmest affection—parental feelings, indeed, strong in almost all but the utterly selfish, were peculiarly warm in his bosom. The education and progress of his son occupied a large share of his attention, even on the most momentous occasions of his life;† and one of the bitterest pangs which he felt during his exile at St. Helena was owing to his separation from that beloved infant with whom his affections and prospective glories had been indissolubly wound up.‡

His conduct at St. Helena.

To complete the character of this extraordinary man, it only remains to add, that his conduct at the time of his fall, and during his exile at St. Helena, exhibited the same mixture of grandeur and littleness, of selfishness and magnanimity, which characterized every other period of his life. History has not a more splendid scene to record than his heroic, though unsuccessful campaign in France in 1814; but he lost its whole fruit by the want of moral courage to prosecute his movement upon St. Dizier, and was content at last to abdicate his throne, and retire to a little appanage assigned him by the conquerors in the island of Elba. His triumphant return from thence to Paris in the succeeding year seemed to have outdone all that romance had figured of the marvellous; and his genius never shone forth with brighter lustre than in the preparations which he made during the Hundred Days to renew the war, as well as in the conduct of the short and decisive campaign which followed; but, although he himself has repeatedly admitted that he should have died at Waterloo,◊ yet he had no hesitation in flying from his faithful guards on that fatal field, and purchasing his personal safety by surrendering to a British man-of-war. He bore his exile in St. Helena, in general, with praiseworthy equanimity, and his conversations in that sequestered isle will be admired to the end of the world, as extraordinary proofs of the vigour of his genius and depth of his thoughts; yet even there, the pettishness of a little stood in striking contrast to the grandeur of an exalted

* "I sat down in the arm-chair, all lacerated and cut up with the penknife, on which the emperor used to rest."—*Souvenirs de* CAULAINCOURT, ii., 14.

† The author has repeatedly seen them.—See, also, CAULAINCOURT, ii., 14.

‡ Opinions de Napoleon, dans le Conseil d'Etat, par Pelet, Paris, 1833; and Thib., sur le Consulat, Paris, 1815.

* Bausset, ii., 7, 8.

† See, in particular, his conduct on receiving the portrait of the King of Rome the evening before the battle of Borodino.—*Ante*, iii., 561.

‡ Las Casas. O'Meara.

◊ "I should have died, if not at Moscow, at latest at Waterloo"—LAS CASAS, vii., 70, 71

mind: he fretted at restraints which, had he been in the place of the allies, would possibly have been cut short by the scaffold; and the general who had been recounting the greatest achievements in modern history, and the prophet who was piercing with his eye the depths of futurity, often found his serenity disturbed, and his reflection destroyed, by the appearance of an English uniform attending him in his rides, or the omission in some one of his attendants to salute him with the title of emperor.

Importance of the preceding details.

The preceding detail, long and minute as it is, will probably be regarded by many as not the least interesting part of this history, and by all deemed to give a truer insight into the character of Napoleon than the public actions, embracing so great interests and fraught with such momentous consequences, which are scattered through its volumes. They could not have been introduced earlier, for the events had not then occurred to which many of them refer; nor later, for not an instant is there left for reflection amid the crash which attended his fall. It is during this armistice alone, where the stream of events presents

"The torrent's smoothness ere it dash below,"

that an opportunity occurred for collecting details concerning the character and habits of a man who, for good or for evil, has forever imprinted his name and deeds on the records of history.

Character of Murat.

Murat, King of Naples, Napoleon's brother-in-law, was also so remarkable a character during the whole wars of the Revolution, that some account of his peculiarities seems desirable. So early as the battles of Millesimo and Montenotte, in 1796, he was Napoleon's adjutant, and by his intrepidity and daring contributed not a little to the triumph of that memorable campaign. It was by these qualities, as well as his handsome figure and dashing manners, that he laid the foundation of the reputation which gained for him the attention of the emperor's sister, and by winning her hand led to his brilliant fortunes, and elevation to the throne of Naples. Nor was his merit in many respects inferior to his fortune. His piercing coup-d'œil; his skill in judging of the positions of the enemy; his chivalrous demeanour when leading his troops into battle; his calm intrepidity in the midst of the most appalling dangers; his tall figure and noble carriage, as well as incomparable seat on the splendid chargers which he always bestrode, gave him the air of a hero of romance, not less than the character of a first-rate cavalry officer. At the head of his gallant cuirassiers he feared no danger, never paused to number his enemies; but with matchless hardihood threw himself into the midst of the hostile array, where he hardly ever failed to achieve the most dazzling exploits. In Napoleon's earlier campaigns at Austerlitz,* Jena,† and Eylau,‡ Murat was always at the head of so immense a body of horse as to render success almost a matter of certainty; and it was to the weight of this formidable phalanx, generally eighteen or twenty thousand strong, that the emperor mainly trusted for the gaining, as well as completion, of his victories.* But Murat's genius and daring in the field were equally conspicuous when he had no such superiority to ensure the advantage. Napoleon's sense of these qualities induced him to overlook his desertion of his post after the Russian retreat, and subsequent advances towards the allies;† and his heroic courage never appeared with brighter lustre than when he threw a last radiance over the victories of the empire at Dresden, and stemmed the torrent of disaster at Leipsic.‡

His military abilities and civil weaknesses.

Napoleon had the highest opinion of Murat's military abilities, and frequently consulted him upon the disposition of the troops, the lying of the ground, and the probable effect of any movements which were in contemplation. On these occasions, Murat, who had a great degree of military frankness in his manner, and whose near relationship to the emperor enabled him to take liberties on which no other would have ventured, spoke with remarkable decision and independence; and not unfrequently Caulaincourt, on whom known fidelity and tried services had conferred an almost equal privilege, united with him in combating the most favourite projects of their chief. The habitual good-humour of the King of Naples, and his constant disposition to make merry even in the most serious discussions, carried him, in general, safely through these dangerous shoals. But it was in such military discussions that the confidence of the emperor, and with reason, terminated: the moment that diplomacy or civil transactions came on the tapis, Murat turned aside, or left the council-room, from conscious incapacity or insurmountable aversion. "He was a Paladin," said Napoleon, "in the field, but in the cabinet destitute either of decision or judgment. He loved, I may rather say adored me: he was my right arm; but without me he was nothing. In battle, he was perhaps the bravest man in the world; left to himself, he was an *imbecile* without judgment."§

His appearance and dress as contrasted with that of Napoleon.

The external appearance of Napoleon formed a striking contrast to that of his royal brother-in-law. When they rode together along the front of the troops, Murat attracted universal attention by his commanding figure, his superb theatrical costume, the splendid trapping and beautiful figure of his horse, and the imposing military dignity of his air. This dazzling display contrasted strangely, but characteristically, with the three-cornered hat, dark

* *Ante*, ii., 371. † Ib., ii., 445. ‡ Ib., ii., 484.

* "My decided opinion," said Napoleon, "is, that cavalry, if led by equally brave and resolute men, must always break infantry." An opinion contrary to that generally received, but supported by not a few of the most memorable facts recorded by history in all ages, and which, coming from such a commander, who so well knew the value both of infantry and artillery, is well worthy of the most serious consideration.—See Las Casas, vii., 184. It was by his cavalry that Hannibal conquered at the Ticino and Cannæ, and Napoleon at Austerlitz and Jena; the Asiatic horse arrested Richard Cœur de Lion in Palestine; the Parthians destroyed Crassus and Julian in Asia, and Napoleon himself at Moscow; the genius of Cyrus sunk under, that of Alexander the Great recoiled before, the fortunes of Darius perished amid, the Scythian cavalry; Hyder's horse all but drove the English into the Madras surf, and the English dragoons decided the fate of India at Assaye; a charge of French horsemen at Marengo placed Napoleon on the consular throne; another of the English light dragoons, on the flank of the Old Guard, hurled him to the rock of St. Helena.

† *Ante*, iv., p., 000. ‡ Odel., i., 198, 199.

§ O'Meara, ii., 96. Odel., i., 198, 200.

surtout, leather breeches, huge boots, corpulent figure, and careless seat on horseback, which have become immortal in the representations of Napoleon. The imposing aspect of Murat was, however, weakened, rather than heightened, by the rich and fantastic dress which he wore. Dark whiskers on his face contrasted with piercing blue eyes; his abundant black locks spread over the neck of a splendid Polish dress, open above the shoulders; the collar was richly adorned with gold brocade, and from a splendid girdle of the same material hung a light sabre, straight in the blade, after the manner of the ancient Roman, with the hilt set in diamonds. Wide pantaloons, of a purple or scarlet colour, richly embroidered with gold, and boots of yellow leather, completed this singular costume, which resembled rather the gorgeous trappings of the melodrame than the comparatively simple uniform of modern times.*

His extraordinary gallantry of conduct.

But its greatest distinction was a large three-cornered hat, surmounted by a profusion of magnificent white ostrich feathers, rising from a broad gold band, which enclosed, besides, a superb heron plume. His noble charger was set off with gorgeous bridle and stirrups, richly gilt after the Turkish fashion, and enveloped in trappings of azure blue, the tint of the Italian sky, which also was the prevailing colour of his liveries. Above this fantastic, but dazzling attire, he wore, in cold weather, a magnificent pelisse of dark-green velvet, lined and fringed with the richest sables. When he rode beside Napoleon, habited after his simple fashion, in this theatrical costume, it appeared a living image of splendid folly contrasting with the naked majesty of thought. It was only in his own person, however, that Napoleon was thus simple: his aids-de-camp and suite were arrayed in brilliant uniforms, and everything studiously attended to which could set off their lustre in the eyes of the army or people. And with whatever sentiments the fantastic magnificence of the King of Naples might be regarded on peaceful parades, they yielded to an involuntary feeling of respect when his white plume was seen, like that of Alexander the Great, ever foremost in the ranks of war, plunging into the thickest of the hostile ranks, regardless of the shower of cannon-balls for which it formed a never-failing mark; or when he was beheld returning from a charge, his sabre dripping wet with the blood of the Cossacks whom, in the impetuosity of overflowing courage, he had challenged and slain in single combat.†‡

Character and history of Ney.

NEY is another hero whose deeds shone forth with such lustre during the whole Revolutionary war, that a separate delineation of his character seems called for. Born on the 10th of January, 1769, in the same year as Wellington and Napoleon, in an humble station, the son of a common soldier who had served in the Seven Years' War, and who afterward became a cooper, he raised himself to be a leading marshal of the Empire, Prince of Moskwa, and won, by universal consent, the epithet of the bravest of the brave. He was no common man who, even during the turbulence of the Revolution, rose in such a manner, and acquired such an appellation. In early youth, at the age of fifteen, Ney had a presentiment, as most men reserved for ultimate greatness have, that he was destined to distinction; and, in spite of all the tears of his mother and remonstrances of his father, who had made him a miner, and wished him to remain in that humble sphere, he entered the army at Metz, on the 1st of February, 1787, as a private dragoon. His military air, address on horseback, and skill in the management of his sabre, attracted the notice of his comrades, and procured for him the dangerous honour of being selected to challenge the fencing-master of another regiment in the garrison, who had given a real or supposed insult to his corps. The commission was accepted with joy by the young soldier, the ground chosen, and the sabres crossed, when the whole party were seized by their officers; and as duelling was then punished with death, it was with no small difficulty, and by the intervention of a long captivity only, that he was saved from the scaffold.*

His overflowing courage and simple character.

No sooner, however, was he liberated from prison, than the long-suspended duel was renewed in a secret place; and Ney, victorious, inflicted such a wound upon his adversary in the hand, that it disabled him from continuing his profession, and soon reduced him to poverty. Ney, having afterward risen to greatness, did not forget the adventure, nor the calamitous consequences with which it had been attended to his opponent: he sought him out, and settled a pension on his old antagonist. Like all men of real elevation of mind, he not only was no ways ashamed of, but took a pride in recounting the circumstances of his early life; and when some young officers, after he was made marshal, were descanting on their descent, and the rich appointments which they enjoyed from their families, he said, "Gentlemen, I was less fortunate than you: I got nothing from my family, and I esteemed myself rich at Metz when I had two loaves of bread on the table." When he was made marshal, a splendid party were assembled at his hotel, among whom were the chief dignitaries of the Empire. Amid them all he made his way to an old captain, who stood behind the crowd at a respectful distance. "Do you recollect, captain," said he, "the time when you said to me, when I gave in my report, 'Go on, Ney, I am content with you: you will make your way?'" "Perfectly," replied his old commander: "one does not easily forget having commanded a marshal of France." His father, who tenderly loved him, lived to see his highest elevation, and was never informed of his tragic fate: the weeds of his family alone informed him, in 1815, that some mournful event had taken place: he never again pronounced his name, and died twelve years after, at the age of a hundred, without ever having been informed of his end.†

* Odel., i., 201.

† Odel., i., 201, 203. O'Meara, ii., 96. Las Casks.

‡ Such was his passion for danger, that he used to challenge the Cossacks to single combat; and when he had vanquished them, he would give them their liberty, often accompanied by a gold chain, which he took from around his neck, or one of the richly-jewelled watches which he always had on his person.—See O'MEARA, ii., 96; and SEGUR, *Campagne de Russie*, ii.

* Ney's Memoirs, i., 3, 4.

† Mémoires du Marshal Ney, i., 3, 10.

His military character.

The distinctive characteristic of Ney was his perfect calmness and self-possession in the midst of danger, and the invincible energy with which he pursued his object, notwithstanding the most formidable obstacles with which he was opposed. Showers of grapeshot, the onset of cuirassiers, even the terrible charge of the English bayonets, were alike unable to deter his resolution or disturb his steady gaze. When one of his officers asked him if, on such occasions, he never felt fear, "I never had time," was his simple reply. This extraordinary self-possession in danger, accompanied, as it was in his case, with the practised eye which discerns the exact moment of attack, and measures with accuracy the probable resistance that may be anticipated, rendered him an invaluable auxiliary to a commander-in-chief; and when Napoleon, after his glorious march across the Dnieper, near Krasnoi, in 1812, said, "I have three hundred millions in the vaults of the Tuileries: I would willingly give them all to save Marshal Ney,"* he only expressed a sentiment which long experience of his vast services had suggested, and which the unexampled heroism with which he had headed the rear-guard during the whole of that calamitous retreat had amply confirmed. It was when danger was greatest and success most doubtful, that his courage was most conspicuous and his coolness most valuable; and if these qualities could have ensured success, Napoleon would have found victory in the last attack, headed by this heroic marshal, at Waterloo.†

Inefficiency in separate command.

Nevertheless, Ney was far from being either a general of the first order, or a man of character capable of withstanding the severest trials. "He was the bravest of men," said Napoleon: "there terminate all his faculties." Notwithstanding his great experience, he never was able to comprehend, in complicated cases, the true spirit of his instructions, and was indebted for many of his most important successes to the admirable sagacity with which his chief of the staff, General Jomini, divined the emperor's projects, and put his chief on the right course for their execution. It was the able counsels of this accomplished general that enabled Ney to complete the investment of Mack at Ulm, and his prompt succour which extricated him from impending ruin at Jena.‡ The diverging directions which he gave to his corps had wellnigh proved fatal to the French army in the mud of Pultusk;◊ and a clearer perception of the vital importance of the movement with which he was intrusted might have re-established the throne of Napoleon on the field of Bautzen.‖ In separate command he seldom achieved anything worthy of his reputation, and, when placed under any other general than the emperor, his unseasonable jealousy and overbearing temper were often attended with the most injurious results.¶

Moral weaknesses.

But these errors, serious as they were, affected his intellectual powers only: his subsequent vacillation on a political crisis, and unpardonable violation of his fidelity at Fontainebleau, and of his oath during the Hundred Days, have imprinted a darker stain on his memory, and prove that, if his physical courage was above, his moral firmness was below the ordinary average of human beings. Yet, even in that melancholy catastrophe, the reflecting observer will discover the grounds for individual forgiveness and general condemnation: he will contrast the weakness, under worldly temptation, of the brightest characters of the Revolution, with the glorious fidelity, under severer trials, of La Vendée, Saragossa, Moscow, and Tyrol; and conclude that, if the white plume of Murat was sullied by defection, and the glorious forehead of Ney stained by treason, we are to ascribe these grievous blots to the vices of the age in which they lived rather than their own individual weakness, and conclude that the utmost efforts of worldly greatness falls short of the constancy in misfortune which religion inspires, or the superiority to temptation which virtue can bestow.

Character of Berthier.

Inferior to both these characters in the dazzling qualities of a hero, BERTHIER was, nevertheless, too important a person in the military and civil administration of Napoleon to be passed over without special notice. He was so constantly the companion of the emperor, and all the orders from headquarters emanated so uniformly from his pen, that it was at one period imagined that his abilities had contributed not a little to the imperial triumphs; but this impression, which never existed among those who knew them both personally, was entirely dispelled by the incapacity evinced by the major-general on occasion of the commencement of the campaign of 1809 in Germany, which brought the Empire to within a hair's breadth of destruction.* Nevertheless, though totally destitute of the vigour and decision requisite to form a great commander, he was not without merit, and possessed some qualities of incalculable value to the emperor. He was the essence of order itself. Unwearied in application, methodical in habit, indefatigable in exertion, he was constantly ready to reduce into the proper form the slight hints of the emperor. The precision, order, and regularity which he displayed in the discharge of these important duties could not be surpassed. Night and day he was alike ready to commence the work of redaction: no amount of writing could fatigue, no rapidity of travelling disarrange, no pressure of despatches perplex him. "This," said Napoleon, "was the great merit of Berthier, and it was of inestimable importance to me. No other could possibly have replaced him." The constant habit of associating with the emperor, with whom, during a campaign, he dined and travelled in the carriage every day, necessarily gave him a considerable degree of influence, and the pretensions of his manner indicated that he assumed more than he possessed. "That was quite natural," said Napoleon: "nothing is so imperious as weakness which feels itself supported by strength. Look at women." Like almost all the creatures of his bounty, he deserted the emperor in the hour of his distress,

* Fain, ii., 324. Guerre de 1812. *Ante*, iii., 589.
† Mémoires du Ney, i., 19, 21. Art. Ney, Nouv. Biog. des Contemp.
‡ *Ante*, ii., 349, 445.
◊ *Ante*, ii., 475.
‖ *Ante*, iv., p. 75.
¶ *Ante*, iii., 355.

* *Ante*, iii., 248.

and made his peace with the Bourbons at Fontainebleau; but he did not survive long to enjoy the fruits of his defection, having perished in an ignoble manner by a fall from a window, in the year following, in the streets of Manheim.*

Diplomatic relations in the commencement of 1813.

Great were the efforts made by the English cabinet to turn to the best account the unhoped-for flood of good fortune which set in during the first months of 1813. It was hard to say whether the alacrity of the nation in submitting, in the twentieth year of the war, to fresh burdens; or the boundless generosity with which supplies of every sort were sent to the insurgent nations of Germany; or the efforts made to strengthen the victorious army of Wellington in Spain; or the diplomatic activity which hushed separate interests, and reconciled jarring pretensions, in the conclusion of the alliances of cabinets, was most worthy of admiration. Lofty and commanding, indeed, was the position of Great Britain in thus finding the Continental States, after so long a contest, ranging themselves around her standard, and the jealousies of rival governments merged in the common sense of the necessity, at all hazards, of throwing off the tyranny which previously she alone had uniformly and successfully opposed. But many serious obstacles were to be overcome before this consummation could be effected; and diplomatic difficulties of no ordinary kind awaited the statesman whose perseverance at length smoothed them all away, and cemented, out of such discordant materials, the glorious fabric of the Grand Alliance.

First convention between Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia, April 28.

The decided step taken by Prussia, in seceding from the French alliance, and uniting her fate to that of Russia by the treaty of Kalisch, at once, and without any formal convention, re-established amicable relations between the cabinet of Berlin and that of London; and long before any diplomatic connexion had been resumed between them, immense supplies of arms, ammunition, and warlike stores of every description, had been forwarded from the Thames to the mouth of the Elbe, from whence they were disseminated through the whole Prussian dominions.† To accelerate the conclusion of a regular treaty, Sir Charles Stewart, now the Marquis of Londonderry, was sent by the British government to the north of Germany early in April, and arrived in Berlin on the 22d of that month. Finding the King of Prussia at Dresden, he instantly pushed on to that city; and there it was at once agreed upon, that England, in addition to the immense supplies of arms and military stores which she was furnishing with such profusion, should advance two millions sterling to sustain the operations of the Prince-royal of Sweden in the north of Germany; and a like sum to enable Russia and Prussia to keep up the vast armaments which they had on foot in the centre of Saxony; besides five hundred thousand pounds with which the British government charged itself as the cost of the Russian fleet.

April 26.

In return for these liberal advances, Russia agreed to maintain two hundred, and Prussia one hundred thousand men in the field, exclusive of garrisons; and on this basis matters remained till the conclusion of the armistice of Pleswitz.*

Treaty of Reichenbach between these powers.

No sooner, however, were the allied sovereigns delivered, by that convention, from the pressure of impending hostilities, than they turned their attention to drawing closer their diplomatic relations with Great Britain; and as both Sir Charles Stewart and Earl Cathcart, the English ambassador at the court of St. Petersburg, were at the allied headquarters, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was soon concluded. By this treaty, signed at Reichenbach on June 14, the foundation was laid of the Grand Alliance which effected the deliverance of Europe. It was stipulated that England should pay to Prussia, for the six remaining months of the year, a subsidy of £666,666, in consideration of which the latter power was to keep in the field an army of 80,000 men. Two separate and important articles were inserted in the secret treaty. By the first of these, the British government engaged "to contribute its efforts to the aggrandizement of Prussia, if the success of the allied arms would admit of it, in such geographical and statistical proportions as should at least restore it to the situation in which it stood prior to 1806;"† while, by the second, the King of Prussia agreed to cede to the Electorate of Hanover a part of his possessions in Lower Saxony and Westphalia, to the extent of 300,000 souls, including, in particular, the bishopric of Hildesheim.

June 14.

By another and relative treaty, signed the day after, between Russia and Great Britain, it was stipulated that Great Britain should pay to its emperor, till January 1, 1814, a subsidy of £1,333,334, by monthly portions; in return for which, he was to maintain 160,000 men in the field, independent of the garrisons of strong places. In addition to this, England took upon herself the maintenance of the Russian fleet, which had been in the harbours of Great Britain ever since the convention of Cintra in 1808,‡ with its crews, a burden estimated at £500,000 yearly. And as these subsidies, great as they were, appeared to be inadequate to the daily increasing cost of the enormous armaments which the allies had on foot or in preparation; and, in particular, the want of specie, which was everywhere most severely felt, it was stipulated that an issue of paper, to the extent of five millions sterling, should take place in the Prussian states, guarantied by the three powers, of which two thirds were to be at the disposal of Russia, and one third at that of Prussia; the ultimate liquidation of the notes, which were payable to bearer, being fixed for the 1st of July, 1815, or six months after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace, and undertaken in the proportion of three sixths by England, two sixths by Russia, and one sixth by Prussia. And although the treaty, by its letter, was to

* Las Casas, i., 357. Biog. des Cont., par Michaud, art. Berthier. † *Vide* list of these stores, *Ante*, iv., 57.

* Lond., 5, 13. Hard., xii., 180, 182.

† See the Treaty in Martin, Sup., xii., 571; and Ann. Reg., 1813; State Paper, 357; and Secret Articles in Schoell, x., 255.

‡ *Ante*, iii., 84.

continue only during the year 1813, yet the high contracting parties, both in this and the Prussian treaty,* agreed to concert anew on the aid they were to afford each other in the event of the war being prolonged beyond that period; and, in particular, "reciprocally engaged not to negotiate separately with their common enemies, nor to sign any peace, truce, or convention whatsoever, otherwise than by mutual consent."

Convention of Peterswaldau, July 6.

A supplementary treaty was signed between Great Britain and Russia, at Peterswaldau, on July 6, for the regulation of the German legion in the service of Russia. It was stipulated that the expense of this legion, which was to be raised to ten thousand men, should be undertaken by the British government, and, in return, should be placed at their disposal, and officered according to their recommendation. The estimated expense of each man was taken at £10 15*s.* overhead, including pay and provisions: a curious and valuable fact, as indicating the wide difference between the cost of military armaments on the Continent and in this country, where the charges per head are nearly three times as great.†

Convention of London regarding the issue of paper money.

So excessive did the want of specie become in Germany in the autumnal months of this year, from the enormous demands of the multitudes of armed men who were assembled within a narrow space on its surface, that England was again obliged to interpose its inexhaustible public credit to supply the deficiency. By a supplementary convention, signed at London on the 30th of September, the government of Great Britain engaged to propose to Parliament a measure whereby bills of credit in favour of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia should be issued by the English exchequer, to the extent of £2,500,000, or 15,000,000 Prussian thalers; one million to be put monthly into circulation, and payable in specie one month after the ratification of a general peace, at offices in such towns in the north of Germany as the British government, in concert with the courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin, should point out; with an option to the holders, instead of receiving payment in specie then, to fund them in a stock bearing six *per cent.* A similar treaty was, on the same day, signed with Prussia, which power obtained one third of the proposed sum, the other two thirds being at the disposal of Russia. These stipulations were immediately carried into effect by the British government: the issue took place, and had the effect of instantly providing the requisite supply of circulating medium in Germany and Russia, which passed at par with specie through all the North of Europe. A memorable instance of the wonderful effect of national credit on human transactions, and of the inexhaustible resources of a country which was thus able, at the close of a war of twenty years' duration, not only to furnish subsidies of vast amount to the Continental States, but to guaranty the circulation of their own dominions, and cause its notes of hand to pass like gold through vast empires, extending from the Elbe to the wall of China, which, but a few months before, had been arrayed in inveterate hostility against it.*

Treaty of Stockholm with Sweden, March 3, 1813.

With Sweden, also, a treaty, already alluded to, had been concluded at an earlier period, which in the end was attended with the most important consequences to the deliverance of Europe. By this treaty, signed at Stockholm on the 3d of March, 1813, it was provided that the King of Sweden should employ a body of thirty thousand men, in concert with the Russian troops, in such operations as should be agreed on, in the north of Germany; in consideration of which the British government agreed to pay yearly the sum of £1,000,000, by monthly instalments. Great Britain engaged to cede the island of Guadaloupe, in the West Indies, to Sweden, and Sweden promised to give the British subjects the right of entrepôt in the three harbours of Gottenberg, Carlsham, and Stralsund. Finally, the British government acceded to the convention already concluded between the cabinets of St. Petersburg and Stockholm, for the cession of Norway in perpetuity to the Swedish crown, and engaged, if necessary, to employ their naval co-operation along with the Swedish or Russian forces. This last article has been severely condemned by the French writers, as an adoption by the allies of Napoleon's system of transferring kingdoms and spoliating crowns; but, in answer to this, it is enough to observe, that though Russia, prior to Napoleon's invasion, had been in amity with the cabinet of Denmark, yet that power had adhered to his standard when the war of 1812 commenced; and against England the Danish court had been in a state of violent hostility ever since 1807. Having thus made their election to cast in their fortunes with the Emperor Napoleon, they had no right to complain if they underwent the fate of war from his and their own armies.†

Alliance of France and Denmark, July 10.

While the allies were thus strengthening themselves by alliance for the great struggle in which they were engaged, Napoleon, on his part, had only one additional ally whom he gained, and that was Denmark, with whom a treaty, offensive and defensive, was concluded on the 10th of July, at Dresden. The English government had made an ill-concerted attempt, some time previously, to compel the court of Copenhagen to join the Grand Alliance, and for this purpose a squadron appeared before Copenhagen, and demanded a categorical answer within forty-eight hours, under the pain of bombardment. This measure, which, if supported by an adequate force, might have been attended with the happiest effects, failed from the want of any military or naval force capable of carrying it into execution; and, shortly after, the treaty, offensive and defensive, was signed between France and Denmark. By this treaty it was stipulated that France should declare war against Sweden, and Denmark

May 31.

July 10.

* Ann. Reg., 1813, 355. State Papers, Martin, xii., 568. Schoell, x., 255, 256.

† Martin, Sup., xii., 573. Schoell, x., 256. Ann. Reg., 1813; State Papers, 357, 359.

* See Convention in Martin, Sup., xii., 577; and Schoell, x., 261, 262; and Ann. Reg., 1813. State Papers, 361.

† Ann. Reg., 1813. State Papers, 356. Martin, Sup., xii., 556. Schoell, x., 207.

against Russia, within twenty hours after the denunciation of the armistice, concur with all their forces to the common object, and mutually guaranty each other's possessions. This treaty secured to the French troops a considerable support at the mouth of the Elbe, and the aid of twenty thousand good troops—a succour of no inconsiderable importance, considering the advanced position of Marshal Davoust at Hamburg, and the importance of providing a counterpoise to the Crown-prince of Sweden in the north of Germany.*

Importance of the position which Austria now held.

Austria, however, was the important power which, in reality, held the balance between the hostile parties, and whose forces, hourly accumulating behind the Bohemian Hills, threatened to pour down with irresistible force upon whatever party ventured to dispute its will. In physical strength, the allies and Napoleon, as the indecisive result of the late battles proved, were very nearly matched. France, Bavaria, and the Confederation of the Rhine, supported by Italy on the one flank and Denmark on the other, were superior in number of inhabitants and resources to Russia, Prussia, and Sweden; while the land-forces of England were wholly absorbed in the Mediterranean and Peninsular contests. It was Austria, therefore, with her hundred and fifty thousand men, in the central salient bastion of Bohemia, which, in reality, held the balance, and it was hard for an ordinary observer to say to which side she was likely to incline; for, if the direction of the allied armies to Upper Silesia, and their abandonment of their natural line of communication with the Oder and the Vistula, indicated a reliance upon the secret favour of the cabinet of Vienna, the family alliance between Napoleon and the house of Hapsburg might be expected to lead to an opposite inclination; and it was difficult to imagine that the Emperor of Austria would be inclined, in the end, to push matters to such extremities as to endanger the throne of his own daughter.†

Views of the Austrian cabinet at this period.

In truth, however, the views of Austria at this period were sufficiently matured, and it was only the extreme circumspection with which she carried them into execution that occasioned any doubt as to their tendency. Metternich, who at that period had come to acquire that direction of the cabinet of Vienna which he has ever since enjoyed, was too clear-sighted not to perceive the extraordinary advantages which fortune had now thrown in his way; and he was determined, if possible, to render them the means of regaining the lost possessions, and restoring the tarnished lustre of the Austrian crown. He was too well aware of the insatiable ambition by which Napoleon was actuated, as well as the warlike influences from within to which he was subject, to place the slightest reliance on the promises of moderation now so prodigally lavished by him; and he saw little proof of such a disposition in the determination, openly avowed, to avenge the defection of Prussia by entire extinction, and thereby render himself the undisputed master of Germany. By his advice, therefore, the bait thrown out of restoring Silesia to the house of Hapsburg was refused; and the cabinet of Vienna came under engagements, conditional, indeed, but sufficiently explicit to authorize the King of Prussia to announce publicly, in his proclamation of the 7th of May, "that in a few hours *another power* would join itself to the cause of the allies." And although the unforeseen issue of the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen suspended this declaration, and threw Saxony, which was all but engaged in a similar policy, into the arms of France, yet, in truth, there was no variation of purpose on the part of the cabinet of Vienna; on the contrary, they were only the more determined, on account of the near balance of the contending parties, to turn to the best account their all-important functions as armed mediators. Not only the Illyrian provinces, but Lombardy and the Tyrol, were now openly talked of as restorations to be demanded; and the restitution of the papal dominions, and dissolution of the Confederacy of the Rhine, as concessions to be strongly contended for. Still Austria was most anxious, if she possibly could, to avoid drawing the sword, and would greatly have preferred gaining these advantages by the weight of her armed mediation than submitting them to the doubtful fortune of arms. But she was determined to appeal to that issue if her objects could not be otherwise gained; and these views were clearly evinced in the choice she made of ambassadors to send to the headquarters of the opposite parties; for Stadion, the avowed enemy of the French emperor, was despatched to those of the allies,* and Count Bubna, the declared advocate of peace, to those of Napoleon; while the Emperor Francis himself repaired to the castle of Getschen, in Bohemia, to be near the theatre of the important diplomatic negotiations by which, to all appearance, the fate of Europe would be determined.

May 7.

Little progress was made during the first three weeks of the armistice in the work of negotiation. Difficulties arose from the very outset as to the forms in which, and the parties by whom they should be conducted. The allied sovereigns were desirous that their plenipotentiaries should not treat directly with those of France, but that both parties should address themselves to Austria as the mediating power; and this proposition was strongly supported by Prince Metternich on the part of the cabinet of Vienna. To solve this difficulty, he came in person to Getschen, and an active correspondence there took place between him and Maret on the part of the French emperor. In the course of these letters, Maret strongly insisted for a categorical answer to the question, whether France was to regard Austria as still its ally under the treaty of the 14th of March, 1812. To this Metternich replied, that the duties of a mediator were noways inconsistent with those of an ally under the existing treaty; and, therefore, that he at once agreed to a convention, to supply whatever was wanting in the original treaty, and strongly urged all the powers to send plenipotentiaries to Getschen to conclude a general

Commencement of the negotiations with the belligerant powers.

June 15.

* See Treaty in Martin, Sup., i., 589. Jom., iv., 315. Fain, ii., 15.

† Hard., xii., 177, 179. Jom., iv., 316, 317.

* Hard., xii., 177, 179. Jom., iv., 316. Schoell, x., 241.

pacification. It was at length agreed that, to preserve the independence essential to the due discharge of the duties of a mediator, the alliance should not be considered as broken, but only *suspended:* an equivocal expression, which Napoleon justly considered as equivalent to its entire dissolution.*

The next point upon which difficulties arose was the form in which the negotiations should be conducted; and upon this matter the variance was such that Metternich repaired to Dresden in person, in order to arrange the basis of the proposed mediations with the emperor, and discussions of the highest interest and importance took place between them. They were prolonged till past midnight, and have been preserved by Baron Fain, his private secretary, and bear all the stamp of originality and truth.†

Interview between Napoleon and Metternich, June 28. Remarkable speech of the former.

"You are welcome, Metternich," said Napoleon, as soon as he was introduced, "but wherefore so late? We have lost nearly a month, and your mediation, from its long inactivity, has become almost hostile. It appears that it no longer suits your cabinet to guaranty the integrity of the French Empire: be it so; but why had you not the candour to make me acquainted with that determination at an earlier period? It might have modified my plans, perhaps prevented me from continuing the war. When you allowed me to exhaust myself by new efforts, you doubtless little calculated on such rapid events as have ensued. I have gained, nevertheless, two battles: my enemies, severely weakened, were beginning to waken from their illusions, when suddenly you glided among us, and, speaking to me of armistice and mediation, you spoke to them of alliance and war. But for your pernicious intervention, peace would have been at this moment concluded between the allies and myself. What have hitherto been the fruits of your intervention? I know of none except the treaties of Reichenbach between Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain. They speak of the accession of a third power to these conventions; but you have Stadion on the spot, and must be better informed on these particulars than I am. You cannot deny that, since she has assumed the office of mediator, Austria has not only ceased to be my ally, but become my enemy. You were about to declare yourselves so when the battle of Lutzen intervened, and, by showing you the necessity of augmenting your forces, made you desirous of gaining time. You have your two hundred thousand men ready screened by the Bohemian Hills: Schwartzenberg commands them; at this very moment he is concentrating them in my rear; and it is because you conceive yourself in a condition to dictate the law that you have come to pay this visit. I see through you, Metternich: your cabinet wishes to profit by my embarrassments, and augment them as much as possible, in order to recover a portion of what you have lost. The only difficulty you have is, whether you can gain your object without fighting, or whether you must throw yourselves boldly among the combatants; you do not know well which of these lines to adopt, and possibly you have come here to seek more light on the subject. Well, what do you want? let us treat."*

Metternich's reply.

To this vehement attack, which imbodied more truth than he was willing to admit, Metternich replied with studied address. "The sole advantage which the emperor, my master, proposes, or wishes to derive from the present state of affairs, is, the influence which a spirit of moderation, and a respect for the rights and possessions of independent states, cannot fail to acquire from those who are animated with similar sentiments. Austria wishes to establish a state of things which, by a wise distribution of power, may place the guarantee of peace under the protection of an association of independent states." "Speak more clearly," interrupted the emperor: "come at once to the point; but do not forget that I am a soldier, who would rather break than bend. I have offered you Illyria to remain neutral; will that suffice? My army is amply sufficient to bring back the Russians and Prussians to reason: all that I ask of you is, to withdraw from the strife." "Ah! sire," said Metternich, eagerly, "why should your majesty enter singly into the strife: why should you not double your forces? You may do so, sire! It depends only on you to add our forces to your own. Yes, matters have come to that point that we can no longer remain neutral: we must be either for you or against you."

Napoleon's reply.

At these words the emperor conducted Metternich into a cabinet apart, the tables of which were covered with maps, and for some time their conversation could not be overheard. In a little, however, the voice of Napoleon was again audible above its ordinary pitch. "What! not only Illyra, but the half of Italy, and the return of the pope to Rome, and Poland, and the abandonment of Spain, Holland, the Confederation of the Rhine, and Switzerland! And this is what you call the spirit of moderation! You are intent only on profiting by every chance which offers: you alternately transport your alliance from one camp to the other, in order to be always a sharer in the spoil, and you yet speak to me of your respect for the rights of independent states! You would have Italy; Russia, Poland; Sweden, Norway; Prussia, Saxony; and England, Holland and Belgium: in fine, peace is only a pretext; you are all intent on dismembering the French Empire! And Austria thinks she has only to declare herself, to crown such an enterprise! You pretend here, with a stroke of the pen, to make the ramparts of Dantzic, Custrin, Glogau, Magdebourg, Wesel, Mayence, Antwerp, Alexandria, Mantua: in fine, all the strong places of Europe, sink before you, of which I did not obtain possession but by the force of victories! And I, obedient to your policy, am to evacuate Europe, of which I still hold the half; recall my legions across the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; subscribe a treaty which would be nothing but a vast capitulation; and place myself at the mercy of those of whom I am at this moment the conqueror! And it is when my standards still float at the mouths of the Vistula and on the banks of the Oder; when my victorious army is at the gates of Berlin and

* Maret to Metternich, 15th June, 1813. Metternich to Maret, 28th June, 1813. Fain, ii., 121, 139.

† Fain, ii., 34.

* Fain, ii., 36, 38. Hard., xii., 191, 192.

Breslau; when in person I am at the head of three hundred thousand men, that Austria, without striking a blow, without drawing a sword, expects to make me subscribe such conditions! And it is my father-in-law that has matured such a project; it is he that sends you on such a mission! In what position would he place me in regard to the French people? Does he suppose that a dishonoured and mutilated throne can be a refuge in France for his son-in-law and grandson? *Ah! Metternich, how much has England given you to make war upon me?*"*†

This violent apostrophe was delivered while Napoleon, strongly excited, was striding up and down the apartment; and at the last insulting expression, which nothing in the character or conduct of the Austrian diplomatist could for an instant justify, the emperor let his hat, which he held in his hand, fall to the ground. Metternich turned pale, but without making the movement to raise it which his politeness would at any other moment have dictated, suffered him to pass and repass it several times, and at length the emperor kicked it aside himself.‡

Calm conduct of Metternich.

After a pause of some minutes' duration, during which not a word passed on either side, Napoleon became more tractable, and, reverting to fair words, contended only for a congress, which should continue its sittings even during hostilities, in case they should recommence. A convention, in consequence, was agreed upon, by which it was stipulated that the congress should meet at Prague, at latest on the 5th of July, and that Austria should procure the prolongation of the armistice to the 10th of August. The convention set out with the Emperor of Austria's offer of his mediation, which was accepted by the Emperor Napoleon, "for a general or Continental peace." By this means, Metternich gained a great advantage over Napoleon, inasmuch as he drove him out of his favourite project of a convention of separate powers to treat for peace, and won him over to the acceptance of Austria's mediation, which he had so much at heart, and which was so obviously calculated to augment the influence of that country in the approaching negotiations.◊

Convention between Austria and France for a mediation. June 30.

June 30.

Nothing definitive, however, was as yet settled as to the intentions of Austria: she had gained her object of interposing her mediation between the belligerent powers; but it was uncertain to which side she would ultimately incline; Metternich had openly avowed that, if the French emperor would accede to the terms which she proposed, he would throw his whole two hundred thousand men into the scale in his favour. But at this decisive moment, big with the fate of Europe and of the world, the star of England prevailed, and Wellington, with irresistible force, cast his sword into the balance. On the morning of the 30th of June, on the evening of which day the convention with Austria was signed, Napoleon received by express the details of the BATTLE OF VITTORIA, by which a deathblow had been given to the French power in the Peninsula, and his armies had been swept as by a whirlwind from the north and west of Spain. It was not difficult to see, therefore, to what cause his ready accession to the convention had been owing. Metternich had no sooner regained the Emperor of Austria's headquarters than he also received the same important intelligence, which was followed, a few days after, by the most complete proof of the decisive nature of the victory, in the announcement that, six days after the battle was fought—viz., on the 27th of June—not one man of the seventy thousand who there combated under the standards of Joseph remained on the Spanish territory.*

Intelligence is received by both parties of the battle of Vittoria.

June 30.

July 1.

July 6.

Great and decisive was the influence which this immense achievement exercised on the conferences at Prague. "Metternich," says Fain, "could not fail to learn the details of this victory from the mouths of the English themselves, the moment he returned to Bohemia; and we shall soon see the *fatal influence* which it exercised on the progress of the negotiations." "The impression of Lord Wellington's success," says Lord Londonderry, "was strong and universal, and produced ultimately, in my opinion, the recommencement of hostilities." Nor is it surprising that the English and French diplomatists then on the spot should thus concur as to the influence of this great victory on the issue of the negotiations. The Peninsular contest was now decided: it was no longer a consummate general maintaining with inferior means a painful defensive conflict, but a victorious chief at the head of the military force of three nations, who, after expelling the enemy from the soil which they had polluted, was preparing to cross the frontier, and carry his triumphant standards into the heart of France. A hundred thousand men, assembled around the standards of Wellington, awaited only the fall of the frontier fortresses to descend like a torrent from the Pyrenees, and inundate the valley of the Garonne. The charm of Napoleon's invincibility was at an end; disaster had overtaken his arms alike in the South as in the North of Europe; no snows existed to extenuate the last calamity; and the only question Austria had to consider was, whether she should voluntarily ally herself to a sinking empire and a falling cause.†

Vast influence which it exercised on the issue of the negotiations.

Fully impressed with the magnitude of the disaster, Napoleon took immediate and vigorous steps to arrest it. Aware that the disunion among his generals had been one great cause of the loss of the Peninsula, he immediately sent for the ablest of his marshals, Soult, and despatched him to the theatre of war in the Pyrenees, with full powers,

Soult is sent with extraordinary powers to Spain.

July 2.

* Fain, ii., 41, 42. Hard., ii., 193, 194.

† The authenticity and accuracy of this remarkable conversation and anecdote formerly rested only on Baron Fain's account of the scene, which, although worthy of all credit from the character of the writer, might be supposed to be a little influenced by his evident partiality for the French hero, in whose service he was; but it is now entirely confirmed, in every particular, by the corroborating testimony of Capefigue, who derived his information from Metternich himself. —See CAPEFIGUE, *Historie de l'Europe pendant l'Empire*, x., 141.

‡ Fain, ii., 43.

◊ Fain, i., 44, 46. Hard., xii., 194, 196.

* Hard., xii., 196. Fain, ii., 64. Lond., 88. Thib., ix., 323.

† Fain, ii. Lond., 88.

as "lieutenant of the emperor," and instructions to defend the passes of those mountains to the last extremity; while, at the same time, orders were despatched to Suchet to evacuate Valencia and fall back behind the Ebro into Catalonia. Thus, on all sides, the vast fabric of French power in Spain was crumbling into ruins: a single deathblow on the decisive point had sufficed to lay the huge edifice, painfully raised during five successive years, and by fifty victories, in the dust.*

Napoleon's preparations for war.

From this moment all prospect of peace was abandoned: the views of both parties were mainly directed to war, and the negotiations at Prague were used but as a cover, on both sides, to gain time for completing their preparations. On July 5. the 5th of July, only four days after the disastrous intelligence from Spain had been received, Marshal St. Cyr set out on a special commission from the emperor to inspect the whole frontier passes into Bohemia, and report upon the forces necessary to guard them, and the amount of the enemy's troops which were collected within the mountain screen. Meanwhile, the emperor in all directions made the most vigorous preparations for the resumption of hostilities. Making Dresden his headquarters, he was incessantly occupied in inspections of the fortifications of that city and the adjoining forts, reviewing the numerous *corps d'armée* which were now assembled in its vicinity, or corresponding with the different marshals who were stationed so as to maintain the line of that river from the Bohemian Mountains to July 7. the sea. One day he went by Torgau to Wittemberg, reviewing troops and inspecting July 9. the fortifications at both places; the next he set out by Dessau for Magdebourg, and thence returned by Leipsic to Dresden. On another occasion he minutely inspected the fortifications of Koenigstein, and the famous intrenched camp of Pirna, of which the mouldering lines were renovated and strengthened. Such was his activity, that he not unfrequently made a circuit of seventeen or eighteen leagues on horseback, or in his carriage, in a single afternoon. When not himself inspecting the environs of Dresden, he was constantly poring over the map, with his battalions of many-coloured pins placed in almost every conceivable situation, sometimes in the Bohemian passes, sometimes in the Saxon plains; so that it was hardly possible that hostilities should take place on any ground with which he was not acquainted, or under any combination which he had not considered.†

His plans of the campaign, and measures for the defence of Dresden.

These minute investigations were preliminary to a design which Napoleon had profoundly conceived, and which he most ably carried into execution, of making Dresden the centre and pivot of his defensive line on the Elbe, and of taking his last stand there for the empire of Germany. The situation of the ground in its environs was eminently favourable to such a design. The Elbe, in issuing from Bohemia, makes its way into the Saxon plains between two huge rocks, which restrain the course of the river and master its direction. Their summits overlook the whole valley in which the river flows: that on the right bank is named the Lilienstein, that on the left the Koenigstein. These two immense piles of stone may be regarded as the advanced sentinels of Dresden. On the Koenigstein was already placed a fortress of the same name, which was altogether impregnable to open force, and at its foot stands the camp of Pirna, to which the wars of the Great Frederic had given immortality. On the opposite rock, the Lilienstein, works were established which communicated by two bridges with the opposite fortress, and the two together were intended to command the defile, and cover an intrenched camp for sixty thousand men. The lines of defence at this point extended from Gieshubel across to Stolpen, the ancient citadel of which, built on the flat summit of the basalt, was strengthened with additional works; and the bridges which they commanded served as a communication, not only between the opposite fortresses, but between the armies on the right and left bank in Silesia and Lusatia. The traveller in the places now described will recognise the well-known features of those magic scenes, where, amid awful precipices, sable forests, sounding cataracts, and spacious streams, he regains in the heart of Germany the images and the enchantment of Alpine solitude.*

Works around Dresden and on the Elbe.

Nor was it only at the great mountain gate from Bohemia into Saxony that the care of the emperor was bestowed: Dresden itself was the object of his anxious solicitude. Being but imperfectly fortified, the gaps in its walls were filled up by ditches and palisades, which completed the circuit; the mouldering masonry of the old bastions was repaired, their ditches cleaned out and filled with water; while five large redoubts, connected together by strong palisades, were constructed farther out, the fire from which intersected the whole intervening space, and rendered it impossible to approach the town till part of them, at least, were taken. The value of these redoubts was strongly felt in the campaign which followed: they saved the French army from a deathblow within a few days after the resumption of hostilities; and so anxious was the emperor for their completion, that fifteen thousand peasants, conscribed from all parts of Saxony, were, during the armistice, employed constantly on them night and day. All the fortresses lower down the river were, in like manner, put in the best possible state of defence; cannon mounted on all their embrasures, and stores and provisions for a long siege laid in by convoys from France, and requisitions from all the adjoining country. Hamburg, in particular, which formed the last of this iron chain stretched along the Elbe, was strengthened with additional works, its old rampart repaired, and its ditches cleaned out; while, under the able direction of General Haxo and Colonel Ponthon, new outworks were formed to a considerable distance around the walls, which carried the axe of desolation through the charming gardens and villas which had so long constituted the delight of that luxurious people.

* Fain, ii., 81. Hard., xii., 198, 199.

† Odel., i., 221, 224. Fain, ii., 20, 21. St. Cyr, Hist. Mil., iv., 51.

* Témoin Occulaire. Odel., ii., 141. Fain, ii., 20. 23. Personal observation.

But their tears and entreaties were alike unavailing: the rising redoubt ploughed equally through the scenes of festivity and the abode of joy; the disconsolate owners, turned adrift on the world, were ridiculed when they sought indemnification; while the methodical genius of Marshal Davoust, always fully alive when money was to be extorted from a suffering people, contrived, during the six months of his occupation, to extract such immense sums from this industrious community as would have been reckoned impossible by the generals of any other nation, and passed as fabulous in any other age but that which saw the arts of extortion brought to perfection by the generals of the French Revolution.*†

Strength of this line of the Elbe.

By these means, though at the expense of an enormous amount of human suffering, a very strong line of defence was obtained on the Elbe. From the rocks of Koenigstein to the fields of Hamburg, a line of fortresses extended, some of the first order, others of inferior strength, but all calculated to impede the motions of the enemy, and afford to Napoleon the inappreciable advantage of transferring the seat of his operations at pleasure from one bank to the other. Koenigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittemberg, Magdebourg, Hamburg, formed a line of formidable fortresses on the Elbe, of all of which he was master; while Merseberg, Erfurth, and Wurtzburg composed his chain of fortified posts to the Rhine. Erfurth, in particular, which lay in the centre of, and commanded the main communication with, France, was the object of his principal solicitude: large stores of provisions were already accumulated within its walls, and its rocky citadels assumed the aspect of formidable forts. The active genius of Napoleon, revolving the possible events of the campaign,‡ was preparing against all the changes which might occur; and while he was closing with iron gates the passes of the Bohemian Mountains, and adding to the fortifications on the whole line of the Elbe, he was alternately preparing for a desperate defensive warfare on the Saxon plains, meditating a hostile irruption into the sands of Prussia, and taking measures for an eventual retreat to the banks of the Rhine.

Murmurs against those plans in the French army.

The magnitude and vigour, however, of the emperor's preparations on the Elbe clearly evinced to both his generals and soldiers his determination to make that river the base of a desperate defensive struggle, and gave rise to much discussion, and many sinister presentiments in the army. Defensive warfare does not suit the genius of the French soldiers, and it, accordingly, has rarely, if ever, succeeded with them. Murmurs, loud and long, arose on all sides against the proposed plan of operations. "Austria," it was said, "by opening the gates of Bohemia to the allied forces, will enable them to take the whole line of the Elbe in reverse. Is the emperor about to expose himself to be cut off from France? Instead of so hazardous a project, would it not be more prudent to collect our garrisons from the Oder and the Elbe, leave those on the Vistula to their fate, and, with all the troops which can be collected, retire to a defensive position on the Saale, and, if necessary, to the Rhine? Serious losses, indeed, will be incurred by such a system, and a cloud be thrown over the star of the Empire; but can it any longer be maintained in its former brilliancy, and is it not better to lose a part than endanger the whole?"*

Napoleon's reply.

These representations came from too respectable quarters, and were in themselves too much founded in common sense, to permit the emperor entirely to disregard them; and therefore he laboured, in conversation with his marshals, to explain the grounds connected with the peculiarity of his situation, and the general interests of his empire, on which his plan of operations was based. "It is quite true," said he, "that you should not lightly hazard your line of communications: every tyro in the military art knows that; but, at the same time, when great interests are wound up with the maintenance of a particular position, it must often be maintained at all hazards: we must have courage to apply the torch to our vessels. What would the defensive system which you advocate reduce us to? losses greater than would result from the loss of ten pitched battles. We now require a complete triumph. The question is no longer the abandonment of such or such a position: our political superiority is at stake; the enemy would reduce it, and on it our existence depends. Are you afraid I shall be too much in the air in the heart of Germany? Was I not in a position still more hazardous at Marengo, Austerlitz, and Wagram? From Arcola to this day, all the important steps I have taken have been hazards of that description, and, in so doing, I have only followed the example of other illustrious conquerors.† If the enemy debouch from

* Odel., i., 226. Fain, ii., 24.

† Davoust levied a contribution of 40,000,000 francs, or £1,600,000, on the city of Hamburg; and as the magistrates were utterly unable to produce such a sum, he took possession of the bank, and carried off the whole specie which it contained, amounting to more than half the sum, and levied the remainder, without mercy, from the inhabitants. Hamburg at this period contained about 107,000 inhabitants, being a little more than a third of the number at present in Glasgow; and, taking into view the difference between the value of money in the two countries, it may safely be affirmed that this burden was not less in amount than four millions sterling would be upon Glasgow at the present time. Some idea may be formed, from this fact, of the enormous amount of the contributions levied by the French generals on the countries which they occupied, and which excited everywhere such unbounded exasperation against them. This, however, was but a small part of the losses sustained by the inhabitants; for Davoust seized the merchandise, shipping, and movable property of every description that could be brought to sale, and disposed of them for the purposes of his army, insomuch that the total loss sustained by the inhabitants was estimated at four millions sterling. From the bank alone there was taken no less than 7,500,000 marks, or above £1,200,000. So sensible were the French government of these enormous spoliations, that, by a treaty in 1816, they agreed to pay to Hamburg £500,000 by way of indemnity; which, however, did not amount to more than an eighth part of the actual amount of their losses. So dreadfully did it suffer from these exactions, that its population in 1814 was reduced to 67,000 souls, instead of 107,000, which it contained when it was united to the French Empire.—See MALTE BRUN, *lib.* 124, *voce* Hamburg, and CAPEFIGUE, x., 271.

‡ Bout., Camp de 1813, 5, 6. Nap. in Montholon, ii., 40. Fain, ii., 23, 24. Jom., iv., 363, 364.

* Fain, ii., 25, 26.

† "Did Alexander, Hannibal, or Cæsar occupy themselves about their line of retreat when the moment had come to combat for the empire of the world? And what would have happened if Alexander had been beaten on the Indus, or Hannibal at Cannæ, or Cæsar on the promontory of Dyrrachium? In the campaign of 1805, I was about to have Prussia in my rear; I was engaged in the depths of Moravia; retreat across Germany was impossible; but, nev-

Bohemia in my rear, it will be precisely in order to compel the retrograde movement which you would have me voluntarily undertake. I am not in the air in Germany when I rest on all the strong places of the Elbe.

"Dresden is the pivot on which all my operations will turn. From Berlin to Prague, the enemy is disseminated over an immense circle, of which I occupy the centre; his corps must make immense detours to concentrate, whereas mine, moving on an interior line of communication, will not have half the ground to go over. Wherever I am not in person my generals must learn to wait for me, without committing anything to hazard. Do you suppose it likely that the allies will be able, for any length of time, to maintain the unity requisite for such extended operations? And may not I reasonably expect, sooner or later, to surprise them in some false movements? They will throw detached parties between the Elbe and the Rhine. I expect it; I am prepared for it. Independent of the garrisons of the fortresses on that line, Mayence, Wesel, Erfurth, Wurtzburg, Augereau is collecting a corps of observation on the Maine. Should they have the audacity to interpose in force between our fortified lines on the Elbe and the Rhine, I will straightway enter into Bohemia; and it is I who will threaten their rear. A few Cossacks, it is true, may insult our departments bordering on the Rhine; but the National Guard will suffice to repel them, and the transference of the seat of war to the gates of Mayence would be attended with consequences of a very different description. It is very natural that the Saxons should be desirous to remove the war from their territory; but is it our interest, as Frenchmen, to re-echo their complaints? It is in the Saxon plains that the fate of Germany is about to be decided. I repeat it: the position which I occupy presents such advantages, that the enemy, even though victorious in ten battles, could hardly force me back to the Rhine; while a single victory gained by me, by bringing our eagles to the capitals of the enemy, and delivering our garrisons on the Oder and the Vistula, would speedily bring the allies to terms. I have calculated everything: fortune must now decide the event. However good my reasons may be, I know that I shall be judged of according to the event; it is the rigorous law of history."*

Forces of Napoleon at the conclusion of the armistice.

It was not surprising that the emperor entertained such an opinion on his chances of success in the position which he held at Dresden, for the forces which he had accumulated for its defence were immense. By vast efforts, the conscripts and reserves had been so completely brought up to the Elbe, that the army ready to recommence hostilities was raised to four hundred thousand men, of whom nearly three hundred and fifty thousand were effective, and present with the eagles.* This immense force carried with them no less than twelve hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, of which two hundred were the redoubted artillery of the Guard, in the finest possible condition. The caissons were all replenished, vast military stores collected, and the *matériel* of the army, generally speaking, in good, that of the Guard in the most admirable order. The cavalry was the only arm which was deficient: that of the reserve, under Murat, was only thirty thousand; the light horse, attached to the differents corps, fifteen thousand men. Nor was money wanting: the vaults of the Tuileries had poured forth their vast treasures with seasonable profusion; the whole corps of the army had received their pay, and ample funds existed to carry on the prodigious fortifications which were everywhere in progress to render the line of the Elbe impregnable to the forces of combined Europe.†

New measures of the emperor to hasten the conscripts to the army.

It was by unheard-of exertions, and wringing out of the country its last resources, however, that so vast a force had been concentrated for the defensive struggle in the heart of Germany. Aware of the decisive nature of the contest which was approaching, the emperor spared no efforts, either of his own or his lieutenants, to bring up every sabre and bayonet into the field. The frequent desertion of the conscripts, and numerous acts of license and pillage which attended their line of march, induced him to prepare an entirely new set of regulations, which were rigidly enforced, for restraining these disorders and forcing on the refractory or reluctant levies to the scene of action. Every conscript, from the moment he was clothed and armed, was considered as disposable, and treated accordingly. The moment he was drawn, the young soldier was hurried off to the depôt, arrayed in uniform, armed, and that very day his military instruction commenced. As soon as a hundred were assembled, they were marched off, under the orders of a captain, to the headquarters of their regiment, and taught the manual and platoon exercise while walking along the road. Other companies were directed to the same line, and, as fast as they met, united together so as to form a battalion of march; and these battalions again joined, so as to form a regiment of march. Before crossing the Rhine, these troops were formed into columns of march, over the formation

ertheless, I conquered at Austerlitz. In 1806, when my columns entered the Thuringian forests, Austria was marching on my communications, and Spain was about to cross the Pyrenees; but I conquered at Jena. In 1809, when I had to contend with the waves of the Danube, Hungary and Tyrol were insurgent on either flank, and Prussia was preparing to descend to Franconia, and the English menaced Antwerp; but still I conquered at Wagram."—NAPOLEON *in* MONTHOLON, ii., 11; and LAS CASAS, iii., 128, 129.

* Fain, ii., 29, 31.

* These numbers are ascertained in an authentic manner, and on the best possible evidence—the confidential correspondence of Napoleon himself at that period with the marshals commanding his armies. On the 17th of August, 1813, he wrote to Marshal St. Cyr, "The army of Buntzlau, in Silesia, is 130,000 or 140,000 strong, independent of the Guard, which is 50,000. Poniatowsky, Kellerman, St. Cyr, and Vandamme have 70,000 opposite to Gabel in Bohemia. The Duke of Reggio is at the head of 80,000 men near Magdebourg, besides 10,000 in that fortress. The Prince of Echmuhl is at the head of 25,000 French and 15,000 Danes at Hamburg; in Torgau and Wittemberg are 20,000. It is clear that 400,000 *men, resting on such a chain of fortresses as those of the Elbe*, and which may, at pleasure, debouch by Dresden, Torgau, Wittemberg, and Magdebourg, are not to be turned."—See NAPOLEON *to* ST. CYR, *17th August*, 1813; *to* DAVOUST, *13th August*, 1813; and *to* OUDINOT, *13th August*, 1813: ST. CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iv., 355, 358, 360, 367. *Pièces Just.* Jomini, accordingly, states, "The active army in Germany consisted, at the resumption of hostilities, of 400,000 men, with 1250 pieces of cannon."—JOMINI, *Vie de Napoleon*, iv., 361.

† Fain, ii., 56, 226, 227. Jom., iv., 361. Bout., Camp. de 1813, 4, 5.

and organization of which the veteran Marshal Kellerman, stationed at Mayence, presided. The most rigorous discipline was enforced upon these moving columns; and though it was inadequate to prevent dreadful disorders, consequent on the passage of such a multitude of young men just emancipated from the restraints of parental discipline, yet it augmented to a surprising degree the number of efficient soldiers who made their appearance around the eagles of the regiments. All these columns of march were directed to Dresden, where the emperor received daily returns of the accessions of strength which his army was receiving, so that he knew the exact force on which he could rely. No sooner was this return made than the column of march was dissolved, and the conscripts of each regiment, under the direction of its own officers, took the route for the regimental headquarters.* With such rapidity were the military formations and discipline thus acquired, that a regiment was reviewed by the emperor, and made a respectable appearance, on the 20th of July, at Dresden, which had only been imbodied in France on the 27th of May.

Aspect of Dresden at this period.

The concourse of so prodigious a number of soldiers at Dresden, as well as the continued residence of Napoleon, who, during the armistice, constantly had made it his headquarters, entirely altered the aspect of that charming city. If you cast your eyes on its palisaded trenches—on the girdle of redoubts which encircled its walls, on the hosts of pioneers who cut their way through its smiling gardens, on the formidable batteries which arose, as if by magic, around its environs, and the innumerable camps which covered its lovely hills—it was hardly possible to conceive whither the peaceful Saxon capital had fled. Nothing was to be seen on every side but long columns of troops, trains of artillery, and endless files of chariots; while the rich and varied uniforms of officers on horseback, riding to and fro, bespoke the incessant activity of the chief by whom the immense multitude was ruled and directed. But in the interior of the city things still wore a pacific aspect. The multitude of French officers, indeed, and civil functionaries, who were there established, had given an entirely foreign air to the capital. German signboards were generally displaced by French; Parisian costumes and articles of ornament were to be seen on every side; the theatres were filled with actors and actresses from the Theâtre Français or Opera Comique; the hotel-keepers and sellers of military maps reaped a rich harvest; and, what was not less characteristic of French habits, the multitude of ladies of pleasure, who resorted thither from all quarters, was so great, and the gains they made so immense, that, despite the well-known extravagance and improvidence of that class, their expenditure could not keep pace with their receipts, and numbers, in a few weeks, realized fortunes which rendered them independent for the rest of their lives.† Extravagance, profusion, and licentiousness universally prevailed; and even the proverbial honesty of the Saxon character was fast giving way under the accumulated temptations which the presence of such prodigious bodies of foreign troops necessarily induced. But the progress of this moral gangrene was concealed under a still splendid exterior. The listless, indolent groups of officers who thronged the coffee-houses, lounged through the shops, or adorned the theatres; the multitudes of superb liveries which were to be seen in the streets; the splendid equipages which were driving in every direction; and the crowds of richly-dressed functionaries, who every morning attended at the levées in the palace, bespoke the mighty monarch, still, from his central capital, giving the law to the half of Europe.*

Disposition of Napoleon's force in Germany.

This vast force, which, by such extraordinary efforts, Napoleon had collected together, was disposed after the following manner. Twenty-five thousand Bavarians, stationed at Munich, observed the threatening masses of the Austrians, of equal strength, who were collecting in the neighbourhood of Lintz; twenty thousand conscripts, for the most part almost entirely inexperienced, were collected, under Augereau, at Wurtzburg and Bamberg; Davoust occupied Hamburg, at the extreme left, with twenty-five thousand French and fifteen thousand Danes; Oudinot, with eighty thousand, was stationed in front of Torgau, on the road to Berlin, to watch Bernadotte, who, with ninety thousand men, covered that capital; while two hundred and thirty thousand, divided into eleven corps, or forty-three divisions of infantry, and eighteen divisions, or four hundred and twenty-nine squadrons of cavalry, were under the immediate orders of the emperor, and cantoned from Dresden to Liegnitz, with a corps, under St. Cyr, to observe the passes into the Bohemian Mountains. This was independent of thirty-five thousand men, of various nations, who were assembled, under Rapp, at Dantzic, and the garrisons on the Elbe and Oder, in all eighty thousand combatants. But they were out of the sphere of operations, and could only be reckoned available by withdrawing an equal force of the enemy from the field.†

Deplorable condition of the garrisons in his rear.

The situation, meanwhile, of the garrisons, who were in a manner lost to France amid the inundation of hostile nations by which they were surrounded, was such, that it was impossible to expect that they could much longer hold out for the French crown. The stores which Dantzic contained were immense; but such was the situation of its defenders, that they were hardly able to make any use of them. A hundred and twenty thousand stand of arms, twelve millions of francs in specie, and five-and-twenty millions' worth in grain and military clothing, constituted a prize to the conqueror, which it was alike impossible to abandon, and hopeless, in the end, to defend, from the condition of the garrison, notwithstanding its still formidable numbers. Five-and-thirty thousand men, composed of two-and-twenty different nations, had there taken refuge after the calamities of the retreat; but they were not only in part mutilated by the se-

* Fain, ii., 52, 53. Odel., i., 209.

† "Ce fut l'age d'or des femmes livrées à la debauche. On en vit plusieurs s'enrichir au point de se constituer des rentes, ou de payer comptant en Napoleons des maisons qu'elles achetaient."—*Témoin Oculaire*, 148. ODEL., ii., 148.

* Fain, ii., 57, 58. Témoin Ocul. Odel., ii., 148, 149.

† Jom., iv., 361, 362. Fain, ii., 226, 228.

verity of the cold, but almost all so extenuated in body and depressed in mind, from the unexampled horrors from which they had escaped, as to be incapable of any active exertion. They brought with them, moreover, in common with those who took refuge in Thorn, Wittemberg, Torgau, and all the fortresses which opened their gates to the fugitives of the Grand Army after the Moscow campaign, the seeds of a dreadful typhus fever, the invariable attendant on wide-spread suffering, whether from civil or military causes; and which, spreading with frightful rapidity, from the crowded quarters in which they were huddled together, and the total want of hospital stores, linen, or medicines for their use, soon cut off nearly a half of the whole soldiers assembled. Thorn had already succumbed, from these causes rather than from the artillery of Barclay de Tolly, who, with the Russian reserve, had been intrusted with its siege, and compelled it to capitulate, with eighteen hundred men, before a practicable breach was made; Spandau, with a garrison of three thousand, and immense military stores, was surrendered on the same terms on the 24th; and Czentoschau in Poland, with nine hundred men, on the 22d. Dantzic, indeed, still held out, and with the whole fortresses on the Oder, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, as well as Modlin and Zamosc on the Vistula, yet hoisted the tricolour flag;* but their garrisons, weakened by disease and misery, were long unable to undertake any offensive operation, and nothing but the continued blockade of the landwehr, by which they were invested, was requisite to make the fifty thousand veterans they contained surrender, eventually, to the allied arms.

April 17.

April 24.

If Napoleon made good use of his time in reenforcing and strengthening his army during the interval afforded by the armistice, the allies, on their part, were not idle; and such was the activity which they employed, and the enthusiastic spirit with which their people were animated, that they gained much more during that interval than their opponents; and it is to this accession of strength, more, perhaps, than any other cause, that the extraordinary and decisive success which they so soon afterward obtained is to be ascribed.

Preparations of the allies during the armistice.

The first care of the allied sovereigns, after the conclusion of the armistice, was the arrangement of a general plan of operations for the conduct of the campaign; and in this important part of their duty they displayed equal judgment and ability. The general principle laid down was, "that the allied forces should always be directed in strength to the quarter where the principal forces of the enemy were assembled." As a consequence of this, the detached corps which were destined to act on the rear of the enemy should always move as directly as possible upon his line of communications. "The greater part of the allied forces were to be accumulated in the salient angle *of Bohemia*, which appeared eminently calculated to enable them to turn with facility in whatever direction their services were required. In pursuance of these plans, the following operations were agreed on. Part of the allied forces, fifty thousand strong, were to be left at Silesia to check the operations of the enemy in that quarter, but with orders not to hazard a battle. One hundred thousand Russians and Prussians were directed to move, some days before the expiration of the armistice, by the roads of Landshut and Glatz to Jung-Buntzlau, and Budyn in Bohemia, to join, as rapidly as possible, the Austrian army, and augment the allied force in that quarter to two hundred, or two hundred and twenty thousand men. The army of the Prince Royal of Sweden, leaving a corps of twenty thousand men to observe the French in Hamburg, was to assemble, in number about ninety thousand men, in the environs of Treinenbrutzau, before the expiration of the armistice, pass the Elbe between Torgau and Magdebourg, and thence move on Leipsic. The remainder of the allied force in Silesia, estimated at fifty thousand men, was to approach the Elbe, taking care to avoid a general action, and strive to pass that river between Torgau and Dresden, so as to unite to the army of the Prince Royal of Sweden, which by that means would be raised to one hundred and twenty thousand combatants.*

Plan of the campaign fixed at Trachenberg. July 12.

"In the event of circumstances rendering it indispensable to re-enforce the allied army in Bohemia, before the army of Silesia could effect its junction with that of the Prince Royal of Sweden, then the army of Silesia was to march forthwith into Bohemia. The Austrian army, *united to the allied forces*, shall debouch from Bohemia either into Saxony, Silesia, or towards the Danube, as circumstances may require. Should the Emperor Napoleon, in order to anticipate the allied army in Bohemia, march against it, in the first instance the army of the prince royal shall endeavour, by forced marches, to throw itself upon his rear and communications. On the other hand, if the Emperor Napoleon should direct his attack against the army of the prince royal, the grand allied army is immediately to follow from Bohemia, to fall upon his communications, and give him battle. The general principle is, that the whole allied armies shall, from the outset, assume the offensive, and the camp of the enemy shall be their place of rendezvous. The Russian army of reserve, under General Benningsen, shall forthwith advance from the Vistula, and move by Kalisch upon the Oder, in the direction of Glogau, in order to be at hand to act according to the same principles, and assist in the general attack upon the enemy if he remains in Silesia, or oppose his progress if he should attempt an incursion into Poland."†

Such was the memorable plan of operations drawn up at Trachenberg, signed by the allied sovereigns and the Prince Royal of Sweden, on the part of Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, and conditionally, in the event of her mediation failing, by Austria. History, perhaps, affords no previous example of operations so vast, diffused over so wide a circle, and carried on by armies drawn from

Reflections on the admirable wisdom in which they were conceived.

* Hardy, xii., 113, 114. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 27, 28.

* See the Protocol in Lond., 372, and St. Cyr, Hist. Mil., iv., 347. Plotho, i., 386.

† St. Cyr, iv., 348. Lond., 372.

such remote and apparently unconnected empires, being combined with such judgment, and executed with such ability and perseverance. They required for their direction a rare degree of unanimity and prudence on the part of all the principal commanders, and could not prove successful unless carried into effect with the utmost zeal and unanimity on the part of the officers and soldiers of all the different nations employed. Dangers of the most formidable kind awaited the combined armies if any false step was committed, for they acted on the circumference of an immense circle, with a great river, wholly in the hands of the enemy, flowing through its centre; and in the middle lay Napoleon, resting on six fortresses, and at the head of three hundred and fifty thousand effective men. At no earlier period of the war would it have been practicable to have combined the armies of three monarchies in concentric attacks against an enemy of such strength, possessing such a position, and led by such a commander; but times were now widely changed from what they had ever previously been: experienced evil had allayed the jealousies of cabinets, universal suffering had aroused the spirit of the people, and repeated defeats had given wisdom to the generals who led them. Like Charles XII., Napoleon had taught his enemies how to beat him; and a disaster greater than Pultowa awaited him from the lessons which he had given them.

Determination of the cabinet of Vienna to join the allies.

The determination of the cabinet of Vienna had been definitively taken at this period to join their forces to those of Russia and Prussia, if Napoleon refused the sweeping reductions in his empire which Metternich had proposed at the Dresden conference. It is proved, by authentic state papers, that the motive which induced that astute diplomatist to propose the direct mediation of Austria in the end of June, and to urge the extension of the armistice till the 10th of August, was to gain time for the landwehr and Hungarian insurrection to be brought up from the distant provinces of the monarchy, to make head against the immense forces which Napoleon had so unexpectedly brought into action on the Elbe.* Met- July 9. ternich now declared, "that the Emperor Francis's determination was to support the cause for which the Emperor Alexander had made such noble efforts." Agreeably to this determination, the Austrian government was a party to the operations agreed on at Trachenberg; and Bohemia was, with July 12. her approbation, made the great salient bastion from which the forces of the coalition were to issue forth against the enemy. And on the 27th of July, when all hope of a pa- July 27. cific accommodation had vanished, and it had become evident that, with both parties, the renewal of hostilities was only a matter of prudence and time, the Emperor Francis permitted the signature of Austria to be affixed to the secret article of the treaty of Reichenbach, which had been expressly reserved for his sanction by Count Stadion, and in which it was stipulated that, "in the event of Austria taking a part in the war, she should receive £500,000 in bills upon London, and the like sum in military stores and equipments; that she should bring two hundred thousand men into the field, and be restored to the condition in which she was in 1803, or, at any rate, at the peace of Presburg, and that the pope should be restored to his dominions." This clause had been drawn up under Stadion's eyes in the treaty between Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, but without the direct authority of Austria, and the Emperor Francis long hesitated to sanction it; but at length, when all hope of peace had disappeared, he gave his consent on the 27th of July, and thereby incorporated Austria with the Grand Alliance.*

Doubts regarding Bernadotte.

But although the accession of Austria to the league against France, though not yet announced to the world, and still veiled under the dubious guise of armed mediation, removed the greatest source of disquietude from the allied sovereigns, yet they were not without serious uneasiness in another quarter. Although Bernadotte had not hitherto failed in any of his engagements, and his interests were evidently wound up with the maintenance of the Russian power in the North of Europe, from which he was likely to derive such substantial advantages, yet it was more than doubtful how he would act when the contest was removed to Germany, and when he was brought into conflict with his countrymen, his comrades, and his old commander. In truth, nothing could be more heterogeneous than the composition of his moral qualities, or strange than the political combinations in which he was at this time involved. A Frenchman by birth, he was now engaged in a war of life or death against France; a Republican by principle, he was now deeply involved in a coalition of sovereigns against the child of the Revolution; a soldier of fortune under Napoleon, he now headed a powerful army against him; the

* In a military report by Prince Schwartzenberg to the Emperor Francis, dated 28th of June, it was stated, as a reason for prolonging the armistice, "The Bohemian army would be not more than entirely complete on the 20th of June. The vast and unexpected preparations of France render an increased armament on the part of Austria necessary. Every unappropriated regiment of the line, the landwehr, and Hungarian insurrection, must be called out and put into activity. Even if the difficulty of clothing and arming them is got over, it is impossible to bring them to Znaim and Presburg, from the southeastern provinces, before the 14th of August, and the other troops in proportion. Besides the troops raised in Bavaria, 66,000, under the viceroy, have crossed the Tagliamento, and large reserves are collecting at Wurtzburg and Fulda. As these measures menace Vienna, it is necessary to assemble a force at Klagenfurth, and near the capital, to counterbalance them. All this must be done without any detachments from the Bohemian army. Carriages cannot be got to supply Russia with the provisions she requires from Bohemia; and as the extension of the French line on the Elbe may render it desirable that part of the allied force should move into that province, it is most desirable that there should be sufficient time for supplying such a force, and that, in the mean time, the wants of the allies should be supplied from Galicia." "Count Metternich's first and principal object in the negotiations at Dresden, in the end of June, was to urge the prolongation of the armistice till the 10th of August, for the reasons stated in Prince Schwartzenberg's report. He was desirous, also, that Count Stadion should accompany the emperor to Trachenberg, who was to be instructed to use his utmost to strengthen and decide the prince royal to co-operate with the allies. Count Metternich now declared that the Emperor Francis's determination was to support the cause for which the Emperor Alexander had made such noble efforts."—*Heads of the Arrangement touching the Armistice and Negotiations*, LONDONDERRY'S *War in Germany*, App., No. iii., p. 368.

* Hard., xii., 184. Heads of Arrangement touching Armistice and Negotiations, Lond., 368, Appendix, No. iii. Schoell, x., 257.

heir to the throne of Sweden by election, he was now called on to shed the best blood of his people in a contest seemingly foreign to their immediate interests. His character, able, indeed, and energetic, but vain, declamatory, and overbearing, afforded but little security against his conduct being influenced by some of the contending feelings arising out of so strange a combination; and yet the important position assigned him by the conferences of Trachenberg, and to which he was well entitled, both by his military talents and political station, rendered it of the last importance that the allies should be able to rely on his steady and sincere co-operation. When the military maps, indeed, were laid out before him, and the prince royal had his scented white pocket-handkerchief in his hand, he descanted with equal animation and eloquence on the great military measures which were in contemplation; but, as was well observed at the time by one who knew him well,* "He clothed himself in a pelisse of war, but his under garments were made of Swedish objects and peace;" his zeal was always greatest in proportion as it appeared to be least necessary. A celebrated French actress, who had lately taken her departure from Stralsund for Vandamme's headquarters, gave rise to various surmises as to the prince's secret communications with the French emperor. His aversion to the Austrian alliance was openly expressed: he publicly aspired to the chief command in the armies of the confederacy; it was only by the most sedulous attention of the crowned heads at Trachenberg that he was rendered more tractable, and by the able and courageous efforts of Sir Charles Stewart, now Marquis of Londonderry, and General Pozzo di Borgo, who were attached on the part of the British and Russian governments to his headquarters, that he was retained during the campaign in a course suitable to the great objects of the alliance.†

Composition of his army.

Whatever, however, his secret inclinations may have been, Bernadotte faithfully discharged his obligations with respect to the troops which he brought into the field. They amounted to twenty-four thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry—a very large force for a monarchy which did not, at that period, contain, after the loss of Finland, two millions and a half of inhabitants; and its composition being drawn almost entirely from the rural population, where the want of labourers was strongly felt, while it rendered the troops more respectable, necessarily imposed upon the commander the duty of economizing, as much as possible, blood so valuable to the nation. Their leaders, Adlercrentz, Lowensheim, and others, were not only men of tried ability and valour, but ardently devoted to the cause of European independence; and although the rustic air and uncombed locks of these Scandinavian warriors appeared to some disadvantage beside the Russian or Prussian guards, yet they were robust, fully clothed, and well armed, and they evinced, by their conduct in the campaign, that they had not degenerated in the elements of military spirit from their ancestors in the days of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII. In addition to this, Bernadotte had under his command twenty-five thousand Hanoverian levies, in part composed of the veterans who had combated in former days under the British standard, and who now, clothed and equipped by British liberality, and headed by the gallant Walmoden, had already attained a surprising degree of efficiency, and burned with anxiety to avenge their country's wrongs in the blood of the enemy. Thirty-five thousand Prussians, in great part landwehr, under Bulow and Tauenzein, in the highest state of enthusiastic excitement; twelve thousand Russian veterans, under Woronzoff and Winzingerode; and six thousand German troops, paid by England, but in the Russian service, formed, after all deductions to the rear were taken into account, an army of nearly ninety thousand effective men in the north of Germany, independent of a detached corps of twenty thousand which watched Hamburg; and this force, although heterogeneous, and drawn together from many different nations, was animated in common by the best spirit, and effected most important achievements in the course of the campaign.*

Army of Silesia.

The most experienced and powerful of all the divisions of the allied forces, however, was that which was still cantoned in Silesia, and which, being composed of the veterans who had survived the Moscow campaign, and the Prussians who had withstood the shock of France at Lutzen and Bautzen, might be relied upon for any emergencies, how trying soever. During the armistice, this noble force was raised to no less than a hundred and sixty thousand men; having been swelled to that amount, during the breathing-time afforded by the armistice, by the incredible exertions of the Prussian government, the unbounded spirit of the Prussian people, and the great re-enforcement, sixty thousand strong, which joined the Russian army after the fall of Thorn, and some lesser fortresses on the Vistula. This immense force was at this period cantoned between Schweidnitz and the Oder; but a few days before the commencement of hostilities, one half of it, including the whole Russian and Prussian guards, in conformity with the plan laid down in the conferences of Trachenberg, moved into Bohemia and joined the grand Austrian army there, leaving only eighty thousand, under the command of the gallant Blucher, to maintain the war in Silesia. But this force, which embraced fifty thousand veteran Russians under Langeron, Sacken, and St. Priest, and thirty thousand Prussians under Kleist, in the very highest state of discipline and equipment, and which possessed, besides, three hundred and fifty-six pieces of cannon, was animated with an invincible spirit; and its commanders exhibited that rare combination of military audacity with scientific calculation, which constitutes the mainspring of success in war.†

Character of Blucher. His early history.

Blucher, the commander-in-chief of this noble army, was a veteran now far advanced in years, but who retained, under the gray hairs of age, the

* Lord Londonderry.
† Lond., 77, 79. Hard., xii., 181, 182.

* Hard., Etat des Forces Alliés, Lond., 379, and 74, 82.
† Bouterlin, Camp. de 1813, 3, 4. Lond., 379. Schoell, x., 270.

whole fire and impetuosity of youth. He was born at Rostock, in Mecklenburg, on the 16th of December, 1742, so that in 1813 he was upward of seventy years of age. Descended of an old and respectable family of landed proprietors, he first entered the army as cornet in a troop of hussars, in the service of the King of Sweden, in 1757. His education, during the troubles of the Seven Years' War, had been neglected, a want which he never afterward entirely recovered; but his vigour of character soon made him distinguished, and threw him into a more honourable career than with the then unwarlike troops of Scandinavia. Made prisoner, in 1760, in a skirmish, by the Prussian hussars, he immediately entered the service of the Great Frederic, and took an active part in the remaining years of that memorable contest, particularly at the battle of Kunnersdorf, in 1761. The long period which followed the treaty of peace in 1763, threw the young lieutenant into the usual follies and vices of idle military life; and between the sports of the field, the gambling-house, or still worse places of dissipation, he had little leisure to improve himself in the military art. He was engaged in the contest with Poland in 1772; but his impetuous temper having led him into an unjustifiable act towards a Catholic priest, whom he had arrested and threatened with military execution, he was dismissed from the service by Frederic with these characteristic words, "Captain Blucher has got his congé, and may go to the devil!" His career, however, was not destined to be thus terminated. He shortly afterward married, and was engaged for fourteen years in agricultural pursuits, by which his fortune was greatly augmented.*

His passion for war, however, was not extinguished by this rural retirement.

First exploits in arms.

In 1786, he again entered the Prussian army in his old regiment of hussars; four years afterward he was promoted to the rank of colonel, and in 1792 distinguished himself by his intrepidity in the invasion of Champagne by the Duke of Brunswick. In the campaign of 1794, he was actively engaged in the combat of Kaiserslautern. It was not till 1806, however, that he was called to a theatre worthy of his talents. He was engaged in the disastrous affair of the battle of Auerstadt; and although the cavalry which he commanded were overthrown in a charge by the terrible artillery of the French in that battle, yet he amply redeemed his credit by the activity with which he gathered together the scattered remains of the army after the disaster, and the heroic courage with which he defended himself at the assault of Lubeck. Taken prisoner there, he was sent to Hamburg, where he consoled himself, amid the humiliation of his country, by visions of its future resurrection and glory.† He afterward was a member of the Secret Society of the Tugendbund, awaiting in silence the moment of deliverance. Called to the head of the army in 1813, he evinced the ardour of the sentiments with which he was inspired by the following proclamation to the Saxons: "The God of armies has in the East of Europe pronounced a terrible sentence; and the angel of death has, by the sword, cold, and famine, cut off 500,000 of the strangers, who, in the presumption of their prosperity, sought to subjugate it. We go where the finger of Providence directs us, to combat for the security of ancient thrones, for the present independence of nations, and to usher in the Aurora of a brighter day."*

A true Goth by temperament and complexion, with light flowing hair scattered over his bald forehead, blue eyes, huge mustaches, and an aquiline countenance, he realized the image of those northern warriors who combated under Armenius with the legions of Rome, or arrested on the Elbe the bloody torrent of Charlemagne's conquests. Originally a hussar officer, he always retained the ardent character which suits that branch of the military service: the habits then acquired never afterward deserted him; and in the close of his career on the field of Ligny, when commander-in-chief of eighty thousand men, he headed a charge of dragoons against the French cuirassiers with as much alacrity as he would have done at twenty-five, and wellnigh perished in the shock. Impetuous and unruly in his desires, he was through life an ardent votary of pleasure; and the attractions of wine, women, and play, chiefly filled up, during intervals of rest, the passions of a mind to which, by nature and habit, violent excitement had become indispensable. But it was the necessity of strong sensation, not selfishness of disposition, which was the cause of these irregularities; and though he indulged them at times to the close of life, and might be seen at Paris, in 1814, rising from copious libations of Champagne to indulge in the excitement of *rouge et noir*, he was yet ever ready to exchange these unworthy pursuits for the more honourable and yet stronger excitement of the field.

Vehement, irascible, and often imprudent, he was yet an ardent patriot: a true German in his heart, his whole soul was wound up in the welfare of the fatherland; alone, of all his contemporaries, he distinctly predicted, amid the disasters of 1806, the future deliverance of his country;† deeply implicated in the Tugendbund, he waited only, during the succeeding years of bondage, the moment of retribution; and when Frederic William at length raised the standard of independence, he was the first to draw his sword in its behalf. He could not be said to be a great general, though few commanders have achieved more important or glorious victories; the ardour of his disposition, and overflowing impetuosity of his courage, induced him, like Murat, to court danger wherever it was to be found, rather than avert disaster, from wherever it threatened. He preferred seeking "the bubble reputation at the cannon's mouth," to waiting by patience and combination the tardier honours of the general. But he possessed, at the same time, the rapid glance, quick decision, and moral courage which constitute such important elements in the character of a commander: like Suwarrow, he always struck home to the centre of the enemy's force, and never wasted his strength on their extremities. He was unrivalled in the tenacity with which he clung to his projects, and the vigour with which he repaired, in an incredibly short space of time,

* Biog. Univ., lviii., 375, 378. † *Ante*, ii., 463.

* Schoell, iv., 336. Biog. Univ., lviii., 375, 382.
† *Ante*, ii., 463.

the most serious disasters; and many of the movements which he executed, particularly the passage of the Elbe, the battle of the Katzbach, and the cross march from Ligny to Waterloo, were not only characterized by military genius of the highest order, but produced the most decisive effect upon the issue of the war.

Of General Gneisenau: his birth and early history.

What was wanting in prudence and circumspection for the ordinary duties of a general in the commander-in-chief, was amply compensated by the admirable talents and scientific acquirements of his chief of the staff, General Gneisenau. This most able man, though much younger than Blucher, was endowed with all the foresight, accuracy, and comprehensive views which are, in the long run, indispensable for the successful conduct of a great army. He was born at Schilda, near Torgau, on the 28th of October, 1760, so that he was twenty years younger than Blucher, and was now fifty-three years of age. From his earliest years he evinced the strongest turn for military affairs; but his impetuous turn of mind, as is often the case in Germany, broke out at the University, and he was obliged to leave the College of Erfurth on account of a duel with a tradesman, and soon after entered the Austrian service under Marshal Wurmser. But here he got involved in another duel, and was obliged to leave that service; and his father, on account of these repeated scrapes, having forbid him his house, he became desperate, and engaged in the troops which the Margrave of Anspach, in 1780, sent out to America. These misfortunes cooled down his impetuous disposition: repentant letters from America reconciled him to his father; and in three years this second prodigal returned to his country and paternal home, where he soon entered the Prussian service as a captain of fusiliers. In 1793 and 1794 he was engaged with distinction in the Polish war; in 1796 he married, and from that time devoted himself, with the most intense ardour, to the study of the military art. In the war of 1806 he was engaged in the bloody skirmish, at the outset of the campaign, in which Prince Louis fell; and after the prostration of Prussia, maintained himself with the most heroic resolution in Colberg, till the peace of Tilsit overtook him, still unconquered, within its walls. He then entered the civil service of government; but, under pretence of discontent, passed over to England, where he was engaged in secret political transactions, in which capacity he made frequent journeys in 1813 to Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Stockholm. No sooner had the disasters of Moscow broken out than he renewed his conferences with the English government, and immediately embarking for Germany, repaired to Breslau, where he was appointed quartermaster-general of Blucher's corps. He then laboured assiduously with Stein and Scharnhorst at the organization of the Tugendbund, which spread so far the elements of resistance to France. It was under his direction that the retreat of the Prussians was conducted with so much skill from Lutzen to Breslau; and so highly were his abilities now appreciated, that, on the resumption of hostilities, he was made chief of the staff to Blucher, in room of Scharnhorst, who had died of his wounds received at Lutzen, which office he held till the final termination of the war by the battle of Waterloo.*

His character as a general.

Thoroughly acquainted with the seat of war, a perfect master of strategy, and invariably accurate in his estimate of distances and the march of troops, he infused a degree of correctness and precision into the movements of the army of Silesia which enabled it to inflict the most terrible blows upon the enemy, without sustaining any serious losses itself. Europe was astonished at the admirable skill with which, during that whole campaign, the movements of this important army were conducted: yielding ground where Napoleon pressed on them in person with superior forces; returning again to the offensive the moment that the eagles of the Imperial Guard were seen receding in the distance; sacrificing on every occasion the lustre of separate achievements to the promotion of general objects; and sedulously following out, amid the intricacies of their own movements, the leading plan of operations agreed on by the allied sovereigns. Without detracting from the great services of Marshal Blucher in that eventful contest, it may safely be affirmed that the chief merit of it, at least so far as the general conduct of the campaign is concerned, as well as of the contest in France in 1814, and in the guidance of the Prussian force in 1815, is due to General Gneisenau; and, what is very remarkable, in combating the modern Hannibal, the Marcellus of the allies was found under the gray locks of the Prussian veteran, and the Fabius in the more youthful breast of his gifted lieutenant.

Striking concord which existed between him and Blucher.

No jealousy whatever marred the cordial cooperation of these illustrious chiefs: a sure sign, considering the delicate situation which the veteran held under the guidance of his comparatively youthful Mentor, that they were both great men. "When we wished to beat the French," said Blucher, "I rode out with Gneisenau, and we went to see how these carls (Kerls) were placed. Then I would say to him, 'What would you think if we were to move in such and such a way?' and in less than an hour the orders were given." The destruction of the French army on the Katzbach, the passage of the Elbe, and the battle of Mockern, near Leipsic, were in great measure owing to his judicious counsels. He had a great part, also, in the bold advance towards Paris in 1814, which brought about the fall of Napoleon; and never was more rejoiced than when his unlooked-for return stilled the discord among the allies at the Congress of Vienna, and gave him another opportunity of striking a blow at the power of France. He directed the retreat at Ligny, after Blucher was disabled by the fall of his horse, and had the principal share in the decisive cross march on the 18th to Waterloo, which, with the valour of the English army, terminated the contest.†

The Austrian army at Prague.

The grand Austrian army, under the command of Prince Schwartzenberg, cantoned in the neighbourhood of Prague, consisted of a hundred and twenty thousand men, great part of whom were in an incomparable state of discipline and

* Biog. Univ., Sup., lxv., 436, 437.
† Biog. Univ., lxv., 437.

efficiency. It was divided into four corps, commanded by Count Colloredo, General Chastellar, and afterward General Meerfeldt, General Giulay, and Count Klenau; while Prince Hesse Homberg was at the head of the reserve, and General Bubna of the detached corps. Parts of this force, however—in particular, the infantry of Klenau's corps—were newly raised, and hardly as yet capable of withstanding the shock of Napoleon's legions; and, though the artillerymen were scientific and expert, the horses for the guns and wagon train were greatly inferior to those of the Russians, and little adequate to the fatigues of a protracted and active campaign. Very different, however, was the aspect of the cavalry. In this force were included twenty thousand admirable horse: the cuirassiers and hussars of the guard, in particular, outshone any in Europe in the splendour of their appearance, the quality of their horses, and the brilliancy of their appointments; and their achievements on the field of Leipsic were worthy of their high renown and martial aspect. When the élite of this immense force was reviewed, in the neighbourhood of Prague, by the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia in the middle of August immediately after the resumption of hostilities, to the number of seventy-seven thousand infantry and eight thousand horse, with three hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, it presented an array rarely paralleled in Europe, and formed a military spectacle of unrivalled sublimity. The cuirassiers on this interesting occasion were presented with new standards; and when the three sovereigns nailed, in unison, their colours to the poles, in token of their firm alliance, it seemed as if no power on earth could resist a league of potentates, one only of whom could summon up so noble an array.*

Aug. 19.

PRINCE SCHWARTZENBERG, who commanded the Austrian force, and afterward obtained the general direction of the allied armies, though far from being a general of the highest order, was, nevertheless, in many respects, well qualified for the arduous duties with which he was intrusted. It was no easy matter, as he himself said, to command an army when kings and emperors were at headquarters; and probably there was no man in all the imperial service who could have discharged that arduous and delicate duty so well as himself. Without possessing any great force of mind or decision of character, he was yet admirably calculated, by the suavity of his manners, the prudence of his disposition, and the amenity of his temper, to allay the jealousies, and keep together the often discordant powers of the alliance. Descended of a noble family, habituated from his youth to the very highest society, and personally known, both as a diplomatist and a commander, to most of the leading persons at the headquarters of the allies, he possessed, at the same time, the prudent temper and conciliatory disposition which, in dealing with such exalted personages, was fitted to prevent any serious dissensions arising among them, and yet preserve, upon the whole, the even tenour of his own intentions. His combinations were judicious, often able and comprehensive; but he wanted the decision requisite for carrying them into execution; and more than once, particularly at Dresden in 1813, and in Champagne in 1814, when he had brought Napoleon, by his well-conceived measures, to the very brink of destruction, he failed in effecting his object by want of vigour at the decisive moment in carrying them into execution. For the bold measures which, in the end, hurled the French emperor from the throne, we are indebted to the indomitable moral courage of Lord Castlereagh, and the noble decision of the Emperor Alexander: Schwartzenberg's measures were of a more temporizing and prudent character, and he more than once seriously endangered the allied cause by his ready recurrence to the favourite Austrian step of a retreat. Yet justice must observe, that the powers even of the generalissimo of the allied armies were far from being of an unlimited character; the Aulic Council, now transported to the very theatre of action, exercised a secret, and sometimes prejudicial, control over its operations; diplomacy often interposed its obstructions, and asserted its supremacy in the most critical moments; and even when he was most unfettered, the power of individual direction was generally as much restricted as the responsibility of the generalissimo was increased, by the nature of a contest which had never less than two, sometimes three, of the greatest crowned heads in Europe, at the military headquarters.*

Prince Schwartzenberg: his character.

The Grand Army of Bohemia, after eighty thousand of the Russians and Prussians had joined it, formed a mass of above two hundred and twenty thousand combatants, of whom forty thousand were admirable horse, with seven hundred pieces of cannon, which, from the salient bastion of Bohemia, threatened the rear and communications of the French emperor on the Elbe. This, with eighty thousand pressing on him from Silesia, and ninety thousand from the north, composed a force of nearly four hundred thousand men, ready for instant operation in the field, all acting under one direction, in a concentric circle, upon one central point. The forces, therefore, at the outset of the campaign, were very nearly balanced; and Napoleon's central position astride on the Elbe, and with six fortresses on that river in his hands, might seem more than sufficient to counterbalance all the enthusiasm which animated the enemy's troops. But this was by no means the whole of the military array which the allied sovereigns had at their disposal; and it was evident that, if the contest were protracted for any time, the forces of the coalition would acquire a decisive preponderance against him. The military force of France was exhausted: not two thousand troops remained even in the barracks of Paris, a force scarcely equal to the daily service of the metropolis, and the depôts in the interior had sent off their last man.† On the other hand, vast re-enforcements might ere long be expected within the allied lines. Benningsen was organizing a large army of seventy thousand Rus-

Resumé of the allied forces in action on the Elbe.

* Lond., 106. Plotho, ii., App., No. iv. Fain, ii., 231.

* Fain, ii., 242. Sir R. Wilson, Power of Russia, 39. Lond., 97.

† "Paris and the neighbouring departments had not at that period more than 2000 troops, veterans and gendarmes included."—*Recueil des Lettres Interceptées en* 1813, p. 13; and FAIN, ii., 356.

sians in the interior of Poland, which, it was calculated, would join the allied forces on the Elbe in the first week of September; the last reserve, it is true, of the Muscovite Empire, but to which Napoleon had nothing additional on his side to oppose: twenty thousand men watched the combined force of Danes and French conscripts which Davoust commanded at Hamburg; and the total amount of Russian and Prussian forces which blockaded the fortresses that still held out for Napoleon on the Oder and the Vistula, amounted to the enormous number of one hundred thousand men. Thus, the total allied force accumulated in Poland and the north of Germany was nearly six hundred thousand men;* and although only two thirds of this immense force, or four hundred thousand combatants, could be relied on for the shock of war on the Elbe, yet the remainder would, in the end, prove available, when the eighty thousand French veterans, who were now shut up in the fortresses on the Oder and Vistula, had yielded to the pangs of hunger or the ravages of disease.

Forces on both sides on the Bavarian and Italian frontiers.

Immense as the forces were which were thus arrayed against each other on the banks of the Elbe, they did not compose the whole of those which were drawn forth by the contending parties in this gigantic conflict. Five-and-twenty thousand Austrians, in addition, were assembled, under the Prince de Reuss, at Lintz, on the Danube, to observe the motions of Wrede, who was at the head of twenty-six thousand Bavarians in the neighbourhood of Munich; while Hiller, with fifty thousand excellent troops, and one hundred and ninety-eight guns, was prepared to cross the Isonzo, and renew the conflict on the Italian plains with the viceroy, who had arrayed sixty thousand combatants on the banks of the Tagliamento and the Adige. In addition to this, an army of reserve was forming between Vienna and Presburg, under the Grand-duke Ferdinand of Wirtemberg, which was to be raised to sixty thousand men from the distant resources of Hungary and Transylvania, which had not yet arrived at the theatre of war: making a total of seven hundred and thirty thousand combatants who obeyed the orders of the Conference of Trachenberg. If to this be added a hundred and twenty thousand men who, at this period, were preparing, under the standards of Wellington, to cross the Pyrenees, where Soult, with eighty thousand, was intrenched to resist them, and forty-five thousand allied troops in Catalonia, who pressed on an equal force under Marshal Suchet, the general result will be, that NINE HUNDRED THOUSAND men in arms encircled the French Empire, which was still defended by SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND who followed the fortunes of the Revolution.† But if the central situation of the French is considered, and the advantages which they derived from unity of command and comparative homogeneity of race, as well as the talents and reputation of their chief, it can hardly be said that Napoleon was overmatched in the field, save from the effects of the unbounded enthusiasm and exasperation which his own oppression had excited among his enemies.*

Cordial spirit of unanimity with which the allied powers were animated.

The whole of the allied armies in Germany were animated by the highest spirit, and inspired with the most touching cordiality. The feeling of depression by which the Russians were animated when, in the outset of the campaign, they found themselves far advanced in Europe, and engaged in a fresh war, which seemed foreign to the real interests of their country, had given place to a universal and enthusiastic desire to share with their Prussian brethren in the deliverance of the fatherland. Common danger had awakened brotherly feelings; common injuries a joint desire of vengeance; valour on both sides, mutual respect. Those who had stood side by side on the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen, felt confident against the world in arms. The universal animation with which the war was embraced by all classes in Germany, had excited a corresponding enthusiasm in the Russian warriors; the generous flame had spread to every breast; and such was the warlike spirit with which they were animated, that it was with no small difficulty, and only by the personal exertions of the allied sovereigns, that they could be prevented from breaking into open hostilities on the expiration of the original period assigned for the armistice. The Emperor Alexander and King of Prussia set the example of this touching fraternity: constantly living together on terms of the closest intimacy, they had not a thought nor a wish but in common; their suites formed one large family; and when they reviewed their respective troops, they always appeared in the uniform of each other's guards, and with the military orders hanging on their breasts, which were shared by them with the humblest of their soldiers.†

Slow progress of the negotiations at Prague.

When preparations on so vast and unprecedented a scale had been made on both sides for the resumption of hostilities, it becomes almost ludicrous to follow out the diplomatic evasions, trifling disputes, and studied procrastination of the Congress of Prague. Official intimation was sent to the French emperor on the 11th of July, by M. Metternich, that the allied sovereigns had agreed to the prolongation of the armistice, and had sent their plenipotentiaries to that city, viz., M. d'Anstett on the part of Russia, and M. de Humboldt on that of Prussia, while Metternich himself represented Austria; and these high functionaries all arrived there on the 15th. Instead, however, of straightway complying with this intimation, and sending his own plenipotentiaries to commence business, Napoleon, when every hour was precious, commenced an altercation with the Prussian and Russian governments upon the choice they had made of plenipotentiaries at the congress: objecting to M. d'Anstett that he was a French emigrant, and to M. de Humboldt that he was not of adequate rank to meet either with

July 11.

* Plotho, ii., App., iii. Schoell, x., 268, 271. Hard., xii., 220.

† See App. A., Chap. LXX., where the whole particulars of this immense force are given from the official states, published by the German author Plotho, and the nearest approximation that can be formed to those of the French, amid the incessant efforts they have made to diminish their real numbers in a campaign so prolific in disasters to their arms.

* Plotho, ii., App., iii. Hard., xii., 219, 220. Schoell, x., 270, 272. Jom., iv., 360, 361.

† Lond., 75, 76. Capef., x., 159, 160.

Count Narbonne or M. Caulaincourt. These objections came with a peculiarly bad grace from the plenipotentiaries of the Revolutionary dynasty; and certainly Humboldt, the illustrious naturalist, was on a level with M. Maret or Caulaincourt, neither of whom had any pretensions to family, and they were, accordingly, after much angry correspondence, finally overruled, and the negotiations carried on with the existing diplomatists.*

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Difficulties which arose respecting the form of the conference.

No sooner, however, was this difficulty surmounted, and Narbonne and Caulaincourt both arrived at Prague, where they were not installed till the 28th, sixteen days after the arrival of the allied diplomatists, than a new and still more serious cause of dissension arose regarding the *form* in which the negotiations should be conducted. Metternich contended that they should proceed after the manner of the Congress of Teschen in 1779; that is, that the negotiations should be conducted by means of written notes, addressed, not by the belligerant parties to each other, but by both to the mediating power, and by it transmitted to the plenipotentiary of the power for whom they were respectively intended. To this proposition the allied diplomatists at once gave their consent; but the French strenuously contended for the course pursued at the Congress of Utrecht, where both parties sent their notes directly to each other, and the communications were carried on partly in writing, and partly verbally. It is evident that the former method was calculated to increase the importance and influence of the mediating power, by enabling it to keep in its hands the thread of the whole negotiations; and it is equally plain that, when parties are really in earnest, and time, as in this instance, presses, it is far more expedient to proceed at once to personal intercourse and verbal conferences, than to adopt the circuitous form of written communications addressed to a third party. Austria, therefore, by contending for the latter course, clearly evinced her desire to procrastinate; but it is equally plain that, if France had been sincere in the desire of an accommodation, she would have preferred the commencement of negotiations in any conceivable method, to the prolongation of unmeaning discussions about its form. In this dispute about the mode of conducting the conferences, the whole short remainder of the period assigned for the prolongation of the armistice was consumed; and the 10th of August, the fatal period fixed for its termination, passed without either any commencement having been effected of a negotiation, or any proposal made for its longer continuance.†

Real views of the different powers at this period.

It is incorrect, however, to say that neither party in this armistice wished for a termination of hostilities. Both parties, in reality, desired it, but both were alike aware that the terms on which they were willing to come to an accommodation were such as there was no prospect of attaining. Austria was not only willing, but anxious to mediate with efficacy, and bring about a general accommodation; but then it was on condition that she obtained the Illyrian provinces, and a share of Italy for herself, and the renunciation by France of the Confederation of the Rhine and the kingdom of Italy, for the cause of European independence. Russia and Prussia were ready to terminate hostilities; but it was on condition that Prussia was restored and augmented, Poland dissolved, and the Hanse Towns restored to freedom. France was prepared to renounce some of her acquisitions, and sheath, for a time at least, the sword of conquest; but she could contemplate no greater abasement than the restitution of the Illyrian provinces to Austria, and her lost provinces to Prussia, and the dissolution of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, to sooth Russia; and still clung to the Rhenish Confederacy, the Swiss supremacy, the kingdom of Italy, the Peninsular and the Westphalian thrones, and the extension of the French frontier over Holland and the Hanse Towns. Thus, though all parties were willing to negotiate, none were sufficiently lowered in their pretensions to render an understanding practicable: the victories of twenty years could not be obliterated by a single disaster, how great soever; and, as in the conferences between the Gauls and Romans of old, the sword required to be thrown in to restore the balance.*

Napoleon's journey to Mayence to meet Marie Louise.

Napoleon himself gave the clearest sense of the hopelessness of all attempts at a pacification, by a step which at once dissolved all the hopes which had been entertained at Dresden of a speedy termination of hostilities. On the 26th of July, three days before the French plenipotentiaries, Caulaincourt and Narbonne, had come to Prague, though a fortnight after those of the allies had been in that city, and seven weeks after the commencement of the armistice, Napoleon set out from Dresden for Mayence, to inspect the fortifications in progress at that place, and to meet the Empress Marie Louise, who, by his directions, had come to meet him in that frontier city. He remained with her for six days, during which the most active military preparations were going forward, and everything announced the speedy resumption of hostilities. What the communications were which passed between him and the empress regent during this momentous period is now known by the best possible evidence, that of the empress herself. "Associated," said she to the Senate, "in that short interview, with the most secret thoughts of the emperor, I then perceived with what sentiments he would be inspired if seated on a dishonoured throne, and under a crown without glory." In these words were truly revealed the most secret feelings of Napoleon. Seated on a revolutionary throne, and the head of a military republic, he was compelled to advance without intermission: unbroken success was to him not merely essential to popularity, but the price of existence. He was much pressed at Mayence by the empress and Senate to make peace on any terms; but his answer, in three words, conveyed the whole secret of his policy during the remainder of his reign, "*Tout ou rien.*" The emperor spent six days at that place, inspecting the for-

* Metternich to Maret, July 12, 1813, Fain, ii., 152. Anstett to Metternich, August 7, 1813, Capef., x., 150.

† See Official Corresp. in Fain, ii., 200; and Capef., x., 155, 156

* Capef., x., 153, 154. Fain, ii., 92, 93.

tifications and reviewing the troops, which were incessantly urged on to swell the roll of Augereau's corps, and on the 3d of August returned to Dresden, where the increased vigour of his military preparations at all points, and the prodigious concourse of troops who incessantly poured into that capital, soon dispelled the hopes which had, till then, been entertained of a general peace.*

Ultimatum of Austria to France.

The day after Napoleon returned from Mayence he wrote a confidential letter to the Emperor of Austria, a copy of which was communicated to Metternich, desiring to know, in a categorical manner, how the cabinet of Vienna proposed that peace should be arranged, and whether, in the event of hostilities, she would make common cause with France. This led to more substantial overtures; and on the 7th of August Metternich transmitted the ultimatum of his cabinet, which was as follows: "The dissolution of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, which was to be divided between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, reserving Dantzic for the latter power; the re-establishment of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns in their independence; the reconstruction of Prussia in its ancient possessions, with a frontier on the Elbe; the cession to Austria of all the Illyrian provinces, including Trieste." These were the cardinal points; but the Austrian diplomatist stated as minor questions, which would require to be adjusted in a general pacification, the independence of Holland, of Spain, and of the Pontifical States.†

Napoleon's answer, which declines these terms.

Napoleon spent the 9th in deliberating, and on the 10th returned an answer consenting to the dissolution of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, but insisting that Dantzic should be a free city, its fortifications demolished, and the King of Saxony indemnified by the cession of the territories included in Saxony, belonging to Silesia and Bohemia. He agreed to cede the Illyrian provinces to Austria, with Fiume, but refused to give up Trieste; the Confederation of the Rhine was to be extended to the Oder, and the integrity of the Danish dominions guarantied. These terms were despatched in duplicate to Prague, where they arrived early on the morning of the 11th, but after twelve o'clock on the preceding night, which was the termination of the armistice. They were not such, however, as Austria could agree to; and the armistice having now expired without any accommodation having been come to, the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries, at midnight on the 10th, addressed official intimations to Metternich that their powers were at an end, and the congress dissolved; on the 11th the Austrian minister announced these communications to Caulaincourt and Narbonne, and on the day following Austria declared war against France.

Aug. 10.

Aug. 11.

Aug. 12.

Austrian manifesto.

The grounds stated in this official instrument, on the part of the cabinet of Vienna, for joining the allies and coming to a rupture with France, were as follows: "The progress of events at the congress left no room for doubt that the French government was insincere in its professions of a desire for peace. The delay in the arrival of the French plenipotentiaries, under pretexts which the great objects to be discussed at the congress might well have reduced to silence; the insufficiency of their instructions on points of form, which occasioned the loss of much precious time, when a few days only remained for the most important of all negotiations: all these circumstances combined demonstrated too clearly that peace, such as Austria and the allied sovereigns desired, was foreign to the views of France; that she accepted the form of a congress in order to avoid the reproach of being the cause of the prolongation of war, but with a secret desire to elude its effects, or in the wish to separate Austria from the other powers already united with her in principles, before treaties had consecrated their union for the cause of peace and the happiness of the world. Austria comes out of this negotiation, the result of which has deceived her most cherished hopes, with the consciousness of the good faith which has animated her throughout. More zealous than ever for the noble end which she has proposed, she does not take up arms but to attain it, in concert with the powers which are animated by the same sentiments. Ever disposed to aid in the establishment of an order of things which, by a wise division of power, may place the preservation of peace under the shield of an association of independent states, she will neglect no occasion for arriving at such a result;* and the knowledge she has acquired of the courts now become her allies, gives her a certain assurance that they will sincerely co-operate in so salutary a purpose."*

Reply of France. Aug. 18.

To this it was replied, on the part of the French emperor: "Ever since the month of February, the hostile dispositions of the cabinet of Vienna have been known to all Europe. Denmark, Saxony, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, have documents in their archives which prove that Austria, under pretence of the interest which she took in her ally and of the love of peace, nourished a secret jealousy of France. The undersigned will not go over the system of protestations so prodigally made on the one hand, and of insinuations, covertly spread, on the other, which the cabinet of Vienna has adopted, and which, when fully developed, has prostituted what has hitherto been reckoned most sacred among men—a mediation, a congress, and the words of peace. If Austria desire hostility, what need had she of a false language, or of enveloping France with a tissue of deceitful snares which met her on every side? If the mediator really wished for peace, would he have pretended that transactions so complicated could be adjusted in the space of fifteen or twenty days? Is it an indication of a pacific disposition to propose to dictate peace to France in less time than it would require to conclude the capitulation of a besieged town? The peace of Teschen was only concluded after four months of negotiation. Six weeks were consumed at Sistow before the conferences on the forms were concluded; the negotiations for the peace of Vienna lasted two months, though the greater part of the Austrian States were in the hands of France. Can it be

* Fain, ii., 23, 24. Odel., i., 228, 231. Capef., x., 153, 154. Lond., 108, note.

† Fain, ii., 93, 94. Hard., xii., 205, 206.

* Fain, ii., 212, 216. Declaration of Austria.

seriously proposed to reconcile the differences and adjust the interests of France, Austria, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Saxony, and so many other states, watch in hand, in fifteen days? But for the fatal intervention of Austria, peace at this moment would have been concluded between Russia, France, and Prussia. Austria, the enemy of France, and covering her ambition under the mask of a mediator, complicated everything, and rendered reconciliation impossible. But Austria, in an open and avowed state of hostility, is in a position at once more sincere and more simple: Europe is nearer peace; there is a complication the less. If Austria is really desirous of an accommodation, let her name a place which may be neutralized and set apart for a congress, where plenipotentiaries of all the powers, great and small, may assemble, and the negotiations may proceed with the gravity and deliberation suited to the magnitude of the interests at issue, without the continuance of hostilities." To this last proposal Metternich replied that Aug. 21. the proposal for a congress should forthwith be communicated by the three allied powers to their other allies; but before their answers could be received the struggle recommenced, and all thoughts of peace were drowned in the roar and whirl of war.*

Reflections on this debate, and on the subsequent manifesto of Austria.

It may safely be affirmed that France had the better in this debate; and that, though both parties were insincere in their proposals for peace at that time, the reasons which Napoleon's diplomatists adduced for questioning the pacific intentions of the cabinet of Vienna were more weighty than those which Metternich advanced to substantiate a similar charge against them. But, as usual with state papers of this description, they were very far from revealing the real motives which actuated either party; and were put forward with hardly any other view, on either side, than to effect that grand object of diplomacy, the concealing of the real thoughts of the parties. The true motives which actuated Austria at this momentous crisis are much more sincerely, and, therefore, powerfully put forth in the Austrian manifesto on the ground of war against France, drawn by Gentz, which was shortly afterward published by the cabinet of Vienna, and will be found in the Appendix to this chapter.† Napoleon gave the most decisive proof that he felt he had been struck between wind and water by this manifesto by omitting, in his publication of it in the Moniteur, the most material passages which it contained, which will be found in italics in the document given in the Appendix.‡ And so reasonable were the terms of Austria's ultimatum, already given, that we have Lord Londonderry's authority for the fact, that, in a private conversation between Caulaincourt and Metternich, the former admitted, that, if he were Napoleon, he would at once accept them, but that he had no power to do so, and that they must be referred to the emperor.§

PRINCE METTERNICH, who bore so distinguished a part in this memorable negotiation, and in whose hands the question of peace or war was in a manner definitively placed, was a statesman who for above a quarter of a century exercised so great an influence on the history of Europe, that any history might justly be regarded as defective that did not delineate the leading features of his character and biography. He was the son of a public functionary, who, at an early period of the Revolutionary war, bore a distinguished part in the administration of the Flemish provinces, and was born in 1773, at his father's hereditary seat near Johannisberg, on the banks of the Rhine. Educated at Strasburg, he early improved his information regarding public affairs by travels in Germany, Holland, and Great Britain, and soon after entered the diplomatic line, and served at the Congress of Rastadt in 1799. His great abilities, however, soon attracted notice at a court which, justly impressed with the vast importance of diplomatic talent, never fails, despite its aristocratic prepossessions, to seek for it wherever it is to be found, even in the humblest ranks of the state; and he was employed on missions of importance to St. Petersburg in 1804, and Berlin in 1805. At both these capitals he sedulously studied, not only the national resources, but the temperament and habits of the people; and, as his elegant and polished manners gave him an easy access to the highest circles, he soon became personally acquainted with the most influential persons at the northern cabinets. After the peace of Presburg, in 1805, he was appointed ambassador at Paris; and in that delicate situation, though representing a vanquished monarch, he succeeded, at the early age of thirty-three, in conciliating all who came in contact with him, by the urbanity of his manners, and the admirable skill with which he maintained a difficult, and yet important position. In 1809 he was appointed chancellor of state upon the resignation of Count Stadion, under whose auspices he had risen to eminence, and whose known hostility to France rendered it necessary for him to retire upon the peace of Schoenbrunn; and for more than thirty years from that period he exercised, almost without control, the highest authority in the Austrian dominions.*

Early history of Prince Metternich.

No diplomatist, even in that age of intellectual giants, excelled, perhaps hardly any equalled Metternich, in the calm and sagacious survey which he took of existing events, in the prophetic skill with which he divined their probable tendency, and the admirable tact with which, without exciting unnecessary jealousy, he contrived to render them conducive to the interests of the country with whose direction he was intrusted. An easy and graceful address, a coolness which nothing could disturb, an inexhaustible flow of brilliant conversation, a fascinating power of delicate flattery, while they rendered him the charm of the highest society wherever he went, concealed powers of the first order, and a sagacity in discerning the probable tendency of events which never was surpassed. He had not the moral courage which rendered

His character as a statesman.

* Maret's Declaration, Aug. 18, 1813, and Metternich's note, Aug., 21, Fain, ii., 217, 222.

† App., C, ii., to chap. lxx.

‡ Compare manifesto in Hard., xii., 211, and in Moniteur, Sept. 21, 1813.

§ Lond., 97.

* Hard., xii., 60, 61. Biog. Univ., art. Metternich, Sup.

Lord Castlereagh superior to the storms of fortune, nor the heroic sense of duty which made Wellington indifferent to them, nor the ardent genius which enabled Napoleon to direct their fury: his talent, and there it was unrivalled, consisted in gaining possession of the current, and directing it to his purposes. *Laissez venir* was his ruling principle at all periods of his life; but this seeming *insouciance* was not the result of listlessness or indifference, but of a close observation of the course of events, a strong sense of the danger of directly opposing it, and a conscious power of ultimately obtaining its direction. He was well aware of the tide in the affairs of men which every age has so clearly evinced, and trusted, in combating the Revolutionary torrent, chiefly to its speedy tendency, like all violent passions, to wear itself out. No man was more fixed in his opinions, or more convinced of the necessity of upholding those conservative principles, both in internal government and external relations, which the French Revolution had wellnigh subverted; but none, at the same time, saw more clearly the necessity of awaiting the proper time for action, or disguising formed determinations till the proper season for executing them had arrived. A perfect master of dissimulation, he was able to act for years in opposition to his real tenets without letting his secret designs be perceived, or even suspected; and such was the power which he possessed of disguising his intentions, that down to the very last moment, in the Congress of Prague, he succeeded in concealing them even from the penetrating eye of Napoleon.

His private honour and patriotic spirit.

Talents of this description might have been in the last degree dangerous in the hands of an ambitious and unprincipled man; but in Metternich's case they were restrained by influences of a higher description, which in a great measure secured their right direction. Though abundantly unscrupulous in diplomatic evasion in state affairs, and generally acting on the principle that in public negotiations, as in love, oaths and protestations are the weapons which both parties may make use of at pleasure, he was yet of unsullied honour in private life, and whatever he said on the honour of a gentleman might with confidence be relied on. Though long vested with almost unlimited power, and often placed in hostility with the aspiring spirit especially of Italian liberalism, he had nothing cruel or vindictive in his disposition: blood was hardly ever shed under his administration, and secondary punishment, though sometimes severe, inflicted only so far as was deemed necessary to preserve the consistency of a despotic frame of government. Above all, his spirit was essentially patriotic: his ruses and subterfuges, and they were many, were all directed to the extrication of his country from difficulty, or the augmentation of its territory or resources; and under his long administration it was raised from the lowest point of depression to an unexampled height of felicity and glory. Admitting that much of this is to be ascribed to the reaction in Europe against French oppression, which was commencing when he was called to the helm of affairs, and soon produced a general effervescence which was irresistible, still much also must be confessed to be owing to the skilfulness of the pilot who weathered the storm—who yielded to it when its force was irresistible, and gained the mastery of its direction when the gales were setting in his own favour.

And principles of government.

"Everything for the people, nothing by them," which Napoleon described as the true secret of government,* was the means by which his conduct was uniformly regulated in domestic administration. He had the strongest aversion to those changes which are forced on government by the people, but clearly saw the propriety of disarming their leaders of the most dangerous weapons which they wielded, by a paternal system of domestic administration, and a sedulous attention to their material interests. He rigorously prohibited the importation of literary works having a Democratic or infidel tendency, and exercised in this respect a vexatious, and, perhaps, unnecessary strictness over travellers: the press at Vienna was subjected to the usual censorship of absolute governments; and public thought confined within those channels which the Romish Church and Aulic Council deemed advisable. But within these limits no minister ever attended with more anxiety and success to the interests of the people: public instruction has been rendered universal; the hereditary states exhibit in their uniform wellbeing the blessed effects of a paternal administration; the provinces of Lombardy have almost forgot, in the substantial blessings of German government, the visionary dreams of Italian independence; and the Austrian monarchy, as a whole, exhibits, with a few exceptions, an example of general felicity which may well put more popular governments to the blush for the vast capacities for exertion which they have misapplied, and the boundless means of general happiness which they have abused.†

His own account of his policy at this period.

The principles on which Metternich's policy, from the time when he was raised to the supreme direction of affairs in 1809, till the rupture of the Congress at Prague in 1813, were well described by himself to Sir Charles Stewart. He found the finances of the monarchy insolvent, its military strength weakened, its public spirit crushed by misfortune. His first care was to arrange and bring about the marriage of the Archduchess Marie Louise, in order to raise his country one step from the abyss into which it had fallen: never intending, however, when the national existence and power were again secured, to make any permanent change on the policy of the state. This policy, for the three years which followed the peace of Schoenbrunn, was attended with the happiest effects: insomuch that, when Austria was again called to appear on the theatre of Europe, she found herself speedily at the head of a force which recalled the most prosperous days of the monarchy. His object throughout was to re-establish the influence and power of his country, and through it give peace to the world; and on this principle he resolutely resisted all the entreaties with which he was beset to join Austria to the alliance after the disasters of the Russian campaign, till the period had arrived when his

* *Ante*, iii., 34.
† Personal observation. Capef., viii., 341.

preparations were complete, and matters had arrived at such a crisis that she could interpose with decisive effect. But that his policy was essentially pacific, and that he had no desire to augment Austria, when restored to her suitable place in Europe, at the expense of less powerful states, is decisively proved by the fact that, ever since the peace of Vienna in 1814, and fall of Napoleon, she has remained at rest, and no projects of ambition have either agitated her councils or disturbed the peace of Europe.*

Universal joy in the allied army at the junction of Austria.

Unbounded was the joy diffused through the Russian and Prussian troops by the accession of Austria to the alliance. To outstrip the slow arrival by couriers of the long-wished-for intelligence, bonfires were prepared on the summits of the Bohemian Mountains; and at midnight on the 10th, their resplendent light told the breathless host in Silesia that two hundred thousand gallant allies were about to join their standard. The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, with their respective troops, were assembled, in anxious expectation, at Trachenberg, in a large barn, awaiting the agreed-on signal, when, a little after midnight on the night of the 10th, loud shouts on the outside announced that the flames were seen; and soon the sovereigns themselves, hastening to the door, beheld the blazing lights, prophetic of the fall of Napoleon, on the summits of the mountains. Such was the joy which pervaded the deeply-agitated assembly, that they all embraced, many with tears of rapture. Spontaneous salvos of artillery and *feux-de-joie* of musketry resounded through the whole Russian and Prussian lines. Joy beamed in every countenance: confidence had possessed itself of every heart. With lightsome steps the great body of the forces in Silesia obeyed, next morning, the order to march into Bohemia. Innumerable columns of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, soon thronged the passes in the mountains; and before the six days' delay allowed for the commencement of hostilities, after the termination of the armistice, had expired, eighAug. 16. ty thousand Russian and Prussian veterans were grouped around the walls of Prague. The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia arrived soon after in that city, where they were received with the utmost cordiality and magnificence by the Emperor of Austria; and a review of the principal forces of the latAug. 19. ter on the 19th of August, when ninety-one battalions of infantry and fifty squadrons of cavalry, in all nearly ninety thousand men, defiled before their majesties, conveyed a vivid image of the vast accession of strength which their cause had received by this fortunate alliance. It was a gratifying spectacle to the English diplomatists—Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart, who had so powerfully contributed to bring about this felicitous union—to behold the persevering efforts of their country, after twenty years of constancy and warfare, at length crowned by the formation of a league which promised speedily to effect the deliverance of Europe; and their patriotic pride was not a little increased by the accounts which arrived next day of the defeat of Soult with immense loss, after a series of desperate battles in the Pyrenees, and the expulsion of his army, after a second irruption, from the whole Spanish territory.*

* Lond., 104, 105. See, also, Capefigue, viii.

Last review of Napoleon at Dresden, August 10.

It had long been fondly hoped at Dresden that the 15th of August, the day of the fête of Napoleon, on which, according to the custom of Catholic countries, his birthday was held, would be the day on which the signature of the preliminaries of peace would be celebrated. As the armistice drew near to its termination, however, these hopes were gradually dispelled; and at length an imperial order, that the fête should take place on the 10th, clearly revealed the presentiment, that on the 15th the approaching resumption of hostilities would render such a display as was desired for the occasion impossible. A grand review, however, took place on the former day, with all the circumstance of military pomp, at which the King of Saxony, his brothers and nephews, and all the principal marshals and dignitaries of the Empire, assisted. Napoleon, followed by this splendid cortège, passed the line, which was drawn up in the great plain of Ostra-Gehege, near Dresden, at the gallop; and afterward the whole troops, who were collected at Dresden and its environs, defiled before him. The multitude of uniforms, costumes, and nations, which were then assembled, strongly bespoke the heart-stirring nature of the contest which had thus roused the world against itself in arms: the Old Guard, twenty thousand strong, of whom five thousand were splendid cavaliers, presented a magnificent spectacle, and it seemed as if nothing could withstand the hero who had such a force still at his disposal. A grand banquet followed, at which the whole soldiers of the guard were entertained, and in the evening fireworks and illuminations recalled for a moment the triumphant days of the Empire. But though the splendour of these rejoicings for a while diverted the attention and distracted the cares of the soldiers and citizens, they afforded no respite to the cares and anxiety of their chief: serious and thoughtful, he beheld the vast array defile before him, and immediately after the review terminated, shut himself up in his cabinet to resume the labours of diplomacy, which then wore so threatening an aspect. Melancholy forebodings filled every breast: it was universally believed that Austria had joined the alliance; no glowing order of the day, no heart-stirring proclamation, dispelled these fears, or called the troops to fresh victories; and next morning the rolling of the drums, which in every direction called the troops to their rallying-points, the aids-de-camp hurrying to and fro, the clatter of artillery and wagons through the streets, and the long columns of bayonets and lances which defiled through the gates, told but too plainly that war was again about to rekindle its flames. This review deserves to be noticed: it was the LAST that Napoleon ever held of the Grand Army; disaster afterward succeeded disaster too rapidly for the animating pageantry of military magnificence.†

Shortly before the recommencement of hostilities, Napoleon summoned an old veteran of the Revolution and the Empire to Dresden, whose

* Lond., 105, 106, 109. Fain, ii., 95, 96. Capef., x., 175, 176.

† Fain, ii., 91, 92.

Interview of Napoleon with Fouché at Dresden.

selfish ambition and capacity for intrigue were too dangerous to be allowed to remain in his rear in the disgrace into which he had fallen. Fouché forthwith obeyed the summons, and on his way from Paris had an interview with Augereau at Mayence, who strongly expressed, with military energy, his conviction that the obstinacy of Napoleon would speedily prove his ruin.* The emperor received him with cold civility: after the first compliments were over, they entered on the state of affairs; and Fouché had the boldness to tell him that he was fearful that five hundred thousand soldiers, supported by an insurgent population in rear, would compel him to abandon Germany. Napoleon immediately resumed his warlike air. "It is distressing," said he, "that a general discouragement has seized even upon the bravest minds. The question is no longer the abandonment of this or that province: our political supremacy, and with it our very existence, is at stake. If my physical power is great, my moral power is still greater: let us beware how we break the charm. Wherefore all these alarms? Let events take their course. Austria wishes to take advantage of my embarrassments to recover great advantages; but she will never consent to my total destruction, in order to surrender herself without a shield to the jaws of Russia. This is my policy: I expect that you are to serve me with all your power. I have named you Governor-general of Illyria; and it is you, in all probability, who will have to put the finishing hand with Austria. Set off; go by Prague; set on your well-known threads of secret negotiation, and thence travel by Gratz to Laybach. Lose no time, for poor Junot, whom you are to succeed, is decidedly mad. In my hands, Illyria is an advanced guard in the heart of Austria, a sentinel to keep the cabinet of Vienna right." Fouché made a profound obeisance, and straightway set out. He was well aware that he was sent into honourable banishment, but he was too prudent to remonstrate against his destination. Before he arrived in his province, Junot had displayed evident marks of insanity: the vexations consequent on the public reproaches addressed to him by the emperor in Russia, joined to the rigours of its climate and domestic embarrassments, had combined to destroy his understanding; and after Fouché's arrival he was sent back to France, where, in a fortnight after, he died in the house in which he had been born, having, in a paroxysm of madness, thrown himself from a window. Napoleon's early companions in arms were fast falling around him. Bessières, Duroc, and Junot perished within a few months of each other; the stars which shone forth in the firmament eighteen years before on the Italian plains, in the first years of the Revolution, were rapidly sinking into the shades of night.*†

July 29.

The astute chief of the police, in passing through Prague, however, immediately commenced his usual system of underhand intrigue and selfish foresight. He saw clearly that it was all over with Napoleon, and deeming the opportunity favourable for setting on foot the threads of a negotiation, which might give him the means of escape in the general ruin, he opened to Metternich in that city his ideas on the important part which the Senate would come to play in the event of his fall. "Europe," said he, "rising *en masse* against Napoleon, cannot fail to occasion his overthrow: we must look to the future. A regency, with the empress at its head, and Austria as its support, seems to afford the fairest chance of success; the members of the Bonaparte family must be pensioned and sent to travel; a regency, composed of the leading men of all parties, including Talleyrand, Fouché, and M. de Montmorency, would soon arrange matters; the imperial generals might be easily appeased by great appointments, and France reduced to the limits of the Rhine." Metternich, without committing himself, received the plan proposed as a memorial, observing, only, "that all would depend on the chances of war." But this project on the part of the veteran regicide and revolutionist of Nantes, deserves to be recorded as the first germe of the vast conspiracy which, in the end, precipitated Napoleon from the throne.‡

Fouché's secret interviews with Metternich.

While Napoleon was thus providing, in the honourable exile of his old minister of police, for the security of his empire during the chances of war, another illustrious chief of the Revolution was again reappearing on the theatre, and destined shortly to close his brilliant career in the ranks of his enemies. Moreau, ever since his trial and condemnation by the First Consul◊ in 1804, had lived in retirement in America, beholding the contest which still raged in Europe as the shipwrecked mariner does the waves of the ocean from which he has just escaped. But the Emperor of Russia, who entertained the highest opinion of the Republican general, deeming it not unlikely that he might be induced to lend the aid of his great military talents to support the cause of European freedom, had

Arrival of Moreau in Europe.

* "I received," said Augereau to Fouché, "letters from headquarters immediately after the battle of Bautzen, and it appears that that horrible butchery led to no result: no prisoners, no cannon. In a country extremely intersected with enclosures, we have found the enemy prepared or intrenched at every point; we suffered severely at the subsequent combat of Reichenbach. Observe that, in that short campaign, one bullet has carried off Bessières on this side of the Elbe, and another Duroc at Reichenbach. What a war! we shall all be destroyed; what would he do at Dresden? He will not make peace; you know him better than I do. He will get himself surrounded by 500,000 men. No one can doubt that Austria will follow the example of Prussia. If he continues obstinate, and is not killed, which he will not be, we shall all be destroyed."—See *Mémoires de* Fouché, ii., 171, 172.

* Fouché, ii., 198, 215. Capef., x., 184, 185. D'Abrantes, xvi., 278, 321.

† Napoleon was deeply affected by the death of Junot: when he received the intelligence he exclaimed, "Voila encore un de mes braves de moins! Junot! O mon Dieu!" Shortly before his death, Junot wrote a letter to the emperor, which, amid much excitement arising from commencing insanity, contained expressions strongly descriptive of the feelings entertained by his early companions in arms at that period. "I, who love you with the adoration of the savage for the sun—I, who live only in you—even I implore you to terminate this eternal war. Let us have peace. I would wish to repose my worn-out head, my pain-racked limbs in my house, in the midst of my family, of my children, of my friends. I desire to enjoy that which I have purchased with what is more precious than all the treasures of the Indies—with my blood—the blood of an honourable man, of a good Frenchman. I ask tranquillity—purchased by twenty-two years of active service, and seventeen wounds, by which the blood has flowed, first for my country, then for your glory."—D'Abrantes, xvi., 323.

‡ Fouché, ii., 209, 210. Capef., x., 185, 186.

◊ *Ante*, ii., 233.

some time previously opened a correspondence with him at New-York; the result of which was, that it was agreed, as the basis of his co-operation, "that France should be maintained in the limits which it had acquired under the Republic; that she should be allowed to choose her own government by the intervention of the Senate and political bodies; and that, as soon as the imperial tyranny was overturned, the interests of the country should become paramount to those of the imperial family." In pursuance of these principles, it was agreed that Moreau and Bernadotte should appear together on the banks of the Rhine, make an appeal to the exhausted army with the tricolour flag, and strive to overturn the tyranny which the 18th Brumaire had established. No sooner were these preliminaries agreed on than Moreau embarked at New-York, on board the American ship Hannibal, and, after a passage of thirty days, arrived at Gottenburg on the 27th of July, from whence he immediately set out for Stralsund to have an interview with Bernadotte.*

His reception at Stralsund by Bernadotte.

Moreau's arrival on the shores of the Baltic was felt, as Marshal Essen, the Swedish commander, expressed it, "as a re-enforcement of a hundred thousand men." He was received at Stralsund with the highest military honours by Bernadotte, who, amid the thunders of artillery and the cheers of an immense concourse of spectators, conducted him to his headquarters. But though the meeting between the hero of Hohenlinden and the old Republican of the Sambre and Meuse was extremely cordial, yet they experienced considerable embarrassment when they came to consult on the ulterior measures to be pursued in France, in the event of Napoleon being dethroned. Moreau, whose Republican ideas had undergone no change by his residence in America, was clear for reverting to the Constitution of 1792, and perhaps indulged the secret hope that, in such an event, he might be called to an elevated place in its councils; Bernadotte, whose Democratic principles had been singularly modified by the experience he had had of the sweets of royalty, inclined to a monarchical constitution, and nursed the expectation that the choice of the French people, as well as of the allied sovereigns, might fall on himself. But, though the seeds of future and most serious discord might thus be perceived germinating in the very outset of their deliberations, yet common hatred of Napoleon kept them united in all objects of present policy; and after concerting, for three days, with perfect unanimity the plan of military operations, Moreau set out for the allied headquarters in Bohemia.†

His journey to, and reception at, Prague.

Moreau's progress from Stralsund to Prague was a continued triumph. Such was the greatness of his reputation, and the enthusiasm excited in the north of Germany by his joining the allied cause, that his journey resembled rather the progress of a beloved sovereign than that of a foreign, and at one period hostile, general. The innkeepers refused to accept anything from him for their entertainment; the postmasters hastened to offer him their best horses, and send on couriers to announce his approach; wherever he stopped a crowd collected, eager to catch a glance of so renowned a warrior. At Berlin, not only the street in which the hotel was situated where he lodged was thronged with multitudes, but those even which opened into it; and during the few hours that he remained there, he was visited by the principal persons in that city. Nor was his reception at the allied headquarters, where he arrived late at night on the 16th of August, less flattering. Early next morning he was visited by the Emperor Alexander, who lavished upon him every possible attention; and he was immediately admitted into the entire confidence of the allied sovereigns. "General Moreau," said Alexander, "I know your opinions; I will do nothing which can thwart them. France shall be allowed to pronounce itself—to show its power; I leave it perfectly free." His reception by the Emperor Francis was not less flattering, who publicly thanked the conqueror of Hohenlinden for the moderation he had displayed, and the discipline he had preserved, when in possession of a considerable part of his dominions. Moreau immediately began to study the maps for the campaign which was about to open; and it was very much by his advice that the grand attack on Dresden, which so soon ensued, and so nearly proved fatal to Napoleon, was adopted. On the 15th of August, General Jomini, whose military writings have rendered him so celebrated, and who at that period occupied the situation of chief of the staff to Marshal Ney, chagrined at being refused the rank of general of division in the French army, to which his services entitled him, passed over to the allies, and was most cordially received. Lecourbe was hourly expected: so that circumstances seemed to afford no small countenance to the favourite idea of Moreau, that it was possible to form a legion of thirty thousand men out of the French prisoners in Russia, who were reported to be ready to combat Napoleon, and that this force would form the nucleus of a host which would divide, under his command, with the emperor the military forces of the French Empire.*

Aug. 16.

Aug. 15.

Contention about the appointment of a commander-in-chief to the allies.

But how gratifying soever the arrival of such distinguished French officers at the allied headquarters might be, they led to a division on a point of vital importance, which, if not terminated by the magnanimous self-denial of the party principally concerned, might, at the very outset, have proved fatal to the whole alliance. That one generalissimo was indispensable to give unity to the operations of so many different armies, when combating such a commander as Napoleon, was sufficiently evident; but who that generalissimo was to be was by no means equally apparent. This point was canvassed with the utmost anxiety at the allied headquarters for some days before hostilities were resumed, and no small heat was evinced on both sides in the discussion. The Emperor Alexander openly and eagerly aspired to the supreme command, in which he was supported by the King of Prussia. His colossal power and great reputation; the unexampled sacrifices

* Capef., x., 169, 170. Lab., Chute de Napoleon, i., 294.
† Lab., i., 294, 295. Capef., x., 170, 171.

* Jom., iv., 368, 369. Lab., i., 296, 297. Capef., x., 172, 173.

which he had made in combating the French emperor, as well as the unparalleled successes with which his efforts had been crowned; his personal courage and tried energy of character, all conspired to give weight to his claim, which was strongly recommended by both Moreau and Jomini. It seemed difficult, indeed, to conceive on what grounds it could be resisted; the more especially as the Archduke Charles, the only general in the allied armies whose experience or exploits could render him a fit competitor for the situation, was kept at a distance by the unhappy dissensions which for some years had prevailed in the imperial family of Austria. The command, in truth, would have been unanimously conferred upon the emperor by the allied powers, had it not been for the arrival of Moreau, and the high place immediately assigned him in the Russian military councils. The Austrians, not unnaturally, felt apprehensive of being placed, in some degree, under the command of a French general, from whose hostility they had suffered so much; and it was soon painfully evident that, on this account, no cordial co-operation on their part could be hoped for if the Emperor Alexander were invested with the supreme command. In these circumstances, that generous and noble prince, though not without a severe pang, relinquished his claim to that elevated situation; and, from deference to Austria, it was conferred on Prince Schwartzenberg, who remained generalissimo down to the capture of Paris. But, though another was placed at the nominal head of affairs, it was impossible to deprive the Emperor Alexander of the weight which he possessed as the head of the largest and most experienced portion of the allied forces: such was the jealousy of the Russian soldiers at the idea of foreign interference, that Schwartzenberg's orders were, for a considerable time, privately sent to Barclay de Tolly, and by him transmitted, in his own name, to the corps of his army.* It was often difficult to say, amid the confusion of emperors, kings, and generals at headquarters, who really held the supreme command: every one was willing to share in the credit of successful measures, but none would admit the responsibility of reverses; and nothing but the common danger to which they were exposed, and the fervent spirit by which they were animated, prevented the alliance from falling to pieces, from the want of a real head, in the very outset of its operations.

Disinterested conduct of the allied generals in regard to the command.

Nor was it only by the Emperor Alexander that disinterested generosity was displayed on the trying occasion of arranging the commands and distributing the corps of the multifarious host which was assembled around the allied standards. Princes, generals, diplomatists, officers, and soldiers, vied with each other in the alacrity with which they laid aside, not only national enmities, but individual rivalry, and bent all their energies, without a thought of self, on forwarding the great objects of the confederacy. Alexander, discarding all thought of the supreme command, divided his force in nearly equal proportions between the three grand armies, and subjected them to the command of Schwartzenberg, who had invaded his dominions; of Blucher, who had hitherto been unfortunate in war; and of Bernadotte, who had taken so active a share in the first Polish war. Tauenzein and Bulow obeyed without a murmur the commands of the Prince Royal of Sweden, whose sword had cut so deep into the vitals of Prussia at Jena and Lubeck; Langeron and Sacken cheerfully acted under the command of the veteran Prussian Blucher, as yet unknown to successful fame: Russia, the main stay and soul of the alliance, whose triumphant arms had changed the face of Europe, had not the command of one of the great armies; while Austria, the last to enter into the confederacy, and so recently in alliance with Napoleon, was intrusted with the general direction of the whole. On contrasting this remarkable unanimity and disinterestedness with the woful dissensions which had paralyzed the efforts, and marred the fortunes of all former coalitions, or the grasping ambition and ceaseless jealousies which at that very time brought disaster upon Napoleon's lieutenants in Spain, we perceive that it is sometimes well for nations, as well as for individuals, to be in affliction; that selfishness and corruption spring from the temptations of prosperity, as generosity and patriotism are nursed amid the storms of adversity; and that the mixed condition of good and evil is part of the system which the mercy of Providence has provided in this world, against the consequences of the blended principles of virtue and wickedness which have descended to us from our first parents.

Great influence of Wellington's success on the allied cause at this period.

It is a singular, and, to an Englishman, highly gratifying circumstance, to observe in how remarkable and marked a manner the achievements of Wellington and his gallant army in Spain operated at all the most critical periods of the struggle in animating the exertions, or terminating the irresolution of the other powers which co-operated in the contest. When Russia, in silence, was taking measures to withstand the dreadful irruption which she foresaw awaited her from the power of France, and hesitated whether even her resources were adequate to the encounter, she beheld, in the defence of the lines of Torres Vedras, at once an example and a proof of the efficacy of a wise defensive system; when the negotiations between her and France were approaching a crisis, in May, 1812, she was encouraged by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz to persevere in resistance; on the eve of the battle of Borodino, she made her lines resound with the thunder of artillery for the joyous intelligence of the victory of Salamanca; during the circular march to Taroutino, she received support amid the flames of Moscow from the fall of Madrid. Nor did the glorious events of the Peninsula in 1813 occur less opportunely to exercise a decisive influence on the fortunes of Europe: the intelligence of the overthrow of Vittoria arrived just in time to determine the vacillation, and add the strength of Austria to the alliance; that of the defeat of Soult in the Pyrenees, to imbolden the counsels, and invigorate the arm of the allied army on the resumption of hostilities, after the armistice of Prague. Whether these remarkable coincidences were the result of accidental occurrence, or formed part of the fixed

* Lab., i., 297. Lond., 101, 102. Capef., x., 190, 191. Jom., iv., 375, 376.

design of Providence for the deliverance at the appointed season of an oppressed world, it is not given to mortal eye to discover; but this much may with confidence be asserted, that they afford a memorable example of the all-important truth, applicable alike to nations and individuals, that the only sure foundation for final success is to be found in the fearless discharge of duty; that human eye cannot scan, nor human foresight discover, the mysterious threads by which an overruling power works out ultimate reward for strenuous, or ultimate retribution for ignoble conduct; and that, whatever may be the horrors of the wilderness through which they pass, ultimate salvation is decreed for that people who, following the pillar of fire by night, and the pillar of cloud by day, resolutely persevere through every difficulty in the appointed path of virtue.

CHAPTER LXXI.

DELIVERANCE OF GERMANY.

ARGUMENT.

Spirit of the French Revolution.—Causes of the vast Strength of the Passions it developed.—Moral Reaction which stops this unbridled Career.—Causes of the extraordinary Fall of the Revolutionary Power.—First Operation of the Allies.—Napoleon enters Bohemia.—He turns aside into Silesia, notwithstanding all St. Cyr's Efforts.—Retreat of Macdonald in that Province.—Napoleon advances against Blucher, who falls back.—Advance of the Allies upon Dresden.—They approach that City.—Important Advantage gained by this Movement.—Napoleon returns towards Dresden.—Reasons for that Movement.—His Instructions to Vandamme, who is despatched to Pirna.—Entrance of the French Guards into Dresden.—Arrival of the Emperor after them.—Formidable Attack on the City by the Allies.—Awful Aspect of the Allied Columns as they attacked Dresden.—Success in the Outset of the Allies.—Sally at each Flank by Napoleon, which repels the Attack.—State of both Parties during the Night.—Napoleon's Dispositions on the Day 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Blucher.—Ney's Movements, at the same time, against Bernadotte.—Battle of Dennewitz.—Arrival of Ney with his Centre on the Field.—The Arrival of Bernadotte with the Swedish Reserve decides the Victory.—Operations of Davoust and Walmoden on the Lower Elbe.—Walmoden destroys the French Division Pecheux.—Reasons which now led to a Change of the Seat of War by Napoleon.—Deplorable Condition of the French in Torgau, Dresden, and the Fortresses on the Elbe.—Dreadful Effect of their Distresses on the Condition of the French Army.—Situation of the Allies.—Their Plans at this Period.—Movements of Blucher across the Elbe, in conformity with their Plan of Operations.—Movements of Bernadotte and Schwartzenberg.—Napoleon's Views at this Period.—His admirable military Ideas expressed to St. Cyr.—He afterward alters his Plan.—Sets out to join Ney, and leaves St. Cyr at Dresden, where he is soon surrounded by the Enemy.—Napoleon advances against Blucher, who joins Bernadotte.—Their united Armies march 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the Battle, and Passage of the Rhine by the French.—Reflections on this Battle.—Combat of Hocheim, and Approach of the Allied Armies to the Rhine.—Enthusiasm of the German Troops when they approached that River.—Final Overthrow of the Kingdom of Westphalia.—Operations against Davoust on the Lower Elbe.—Concluding Operations against the Danes, and Armistice with them.—Operations of St. Cyr and Tolstoy before Dresden.—The Blockade of which is resumed after the Battle of Leipsic.—Miserable Condition and Difficulties of St. Cyr, who at length Surrenders.—Terms of the Capitulation, which are violated by the Allied Generals.—Reflections on the Breach of Convention on their Part.—Lord Londonderry prevents a similar Capitulation being granted to Davoust.—Fall of Stettin.—Siege and Fall of Torgau.—Operations before Dantzic during 1813.—Operations there till the Commencement of the regular Siege in October.—Continuation of the Siege, and Fall of the Place.—Capitulation of Zamosc and Modlin on the Vistula, and general Results of the Campaign.—Insurrection in Holland in favour of the Stadtholder and House of Orange.—The French Yoke is universally thrown off, and they are expelled from the Country.—Operations in Italy during the Campaign.—Forces and Positions of the contending Armies.—The Austrians commence the Campaign, and gain considerable Successes.—Able Measures and obstinate Resistance of the Viceroy.—General Results of the Campaign, which throws the French behind the Adige.—Reflections on this memorable Campaign, and on the military Ability displayed by Napoleon in it.—His gross and inexcusable Faults.—Great Talents shown in it by the Allied Generals.—Memorable Example of Moral Retribution which it affords.

Spirit of the French Revolution.

The French Revolution was not so much a revolt against the government and institutions as the morality and faith of former times. It professed to offer new motives of action, new rewards of courage, new inducements to exertion to emancipated man. The old restraints of precept, duty, religion, were to be abolished. The rule of action was to be, not what is right, but what is agreeable; not what duty enjoins, but what passion desires; not what is promised, ultimate reward in another world, but what was attended in this with immediate gratification. Sedulously fanning the passions, it invariably neglected the conscience; often using the language of virtue, it as uniformly directed the actions of vice. The incalculable influence of generous affection—the elevating influence of noble sentiments, was neither overlooked nor underrated by its leaders; on the contrary, they entered largely into their policy for the government of the world. They were considered as the appropriate, and often the most efficacious means of rousing mankind; as instruments never to be despised, but, on the contrary, largely used for effecting the purposes of democratic elevation or selfish ambition. But it never, for an instant, entered into their contemplation that these sentiments were to occasion any restraint upon their conduct; that the limitations, which they so loudly proclaimed should be imposed on the power of others, should be affixed to their own; or that they should ever be called to forego present objects of ambition or gratification from an abstract sense of what is right, or a submissive obedience to the Divine commands. Hence its long-continued and astonishing success. While it readily attracted the active and enterprising by the brilliant prizes which it offered, and the agreeable relaxation from restraint which it held forth, it enlisted, at the same time, the unwary and unforeseeing even in the opposite ranks, by the generous sentiments which it breathed, and the perpetual appeals to noble feelings which it made; and thus, with almost superhuman address, it combined in its ranks the energy of the passions and the sacrifices of the affections, the selfishness of matured and far-seeing sin, and the generosity of deluded and inexperienced virtue.

Cause of the vast strength of the Revolutionary passions.

The vehement passions which the prospect of unrestrained indulgence, whether of pleasure, gain, or power, never fails to excite, the ardent desires which it awakens, the universal energy which it calls forth, are for a time irresistible; and if experience and suffering were not at hand to correct these excesses, and restore the moral equilibrium of nature, it is hard to say how the career of iniquity could be stopped, save by a special interposition of avenging power, or the mutual destruction of the wicked by each other. All the passions of the Revolution, in its different stages, were the passions of sin; the strength it displayed was no other than the energy which, anterior even to human creation, was arrayed against the rule of Omnipotence. The insatiable thirst for power which characterized its earlier stages; the unbounded desire for sensual gratification which succeeded its disappointment; the lust of rapine which sent its armies forth to regenerate by plundering all mankind; the passion for glory, which sacrificed the peace and blood of nations to the splendour or the power of one ruling people—were so many directions which, according to the circumstances of different periods, the same ruling principle, the *thirst for illicit gratification*, successively took. The sober efforts of industry—the simple path of duty—the heroic self-denial of virtue—were insupportable to men thus violently excited: nothing short of the spoils of the world could gratify passions excited by the prospect of all its indulgences. When Satan strove to tempt our Saviour, and reserved for the trial his strongest allurements, he led him up to an exceeding high mountain and showed him all the kingdoms of the earth, and offered to give him them all if he would fall down and worship him. Memorable words! indicating at once the continued agency of the great adversary of mankind on individual conduct, and the pre-eminent strength of the temptations to achieve his conquests which were to be drawn from the social or national passions.

Moral reaction which stops this unbridled career.

"Experience," says Dr. Johnson, "is the great test of truth, and is perpetually contradicting the theories of men." It is by the ultimate consequences of their actions that the eternal distinction between virtue and vice is made apparent, and the reality of Divine superintendence brought home to the universal conviction of men. There is a limit to human wickedness; and duty, supported by religion, generally in the end proves more than a match for passion resting on infidelity. More than two thousand years ago, the royal bard thus sung in words of inspired felicity: "Lo, these are the ungodly, these prosper in the world, and these have riches in possession: and I said, Then have I cleansed my heart in vain, and washed mine hands in innocency. All the day long have I been punished: and chastened every morning. Yea, and I had almost said even as they; but lo, then I should have condemned the generation of thy children. Then thought I to understand this: but it was too hard for me, until I went into the sanctuary of God: then under-

stood I the end of these men; namely, how thou dost set them in slippery places: and castest them down, and destroyest them. Oh, how suddenly do they consume: perish, and come to a fearful end! Yea, even like as a dream when one awaketh; so shalt thou make their image to vanish out of the city."* Of whom were these words spoken? Of those in the days of David, or of Napoleon? Twenty years of almost unbroken prosperity had reared up and consolidated the mighty fabric of the French Empire, and no power on earth seemed capable of overthrowing it. Despite the catastrophe of the Moscow campaign, the genius of the emperor had again brought victory to the tricolour standards. The triumph of Lutzen and Bautzen had steadied the wavering fidelity of his allies, and reanimated the spirit of his people; and four hundred thousand brave men were arrayed around his eagles on the Elbe, to assert and maintain the dominion of the world. Never, save on the Niemen, had Napoleon seen himself at the head of such a force: never had Europe beheld such a host assembled over its whole breadth, for the subjugation of its independence. Within two months from the resumption of hostilities the colossal structure was overthrown; the French armies were swept as by a whirlwind from the German plains; Spain was rejoicing in her freedom; the liberated nations of Europe were returning thanks for their deliverance; and in six months more the Empire of Napoleon was at an end; the mighty conqueror was cast away in mimic sovereignty on a petty island, and the glories of the Revolution were numbered among the things that have been.

Causes of this extraordinary change.

The way in which this extraordinary retribution was brought about now appears traced in colours of imperishable light. It was the same false and vicious principle, pushed to its necessary consequences, which produced the internal calamities and external disasters of the Revolution. By promising and affording unbounded gratification to the passions and desires, without any regard to the mode in which it was to be obtained, that great convulsion arrayed an astonishing force of energy and talent on its side; and if these indulgences could have been obtained without involving the ruin or destruction of others, it is hard to say where the career of selfish ambition would have stopped. But honest industry, laborious exertion, virtuous self-denial alone, can purchase innocuous enjoyments: all summary and short-hand modes of obtaining them without such efforts, necessarily involve the injury of others. Robbery and plunder, accordingly, veiled under the successive and specious names of liberty, patriotism, and glory, constituted from first to last its invariable method of action. It began with the spoliation of the Church and the emigrant noblesse; the fundholders and capitalists were the next objects of attack; the blood of the people was then drained off in merciless streams; and when all domestic sources were exhausted, and the armies raised by these infernal methods, let loose to pillage and oppress all the adjoining states, had failed in extorting the requisite supplies, even the commons of the poor and the hospitals of the sick were at last confiscated under the imperial government. With those who were enriched by these iniquitous methods, indeed, this system was in the highest degree popular; but in all cases of robbery, there are two parties to be considered—the robber, and the victim of his violence. The long continuance and wide extent of this iniquity at length produced a universal spirit of exasperation: resistance was commenced almost by instinct, and persisted in when it appeared hopeless. From the ice of Kamschatka to the Pillars of Hercules; from the North Cape to the shores of Calabria—all nations were now convulsed in the effort to shake off the tyranny of France: a crusade greater than had been collected either by the despotism of Asia in ancient, or the fervour of Europe in more modern times, was raised for the deliverance of mankind; and sixteen hundred thousand men on the two sides appeared in arms in Germany, Spain, and Italy, to decide the desperate conflict between the antagonist principles of Vice striving for a liberation from all restraints, human and divine, and Religion enjoining the authority of duty and obedience to the commands of God. The world had never beheld such a contest: if we would seek a parallel to it, we must go back to those awful images of the strife of the heavenly powers, darkly shadowed forth in Scripture, to which the genius of Milton has given poetic and terrestrial immortality.

First operations of the allies.

The armistice was denounced on the 11th, but, by its conditions, six days more were to elapse before hostilities could be resumed. It was an object, however, for the allies to have their preparations complete for action the moment that the prescribed period arrived; and, accordingly, on the 12th, the Russian and Prussian troops, in pursuance of the concerted plan of operations, began to defile in great strength by their left into Bohemia. The junction with the Austrian troops in the plains of Jung-Buntzlau raised the allied force in that province to two hundred and twenty thousand men; but, though this host was in the highest degree formidable, both from its numbers and the admirable quality of the troops of which the greater part of it was composed, yet a considerable part of the Austrians were new levies, as yet unused to war; and the variety of nations of which it was composed, as well as the want of any previous habit of co-operation among each other, or uncontrolled direction in its head, rendered the success of any important operations undertaken in the outset of the campaign very doubtful. Hostilities were commenced by the allies on the side of Silesia before the six days had expired. Taking advantage of some trifling infractions of the armistice by the French troops, the allied generals, on the 14th, sent a corps to take possession of Breslau, which lay in the neutral territory between the two armies, and was likely immediately to fall into the enemy's hands on the resumption of hostilities; on the day following, Blucher advanced in great force across the neutral territory, and everywhere drove in the French videttes; and the French troops, surprised in their cantonments, hastened to fall behind the Bober.*

August 14.

August 15.

No sooner was the emperor informed of the

* Psalm lxxiii., 12-19.

* Bout., 5, 6. Jom., iv., 369, 370. Fain, ii., 237, 238.

Napoleon enters Bohemia. August 17.

resumption of hostilities on the Silesian frontier, than he set out from Dresden, and the first night slept at Gorlitz. As he was stepping into his carriage, two persons from different quarters arrived: Narbonne from Prague, with the account of the final rupture of the negotiations, and Murat from Naples, with the offer of his redoubtable sword. Napoleon had a conference of an hour in duration with the former, whom he despatched with the proposal for the continuance of negotiations during hostilities, which, as already mentioned, proved ineffectual;* and then set out, with the King of Naples, in his carriage. Though well aware of the vacillation which Murat had evinced in command of the army in Poland, and of the opening which he had made towards negotiation with the allied powers, the emperor had the magnanimity to forgive it all; and he was again invested with the command of the cavalry, in which service he was, in truth, unrivalled. Uncertain on which side the principal attacks of the allies were likely to be directed, and having himself no fixed plan of operations, Napoleon established his guard and reserve cavalry at Gorlitz and Zittau, watching the movements of his adversaries, and prepared to strike whenever they made a false movement, or afforded him an opportunity of falling upon them with advantage. Fifty thousand men, in three columns, crossed the mountain frontier of Bohemia, and established themselves in the Austrian territories at Gabel, Rombourg, and Reichemberg; while the feeble Austrian detachments, which were stationed at that point under Count Neipperg, fell back, still skilfully screening their rear, on the road to Prague.†

He turns aside into Silesia, notwithstanding all St. Cyr's efforts.

Napoleon's movements at this time were based upon the idea, to which he obstinately adhered till it had well-nigh proved his ruin, that the great effort of the allies would be made on the side of Silesia, and that it was there that the first decisive strokes of the campaign were to be struck. He persevered in this belief, even after he had become acquainted, by his irruption into Bohemia, with the march of the grand Russian and Prussian army into that province, and their concentration under the immediate eye of the allied sovereigns around the walls of Prague. All the efforts of Marshal St. Cyr to convince him that this was the quarter from which danger was to be apprehended; that so great an accumulation of force in Bohemia would not have been made without some serious design; and that the French would soon find their quarters straitened in the neighbourhood of Torgau and Dresden, were in vain.‡

Deaf to these arguments, and uninfluenced even by the obvious confirmation which they received from the march of the Russians and Prussians in such force into Bohemia, Napoleon persisted in believing that it was on the Bober and the Katzbach, now comparatively stripped of troops, that he should commence operations; and assuring St. Cyr, who was left at Pirna with thirty thousand men, in command of the passes leading from Bohemia to Dresden, that he had nothing to fear; that Vandamme would come to his assistance if the enemy threatened him in considerable force; and that, if necessary, he himself would return with his guard and assemble a hundred and sixty thousand men around the walls of that city, he ordered the whole troops under his immediate command to wheel to the left, and defile towards Silesia.*† August 20.

Retreat of Macdonald in Silesia.

Meanwhile, Blucher was vigorously pressing on the French army in Silesia, which, not being in sufficient strength to resist his formidable masses, was everywhere falling back before him. Lauriston was pushed by the Russians under Langeron; Ney, by the corps of Sacken; Marmont and Macdonald by the Prussians, under Blucher and D'York. Such was the vigour of the pursuit, that ground was rapidly lost by the French in every direction. Ney fell back on the night of the 17th from Leignitz to Hanau; next day the Katzbach was passed at all points; on the 18th, Blucher established his headquarters at Goldberg, while Sacken occupied Leignitz. Still, the allies pressed on: Langeron, on the left, passed the Bober at Zobten, after routing a detachment which occupied that point; in the centre, Blucher, with his brave Prussians, obliged also Lauriston to recross it; while Ney, in like manner, was obliged to evacuate Buntzlau, and fall back across the same stream. Thus, at all points, the French force in Silesia was giving way before the enemy; and it was of sinister augury that the gallant generals at its head did not feel themselves strong enough to withstand Aug. 17. Aug. 18. Aug. 19.

* *Ante*, iv., p. 122.

† Fain, ii., 239, 240. Odel., i., 239, 241.

‡ "The movement which your majesty has commenced into Bohemia, upon Gabel, and which you appear to design to push still farther on, appears to me one of those happy inspirations of which your genius is so fruitful. The reunion of the three sovereigns at Prague, of the Austrian army, and a considerable part of the Russian and Prussian, do not leave a doubt of the intentions of the enemy. They have always desired to operate on that side; they desire it still, notwithstanding the movements of your majesty. So great an army is not assembled without a purpose: their object is to execute a change of front along their whole line, the left in front moving upon Wittemberg, and to straiten Dresden and Torgau so much by intrenching themselves around them, even if they should not succeed in taking these fortresses, as to render all egress almost impossible, while, with their right, they make head against your majesty on the Elbe."—ST. CYR *to* NAPOLEON, *August* 21, 1813. ST. CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iv., 372; *Pièces Justificatifs*.

* Odel., i., 241, 242. St. Cyr to Napoleon, 20th August, 1813. Napoleon to St. Cyr, Aug. 20th, 1813. St. Cyr, iv., 367, 372.

† "Should the Russian and Austrian forces united march upon Dresden by the left bank, the general Vandamme will come to its relief: you will then have under your order 60,000 men in the camp of Dresden on the two banks. The troops in the camp at Zittau, become disposable in that event, will also hasten there: they will arrive in four days, and raise your force to 100,000. I will come with my Guard, 50,000 strong; and in four days we shall have from 160,000 to 180,000 men around its walls. It is of no consequence though they cut me off from France: the essential point is, that I should not be cut off from Dresden and the Elbe. The army of Silesia, which is from 130,000 to 140,000 men, without the Guard, may be re-enforced by that *corps d'élite*, and raised to 180,000. They will debouch against Wittgenstein, Blucher, and Sacken, who, at this moment, are marching against our troops at Buntzlau; as soon as I have destroyed or disabled them, I will be in a situation to restore the equilibrium by marching upon Berlin, or taking the Austrians in rear in Bohemia. All that is not as yet clear; but one thing is sufficiently clear, that you cannot turn 400,000 men, posted under cover of a chain of fortified places, and who can debouch at pleasure by Dresden, Torgau, Wittemberg, or Magdebourg. All you have to do is to dispute the ground, gain time, and preserve Dresden, and to maintain active and constant communications with General Vandamme."—NAPOLEON *to* ST. CYR, *17th August*, 1813; ST. CYR, iv., 365; *Pièces Just.*

his advance:* for it was an army which Napoleon estimated at a hundred thousand men, which was thus receding without striking a blow.†

Napoleon's advance against Blucher, who falls back.

But the arrival of the heads of the columns of guards and cavalry, commanded by Napoleon in person, which were directed, with all possible expedition, to the left, through the Bohemian Mountains towards Buntzlau, soon changed the state of affairs in this quarter. No sooner did they appear than the retreat of Ney's army was stopped; and the soldiers, with joy, received orders to wheel about and march against the enemy. The indefatigable activity of the emperor communicated itself to the troops: all vied with each other in pressing forward to what it was hoped would prove a decisive victory; and infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with the Imperial Guard at their head, poured in an impetuous, yet regulated, torrent down the valleys of the Bohemian Mountains, and inundated the Silesian plains. Such was Napoleon's anxiety to press forward, that he outstripped even the cavalry of the guard, and arrived at Laubau, in advance of Gorlitz, with hardly any of his attendants around him. By daybreak on the following morning he was on the banks of the Bober, and entered Lowenberg with the advanced guards; the bridge which the Prussians had broken down was restored under the fire of artillery; Lauriston, in face of the enemy, recrossed the river, and advanced, with a constant running fire in front, to the gates of Goldberg. Blucher continuing his retreat on the following day, the Katzbach also was passed, and the whole army of Silesia concentrated around Jauer. But the retreat of the allies, though decidedly pronounced, was far from being a flight: with admirable skill they took advantage of every favourable position to check the pursuit, and give time to the columns in rear to retire in order; and in several severe actions, especially one in front of Goldberg, inflicted a very severe loss upon the enemy. Such was the magnitude of the forces employed on both sides, and the extent of ground over which hostilities were carried on, that, although they had only lasted five days, and no general engagement had taken place, each party was already weakened by full six thousand men. Napoleon evinced the greatest satisfaction at the result of this day's operations, and at thus seeing so great a mass of the enemy's forces retreating before him in the very outset of the campaign; yet cooler observers in the French army remarked that the plan of the allies was sagaciously designed and skilfully executed, when they had thus early succeeded in attracting Napoleon to whichever side they chose, and yet avoided the risk of an encounter when the chances were no longer in their favour.‡

Aug. 20.

Aug. 21.

Aug. 21.

In truth, Blucher's advance and subsequent retreat were part of the general policy of the allies for the conduct of the campaign laid down at Trachenberg, and developed with remarkable precision in his instructions,* and Napoleon, in consequence of it, and from the bold measures adopted in his rear, was brought to within a hair's-breath of destruction. Following out the decided, but yet judicious counsels, of Bernadotte, Moreau, and Jomini, the allied sovereigns had taken the resolution of descending, with their whole disposable force, from Bohemia upon Saxony and Dresden, and thus striking at the enemy's communications, and the heart of his power, at the very time when the emperor himself, with the flower of his army, was far advanced in Silesia in pursuit of the retiring columns of Blucher. At the time when Napoleon was driving the last corps of the army of Silesia across the Bober, the Grand Army of the allies, two hundred thousand strong, broke up from their cantonments in Bohemia, and began to cross the Erzegebirge Mountains, all the passes into Saxony being soon crowded with the innumerable host. To oppose this formidable invasion, there was no force immediately available but that of St. Cyr, stationed at Pirna, which numbered only thirty-two thousand men present with the eagles on the frontier, though its nominal amount was thirty thousand. Vandamme's corps, of greater strength, and Poniatowsky's Poles, were within a few days' march, at the entrance of the passes towards Zittau and Gabel, leading into Silesia; but they could not be relied on to co-operate in any sudden attack on the capital. But, meanwhile, the danger was instant and pressing on the 21st. Barclay de Tolly and Wittgenstein presented themselves in great strength before the barriers, on the heights of Peterswalde, which they speedily forced, and laid open the great road from Prague to Dresden. The Prussians, under Kleist, farther to the left, descended from the mountains upon Gotleub and Dohna; while the

Advance of the allies upon Dresden.

Aug. 21.

Aug. 22.

* Bout., viii., 10. Fain, ii., 243, 244. Jom., iv., 370.

† "MY COUSIN: Inform the Duke of Tarentum (Macdonald) that I have put under his orders the army of the Bober, which is composed of 100,000 men, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers included."—NAPOLEON'S *Instructions to* BERTHIER *for* MACDONALD, *23d August*, 1813. ST. CYR, iv, 374; *Pièces Just.*

‡ Odel., i., 241, 244. Bout., 10, 11. Fain, ii., 244, 245. Lab., i., 301, 302.

* "Should the enemy evince an intention to make an irruption into Bohemia, or to attack the army of the Prince Royal of Sweden, the army of Silesia will endeavour to impede his operations as much as possible, always taking care not to engage superior forces. In order to arrive at that object, it will be necessary to harass the enemy with the advanced guard and light troops, and observe him narrowly, in order to prevent him from stealing a march, unperceived, into Saxony; but still every engagement with the enemy in superior force must be avoided. Should the enemy, on the other hand, direct his principal forces against the army of Silesia, it will endeavour to arrest him as long as possible; and, having done so, operate its retreat upon the Neisse, taking especial care not to compromise its safety. In that event, the corps of General Sacken will extend itself along the Oder, and take measures, by means of a corps of light cavalry, to keep up the communication with the army of reserve in Poland. The light corps at Landshut will also, in that event, keep up the communication with the army of Bohemia; the fortresses of Silesia must be adequately garrisoned, chiefly from the landwehr, and the main army will retire upon Neisse. That place, with its intrenched camp, which must be put in a proper posture of defence, will serve as a *point d'appui* to it, while the army of Bohemia, and that of the Prince Royal of Sweden, will take the enemy in rear. Should the enemy, on the other hand, direct his principal attack against the army of the Prince Royal of Sweden, or on Berlin, the army of Silesia will resume the offensive; and the bulk of the allied forces will be directed against his rear, the army of Silesia on the right bank of the Elbe, that of Bohemia on the left bank."—*Instructions to* FIELD-MARSHAL BLUCHER. ST. CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iv., 349.

great masses of the Austrians, with the imperial headquarters, moved by the roads of Altenberg and Sayda on Dippodiswalde; while, on the extreme left, Colloredo, Chastellar, Giulay, and Klenau poured down from the Marienberg Hills, and, directing their advance upon Freyberg, threatened entirely to intercept the communication between Dresden and the Rhine.*

The allies approach Dresden.

St. Cyr had from the beginning conjectured, from the perfect stillness of the allied army along the whole Bohemian frontier, contrasted with the incessant rattle of tirailleurs which Blucher kept up in front of his line, that the real attack was intended to be made outside of Dresden; but having been unable to get the emperor to share his opinion, he was left alone to make head against the torrent. Too experienced, however, to attempt to withstand so vast a force with the comparatively few troops at his disposal, he contented himself with impeding their advance as much as possible; and, after some sharp encounters with Wittgenstein's advanced guard, withdrew within the redoubts of Dresden, while Wittgenstein occupied the town of Pirna, and the allied headquarters were advanced to Dippodiswalde. Schwartzenberg's original intention was not to have moved on Dresden, but to have directed the main body of his force on Freyberg, with a view to a combined operation with Bernadotte in the neighbourhood of Leipsic; and it was only after arriving at Marienberg, on the 23d, that this plan was abandoned. Without doubt, the movement upon Dresden promised infinitely greater and more immediate results than an advance into the plains of Saxony; but it was owing to the time lost in this march and countermarch that the failure of the operation was owing; for if their whole force had, from the first, marched direct upon Dresden, they would have arrived before its walls on the evening of the 23d, and it would have been carried by assault on the day following, thirty hours before the nearest of Napoleon's troops could have come up to its relief.†

Aug. 23.

Important advantage gained by this movement.

As it was, the allies had now accomplished the greatest feat in strategy: they had thrown themselves in almost irresistible strength upon the enemy's communications, without compromising their own. Nothing was wanting but vigour in following up the measure adequate to the ability with which it had been conceived; and Dresden would have been taken, a corps of the French army destroyed, and the defensive position on the Elbe, the base of Napoleon's whole positions in Germany, broken through and paralyzed. But to attain these great objects, the utmost vigour and celerity in attack were indispensable; for Napoleon was at no great distance on the right bank of the Elbe, and it might with certainty be anticipated that, as soon as he was made aware of the danger with which the centre of his power was threatened, he would make the utmost possible exertions to come up to its relief. The allies arrived, however, in time to gain their object so far. Notwithstanding the unnecessary detour towards Freyberg, part of their army arrived in the neighbourhood of Dresden on the evening of the 23d,* and next morning the trembling inhabitants of that beautiful city beheld the smiling hills around their walls resplendent with bayonets, and studded with a portentous array of artillery. During the whole of the 24th, the troops, who were extremely fatigued, continued to arrive; and on the morning of the 25th, a hundred and twenty thousand men, with above five hundred pieces of cannon, were assembled around the city.† Moreau and Jomini warmly counselled an immediate attack, and Lord Cathcart, who, with his usual gallantry, had rode forward over the green turf behind the Gross Garten, between Plauen and Raecknitz, to the close vicinity of the enemy's posts, reported that the coast was clear, and strongly supported the same advice. Alexander was clear for adopting it; but Schwartzenberg and the Austrians, accustomed only to the methodical habits of former wars, and insensible to the inestimable importance of time in combating Napoleon, insisted upon deferring the attack till Klenau's corps, which, being on the extreme left, had not yet arrived from Freyberg, should be in line. This opinion prevailed, as the most lukewarm and timid invariably does with all *small* assemblies of men on whom a serious responsibility is thrown: the attack was deferred till the following afternoon, and, meanwhile, Napoleon arrived with his cuirassiers and guards, bearing the issue of the strife upon their sabre points.‡◊

Napoleon returns towards Dresden.

The emperor having received intelligence of the movements of the allies across the Bohemian frontier, had halted at Lowenberg on the 23d; and after giving the command of the army destined to combat Blucher to Marshal Macdonald, retraced his steps the same day, accompanied by the reserve cavalry and guards, to Gorlitz. The same evening Murat was sent on to Dresden to inform the King of Saxony and St. Cyr of the speedy arrival of the emperor with the flower of his army; and such was the confidence which prevailed at headquarters, that Berthier said, in a careless way, "Well, we shall gain a great battle: we shall march on Prague, on Berlin, on Vienna!" The soldiers, however, who marched on their feet, and did not ride, like Berthier, in an easy carriage, though animated with the same spirit, were by no means equally

* St. Cyr, iv., 78, 80. Fain, ii., 252, 253. Bout., 24, 25. Lab., i., 307.

† St. Cyr, iv., 85, 86. Bout., 26, 27. Fain, ii., 252, 253. Jom., iv., 380.

* "Dresden, 23*d Aug.*, 1813, *ten at night*.—At five this afternoon the enemy approached Dresden, after having driven in our cavalry. We expected an attack this evening, but probably it will take place to-morrow. Your majesty knows better than I do what time it requires for heavy artillery to beat down enclosure walls and palisades."—ST. CYR *to* NAPOLEON, 23*d August*, 1813, ST. CYR, iv., 380.

† "An immense army, composed of Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, is at this moment all around Dresden, with a prodigious train of artillery. From the vast amount of force which he has collected, it would appear that the enemy is determined to hazard an attack, knowing that your majesty is not far off, though, perhaps, not suspecting that you are so near as you actually are. We are determined to do all in our power, but I can answer for nothing more with such young soldiers."—ST. CYR *to* NAPOLEON, 25*th August*, 1813, *midnight*, ST. CYR, iv., 383, 385.

‡ Bout., 27. Jom., iv., 382, 383. St. Cyr, iv., 96, 99. Lond., iii.

◊ The preceding account of what passed before Dresden on the 25th is entirely confirmed by the minute details on the subject I have often received from my highly-esteemed and venerable friend, Lord Cathcart himself.

confident: they were ready to sink under their excessive fatigue, having marched since the renewal of hostilities nearly ten leagues a day; and such was their exhaustion, that the emperor ordered twenty thousand bottles of wine to be purchased at Gorlitz, and distributed among the guards alone. So great, however, was the exhaustion of the country, from having so long been the seat of war, that hardly a tenth part of that number could be procured, and the greater part of the wearied men continued their march without any other than the scanty supplies which they could themselves extract by terror from the inhabitants. Napoleon continued his march in the middle of his guards all the 24th, and halted at Bautzen, and there took his determination to continue his march direct upon Dresden, or move to the left upon Pirna, and threaten the communications and rear of the allies, according to the information he might receive as to whether or not that capital, unaided, could hold out till the 28th.*

Reasons of Napoleon's return to Dresden.

Early on the following morning the emperor resumed his march, still keeping the road which led alike to Dresden and Pirna, with the design of throwing himself, if possible, on the rear of the allies. Having, however, the day before, despatched General Gourgaud to Dresden† to obtain information as to the state of the city, he halted, according to agreement, at Stolpen, where the road to Dresden branches off from that to Bohemia, and there received the most alarming intelligence as to the state of affairs in the Saxon capital. The letters both of Murat and St. Cyr left no room for doubt that the city was in the most imminent danger, that the accidental delay in the attack had alone hitherto preserved it, and that its fall might hourly be looked for. At eleven at night Gourgaud returned, and confirmed the intelligence, adding, that it was surrounded by so vast an army that not a chance remained of holding out another day but in the immediate return of the emperor. Already the lines of investiture extended from Pirna to Plauen, and nothing but the arrival of Klenau, the approach of whose columns was already announced, was wanting to enable the enemy to complete the circle to the Lower Elbe. Preparations were already made for evacuating the Gross Garten: the glare of a village in flames immediately behind it threw an ominous light on the domes of Dresden; and when Gourgaud left the city, shortly after dark, the whole heavens to the south and west were resplendent with the fires of the enemy's bivouacs.‡

Instructions to Vandamme.

Napoleon now saw that affairs were urgent: there was not a moment to be lost if Dresden was to be saved and the communications of the army preserved. He instantly sent for General Haxo, the celebrated engineer, and thus addressed him: "Vandamme is beyond the Elbe, near Pirna: he will find himself on the rear of the enemy, whose anxiety to get possession of Dresden is evidently extreme. My design was to have followed up that movement with my whole army: it would, perhaps, have been the most effectual way to have brought matters to an issue with the enemy; but the fate of Dresden disquiets me. I cannot bring myself to sacrifice that town. Some hours must elapse before I can reach it; but I have decided, not without regret, to change my plan and to march to its relief. Vandamme is in sufficient strength to play an important part in that general movement, and inflict an essential injury on the enemy. Let him advance from Pirna to Gieshubel, and gain the heights of Peterswalde; let him maintain himself there, occupy all the defiles, and from that impregnable post await the issue of events around Dresden. To him is destined the lot of receiving the sword of the vanquished, but he will require *sang-froid:* above all, do not let him be imposed upon by a rabble of fugitives. Explain fully my intentions to Vandamme; tell him what I expect from him. Never will he have a finer opportunity of earning his marshal's baton." Haxo immediately set out; descended from the heights of Stolpen into the gorges of Lilienstein, joined Vandamme, and never again quitted his side.*

Entrance of the French guards into Dresden.

By daybreak on the following morning the whole troops around the emperor's headquarters were in motion, and defiling on the road to Dresden. Despite their excessive fatigue, having marched forty leagues in four days, they pressed ardently forward; for now the cannon were distinctly heard from the left bank of the Elbe, and the breathless couriers who succeeded each other from Dresden announced that, if they did not speedily arrive, the city was lost. The Guards were at the head of the array; next came Latour Maubourg's cuirassiers; then Victor's infantry and Kellerman's cavalry; while Marmont's corps moved in a parallel line on the direct road from Bautzen, which they had never left. At eight o'clock the advanced guard reached the elevated plateau where the roads of Bautzen, of Stolpen, and of Pilnitz intersect each other, shortly before the entry of the new town of Dresden, and from which the eye can survey the whole plain on the other side of the Elbe. With what anxiety did they behold it entirely filled by an innumerable host of enemies, and the hostile columns so near the advanced works, that an assault might every instant be expected! Already the Prussian uniforms were to be seen in full possession of the Gross Garten: columns of attack were forming within cannon-shot of the suburb of Pirna; while on the banks of the Elbe Wittgenstein had constructed batteries to enfilade the road by which the troops were to enter the capital. Dresden was surrounded on all sides; the suburb of Friderichstadt alone was not enveloped. The French were visible in force in the redoubts and behind the works; but their numbers appeared a handful in the midst of the interminable lines of the beleaguering host; and

* Fain, ii., 256, 257. Bout., 30. Odel., i., 248, 249.

† "To-morrow," said Napoleon to General Gourgaud, "I will be on the road to Pirna, but I will stop at Stolpen. Set you out immediately for Dresden; ride as hard as you can, and be there this evening; see St. Cyr, the King of Naples, and the King of Saxony; reassure every one. Tell them to-morrow I can be in Dresden with forty thousand men, and the day following arrive there with my whole army. At daybreak visit the redoubts and outposts; consult the commander of engineers as to whether they can hold out. Return to me as quickly as possible to-morrow at Stolpen, and report well the opinion of Maret and St. Cyr as to the real state of things."—FAIN, ii., 256.

‡ Fain, ii., 257, 258. St. Cyr, iv., 98, 99.

* Fain, ii., 259, 260.

a silence, more terrible than the roar of artillery, bespoke the awful moments of suspense which preceded the commencement of the fight.*†

Arrival of the emperor and his guards in Dresden. August 26.

So violent was the fire kept up by Wittgenstein's guns on the road by which the emperor was to pass, that he was obliged to leave his carriage and creep along the ground on his hands and knees over the exposed part; while the bullets from the Russian batteries on the one side, and the bombs from the redoubt Marcellini on the other, flew over his head. Having thus got over the dangerous ground, he suddenly made his appearance, at ten o'clock, at the Marcellini palace, to the no small astonishment of its royal inmates, who were deliberating on the necessity of coming to terms with the enemy. After a short visit to the king, whom he reassured by the promise of the speedy arrival of his Guards, Napoleon went out to visit the exterior works from the suburb of Pirna to that of Freyberg, accompanied only by a single page, to avoid attracting attention; and so close were the enemy's posts now in that quarter, that the youth was wounded by a spent musket-ball while standing at the emperor's side. Having completed this important reconnoissance, on which his operations for the day in a great measure depended, he returned to the palace, and sent out couriers in all directions to convey his orders to the corps which successively arrived for the defence of the capital. Meanwhile, the guards and cuirassiers, in great strength, followed the emperor like a torrent across the bridges into the city; and it was soon apparent, from their numbers and gallant bearing, that all immediate danger was at an end. In vain the inhabitants offered them refreshments: these brave men, impressed to the lowest drummer with the urgency of the moment, continued to press on, though burning with thirst, and ready to drop down under the ardent rays of the sun. From ten in the morning till late at night, ceaseless columns of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, defiled, without a moment's intermission, over both the bridges; and while the enemy's columns darkened the brows of the heights of Raecknitz, the gallant cuirassiers, in defiling over the bridges, keeping their eyes fixed on the spot, held their heads the higher and passed on undaunted.*

Formidable attack on Dresden.

At length, at four o'clock in the afternoon, Schwartzenberg's patience, which had long held out for the arrival of Klenau's corps, which had not yet come up, became exhausted, and he gave the signal for the attack. Instantly the batteries on all the heights around the city were brought forward, and above a hundred guns in the front line commenced a terrible fire on its works and buildings. The bombs and cannon-balls fell on all sides, and over its whole extent; several houses speedily took fire; the inhabitants, in despair, took refuge in the cellars and vaults to avoid the effects of the bombardment; while the frequent bursting of shells in the streets, the loud thunder of the artillery from the ramparts and redoubts, the heavy rolling of the guns and ammunition-wagons along the pavement, the cries of the drivers, and measured tread of the marching men, who forced their way through the throng, combined to produce a scene of unexampled sublimity and terror. Every street and square in Dresden was by this time crowded with troops: above sixty thousand men had defiled over the bridges since ten o'clock, and the balls fell and the bombs exploded with dreadful effect among their dense masses.†

Awful aspect of the allied columns as they attacked Dresden.

The attack of the allies was indeed terrible. At the signal of three guns, fired from the headquarters on the heights of Raecknitz, six columns, deep and massy, descended from the heights, each preceded by fifty pieces of artillery, and advanced, with a steady step and in the finest order, against the city. It was an awful, but yet an animating sight, when these immense masses, without firing a shot or breaking the regularity of their array, descended in silent majesty towards the walls. No force on earth seemed capable of resisting them: so vast, yet orderly, was the array, that their tread, when hardly within cannot-shot, could be distinctly heard from the ramparts. Wittgenstein commanded the three columns on the right, who advanced from the Gross Garten; Kleist's Prussians, in the centre, moved partly through the great garden, partly over the open ground to their left, under Prince Augustus of Prussia, and with them were combined three divisions of Austrians under Count Colloredo; the remainder of the Austrians, on the left, under Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, formed the completion of the vast array. Soon the beautiful buildings of Dresden were enveloped in smoke and flame; an incessant fire issued from the works; while the allied batteries, on the semicircle of heights around, sent a storm of projectiles through the air, and the moving bat-

* Fain, ii., 261, 263. St. Cyr, iv., 99, 100. Odel., i., 250.

† On approaching Dresden, Schwartzenberg issued the following order of the day to his troops: "The great day is arrived, brave warriors! Our country reckons on you: heretofore she has never been disappointed. All our efforts to obtain peace on equitable terms—such terms as alone can be durable—have failed. Nothing could restore the French government to moderation and reason. We enter not alone into the strife: all that Europe can oppose to the powerful enemy of peace and liberty is on our side. Austria, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, England, Spain, all combine their efforts to attain the same object—a solid and durable peace; a reasonable distribution of force between the different powers, and the independence of each individual state. It is not against France, but the overwhelming domination of France beyond its own limits, that this great alliance has been formed. Spain and Russia have proved what the constancy and resolution of a people can do. The year 1813 will demonstrate what can be effected by the united force of so many powerful states. In a war so sacred, we require more than ever to practise those virtues by which our armies in time past have been so distinguished. Devotion without bounds to our monarch and our country; magnanimity alike in success or reverses; determination and constancy on the field of battle; moderation and humanity towards the weak; such are the virtues of which you should ever give the example. The emperor will remain with you, for he has trusted to your arms all that he holds most dear: the honour of the nation, the protection of our country, the security and welfare of posterity. Be grateful, warriors, that you march before God, who will never abandon the cause of justice, and under the eyes of a monarch whose paternal sentiments and affection are well known to you. Europe awaits her deliverance at your hands, after so long a train of misfortunes."—CAPEFIGUE, ix., 196, 198, note.

* Odel., i., 249, 242, and ii., 164. Fain, ii., 264, 265. Lab., ii., 309, 310.

† Lond., 112. Odel., i., 251. Tém. Ocul., ii., 166. Fain, ii., 268.

teries in front of their columns steadily advanced towards the embrasures of the redoubts.*

Early success of the allies.

At some points the attack was irresistible. The great redoubt, situated in front of the Mocsinsky Garden, was carried in the most gallant style, after its palisades had been beat down by the Austrians under Colloredo. Sir Robert Wilson, ever foremost where danger was to be encountered or glory won, was the first man who entered it. At the same time, an impetuous attack by the Russians, under Wittgenstein, carried the redoubts on the left, near the Hopfgarten; while Kleist, with his ardent Prussians, drove the enemy entirely out of the Gross Garten, and approached, on that side, close to the barriers of the suburb. The French, by bringing up fresh troops, regained the Mocsinsky redoubt; but the fire of the Austrian batteries, which now enfiladed it on both sides, was so terrible that the men who entered were almost all destroyed, and the work again fell into the enemy's hands. By six o'clock in the evening, the last reserves of St. Cyr's corps had been all engaged; the suburbs were furiously attacked, as well on the side of Pirna as that of Plauen. Napoleon, seriously disquieted, had stationed all the disposable battalions of the Old Guard at the threatened barriers, and was despatching courier after courier to hasten the march of the Young: the Austrian guns were furiously battering the rampart, at the distance of only a hundred paces; a tempest of bombs and cannon-balls was falling in the streets; the trembling inhabitants were wounded as soon as they appeared at their doors; frequent explosions of shells and ammunition-wagons in the streets diffused universal consternation; already the hatchets of the pioneers were heard at the gate of Plauen and barrier of Dippodiswalde, and the triumphant cry was heard among the assailants, "To Paris! to Paris!"†

Sally by Napoleon, which repels the attack.

Napoleon, who had evinced great anxiety while this tremendous attack was going forward, was at length relieved at half past six by the arrival of the Young Guard, and now deemed himself in sufficient strength to hazard a sally at each extremity of his position. The gate of Plauen was thrown open, and the dense masses of the Guard under Ney rushed furiously out; while a quick discharge of musketry from the loopholed walls and windows of the adjacent houses favoured their sortie. The Austrian columns, little anticipating so formidable an onset, fell back in disorder; and the French guards, taking advantage of the moment when the gate was free, defiled rapidly out, and, forming in line on either side of it, by their increasing mass and enthusiastic valour gained ground on the enemy. Similar sorties took place at the gate of Pirna and at the barrier of the Dippodiswalde: at all points the assailants, wholly unprepared for such an attack, and deeming the day already won, lost ground; the Young Guard, with loud cheers, regained the bloody redoubt of Mocsinsky; the left, under Mortier, drove the Russians from the suburb of Pirna, and dislodged the Prussians from the Gross Garten; while Murat, issuing with his formidable squadrons from the gate of Plauen, established himself for the night in the rear of the right wing under Ney, which had emerged altogether from the suburbs on the road to Freyberg into the open country. Astonished at this unexpected resistance, which they had by no means anticipated, and perceiving, from the strength of the columns which had issued from the city, as well as the vigour of the attacks, that Napoleon in person directed the defence, the allied generals drew off their troops for the night; but, not yet despairing of final success, they resolved to await a pitched battle on the adjacent heights on the following morning.*

State of both parties during the night.

The weather, which for some days previous had been serene and intensely hot, now suddenly changed: vast clouds filled the skies, and soon the surcharged moisture poured itself out in a torrent of rain. Regardless of the storm, Napoleon traversed the city after it was dark, and waited on the bridge till Marmont and Victor's corps began to defile over; and as soon as he was assured of their arrival, returned hastily through the streets again, issued forth on the other side, and, by the light of the bivouacs, visited the whole line occupied by his troops, now entirely outside the city, from the barrier of Pirna to the suburb of Friderichstadt. The force he had accumulated was such as to put him in a condition not only to repel any farther attack which might be directed against the city, but to resume the offensive at all points. In addition to the corps of St. Cyr, Marmont, and Victor, he had at his command the whole guards, and all the heavy cavalry of Milhaud and Latour Maubourg, under Murat: at least a hundred and twenty thousand men, of which twenty thousand were admirable cavalry. His position at Dresden also gave him very great advantages; for by securing his centre by means of a fortress, of which the strength had been tried on the preceding day, it enabled him to throw the weight of his forces on the two flanks; while the allies, having no such protection for the middle of their line, were under the necessity of strengthening it equally at all points, and thus, in all probability, would be inferior to the enemy at the real points of attack. Considerable re-enforcements, however, came up during the night from the side of Freyberg; and although Klenau had not yet made his appearance, yet his arrival was positively announced for the following day. Notwithstanding the loss of six thousand men in the assault of Dresden, they had now nearly a hundred and sixty thousand men in line, independent of Klenau, who, it was hoped, would come up before the action was over. They resolved, therefore, to await the attack of the enemy on the following day; and, withdrawing altogether from cannon-shot of the ramparts, arranged their formidable masses in the form of a semicircle on the heights around the walls, from the Elbe above the suburb of Pirna, to the foot of the slopes of Wolfnitz, near Priesnitz, below the city.*

* Lond., 112, 113. Odel., i., 252. Tém. Ocul., ii., 166, 167. Fain, ii., 268, 269. Vaud., i., 152. Kausler, 645.
† Fain, 270, 271. Odel., i., 253, 254. Tém. Ocul. Ibid., ii., 169, 170.

* St. Cyr, iv., 104, 106. Lab., ii., 313, 314. Lond., 113, 114. Fain, ii., 270, 271. Bout., 29.
† Lond., 114, 115. Bout., 29, 31. Odel., ii., 255, 256. Jom., iv., 390, 391.

Napoleon disposed his troops after the following manner: The right wing, composed of the corps of Victor and the cavalry of Latour Maubourg, was stationed in front of the gate of Wildsdrack, and in the fields and low grounds from that down the Elbe towards Priesnitz; the centre, under the emperor in person, comprising the corps of Marmont and St. Cyr, having the infantry and cavalry of the Old Guard in reserve, supported by the three great redoubts; on the left Ney had the command, and directed the four divisions of the Young Guard and the cavalry of Kellerman, which extended to the Elbe, beyond the suburb of Pirna. Above a hundred and thirty thousand men* were, by daylight on the following morning, assembled in this position, having Dresden, bristling with cannon, as a vast fortress to support their centre; but their position was extraordinary, and, if defeated, altogether desperate, for they fought with their backs to the Elbe and their faces to the Rhine: the allied army, in great strength, had intercepted their whole communications with France, and, if worsted, they were thrown back into a town with only two bridges traversing an otherwise impassable river in their rear.†

Napoleon's dispositions on the 27th.

On the other hand, the allies arranged their troops in the following manner: On the right, Wittgenstein commanded the Russians on the road to Pirna, and Kleist the Prussians between Streisec and Strehlen; in the centre, Schwartzenberg, with the corps of Colloredo, Chastellar, and Bianchi's grenadiers in reserve, occupied the semicircle of heights which extend from Strehlen by Raecknitz to Plauen; while beyond Plauen, on the left, were posted the corps of Giulay and one division of Klenau's troops, which had at length come up. But from the extreme allied left, at the foot of the heights of Wolfnitz to Priesnitz, was a vacant space wholly unoccupied, destined for the remainder of Klenau's men when they should arrive; and the whole of that wing was not only intrusted to inexperienced troops, but was destitute of any solid support, either from inequality of ground or villages—an oversight on the part of the general-in-chief which was the more reprehensible, as they stood opposite to the terrible cuirassiers of Latour Maubourg, fourteen thousand strong, with nothing but an intervening level place for the horse to charge over; while, if they had been drawn back half a mile to the passes and broken ground in their rear, or not pushed across the precipitous defile of Tharandt, which separated them from the main army, they would have been beyond the reach of danger.‡

Positions of the allied troops.

Both armies passed a cheerless night, drenched to the skin by the torrents of rain, which never ceased to descend with uncommon violence. Napoleon, however, who had supped with the King of Saxony the night before in the highest spirits, was on horseback at six in the morning, and rode out to the neighbourhood of the great redoubt, which had been the scene of such a desperate contest the preceding day. Ghastly traces of the combat were to be seen on all sides: out of the newly-made graves hands and arms were projecting, which stuck up, stark and stiff, from the earth in the most frightful manner. The emperor took his station beside a great fire which had been lighted by his troops in the middle of the squares of the Old Guard, and immediately behind were the cavalry of the Guard dismounted beside their horses. The cannonade soon began along the whole line; but it was kept up for some hours only in a desultory manner, the excessive rain and thick mist rendering it impossible either to move the infantry or point the guns with precision. Jomini strongly urged the allied sovereigns, during the interval, to change the front of their line, and accumulating their force on the enemy's left, which was next to the Elbe, to cut off Vandamme and Poniatowsky, who were at Pirna and Zittau, from the remainder of the army. This manœuvre, which would have re-established affairs, was altogether foreign to Schwartzenberg's ideas, which were entirely based upon cutting off the French communications by their right with Torgau and Leipsic. Meanwhile, the French right gradually gained ground upon the detached corps of Austrians beyond the ravine on the allied left, which was equally incapable of maintaining itself by its intrinsic strength, or obtaining succour across the chasm from the centre; and Klenau, though strenuously urged to accelerate his movements, had not yet come up.*

Battle of the 27th of August.

Napoleon was not long of turning to the best account this state of matters in the allied line. Occupying himself a strong central position, and in a situation to strike at any portion of the vast semicircular line which lay before him, he had also this immense advantage, that the thick mist and incessant rain rendered it impossible, not only for the allied generals to see against what quarter preparations were directed, but even for the commanders of corps to perceive the enemy before they were close upon them. This last circumstance led to a most serious catastrophe on the left. Unperceived by the enemy, Murat had stole around in the rear of Victor's men, and, entirely turning the flank of the Austrians, got with Latour Maubourg's formidable cuirassiers into the low meadows which lie between Wolfnitz and the Elbe, in the direction of Preisnitz, where it was intended that Klenau's corps should have completed the allied line to the river. Shrouded by the mist, he had thus got with his whole force close to the extreme Austrian left, and almost perpendicular to their line, before they were aware of his approach. Murat, in order to divert the enemy's attention from this decisive attack, caused Victor's infantry to occupy Lobda in their front,

Total defeat of the Austrian left.

* St. Cyr's corps, three divisions.....20,000
Marmont's do. three divisions.....22,000
Victor's do. four divisions.....28,000
Latour Maubourg's cavalry, four divisions.....14,000
Kellerman's do. three divisions..... 9,000
Infantry of the Old Guard..... 6,000
Do. of the Young Guard, four divisions.....28,000
Cavalry of the Guard, four divisons..... 4,000
131,000

—Londonderry, 114. Vaudoncourt, 129.

† Bout., 31, 32. Lond., 114, 115. Vaud., 154. Jom., iv., 390. St. Cyr, iv., 110, 111.

‡ Vaud., i., 154, 155. Bout., 32, 33. Jom., iv., 390, 391. St. Cyr, iv., 111, 112.

* Bout., 33. St. Cyr, iv., 110, 111. Jom., iv., 390, 391. Lond., 115.

from whence they advanced in column against the line, and kept up a heavy cannonade from a strong battery posted on an eminence on their left; and, when the action had become warm with the foot, suddenly burst, with twelve thousand chosen horsemen, out of the mist, on their flank and rear. The effect of this onset, as of the Polish lancers, under similar circumstances, on the English infantry at Albuera, was decisive.* In a few minutes the line was broken through, pierced in all directions, and cut to pieces. A few battalions next the centre made their way across the ravine, and escaped: the whole remainder, being three fourths of the entire corps, with General Metsko, were killed or made prisoners.

Operations on the French left.

No sooner was Napoleon made aware, by the advancing cannonade on his right, that Murat's attack had proved successful, than he gave orders for his left to advance against Wittgenstein, while the action in the centre was still confined to a distant cannonade. Ney had concentrated the four divisions of the Young Guard between the Gross Garten and the Elbe, and with them and Kellerman's dragoons he immediately made a vigorous attack upon the enemy. He was received by the Russians with their wonted steadiness. The villages of Seidnitz and Gross Dobritz were gallantly defended, against an overwhelming superiority of force, by General de Roth; and when he could no longer make them good, he retreated in good order to the main body of Wittgenstein's men, placed in the rear behind Rieck. Jomini seeing Ney far advanced along the Elbe, and showing his flank to the allied centre, counselled the Emperor Alexander to move forward Kleist, Milaradowitch, Colloredo, and the masses of the centre which had not yet been engaged, and assail his columns in flank by Strehlen: a movement which promised the most important results, and would probably have balanced the success of Murat on the left. Alexander at once appreciated the importance of this movement, and Kleist and Milaradowitch were already in motion to execute it; but to support them, and fill up the chasm in the line occasioned by their descending the hills to the right, it was necessary that Barclay de Tolly, with the Russian reserve, should advance to the front. Barclay, however, did not move: the signal made for that purpose was at first not seen from the mist, and subsequently disregarded; and before the order could be renewed by an officer, a dreadful catastrophe had occurred, which in a great measure determined the allies to retreat.†

Wound and death of Moreau.

Moreau, who had with equal energy and ability discharged the important duties devolved upon him in the council of the allies ever since the campaign reopened, was in earnest conversation with the Emperor Alexander about this very advance of Barclay's, when a cannon-shot from the French batteries in the centre almost carried off both his legs, the ball passing through the body of his horse. This melancholy event excited a very deep sensation at the allied headquarters, and for a time averted Alexander's attention at the most critical moment of the action. The interest which it awakened was enhanced by the extraordinary heroism which the wounded general evinced under an excess of pain which might well have shaken any man's fortitude. He never uttered a groan while carried to the rear, with his mangled limbs hanging by the skin; and when laid on the table of the cottage into which he was carried to suffer amputation, he called for a cigar, which he smoked with the utmost tranquillity. He bore the painful operation with the same firmness which had distinguished his whole demeanour since his wound; and when the surgeon who had cut off the right leg examined the other, and pronounced, with a faltering voice, that it was impossible to save it, "Cut it off, then, also," said he, calmly, which was immediately done. When the retreat commenced, he was transported in a litter to Laun, where he wrote a letter to his wife singularly characteristic of his mind.* Alexander was indefatigable in his attentions to the illustrious patient, and sanguine hopes were at one period entertained of his recovery; but at the end of five days fever supervened, and he expired with the same stoicism as he had lived, but without giving the slightest trace of religious impression. His body was embalmed and conveyed to Prague, whence it was transported to St. Petersburg, and buried in the Catholic church of that capital with the same honours as had been paid to the remains of Kutusoff. Alexander wrote a touching letter to his widow,† and presented her with a gift of five hundred thousand roubles (£20,000), and a pension of thirty thousand (£1500;)‡ but the remains of Moreau remained far from his native land, and amid the enemies of the people whom he had conducted with so much glory.§ Sept. 1.

The manner in which this great general met his death-wound was very remarkable. The cannon of the Guard, which were posted in front

* Kausler, 651. Bout., 32, 33. Lab., ii., 309, 310. St. Cyr, iv., 111, 112. Jom., iv., 391, 392.

† Jom., iv., 394, 395. Bout., 33. Kausler, 650, 651. St. Cyr, iv., iii. Lond., 121.

* "MY DEAREST—At the battle of Dresden, three days ago, I had both my legs carried off by a cannon-ball. That rascal Bonaparte is always fortunate. They have performed the amputation as well as possible. Though the army has made a retrograde movement, it is by no means a reverse, but of design to draw nearer to General Blucher. Excuse my scrawl: I love and embrace you with my whole heart."—CAPEFIGUE, x., 201.

† "When the frightful catastrophe which befell at my side General Moreau, deprived me of the guidance and experience of that great man, I indulged the hope that, by means of care, he might yet be preserved for his family and my friendship. Providence has disposed it otherwise: he has died as he lived, in the full possession of a great and constant mind. There is but one alleviation to the evils of life: the assurance that they are sympathized with by others. In Russia, madame, you will everywhere find these sentiments; and if it should suit your arrangements to fix yourself there, I will strive to do everything in my power to embellish the existence of a person of whom I consider it a sacred duty to be the support and consolation. I pray you, madame, to count on this irrevocably, and not to permit me to remain in ignorance of any circumstance in which I can be of any service to you, and always to write to me directly. The friendship which I had vowed to your husband extends beyond the tomb; and I have no other means of discharging what is but in part the debt which I owe him, but by attending to the comfort of his family. Receive, madame, in these sad and mournful circumstances, the assurances of my unalterable friendship.—ALEXANDER."—See CAPEFIGUE, x., 205, note.

‡ Lond., 115, 121. Capef., x., 201, 202. Biog. Univ., xxx., 95, 96.

§ The spot where Moreau was struck is marked by a simple monument, shaded with trees, and constitutes one of the many interesting objects with which the charming environs of Dresden abound.

Singular manner in which he came by his death.

of the position which Napoleon occupied, had been observed for some time to exhibit an unusual degree of languor in replying to the discharges of the enemy, and the emperor sent Gourgaud forward to inquire into the cause of so unusual a circumstance. The answer returned was, that it was to no purpose to waste their fire, as they could not reply with effect to the enemy's batteries, placed on the heights above, from so low a situation. "No matter," said the emperor, "we must draw the attention of the enemy to that side; renew firing." Immediately they began their discharge, and directed their shot to a group of horsemen which at that moment appeared on the brow of the hill on the heights above. An extraordinary movement in the circle soon showed that some person of distinction had fallen; and Napoleon, who was strongly inclined to superstition, at first supposed it was Schwartzenberg, and observed on the sinister augury which the conflagration in his palace on the night of the fête on Marie Louise's marriage had afforded.* It was then, however, that Moreau was struck; and so anxious had the emperor been to conceal the intelligence of that great commander's arrival from his troops, though well aware of it himself, that it was not till next day that it became known; when the advanced guards, in pursuing the allies towards Bohemia, coming upon a little spaniel which was piteously moaning, were attracted by the collar round its neck, on which were written the words, "I belong to General Moreau." Thus they became at once acquainted with his presence and his fate.†

Council of war among the allies, when it is resolved to retreat.

A council of war was now held at the allied headquarters as to the course which should be pursued: the Emperor Alexander, King of Prussia, and principal generals, assembled on horseback in a ploughed field, to deliberate on a step on which the destiny of Europe might depend. The King of Prussia was clear for continuing the action, and to this opinion the Emperor of Russia and his principal generals inclined: observing that the whole centre and reserves had not yet engaged; that the French would hardly venture to attack their centre, when defended by so powerful an artillery; and that a decisive blow might yet be struck at the French left. But Schwartzenberg was decidedly for a retreat. Independent of the disaster on his left, which he felt the more sensibly as it had fallen almost exclusively on the Austrian troops, he was not without anxiety for his right, on account of the progress of Vandamme in his rear in that direction, who had advanced to Koenigstein, and already made himself master of the defile of Pirna. He strongly represented that the reserve parks of the army had not been able to get up; that the prodigious consumption of the two preceding days had nearly exhausted their ammunition, several guns having only a few rounds left; that the magazines of the army had not been able to follow its advance; in fine, that it was indispensable to regain Bohemia to prevent the dissolution of the army. These reasons, urged with the authority of the commander-in-chief, and supported by such facts, proved decisive, and a retreat was agreed to against the strenuous advice of the King of Prussia, who foresaw to what risk it would expose the allied cause, and in an especial manner his own dominions. But it is evident that they were mere covers, put forward to conceal the sense of a defeat: no victorious army ever yet was stopped in its career by want of ammunition, and, somehow or other, the successful party hardly ever fails to find food.*†

Extraordinary difficulties as to the line of retreat.

But although retreat was thus resolved on before dark on the 27th, it was by no means equally clear how it was to be effected. Vandamme was master of the road by Pirna; that by Freyberg had been cut off by the successes of the King of Naples. Thus the two great roads, those by which the army had traversed the mountains, were in the enemy's hands; and the intermediate range between them was crossed only by country or inferior roads, which, amid the torrents of rain which were falling, and the innumerable chariots and guns which would have to roll over them, would soon be rendered almost impassable. There was every reason to fear that the allied columns, defiling with these numerous encumbrances in the narrow gorges, traversed by these broken-up roads, would fall into inextricable confusion, and, at the very least, lose a large part of their artillery and baggage. Schwartzenberg, however, deemed the risk of a prolonged stay, in presence of the enemy, after the disasters of his left, more than sufficient to counterbalance these dangers; and therefore, though Klenau came up on the night of the 27th, the retreat was persisted in the following day. The army was ordered to march in three columns: the first, under Barclay de Tolly, with the Prussians of Kleist, on Peterswalde; the second, under Colloredo, on Altenberg; and the third, led by Klenau, on Marienberg. Wittgenstein was intrusted with the command of the rear-guard; and Ostermann, who, with a division of Russian guards and cuirassiers, had been left to oppose Vandamme on the side of Pirna, was ordered to fall back towards Peterswalde.‡

Appearance of the field of battle. Aug. 28.

Early on the morning of the 28th, Napoleon, after his usual custom, visited the field of battle. It may be conceived what a ghastly spectacle was presented by the ground, on which, within the space of a league round the walls, three hundred thousand men had combated for two days with determined resolution, under the fire of above a thousand pieces of cannon. The wounded had, for the most part, been transported during the night into the town by the efforts of the French surgeons and the unwearied zeal of the inhabitants, who on this occasion, as after the battle of Bautzen, exhibited in its full lustre the native benevolence of the Saxon character. But the dead, still unburied,

* *Ante*, iii., 335.
† Fain, ii., 291, 292. Capef., x., 202, 203.

* Jom., iv., 395. Bout., 34, 35. Lond., 120, 121.
† The preceding account of Moreau's wound and death, and the council of war which assembled to determine on the retreat, is entirely confirmed, and in part taken from the statement made to me by my venerable friend Lord Cathcart, who was with the Emperor Alexander the whole time, and both witnessed Moreau's fall at his side, and was present at the conference.
‡ Bout., 34, 35. Jom., iv., 396, 397. Fain, ii., 288.

lay accumulated in frightful heaps, for the most part half naked, having been stripped by those fiends in woman's form, whom so prodigious a concourse of men had attracted in extraordinary numbers to the scene of wo. They lay piled above each other in vast masses around and within the Mocsinsky redoubt, before the Dippodiswalde and Plauen barriers, near Lobda, and in the environs of the Gross Garten. The profound excitement which the war had produced throughout the civilized world was there manifest; for the corpses of the slain exhibited all nations and varieties of men, both of Asia and Europe; the blue-eyed Goth lay beneath the swarthy Italian; the long-haired Russian was still locked in his death struggle with the undaunted Frank; the fiery Hun lay athwart the stout Norman; the lightsome Cossack and roving Tartar reposed far from the banks of the Don or the steppes of Samarcand. Cuirasses, muskets, sabres, helmets, belts, and cartouch-boxes lay about in endless disorder, which the inhabitants, stimulated by the love of gain, were collecting, with the vast numbers of cannon-balls which had sunk into the earth, for the French artillery and stores.*

Napoleon sets out in pursuit.

Napoleon was far from being insensible to the magnitude of the wreck, and gave orders that the principal Saxon sufferers by the siege should be indemnified as far as possible; and then rode on to the height where Moreau had been struck, and caused the distance to the battery from whence the shot issued to be measured, which proved to be two thousand yards. The vast array of the allies was already out of sight: a few horsemen alone observed the approach of the French, who were actively engaged in the pursuit. Seeing he could not overtake them, the emperor turned aside and rode to Pirna, where he inquired minutely into what had passed there during the two preceding eventful days. The Prince of Wirtemberg, he learned, had that morning been engaged with Vandamme's corps, and was retiring in good order towards Tœplitz, closely pursued by that general; Murat, with his horse, was following on the traces of the left wing, on the road of Freyberg; and Marmont and St. Cyr's columns were pursuing the centre on the intermediate roads. After sitting still an hour, he said, in the highest spirits, "Well, I think I have seen it all: make the Old Guard return to Dresden; the Young Guard will remain here in bivouac;" and, entering his carriage, returned to the capital.†

Great ability displayed by Napoleon in this battle.

The battle of Dresden is one of the most remarkable victories ever gained by Napoleon; and if it were memorable for no other reason, it will never be forgotten for this—it was the LAST pitched battle he ever gained. The advance to Pirna seemed the fatal limit of his prosperous fortune: from the moment that he then relinquished the pursuit, he became involved in calamity, and disaster succeeded disaster, till he was precipitated from the throne. Yet was this great battle a truly glorious achievement, worthy to be placed beside the brightest of his earlier career, and such as well might cast a long ray of light over the dark vista of misfortune by which it was succeeded. Anticipated by the allies in their masterly march upon Dresden, wellnigh deprived of that vital stronghold by his never conceiving they would have the courage to attack it, he contrived, by extraordinary efforts, not only to arrive in time for its deliverance, but to discomfit the allies by a signal defeat under its walls. This battle is the only one in his whole career in which Napoleon operated at once by both flanks, without advancing his centre; and the reason of his selecting this singular, and, in ordinary circumstances, perilous mode of attack, was not merely that his position in front of the intrenched camp enabled him to do so without risk, while the great strength of the allied centre forbade an attack on them in that quarter; but that by gaining, by success at these two extremities, command of the roads of Freyberg and Pirna, he threw the allies back, for their retreat to Bohemia, upon the intermediate inferior lines of communication across the mountains, where there was reason to hope that a vigorous pursuit would make them lose great part of their artillery and baggage.*

Results of the battle on both sides.

The fruits of this victory were as great as its conception had been felicitous. Thirteen thousand prisoners, almost all Austrians, were taken. Six-and-twenty cannon, eighteen standards, and a hundred and thirty caissons, fell into the hands of the enemy. Including the killed, wounded, and missing, on the two days, the allied loss was not short of twenty-five thousand men, while the French were not weakened by more than half the number. But these results, important and dazzling as they were, especially in re-establishing the *prestige* of the emperor's invincibility, were but a part of the consequences of the discomfiture at Dresden. Barclay had been ordered to take the road, by Dohna and Gieshubel, to Peterswalde; but the Russian officer who delivered the order said Altenberg, by mistake, instead of Peterswalde. Barclay understood him so: the consequence of which was, that Kleist alone, with his Prussians, was left to follow the great road by Pirna, and the Russians were thrown on the road by Dippodiswalde and Altenberg, already encumbered with the prodigious accumulation of Austrian carriages. The highway was speedily cut through—the confusion of artillery and carriages of all sorts became inextricable. Cannon and baggage-wagons were abandoned at every step, and the disorder soon became extreme. Different corps of different nations got intermingled in the crowded defiles: orders were given in a language which one half who heard them did not understand; supplies of all sorts were wanting, and it was only by straggling on either side that the soldiers for some days could pick up a scanty subsistence. A great quantity of baggage and ammunition-wagons fell into the enemy's hands; and before the troops had extricated themselves from the mountains, two thousand additional prisoners had been taken. The poet Körner, who had recovered of the wound he had so perfidiously received at the commencement of the armistice, received a ball in his breast, and died in the action. A few hours before it began he had composed his im-

* Odel., i., 262, 263. Fain, ii., 288, 294. Lab., i., 323.
† Odel. i., 262, 265. Fain, ii., 288, 293. Lab., i., 322, 324.

* Jom., iv., 397. Bout., 35.

mortal lines to his sword, the testament of his genius to his avenging countrymen. But the most sensible loss which the allies sustained during the retreat was that of General Moreau, whose great talents were never more required than at that period to arrest the evils which then menaced the very existence of the coalition. But Providence had decreed that the cause of virtue and justice should triumph by its own native strength, and owe nothing, even in their most exalted or blameless form, to the forces of the Revolution.*

Glaring errors of the Austrian commander on this occasion.

Great, however, as were the abilities displayed by Napoleon on this occasion, they would have failed in producing the results which took place, if he had not been seconded to a wish by the imbecility displayed in the *execution* of the attack upon Dresden. The original conception of that design was in the highest degree felicitous; and by succeeding in placing themselves in overwhelming strength before that capital, and on the direct line of the enemy's communications on the 25th, when Napoleon and his guards were still a full day's march off, they had completely outgeneralled that vigilant commander, and brought him, beyond all question, to the very brink of destruction. Had they commenced the assault that afternoon, success was certain, for they were already six to one: St. Cyr and his corps would have been beaten, and the whole defensive system of Napoleon on the Elbe broken through and destroyed. Even when, by delaying the attack till next day, they had given time for Napoleon himself to come up, they might still, by commencing the assault early on the forenoon of the 26th, before the bulk of his guards had arrived, have carried the place, with the additional lustre of having done so when the emperor in person was in command. By delaying the attack till four in the afternoon they gained nothing, for Klenau even then had not come up, and they had merely given time for Napoleon to bring up sixty thousand additional men for the defence. It was impossible to expect to carry a fortified place, garrisoned by eighty thousand men, by a *coup-de-main:* the stroke was now too late, and should not have been delivered. The dispositions next day were equally faulty, for Schwartzenberg, contrary to all advice, insisted on extending his left over the open ground beyond Plauen, without any support, against Murat's cavalry, to which, in consequence, it fell an easy prey; while by throwing it back, up the side of the ravine of Tharandt, it would have been altogether secure on the top of its precipitous banks from attack; and he placed inexperienced infantry there, without horse to cover them, when thirty thousand noble cavalry were massed together in useless strength behind the centre, which was already so strong, from its position on the heights, and the prodigious array of artillery by which it was defended, as to be beyond the reach of danger.

Great divisions at the allied headquarters.

In justice to Schwartzenberg, however, it must be observed, that these glaring errors are not to be wholly ascribed to him. It is no easy matter, as he himself said, to command an army when emperors and kings are with its general. Such were the dissensions which at this period prevailed at the allied headquarters, that nothing but the most exalted spirit in the bosoms of the sovereigns who ruled its destinies, and the most indefatigable efforts on the part of the able diplomatists who were intrusted with its counsels, prevented the alliance from being broken up within a few days after it began the great contest for the deliverance of Europe. Hardenberg, Metternich, D'Anstett, Lord Aberdeen, and Sir Charles Stewart, laboured assiduously, and not without effect, to reconcile the conflicting jealousies and interests; but it was a Herculean task, and nothing but a universal sense of the common danger which they all incurred could have prevented a rupture taking place. They experienced the truth of the words of Tacitus: "Prospera omnes sibi vindicant, adversa uni solo imputantur." No one would acknowledge responsibility for the advance against Dresden after it failed: to hear the opinions of the military council, you would imagine it had been forced on the army against the universal opinion of its leaders. The Russians loudly exclaimed against the Austrians as the authors of all the calamities, and referred, not without secret satisfaction, to the magnitude of the losses which they, and they alone, had sustained; the Austrians replied that, if Barclay had obeyed Schwartzenberg's order to advance on the forenoon of the 27th, all would yet have been repaired. The Prussians lamented a retrograde movement which would, to all appearance, deliver up Berlin to the cruel exactions of the enemy, and paralyze the rising spirit of Germany by the exhibition of its northern capital in chains. Conferences, political as well as military, were frequent during the retreat: the troops of the different nations would take no orders but from their own generals; it was hard to say who really governed the army, or whether it had any direction at all. Schwartzenberg deemed it advisable, situated as he was, to avoid any general action, and remain wholly on the defensive; and it was apparent to all that, if Napoleon persevered in making propositions, there was great probability they would be listened to. Such was the untoward aspect of affairs at the allied headquarters, when the face of events was entirely changed, unanimity and concord restored to the combined chiefs, and confidence and mutual esteem to their followers, by a series of events in the exterior circle of the conflict, so marvellous that they defeated all human calculation, and converted the recriminations of misfortune into the song of triumph, over the whole allied states.*

Movements of Vandamme against Ostermann.

On the very day on which Napoleon gained his decisive success before Dresden, Vandamme, following up his instructions, to throw himself upon the rear of the allied army and await the issue of events before that city, had crossed the Elbe at Koenigstein, and been engaged with Ostermann, who had been left to watch him with the division of the old Russian guards and the Russian division of Prince Eu-

* Lond., 121, 122. Jom., iv., 397. Vaud., i., 157. Bout., 36, 37. Capef., x., 207.

* Lond., 120, 122.

gene of Wirtemberg. The French general advanced towards Pirna, in order to intercept the line of the enemy's retreat; and the disproportion of force gave him good reason to hope that he would be able to do so, for he had twenty-seven thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and eighty pieces of cannon,* whereas the Russian had only seventeen thousand at his disposal. Ostermann in the first instance fell back also towards Pirna; but on the day following, being that on which Napoleon halted his guard at that place, he was obliged, by the retreat of the allies and its occupation by the French, to change the direction of his retreat, and fall back towards Peterswalde. Vandamme had got before him on the high road to that place, and the Russians had to fight their way through the enemy's ranks at Gieshubel and Nollendorf. Ostermann's grenadiers, however, made their way, after a sharp encounter; and he reached Peterswalde, where he collected his forces and prepared to oppose a strong resistance to Vandamme, who, having failed in barring the way to his columns, was now preparing to follow closely upon his footsteps, and press him vigorously with all his forces.† Aug. 17.

A great issue now depended on the efforts of these intrepid generals: nothing less than the ruin of the allied army, or the destruction of the corps which had so fearlessly descended into its rear, was at stake. All the roads from Saxony in that direction through the Erzgebirge range, terminate upon Tœplitz, in the Bohemian plain. If, therefore, Vandamme could make himself master of that point of intersection, he would be in a situation to prevent the allies debouching from the mountains; while the King of Naples on the one road, Marmont and St. Cyr in the centre, and Napoleon with the guards on the left pass, pressed the rear of their columns, and thus exposed them to almost certain ruin when entangled with severel thousand carriages in those narrow defiles and inhospitable ridges. On the other hand, if the French were defeated, they ran a still greater risk of being destroyed by the retiring masses of the Grand Allied Army, who would fight with the energy of despair to reopen their communication with the Bohemian plains. Thus, both parties had equal motives for exertion: both saw clearly the vital importance of the contest, and the meanest soldier in the ranks was as strongly impressed with it as their chiefs. Vandamme now recollected the emperor's words, that to him would be given to receive the sword of the conquered, and that now was the time to win his marshal's baton. Ostermann was penetrated with the conviction that on his efforts, and those of his brave guards, would depend the safety of their beloved emperor, and both were firmly resolved to conquer or die on the ground where they stood.‡ Great interests depending on this conflict.

Vandamme, sensible of the value of time in the critical operation which had been intrusted to him, and aware that the Young Guard was at Pirna, to give him the support which Napoleon had promised him if required, eagerly descended, on the morning of the 29th, from the mountains, and approached the Russians, who had taken post in a good position in the plain between CULM and Tœplitz, little more than half a league in advance of the latter town. Ostermann's forces, however, were now much reduced: from the losses and detachments of the preceding days, he could not collect above fourteen thousand men to defend his posts, and the French had at least double the number. Already the near approach of the enemy had spread the most violent alarm among its inhabitants; and the whole *corps diplomatique*, in particular, had taken to flight, and were already far advanced on the road to Dutch and Lahn; and the King of Prussia, who was there, and remained at his post, alone succeeded, by his coolness, in preserving some degree of order in the rear of the combatants. The French general, conceiving he had only to deal with the broken and dejected remains of the army beaten at Dresden, at first brought forward his troops, as they successively came up, into action, and hurried with only nine battalions to assault the Russian left wing. This rash attempt was speedily repulsed; but the arrival of the division of Mouton Duvernet restored the combat in that quarter, and the Russians, in their turn, were compelled to give way. An obstinate action, with various success, now took place over the whole line: the villages of Straden and Priesten were successively carried by the division of Philippon, which had just come up; but the latter village was shortly after retaken, and, after being three times lost and won at the point of the bayonet, finally remained in the hands of the Russians. The weight of the French attack, however, was directed against the Russian left, where the line stood in the open plain; and Ostermann, seeing this, brought up three regiments of the Russian guards to the menaced point—the Bonnet d'or, Preobazinsky, and Simonofsky grenadiers; and the heroic resistance of these incomparable troops, the flower and pride of the Russian army, opposed a wall of steel to the French, which all the efforts of the assailants were unable to pass. In vain the French batteries were advanced to within pistol-shot, and sent a storm of grape through the Russian lines; in vain company after company was swept away by the terrific discharges of their musketry; these heroic troops stood firm, constantly closing to the centre as their ranks were thinned. They found there the Russian Thermopylæ, and the greater part of them perished where they stood; but, like the three hundred Spartans under Leonidas, they changed the fate of the world by their blood. A strong French column in the evening advanced against Priesten, carried it by assault, and moved on to attack the grand Russian battery in the centre, but the heroism of the guards had gained the requisite time. General Diebitch and the Grand-duke Constantine at this moment arrived with the cavalry and some grenadiers of the Russian guard, with which Battle of Culm, and heroic resistance of the Russians. Aug. 29.

* He had fifty-two battalions, twenty-nine squadrons, eighty guns.—KAUSLER, 653; and Napoleon has told us "they were 30,000 strong."—See NAPOLEON *to* ST. CYR, *August 17th*, 1813, ST. CYR, iv., 367.

† Kausler, 654. Jom., iv., 398. St. Cyr, iv., 128, 129. Bout., 40, 41. Vaud., i., 158.

‡ Jom., iv., 398, 399. Bout., 40, 41. Fain, ii., 312, 313. Lab., i., 331.

this menacing column was stopped; and Vandamme, seeing that the Russians were now receiving considerable re-enforcements, drew off for the night to the ground he occupied before the action.*

Vandamme remains firm on the next day.

Prudence now counselled a retreat to the French general; for the superiority of force which he had the first day was now turned the other way; and the increasing force of the enemy, who were now issuing at all the passes from the mountains, threatened, not only to expose him to ruinous odds, but even might entirely overwhelm his corps. He had been promised support, however, by Napoleon, and distinctly ordered to advance to Tœplitz: the Young Guard, eight-and-twenty thousand strong, was only a few hours' march in the rear; and he never for a moment conceived it possible that, having assigned to him the onerous duty of cutting off the retreat of the right wing of the allied army, that great commander would leave him unsupported in the perilous attempt.† The marshal's baton danced before his eyes: instances were frequent, in the earlier history of the Revolutionary wars, of a similar act of daring being attended with the most glorious results; in war, as in love, he who nothing ventures will nothing win. Influenced by these considerations, to which the native resolution of his character gave additional weight, he resolved to maintain his ground, and disposing his corps, now reduced by the losses of the preceding days to twenty-three thousand men, in the best order, he awaited the approach of the allies in the neighbourhood of Culm.‡

Dispositions of the Russians to attack him, 30th August.

The hourly increasing numbers of the enemy now gave them an opportunity, of which they skilfully availed themselves, of crushing the audacious invader who had thus broken into their rear, in the hope of receiving the sword of the conquered. Their dispositions were speedily made. Vandamme had taken post on the heights in front of Culm, looking towards Tœplitz, his right resting on the foot of the mountains—his centre crossing the great road leading to Pirna—his left in the plain, as far as the hamlet of Zigeley. This was the weak point of his line, as the ground afforded no natural advantages; and the allied generals, therefore, resolved to overwhelm it with superior force, and drive both it and the centre up against the mountains, where escape, at least for the artillery and carriages, would be impossible. With this view, Barclay de Tolly, who had now assumed the command, as well from his rank as the wound of Ostermann, who had lost an arm on the preceding day, directed the Russians under Raeffskoi to attack on the left; while the right, composed of twenty squadrons of Russian cavalry, under the orders of Prince Gallitzin, and the Austrian corps of Colloredo, and the division Bianchi in reserve, was destined to make the decisive onset on the French left, which was unsupported in the plain. A screen of Russian light and heavy horse stretched across the chaussée with a powerful artillery, and united the right and left wings. The total force thus brought to bear against Vandamme was little short of sixty thousand men, of whom ten thousand were admirable horse.*

Second battle of Culm, 30th August.

The battle began by a vigorous charge of the Russian horse on the flank of the French left in the plain, which being outflanked, and turned at the same time that Colloredo's corps advanced against its front, was speedily thrown into confusion, and driven up against the centre, in front of Culm. Steadily the Austrians moved directly towards that town, while the French left, now entirely broken, and pushed on by the cavalry in flank, was dispersed over the plain, like chaff before the wind. Vandamme, now seriously alarmed, despatched a fresh brigade to stop the progress of the enemy on the left; but they, too, were overwhelmed in the confusion, and the allied horse, sweeping round their rear, had already approached the village of Arbesau, not far distant from the great road to Pirna. At the same time, a sharp conflict was going on on the right, and the Russians were gradually gaining ground on their adversaries posted on the slopes of the mountains. Matters were in this critical state when a loud fire of musketry, followed by several explosions, was heard on the summit of the pass, towards Nollendorf, directly in the rear of the French column, and on the only line by which they could escape. Joy at first illuminated every countenance in the French ranks, for no one doubted that it was the Young Guard pushed on from Pirna to their support, which would speedily re-establish the fortunes of the day; but this satisfaction was of short duration, and was converted into corresponding consternation when the Prussian standards were seen on the summits; and the news circulated through the ranks that it was Kleist, with eighteen thousand Prussians, who thus lay directly on their only line of retreat. In effect, the Prussian general, who had been directed to retreat by Schoenwald and Nollendorf, and had the evening before received orders from Alexander to descend upon the right flank of the French towards Kraupen, finding the road which he followed insupportably bad, had made his way across to the great chaussée, and had just seized and blown up some French caissons at the top of the pass.†

Appearance of Kleist, and total defeat of the French.

And now a scene ensued unparalleled even in the varied annals of the Revolutionary war. Vandamme, seeing his danger, drew off his troops from the heights on the right in front of Culm, and rallying as well as he could the broken remains of his left, formed his whole force into a column, the cavalry in front under Corbineau, the artillery in the centre, and the infantry on the flank. Having made these dispositions, which were the best which circumstances would admit, he began his retreat, and got through Culm in safety; but in the little plain beyond, extending to the foot of the gorge of Tilnitz,

* Kausler, 654, 656. Bout., 40, 41. Jom., iv., 399. Lond., 123, 124. Fain, ii., 314, 315.

† Vandamme received, on the night of the 29th, a distinct order from Berthier to push on to Tœplitz: it was brought to him by a colonel of the Swiss état-major.—Jomini, iv., 401, *note*.

‡ Fain, ii., 315. Jom., iv., 400, 401. St. Cyr, iv., 128, 129.

* Bout., 42. Lond., 126, 127. Lab., i., 333. Vaud., i., 160. Jom., iv., 401, 402.

† Kausler, 658. Jom., iv., 401, 402. Bout., 43. Fain, ii., 316, 317. St. Cyr, iv., 129.

the Russian and Austrian horse precipitated themselves on all sides upon the retreating mass, while a formidable array of artillery, by incessant discharges, threw its rear into confusion. Disorder was already spreading rapidly in the ranks, and Vandamme had resolved to sacrifice his guns to save his men, when, to complete their misfortunes, the advanced guard reported that the defile which they must immediately ascend was occupied in strength by the Prussian corps! Despair immediately seized the troops: all order and command were lost; Corbineau, at the head of the horse, dashed up the pass with such vigour, that, though the ascent was so steep that in ordinary circumstances they could hardly have ascended at the gentlest trot, he pushed right through the Prussian column, cut down their gunners, and seized their artillery, which, however, he could not carry away, and got clear off.*

Dreadful struggle in the defile of Tilnitz.

The Prussians now imagined that they were themselves cut off, and at the point of ruin; and their whole infantry, breaking their ranks, rushed like a foaming torrent headlong down the defile, to force their way through the barrier which seemed to oppose their retreat at its foot. In the middle of the gorge they met the French column, in similar disorder and impelled by the same apprehensions, which was struggling for life and death, with the Russians thundering in their rear, to get up! A scene of indescribable horror ensued: close pent in a steep and narrow pass, between overhanging scaurs and rocks, nearly thirty thousand men on the two sides, animated with the most vehement passions, alike brave and desperate, contended elbow against elbow, knee against knee, breast against breast, mutually to force their way through each other's throng. In the confusion Kleist was seized by the French, but speedily delivered; Vandamme, however, was made prisoner by the Prussians. The remainder of his corps, who were squeezed through or out of the defile, immediately dispersed through the neighbouring woods and wilds, and, throwing away their arms, made the best of their way over the mountains to Peterswalde, where they were received and rearmed by St. Cyr's corps.† Nearly twelve thousand men, including Corbineau's cavalry, escaped in this manner, though in woful plight, and totally ruined as a military force; but the whole remainder of the corps, including both Vandamme's and Haxo's men, were either killed or made prisoners. The latter amounted to seven thousand; and sixty pieces of cannon, two eagles, and three hundred ammunition-wagons were taken. The total loss of the French in the two days was not less than eighteen thousand men, while that of the allies in the same period did not exceed five thousand.‡◊

Napoleon's views at this period for an attack on Berlin.

On the morning of the 30th, thus fraught with disaster to Napoleon, he was with great complacency surveying the different positions of his corps on the map, and anticipating the brilliant accounts he was so soon to receive of the operations of Vandamme in the rear of the enemy. "At this moment," said he to Berthier, "Marmont and St. Cyr must have driven the Austrian rear-guards on Tœplitz; they will there receive the last ransom of the enemy. We cannot be long of hearing news of Vandamme, and we shall then know what advantages he has been able to derive from his fine position. It is by him that we shall finish in that quarter. We will leave some corps of observation, and recall the rest to headquarters. I calculate that, after the disasters experienced at Dresden, it will take at least three weeks for the army of Schwartzenberg to reorganize itself, and again take the field. It will not require so much time to execute my projected movement on Berlin." Such were Napoleon's views on the morning of that eventful day, and the forenoon was spent in making arrangements for his favourite design of marching on Berlin, which was at once to demonstrate the reality of his victory, and again spread the terror of his arms through the whole north of Germany.*

Manner in which he received the accounts of the disaster at Culm.

In the afternoon of the same day the most alarming news began to spread from the side of Pirna. It was rumoured that a great disaster had been sustained beyond the mountains; it was even said that Vandamme's corps had been totally destroyed. Soon the frequent arrival of breathless and disordered horsemen confirmed the dismal intelligence; and at length Corbineau himself, wounded and covered with blood, made his way to the emperor, still armed with the Prussian sabre which, in the *mêlée*, he had exchanged for his own. From him Napoleon heard authentic details of the extent of the calamity; and he learned, with grief, that not only the Grand Allied Army was saved, but that it would bear back to Prague the trophies of a victory. Napoleon received the details of the disaster coldly, and said, "To a flying enemy you must either open a bridge of gold or oppose a barrier of steel. Vandamme, it appears, could not oppose that barrier of steel." Then turning to Berthier, he said, "Can we have written anything which could have inspired him with the fatal idea of descending into the plain of

* Jom., iv., 402. Bout., 44. Fain, ii., 319. Vaud., i., 161. Sir R. Wilson, 44, *note*.

† "Generals Philippon and Duvernet are occupied in rallying what remains of their troops; their number, they think, exceeds ten thousand. We are furnishing them with cartridges and cannon; in fine, we would put them in a respectable situation, if they can only succeed in recovering their spirits."—ST. CYR *to* BERTHIER, 31*st August*, 1813, ST. CYR, iv., 389.

‡ St. Cyr to Berthier, Aug. 31, 1813, St. Cyr, iv., 389. Bout., 44, 45. Jom., iv., 402, 403. Fain, ii., 318, 319. Sir R. Wilson, 43.

◊ "Of this number, no less than three thousand two hundred were killed and wounded in the Russian Imperial Guard, whose numbers at going into the battle did not exceed eight thousand men, cavalry included. The great loss sustained by so small a body of men, being full half of the infantry who were seriously engaged, is a decisive proof, when they were not broken, of the extreme severity of the action and gallantry of their resistance. This action deserves to be born in mind as the most desperate and glorious engagement of any body of the Russian or German troops during the war, and is to be placed beside the heroism of the British at Albuera, where, out of seven thousand five hundred English engaged, the loss was four thousand three hundred. It must be observed, however, that nearly half of the English loss was occasioned by the surprise of the Polish lancers, which cut off nearly three entire battalions; so that the amount of the respective loss is not, in these instances, an exact test of the comparative heroism of those worthy rivals in arms."—See LONDONDERRY, 124, 125, for Russian loss at Culm; and *Ante* iii., 447, for British at Albuera.

* Fain, ii., 312, 313.

Bohemia? Fain, look over the order-book." Nothing, however, it is said, was discovered to warrant the descent from Peterswalde. "Well," said he to Maret, "this is war. High in the morning—low enough at night. From a triumph to a fall is often but a step." Then, taking the compasses in his hand, he mused long on the map, repeating unconsciously the lines of Corneille,*

> "J'ai servi, commandé, vaincu, quarante années;
> Du monde entre mes mains j'ai vu les destinées:
> Et j'ai toujours connù qu'en chaque évènement,
> Le destin des états depend d'un moment."

But, in truth, without disputing the incalculable influence of a few hours, or even minutes, on the fate of nations during war, nothing is more certain than that, in this instance, the misfortunes of Napoleon were owing to himself; and that the attempt which he made, according to his usual custom, to throw the blame upon others, was as unjust as it was ungenerous. He maintained stoutly in writing, as well as speaking, thinking that Vandamme was killed, that he had given him positive orders to intrench himself on the summit of the mountains, and not descend into the gulf at their feet;† and yet, only two days before, Berthier, by his orders, had enjoined him "to march directly upon Tœplitz;"‡ and on the very day on which the disaster occurred (30th of August), Berthier had written to St. Cyr, informing him of Vandamme's success on the first day against Ostermann, from which he anticipated the most glorious results.◊ In fact, Napoleon himself admitted, in conversation to St. Cyr, that he should have moved forward the Young Guard from Pirna to support Vandamme,‖ in which case not only would no disaster at all have been incurred, but the movement on Tœplitz, which was ably conceived, would have led to the destruction of Kleist's corps, and the disorganization of the whole right wing of the allied army. Decisive success was within his grasp, when he omitted to seize it, and permitted the advantage to pass over to the enemy, by retaining his Young Guard inactive at Pirna during the two most vital days of the campaign.*

Reflections on the real causes of Vandamme's disaster.

His panegyrists endeavour to account for this neglect by observing that he was seized with vomiting at Pirna, and obliged to return to Dresden, in great pain, on the afternoon of the 28th; but, admitting this to have been true, it is no reason why he should not have advanced Mortier with the Young Guard to support a corps charged with so perilous and momentous a mission as that of stopping the retreat of a hundred thousand men. No man knew better than he did what risk is incurred in striving to stop the retreat of a large army; his own success on the Beresina must have been fresh in his recollection. Even on the night of the 29th it would have been time enough to have moved up the Young Guard, for they required only a few hours to march from Pirna to Peterswalde.† The truth was, that Vandamme neither disobeyed orders, nor was forgot: he acted strictly according to his instructions, and was fully present to the emperor's mind, who watched his march with the utmost anxiety. But Napoleon judged of present events by the past. He conceived that the apparition of thirty thousand men in their rear, immediately after a severe defeat in front, would paralyze and discomfit the allies as completely as it had done in the days of Rivoli and Ulm; and he was unwilling to engage the Young Guard in the mountains, as it might ere long be required for his own projected march upon Berlin. He forgot that his conscripts were not the soldiers of Austerlitz and Jena; that the Russian guards were not the Austrians of 1796; and that Ostermann was neither Alvinzi nor Mack.‡

Failure of all attempts to exculpate Napoleon on this point.

While these momentous events were going forward in the neighbourhood of Dresden, and in the Bohemian valleys, events of scarcely less importance were in progress among the ravines of Upper Silesia, and on the sandy plains in front of Berlin.

Operations in Silesia at this period.

* Fain, ii., 320, 321.

† "That unhappy Vandamme, who seems to have been killed, had not left a single sentinel on the mountains, nor any reserve in any quarter: he ingulfed himself in a hollow, without feeling his way in any manner. If he had only left four battalions and four pieces of cannon on the heights in reserve, that disaster would not have occurred. I had given him *positive orders to intrench himself on the heights, and encamp his corps there*, and send down into Bohemia nothing but parties to disquiet the enemy and obtain news."—NAPOLEON *to* ST. CYR, 1*st September*, 1813, ST. CYR, iv., 392.

‡ "*March direct to Tœplitz; you will cover yourself with glory.*"—BERTHIER *to* VANDAMME, 29*th August*, 1813.—"Three or four hours only were required to retreat to Nollendorf, where he would have been in an impregnable position; but Vandamme conceived he was not at liberty, after this positive order, to effect that movement. What would he have said to Napoleon if, on his retreat, he had met him at Nollendorf, as he had been led to expect would be the case, and the enemy, meanwhile, resuming his ground at Culm, had secured the retreat of the Grand Army?"—*Vict. et Conq.*, xxii., 5, *note*.

◊ "I have received your letter of the 6th, from Reinhard Grimme, in which you describe your position behind the 6th corps (Marmont). The intention of his majesty is, that you support the 6th corps; but it is desirable that you should select for that purpose a road to the left between the Duke of Ragusa and the corps of *General Vandamme*, who has obtained great success over the enemy, and made two thousand prisoners."—BERTHIER *to* ST. CYR, 30*th August*, 1813, ST. CYR, iv., 388.

‖ "The emperor admitted to me, in conversation, on the 7th of September, that, if he had not halted his guard at Pirna on the 28th, but, on the contrary, followed it up on the traces of Vandamme, he would have found a great opportunity of striking a blow in the neighbourhood of Tœplitz."—ST. CYR, iv., 137, 138.

* Fain, ii., 298.

† "On the 29th, in the evening, the emperor must have known that Vandamme had fought the whole day, not only against the forces of Ostermann, but those which Barclay had brought up. He had, therefore, the whole of that night to make his dispositions, which a man such as he could easily have done in an hour; and if he conceived the position of Vandamme hazardous, as unquestionably it was, he had time to draw it back, or support it by his guard. The latter corps could have marched to Nollendorf or Peterswalde in a few hours; that is, before Kleist's Prussians, who were encamped on the night of the 29th at Furstenwalde, had come up."—ST. CYR, iv., 129.

‡ "Vandamme's defeat was a double misfortune; for it was to be ascribed to an evident oblivion of the first principles of war, which prescribe the pursuit to extremity of a beaten enemy. Napoleon should unquestionably have pursued, *à l'outrance*, the defeated army of the allied sovereigns. There was the vital point of the war; all the rest was merely secondary, and could have been repaired. There, also, was the greatest chance of disorder, from the number of chiefs who commanded different corps. If he had quitted Pirna to fly to the succour of Macdonald, routed on the Katzbach, the proceeding would have been at least intelligible, but he did not then know of it; and his return to Dresden, having no other object but to prepare the march upon Berlin, was one of the greatest faults of his whole career. Independent of its cutting short the fruits of victory, it became the principal cause of Vandamme's defeat."—JOMINI, *Vie de* NAPOLEON, iv., 403, 404.

Napoleon's instructions to Macdonald, and his movements.

Napoleon, on leaving the command of the army of Silesia to Macdonald, had given that general instructions of the most judicious description, and which, if duly followed out, would have probably prevented the dreadful disaster which he experienced. They were, to "concentrate his troops and march towards the enemy, so as to be in a situation to lend a helping hand to the operations of the Grand Army against Dresden or Bohemia; but, if attacked by superior forces, to retire behind the Queisse and hold Gorlitz; and if hard pressed, and the emperor was far advanced in his attack, by Zittau, upon Prague, to retire to the intrenched camp at Dresden: keeping in view that his principal care should be to keep in communication with him." Instead of following this judicious direction, Macdonald, who was inspired with that unfounded contempt for his adversaries which so often proved fatal to the lieutenants of Napoleon, no sooner found himself, after the departure of the emperor to Dresden on the morning of the 24th,* at the head of three corps and a division of cavalry, numbering seventy-five thousand combatants, than he broke up, early on the 26th, to attack the enemy, whom he conceived still to be concentrated in the position he had taken after his retreat before Napoleon in front of Jauer. Instead, however, of following up the emperor's instructions to concentrate his forces, Macdonald, impressed with the belief that the enemy was continuing his retreat in the direction of Breslau, and that he had nothing to do but follow upon his traces, divided his troops, for the facility of marching and getting supplies, into five columns, spread out over a front twenty-four miles in breadth, from Schoenau to Leignitz. In this straggling manner they were to cross the Katzbach and advance towards Jauer: the right wing, under Lauriston, moving by Schoenau and the foot of the mountains; the centre, under Macdonald in person, by the Wuthende-Neisse on Neinburg; while the left, led by Sebastiani and Souham, in the absence of Ney, who had been despatched to command the army destined to act against Berlin, was to move by Leignitz to pass the KATZBACH there, and fall on the right of the enemy.†

Aug. 26.

Simultaneous advance of Blucher against Macdonald.

By a singular coincidence, Blucher, having rested his troops, in their position in front of Jauer, on the 24th and 25th, and being informed of the departure of the emperor for Dresden on the morning of the first of these days, which the halt of his advanced guard on the Katzbach entirely confirmed, had, on the very same day, broken up from his ground to resume the offensive. He kept his troops, however, much better in hand, and was better qualified, in consequence, to take advantage of any omission on the part of his adversaries, or guard against any disaster on his own side. He directed his three corps to pass the Katzbach between Goldberg and Leignitz: D'York and Sacken on the right, towards the latter place, directing their attack against Ney's corps; and Langeron on the left, on the side of Goldberg, moving towards Lauriston and Macdonald. At two o'clock in the afternoon, the troops were so far advanced that the enemy were in sight, and Blucher made his dispositions for a general attack. The better to conceal his movements from the enemy, and confirm them in the illusion under which they laboured, that the allies were flying before them, he concealed his troops behind some eminences which lay in their front, on the plateau of Eichholz, and awaited the movements of his opponents. A heavy rain, accompanied with thick mist, which had fallen the whole day, contributed to conceal the movements of the opposite armies from each other; and it was only some Prussian batteries, placed on the top of the eminences, which, by the vivacity of their fire, made the French suspect that any considerable body of the enemy were in their way, and that a general engagement might be expected. Macdonald immediately gave orders for his columns to deploy at all points between Weinberg and Klein Tintz; but it required a long time for the orders to be conveyed along so extensive a line; and Blucher, seeing that the enemy had only partially crossed the ravine of the Neisse, so that the troops which had got through were, in a great measure, unsupported, and judging the opportunity favourable, and the enemy unprepared, gave the signal for attack.*

Battle of the Katzbach.

Macdonald's right, so far as hitherto come up, when thus unexpectedly assailed, was supported by the rocky banks of the Wuthende-Neisse; but his left was in an elevated plain beyond that river, which its rear columns were still crossing, wholly uncovered except by cavalry under Sebastiani, the squadrons of which were at that moment in part passing the defile. Blucher, perceiving the weak point of his adversary's line, detached Wassilchikoff, at the head of the cavalry of Sacken's corps, to charge the French horse which had mounted upon the plateau, and so uncover their left. This order was immediately executed, and with the happiest effect. The Russian cavalry, superior in number, and greatly more experienced, approached the French dragoons on the extreme left, both in front and flank; while Karpoff's Cossacks, who had been sent round by a long detour, were to threaten their rear in the middle of the action. Sebastiani's horse, little prepared for the danger, had to struggle through the narrow defile of Kroitsch at Neider Crain, already encumbered with the whole artillery of Ney's corps, which was passing it at the time. The consequence was, that the squadrons arrived successively on the plateau on the other side, where they were immediately charged by a formidable body of horse, four thousand strong, in close array, both in front and flank. Unable to resist the shock, the French dragoons were driven back headlong into the defile in their rear, from which they had just emerged: two brigades of infantry, which were brought up to support them, shared the same fate: Sacken's main body now came up, and, as the incessant rain prevented the muskets going off, charged, with loud hurrahs, with the bayonet against the unprotected infantry of Ney's corps, which

Aug. 26.

* *Ante*, iv., 134.

† Jom., iv., 373, 410. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 80, 81. Vaud., i., 145.

* Blucher's Official Account, Schoell, Recueil, iv., 361, 362. Lab., i., 327. Bout., 14, 15. Vaud., i., 145

broke, and was driven headlong over the precipices into the roaring Katzbach and Wuthende-Neisse, where vast numbers were drowned.* The guns, still entangled in the defile, to the number of twenty-six, with their whole ammunition-wagons, were taken, and fifteen hundred prisoners on this wing fell into the enemy's hands.†

Defeat of Souham on the French left.

To complete their misfortunes, Souham, who was marching towards Leignitz, still farther to the French left, hearing the violent cannonade to his right, turned aside, and, moving in its direction, arrived at the mouth of the defile of Neider Crain at six o'clock. This movement, ably conceived and in the true military spirit, would, in ordinary circumstances, have probably restored the battle, by throwing a fresh division into the scale when the allies were disordered by success; but, as matters stood, it only aggravated the disaster. Souham's men arrived at the edge of the ravine of Kroitsch just as Sebastiani's horse were beginning to break on the plateau opposite. Uniting to Sebastiani's cuirassiers, which were left in reserve, Souham immediately led his men down the defile, and hastened to ascend the front, in hopes of reaching the opposite plateau in time to arrest the disorder; but just as they began to mount the gorge on the opposite side of the glen, they met the torrent of fugitives from the other side, who were hurrying down, with the bloody Russian and Prussian sabres glancing in their rear. The confusion now became inextricable: the dense and ardent columns pressing up, were, for the most part, overwhelmed by the disordered mass of horse and foot, mixed together, which was driven headlong down; and such of the battalions and squadrons as succeeded in forcing their way through the throng, and reached the summit, were speedily swept away and driven back into the gulf, when attempting to deploy, by the impetuous charges of a victorious and superior enemy, now firmly established on the summit, who, with loud hurrahs, asserted the triumph of Germany.‡

Continuation of the battle on the right and centre.

While this decisive success was in the course of being gained on the allied right, their left, under Langeron, had also come into collision with the French right, under Lauriston, near Hennersdorff. The combat there was more equal, and very obstinate: both sides stood their ground with great resolution; but towards night, the French general having learned the disaster on his left, fell back, still, however, in good order, to Praunnitz. The action seemed over for the day, when an accidental circumstance renewed it, and augmented the losses of the French general. At nine at night, two fresh divisions of Ney's corps, now under the orders of Souham, having come up, Macdonald in haste crossed them over the Katzbach, at the ford of Schmochowitz, below the confluence of the Neisse, and directed them against the extreme right of Sacken's corps, now advanced to the very edge of the plateau, and engaged in driving the other division and Sebastiani's horse into the flooded torrents at the foot of the precipitous banks. These divisions were under the command of General Tarayre; they drew with them sixteen pieces of cannon, and ascended to the top of the plateau with a good countenance. Sacken, however, who had received intelligence of their approach, was on his guard: his troops were rapidly made to front to the right, and these fresh divisions were driven by Count Lieven and General Neweroffski again over the Katzbach, with considerable loss.*

Great successes of the allies on the following day.

Next day, Blucher early put his columns in motion to follow up his successes; while Macdonald, in great consternation, drew back his shattered bands towards Goldberg. It would seem, however, as if the elements had conspired with the forces of the enemy to accomplish his destruction. The floodgates of heaven seemed literally opened the whole night: the rain fell, without an instant's intermission, in tremendous torrents; and next morning, not only were the raging waters of the Neisse and the Katzbach unfordable at any point, but several of the bridges over those streams, as well as over the Bober, which also lay farther back in the line of the French retreat, were swept away by the floods which descended from the Riesingeberg chain. Lauriston, sorely pressed by Langeron, only succeeded in getting across the foaming torrents by the sacrifice of two-and-twenty pieces of cannon, his whole ammunition-wagons, and two thousand prisoners. Aug. 27. On the same day the allies occupied Goldberg, and, continuing the pursuit, on the day following crossed the Katzbach, and drove the enemy back at all points towards the Bober. Aug. 28. All the bridges over that river had been swept away except that at Buntzlau, and, of necessity, the whole French divisions were directed to that point. In the course of the rapid retreat thither, forty pieces of cannon, and several hundred ammunition-wagons were sacrificed, and fell into the enemy's hands.†

Disaster of Puthod's division. Aug. 26.

A still more serious disaster, however, awaited the enemy in the course of this calamitous retreat. The division Puthod, of Lauriston's corps, had been despatched on the 26th, by a circuit at the foot of the mountains by Schoenau and Jauer, in order to menace the rear of the allies, and harass the retreat which was deemed on their part inevitable. He was already far advanced on his journey when news of the disaster on the Katzbach arrived, and he at once felt the necessity of hastening to regain the main body of the army. Overlooked by the allies in the first heat of the pursuit, Puthod succeeded, without any great difficulty, in retiring during the 27th; but, on arriving at the Bober, he found the bridge at Hirschberg swept away by the floods, and he was obliged to come down the right bank of the torrent to endeavour to effect a passage. Next morning he got Aug. 29.

* The name "*Wuthende*-Neisse" (mad or furious Neisse) indicates with what a raging torrent that stream, at ordinary seasons insignificant, and fordable in every part, descends during floods from the Bohemian Mountains.

† Kausler, 639, 640. Bout., 14, 15. Sacken's Official Account, Schoell, Recueil, iii., 80, 81. Jom., iv., 411, 412.

‡ Jom., iv., 412, 413. Kausler, 640, 641. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 82, 83.

* Sacken's Official Account, Schoell, Rec., iii, 81. Bout., 16. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 83. Jom., iv., 412, 413.

† Vict. et Conq., xxii., 83. Jom., iv., 414, 415. Bout., 16, 17.

as far down as Lowenberg, but there, too, the bridge was destroyed; and, after several vain attempts to re-establish it, he was obliged to wind his toilsome and devious way, anxiously looking out for a passage, towards Buntzlau. In doing so, ill luck made him fall in with the advanced posts of Langeron's corps, who, wholly unsuspicious of his arrival, were pursuing their opponents towards the Bober. The Russian general immediately collected his forces, and made dispositions for an attack. General Korff, with his own horse and Czorbatow's infantry, was despatched so as to cut off the retreat of the French back again up the Bober, which they seemed at first disposed to attempt; while Rudziwicz was posted on the road to Buntzlau, so as to render all escape impossible. Surrounded in this manner by greatly superior forces, in the most frightful of all positions, with a roaring, impassable torrent in his rear, the brave Frenchman did not despair, but taking ground on the hill of Plagitz, nearly opposite to Lowenberg, prepared to resist to the last extremity. There he was speedily assailed on every side: Rudziwicz attacked him on one flank, while Gorbatow and Korff charged him on the other, and a powerful train of artillery opened upon his columns in front. Shaken by such an accumulation of force, as well as by the evident hopelessness of their situation, the French broke, and fled in wild confusion down the hill towards the river; on the banks of which they were, with the exception of a few who swam across the foaming torrent, made prisoners: nearly two thousand were slain or drowned. A hundred officers, including Puthod himself, and his whole staff, three thousand private soldiers, two eagles, and twelve pieces of cannon, with the whole park of the division, fell into the enemy's hands, who did not lose a hundred men.*

Results of the battle.

Such was the great battle of the Katzbach: the counterpart of that of Hohenlinden, and one of the most glorious ever gained in the annals of European fame. Its trophies were immense, and coincided almost exactly with those which had, twelve years before, attended the triumph of Moreau:† eighteen thousand prisoners, a hundred and three pieces of cannon, and two hundred and thirty caissons, besides seven thousand killed and wounded, presented a total loss to the French of twenty-five thousand men. When Macdonald re-formed his broken bands behind the Queisse, he could with difficulty collect fifty-five thousand around his standards, instead of eighty thousand, who, when he received the command from Napoleon, crowded the banks of the Bober. The loss of the allies was very trifling, considering the magnitude of the success gained: it did not exceed four thousand men. Indeed, there was scarcely any serious fighting: the French having been surprised by Blucher's attack when wholly unprepared for it, and subsequently prevented, by the dreadful weather and casual destruction of the bridges in their rear by the floods, from reuniting their broken bands, or forming any regular mass for resistance to the enemy.‡

* Langeron's Official Accounts, Schoell, ii., 83, 84. Bout., 17, 18. Jom., iv., 414, 415. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 84. Vaud., i., 147, 148.

† *Ante*, ii., 124.

‡ Vict. et Conq., xxii., 84. Bout., 19. Jom., iv., 19. Vaud., i., 148.

Reflections on the conduct of the generals on both sides.

Great as were the successes thus achieved by the army of Silesia, and deservedly as they have given immortality to the name of Marshal Blucher, it may be doubted whether he would not more completely have succeeded in his object of disorganizing the French army, if, instead of directing the weight of his forces against the enemy's left, he had thrown it against their right wing, placed at Goldberg, as it was by that town that the whole French communications were preserved; and, consequently, a reverse there would have cut off Souham and the French left, and paralyzed the whole army. On the other hand, when the line of operating on the French right was taken, it must be admitted that the Prussian general showed admirable skill in the selection of his ground for the principal attack, where a precipitous glen in the rear of the French rendered retreat on their part impossible; in the concealment of his own troops till half the enemy was past the ravine; and in then falling on the portion which was drawn up on the plateau, with such a concentration of infantry and cavalry as at once rendered resistance hopeless, and assistance through the narrow gorge impossible. The movements of the French general will not admit of a similar apology. In direct violation of the instructions of Napoleon—which were, to concentrate his troops and decline battle except with a superiority of force—he rashly advanced against an enterprising general, at the head of an army superior both in number and in warlike experience to his own, with his troops so scattered over a line from Leignitz to Schœnau, nearly thirty miles in length, that, when assailed in his centre and left on most critical ground by the concentrated masses of the enemy, he had no adequate force at hand to arrest the disaster consequent on their first successful onset. Nor was the management of his principal force less injudicious than its direction. By directing the bulk of his troops on the great road from Goldberg to Jauer, Macdonald would at once have menaced his opponent's communications, covered his own, and secured to himself a comparatively safe retreat in case of disaster; whereas, by accumulating them on the left, he both uncovered his vital line, left untouched that of his adversary, and got his troops entangled in the rugged ravines of the Katzbach and Wuthende-Neisse, where any check was the certain prelude to ruin.*

Operations against Bernadotte, and Napoleon's great anxiety for success over him.

While these important operations were going forward in Saxony, Bohemia, and Silesia, the campaign had also been opened, and an important blow struck to the north of the Elbe, in the direction of Berlin. Although nothing is more certain than that the vital quarter of the war was to be found on the Bohemian or Silesian frontier, where the great masses of the allies were concentrated, yet it was by no means in that direction that Napoleon was desirous to begin hostilities, or most anxious to obtain success. He was much more intent upon making himself master of Berlin; it was to clear his flank of Blucher, before engaging in that enterprise, that he opened the campaign by the march into Si-

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 85, 86. Bout., 20, 24.

lesia. The first question which he asked when he returned to Dresden, beset by the allied Grand Army, was, whether there was any news from Berlin; and it was to prosecute that favourite design that he made the fatal stop of the Young Guard at Pirna, and returned himself to Dresden, in the midst of the pursuit of Schwartzenberg's army. Napoleon, however, in his anxiety to dazzle the world by the capture of the Prussian capital, and to gratify his private pique by the defeat of Bernadotte, committed an extraordinary oversight in the estimate which he formed of the strength of the enemy to whom he was opposed in that quarter. He conceived that Bernadotte had only eighty-five thousand men in all under his command, including those who, under Walmoden, were opposed to Davoust at Hamburg; whereas, such had been the efforts made to re-enforce the army in the north of Germany, and such the enthusiasm with which, under a sense of recent wrongs, they were seconded by the people, that Bernadotte had now ninety thousand men under his immediate command, of whom nearly twenty thousand were admirable cavalry, besides above forty thousand who were opposite to Hamburg, or guarded the banks of the Lower Elbe. With this imposing force, he took post at Charlottenberg to cover Berlin, and concentrate his troops, as soon as the denunciation of the armistice gave reason to anticipate a resumption of hostilities.*

Advance of Oudinot, and preparations for a battle. August 21.

Meanwhile, Oudinot received orders to move forward and open the campaign; but he not being prepared immediately to obey the emperor's directions, the prince royal advanced his headquarters to Potsdam, and his numerous army occupied Juterbock, Trebbin, and the villages of Saarmunde and Bilitz. On the 21st, the French army moved forward, consisting of three corps of infantry, viz., Bertrand's, Regnier's, and Oudinot's, with Arrighi's cavalry, mustering in all about eighty thousand men; and, leaving the great road from Torgau to Berlin, made a flank movement towards the Wittenberg road. This speedily brought it in contact with the foremost posts of Bernadotte's army, and a rude conflict ensued with the advanced guard of Bulow's Prussians, which terminated in the forcing of the defile of Thyrow, and the establishment of Oudinot's forces on the heights behind Trebbin, and in front of Mittenwalde. Bernadotte, perceiving that a general battle was inevitable to prevent the enemy from making their way to Berlin, immediately gave orders for concentrating his forces, and the greater part of the day following was occupied in bringing them into line; but before they were all assembled, General Thumen, with a body of Prussians, was attacked by Regnier with so great a superiority of force at Trebbin, that he was forced to retire with considerable loss; the enemy carried the defile of Juhndorff, and the prince royal, now seriously alarmed for his left, drew back the troops which he had at Trebbin and Mittenwalde, and brought up Tauenzein's whole corps to Blackenfelde. Oudinot's object in thus directing the weight of his forces against the enemy's left, was to beat his forces in detail towards Blackenfelde and Teltow,* and force the prince royal, driven up against Potsdam, to throw back his left, and abandon Berlin. With this view, Regnier, in the centre, was directed to march on Gross Beeren; Bertrand, on the right, on Blackenfelde; while the commander-in-chief himself, with the left, moved on Ahrensdorf. He was not now above twelve miles from Berlin, which he fully expected to enter on the following day.

Aug. 22.

The battle began early on the morning of the 23d, by the French right, under Bertrand, who had the shortest distance to go over before arriving at the enemy, falling with great vigour on Tauenzein, who with his gallant Prussians held Blackenfelde. Bulow, who was in reserve behind the centre, upon this began to extend his columns to the left to aid his brethern in arms in that quarter; but the movement was countermanded by the prince royal, for Tauenzein had made such a vigorous resistance, that not only were Bertrand's attacks repulsed, but several prisoners were taken, and the line was perfectly safe in that direction. Matters, however, wore a more serious aspect in the centre, where Regnier, at the head of twenty-four thousand Saxons, supported by a strong reserve, attacked and carried Gross Beeren, and established himself close to the very centre of the allied line. Bernadotte, sensible of the dangerous consequences of this success, instantly took the most vigorous measures to arrest it. Bulow's whole corps was stopped in its march to the left, and brought up to the support of the centre, which had retired, still, however, bravely fighting, to some woods in the rear of the village. Meanwhile, Regnier, little anticipating a second conflict, and deeming the combat over, was preparing to establish his bivouacs for the night on the ground he had won, when Bulow, at the head of thirty-five thousand Prussians, fell upon him.†

Battle of Gross Beeren. August 23.

The measures of the Prussian general were taken with great ability, and he was admirably seconded by the intrepidity of his troops. While he himself advanced with the main body of his force to recover Gross Beeren in front, Borstel, with a strong brigade, was moved on to Klein Beeren, in order to turn the right of the enemy, and the Swedish horse were advanced so as to threaten their left. The troops advanced in two lines, preceded by sixty pieces of cannon, and followed by the cavalry in reserve; incessant rain had fallen the whole day, which prevented the muskets from going off; but the cannon on both sides soon opened a tremendous fire, while, in rear of the Prussian pieces, their infantry advanced with the precision and coolness of the troops of the Great Frederic. At length they arrived within grapeshot range, and Bulow immediately ordered a charge of bayonets by the front line deployed, while the second followed in column. The struggle, though violent, was not of long duration: Regnier, assailed by superior forces in front, could with difficulty maintain his ground; and the attack of Borstel on his right, and the opening of the Swedish

Defeat of the French centre at Gross Beeren.

* Jom., iv., 405. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 49. Bout., 48.

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 98, 99. Bernadotte's Official Account, Schoell, Recueil, i., 72, 73. Bout., 50, 51. Jom., iv., 405, 406.

† Bernadotte's Official Report, Schoell, Recueil, i., 73. Bout., 52, 53. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 97. Jom., iv., 406, 407.

cannon, supported by an immense body of Russian horse on his left, decided the conflict. He was already beginning to retreat, when the Prussians in front, with loud hurrahs, charged with the bayonet. Gross Beeren was speedily won, several batteries were carried, and the allied horse, by repeated charges on the left flank, completed his defeat. Oudinot's corps, alarmed by the violence of the cannonade at this period, stopped their advance on Ahrensberg, and, hastening to the centre, came up in time to arrest the disorder. Behind their fresh columns the broken Saxons were enabled to re-form, but it was too late to regain the day. The Prussians, indeed, ignorant of the strength of the new army which they had thus encountered in the twilight, retired from the pursuit, and even at the moment evacuated Gross Beeren; but the defeat of the French centre determined the retreat of their left: their whole army retired to Trebbin, while Bulow reoccupied Gross Beeren, and Tauenzein advanced to Juhndorf.*

Results of the battle.

Although the battle of Gross Beeren was not attended with such extensive trophies in the field as those of Culm or the Katzbach, yet in its moral influence, and the effects which it finally had on the fortunes of the campaign, it was almost equal to either of these memorable conflicts. Fifteen hundred prisoners, thirteen cannon, and a large quantity of baggage, were taken, but these were its most inconsiderable results. The moral influence of the defeat of the attack on Berlin was immense. Great had been the consternation in that capital when the enemy's columns were advanced almost to within sight of its steeples, and every house shook with the discharges of their cannon; they remembered Jena and six years' bondage, and every heart throbbed with emotion. Proportionally vehement was the joy when news arrived, at ten at night, that the enemy had been repulsed, that his columns were retiring, and the capital saved; and the general transports were increased by the circumstance that the triumph was exclusively national—Bulow and Tauenzein having, with their new Prussian levies, almost alone had a share in the action. The warmest thanks were next day voted by the municipality to the prince royal as their deliverer; joy beamed in every countenance; great numbers of the Saxon prisoners, carried away by the torrent of patriotic feeling, petitioned to be allowed to serve in the ranks of the fatherland, and formed the nucleus of the Saxon corps which soon appeared in the lines of the allies; while several of the officers, who had served under Bernadotte in the campaign of Wagram, wept for joy at finding themselves again in the patriot ranks of Germany, and under the banners of their old general.†

Subsequent results of the battle.

The battle of Gross Beeren was immediately followed by other successes, naturally flowing from the former, which materially augmented its trophies. On the 25th, Bernadotte moved forward, though very slowly, and with extreme circumspection; but the enemy were so scattered that he could not fail, with his superiority in cavalry, to gain considerable advantages. Luckau had been fortified by the French, and garrisoned by a thousand men; but the governor not conceiving himself in sufficient strength to withstand the assault of the allies, by whom he was soon surrounded, capitulated, when summoned, with nine pieces of cannon, and considerable magazines. A still more serious disaster soon after occurred on the side of Magdebourg. Gerard, with his division, five thousand strong, had issued from that fortress as soon as he heard of the advance of Oudinot, in order to co-operate in the general movement against Berlin; but the reverse of Gross Beeren, of which, from the hostile feeling of the country, he had received no information, followed by the advance of the allies, led him, without being aware of it, into the very middle of the enemy's columns. Finding Belzig occupied by the Cossacks of Chernicheff, he withdrew to Liebnitz, where he took post to await farther orders. There he was assailed next day by a division of the Prussians under Hirschfeld; and after a gallant resistance, being attacked in rear by Chernicheff's Cossacks, he was totally defeated, and compelled to take refuge in Magdebourg, with the loss of fourteen hundred prisoners and six pieces of cannon. These advantages made the total results of the battle of Gross Beeren four thousand prisoners, besides an equal number killed and wounded, and twenty-eight guns, while the allies were not weakened by more than half the number. These results, considerable as they were, might have been greatly augmented if Bernadotte had made a proper use of the superiority of force, and great preponderance in cavalry, which he enjoyed; but he was so cautious in his movements, that, though he had no force to withstand him in the field, and the enemy fell back at all points, he took eleven days to advance from Gross Beeren to Rabinstein, near the Elbe, where he established his headquarters on the 4th of September, though the distance was little more than fifty miles.*

Aug. 25.

Aug. 26.

Sept. 4.

Napoleon was at Dresden when these disastrous tidings from Bohemia, Silesia, and Prussia arrived, with stunning rapidity, after each other. His whole projects for the campaign, which seemed to be opening in so auspicious a manner by the glorious victory of Dresden, were at once blasted; the moral effect of that great triumph was destroyed. The allies, instead of regaining Prague in consternation, brought with them the trophies of Vandamme, and a considerable part of his corps prisoners. The battle of Culm had turned into cries of joy the desolation which began to be felt in the valleys of Bohemia; the army of Silesia was flying in disorder before its terrible antagonists, and loudly demanding the emperor and his guards as the only means of stemming the torrent; the attack on Berlin had failed; instead of electrifying Europe by the capture of the Prussian capital, the northern army was thrown back to the Elbe, while the Prussian landwehr was singing the pæans of victory, and unheard-of enthusiasm animated the whole north of Germany. Napoleon was

Vast effects of these successes of the allies.

* Bout., 53, 54. Jom., iv., 407, 408. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 99, 100. Vaud., i., 166, 167.

† Bernadotte's Official Account, Schoell, i., 75, 76. Bout., 53, 54. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 100, 101.

* Bout., 57, 59. Jom., iv., 408. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 100, 101. Vaud., i., 168, 170.

strongly affected by these reverses, the more so as they were quite unexpected; and he immediately began, as usual, to lay the whole blame upon his lieutenants.* Circumstances, however, were so pressing, and succours were demanded from so many quarters at once, that it was no easy matter to say to which direction the emperor should turn with the anxiously-expected relief. His first design was to re-enforce the army of the North, and resume in person, and with the aid of his guards, his favourite project of a march upon Berlin. But Macdonald's representations of the disastrous state of the army of Silesia were so urgent, and the advance of the enemy on that side so threatening, that he at length determined, though much against his will, to direct his steps towards Bautzen and the banks of the Bober.†

Defensive measures of Napoleon for the protection of Saxony.

In pursuance of this resolution, orders were immediately given to stop at all points the pursuit of the allied columns into Bohemia; the broken remains of Vandamme's corps, intrusted to the care of Count Lobau, after being inspected at Dresden by the emperor, were reconducted to the inhospitable summits of the mountains at Gieshubel and Petterswalde; St. Cyr's corps was stationed between the latter point and Altenberg; while Victor occupied the passes and crest of the range from that to the right towards Reichenberg and Freyberg. The command of the army of the North was intrusted to Ney; the emperor being with reason dissatisfied with Oudinot, for the senseless dispersion of his force which had led to the check at Gross Beeren, as well as for the eccentric direction of his retreat towards Wittenberg instead of Torgau, thereby putting in hazard the interior line of communication between the army of the North and the centre of operations at Dresden, and even exposing Macdonald's rear and supplies to the risk of being cut off or disquieted by the clouds of light horse, which inundated the plains beyond the Elbe, from Bernadotte's left. To prevent this inconvenience, and keep up the communication between the armies of Ney and Macdonald, Marmont's corps was withdrawn from the pursuit of the allied Grand Army, and transferred to Hoyerswerda, ont he right bank of the Elbe, nearly midway between them; while the emperor himself, taking with him the guards and reserve cavalry, and calling to his standard Poniatowsky's corps, which had hitherto lain inactive in observation at Zittau, proceeded with sixty thousand choice troops to re-enforce the dejected remains of the army which had been shaken by the disasters of the Katzbach. Thus, after all the losses from the preceding defeats were taken into account, sixty thousand men were left under St. Cyr, Victor, and Murat, to make head against the Grand Army of the allies on the left of the Elbe; a hundred and twenty thousand, under the emperor in person, were directed against Blucher in Silesia; seventy thousand, under Ney, were opposed to the army of Bernadotte; and eighteen thousand, under Marmont, were in observation, and kept up the communications on the right bank of the Elbe.*

The emperor's own movement, as usual, was attended with the desired effect. On the 3d of September, Napoleon set out from Dresden in the evening, and slept that night at the chateau of Hartau, near Bischoffwerda. The guards and cuirassiers of Latour Maubourg made a magnificent appearance as they defiled along the road. The departure of the emperor was accelerated by the intelligence received that day of the capture of a considerable convoy of ammunition, between Bautzen and Bischoffwerda, by the Cossacks from Bernadotte's army. Marmont was pushed forward in that direction to prevent a repetition of the insult, and finally took post at Hoyerswerda. On the following morning, Napoleon set out by break of day, and early in the forenoon came in contact with the advanced guard of Blucher, which was strongly posted on the high grounds of Stromberg and Vohlaerberg, beyond Hochkirch, on the road to Gorlitz. The Prussian generals soon perceived, from the increased activity in the French army and the splendid array of troops which crowded the roads coming from Dresden, that the emperor was before them; and Blucher, faithful to the instructions he had received, and the general system agreed on at Trachenberg, immediately fell back. The French, continuing to advance, soon reoccupied Gorlitz, while Blucher's retiring columns repassed, successively, both the Queisse and the Neisse. Napoleon slept, on the night of the 5th, in the parsonage manse of the parish of Hochkirch; and on the following morning resumed his march in pursuit of the allied troops, hoping that the impetuous character of the Prussian marshal, flushed with his recent victory, would lead him to halt and give battle. Blucher, however, still continued to retreat; and at noon the emperor, altogether exhausted with fatigue, entered a deserted farmhouse by the wayside, where he threw himself on some straw in a shed, and mused long and profoundly on the probable issue of a contest in which the allies never gave him an opportunity of striking a blow in person, and the armies of his lieutenants, when left to themselves, hardly ever failed to be involved in disaster. At the close of his revery, he started up, and ordered the guards and cuirassiers to return to Dresden, leaving Marmont in such a situation at Hoyerswerda as to be able to lend assistance, in case of need, either to Ney or Macdonald. His presence at the Saxon capital was much required; for already the allies were beginning to resume the offensive on the fron-

Napoleon advances against Blucher.

Sept. 4.

* "Mon cousin, le Duc de Tarente (Macdonald) s'est laissé pousser sur Gorlitz. Il sera possible que je sois obligé demarcher sur Bautzen, demain ou après demain. Occupez, donc, promptement les positions défensives."—NAPOLEON *to* ST. CYR, 1*st September*, 1813, ST. CYR, iv., 391.

"Mon cousin, écrivez au Prince de la Moskwa (Ney). Nous venons de recevoir des nouvelles du Duc de Reggio (Oudinot), qui a jugé convenable de venir se mettre, à deux marches, au dessus de Wittenberg. Le résultat de ce mouvement intempestif est, que le corps du Général Tauenzein, et un fort parti des Cosaques, se sont partis du côté de Luckau et de Bautzen, et inquiétant les communications du Duc de Tarente. *Il est vraiment difficile d'avoir moins de tête que le Duc de Reggio.* Il n'a point su d'aborder l'ennemi; et il a eu l'art de faire donner un de ses corps séparament. S'il l'eut abordé fraîchement, il l'aurait partout culbuté."—NAPOLEON *to* BERTHIER, 2*d September*, 1813, ST. CYR, iv., 393, and JOMINI, iv., 417, 418, *note*.

† Fain, ii., 324, 325. St. Cyr, iv., 130, 131.

* Fain, ii., 325, 326. Napoleon to St. Cyr, 3d September, 1813, St. Cyr, iv., 395. Jom., iv., 415, 416.

tier of Bohemia, and a terrible disaster had been incurred to the north of the Elbe.*

Ney's movements against Bernadotte.

Ney, who had been appointed to replace Oudinot in the command of the army of the North, had received the emperor's instructions to march direct to Baruth, where a corps was to be waiting him to bring re-enforcements. He would there be only three days' march from Berlin; and, so low did Napoleon still estimate the Prussian landwehr and light horse, that he persisted in assuring him that, if he would only keep his troops together and put a good countenance on the matter, all that rabble would soon disperse, and he would find the road to the Prussian capital lie open before him.† Ney, in pursuance of these instructions, and impelled not less by the ardour of his own disposition than the express command of Napoleon, immediately put himself in motion. He arrived at the headquarters of the army on the 4th of September, and found the whole troops arranged under shelter of the cannon of Wittenberg — a state of things which sufficiently evinced the entire incapacity of Oudinot for separate command; for he had now altogether lost his communication with the central point of Dresden, and permitted the whole right bank of the Elbe, between that fortress and the Saxon capital, to be inundated by a deluge of Russian and Prussian light horse, who did incredible mischief to the communication and supplies of both armies. Having reviewed his troops, and encouraged them by the assurance of prompt succour from the emperor, Ney immediately put them in motion on the morning of the 5th, directing his march by Zahna and Seyda, so as to regain the high road from Torgau to Berlin, which was his proper line of communication with the grand headquarters at Dresden. On the evening of the same day the army was established on a line between these two villages, the Prussian advanced posts rapidly retiring before them. On the other hand, the prince royal no sooner ascertained that the enemy were marching in strength against him, headed by his old comrade, Marshal Ney, with whose determined character in the field he was well acquainted, than he took measures for concentrating his army. Setting out from Rabbenstein, where his headquarters had been established, he marched across the country, so as to regain the great road between Torgau and Berlin. Tauenzein, who formed the advanced guard of his army, reached DENNEWITZ early on the morning of the 6th, and soon found himself in front of the vanguard of the French army, which, in its march from Zahna and Seyda, had approached that village on the route to Juterbock, where the great road from Torgau would be regained. Tauenzein immediately drew up his troops in order of battle, and unmasked a powerful battery, the fire of which arrested the progress of the Italian troops under Count Bertrand. The French general, however, was not disconcerted, but, bringing up his remaining divisions, re-established the combat: the French artillery, posted on higher ground, played with advantage upon that of the allies, and Morand advancing with his division, which was composed, in great part, of veterans, sensibly gained ground, and threatened the left wing of the allies, which had first come into action, with total defeat.*

Battle of Dennewitz. September 6.

Succour, however, was at hand; for Bulow, who commanded the allied centre, which was marching up immediately after their left wing, and in the same direction, no sooner heard the cannonade on the side of Dennewitz than he hastened his march and arrived with twenty thousand Prussians, whom he deployed with the corps under Hesse Homberg in reserve; and, not contented with remaining in position, he immediately directed the troops by an oblique advance against the flank of Bertrand's corps, which was now pushing Tauenzein before it, in front of Dennewitz. The Prussians advanced in echelon by the left, but, before they could reach the enemy, Regnier, with the Saxons, had come up to the support of Bertrand, and a combat of the most obstinate description ensued; the French centre and left presenting a front on the two sides of an oblique triangle to the enemy, and the Prussians urging them on both its faces. After four hours' hard fighting, however, the enthusiasm of the Prussians prevailed over the intrepidity of the Saxons. The village of Nieder Gerstorf and Gohlsdorf were successively carried, and the French centre and left driven back in the direction of Ohna.†

Arrival of Ney with his centre on the field.

Ney, however, now came up in haste with Oudinot's corps, which was stationed to the left of the Saxons, and immediately in front of Bulow's right. The arrival of this fresh corps, fully twenty thousand strong, made an immediate change upon the field of battle. The two corps uniting, turned fiercely on their pursuers, and, being superior in numbers, not only regained Gohlsdorf, but drove the Prussians entirely across the road to the high grounds near Wilmsdorf, from which Bulow had originally come. Bulow, upon this, brought forward his reserve; the Saxons, though they combated bravely, were forced in their turn to retreat; and Gohlsdorf, the object of such fierce contention, a second time fell into the hands of the Prussians. Oudinot then again advanced the division of Pacthod, and it, in the first instance, gained ground upon the enemy, and restored the combat. It was hard to say to which side ultimate success would incline, when, at this critical moment, the Prussian brigade of Borstel, which was marching in the rear across the country towards Juterbock, informed, near Talischau, of the critical state of matters on the allied right, appeared on the field, and immediately attacked, with loud cheers, the extreme left of Oudinot in flank. At the same time, the Prussians under Thumen, who had combated

* Fain, ii., 325, 326. Bout., 70, 71. Odel., i., 269. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 105, 106.

† "From Baruth you will be only three days' march from Berlin. The communication with the emperor will then be entirely established, and the attack on the Prussian capital may take place on the 9th or 10th instant. All that cloud of Cossacks and rabble of landwehr infantry will fall back on all sides when your march is once decidedly taken. You will understand the necessity of moving rapidly, in order to take advantage of the present state of inefficiency of the allied Grand Army in Bohemia, which might otherwise recommence operations the moment that they become aware of the departure of the emperor."—*Instructions to* NEY, *2d September*, 1813, ST. CYR, iv., 394.

* Vaud., i., 171. Bout., 61, 62. Jom., iv., 419, 420.

† Vaud., i., 172. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 103. Bout., 62. Jom., iv., 420, 421.

behind Dennewitz ever since the morning, resuming the offensive, vigorously attacked and carried that village, and drove back Bertrand's corps, who were excessively fatigued with their long march and subsequent combat, to a considerable distance. The effect of this double advantage occurring at the same time was decisive. Ney, finding both his wings driven back, and his centre in danger of being enveloped by the enemy, gave orders for a retreat at all points. This retrograde movement, however, was conducted with great regularity: the French braved, without shrinking, the destructive fire of grapeshot from the enemy's numerous batteries, which were now hurried to the front, and several charges of the Prussian horse were repulsed by the rolling fire and steady conduct of their retiring columns.*

Arrival of Bernadotte with the Swedish reserve decides the victory.

Hitherto the Prussian army, not in all above forty-five thousand strong, had singly maintained the conflict, with heroic resolution, against the French, who numbered seventy thousand combatants. The Swedes and Russians, composing nearly a half of the army, had not yet come into action, having composed the right of the column of march, which was advancing with the left in front. But Bernadotte, with this powerful reserve, having broken up in the morning from Lobesson and Echmansdorf, had now reached Kaltenborn, a league in rear of Dennewitz, where the battle was raging, and, forming his whole force in order of battle, advanced rapidly to the support of the Prussians, now wellnigh exhausted by their long and arduous exertions. The appearance of this imposing mass on the field of battle, where Ney had no longer a reserve on his part to oppose to them, was decisive. Seventy battalions of Russians and Swedes, supported by ten thousand horse of the two nations, and preceded by a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, advanced in beautiful array of columns of attack, with sufficient space left between them for the front file to deploy, and form a continuous line. Ney, who had not been able to succeed in his attack upon the Prussians alone, was in no condition to maintain his ground when this fresh and formidable body came upon him. Disorder and vacillation speedily became visible in his retreating columns; soon four thousand Russian and Swedish cavalry advanced at the gallop to support the points of the Prussian line, where the contest was most obstinately maintained; and the ranks were no longer kept, when Bulow's men, opening with admirable discipline, made room for the infantry of the reserve to advance, and the Russian cavalry, charging furiously through the apertures, swept like a torrent round the French retreating columns.†

The retreat soon turned into a flight: in vain Ney endeavoured to hold firm, with the Saxons in the centre, who were hitherto unbroken, near Rohrbeck; the troops there, too, were seized with a sudden panic on seeing their flanks turned by the Swedish and Russian horse, and, breaking into disorder, fled in confusion. The effects of this rout of the centre were in the highest degree disastrous: the enemy rushed into the huge gap thus formed in the middle of the line, and, vigorously pursuing the fugitives, separated the right from the left wing. In vain Arrighi brought forward his dragoons to cover the retreat: a thick cloud of dust enveloped the advancing squadrons of the pursuers, and rendered them more terrible from being unseen. Arrighi's men were shaken by the terrors by which they were surrounded, and wavered before reaching the enemy. Soon they were overwhelmed by the torrent, and drawn into its vortex before the Russian sabres were upon them; and at length the whole army presented nothing but a vast mass of fugitives. Ney did all that courage and coolness could suggest to arrest the disorder, but it was in vain: his utmost efforts could only preserve some degree of order in the retiring cannoniers, who, by rapidly working their guns, prevented the total destruction of the centre; but the wings were irrevocably separated. Oudinot, with his own corps and a part of the Saxons, retreated to Schweinitz; while Ney himself, Bertrand, and the cavalry, got off to Dahme. On the day following, additional successes were gained by the allies: Ney's rear-guard was attacked by the victorious Prussians, and defeated, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners; and during the night six hundred more were taken by their light horse, with eight pieces of cannon. It was not till the 8th that the French general succeeded in reuniting his shattered and divided columns, under cover of the cannon of Torgau.*

Result of the battle.

The loss of the French in the battle of Dennewitz was very severe. It amounted, in the battle and subsequent retreat to Torgau, to thirteen thousand men, of whom one half were prisoners; with forty-three pieces of cannon, seventeen caissons, and three standards, besides six thousand stand of arms which the fugitives threw away to accelerate their flight. The allies lost nearly six thousand men, of whom five thousand were Prussians: a clear proof upon whom the weight of the battle had fallen, and with whom the glory of the victory should rest. But its moral consequences were far more important. The Prussian troops, of whom a large proportion were landwehr, had here defeated the French in a pitched battle, led by one of their most renowned chiefs: the stain of Jena was washed out; the days of Rohrbeck and the Great Frederic seemed about to return; and Berlin, no longer trembling for foreign occupation, might send forth her sons conquering and to conquer on the brightest fields of European fame.†

Reflections on the battle.

The French military historians, confounded at this defeat—which they could neither ascribe to the cold, as in Russia, nor to the force of overwhelming numbers, as on the second day at Culm, nor to flooded rivers, as at the Katzbach—have laboured to save the honour of their arms by ascri-

* Jom., iv., 421. Bout., 62, 63. Vaud., i., 172. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 103.

† Bernadotte's Official Account, Schoell, iii., 116. Bout., 64, 65. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 104, 105. Vaud., i., 172, 173.

*. Bernadotte's Official Account, Schoell, iii., 117. Bout., 64, 65. Jom., iv., 422, 423. Vaud., i., 173.

† Bernadotte's Official Account, Schoell, Recueil, iii., 117. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 105. Bout., 66. Jom., iv., 424.

bing it entirely to the incapacity of Marshal Ney, who had no head, they affirm, for previous combination, and never received any illumination of genius till the enemy's balls were whirling through the bayonets. Without ascribing the disaster entirely to this cause, it must be admitted that the conduct of the French marshal on this occasion was not such as to support his great reputation. Like Oudinot at Gross Beeren, he was surprised by an attack on his line of march when little prepared for it, and under circumstances when such an event was not only probable, but certain. When Ney took the command of the army under the cannon of Wittenberg, it was completely concentrated, and occupied a position of all others best adapted to act with effect on the army of the allies, then occupying a line above twenty miles in length, from Rabenstein to Sayda. Instead of this, he brought up his columns in so desultory a manner to the attack, that he was never able to take any advantage of the great superiority of force which he might have thrown upon any point of the enemy's line, and, in the end, had the whole hostile array on his hands before he had been able to make any impression on the corps first engaged. In justice, however, to the French marshal, it must be observed, that he was on this occasion very indifferently aided by his lieutenants; and that Oudinot, in particular, stung to the quick by having been deprived of the command, by no means pressed forward into action with the alacrity which might have been expected from his character. This jealousy of the marshals of each other, already so long known and sorely experienced in the Peninsular war, had already risen to such a height in Germany, as to render all cordial co-operation, except under the immediate eye and authority of the emperor, impossible.*

Errors committed by the generals on both sides.

Nor was the conduct of the prince royal, though crowned with success, by any means beyond the reach of reproach. Great as his victory was, it would have been much more decisive, if, instead of marching with his reserves on Echmandorf and Wilmersdorf, that is, in the rear of the Prussian line of battle, at the distance of five miles, he had followed the march of Tauenzein and Bulow by the great road direct on Dennewitz, which would have brought an overwhelming force on the flank of the French at this crisis of the battle, just as Ney did to the allies at Bautzen, and Blucher to Napoleon at Waterloo. Still more, his pursuit was languid and inefficient: he made no sufficient use of the unparalleled advantage of having utterly routed the enemy's centre, and separated their two wings from each other; his noble cavalry were not, on the day after the battle, thrown with sufficient vigour on the traces of the enemy; and an army which had been routed on the field, in a way hardly to be equalled in modern war, was allowed to retire with scarcely any molestation to the Elbe, and reunite its dissevered wings at Torgau, while the victor remained inactive at Juterbock, only a few miles from the field of battle.†

But if the conduct of Bernadotte, both at Dennewitz and Gross Beeren, was open to serious reproach, and indicated not obscurely a wish to spare the native troops of Sweden, and not to push the advantages even gained by the Prussians to the utmost, the vigour, resolution, and capacity evinced by the Prussian generals, especially Bulow and Borstel, in bearing up with inferior means for half the day, against superior forces on the part of the enemy, were most conspicuous; and, in particular, the perfect unanimity and concord with which they supported each other on every trying occasion, and the true military instinct which led them at once, and without orders, to hasten where the cannon was loudest and the danger greatest, were beyond all praise; and, seconded by the devotion and valour of their brave, though inexperienced followers, mainly contributed to the victory on both these glorious days. Never, in truth, was a more animated spectacle witnessed than the Prussian army exhibited at that period. Jealousies there were none in that noble array: individual interests, separate desires, were forgotten; old-established feuds were healed; recent rivalries were suppressed: one only feeling, the love of country, throbbed in every heart; one only passion, the desire to save it, gave strength to every hand.*

Admirable conduct of the Prussian generals and soldiers.

The repeated defeats which he had thus experienced in every quarter, and under circumstances where the faults of generalship appeared to be equally divided between the contending parties, at length brought home to Napoleon the painful conviction, that neither his own troops nor those of his opponents were what they once had been. However much the adulation of his military courtiers might at the time, or the fond partiality of his subsequent panegyrists may still, be inclined to ascribe these misfortunes to errors of conduct on the part of the generals at the head of the movements, or to inconceivable fatality, their reiterated occurrence, under every variety of command, officers, and troops engaged, was sufficient to demonstrate to all unprejudiced observers, that the long-established superiority of the revolutionary troops was at an end. In presence of the emperor, indeed, and with the consciousness that his redoubtable guards and cuirassiers were at hand to arrest any disorder, the conscripts evinced extraordinary enthusiasm, and still performed heroic actions; and the able use which he long made of that formidable reserve of fifty thousand chosen veterans, in battles where he commanded in person, arrested the tide of disaster. But where this great cause of enthusiasm and tower of strength was wanting, the usual appearances of a sinking cause were apparent. The marshals wanted vigour, and had become timid and over-circumspect, or were unduly rash and overweening in their movements: the troops generally went into battle with courage, but they failed to sustain it with constancy; and on the first appearance of a reverse took flight by whole battalions, or laid down their arms, like the Austrians in the beginning of the war, in large bodies. Thirty thousand prisoners and two hundred guns had been taken by the allies in pitched battles within three weeks after the resumption of hostilities;

These defeats destroy the charm of French invincibility.

* Bout., 68, 69. Jom., iv., 25.
† Jom., iv., 424, 425. Bout., 68, 69.

* Bout., 69, 70.

while the Russians retreated from the Niemen to Moscow, a distance of six hundred miles, in presence of four hundred thousand men in close pursuit, without one battalion being broken or one cannon taken. A change, therefore, had plainly come over the spirit of the contest: the old enthusiasm of the Revolution was worn out, the military array of the Empire had broken down; while its oppression had roused an indomitable spirit of resistance on the other side, and its antagonists had learned, in combating, to conquer it. The effects of this truth being perceived, were in the highest degree important: Napoleon lost confidence in his troops and his fortune, and no longer exhibited those daring strokes which had so often in former campaigns crowned him with success; while his marshals evinced that dread of responsibility, and nervousness about consequences, which are the invariable attendants, save among those whom a sense of duty supports, of the secret anticipation of disaster.

Second advance of the allies towards Dresden.

While these events were taking place in the northern line of operations, the allied Grand Army had resumed the offensive on the Bohemian frontier. No sooner was Schwartzenberg made aware, by the cessation of the pursuit of his columns, that Napoleon had set out in a different direction, than he put his troops in motion, again to threaten the Saxon capital.

Sept. 5. On the 5th of September, Wittgenstein crossed the mountains with the right wing, and pushed his advanced guard to Nollendorf, and on the following day he reached

Sept. 6. Gieshubel; while Ziethen occupied Gross Koeta, and Count Pahlen and Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, who had crossed by Hippersdorf, took possession of Nentmansdorf. On the day

Sept. 7. following, Wittgenstein, continuing his march, occupied Pirna, and his advanced posts again appeared in the environs of Dresden; Schwartzenberg himself, with his heavily-laden Austrians, also approached the mountains in the rear of the Russians, and on the 8th reached Aussig, near Tœplitz, while certain intelligence was received that Benningsen, with the Russian reserve, full sixty thousand strong, was advancing by rapid strides from the Oder, and might be expected on the Elbe before the end of September. This intelligence was accompanied by the opinion from St. Cyr, that "the system of the enemy is, to hazard nothing on the points where the emperor is ascertained to be, with the troops which he always brings along with him. It may be presumed, therefore, that he will undertake no operation against Dresden so long as his majesty, with his guards, is known to be in the neighbourhood of that town; but that he will march against it as soon as they are withdrawn, the great bulk of his force being concentrated within one march of Dresden, on the passes of Altenberg, Furstenwalde, and Peterswalde."*

Napoleon resumes the offensive in Bohemia.

Napoleon had no sooner received this intelligence than he took measures for the concentration of his troops on the side of Silesia, by ordering Macdonald to retire to Bautzen, near which Poniatowsky was placed, so as to form his right, while he himself, with the guards, set

Sept. 7. out in the direction of Pirna; Marmont was drawn back with his corps to Dresden, and a division, ten thousand strong, was stationed at Leipsic under Margaron. The repeated checks he had received made him feel the necessity of contracting his circle of operations, and stationing his generals at such distances from the central Saxon capital that in a day or two he might be able, with his guards and reserve, to carry succour to any quarter where their assistance might be required. Meanwhile, the Russian army, in great strength, was concentrating in the environs of Culm and Tœplitz, while the Austrians were coming up behind them, though still at a considerable distance, from the side of Prague. The emperor felt strongly the necessity of delivering some decisive blow to extricate himself from his difficulties; and immediately after he joined Marshal St. Cyr, in the neighbourhood of Pirna, on the evening of the 7th, he had a long conversation with that able general, in the course of which he admitted that "he had lost a brilliant opportunity of striking such a stroke, by halting the Young Guard at Pirna when Vandamme was advancing to Culm;" but still inclined to the opinion that it should now be directed towards Blucher or Bernadotte, and insisted that the Grand Allied Army would attempt nothing during his absence. Impressed with these ideas, which St. Cyr in vain combated with military frankness, he returned to Dresden the same night,

Sept. 8. meditating a great blow against Bernadotte, and consequent triumphal entry into Berlin; but early next morning he was roused from his dream of security, and recalled to the advanced posts on the side of Pirna, by the sound of cannon, which announced a formidable attack by the Russian vanguard in that quarter.*

He forces back the Russian centre.

Quick as lightning, Napoleon moved up his guards and cuirassiers to the scene of action, and, after reconnoitring the enemy's columns from the heights of Gahrnig, determined that, although the great body of his reserves had not yet come up, it was advisable not to delay the attack, as by the next day the plateau which the enemy occupied would be so strongly supported by artillery as to be altogether unassailable. He, accordingly, forthwith put his troops in motion, and, aiming his movement against the left of the allied advanced guard, he directed the weight of his forces towards Liebstadt, whereby he threatened their communications with Tœplitz. To avoid that danger, Wittgenstein immediately withdrew his men, and joined Kleist at Nollendorf; while, at the same time, Klenau's Austrians, who had been pushed on towards Chemnitz, retired to Marienberg. The arrival of Napoleon was felt like a shock along the whole line of the Bohemian Hills. Satisfied with this advantage, Napoleon retired to his quarters at Dahme, where he received from Ney's aid-decamp the whole details of the disaster at Dennewitz. The emperor interrogated him closely as to all the particulars, and explained in the most lucid manner the causes of the reverse to the generals present, without giving vent to any ill-humour whatever against his lieutenant, but ascribing it all to the difficulties of the military

* Bout., 71, 72. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 106, 107. St. Cyr to Napoleon, 3, 4, 5, and Sept. 7, 1813, St. Cyr, iv., 397, 405.

* St. Cyr, iv., 140, 143. Bout., 72. Vaud., i., 176.

art, which, he said, were far from being generally understood.* He had just received the account of one of the greatest disasters of the campaign, and which, in the end, was attended with the most ruinous effects to his fortunes; and he was not only calm enough to discuss the subject, as he would have done the wars of Scipio and Hannibal, but had the magnanimity to exculpate entirely the general whose errors had had no small share in inducing it.†

Napoleon reaches the summit of the mountains, Aug. 10.

On the following morning, at daybreak, St. Cyr's corps pursued its march, and reached, without opposition, the village of Ebersdorf, on the Geyersberg—the highest point of the mountains between Saxony and Bohemia, and from the heights adjoining which the eye can discover a considerable expanse of the plains from Tœplitz towards Prague. No sooner had the emperor set foot on the frontier than he despatched a messenger to the King of Saxony, to announce that the enemy was thrown back into Bohemia, and then halted to gaze at the prospect which opened before him. Immediately at his feet descended the rapid slope of the Geyersberg, its sides, naked rocks or hanging woods, with the road, which was much cut up by the retreat of the allied troops from Dresden, descending in zigzag down the steep, till it was lost in the gulf at its feet. The artillery with extraordinary alacrity threw themselves into the hollow, and already the descent of the army had commenced, when the progress of the column was stopped by a carriage breaking down in a hollow part of the way; Drouot was sent forward to report on the passage, and he stated that it was impracticable till it was repaired. A few hours only, however, were required for that purpose, and Napoleon had himself shown, at the passages of the Landgrafensberg, the evening before the battle of Jena,* how quickly the most formidable obstacles of that description yield to the vigorous exertions of a skilful body of engineers.†

But declines to descend to Culm, or enter Bohemia.

St. Cyr eagerly pointed to the plain at the foot of the mountains, where the Russian and Prussian army were to be seen in great masses, deploying, widening, and extending, as if in preparation for an immediate attack. From the rapidity of their movements, the confusion which prevailed, and the hurrying of officers to and fro, it was evident that they expected to be instantly assailed, for which they were little prepared, and that their leaders were in great anxiety for the result, as their situation and the nature of the ground in their rear would not admit of a retreat in presence of the enemy; while a huge column of smoke, the agreed-on signal, rising from the elevated summits of the Millerschauer, the highest point of the range, told to the whole north of Bohemia that the dreaded invasion of the Franks had commenced. Prince Constantine's reserve of the guards were the first in position, next Wittgenstein's Russians, and Kleist's Prussians, formed in close array; but still there was no appearance of the Austrians, and St. Cyr strongly urged the emperor to hasten the attack, when his whole forces were at hand, and the Russians and Prussians, in a position from which they could not recede, stood alone exposed to his blows. Napoleon, who, from the elevated position which he occupied, beheld every rank, almost every man, in the hostile army, remained with the telescope at his eye, intently gazing on the enemy for above an hour; but at the end of that time he said, "I will not attack the enemy in that position, but cautiously conceal my intention: let the engineers continue to repair the road to-day and to-morrow, and suffer every one to rest in the belief that we are to have a great battle; if you are attacked on the mountain, I will support you." So saying, he returned to Pirna, much dejected at the failure of his designs, and the day after re-entered Dresden, having thereby lost the only opportunity which presented itself during the campaign of engaging on favourable terms the Russians and Prussians when detached from the Austrians.‡ Sept. 11.

The allies again attack St. Cyr when the emperor retires.

St. Cyr's sinister presentiments were not long of being verified: no sooner were the allies aware, by the cessation of the advance, that Napoleon was no longer on the summit of the Erzgebirge, than they again resumed at all points their offensive movement. Wittgenstein ascended directly towards Nollendorf, and two regiments of Russian hussars attacked, without waiting the arrival of the other troops, the French division of Dumonceau on the summit of the mountain, cut to pieces one battalion, made prisoners of another, and forced back the whole to Peterswalde, with the loss of above fifteen hundred men, which compelled St. Cyr

* Napoleon's conversation on this occasion, which is reported by St. Cyr, who was present, was very remarkable: "The emperor interrogated the officer minutely, and entered with the most imperturbable *sang-froid* into the movements of the different corps; after which he explained, in a manner equally lucid and satisfactory, the causes of the reverse, but without the slightest expression of ill-humour, or any manifestation of displeasure at Ney, or any of the generals engaged. He ascribed the whole to the difficulties of the art, which, he said, were far from being generally known. He added, that one day or other, if he had time, he would write a book on the subject, in which he would demonstrate its principles in a manner so precise that they should be within the reach of all military men, and enable them to learn the art of war as they learn any other science. I (St. Cyr) replied, that it were much to be wished that the experience of such a man should not be lost to France, but that I had always doubted whether it were practicable to form such a work, though, if any one could, it was himself; that it seemed extremely doubtful whether the longest experience or practice was the best school for learning the art of a commander; that of all the generals, whether on our own side or that of our enemies, whom we had seen at the head of the armies of Europe, in all the long wars which the French Revolution had occasioned, none appeared to have gained by experience; and that I did not make any exception in his own case, as I had always considered his first campaign in Italy as his *chef d'œuvre* in war. He said I was right, and that, considering the limited force he then had at his disposal, he regarded it as his greatest campaign; that he knew but one general who had constantly gained by experience, and that was Turenne, whose great talents were the result of profound study, and who had approached nearest to the end which he proposed to demonstrate, if, one day, he had time to compose the work which he had mentioned. That conversation was brought on by the recital of one of the greatest disasters of the campaign—a disaster attended with terrible effects to the interests of many, and of none so much as himself. He spoke, nevertheless, of it as calmly as he would have done of the affairs of China, or of Europe in the preceding century."—St. Cyr, *Histoire Militaire*, iv., 149, 150.

† St. Cyr, iv., 149, 150. Bout., 73, 74.

* *Ante*, ii., 443.

† Odel., i., 276. Fain, ii., 331. St. Cyr, iv., 157.

‡ St. Cyr, iv., 156, 158. Fain, ii., 332. Odel., i., 276, 277.

to draw back his whole corps to Gieshubel. Meanwhile, Napoleon was busied with orders for the construction of a bridge over the Elbe at Pirna, and the formation of a great series of redoubts around it, to secure the passage of the army from one bank of the Elbe to the other; as also intrenchments on a large scale near Gieshubel, to bar the entrance from Bohemia in that quarter. Everything announced a resolution to hold by the Elbe to the last extremity, and, without resuming the offensive to any considerable degree at any one point, to maintain that line as long as possible, and take advantage of any errors the enemy might commit in their operations on an immense circumference around it. During all this time, however, the troops, perched on the inhospitable summits of the Erzgebirge, were starving; the few villages which were to be met with in those elevated regions, devastated by the triple passage of armies over them, were entirely laid waste: so universal was the destruction, that it was with the utmost difficulty, and only by repairing a ruin, that quarters were got for the emperor himself in the parish manse at Breitenau; the conscripts, stretched on the cold ground, had no protection against the frosty nights and frigid dews of autumn, nor was their satisfaction increased by beholding their adversaries comfortably encamped in the rich plains of Culm and Tœplitz, and hearing the joyous sound of the *feux-de-joie* which announced the universal transport of the allied troops at the victory of Dennewitz.*

Napoleon again returns to the frontier, and repels the enemy. September 15.

No sooner was Napoleon informed that the allies were again threatening St. Cyr, and of the check experienced by Dumonceau, than he hastened, at the head of a powerful body of his guards and cuirassiers, to the frontier, and, suddenly approaching Peterswalde, fell unexpectedly, with superior forces, on a considerable body of the enemy's horse, which was defeated, and Colonel Blucher, son of the marshal, after a gallant resistance, made prisoner. On this occasion the emperor altered his line of attack: it was against the enemy's right, and ascending the course of the Elbe, that his columns were directed; Sept. 17. in consequence, he found the roads everywhere passable, and the enemy were without difficulty thrown back into the Bohemian plain. There, however, they stood firm, and took a position in the level, ready to give battle. The opportunity of striking a blow with advantage had been lost: great part of the allied army were now assembled, above seventy thousand strong, in the plain at the foot of the mountains. Zeithen, with their advanced guard, occupied a wood at the base of the hill, Wittgenstein was in Culm, Colloredo on the heights of Striegewicz in its neighbourhood, and Kleist at Siberschen; the Russian and Prussian guards in reserve between Culm and Tœplitz.†

Views of the opposite generals at this period.

Everything seemed to presage a decisive battle, and the soldiers in both armies expected it. Nevertheless, the crisis passed over with nothing more than some sharp affairs of advanced guards. In truth, the generals on both sides were desirous to avoid such an extremity: it was obviously for the interest of the allies to postpone any general engagement till the arrival of Benningsen's reserve had added sixty thousand fresh troops to their arms; and Napoleon was desirous not to descend with the bulk of his forces into the Bohemian plain, both because retreat in case of disaster was difficult back again over the mountains, and because he still thought that it was on the side of Berlin or Silesia that the decisive blow was to be struck, and that some unguarded movement on the side of the allied generals would soon enable him to deliver it with advantage. He had no fixed plan, but was on the look-out for his opportunity, and he saw clearly it was not to be found on the side of Bohemia.*†

Affair of Nollendorf, in which the French are worsted.

Desirous, however, not to depart for Dresden without having accomplished something worthy of his renown, and which might check the allies from renewing their incursions during his absence, he ordered, on the afternoon of the 17th, a partial descent into the plain and attack on the enemy's position. Zeithen, who held the post at the foot of the descent, was dislodged, and driven back towards Culm by Mouton Duvernet, and Arbesau was carried. Napoleon himself, encouraged by the success of his advanced guard, descended to Dodnitz, at the foot of the declivity, where he eagerly reconnoitred the position and strength of the enemy. An obscure haze concealed the greater part of the hostile columns: even the Chapel of Culm could not be discerned through the mist, when suddenly a terrible cannonade, loudly re-echoed from the neighbouring mountains, burst forth on the right and left; numerous batteries, placed on the heights on either side, concealed by the woods and fog, sent a storm of bullets down on the advancing columns; while the Russians in front, resuming the offensive, with loud shouts returned to the charge. Napoleon quickly retired to the heights, but the column which had advanced into the plain did not escape without very serious loss. Colloredo turned their left, and regained Arbesau at the point of the bayonet; Meerfeldt, on the right, moved direct from Aussig on Nollendorf, so as to threaten their retreat, while Wittgenstein and Zeithen fiercely assailed their rear. A thick fog, which prematurely brought on the darkness of night, alone saved the whole division which had descended into the plain from total destruction; but as it was, they did not regain the mountains without the loss of an eagle, three guns, and twelve hundred prisoners, besides an equal number killed and wounded.‡

Convinced, by the view he had now obtained of the positions and strength of the enemy, that

* Odel., i., 277, 279. Fain, ii., 333. St. Cyr, iv., 167, 168. Lond., 136.

† Bout., 77, 78. St. Cyr, iv., 169, 171. Fain, ii., 333.

* St. Cyr, iv., 173, 175. Vaud., i., 179. Bout., 78, 79.

† "Yesterday I made a reconnoissance to ascertain the force and position of the enemy; and although the debouch of Peterswalde was favourable for artillery, the declivities being gentle, the position of the enemy did not permit me to attack him. I have resolved, therefore, to hold to the system of *va et vient*, and to await my opportunity."—NAPOLEON *to* ST. CYR, *18th September*, 1813, ST. CYR, iv., 421.

‡ Vaud., i., 179. Lond., 138. Bout., 78, 79. Odel., i., 282, 284. Fain, ii., 334.

Napoleon marches again against Blucher.

nothing was to be made of an attack on the side of Bohemia, and conceiving that the allies were so situated and scattered that they could not make any formidable attack on the French position on the mountains, at least for some days,* Napoleon returned to Pirna, and from thence to Dresden. After a few hours' rest there, he continued his march with his guards and cuirassiers across the Elbe, to check the incursions of Blucher, who, taking advantage of the emperor's absence, was now driving Macdonald before him, and had already occupied Bautzen and extended himself along the line of the Spree. Napoleon arrived in front of the enemy, whose advanced posts were in the wood of Hartau. He immediately mounted on horseback, and a skirmish ensued, in the course of which the village of Goldbach became the prey of the flames. That night the emperor slept at a miserable hamlet near Hartau, with only a part of his guards around him; the greater part, unable to bear up against the incessant fatigue of so many marches and countermarches, which led to nothing, had fallen behind.†

Sept. 21.

Sept. 22.

Returns to Dresden without effecting anything.

The utmost melancholy prevailed at his headquarters. The campaign seemed endless: the troops, worn out by incessant fatigue and the severest privations, had lost much of their former spirit; fatigue, sickness, and the sword of the enemy, had in an extraordinary degree thinned their ranks; and the generals could not conceal from themselves that the French army, daily hemmed in within a more contracted circle, and diminishing in numbers, was no longer able to resume the offensive with a prospect of success at any point. On the following day the emperor seemed, what was most unusual to him, a prey to indecision: Blucher's army was drawn up in order of battle, but he did not venture to attack him; and after remaining under arms for the whole forenoon, gallopod at ten in the evening towards Neustadt, where a body of Austrians and Russians, under General Neipperg, was engaged in a skirmish with Lauriston, previous to their retiring into Bohemia. Next day, feeling himself too weak to resume the offensive in any direction, he returned to Dresden; and, being sensible of the necessity of contracting his circle of operations, withdrew Macdonald's army to Weissig, within two leagues of that capital, thereby, in effect, abandoning the whole right bank of the Elbe to the allies. On the morning of that day there was a dreadful storm, accompanied with loud peals of thunder: an unusual circumstance so late in the season, and when the chill of winter was already felt, which, combined with the state of the emperor's fortunes, was deemed by many ominous of his fall.‡

Sept. 24.

While these indecisive but important operations were going on in Saxony and on the Bohemian frontier, a serious partisan warfare had sprung up in the rear of the French army towards Leipsic and Westphalia. Secure in their mountain stronghold of Bohemia, the allied sovereigns wisely resolved to take advantage of their great superiority in light horse to threaten the French communications, and seize their convoys on the roads to the Rhine. With this view, Schwartzenberg advanced Klenau's corps to Freyberg, where he made four hundred prisoners; from whence Thielman, with three thousand horse, was detached to scour the country towards Leipsic, while Mensdorf, with two thousand, beset the road from Dresden and Torgau towards that city. Thielman at first had considerable success. He attacked and destroyed, near Weissenfels, a large convoy of ammunition destined for the use of the Grand Army, made prisoners of five hundred men in Merseberg, and spread alarm through the whole of Western Saxony. Lefebvre Desnouettes, however, now took the field with eight thousand *chasseurs à cheval* and cavalry of the Guard, and coming up with Thielman, near Merseberg, defeated him with considerable loss, and obliged him to retire towards Zwickau, after abandoning his prisoners. This check, however, had no other effect than that of calling forth Platoff, who issued from Bohemia with seven thousand Cossacks and Austrian horse, two days after, and, directing his march to Altenberg, where Lefebvre Desnouettes lay, wholly unconscious of the impending danger, attacked him with such vigour, that he was quickly driven back to Zeitz. The French general, however, was effecting his retreat by echelon in good order, while still pressed by Platoff in rear, when he was attacked by Thielman, who had rallied after his check, and totally defeated with the loss of five guns and fifteen hundred prisoners: a blow the more sensibly felt, that it fell on some of the best corps of cavalry in the French army.*

Partisan warfare in the rear of the French.

Sept. 10.

Sept. 11.

Sept. 18.

Sept. 24.

Sept. 26.

Sept. 28.

Operations of a still more important character were undertaken at the same period by the army of the prince royal in the north of Germany. Slowly advancing forward, after his important victory at Dennewitz, Bernadotte at length moved his headquarters, a week after the battle, to Coswig, in the direction of the Elbe, and on the 15th he had got as far as Zerbst, while his vanguard was at Dessau on the Elbe. Bulow, meanwhile, laid siege to Wittenberg. The operations were pushed forward with great vigour, and on the 24th the suburbs were carried: under cover of a heavy bombardment, which set the town on fire in many different places, the second parallel was opened, and everything announced that, if not relieved, it could not hold out for any considerable time. Ney, who commanded now only two corps, not numbering above fifty thousand combatants (Oudinot's corps having been dissolved, and its remains incorporated with the two others since the disaster of Dennewitz), was in no condition to raise the siege; and a

Commencement of the siege of Wittenberg.

Sept. 15.

Sept. 24.

* On the morning of the 18th, when the mist had cleared away, Napoleon ascended an eminence, and long gazed through his telescope at the columns of the enemy. "All that I can see," said he to Berthier, "forms, perhaps, two corps of 60,000 men: they will require more than one day before they can unite and attack. Let us return to Pirna."—FAIN, ii., 334.

† Fain, ii., 336. Odel., i., 287, 288. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 110, 111.

‡ Odel., i., 287, 289. Jom., iv., 431. Fain, ii., 335, 336. Bout., 83.

* Lond., 141, 142. Bout., 84, 85. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 112.

movement which he made from Torgau, to clear the left bank of the Elbe of some of the allied parties who had begun to infest it, had no other effect but to make them withdraw within the *tête-du-pont* at Dessau, which he did not feel himself in sufficient strength to attack.*

Meanwhile, Chernicheff, with more than his wonted boldness and address, carried the partisan warfare, with the most signal success, into the heart of Westphalia. Detached with three thousand horse from the army of the North, this indefatigable leader crossed the Elbe at Dessau, and, pushing with great celerity across Germany, reached Cassel, the capital of the kingdom of Westphalia, in the end of September. Jerome, with the few troops which the necessities of the emperor had left him for the defence of his capital, made a precipitate retreat without firing a shot; and Chernicheff immediately made his entry into the city at the head of his Cossacks, amid the vociferous applause of the people, and proclaimed the dissolution of the kingdom of Westphalia. Symptoms of insurrection against the French authorities were immediately manifested; the students flocked in hundreds to be enrolled in battalions of volunteers; crowds assembled in the streets loudly demanding arms, and the flame rapidly spread into all the villages in the neighbourhood. But the Russian commander, being destitute of infantry and artillery, was unable to maintain the advanced position which he had gained; and, after remaining in the capital a week, he was obliged, by the approach of a considerable body of French troops, to evacuate it and retire across the Elbe. He regained the right bank of that river, however, as he had effected his advance, without losing a man, taking with him in triumph the stores of the arsenal, the royal horses and carriages, and an immense store of booty beneath the saddles of his Cossacks. But the moral effect of this blow far exceeded these predatory gains: the brother of Napoleon had been put to flight from his capital, his dethronement pronounced, and all but effected by a foreign partisan; and a dangerous example given to the world of the facility with which these oppressive military thrones, destitute of all support from the interests or affections of the people, might be swept from the earth the moment the military power which upheld them was overturned. The effect, accordingly, of this stroke was soon felt through the whole north of Germany: already a Saxon battalion had come over from the camp of Marshal Ney to that of the prince royal; the remainder was only prevented by their personal regard for their sovereign, and the energetic appeals which he made to their military honour, from following the example; and more than one Westphalian battalion, after the surrender of Cassel, took the first opportunity of passing over from their fugitive monarch to the ranks of German freedom.†

Great success of Chernicheff in Westphalia.

Sept. 30.

Sept. 27.

Operations, also, of minor importance, but still of great local interest, had, during the same period, taken place on the Lower Elbe. The forces there were very nearly matched: Davoust having above thirty thousand men under his command at Hamburg, and Walmoden thirty-five thousand on the outside of its walls. Neither party, for some time after hostilities were resumed, made any considerable movements; but at length Davoust issued forth on the right bank of the Elbe, and moved towards Berlin. Lauenberg was early attacked by a battalion of French infantry, and the partisan corps of Jutzon expelled. Walmoden, whose forces were injudiciously scattered, had not troops adequate at any one point to restrain the enemy; and the consequence was, that he was compelled, though superior in numbers upon the whole, to fall back towards Grabow, leaving his right wing, composed of Swedes under Vegesack, seriously endangered. Davoust's instructions, however, were to await the result of Oudinot's advance at that period to Berlin; and he remained, therefore, inactive at Schwerin, till the defeat of Gross Beeren having rendered the projected combined movement against the Prussian capital impossible, he made the best of his way back to the Elbe. In doing so, the Danes under his command separated from the French, the former retiring to Lubeck, and the latter to the lines in front of Hamburg.*

Operations of Davoust and Walmoden on the Lower Elbe.

Aug. 19.

Aug. 30.

Though this sortie of the French from Hamburg was attended with no material results, and, by leading to the dislocation of the French and Danish forces, was rather hurtful than beneficial to their ranks, yet it opened the eyes of the allied generals to the necessity of strengthening the force which observed the enemy's operations in that quarter. With this view, twenty thousand of the landwehr of Mecklenburg and Swedish Pomerania were called out, who did good service by rendering disposable a much larger portion of Walmoden's regular forces than he had hitherto been able to bring into the field. The beneficial effects of this arrangement were soon conspicuous. One of his light squadrons, which scoured the left bank of the Elbe, having intercepted a despatch from the French marshal to the governor of Magdebourg, in which he announced his intention of despatching the division Pecheux from Hamburg to re-enforce the garrison of that fortress, which was threatened with a siege after the route of Dennewitz, the Prussian general immediately took measures to intercept and destroy it. For this purpose, leaving Vegesack with the Swedes and landwehr of Mecklenburg in the environs of Schwerin to observe Davoust, he himself set out with the flower of his army, sixteen thousand strong, for Doernitz, where, with surprising celerity, he had thrown a bridge of boats across the Elbe, and, having crossed the river, came up with Pecheux, who had six thousand men and eight pieces of cannon, at the village of Goerda, near Dannenberg. There the French were speedily assailed by forces twice as numerous as their own, and totally defeated; the general and eighteen hundred men made prisoners, the whole guns and caissons taken, and twelve hundred killed and wounded, while the allies

Walmoden destroys the French division Pecheux.

Sept. 16.

* Bout., 80, 81. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 109, 110.
† Fain, ii., 357, 359. Bout., 84, 85. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 113. Vaud., i., 182, 183.

* Bout., 85, 87. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 113, 114. Vaud., i., 186, 187.

lost only eight hundred men. Having gained this brilliant success, Walmoden instantly re-crossed the Elbe to oppose Davoust, who was greatly superior to the forces left to observe him; and with such secrecy and skill were the operations conducted, that he was back, like the Consul Nero in the war with Hannibal, before the enemy were aware of his absence.*

Reasons which now compelled a change of the seat of war by Napoleon.

Matters had now arrived at that pass with Napoleon, that a change of position, and an alteration of his line of action, had become indispensable. With equal judgment and ability, he had taken every possible advantage of the fortified line of the Elbe; and by means of the skilful use of his bridges over that river, and his interior line of communications, he had long, with inferior forces, maintained his ground in the heart of Germany. By so doing, he had preserved his ascendency over the states of the Rhenish Confederacy longer than in any other way could have been practicable, and kept at bay forces of the allies by which, under any other system of operations, he would in all probability have been crushed. But the time had now arrived when this defensive system could no longer be maintained. Rich as the agricultural productions of Saxony are, they were by this time entirely consumed by the enormous multitudes of men and horses who had so long been quartered on its territory; and the contracted circle within which, on all sides, the French armies now stood, rendered it totally impossible for any farther subsistence to be extracted from the soil; while the increasing audacity and strength of the allied cavalry made any supply from the rear to the last degree precarious. Not only had all the towns and villages around Dresden been long ago exhausted by the triple scourge of quartering, pillage, and contributions, but the forage was everywhere totally consumed, the stack-yards emptied, the houses burned or in ruins; while the fields of potatoes in the rural districts, in some cases ten times turned over in search of food, told to what shifts the countless swarms of troops of all nations, by whom they had been trodden, had been reduced.* On the small town of Pirna, already reduced to despair by previous exactions, the crushing burden of six thousand rations a day was imposed in the end of September; while such were the necessities or cupidity of the soldiers, when quartered in the villages between it and Dresden, that not only were the wooden crosses, erected by the piety of former ages over the places of interment, torn up and burned for firewood, but the graves themselves were opened, the coffins broken and dragged up, the bones and corpses scattered about, the very shrouds and dead-clothes they contained, with the garlands of flowers found on once loved hearts,‡ seized by avaricious hands, and sold to the miscreants who followed the army to profit by its excesses.

Deplorable condition of the French in Dresden, Torgau, and the fortresses of the Elbe.

Deplorable as was the condition of the troops in the environs of Dresden, from the total ruin of the country, and the excessive privations to which they were exposed, their lot was enviable compared to that of a great part of the soldiers who were accumulated in the towns. The latter had warmth and lodging, indeed, but they were often dearly purchased amid the accumulated horrors of famine, contagion, and mortality. The immense number of wounded who had been brought into the hospitals of that city since the campaign recommenced, had not only filled all the public establishments, but a great number of private houses, with the sick and the maimed; and although death had fearfully thinned their ranks, often at the rate of two hundred a day, yet fifteen thousand were still heaped together in such a state of misery as to engender the never-failing accompaniment of human wo, a typhus fever of the most malignant kind. In this state of wretchedness they were when the general retreat of the army from Silesia and the Bohemian frontier, in the end of September, suddenly filled the city with thirty thousand fresh troops, besides twice as many quartered in the environs, upward of two thirds of whom were in a state of the most deplorable destitution. The accumulation of men and horses in a narrow space, and consequent spread of contagion, were then prodigiously augmented. In vain the most severe orders were issued by the emperor—one in particular, that every tenth marauder should be shot—to arrest the progress of disbanding and wandering on the part of the troops; the necessities of their situation, the confusion which prevailed, the thirst for gain and enjoyment, with the continual prospect of death before their eyes, rendered the men utterly indifferent to all such precautions.* The distribution of rations of meat had become rare; those of bread were reduced a half, and nearly the whole army, with the exception of the guards, were compelled to forage individually for their own subsistence. This system, which did admirably well as long as the French armies were continually advancing, under the guidance of victory, to hitherto untouched fields of plunder, told against them with crushing, but well-deserved severity, now that they were thrown back by defeat upon the exhausted theatre of former devastation. It was the counterpart of the compulsory retreat by the wasted line of the Smolensko road.†

Orders of Sept. 5.

Often a hundred men were crowded together in huts intended only for a single family, and that of the humblest rank; men and horses,

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 114, 115. Bout., 88, 89. Vaud., i., 187, 188.

† "Not a vestige of forage was to be got for the horses. The frontier villages were all in ruins. All the houses not built of stone were torn to pieces for the fires of the bivouacs. All the environs bore the impress of the ravages of war. The earth in the fields, which had been ten times turned over, was again carefully searched for the few potatoes which might have escaped the eye of former plunder."—*Témoin Oculaire in* ODELEBEN, ii., 278.

‡ Témoin Oculaire, ii., 196, 197. Odel., i., 268, 269, 278. St. Cyr, iv., 177, 178.

* "The recent movements of the Grand Army had entirely exhausted the last resources of the country; and the soldier, having no longer the excitement of combats to distract his misery, felt it the more keenly. To all verbal complaints on this head, the answer always was, 'Cause the commissary to be shot, and you will want for nothing.' To the written reclamations an invitation was given to apply for orders or decorations, being more easy to supply than bread. At this moment, the emperor sent a decree by which the town of Pirna, at that moment at the lowest point of misery itself, should furnish us with six thousand rations of bread a day."—ST. CYR, iv., 178.

† Odel., ii., 196, 197 Tém. Oculaire.

soldiers and marauders, camp-followers and prostitutes, were shut up together, half famished, and eagerly snatching from each other the plunder which they had wrenched from the miserable inhabitants. Even the hospitals of the insane had been seized on for lodging, and the lunatics turned out, without the slightest means of subsistence, in pursuance of Napoleon's inhuman order, "to turn out the mad."* The wonted spirit of the soldiers was entirely broken by the sombre aspect and protracted fatigues of the campaign, and, above all, the exhausting marches and countermarches which came to no result. Their discontent broke out in open murmurs, and their despondency exhaled in bitter and graphic terms in their correspondence with their relations in France, great part of which was taken by the partisan corps in the rear, and fell into the hands of the allies.† It may be conceived how the bonds of discipline were relaxed, how the progress of contagion was accelerated, among multitudes thus cooped up together, under circumstances of such physical privation and mental depression. The diminution experienced in the effective force of the French army from these causes was far greater than that occasioned by capture or the sword of the enemy. From official documents, it appears that the total number of military inmates who were quartered on the inhabitants of Dresden and its suburbs, from the 15th of June to the 15th of November in this year, amounted to the enormous, and, if not proved by authentic evidence, incredible number of 5,062.871 different persons,‡ a result which can only be explained by recollecting how frequently armies of a hundred thousand men, with their followers, passed through its gates during that disastrous period; while, from equally certain evidence, it is proved that the military force at the disposal of Napoleon, which, when the armistice was broken, amounted to nearly three hundred and sixty thousand men present with the eagles, had, by the end of September, a period of only six weeks, sunk down to less than two hundred thousand combatants.§‖

Dreadful effects of these causes on the French army.

On the other hand, the condition of the allies, since the struggle commenced, had sensibly ameliorated. They had lost, indeed, by sickness, prisoners, and the sword, above eighty thousand men since hostilities were renewed; but this number, great as it was, would be nearly replaced by Benningsen's army, which was now advancing by rapid strides across Silesia, and which crossed the Elbe on the 25th, and reached Tœplitz in the beginning of October. Their troops were incomparably more healthy than the French. With the exception of the advance to Dresden in the end of August, when the fatigue had been excessive, the soldiers had not been exposed to any considerable hardships. Comfortably hutted or lodged in Bohemia, the Grand Allied Army was able, by the advance of a few corps to a short distance on the frontier, to put the flower of the French troops in motion, and bring back Napoleon's guards, in breathless haste, from the extremity of Silesia to the summit of the Erzgebirge. Their wants, purveyed for by the wealth of England in the immense circle of Germany in their rear, were amply supplied. rations were regularly served out to the men; and the necessity of providing for their own wants, so fatal to military discipline and subordination, was almost unknown. The enthusiastic spirit and signal success of the troops preserved them from mental depression; the sick and wounded were attended to in the rear, where contagion was not fostered by multitudes, and the kindly feelings of the peasantry alleviated the evils they had undergone; while the universal exhilaration and spirit which prevailed served as a balm to the wounds of those who had been injured, and sent them back in an incredibly short time to the ranks of war.*

The arrival of Benningsen's army at Tœplitz, where it was reviewed on the 1st of October, and found in a very efficient state, along with the accession of eight thousand Prussians to Kleist's corps, raised the Russian and Prussian armies in Bohemia, after all their losses, to eighty thousand effective men in the field, exclusive of the Austrians, who were full seventy thousand. This was the signal for the recommencement of great operations. The allied sovereigns were at first inclined to have gone into Schwartzenberg's plan, which was to have called Blucher's army, as well as that of Benningsen, into Bohemia, and acted by one line, by Kommotau and Chemnitz, on Leipsic, so as to intercept altogether the communications of the French army, and compel them to fight their way through two hundred and thirty thousand men back to the Rhine. But, independent of the consideration that this would have left on Bernadotte's hands a force which he would not attempt to resist, if the enemy chose to cross the Elbe with all his forces, and carry the war into the hitherto untouched fields of Prussia, whereby Berlin would inevitably be taken, difficulties all but insuperable were experienced, when the proposal was mooted to place Blucher and the Silesian army under the immediate direction of the Austrian commander-in-chief. They had hitherto done very well at a distance, and when each obeyed the commands of his respective sovereign, but it was very doubtful whether this harmony would continue if they were brought into immediate and personal collision: little cordial co-operation could be expected from the hussar-like energy of the Prussian veteran and the methodical circumspection of the Austrian commander; and Blucher himself, whose opinion, age, and great services were entitled to re-

Plan of the allies at this period.

* "Depuis plusieurs mois il y avait à Sonnenstein, près de Pirna, une maison de santé pour les insensés. Le 14 Sept. elle fut tout à coup evacuée et convertie en une forteresse. Le directeur de l'établissement obtenait pour toute réponse du chef suprême, 'Qu'on chasse les fous.' Le major chargé de prendre possession du chateau, rendit encore plus dure par la rigeur du mésures qu'il prit, l'exécution de cet act de violence."—ODELEBEN, *Témoin Oculaire*, ii., 200.

† The following are a few of the extracts: "Two years in succession of such torments exceed the limits of human strength." Another: "I am worn out with this life; continually exposed to fatigue and danger, without any appearance of a termination." A third: "Louis is there, wounded and a prisoner; this, then, is the end of military honours; this the issue of our prosperity." A fourth: "Such a one has been killed: if this continue, every one will be killed: such as survive one campaign will be cut down in the next."—FAIN, ii., 374, 375.

‡ See App., A, chap. lxxi., and ODELEBEN, *Témoin Oculaire*, 287. § Odel., ii., 196, 197. Lond., 140.

‖ See App., B, chap. lxxi.—Lord BURGHERSH'S *War in Germany*, 316, App., No. ii.

* Lond., 139, 140. Bout., 88.

spect, had expressed his disinclination to any such arrangement. It was, therefore, resolved to descend with the Grand Army of Bohemia and Benningsen's corps alone into the plains of Leipsic; and to unite Blucher's army to that of the prince royal, which would form a mass of a hundred and fifty thousand men, capable, it was hoped, either of arresting any advance of the enemy in the direction of Berlin, or of co-operating in a general and decisive attack on his forces in the Saxon plains.*

Movements of Blucher across the Elbe in conformity with this plan of operations.

The different corps of the allies forthwith received orders in conformity to these views. Blucher, as usual, was the first in motion. Leaving the division of Prince Czerbatow at Bautzen to cover Lusatia from the incursions of the garrison of Dresden, he marched with the remainder of his forces, about sixty-five thousand strong, towards the Elbe, and reached Elsterwerda, while the French corps there crossed at Meissen. To deceive the enemy, he caused Sacken's advanced guard to attack the bridge-head at that place; and, while their attention was forcibly drawn to that point, he himself marched rapidly by Hertsberg and Jessen, and on the night of the 2d of October reached the Elbe, at the mouth of the Schwartze-Elster. Bridges were thrown across with incredible expedition; and such was the activity of all concerned in the operation, and the admirable arrangements made for its completion, that by six next morning half the army was across without experiencing the slightest opposition. Bertrand's corps, however, eighteen thousand strong, was strongly intrenched at Wartenberg, at a short distance from the river, and Blucher could not advance without forcing this position. He commenced the attack, accordingly, at eight o'clock, with the troops which had effected the passage; and, after six hours' hard fighting, drove the enemy from their position, with the loss of six hundred prisoners and an equal number killed and wounded, though the loss of the Prussians, who were alone engaged, was hardly less considerable. On the following day, the remainder of the army effected its passage without opposition, and Blucher, moving forward, established his headquarters at Duben.†

October 2.

October 3.

Movements of Bernadotte and Schwartzenberg.

At the same time, the Prince Royal of Sweden crossed the Elbe without any resistance, the Russians at Ackow, the Swedes at Rosslau, where headquarters were immediately established. His advanced posts were pushed forward, so as to enter into communication with Blucher from Duben; and on the day following Bulow and Tauenzein were also crossed over, leaving Thumen only, with fourteen thousand men, to continue the siege or blockade of Wittenberg. Ney, whose army was so reduced that he had under his immediate command only Regnier's corps, now not more than twelve thousand strong, was in no condition to make head against forces so considerable: he therefore evacuated Dessau, and retreated by Bitterfeldt towards Leipsic, summoning Bertrand to join his standard. At the same time, the Grand Allied Army began to defile by its left through the mountains, to penetrate into Saxony by the route of Sebastiansberg and Chemnitz. Colloredo remained at Tœplitz, to guard the magazines there, and Benningsen continued in the same place, but for a few days only, to rest his soldiers after their long march across Germany. The reserve of that army, under Prince Labanoff, presented striking marks of the prodigious efforts which Russia had made to recruit her forces: a great number of Tartars and Baschirs were to be found in its ranks, who had come from the Lake Baikal and the frontiers of China, and some of whom were armed with their primitive weapons of bows and arrows. On the 3d of October, the advanced guard, under Klenau, reached Chemnitz, where it was attacked, at first with success, by Prince Poniatowsky at the head of his gallant Poles; but the indefatigable Platoff appeared on the flank of the victors as they were pursuing their advantages, and compelled them to make a precipitate retreat to Mittwerda. Next day the headquarters were advanced to Marienberg: a hundred thousand men had already entered the Saxon plains, while a hundred and thirty thousand had crossed the Elbe, under Blucher and Bernadotte, to encircle the French emperor.*

October 6.

October 1.

October 4.

Napoleon's views at this period

While the vast armies of the allies, acting upon an immense circle, and directed by consummate judgment, were thus drawing round the French army, and preparing to crush it in the position it had so long maintained on the banks of the Elbe, Napoleon, for the first time in his life, remained without any fixed plan, and watching merely the course of events to select his point of attack. When he first regained Dresden, after his last abortive expedition against Blucher, he said, "I will not go out again: I will wait;" and, in effect, he rested on his oars for ten days, constantly expecting his enemies to commit some fault, which would give him an opportunity of striking with effect. He summoned up Augereau with his newly-raised corps, about fifteen thousand strong, to Leipsic from Mayence, where it had barely completed its military formation. Meanwhile, however, the losses sustained by the partisan warfare in his rear, and the frightful progress of famine and disease in Dresden, Torgau, and the other fortresses on the Elbe, rendered it indispensable for the French army to move: the emperor had no alternative but to do so, or see his army melt away and sink to the last stage of weakness before his eyes without firing a shot. The rapid march of Blucher to the Elbe; the movements of the Grand Army towards Kommotau and Chemnitz; the passage of the Elbe by Bernadotte at Rosslau—all indicated a determination on the part of the allies to hem him in on every side, and possibly renew on the banks of the Elbe the catastrophe of the Beresina. Napoleon felt his danger; and calling St. Cyr to his cabinet at midnight on the 6th of October, he thus expressed himself upon the prospects of the campaign.†

"I am going to leave Dresden," said he, "and I will take Vandamme's and your own corps

* Jom., iv., 432, 433. Bout., 92. Lond., 142.
† Bout., 93, 94. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 118, 119. Jom., iv., 433.

* Bout., 95, 96. Jom., iv., 433. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 119. Fain, ii., 363, 366. † St. Cyr, iv., 178, 185.

His admirable views expressed to St. Cyr.

with me. I am certainly about to engage in a decisive battle: if I gain it, I shall regret not having had my whole forces at my disposal to profit by it; if, on the other hand, I experience a reverse, you will be of no use to me in the battle; and, shut up here, you will be lost without resource. Besides, what is Dresden now to me? It can no longer be considered as the pivot of the army, which is unable to find subsistence in the exhausted country which surrounds it. As little can it be considered as a great depôt, for there remain in it only provisions for a few days: almost all the stores of ammunition are exhausted, and what little remains may be distributed among the soldiers. There are at Dresden twelve thousand sick or wounded; but they will almost all die, being the remains of sixty thousand who have entered the hospitals since the opening of the campaign. When winter sets in, the Elbe no longer affords a position: being frozen, it can be passed at every point. I am about to take up another position, which is defensible at every point. I will throw back my right as far as Erfurth, support my left by Magdebourg, and my centre by the heights forming the left bank of the Saale, which form a material bulwark, at all times capable of arresting an enemy. Magdebourg will become to me another Dresden: it is a noble fortress, which can be left as long as necessary to its own resources, without the risk of seeing it carried, as Dresden might have been during the three days that the allies were before its suburbs, if they had been commanded by a man of capacity. Dresden can never be made a strong place without destroying the vast suburbs which at present constitute the chief part of that beautiful capital. In addition to this, it would require to be re-stored with ammunition and provisions, and it is now impossible to introduce them. In fine, I wish to change my position. Dresden is too near Bohemia: no sooner have I left it, even upon the shortest expedition, than the enemy are before its walls; and I have not the means of preventing that by threatening their rear. By the more distant position which I propose to take, I will be in a situation to direct great strokes against them, and force them to a durable peace."* St. Cyr expressed his entire concurrence in these lucid and masterly opinions; and he was dismissed with the assurance that next morning he would receive the requisite formal order for the destruction of the blockhouses, palisades, and exterior fortifications of Dresden, and the evacuation of its stores upon Magdebourg.

Napoleon alters his plan, sets out to join Ney, and leaves St. Cyr at Dresden. October 7.

Early next morning, Napoleon set out from Dresden, and had a conference with Murat at Meissen; but, instead of then following out the plan he had formed, and transmitting the instructions he had promised to St. Cyr for the evacuation of the capital, he totally altered his views, transmitted orders to that general to hold it to the last extremity, and placed under his orders his own and the remains of Vandamme's corps, about thirty thousand sabres and bayonets, besides twelve thousand sick and wounded, who encumbered the hospitals. With the bulk of his forces the emperor marched to the northward, with the intention of joining the army of Ney in the vicinity of Torgau, and resuming his favourite project of an attack on Berlin; not without the hope that he would succeed, with his army in a central position between Bernadotte and Blucher, in separating the one of these commanders from the other, and beating them both in succession. To cover his communications, and keep in check the Grand Allied Army, which was now fast issuing from Bohemia towards Leipsic, by Marienburg and Chemnitz, he detached Murat, with fifty thousand men, composed of the corps of Victor, Lauriston, and Poniatowsky, to Freyberg, with instructions to retard the advance of the enemy as long as possible, and, when he could no longer keep his ground, retire towards Leipsic and the Upper Mulda.* The Imperial Guard and cavalry, with Macdonald's and Marmont's corps, followed the standards of the emperor; and, joined to the corps of Oudinot, Bertrand, and Regnier, under Ney, would form a mass of a hundred and twenty five thousand men, with which he proposed to strike the redoubtable blows which he meditated in the direction of Berlin. The King of Saxony, with his family and court, left Dresden in the suite of the emperor: it was a mournful sight when the long train of carriages, amid the tears of the inhabitants, defiled through the streets, and the sovereign, leaving his beloved capital to the horrors of an inevitable siege, set out a suppliant or a captive in the iron ranks of war.†‡

Dresden is left to St. Cyr, and surrounded by the enemy.

The rapid evacuation of the right bank of the Elbe, in pursuance of these orders for the concentration of the army, prevented the execution to the letter of the rigorous orders of Napoleon, which were "to carry off all the cattle, burn the woods, and destroy the fruit-trees." The officers intrusted with the execution of this inhuman order found various excuses, and, in general, had not time to execute instructions which would have reduced a large part of Saxony, where they had been treated with so much hospitality, to a desert wilderness. The rapid approach of the allied armies, who covered the whole right bank of the river, and were already descending from the Bohemian Hills by Pirna and Sonnenstein, threw back the numerous swarm of stragglers whom the French had left behind them. Dresden was speedily invested on all sides, and numerous covered boats, laden

* St. Cyr, iv., 186, 188.

* Napoleon's instructions to Murat, which explained his views at this period, were in these terms: "I have raised the siege of Wittenberg: I have separated the corps of Sacken from that of Langeron and D'York: Augereau this evening will be at Lutzen or Leipsic, and Arrighi has orders to join him, which will bring you a re-enforcement of at least 30,000 men. One of two things will happen: either I will attack the enemy to-morrow and beat him, or, if he retires, I will burn the bridges over the Elbe. Then you will do what you can to preserve Leipsic, so as to give me time to beat the army of Silesia; but if you are obliged to quit Leipsic, you should direct your course to the Mulda: the bridges of Duben and Eulenburg are guarded. My intention is to pass over to the right bank of the Elbe, and to manœuvre between Magdebourg and Dresden, debouching by one of my four places on that river to surprise the enemy."—See Jomini's *Vie de Napoleon*, iv., 435, 436.

† Fain, ii., 366, 367. Norvin's Recueil de 1813, ii., 371, 372. Jom., iv., 434. Odel., ii., 210, 211.

‡ Napoleon's notes on the position of the French and the allies, and the different plans which he had entertained for the conduct of the campaign at this critical juncture, are very curious and instructive.—See APPENDIX C, chapter lxxi.; and NORVIN's *Recueil de* 1813, ii., 366.

with crowds of sick and wounded, in the last stage of weakness and contagion, were daily arriving within its walls. Nothing could be more revolting than the conduct of the French military to these miserable wretches, when there was no longer any prospect of their being serviceable in the campaign. A soldier in the last stage of dysentery was found lying by the roadside, almost buried in a dunghill, and uttering the most piteous cries. One said, in passing, "That is no business of ours;" another, "I have no orders on the subject." An officer passed by, and exclaimed, "He is not to be pitied—he is about to die."*

Napoleon advances against Blucher, who joins Bernadotte.

As soon as Napoleon was informed of the passage of the Elbe by the prince royal, he moved forward to interpose between his army and that of Silesia, and, if possible, crush one or other before any assistance could be obtained. With this view, he pushed on at the head of a hundred and twenty-five thousand men. The French army, being concentrated, had the fairest prospect of falling on the detached columns of Blucher's army, which were marching across from the Elbe, in the direction of Bernadotte's forces. Langeron and D'York alone were at the headquarters at Duben, Sacken being between Eulenburg and Torgau. So late was the Prussian general of receiving information of the approach of danger, that it was only by a sudden decision and immediate movement that he extricated himself from his peril-
Oct. 9. ous situation. On the 9th he passed the Mulda, and, by forced marches, joined Bernadotte with all his forces, late on the even-
Oct. 10. ing of the 10th, at Zoerbig. On the same day Napoleon established his headquarters at Duben, which Blucher had left the morning before.† So near was Sacken being cut off, that, in following the wake of Blucher towards Duben on the evening of the 9th, he found the town already occupied by the French advanced guard, and only got on by filing to his right, and making a detour by the village of Sokana, where he passed the night.

The allies march to the west, and pass Napoleon, who prepares to cross the Elbe and invade Prussia.

The decisive crisis was now approaching: every moment was precious; the fate of Europe hung in the balance, suspended almost even; a feather would make it incline either way. Both parties now adopted equally bold resolutions; and it was hard to say which would be first pierced to the heart in the desperate thrusts that were about to be exchanged. Each army had passed the other, and lay in great strength upon his opponent's communications: Blucher and Bernadotte, at Zoerbig, were between Napoleon and
Oct. 10. the Rhine, while he, at Duben, was between them and the Elbe. Both thought that, by threatening their adversary's communications, they would draw him back, or reduce him to the defensive, and both acted on this
Oct. 11. principle. On the 11th, the prince royal and Blucher, leaving Thumen before Wittenberg, and Tauenzein at Dessau, to guard the passage of the Elbe, instead of returning towards the Elbe, marched still farther to the southwest, and established themselves at Halle and Rothenburg, directly between Napoleon and the Rhine, and in such a situation that they could open up a communication across the plain of Saxony with the Grand Army descending from Bohemia. Napoleon, on his part, pushed forward Regnier to Wittenberg, and Ney to Dessau. The former, with the aid of the garrison of the besieged fortress, speedily raised the siege of Wittenberg, and drove Thumen, who commanded the blockading force, before him towards Rosslau; while Tauenzein, finding himself in no condition to make head against Ney at Dessau, fell back, with considerable loss, to the same place, and, after breaking down the bridge over the Elbe, continued his re-
Oct. 12. treat by Zerbot, towards Potsdam and Berlin. Napoleon was highly elated with these advantages, and, seeing the road to that capital open before him, entertained the project of carrying the war into the heart of the Prussian territory, rallying to his standard the besieged garrisons on the Oder, and establishing his winter-quarters, supported by Torgau, Magdebourg, and Wittenberg, in the hitherto untouched fields of Northern Germany.*†

False movement of Bernadotte towards the Elbe.

Although, however, Napoleon did not prosecute his projected movement upon Berlin, and even withdrew Regnier back to Wittenberg, yet his demonstrations against that capital had the effect of withdrawing Bernadotte from his true line of operations, and endangering in the last degree the army of Silesia. On the 12th of October, he detached himself from Blucher, recrossed the Saale, and moved back towards the Elbe as far as Coethen. The forces under his command, however, as Tauenzein was on the other side of that river, did not exceed fifty thousand combatants, with which he could never have hoped to stop Napoleon at the head of a hundred and twenty thousand; while the separation seriously endangered Blucher, whose communications were now entirely cut off, and who had lost a considerable part of his baggage by the operation of the French light horse on his rear. Bernadotte's true policy would have been to have continued united to Blucher, who had so gallantly made his way to him through many dangers across the Elbe; and their united force, a hundred and thirty thousand strong, might not only have bid defiance to Napoleon, but would have entirely cut him off from the Rhine, and rendered his retreat to France, or even Holland, impossible.‡

Advance of the Grand Allied Army towards Leipsic. October 6.

Meanwhile, however, the Grand Allied Army was not idle. Issuing from the defiles of the Bohemian Mountains, Klenau, on the extreme left, pushed as far as Penig on the 6th, on the direct road to Leipsic, while Wittgenstein, on the right, reached Altenburg on the

* Tém. Oeul., ii., 212, 213. Odel., ii., 223.
† Bout., 97, 98. Jom., iv., 436, 437. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 120, 121. Fain, ii., 369, 370.

* Bout., 98, 99. Napoleon to St. Cyr, Oct. 10, 1813, Jom., iv., 436. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 120, 121. Vaud., i., 196, 197.
† Napoleon at this period wrote to St. Cyr: "I have raised the siege of Wittenberg; the army of Silesia is in full retreat by the left bank; to-morrow I will compel it to receive battle, or abandon the bridges of Dessau and Wartenburg. I shall then probably pass over to the right bank with all my army; and it is by the right bank I will return to Dresden."—NAPOLEON *to* ST. CYR, 11*th October*, 1813, JOMINI, iv., 436.
‡ Bout., 151. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 121, 122. Vaud., i., 197, 198.

same day. Meanwhile, Murat marched from Freyberg to Orderau—a central position at the foot of the high mountains, well calculated at once to maintain his connexion with the garrison of Dresden, and keep in check the advancing columns. On the day following, Oct. 7. Schwartzenberg moved his headquarters, with the bulk of his army, to Chemnitz; and, although Murat, Poniatowsky, and Victor exerted themselves to the utmost, and the Poles even regained Penig, and drove back Klenau to a considerable distance, yet the continued approach of the vast masses of the allies on all the roads turned all the positions which they took up, and compelled them to fall back towards Leipsic. It was impossible that fifty thousand men could maintain their ground against a hundred and twenty thousand. The Oct. 8. Austrians, constantly pressing forward, gained ground in every quarter; and on the night of the 9th their advanced guard, under Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein and Oct. 9. Thielman, surprised Wetlau, between Naumburg and Weissenfels, and on the direct road from Leipsic to Mayence. This movement in advance, however, which, by destroying the French communications, would have been of the very highest importance if effected by a large body of the allies, totally failed in its effect from the insufficiency of the means employ- Oct. 10. ed. Augereau, who was hurrying up by forced marches to Leipsic, next morning attacked them with great vigour, and not only cleared the road, but defeated the allied advanced guard with considerable loss. On the Oct. 12. 12th, Augereau, with fifteen thousand men, entered Leipsic, where a considerable concentration of troops had already taken place. On the allied right, Wittgenstein continued to advance, though not without experiencing considerable resistance, and after several severe combats with Murat's cavalry. The forward movement, however, of the allied right rendered Murat's position at Orderau no longer tenable, and he was obliged to fall back along the course of the Tchoppa to Mittwerda. On all sides the allied forces were approaching Leipsic, and already their advanced posts were Oct. 14. within sight of that city. On the same day on which Augereau entered it, Giulay made himself master of Weissenfels, on the road to France from Leipsic, where he captured twelve hundred sick and wounded; and, two days afterward, Schwartzenberg made a reconnoissance with the corps of Klenau and Wittgenstein, which led to a severe action between three thousand of Murat's horse and Pahlen's dragoons, which, after several gallant charges, terminated in the overthrow of the French by sixteen squadrons of Prussian cuirassiers, in which the former lost almost all the veteran cavalry under Milhaud, eighteen hundred strong, which had just arrived from Spain.*†

* Vic. et Conq., xxii., 123, 125. Bout., 103, 104. Vaud., i., 199. 200. Norvin, Recueil de 1813, ii., 380.

† The Russian cavalry on this occasion were overwhelmed by the great superiority of the enemy, and would have been destroyed had it not been for the brilliant charge of the Prussian cuirassiers, who threw themselves upon the enemy, in the midst of their triumph, with the most determined courage. When Colonel Boutourlin, Alexander's aid-de-camp, expressed to an officer engaged in it the high admiration which he felt at witnessing their gallant bearing, the brave Prussian replied, "Comrade, could we do less? this is the anniversary of the battle of Jena."—BOUTOURLIN, 106. In the course of this desperate cavalry encounter, six regiments of cuirassiers, which had come up with Augereau, and had recently arrived from Spain, were almost totally destroyed. Murat, who threw himself with his wonted gallantry upon the enemy, was on the point of being made prisoner. When the Prussian cuirassiers broke those of France in the close of the day, he was obliged to fly, closely pursued by the enemy; and an officer who headed the pursuit, almost touching the monarch, repeatedly called out, "Stop, stop, king!" A faithful follower of Joachim passed his sword through the pursuer's body, and so effected the monarch's deliverance; for which he was made an esquire of the king on the spot, and next day received the decoration of the Legion of Honour from Napoleon.—ODEL.

Napoleon's project for carrying the war into Prussia.

While the vast masses of the allies were thus in all directions concentrating towards Leipsic, Napoleon remained inactive at Duben, waiting the concentration of his corps to carry into execution the plan which he had so long meditated, of transferring the war to the Prussian territory, and, under the protection of the strong places which he still held on the Elbe and the Oder, maintain the contest in the space hitherto untouched between these two rivers.* When he came to propose this bold design, however, to his marshals, he experienced a unanimous and most determined resistance. They were not equally sanguine with the emperor as to the success of future operations: they had experienced the inability of their troops to contend with the allies when the animating effect of his presence was no longer felt; and they not unnaturally entertained the greatest dread of plunging, with two hundred and fifty thousand men, into the north of Germany, when four hundred thousand allied troops were prepared to interpose between them and the Rhine, and cut them off entirely from their communications with the French Empire. Granting that they would find provisions for a considerable period in the fields of Northern Prussia, and shelter from the fortresses of the Elbe and the Oder, of which they still retained possession, how were they to get ammunition and military stores for so vast a host in the plains of Brandenburg, or forage for their cavalry amid the clouds of light horse by which they would speedily be enveloped? In the desperate strife in which they would be engaged, when each party threw himself upon his enemy's communications, and disregarded his own, was it not probable that two hundred and fifty thousand would be crushed by four hundred and fifty thousand, and the party inferior in light horse by the one which had so great a superiority in that formidable arm? Above all, what would the allies lose by the war being transferred into Prussia but Berlin, and the warlike resources, now nearly exhausted, of that diminutive realm?—they still retained Austria, Silesia, and Southern Germany, from which they could derive all their supplies; but if the French army were irrevocably cut off from the Rhine, a very few

* "The plan of the emperor was to have allowed the allies to advance into the territory between the Elbe and the Saale, and then, manœuvring under protection of the fortresses and the magazines of Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, and Hamburg, to have carried the war into the territory between the Elbe and the Oder, on which latter river France still held Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin; and, according to circumstances, to have raised the blockade of Dantzic, Zamosc, and Modlin, on the Vistula. Such was the success which might have been expected from that vast plan, that the coalition would have been disorganized by it."—NAPOLEON *in Montholon*, ii., 125.

weeks' warfare, such as that which had recently occurred, would exhaust all their resources; and the very magnitude of their forces would the sooner paralyze them, from the failure of all the muniments of war.*

Napoleon's interview with his marshals, and reasons for advancing to Berlin.

Notwithstanding these obvious considerations, Napoleon was strongly bent upon carrying his bold project into execution; and the four days that he spent at Duben, endeavouring to overcome the repugnance of his marshals, and revolving in his mind the probable risks and advantages of the undertaking, were among the most gloomy and painful of his life. "When the intentions of the emperor," says Caulaincourt, "to cross the Elbe, and carry the war into Prussia, became known, there was a general explosion of murmurs in the army. 'Are we, then,' said they, 'to recommence a levy of bucklers in Prussia, and go and bury the remains of the army at Berlin? Has he not yet slaughtered enough? this will never come to an end. It is too late to adventure on this perilous campaign. Had he replaced us on the Rhine, we should have found winter-quarters, and in spring, if necessary, resumed the offensive. We have had enough of fighting: we must regain France.' I was in the saloon of the emperor when the staff in a body came to supplicate him to abandon his projects on Berlin, and march on Leipsic. No one who did not witness that deplorable scene can conceive what he suffered in that moment. The reasons they advanced were futile in the extreme. He remained cold and reserved. 'My plan,' replied he, 'has been deeply calculated: I have admitted into it, as a probable contingency, the defection of Bavaria; I am convinced that the plan of marching on Berlin is good. A retrograde movement, in the circumstances in which we are placed, is a disastrous step; and those who oppose my projects have undertaken a serious responsibility —I will think on it, gentlemen.' With these words he re-entered his cabinet, and remained the whole remainder of the day wrapped in thought, silent and moody. The weather was sombre and cold: the wind blew with violence, and moaned through the vast corridors of the ancient chateau of Duben, and its old lead-encased windows trembled in their sockets. Everything in that mournful residence bore the character of profound melancholy."† It is interesting to recollect that exactly similar circumstances attended the decisive debate in the National Assembly of France on the 17th of June, 1789, when the sovereignty of the nation was assumed, the monarchy overthrown, and the march of the Revolution rendered inevitable ‡

Defection of Bavaria, which overturns his project. Nov. 12.

In spite of all the obstacles which the marshals threw in his way, it is probable that the emperor would have ventured on the movement immediately; but news arrived on the 12th which rendered it impossible. The cabinet of Munich, which, ever since the war began in Germany, had been besieged with entreaties on the part of its subjects to abandon the Confederation of the Rhine and join the alliance against France, had at length, notwithstanding its strong partiality for Napoleon, and natural gratitude for the benefits he had conferred upon the Bavarian governments, been compelled to yield; and a treaty signed at Ried, on the 8th of October, had secured the accession of Bavaria to the grand alliance. This important event, which the emperor had foreseen, as he had been forewarned of it by the King of Bavaria, but which was not equally expected by the army, gave great additional weight to the marshals who urged a return to France. "By this inconceivable defection of Bavaria," said they, "the question is entirely changed: we must look forward to the other defections which will follow. Wirtemberg, Baden, and Darmstadt, will be swept away by the impulse given so violently to the north of Germany. The Austrian army, which was on the Inn, is doubtless already in march for the Rhine. The Bavarian army will follow it. They will draw after them the whole armed force which they find on their road, and then our frontier is at once menaced and invaded. What can be so urgent, then, as to draw near to it? It is always, without doubt, an evil to change a plan; and the peril here is the greater, that we must operate towards the Rhine, when we were prepared to have marched across the Elbe. But is it not better to resign ourselves to it than to lose everything? Circumstances have changed; we must change with them." The emperor was not convinced by these reasons, how weighty soever they might appear; but he yielded to the torrent, and gave orders to recall Regnier and Bertrand, who were making ready to march on Berlin, and all was prepared for a retreat to Leipsic.*

Fearful danger with which the French were environed.

When this resolution was taken, however, matters had proceeded to such extremities, that it was not only impossible to regain the Rhine without a battle, but the losses likely to be incurred, in case of disaster, were frightful. St. Cyr was to be left at Dresden with thirty-five thousand men, Davuost with twenty-five thousand at Hamburg; Magdebourg, Wittenberg, and Torgau, had each their garrison, which would be speedily surrounded; and, if the French army were obliged to continue its retreat to the Rhine, it was easy to foresee that the whole fortresses on the Elbe, with ninety thousand men in arms within their walls, would become the prey of the victor. Magdebourg contained the great magazine of provisions for the army; the grand park of artillery, and reserves of ammunition, which had been stopped at Eulenburg, were hurried into Torgau; while the King of Saxony prepared to follow the fortunes of the Grand Army to Leipsic. In this way Napoleon set out to fight his way back to the Rhine, through two hundred and fifty thousand enemies, separated both from his magazines and his reserve artillery and ammunition. It must be admitted that a more perilous position could hardly be conceived, and that the system of pushing forward, and making war maintain war, had now been strained till it was ready to burst. The emperor felt his danger, but still trusted to his star. "A thunderbolt," said he after-

* Jom., iv., 438, 439. Fain, ii., 372, 373. Las Casas, vi., 38, 40. Vict. et Conq., xxii. 121, 122.
† Caul., Souvenirs, i., 261, 263. ‡ *Ante*, i., 72.

* Fain, ii., 377, 378. Jom., iv., 439, 440.

ward, "alone could have saved us; but nothing was desperate so long as I had the chances of a battle; and in our position a single victory might have restored to us the North as far as Dantzic."*

Universal joy with which the French army received the orders to move towards Leipsic.

With joyful steps the army obeyed the order to face about and march towards the Rhine. Joy beamed in every countenance; the sounds of mirth were heard in every rank: at length their sufferings were to come to an end, and they were to revisit their beloved France. The emperor set out early on the morning of the 15th, and arrived at noon at Leipsic, where Marmont and Augereau had for some days past united their forces. In approaching the city, which he already foresaw was to be the theatre of a decisive battle, he cast an eager glance over the heights of Pfaffendorf, and the windings of the Partha, which protect on that side the approach to the town. He then rode out to survey the ramparts, which encircle the old city and separate it from the suburbs; and, while doing so, the sound of cannon was heard in the direction of Pegau. It was the King of Naples, who, on the position of Magdeborn, arrested the approach of the advanced guard of Schwartzenberg's army. Five corps, and a numerous body of cavalry, in all eighty thousand men, were there assembled under his orders. He had previously intended to conduct the bulk of his army through Leipsic, and join the emperor to the north of that city, conceiving that it was in that direction that the battle was to be fought; and, under this idea, he had abandoned to the enemy the important defiles at Grobern and Gochrew; but, being informed the same day of the resolution of Napoleon to hold the town to the last extremity, he retraced his steps the day following, and took post on the heights of Magdeborn, where the severe cavalry action took place between the French dragoons and Russian and Prussian cuirassiers, which has already been noticed.†

Oct. 13.

Oct. 14.

Description of the town and environs of Leipsic.

The old city of Leipsic, which is of no great extent, is surrounded by an irregular rampart, which forms nearly a square. It consists of an old curtain of masonry, covered by a ditch almost obliterated, without a counterscarp, beyond which broad boulevards, planted with trees, form a spacious and shady walk for the citizens. The suburbs, which stretch, as in most Continental cities, beyond this verdant belt, were much more considerable at that period; and they were then, as now, also shut in towards the south and east by walls, and the gates strengthened by palisades; but towards the north, on the side of the Partha, they were altogether open. To the eastward, on the road to France, the city is bounded by the marshes of the Elster and the Pleisse, which streams, flowing in a lazy current to the northwest, enclose between them swampy meadows nearly two miles broad, wholly impassable for carriages; and though the rivers are of no great breadth, they are so deep and muddy that they are in most places unfordable either by cavalry or infantry. This broad marsh is crossed only by the road to Lutzen and Mayence, which, after traversing the long and narrow street which leads to the barrier of Machranstadt, enters the city by the gate of Halle, over a bridge at the same place. There were no other bridges over the Elster but one or two wooden ones for foot passengers, and the stone bridge over which the great road passes, well known from the frightful catastrophe a few days after, which has rendered it immortal in history. To the east the country consists of a beautiful plain, in the highest state of cultivation, offering a theatre worthy of the battle which was to decide the fate of the world. To the southeast, like a chain of verdure, extend the hills of Wachau, then occupied in force by Murat's army; while to the northeast, in the direction of Mockern, the windings of the Partha, and the gentle swells and villages adjoining its banks, present a variety of obstacles to retard the advance of an approaching enemy.*

Napoleon inspects the field of battle.

No sooner was the arrival of the emperor known to Murat than he hastened to wait upon him; and the two sovereigns rode out together towards the heights behind Lieberwolkwitz, from whence the whole plain to the southeast of Leipsic can be descried. From an elevated point in that direction, near the bed of the Pleisse, Napoleon surveyed the whole field, and gave the necessary orders for the day following. Seated by a blazing watchfire, after his usual custom, in the midst of the squares of his Guard, he long and anxiously surveyed the ground, and, in particular, the mossy and swampy beds of the Pleisse and the Elster, which extended, in a broad belt, nearly two leagues across, in the rear of the whole position occupied by the French army. From thence he rode on to the hills of Lieberwolkwitz, from which elevated ridge, not only the positions of his own troops, but the advanced posts of the enemy, were visible. A few gun-shots only separated the two armies. The heads of the Russian and Austrian columns appeared in great strength within cannon range, but as yet all was still: not a sound was heard, and no appearance of hostilities was visible. Here an imposing ceremony took place, in the distribution of eagles by Napoleon to three regiments which had not hitherto received them; and he returned to Leipsic by the course of the Pleisse, after inspecting Poniatowsky's Poles, who occupied the marshy banks of that stream.†

Positions of the French army around Leipsic. October 15.

The positions occupied by the French army on the night of the 15th were as follow: Bertrand's corps held Lindenau, at the entrance of the chaussée which crossed the marshes of the Elster, in order to cover that important defile, and keep at a distance a strong column of the enemy, which, having gained the great road to Erfurth, menaced the rear, and had already entirely cut off the communications of the French army. To the eastward of the marshes, under the immediate command of the emperor, three corps were stationed, facing to the southward: viz., Poniatowsky's Poles on

* Las Casas, vi., 38. Fain, ii., 378, 381.
† Jom., iv., 446, 447. Fain, ii., 383, 384. Bout., 108, 109.

* Personal observations. Bout., 161. Cap., ix., Introd., 15. Fain, ii., 383.
† Odel., i., 15, 17. Fain, ii., 381, 383.

the right, on the edge of the Elster and Pleisse, between Mark-Kleberg and Connewitz; next Augereau, on the southern slope of the heights of Wachau, flanked on either side by Milhaud's cavalry; behind Wachau was placed Victor's right; from thence to Lieberwolkwitz stretched Lauriston's corps; on their left, Macdonald's extended to Holzhausen;* Latour Maubourg and Sebastiani's horse stood on either flank of Victor's corps; while the Imperial Guard, around Napoleon, were in reserve near Probstheyda. In all, six corps of infantry and four of horse, mustering a hundred and ten thousand men, of whom eighteen thousand were cavalry; and of these a hundred thousand were to the eastward of the Pleisse, and on the proper field of battle.

Force and position of the French on the north of Leipsic.

To the northwest of Leipsic, but so far removed from it as to be a separate army, a considerable force was collected to combat Blucher and the Prince Royal of Sweden, who, in that direction, were drawing near to the city with a formidable array of troops. They consisted of Marmont's corps and two divisions of Ney's, which were posted between MOCKERN and Enteritch; the other division of Ney's corps, with the artillery, were on march from Duben, but had not yet taken up their ground. Arrighi's cavalry, however, three thousand strong, had come up, and Regnier's Saxons were hourly expected. The forces on the ground consisted of forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry. The whole army, already arrived or on the road from Duben, and certain to take part in the battle, amounted to a hundred and forty thousand infantry and thirty-five thousand cavalry, with seven hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, distributed in three hundred and eighty-four battalions, and three hundred and seventy-two squadrons. An immense force! equal to that with which Napoleon had conquered at Wagram, and superior to that which had fought at Borodino;† but, great as it was, it was overmatched by the ranks of the allies, who had now arrayed under their banners the greatest military force that modern Europe had ever seen assembled in a single field.‡

Position of the Grand Allied Army to the south of Leipsic.

The forces of the allies were divided, like the French, into two armies, the principal of which, under Schwartzenberg, was opposed to the Grand Army of Napoleon, while that of the North, under Bernadotte and Blucher, advanced against Ney and Marmont. They were thus arranged in the Grand Army for the attack of the French from the south. On their own left, opposite to the French right, and on the edge of the morass of the Elster, stood Giulay's corps of Austrians, with Lichtenstein and Thielman's light troops; the centre, opposite to Wachau, and from thence towards the Elster, was very strong, consisting of Meerfeldt and the Prince of Hesse-Homberg's Austrians, Wittgenstein's Russians, and Kleist's Prussians; while the right wing, opposed to Macdonald and Lauriston, was composed of Klenau's corps of Austrians; Ziethen's brigade of Prussians, who were at Gross Pothna, having their extreme flank covered by the Cossacks under Platoff. The reserve, consisting of the Russian and Prussian guards, and two divisions of cuirassiers, under the Grand-duke Constantine and Milaradowitch, were at Magdeborn. The great defect of this arrangement, but which no representations on the part of the Russian generals could induce Prince Schwartzenberg to alter, was, that the rivers Elster and Pleisse flowed through the middle of the allied line, separating thus the left wing from the centre, and one part of the centre from the other: a most perilous situation, if any disaster had rendered it necessary for one part of the allied line to assist the other, and which exposed the portion of it which was placed between the two rivers to imminent danger. The Austrian general even carried his infatuation so far as to desire to place the flower of the allied army, the Russian and Prussian guards, in the narrow space between the Pleisse and the Elster; and it was only by the determined resistance of the Emperor Alexander that they were brought to the decisive point on the right, to the east of both these rivers. Although Benningsen's corps and Colloredo's reserves had not yet come up, the force here assembled was immense: it consisted of no less than a hundred and forty-three thousand combatants, of which twenty-five thousand were cavalry, with six hundred and twenty guns. Benningsen and Colloredo's reserve, although not in time for a battle on the 16th, might be expected on the day following; and they were thirty-eight thousand more, of whom three thousand were horse, with a hundred and thirty pieces of cannon.*

Forces and position of the allies to the north of Leipsic.

To the north of Leipsic the disproportion was still greater. The armies of Silesia and Bernadotte, which lay in that direction, formed in all a mass of a hundred and three thousand combatants, of whom sixteen thousand were cavalry, with three hundred and ninety pieces of cannon. They had not all, however, come up. Bernadotte, as already mentioned, had made an eccentric movement towards the Elbe, and those in line consisted only of the corps of Langeron and D'York, with Sacken in reserve, which had their headquarters at Skenditz, on the road to Halle; and they amounted to fifty-six thousand effective men, with three hundred and fifty-six guns. Thus the contending parties towards Mockern were very nearly matched on the first day: the French having forty-eight thousand, and the allies fifty-six thousand men. But if the contest should be prolonged for another day, and the prince royal come up in time to take part in it, forty-seven thousand additional combatants would be thrown into the balance, to which the French reserves brought from Duben would not oppose more than thirty thousand. Thus, upon the whole, for the final shock on which the contest would ultimately depend, the allies could count upon two hundred and ninety thousand men, and above thirteen hundred guns; while the French could only reckon on a hundred and seventy-five

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 127. Bout., 112. Vaud., i., 204. Kausler, 932.

† *Ante*, iii., 244, 562.

‡ Vaud., i., 201, 204. Vict et Conq., xxii., 127, 128. Bout., 108, 109. Lab., ii., 379. Kausler, 932. Bat. de Leipsic, Posen, 1835, 32.

* Kausler, 931. Vaud., i., 202. Bout., 110, 111. Jom., iv., 448, 449.

thousand men, and seven hundred and twenty pieces of cannon: a great disproportion, which all the advantages of Napoleon's central position and great abilities could hardly compensate; and which demonstrated that the formidable military confederacy, of which he had so long formed the head, was now fairly overmatched by the vast host which its intolerable exactions had arrayed to assert the independence of mankind.*†

Schwartzenberg's proclamation to his troops, and feelings of the soldiers on both sides.

At midnight, on the night of the 15th, two rockets were sent up to a prodigious height, from the headquarters of Prince Schwartzenberg, to the south of Leipsic, and were immediately answered by three, two of a blue and one of a red light, from Blucher's, on the north. These awful signals told the assembled myriads that all things were in readiness in both armies, and that the hour of the final struggle had struck. All was tranquil in the French lines: their watchfires burned with a steady light, and no moving figures around the flame indicated an intention to retreat. Unspeakable was the ardour which the solemnity of the moment excited in the allied ranks. Now was the appointed time—now was the day of salvation. Retreat to the enemy without a conflict was impossible: the host of Germany encircled his ranks: on the morrow, the mighty conflict which was to avenge the wrongs of twenty years, and determine whether they and their children were to be freemen or slaves, was to be decided. Confidence pervaded every bosom: hope beat high in every heart: recent success, present strength, seemed the certain harbingers of victory. A sombre feeling of disquietude, on the other hand, pervaded the French army: their ancient courage was the same, their hereditary spirit was unshaken; but disaster had chilled their ardour, diminished numbers depressed their hopes, and their confidence in the star of the emperor had been irrevocably shaken. Still they looked forward undaunted to the fight, and resolved to show themselves, under whatever fortune, worthy of the eagles which they bore. At daybreak, the following noble proclamation was issued by Prince Schwartzenberg, and read at the head of every company and squadron in his army: "The most important epoch of this sacred war has arrived, brave warriors! Prepare for the combat. The bond which unites so many powerful nations in the most just, as the greatest of causes, is about to be yet closer drawn, and rendered indissoluble on the field of battle. Russians, Prussians, Austrians! you all combat for the same cause: you fight for the liberty of Europe—for the independence of your children—for the immortal renown of your names. All for each! each for all! With this device, the sacred combat is about to commence. Be faithful at the decisive moment, and victory is your own." No proclamation was issued to the French army; no heart-stirring words breathed the fire of Napoleon's spirit, or announced the well-known prophecy of victory:‡ an ominous circumstance, indicating, in no equivocal manner, that the emperor's confidence in his fortune was at an end.

Commencement of the battle, and early success of the allies.

Early in the morning of the 16th, Napoleon repaired to the army of Murat, and, from a height near Lieberwolkwitz, long and anxiously surveyed the field of the approaching battle. Precisely at nine three guns were discharged from the centre of Schwartzenberg's army, and immediately the fire began along the whole line. The allied columns, dark and massy, advanced to the attack in the most imposing array; two hundred pieces of cannon preceded their march, and soon the cannonade on the two sides exceeded anything ever heard of in the annals of war. The earth, literally speaking, trembled under the discharge, on the two sides, of above a thousand guns: the balls flew over every part of the field of battle, and killed several persons in Napoleon's suite, as well as in the guards and cuirassiers, who were stationed a little in rear; while through the midst of the iron tempest the allied columns advanced to the attack. Kleist, with the left, following the course of the Elster, moved against Mark-Kleberg, of which he soon made himself master. To check his progress beyond that village, a considerable body of Milhaud's horse were brought forward by Poniatowsky; but Lewachow, at the head of two regiments of Russian cuirassiers, boldly charged across the ravine which descends from the heights of Wachau to that village, and, scaling the rugged banks on the opposite side, dispersed the enemy's horse, and brought back his own without sustaining any loss. In the centre, however, the attack was not equally successful. Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg was at first repulsed at Wachau by the heroic defence of Victor's men, while his guns were silenced by the superior fire of the French artillery. And although, by a great effort, he at length carried the village, he was speedily driven out again, with great loss, by the French reserves; while on the right, Klenau and Gorzakow, not having succeeded in reaching Lieberwolkwitz at the same time, successively failed in dislodging Lauriston permanently from that important village, though it was at first carried by the Austrians under the first of these generals. Six times did the brave Russians and Austrians return to the attack of these villages, and six times were they repulsed by the invincible resolution of Lauriston's men, supported by Macdonald's corps and Sebastiani's dragoons.*

Napoleon prepares a grand attack on the enemy's centre.

At eleven o'clock, Macdonald brought up his whole corps in an oblique direction from Holzhausen, and, taking Klenau's attacking corps in flank, he gained considerable success: the Austrians were driven back, and a battery, which they had established on the heights of Kolmberg, taken by Charpentier's division. Encouraged by this success on his left, and deeming the enemy in front of Lieberwolkwitz sufficiently exhausted by three hours' continued and severe fighting, Napoleon, who arrived at noon on the heights behind Wachau, followed by the guards and cuirassiers, resolved to put in force his favourite measure of a grand

* Bout., 121. Kausler, 931, 932. Vaud, ii., 202, 203. Fain, ii., 405.

† See App. D, chap. lxxi., where a detailed account of the whole forces engaged on either side, at Leipsic, is given.

‡ Capef., x., 218.

* Kausler, 937, 938. Bout. 113, 114. Jom., iv., 454. Odel., ii., 19, 20. Vaud., i., 206.

attack on the enemy's centre. With this view, two divisions of the Young Guard, under Oudinot, were brought up and stationed close behind Wachau; two others, under Mortier, were sent to Leiberwolkwitz; Augereau was despatched from his ground on the right centre to support Poniatowsky, who had nearly succeeded in regaining Mark-Kleberg; and behind him the Old Guard moved forward to Doelitz, so as to be in readiness to support either the right or the centre, as circumstances might require. Finally, Drouot, with sixty guns of the Guard, so well known in all Napoleon's former battles, was brought to the front of the centre; and these pieces, moving steadily forward, soon made the earth shake by their rapid and continued fire. The allied centre was unable to resist this desperate attack: Victor and Oudinot, preceded by the terrible battery, steadily gained ground; and Napoleon, deeming the battle gained, sent word to the King of Saxony in Leipsic that he was entirely successful, and had made two thousand prisoners, and enjoined him to cause all the bells to be rung, in the city and adjoining villages, to announce his victory.*

Schwartzenberg's measures to support his centre.

Schwartzenberg, finding his centre thus violently assailed, made the most vigorous efforts to support it. Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, unable to resist the shock of Victor, supported by the Old Guard and Grouot's artillery, gave ground, and was rapidly falling into confusion, when Raeffskoi was brought up to support him with his invincible grenadiers. The brave Russians took post, one division behind the sheepfold of Auenhayn, and the other at Gossa; and, without once flinching before the terrible battery, kept up so incessant a fire as at length arrested the progress of the enemy. Klenau, however, attacked in front by Lauriston, and threatened in flank by Macdonald, was unable to maintain himself on the slopes of Lieberwolkwitz, and was forced back, after a desperate resistance by his cavalry, to Gross Posna and Seyfartshayn, where he at length succeeded in maintaining himself, though with great difficulty, till nightfall. Schwartzenberg, seeing his centre so nearly forced by the impetuous attack of the French Guard, ordered up the Austrian reserve, under Prince Hesse Homberg, from Zobigker, where it had been stationed, in spite of the strenuous remonstrances of Alexander and Jomini, on the other side of the Pleisse, and, consequently, in a situation where it could not be brought to bear on the decisive point without a long delay. They were hurried as fast as possible across the river; but, meanwhile, Napoleon, desirous of beating down the resistance of Raeffskoi's grenadiers, ordered up his reserve cavalry under Latour Maubourg and Kellerman, while an attack by infantry was ordered, under Charpentier, on an old intrenchment on a hill, called the Swedish redoubt, where the bones of the warriors of the great Gustavus reposed, which had been won from the French in the early part of the day. So vehement, however, was the fire from the batteries on the summit, that the assaulting regiments paused at the foot of the hill. Napoleon hastened to the spot: "What regiment is that?" said he to Charpentier. "The 22d light infantry," replied the general. "That is impossible," replied Napoleon; "the 22d would never let themselves be cut down by grapeshot without taking their muskets from their shoulders." These words being repeated to the regiment, they were so stung by the reproach, that, breaking into a charge, they ran up the hill and carried the post, which seemed to give the emperor a decisive advantage in that part of the field of battle.*

Such was the impression produced by the reserve cavalry, that terrible arm which always formed so important an element in Napoleon's tactics, that it had wellnigh decided the battle in his favour. At one o'clock in the afternoon, Kellerman, at the head of six thousand horse, debouched from Wachau, between Connewitz and Grobern, to the left of that village, supported by several squares of infantry, and advanced rapidly against the retiring columns of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg. Lewachow, proud of his gallant achievement in the morning, threw himself, with his three regiments of Russian cuirassiers, in the way of the charge; but he was speedily overwhelmed, and driven back, with great loss, towards Gossa. The consequences might have been fatal had not Alexander, after the advice of Jomini, shortly before brought up his guards and reserves to the menaced point in the centre, where they were stationed behind the Goeselbach; while Schwartzenberg, now sensible, when it was all but too late, of his inexplicable error in stationing the Austrian reserves in a position, between the Elster and the Pleisse, where they could be of no service, had brought up the Austrian cuirassiers of the guard to the point of danger. This superb corps, consisting of six regiments cased in steel, the very flower of the Austrian army, under Count Nostitz, after crossing the Pleisse at Grobern, arrived at the menaced point at the moment, and instantly bore down with loud cheers and irresistible force on the flank of Kellerman's dragoons, when somewhat disordered by the rout of Lewachow's men. The effect was instantaneous: the French horse were routed and driven back in great disorder to the heights behind Wachau, where, however, they re-formed under cover of the powerful batteries which there protected the French centre.†

Desperate combat of cavalry in the centre.

While extreme danger was thus narrowly avoided in the centre to the west of Wachau, peril still more imminent threatened the allies to the east of that village. Latour Maubourg and Murat, at the head of four thousand cuirassiers of the Guard, there bore down on the flank of the allied right, while Victor and Lauriston assailed its front. This double charge was at first attended with great success. Though the brave Latour Maubourg had his leg carried off by a cannon-shot in the advance,‡ the ponder-

Latour Maubourg's vehement charge to the east of Wachau, which is defeated by Alexander in person.

* Bout., 114, 115. Odel., ii., 21, 22. Kausler, 939. Vaud., i., 205, 206. Lab., i., 382, 383.

* Odel., ii., 331. Bout., 115, 116. Jom., iv., 455, 456. Fain, ii., 397, 399. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 131, 132.

† Vict. et Conq., xxii., 131, 132. Jom., iv., 456, 458. Bout., 116, 117. Kausler, 940.

‡ Amputation was immediately performed on this distinguished officer, which he bore with his usual courage and

ous mass advanced in admirable order under Bordesoult, broke by a charge in flank Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg's infantry, routed ten light squadrons of the Russian guard, which strove to arrest its progress, and captured six-and-twenty guns. So violent was the onset, so complete the opening made in the centre of the allies by this terrible charge, that the French horsemen pushed on to the position where the Emperor Alexander and King of Prussia had taken their station, and they were obliged to mount on horseback and retire a little distance to the rear, to avoid being made prisoners. But in this decisive moment Alexander was not wanting to himself or the cause with which he was intrusted. Imitating the coolness of Napoleon on occasion of a similar crisis at the cemetery of Eylau,* he boldly advanced to the front, and ordered the red Cossacks of the guard under Orloff Denizoff to charge the enemy's flank, while the reserve cavalry of Barclay were also ordered up, and the last reserve batteries directed to open their fire. These dispositions, promptly taken and rapidly executed, changed the fate of the day. With resistless force, Orloff Denizoff's men, all chosen cavaliers from the banks of the Don, bore down on the flank of the French cuirassiers immediately after they had captured the guns, and when their horses were blown by previous efforts: their long lances were more than a match for the cuirassiers' sabres; in the twinkling of an eye the whole hostile squadrons were pierced through and routed, four-and-twenty of the guns retaken, and the French cavalry driven back, with immense loss, to their own lines. Resuming the offensive, Raeffskoi's grenadiers now attacked the sheep-farm of Auenhayn, the object already of such desperate strife, and carried it at the point of the bayonet: an acquisition which, from its elevated position, again gave the allies the advantage in that part of the field.†

Arrival of the Austrian reserve on the field.

The crisis of the battle was now past: the direction of Napoleon's attacks was clearly indicated, and Schwartzenberg had gained time to rectify his faulty dispositions, and bring up his powerful reserves from the other side of the Pleisse to the scene of danger. At three o'clock in the afternoon the Austrian reserves came up to the front at all points: Bianchi relieved, at Mark-Kleberg, Kleist's troops, who had with great difficulty maintained themselves there against the attack of Augereau and Poniatowsky; and, turning the powerful batteries which they brought up against the flank of Augereau's corps, they compelled it to fall back to its original position. Bianchi followed up his advantage: he issued from Mark-Kleberg, and charged the right flank of Napoleon's centre with loud cries, and with such vigour that all around the emperor deemed the battle lost, and he himself was forced to retire some hundred paces. He immediately ordered up the battalions of the Old Guard, who stopped the head of the column; but its numerous artillery played in the most destructive manner on the flank of Victor's corps, and compelled it to fall back to the French lines. At the same time, the cannon sounded violently on the north, and repeated couriers from Marmont and Ney announced that, so far from being able to render the emperor any farther assistance, they could with difficulty maintain themselves against the impetuous attacks of Blucher.*

Napoleon's last efforts.

Sensible that, if success now escaped him, he would in vain seek to recall it on the following day, when the prince royal, Benningsen, and Colloredo had brought up nearly a hundred thousand fresh troops to the enemy's standards, Napoleon resolved to make one more effort for victory. With this view, between five and six o'clock he re-formed his reserve cavalry behind Lieberwolkwitz: Victor and Lauriston's corps were thrown into a deep column of attack, and, preceded by a numerous array of artillery, advanced against Gossa. Such was the weight of the column, and the rapidity with which the guns were discharged, that Gorzakow's corps was broken, and Gossa taken; but in this extremity Schwartzenberg brought up the Prussian division of Pirsch, which regained the village, and drove back the column to a considerable distance; while a powerful Russian battery of eighty pieces of the guard, by the precision and rapidity of their fire, arrested the progress of the enemy in that quarter. Excessive fatigue prevented either party from making any farther efforts in the centre and left, and the battle there was reduced to a furious cannonade, which continued, without intermission, till night overspread the scene.†

Last attack of Meerfeldt, which is repulsed, and he is made prisoner.

Meerfeldt soon after came up, having been long retarded in his march across the swamps between the Pleisse and the Elster, by the almost impracticable nature of the ground. Late in the evening, however, he succeeded in crossing the latter stream by the ford of Doelitz, and was advancing at the head of the leading battalion to attack the French right flank near Mark-Kleberg, when he was suddenly assailed by a division of the Old Guard in front, and Poniatowsky's Poles in flank, and driven back, with great loss, into the river. Meerfeldt himself was made prisoner, with a whole battalion, and immediately brought into the emperor's presence; and, although the repulse of his corps was of no material consequence to the issue of the day, it threw a ray of glory over this well-debated field of carnage.‡

Operations of Giulay at Lindenau.

On the other side of the Elster, Giulay was engaged the whole day, with various success, against Bertrand's corps. Though far removed from the head-quarters of either army, and separated by five miles of marshes from the great body of the combatants, the struggle there was one of life and death to the French army; for Bertrand fought for Lindenau, and their only line of retreat to the Rhine in case of disaster! The Austrians were at first successful, though not

sang-froid. His servant, a faithful domestic, having given way to an agony of grief at the sight, he said, "Why do you distress yourself? you will only have one boot to clean."—ODEL., ii., 32.

* *Ante*, ii., 484.

† Bout., 116, 118. Vaud., i., 207. Jom., iv., 457, 458. Fain, ii., 399.

* Bout., 118. Vaud., i., 208. Jom., iv., 458. Fain, ii., 401. Odel., ii.

† Vict. et Conq., xxii., 133, 134. Bout., 118, 119. Jom., iv., 438, 439. Kausler, 941. Fain, ii., 401.

‡ Bout., 119, 120. Jom., iv., 460. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 134. Fain, ii., 403.

without a desperate struggle. After seven hours' hard fighting, their gallant corps overcame the stubborn resistance of the French, and Bertrand was not only driven out of Lindenau into the marshes, but forced to take refuge behind the Lippe, where his troops, drawn up in several squares, maintained the contest only by a loose fire of tirailleurs. If Giulay had, as soon as he got possession of the town, broken the bridges of Lindenau, the retreat of the French army would have been entirely cut off, and their communications with the Rhine rendered impossible. Seriously alarmed at the prospect of such a disaster, Napoleon sent positive orders to Bertrand to regain that important post at all hazards, coupled with severe remarks upon his having ever lost it. Stung to the quick by these reproaches, Bertrand immediately re-formed his troops into columns of attack, and, falling suddenly on the Austrians, who, deeming the contest over, were off their guard, drove them out of Lindenau, and reopened the communications of the Grand Army. Giulay, upon this, drew off his troops to the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the action.*

Battle of Mockern between Blucher and Ney.

To the north of Leipsic, on the side of Mockern, a conflict took place, less important from the number of forces engaged, but not inferior in the valour and obstinacy displayed on both sides, between the armies of Blucher and Ney. The Prussian general, in conformity with the general plan of operations, had put himself in motion at daybreak from his position in front of Halle, and advanced in two columns: Langeron by Radefeldt and Breitenfeldt; and D'York by Lindenthal on Mockern; Sacken formed the reserve. Before they reached the enemy, however, who was posted near Skenditz, the action had begun on the south of Leipsic; and Ney, who had the command, was so impressed with the awful cannonade which was heard in that direction, that he despatched two divisions of Oudinot's corps, now under the command of Souham, towards Wachau, to reenforce the emperor. The effects of this generous zeal were in the highest degree disastrous to the French arms. The other divisions of Souham's corps having not yet come up from Duben, the French marshal had not at his disposal, after this large deduction, above twenty-five thousand foot and three thousand horse, while Blucher had fifty-six thousand. Ney drew up his troops in a strong position, the right in front of a wood of some extent in the neighbourhood of Breitenfeldt; the line extending from thence, through Gross Wetteritz, to Mockern on the left. Advanced posts also occupied Radefeldt and other villages in front. Langeron was directed to expel the enemy from Radefeldt, and, pushing on, to force Breitenfeldt, and drive him into the open plain beyond, towards Leipsic; while D'York, on the French left, following the great road to Leipsic, was to turn to its left at Lutschen, and drive the enemy from Lindenthal.†

Defeat of Ney by Blucher.

At the first onset, Ney, finding himself assailed by such superior forces, abandoned Radefeldt and the villages in front, and drew in his advanced posts over a considerable space to the main line running from Lindenthal to Mockern. There, however, notwithstanding his great inferiority of force, he stood firm, and a most obstinate conflict ensued. The wood on their right, and the villages of Gross and Klein Wetteritz, furiously assailed by Langeron, were as bravely defended by Ney; but, after being three times taken and retaken, finally remained in the possession of the allies. D'York, at the same time, commenced a vigorous attack on Mockern, on the extreme French right, while the Russian horse charged with the utmost gallantry the French batteries and squares in the open plain between the villages. After a most sanguinary conflict, in the course of which it was five times taken and retaken, Mockern was carried by D'York; and Marmont's corps, driven back to the open plain in the direction of the Partha, soon fell into disorder, and lost a considerable part of its artillery under the repeated charges of the Russian and Prussian cavalry. The whole French line was falling into confusion before Sacken came up with the Russian reserve, so that he was not required to take part in the action. Late in the evening, Delmas's division of Ney's corps arrived from Duben, and was immediately hurried forward to the right, to cover the retreat of the park of Ney's corps, which was in the most imminent danger of falling into the hands of the victorious Russians; but, though this calamity was averted by the good countenance which that body showed, yet it was too late to retrieve the day, and the shattered remains of Ney's army retired behind the Partha, having lost an eagle, two standards, twenty guns, and two thousand prisoners, besides four thousand killed and wounded, in this well-fought field. In addition, thirty cannon were surprised by the Cossacks on the night following, where the French, though defeated by superior numbers, displayed the most heroic courage and devotion.*

Result of this day's fighting.

The battle of the 16th, though it terminated decisively in favour of the allies only on the side of the Partha, yet was, in its final results, entirely to their advantage. Situated as Napoleon was, an indecisive action was equivalent to a defeat: his affairs were in such a situation, that nothing could retrieve them but a decisive victory. Under Napoleon in person, the French might boast with reason of having had the advantage, since the allies, who made the attack, had been unable, excepting at Mark-Kleberg, to force them from their position; and the loss, which was upward of fifteen thousand on each side, was pretty nearly balanced. But the defeat at Mockern threatened his rear: the frightful peril incurred at Lindenau had shown the hazard in which his communications were placed. The enemy on the succeeding day would receive reenforcements to the amount of nearly a hundred thousand men, while he could not draw to his standards above thirty-five thousand; and his position, separated from his reserve park of ammunition, which was at Torgau, and his only magazines, which were at Magdebourg, with a single chaussée traversing two miles of morass-

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 134. Bout., 120. Fain, ii., 407. Lab., ii., 387, 388.

† Lond., 155, 156. Bout., 121, 122. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 134, 135.

* Lond., 155, 159. Bout., 121, 122. Jom., iv., 461, 462. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 135. Fain, ii., 406.

es for his retreat, was in the last degree perilous. Sound policy, therefore, counselled immediate preparations for a retreat, when his forces were still, in a great measure, unbroken, and he could, by holding Leipsic as a *tête-du-pont*, gain time for his immense army to defile over the perilous pass in its rear. But Napoleon could not brook the idea of retiring from an open field, in which he himself had commanded. His position, as the head of a revolutionized military state, forbade it. He had announced to the King of Saxony that he had been victorious: all the bells in and around Leipsic had been set a-ringing to celebrate his triumph; if he now retreated, it would be to announce to all Europe that he had been defeated. Actuated by these feelings, as well as by a lingering confidence in his good fortune, and in the likelihood of the allied generals falling into some error which might give him the means of striking a decisive blow from his central position, he resolved to remain firm; and not only made no preparations for a retreat, but gave no directions for throwing any additional bridges over the Elster and Pleisse in his rear, though the engineers could have established twenty in a single night.*

Napoleon's conference with Meerfeldt, whom he sends back with secret proposals.

No sooner had the fire ceased than Napoleon ordered Meerfeldt to be brought into his presence. He hailed, with the utmost eagerness, the opportunity of reopening, by means of the Austrian general, with whom he was well acquainted, diplomatic relations, which he hoped might become separate and confidential, with the Emperor Francis and the cabinet of Vienna. Having partaken of the frugal supper which the bivouac would afford even for the imperial table, Meerfeldt was, at ten at night, introduced into the emperor's cabinet. By a singular coincidence, it was he who had come a suppliant on the part of the Emperor of Germany to solicit the armistice of Leoben; it was he who had conducted, on the part of the cabinet of Vienna, the treaty of Campo-Formio; and it was from his hand, on the night following the battle of Austerlitz, that the pencil note had come, which gave the first opening to the conferences which led to the peace of Presburg. The mutations of fortune had now brought the same general to the emperor's tent, when the latter, in his turn, had become the suppliant, and he was to solicit, not to concede, peace and salvation from his former imperial opponents. He addressed to him some obliging expressions on the misfortune which he had sustained in being made prisoner, and dismissed him to the Austrian headquarters, stored with every imaginable argument that could be urged against continuing in the Russian alliance; and offered, on condition of an armistice being immediately concluded, to evacuate Germany, and retire behind the Rhine till the conclusion of a general peace.† "Adieu, general," said he, when he dismissed Meerfeldt on his parole; "when on my behalf you shall speak of an armistice to the two emperors, I doubt not the voice which strikes their ears will be eloquent indeed in recollections."*

Mournful night at Napoleon's headquarters.

Napoleon's sense of the dangers of his situation was sufficiently evinced by his offering to retire from Germany on condition that an armistice was agreed to. He passed a melancholy night after Meerfeldt had departed, his tents being placed in the bottom of a dried fish-pond, not far from the road which leads to Rochlitz, where they were pitched in the middle of the squares of the Old Guard. The cannon continued to boom occasionally on the side of Mark-Kleberg through the whole night, where the advanced posts were almost touching each other. The most sombre presentiments filled the minds of the generals who attended on the emperor: ammunition was already becoming scarce, and no fresh supplies could be obtained; a few potatoes, found in the fields, were all the provisions the men could obtain in the country, and the stores in Leipsic would soon be exhausted: certain ruin appeared to await them, when the army, which had not been able to discomfit the enemy to whom they had been opposed, was assailed, in addition, by a hundred thousand fresh troops, who would come up on the succeeding day. Still the emperor, though fully aware of his danger, made no preparations to guard against it: not a carriage was directed to the rear, not a bridge was thrown over the Elster; but relying on the valour of his soldiers, his own good fortune, and the strength of Leipsic as a *point d'appui* to his centre, the mighty conqueror remained in moody obstinacy to await the stroke of fate.†

The allies defer the attack till the 18th.

The allied sovereigns were too well aware of the advantages of their situation either to fall into the snare which Napoleon had laid for them, by sending back Meerfeldt with proposals for an armistice, or to throw them away by precipitating the attack before their whole forces had come up. Under pretence, therefore, of referring the proposals to the Emperor of Austria, Schwartzenberg eluded them altogether, and no answer was returned to them till after the French had recrossed the Rhine. Meanwhile, the great re-enforcements on which they relied were approaching. Bernadotte, on the 16th, had reached Landsberg, on his way back from the Elbe, to which he had been drawn by Napoleon's demonstrations against Berlin; Benningsen was at Coelitz, and Colloredo at Borna; so that all three might be expected to take part in the ac-

* Bout., 123, 124. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 136. Rogniat, Art. de la Guerre, 394. Jom., iv., 462.

† "Our political alliance," said Napoleon, "is broken up, but between your master and me there is another bond which is indissoluble. That it is which I invoke; for I shall always place confidence in the regard of my father-in-law. It is to him I shall never cease to appeal from all that passes here. You see how they attack me, and how I defend myself. Does your cabinet never weigh the consequences of such exasperation? If it is wise, it will speedily do so: it can do so this evening; to-morrow it may perhaps be too late, for who can foretell the events of to-morrow? They deceive themselves in regard to my dispositions: I ask nothing but to repose in the shadow of peace, and to dream of the happiness of France, after having dreamed of its glory. You are afraid of the sleep of the lion: you fear that you will never be easy after having pared his nails and cut his main. You think only of repairing, by a single stroke, the calamities of twenty years; and, carried away by this idea, you never perceive the changes which time has made around you, and that now for Austria to gain at the expense of France is to lose. Reflect on it, general: it is neither Austria, nor France, nor Prussia singly, that will be able to arrest on the Vistula the inundation of a people half nomade, essentially conquering, and whose dominions extend from this to China."—Fain, ii., 412, 413.

* Fain, ii., 412, 414. Odel., ii., 23.

† Odel., ii., 23, 25. Jom., iv., 463. Rogniat, Art. de la Guerre, 393, 394.

tion in the evening of the following day. The attack, accordingly, was ordered at two o'clock in the afternoon of that day; but such was the badness of the roads to the southward, from the immense multitude of artillery and chariots which had passed over them, that Colloredo and Benningsen had not then come up, and did not reach their ground, the former till four, the latter till late in the evening. The attack was, therefore, adjourned till the following morning, when the troops were ordered to be in readiness by daybreak; and no doubt was entertained of success, as the Grand Allied Army would then be re-enforced by above fifty thousand combatants, besides those who joined Blucher and Bernadotte.*

Dangerous state of the allied affairs to the north of Leipsic.

But, although matters were thus favourable to the allies on the ground where Napoleon and the allied sovereigns commanded in person, to the south of Leipsic, affairs were far from being in an equally satisfactory state to the north of that town, where Blucher was opposed to Ney and Marmont. Regnier, and the other divisions of Ney's corps, had now come up from Duben, which rendered him more than a match for the army of Silesia, weakened as that noble host was by six thousand men lost on the preceding day, and the incessant fighting which it had sustained since the commencement of the campaign. A violent cavalry action on the 17th, between Arrighi's dragoons and Wassilchikoff's Cossacks, on the banks of the Partha, had only terminated to the advantage of the allies by bringing up the reserve hussars, who at length drove the enemy back to the very walls of Leipsic. Everything, therefore, on that side depended upon bringing the prince royal into action; but in that quarter a most alarming degree of backwardness had become visible, which threatened the cause of the allies with the most serious consequences. Not only had Bernadotte, in pursuance of his usual system of saving the Swedes, so successfully applied at Gross Beeren and Dennewitz, arranged the troops of his own dominions a full march in the rear of the Russians and Prussians, but, instead of directing them to Halle, as he was recommended, where they would have been, if not in line with Blucher, at least not very far in his rear, he had moved the Russians only to Zoerbig, while the Prussians and Swedes stretched by the Peterberg and Grobzig, so far from the decisive point as to be of no service whatever in the crisis which was approaching.†

Oct. 17.

Oct. 15.

Vigorous efforts of Sir Charles Stewart to bring up Bernadotte.

Fortunately for the allies and the cause of European freedom, their interests were at this juncture supported, at the headquarters of the Prince Royal of Sweden, by men whose discernment showed them where the decisive point lay, and whose moral courage rendered them equal to the task of enforcing it upon the commander. Sir Charles Stewart and General Pozzo di Borgo were officially attached to his headquarters on the part of their respective courts, and both possessed great influence with his royal highness; for the former had the disbursement of the British subsidies, and the latter was the accredited diplomatist and personal favourite of Alexander. Indefatigable were the efforts which these ardent men made at this crisis to overcome the backwardness of the prince royal, and bring forward his powerful force, fifty thousand strong, to the support of Blucher, who was always in the front, and might be exposed from that cause, if not adequately backed, to the most serious danger. Not only did Sir Charles personally remonstrate, in the most energetic manner, on the 14th and 15th, against the pernicious and eccentric direction which Bernadotte was giving to his troops, and which had the effect of excluding them from all share in the action of the 16th; but on the morning of that day he addressed to him a written remonstrance, penned with respect, but military frankness, and breathing a warm, but not undeserved spirit of patriotic indignation.* These efforts, which were vigorously seconded by Blucher and Pozzo di Borgo, at length produced the desired effect: the circuitous sweep, indeed, which Bernadotte had given to his troops, saved Ney from destruction, and doubled Blucher's losses on the 16th; but at length he was brought forward to his ground. On the night of the 16th, Bernadotte slept at Landsberg, and on the evening of the 17th he was on the heights of Breitenfeldt,

* Bout., 125, 126. Jom., iv., 464, 465.
† Lond., 160, 161. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 136.

* These letters are very curious, and remain enduring monuments both of the tortuous policy at that period of Bernadotte, and of the clear military discernment and unflinching moral courage of the Marquis of Londonderry. At 9 A.M. on the 16th, he wrote to the prince royal as follows: "According to the report of General Blucher, the enemy has quitted Dolitch. It is of the last importance, according to my ideas, that the army of your royal highness should move to the left behind Dolitch; the marshes and defiles render such a movement free of all risk, and your royal highness will then be in a situation to take a part in the approaching battle, which will be more decisive with your army and military talents. As the whole enemy's force are in the environs of Leipsic, permit me to observe that the moments are precious. The English nation has its eye upon you: it is my duty to address you with frankness. The English nation will never believe that you are indifferent, provided the enemy is beaten, whether you take a part in the battle or not. I venture to beseech your royal highness, if you remain in the second line, to send forward Captain Bogue, with the rocket brigade, to General Blucher, to act with the cavalry." Bernadotte, however, still hung back, and, by Blucher's desire, Sir Charles galloped to his headquarters, and found the Russians only at Landsberg: *the Prussians a march behind the Russians, and the Swedes a march behind the Prussians.* He could not obtain an interview with the prince royal, but got from General Adlercrentz a promise to send forward 3000 horse next morning. Sir Charles then returned to Blucher, took part in the action, and, after it was over, rode back to Halle, where Bernadotte had still not arrived, and wrote to him the following laconic epistle: "Halle, 9 P.M., 16th Oct.—I have just come from General Blucher's field of battle. I have the honour to lay before your royal highness the details of the action. I venture to supplicate your royal highness to march, the moment you receive this letter, on Taucha. There is not an instant to lose: your royal highness has pledged your word to me to do so. I must now address you as a friend. *I speak now as a soldier; and, if you do not commence your march, you will repent it as long as you live.*" To a soldier and a gentleman this was sufficient, and Bernadotte at length moved next morning, and reached his ground on the evening of the same day. He was, however, most indignant at this freedom, and the first time he saw Sir Charles afterward, he said, "Comment! Général Stewart, quel droit avez vous de m'écrire? Ne rappelez vous pas que je suis Prince de Suede, *un des plus grands généraux de l'age?* Et si vous étiez à ma place, que penseriez vous si quelqu'un vous écrivoit comme vous m'avez écrit?" The Gascons are always true to their name and character. He soon, however, recovered his good-humour; and when the Marquis and Marchioness of Londonderry visited Sweden, in 1838, on their way to St. Petersburg, he received them, much to his credit, with the most distinguished kindness and hospitality.—LONDONDERRY, 162, 177; *War in Germany;* and personal information.

immediately in the rear of Blucher's army. His conduct on this occasion, as on many others during the campaign, was not owing either to want of military discernment or physical resolution, but to secret views of political ambition. He clearly foresaw and anxiously desired the fall of Napoleon, but he had no wish to have a hand in completing either his destruction or that of his army; being repelled as much by a natural feeling of patriotic attachment to the land of his birth, as by a conviction that such a catastrophe would prove an insurmountable bar to his own ascent of the vacant throne on which he had already set his heart.*

Changes in Napoleon's position during the night.

Considerable changes, during the night of the 17th, were made by Napoleon in the disposition of his troops. At two in the morning, seeing that no answer had been returned to the propositions he had sent through Meerfeldt, he prepared for battle, and made the requisite contraction of the circle which his troops occupied, to enable them to withstand the prodigious force by which they were to be assailed. He had now brought up his whole reserves from Duben; and Regnier, with his Saxons, now reduced to eight thousand men, had joined the standards of Ney on the Partha. The whole army effected a change of front to the left, the left wing being thrown back, and Connewitz, on the extreme right, serving as the pivot. Poniatowsky remained fixed there, on the edge of the Elster; and the whole army, now not numbering more than a hundred and sixty thousand combatants, was arranged in a semicircle, facing outward from that point to the extreme left, which rested on the Partha to the north of Leipsic. The line, thus contracted, abandoned Wachau, Lieberwolkwitz, and the heights in their rear, the object of such fierce contention on the preceding day; it ran from Connewitz to Probstheyda, in which last village Victor was stationed. Macdonald fell back to Holzhausen; Lauriston, at Stoeteritz, was a reserve to the two latter corps; while the Imperial Guard, under Napoleon in person, on the Thonberg, near the Tobacco-windmill, still occupied a central position, from which he could succour any point that might be peculiarly menaced. Bertrand remained in his old position at Lindenau, and detachments in observation merely occupied the villages to the westward of Tweinainsdorf and Moelkau, round to Ney's army, which was in position immediately to the north of Leipsic on the Partha; Regnier at Paunsdorf, opposite Taucha; Ney at Santa Thecla, and Oudinot at Neutsch. Uneasy about his retreat, Napoleon repaired, at three in the morning, to Lindenau, where he had a conference with Bertrand, who received orders to push forward an advanced guard and occupy Weissenfels, on the road to Mayence, which was done before noon on the same day. The position of the French army around Leipsic, with its flanks secured from being turned by the Elster and the Partha, and the old walls of the town itself as a great redoubt in its centre, was undoubtedly strong, and hardly liable, if bravely defended by such a force as Napoleon's, to be forced by any masses of assailants, how great soever. But it had a frightful defect, that it had but one issue for so vast a multitude of men, horse, cannon, and chariots in rear: resembling thus, in a striking manner, the position of the Russians, with the Alle at their backs, in front of Friedland,* of which Napoleon had taken such decisive advantage in the first Polish war.†

Dispositions of Prince Schwartzenberg for the attack.

Schwartzenberg, on his side, made the requisite dispositions for following up his advantages, and pressing upon the columns of the French from all sides of the narrow circle into which they had now retired. The Grand Army of Bohemia, and Benningsen's reserve from Poland, were formed into three columns: the right, under Benningsen's orders, composed of his own army, the corps of Klenau, and Ziethen's Prussians, was directed to advance from Gross Posna to Holzhausen; the centre, under Barclay de Tolly, who had the corps of Kleist and Wittgenstein under his command, with the grenadiers and guards in reserve, assembled near Gossa, and was to advance straight upon Wachau; while the left, under the direction of the Prince of Hesse-Homberg, consisting of Meerfeldt's and Colloredo's Austrians, his own reserve, and Lichtenstein's men, was to move forward by the edge of the Elster, from Connewitz and Mark-Kleberg, on Doelitz and Leipsic. To the north of Leipsic, also, the prince royal and Blucher, now nearly a hundred thousand strong, had made their arrangements for a decisive engagement: the former, with the corps of Langeron, as well as his own troops, under his orders, was to cross the Partha, turn Ney's right, and force him back upon Leipsic, from the side of Taucha, and the road to Wittenberg; while Blucher, with his two remaining corps of Sacken and D'York, was to remain on the right bank of the Partha, and drive all before him who should remain on that side of the river. The forces of the allies were more numerous than had ever been assembled in one field during modern times, for they mustered two hundred and eighty thousand combatants, with nearly fourteen hundred guns; and in intrinsic strength and military equipment far exceeded any force ever collected for warlike purposes since the beginning of the world.‡◊

Oct. 18.

Commencement of the battle, and success of the allies on their left.

At length the battle of giants commenced. THE 18TH OF OCTOBER dawned, and the last hour of the French Empire began to toll. At nine, Napoleon took his station on the Thonberg: the enemy's columns were already approaching with rapid strides on all sides, and their heads were soon seen surmounting the hills of Wachau, and driving, like chaff before the wind, the French detachments which were stationed to retard their advance in the intermediate villages. Inexpressibly aw-

* Lond., 162, 170.

* *Ante*, ii., 535.

† Bout., 128, 129. Jom., iv., 464, 466. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 137, 138. Vaud., i., 211, 212.

‡ Bout., 128, 131. Jom., iv., 466, 467. Vaud., i., 212, 213. Kausler, 945, 946.

◊ Mardonius, at Platæa, is said to have had 300,000 men, and the Gauls, when they blockaded Cæsar in his lines around Alesia, had 240,000; but neither of these armies could bear any comparison, in the number of real soldiers and military strength, with the host which fought under the allied banners at Leipsic, which was 280,000, with 1384 pieces of cannon.

ful was the spectacle which their advance afforded to the agitated multitude who thronged the steeples of Leipsic. As far as the eye could reach, the ground was covered with an innumerable multitude of men and horses: long, deep masses marked the march of the infantry; dazzling lines of light indicated the squadrons of cavalry; the glancing of the bayonets in the rays of the sun sparkled like crests of foam on a troubled ocean; while a confused murmur, arising from the neighing of horses, the march of the columns, and rolling of the guns, was heard like the roar of a distant cataract. The allied left, under the Prince of Hesse-Homberg, first came into action, and its success was brilliant and immediate; the resistance of the Poles on the banks of the Elster, under the brave Poniatowsky, proud of the rank of Marshal of France, worthily conferred on him the day before by the emperor, was indeed heroic, but they were unable to withstand the superior numbers and vehement attacks of the Austrians, under Bianchi and Colloredo, and gave ground. The danger on that side was soon imminent, for the victorious Austrians, driving the Poles before them, soon passed Doelitz and Loessnig, and menaced Connewitz and the suburbs of Leipsic—the only line of retreat to the army. Napoleon immediately repaired to the spot with two divisions of the Young Guard, under Oudinot, while the Old, under Mortier, was stationed in the rear, in the suburbs of Leipsic: the steady countenance of these veterans restored the combat; Prince Hesse-Homberg was wounded; and though the Poles were driven back, after hard fighting, to Connewitz, the action on this side ceased to be alarming, and all Bianchi's efforts could not dislodge Poniatowsky from that village, even with the aid of Giulay's corps, which Schwartzenberg despatched to his support.*

Desperate conflict at Probstheyda in the centre.

The village of Probstheyda formed the salient angle of the position occupied by the French around Leipsic, and as such it became, early in the day, the object of the most vehement contention between the opposite parties. In the first instance, the progress of the allies in the centre was rapid: Lieberwolkwitz and Wachau, the scenes of such bloody struggles on the 16th, were abandoned after a slight combat of advanced posts; the allied artillery were hurried forward, amid loud shouts, to the summit of the hills of Wachau, and soon two hundred pieces of cannon, arrayed along the heights, began to send an iron tempest into the French columns. But, meanwhile, Napoleon's batteries were not idle: sensible of the inferiority of their pieces in point of number to those of the enemy, the men endeavoured to supply the deficiency by the rapidity of their fire, and their guns were worked with extraordinary vigour. Every cannon that could be brought to bear on either side was hurried to the front; and soon eight hundred pieces of artillery discharged their fire, or played on the hostile masses, in a space of not more than half a league in breadth in the centre of the army. In the midst of this tremendous fire, Prince Augustus of Prussia and General Pirsch received orders, with Kleist's corps, to carry Probstheyda. Swiftly they moved over the intervening open space, and entered the village with such vigour, that they reached its centre before the onset could be arrested; but there they were met by Victor and Lauriston, at the head of dense masses, who combated with such resolution that they were driven back.*

Second attack on Probstheyda is repulsed by Napoleon in person.

Nothing daunted by this bloody repulse, Prince Augustus re-formed his men, and again rushed into the village, followed by Wittgenstein's Russians and nearly the whole of Kleist's corps. Such was the vehemence of their onset, that the French were entirely expelled; the fugitives and wounded overspread the plain, which extended towards Leipsic. Imposing masses, at the same time, displayed themselves towards Holzhausen, on the French left, and the centre seemed on the point of being forced. Napoleon instantly hastened to the spot with the remaining two divisions of the Young Guard: the steady columns made their way through the crowd of fugitives who were leaving the rear of the centre, and blocked up all the roads. Amid the clouds of dust which obscured the view, and the cries of the combatants, which drowned even the roar of the artillery, he preserved his usual calmness and decision, and, pushing forward to the front, arrested the tumult with two battalions of the Guard, and did not return to his station beside the windmill till he had entirely expelled the enemy from the village. Again the Russians under Wittgenstein and Benningsen's reserves were brought up to the attack, and dislodged the French; but a third time the invincible soldiers of Lauriston and Victor recovered their post, and hurled back the assailants, with dreadful loss, into the allied ranks.†

Operations on the allied right.

On the right, Ziethen's Prussians marched against Holzhausen and Zuckelhausen, at eleven o'clock in the forenoon, followed by a considerable part of Benningsen's Russians in reserve. In moving up they were charged in flank by Sebastiani's dragoons; but Pahlen's and Tschaplitz's cuirassiers speedily repulsed the charge, and drove back the enemy's horse with great loss into their own lines. At the same time, Platoff, with six thousand Cossacks, by a circuitous sweep, turned the extreme left of the French on this side, and threatened the rear of Macdonald's corps. He, in consequence, abandoned Holzhausen, and fell back to Stoeteritz, warmly pursued by the victorious Prussians; and the allied sovereigns, who had now advanced their headquarters to the sheepfold of Meusdorf, ordered an attack on that village. Such, however, was the vehemence of the fire of the French batteries of a hundred guns, posted on either side of Probstheyda—which, seeing their rear thus threatened, wheeled about, and opened with terrible execution on the flank of the attacking column—that, after having all but carried the village, it was forced to recoil, glad to seek shelter in the nearest hollows from the fearful tempest. Still farther to the allied right, Bubna's light horse, with a body of Platoff's

* Fain, ii., 418, 420. Bout., 130, 131. Vaud., i., 214. Jom., iv., 470.

* Fain, ii., 420, 422. Bout., 131, 132. Jom., iv., 470, 471. Vaud., i., 214, 215.

† Fain, ii., 419, 420. Bout., 131, 132. Jom., iv., 470, 471. Vaud., i., 214. Lab., i., 393.

Cossacks, pushed across the plain beyond the reach of the combatants, and opened up a communication with Bernadotte's outposts, which soon made their appearance from the direction of Taucha: united, they fell upon the rear of the Wirtemberg brigade of Normann, which straightway abandoned the colours of France, and ranged itself in the ranks of the father-land.*

The allies withdraw their columns, and open a combined fire of cannon.

Schwartzenberg, finding that the resistance of the enemy to the south of Leipsic was so obstinate, and that the assault of the villages was attended with such a fearful loss of life, and having received information of decisive success to the north, which would soon render the enemy's position untenable, ordered his columns over the whole semicircle to the south, to seek refuge in the nearest hollows from the dreadful effect of the enemy's batteries, and for the remainder of the day confined his attack on that side to another and more powerful arm. The whole cannon of the Grand Army, amounting to above eight hundred pieces, were brought forward to the front, arranged in the form of a vast semicircle, two leagues in length, from Loesnitz by the ridges of Wachau towards Holzhausen, and during the remainder of the day they kept up an incessant and most destructive fire on the enemy's columns. The French batteries in that direction, which numbered above five hundred pieces, answered with unconquerable vigour; but, independent of their inferiority in point of number, the position which the allied guns occupied was far superior, being stationed in great part on the heights commanding the whole plain, which the enemy had occupied on the preceding day, while their semicircular position caused their concentric fire to fall with redoubled severity on the dense and close masses of the French, the fire of whose batteries, on the other hand, spreading like a fan towards a wide circumference, was attended, comparatively speaking, with very little effect. Galled beyond endurance by the frightful discharge, Lauriston and Victor's men repeatedly, and almost involuntarily, rushed out of Probstheyda, and advanced with heroic resolution against the hostile batteries; but, as soon as they came within the range of grape-shot, the heads of the densest columns were swept away, and the broken remains recoiled, horror-struck, behind the shelter of the houses. For four mortal hours this awful scene lasted till nightfall; the allied batteries continuing, like a girdle of flame, their dreadful fire, while the French masses, devoted to death, still closed their ranks as they wasted away, but with unconquerable resolution maintained their ground. Close to Napoleon himself twelve guns were dismounted in a few minutes; from the ranks which immediately surrounded him some thousand wounded were carried back to Leipsic. In Probstheyda, Vial, Rochambeau, and several generals of inferior note, were killed, and great numbers wounded during this dreadful interval; but still their columns stood firm beneath the tempest,† exhibiting a sublime example of human valour rising superior to all the storms of fate.

While this terrible conflict was going on to the south of Leipsic, Ney and Marmont had to maintain their ground against still more overwhelming odds on the banks of the Partha. At ten in the morning, Blucher, in pursuance of the plan agreed on, crossed that river, and marched to join the prince royal, who, on his part, broke up at eight from Brietenfeldt, and passed at Taucha and Mockau. Their united force, when they were both assembled, was little short of ninety thousand combatants, exceeding by fully forty thousand men the force which Ney could oppose to them; and they moved direct upon Leipsic by the right bank of the river. The French general, finding himself thus outnumbered, adopted the same change of front which Napoleon had followed to the south of Leipsic, and drawing back his men to Schoenfeld, Sellerhausen, and Stunts, extended across to Regnier's corps, which was established at Paunsdorf. Thus the whole French army was now arranged in a circle around the city, having its right, under Poniatowsky, resting on the Pleisse at Connewitz, and the extreme left, under Marmont, at the confluence of the Partha and Elster, below the gate of Rosenthal.*

Operations of Blucher and Bernadotte against Ney.

The first incident which occurred on this side was of ominous import, and depressed the French as much as it elated the allies. A brigade of Saxon cavalry, as soon as the Russians approached the heights of Heiter Bleik, where it was stationed, instead of resisting, passed over to the allied ranks. This example was speedily followed by two Saxon brigades of foot, with their whole artillery, consisting of twenty-two pieces; and the Wirtemberg horse of Normann, as already noticed, immediately after also went over to the enemy. This unparalleled event caused great consternation, as well it might, in Regnier's corps; for not only were they weakened, when already inferior in force, by full eight thousand men, but such was the exasperation of the Saxon cannoniers, that they pointed their guns, immediately after their going over, against the French lines, and tore in pieces the ranks of their former comrades by a pointblank discharge. The French general, reduced to the single division of Durutte, and threatened on the right by Bubna from the Bohemian army, and on the left by Bulow from that of the prince royal, was immediately compelled to fall back to Sellerhausen, almost close to Leipsic. Ney, informed of the catastrophe, hastened to re-enforce Regnier by Delmas's division of his own corps; while Marmont, to keep abreast of the retrograde movement in other points, withdrew his troops in a similar degree, with the exception of his extreme left, which still stood firm at Schoenfeld.†

Defection of the Saxons, and retreat of the French centre and right to the north of Leipsic

The allied troops, excited to the greatest degree by these favourable circumstances, now pressed forward at all points to encircle the enemy, and

Napoleon's effort on that side is defeated.

* Kausler, 948. Bout., 132. Jom., iv., 471. Vaud., i., 215.

† Fain, ii., 428, 429. Odel., ii., 30, 31 Vaud., i., 215. Bout., 133, 134.

* Kausler, 950. Bout., 135. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 141.

† Jom., iv., 471, 472. Bout., 136, 137. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 142. Lond., 172.

force them back, at the point of the bayonet, into the suburbs of Leipsic; while the French, roused to the highest pitch of indignation by the defection of their allies, made the most desperate and heroic resistance. No sooner was Napoleon informed of the defection of the Saxons, and that Schoenfeld, almost a suburb of Leipsic, was threatened, than, feeling the vital importance of preserving that city as his only line of retreat, he hastened with the cuirassiers of Nansouty, and a division of the Young Guard, to the menaced point. It was full time that succour should arrive; for when these veterans came up, Durutte and Delmas had been driven back close to Leipsic; the Swedish troops had penetrated to Kuhlgaesten, on the very edge of the city; while Langeron, furiously assaulting Schoenfeld, had three times penetrated into that village, and as often been dislodged by the heroic courage of Marmont's men. Nansouty and the Guards were immediately pushed forward by Durutte in the direction where there was a sort of chasm, filled up only by a cordon of light troops, between the extreme right of the army of Bohemia under Bubna, and the extreme left of the prince royal under Bulow. This powerful corps rapidly made its way, almost unresisted, in at the opening; but before it had advanced far, it was assailed with such vigour on the right by Bubna, and on the left by Bulow, supported by the English rocket brigade, under the able direction of Captain Bogue, that it was forced to retire, after Delmas had been slain, with very heavy loss.* At the same time, Schoenfeld was vehemently attacked by Count Langeron, and as gallantly defended by Marmont: five times did the Russians penetrate in with irresistible vigour, and five times were they driven out by the devoted courage of the French; Marmont's aide-de-camp was struck down by his side; General Compans was wounded; General Frederic killed in this terrible struggle. At length, at six at night, it was carried a sixth time, amid terrific cheers, and remained finally in the hands of the Russians; while four thousand of their bravest soldiers, and an equal number of its intrepid defenders, lay dead, or weltering in their blood, in its streets.†

Close of the battle, and commencement of Napoleon's retreat.

Such was the exhaustion of both parties by the long continuance of this mortal struggle, that neither for the remainder of the day were able to undertake any considerable operations. Gradually, however, and almost insensibly, the allies gained ground on every side. Bulow, following up his success against Durutte and Nansouty, carried the villages of Stuntz and Sellerhausen, and drove the French on the northeast back under the very walls of Leipsic; while Sacken attacked the suburb of Rosenthal, from which he was only repelled by the devoted valour of Dombrowsky's Poles and Arrighi's dragoons. But the near approach of the enemy on all sides now made it evident to Napoleon that the position of Leipsic had become untenable, and dispositions were made for a retreat. He had early in the forenoon re-enforced Bertrand, at Lindenau, with a considerable part of the reserves at Leipsic; and that general, driving Giulay before him, had succeeded in opening the road to Weissenfels, so that the principle line of their retreat was secured. Towards evening, the carriages and baggage of the army began to defile in that direction; and Blucher, observing the long files of chariots which filled the highway to France, immediately sent intimation to Schwartzenberg that the enemy was about to retreat, and despatched D'York's corps, which had been kept in reserve during the day, to move upon Halle, in order to anticipate his columns upon the left of the Saale.*

Night council held by Napoleon on the field.

Night came, more terrible even than day after such a conflict; for with it was brought the memory of the past, and the anticipation of the future. To the incessant roll of musketry, and the roar of two thousand cannon, succeeded a silence yet more awful, interrupted only by a casual shot from the sentries as they paced their rounds, and the hollow murmur which, over a field of such vast extent, arose from the cries of the horses and the groans of the wounded. Soon the bivouacs were spread, and the heavens, in the whole circumference of the horizon, were illuminated by the ruddy glow of innumerable watchfires. Silent and sad, Napoleon's marshals and generals assembled around him: little was said in the deliberations which succeeded; the position of the enemy, the dreadful circles of bivouac flames which surrounded them, the dead and the dying who environed them on every side, told but too plainly how near and imminent the danger had become. Sorbier and Dulauloy, the commanders of the artillery, were requested to report on the condition of the army's ammunition: they stated that above two hundred thousand cannon-shot had been discharged during the battle, and to renew it was impossible without thirty or forty thousand fresh troops, and some hundred caissons of ammunition. Neither could be obtained, for the last sabre and bayonet had been brought up on the preceding day: the grand park of ammunition had been deposited in Torgau, and Magdebourg and Erfurth were the nearest depôts of provisions. During this eventful conference, Napoleon, overcome with fatigue, fell asleep in the chair on which he sat; his hands rested negligently folded on his breast, and his generals, respecting the respite of misfortune, preserved a profound silence. Suddenly, at the end of a quarter of an hour, he awoke, and casting a look of astonishment on the circle which surrounded him, exclaimed, "Am I awake, or is it a dream!" Soon recollecting, however, what had happened, he sent a message to the King of Saxony, announcing his intention to retreat, and leaving it to him either to follow his fortunes, or remain where he was, and conclude a separate peace with the allies.†

* This was the first occasion that this new and most formidable implement of modern warfare was brought into action. Such was its effect upon the enemy, that a solid square of French infantry, upon the flank of which it opened its fire, surrendered in a few minutes. Hardly was this brilliant success achieved, when the commander of the brigade, Captain Bogue, a noble and patriotic officer, struck on the breast by a cannon-ball, expired.—See LONDONDERRY, 172.

† Bout., 137, 138. Jom., iv., 474, 475. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 142. Lond., 172, 173. Kausler, 950.

* Bout., 138, 139. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 144. Fain, ii., 430. Kausler, 951, 952.

† Odel., ii., 34, 35. Fain, ii., 430, 431.

Dreadful state of Leipsic during the night.

No words can describe the state of horror and confusion in which the inhabitants of Leipsic were kept during the whole night which followed the battle. The prodigious multitude of wounded who had been brought in during the day had filled to overflowing every house it contained; the maimed and the dying were lying, without either bandages for their wounds or covering for their bodies, in the streets; while the incessant rolling of artillery-wagons and caissons, on every avenue leading to Lindenau, the cries of the drivers, the neighing of the horses as the wheels of the carriages were locked together, and the continued march of the columns, kept every eye open, in that scene of unutterable wo, during the whole night. At eight, Napoleon left his bivouac on the Thonberg, and took up his quarters in the Hotel of Prussia. His horses were ordered to be ready to start at a moment's notice; but he himself sat up till daylight, with Berthier, Maret, and Caulaincourt, receiving reports and dictating orders. The King of Saxony, amid the wreck of his fortunes, was chiefly inconsolable from the defection of his troops during the battle, and repeatedly requested counsel from Napoleon how he should act in the crisis. But the emperor had the generosity to leave him altogether unfettered in the course he was to pursue; and more than once expressed his admiration of the constancy of a prince who showed himself the same now, when surrounded by disaster, as when he inscribed on his triumphal arches the words, "To Napoleon, the grateful Frederic Augustus."*

French dispositions for a retreat on the following morning.

Early on the morning of the 19th, the allied generals made preparations for a general attack on Leipsic. By daybreak the French army was in full retreat on all sides. Victor and Augereau, with the whole five corps of cavalry, defiled across the suburb of Lindenau, and issued forth over the chaussée which traversed the marshes of the Elster; but this was the sole issue for the army: one single bridge over that river was alone to receive the prodigious concourse of soldiers and carriages; for no orders to form other bridges had been given, excepting one of wood, which speedily gave way under the multitude by which it was beset. Regnier, with the division Durutte, which alone remained to him, was charged with the defence of the suburb of Rosenthal; Ney withdrew his troops into the eastern suburbs; while the corps of Lauriston, Macdonald, and Poniatowsky entered the town and took a position behind the barriers of the south. They were destined to the honourable post of the rear-guard; but, though the two former still numbered twenty-five thousand combatants, the Poles had been reduced, by their two days' bloody fighting on the banks of the Elster, to two thousand seven hundred men.† The total loss of the French army, in the two preceding days, had been fully forty thousand men; but nearly sixty thousand were still in Leipsic, besides an equal number who were defiling on the road to France: the barriers were all strongly palisaded, the adjacent walls and houses loopholed; and such a force, defending house by house the suburbs of the city so strengthened, could certainly, it was hoped, make good the post till the evacuation of the ammunition-wagons and cannon was effected.*

Dispositions of the allies for the assault of Leipsic.

No sooner were the allied troops made aware of the preparations in the French army for a retreat, than a universal cry of joy burst from the ranks, and the whole army, almost by involuntary movement, stood to their arms, and loudly demanded to be led on to the assault. The allied sovereigns hastened to profit by this universal burst of enthusiasm, and their dispositions were promptly made. Sacken advanced against the suburb of Halle, supported by Langeron as a reserve. Bulow prepared to storm the barriers of Hinther-Thor, and Kuhl-Garten Thor, on the east; Woronzoff was to move against the barrier of Grimma, on the south-east; while Benningsen and the advanced columns of the Grand Army assaulted the barriers of Sand, Windmuhl, and Munz, on the south. A prodigious multitude of artillery-wagons and chariots obstructed the approaches to the town in that direction; and the French troops, lining all the walls, gardens, enclosures, and windows of the suburbs, were evidently preparing for a desperate resistance; but the allied columns, flushed with victory and burning with enthusiasm, pushed rapidly forward with inexpressible enthusiasm. The instructions of Trachenberg had been executed to the letter: gradually and skilfully contracting the circle within which the enemy's movements were circumscribed, they were at length preparing to meet at the appointed rendezvous, in the centre of his camp.†

Napoleon's last interview with the King of Saxony, and his departure from Leipsic.

Before the assault commenced, a deputation from the magistrates of Leipsic waited on the Emperor Alexander, beseeching him to spare the city from the horrors with which it was menaced if it were carried by open force; and, at the same time, a flag of truce arrived from Macdonald, offering to surrender all that remained of the Saxon troops, with the town, if the French garrison were permitted to retire with their artillery unmolested. This proposal, which would, in effect, have secured the retreat of half the French army, was of course rejected, and the troops moved on to the attack. Meanwhile, Napoleon, at ten o'clock, went to pay a farewell visit to the King of Saxony. He was received with the accustomed etiquette, and conducted into the apartment of the queen, where he remained a quarter of an hour, endeavouring to console the aged monarch in his misfortunes: at length, hearing the rattle of musketry, both on the side of the suburb of Taucha and Grimma, he bade him adieu, and, mounting his horse, set off. In the first instance, he directed his course towards the gate of Ranstadt, which leads into the suburb of Lindenau; but when he arrived there, the crowd of horsemen, carriages, and foot-soldiers was so prodigious, that even the authority of the em-

* Fain, ii., 432, 433. Odel., ii., 36, 37.

† "Prince," said Napoleon to Poniatowsky, "you will defend the suburb of the south." "Sire," replied he, "I have few followers left." "What, then," rejoined Napoleon, "you will defend it with what you have?" "Ah! sire," replied the descendant of the Jagellons, "we are all ready to die for your majesty."—Fain, ii., 434.

* Fain, ii., 433. Kausler, 852. Odel., ii., 38, 39. Vaud., i., 219.

† Bout., 143, 144. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 148, 149.

peror's attendants could not clear a passage through them, and he was obliged to retrace his steps. He then returned through the centre of the city, issued on the opposite side by the gate of St. Pierre, when the bullets were already falling around him, rode round the boulevards, and again reached Ranstadt, by making the entire circuit of the city. There, however, new dangers awaited him; for the confusion of carriages, artillery, and chariots in the streets of the suburb was such, that to penetrate the mass was impossible; while the rapid approach of the enemy, whose deafening cheers were already heard surmounting the roar of the musketry, rendered the moments precious, and instant escape indispensable. In this extremity, one of the citizens pointed out a lane by which he got into a garden, by the back door of which he escaped out on the banks of the Elster, and reached the chaussée beyond the suburb, and hastened across the marshes to Lindenau. Had it not been for that casual discovery, he would undoubtedly have been made prisoner.*

Leipsic is carried on all sides, after a vigorous resistance.

Meanwhile, the allied columns were pressing in on all sides; and the tumult in the interior of the city was such, that it was with the utmost difficulty, and only by the most energetic efforts on the part of Poniatowsky, Lauriston, and Macdonald, who were charged with the maintenance of the post as long as possible, that any degree of order could be preserved in the defence. Despairing of the possibility of carrying off their innumerable artillery-wagons and chariots, the French set fire to three hundred which were in park before the gate of Dresden; and the sight of the flames, by rendering it certain that the enemy intended to evacuate the place, redoubled the ardour of the allied troops. The resistance, however, was beyond expectation vigorous. Sacken was twice repulsed from the suburb of Halle beyond the Partha, and only succeeded, at length, in forcing his way in by the aid of Langeron's corps, and the sacrifice of almost the whole regiment of Archangel. Still the arch over the Partha and the inner suburb were to be carried; but the Russians crossed the bridge in the face of two heavy guns pouring forth grapeshot, and, driving down the main street, commenced a murderous warfare with the French, who were firing from the windows and tops of the houses. At the same time, an obstinate conflict was going on at the barrier of Hinther-Thor, where Bulow, supported by six Swedish battalions, after a furious conflict, at length forced the gate, and commenced a guerilla warfare with the French at the windows and in the houses. The assailants, however, were now pouring in on all sides, and farther resistance was unavailing. Woronzow, at the head of several Russian battalions, forced the barrier of Grimma; Krasowski stormed that of the hospital; while Benningsen and the advanced guard of the Grand Army carried those of Sand, Windmuhl, and Pegau, looking to the south. On all sides the allied troops poured like a furious torrent into the city—the very steeples shaking with their hurrahs—bearing down all opposition, and driving before them an enormous mass of soldiers, carriages, artillery, and wagons, which, with the rear-guard everywhere, yet bravely fighting, was rolled slowly onward towards the west, like a huge monster, bleeding at every pore, but still unsubdued.*

Blowing up of the bridge over the Elster, and surrender of the French rear-guard.

At this dreadful moment the great bridge of Lindenau, the only remaining passage over the Elster, was blown into the air with a frightful explosion. The corporal charged with the mine which had been run under it by orders of Napoleon, hearing the loud hurrahs on all sides, and seeing some of the enemy's tirailleurs approaching in the gardens of the suburbs on either hand, naturally conceived that the French troops had all passed and the baggage only remained, and that the time was therefore come to fire the train, in order to stop the pursuit of the allies. He accordingly applied the match; the arch was blown into the air, and the passage stopped; while the only other bridge over the river, hastily and imperfectly constructed, had shortly before sunk under the weight of the crowds by which it was beset. A shriek of horror, more terrible than even the loudest cries of battle, burst from the dense multitude which crowded to the edge of the chasm, when they found the arch destroyed; the ranks immediately broke, the boldest threw themselves into the river, where a few escaped across, but the greater part perished in the deep and muddy channel. Macdonald, by great exertions, succeeded in reaching the brink, and, plunging in, swam his horse across, and escaped. Poniatowsky also reached the side, and spurred his horse on; but the gallant charger, exhausted with fatigue, reeled as he strove to mount the opposite bank, and fell back on his noble rider, who perished in the water; Lauriston, Regnier, and twenty other generals, with fifteen thousand soldiers, were made prisoners; besides twenty-three thousand sick and wounded who lay in the hospitals and private houses. Two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, nine hundred chariots and ammunition-wagons, an incalculable quantity of baggage, the King of Saxony, two generals of corps, seven generals of division, twelve of brigade, and thirty thousand other prisoners, constituted the trophies, during the three days of a battle in which the total loss of the French was upward of sixty thousand men. The loss of the allies was also immense: it amounted to nearly eighteen hundred officers and forty-one thousand private soldiers, killed and wounded, in the three days' combat. A prodigious sacrifice; but which, great as it is, humanity has no cause to regret, for it delivered Europe from French bondage, and the world from revolutionary aggression.†‡

* Odel., ii., 333 note and 41. Fain, ii., 439, 440. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 149.

* Bout., 143, 146. Vaud., i., 221. Jom., iv., 480, 481. Fain, ii., 441.

† Bout, 146, 149. Odel., ii., 39, 41. Jom., iv., 479, 481. Fain, ii., 442, 443. Vaud., i., 222. Lond., 174, 175.

‡ The following is the exact proportion in which the total loss was divided between the different powers whose troops were engaged, and affords a pretty fair criterion of the degree in which the weight of the contest fell upon them respectively:

	Officers.	Non-comd. Officers and Privates.
Russians	800	20,000
Prussians	620	13,500
Austrians	360	7,000
Swedes	10	300
	1790	40,800
		42,590

—KAUSLER, 952.

Entrance of the allied sovereigns into Leipsic. October 19.

At two o'clock the carnage ceased at all points; the rattle of musketry was no longer heard, and a distant roar in all directions alone indicated that the waves of this terrible tempest were gradually sinking to rest. But what pen can paint the scene which the interior of the city now exhibited? Grouped together in wild confusion, lay piles of the dead and heaps of the dying; overturned artillery caissons, broken guns, pillaged baggage-wagons, and dejected prisoners, were to be seen beside exulting bands of the victors, and dense columns of the allies, who in admirable order forced their way through the throng, and, amid cheers that made the very welkin to ring, moved steadily forward towards the principal square of the city. On the side of the suburb of Machranstadt, in particular, the frightful accumulation of wounded fugitives, and as yet unwounded but captive warriors, recalled the awful image of the passage of the Beresina. Amid this unparalleled scene, the allied sovereigns, at the head of their respective troops, made their entrance into the city. The Emperors of Russia and Austria, with the King of Prussia, surrounded by their illustrious generals and brilliant staffs, came by the barriers on the south, the Prince Royal of Sweden by those on the east, and all met in the great square. At this heart-stirring sight, the enthusiasm of the people knew no bounds: all felt as if themselves, and all dear to them, had escaped from death; the city resounded with acclamations, handkerchiefs waved from every window, and merry chimes rang from every steeple; and tears, more eloquent than words, rolling over almost every cheek, told that the tyrant was struck down, and Germany delivered.*

Commencement of Napoleon's retreat towards the Rhine.

While these scenes, outstripping even the splendour of Oriental imagination, were passing in the city of Leipsic, the French army, sad, disorganized, and dejected, was wending its way towards Machranstadt. The emperor, after passing the last bridge, that of the mill of Lindenau, ascended to the first floor of the windmill to examine the state of the army; but there his exhaustion was such that he fell asleep, and slept profoundly for some time, amid the distant roar of the cannon at Leipsic, and the din of horsemen, guns, and foot-soldiers, who hurried in a tumultuous torrent past the base of the edifice. Wakened by the explosion of the bridge, on the other side of the marshes, he hastily arranged some guns in battery, to guard against an immediate attack; but finding he was not pursued, and having learned the real nature of the catastrophe, he continued his course more leisurely to Machranstadt, where the whole guard had already arrived, and where headquarters were established for the night. But it was already apparent how much the continued fatigues and calamities they had undergone had weakened the authority of the emperor, and dissolved the discipline of the army. The troops, with feelings imbittered by misfortune, marched in sullen and moody desperation: no cheers were heard on the approach of the emperor; pillage and rapine were universal; the bonds of discipline, even in the Guard itself, were relaxed; and the officers appeared to have lost at once the power and the inclination to stop the disorder which prevailed.*

Movements of the allied troops after the battle.

On the side of the allies, a very considerable dislocation of the immense force which had combated at Leipsic immediately took place. Bernadotte, with the Swedes, and a considerable part of his army, as well as Benningsen's force, moved towards Hamburg, where the presence of Davoust, with a powerful corps, both required observation and promised an important acquisition. Klenau was detached towards Dresden, to aid in the blockade of St. Cyr, who, with thirty-five thousand men, was now altogether cut off, and might be expected speedily to surrender. Blucher, with the corps of Langeron and Sacken, moved after the French on the great road to Mayence, and reached Skenditz the same night. D'York was advanced to Halle, and Giulay, with his Austrians, marched on Pegau; but the great body of the allied army, worn out with its toils, remained in the neighbourhood of Leipsic. These movements, and, in particular, the speedy removal of Bernadotte from the headquarters of the allied sovereigns to a separate, but yet important command, were recommended not less by their military importance than by political considerations of yet greater weight. The Grand Alliance, though higherto faithful to itself, and prosperous beyond what the most sanguine could have anticipated, was composed of materials which, when the pressure of common danger was removed, could hardly be expected to draw cordially together. Bernadotte, in particular, could not be an object of very warm interest to the Emperor Francis, by whom his insults at Vienna, fourteen years before, when ambassador of the Directory, were far from being forgotten;† his backwardness, especially in the employment of the Swedish troops, during the whole campaign, was well known at headquarters; and he himself, as he admits, felt that he was in a false position, and that he would be better at a distance from the scene of French carnage and humiliation.‡◊

The funeral of Prince Poniatowsky terminated the last scene of this bloody drama. Vic-

Great part of the French military writers, following the example of Napoleon's official account in the *Moniteur*, have ascribed the catastrophe of the 19th entirely to the accidental blowing up of the bridge, by the corporal on guard, before the prescribed time. It is evident, however, that a single bridge could never have permitted so vast a mass as fifteen thousand soldiers, two hundred and fifty guns, and eight hundred chariots, to defile across in less than an hour, especially when the enemy were pressing the rear of the mass vigorously on all sides; and in the confusion of such a multitude of stragglers to get forward, with the musketry and cheers of the victors approaching on all sides, the passage would necessarily be speedily choked. This is, accordingly, admitted by the more judicious of the eyewitnesses in the French ranks: "Du reste, ceux qui furent coupés séraient de même tombés entre les mains de l'ennemi. Sans cet accident, l'impossibilité de sortir autrement que *l'étroit passage d'une seule porte*, les eut également livrés aux alliés, qui avaient toute facilité de passer l'Elster sur d'autres points."—ODELEBEN, *Témoin Oculaire*, ii., 41.

* Lond., 173, 174. Lab., i., 413.

* Fain, ii., 444. Odel., i, 43, 44. † *Ante*, i., 562.

‡ Fain, ii., 449, 450. Mem. de Charles Jean, ii., 100.

◊ "The prince royal lost no time in quitting Leipsic, and moved in the direction of Hamburg. The fact is, that at Leipsic he was in a false position. The sight of every dead body, of every wounded man, of every French prisoner, awakened in his breast the most cruel feelings."—*Mémoires de Charles Jean*, ii., 100.

Funeral of Prince Poniatowsky. October 20.

tors and vanquished vied with each other in striving to do honour to the hero, who, faithful to his country and his oaths, exhibited, amid the general defection of Europe, the glorious example of unconquerable firmness and unshaken fidelity. After bravely combating at the head of his heroic but wasted band of followers, in the suburbs of Leipsic, to retard the advance of the allies, he was retiring to the banks of the Pleisse, still keeping up a desperate resistance, when an explosion was heard, and the cry arose that the bridge was blown up. "Gentlemen," said he to the officers around him, drawing his sword, "it now behooves us to die with honour." At the head of this gallant band he made his way, though severely wounded, through a column of the allies which strove to intercept his retreat, and reached the banks of the Pleisse, which he succeeded in passing by dismounting from his horse. Exhausted with fatigue and loss of blood, he mounted another, and, seeing no other possibility of escape, plunged into the deep stream of the Elster, and by great exertions reached the other side. In striving, however, to mount the opposite bank, the hind feet of the horse were entangled in the mud; it fell backward, and the exhausted chief sunk to rise no more. His funeral was celebrated with extraordinary pomp by the allied sovereigns, who hastened to do honour to a warrior whose military career had been unsullied, and who, in the last extremity, preferred death to surrender; but a still more touching testimony to his worth was borne by the tears of the Poles, who crowded round his bier, and anxiously strove to touch the pall which covered the remains of the last remnant of their royal line, and the last hopes of their national independence.*

March of the French army to Weissenfels, Oct. 20.

On the day following his dreadful defeat, Napoleon arrived at Weissenfels. In passing over the plain of Lutzen, the soldiers cast a melancholy look on the theatre of their former glory, and many shed tears at the sad reverse of which it exhibited so striking a monument. What had availed them the efforts made, the sacrifices endured, the blood shed, since that heroic combat had been maintained? Where were now the young hearts which then beat high, the glittering hopes that were then formed, the ardent visions which then floated before them "in life's morning march, when their bosoms were young?" Before the bloodstained environs of Kaia and Starsiedel, defiled, in wild confusion, the tumultuous array of a beaten, dejected, and half-famished army: three fourths of those who there had fought so bravely for the independence of France had since perished, or were now captives; the few that remained, more like a funeral procession than a warlike array, passed on pensive and silent; they envied the lot of those who had fallen, for they would not witness the degradation of France.

> "The boast of chivalry, the pomp of power,
> And all that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave,
> Await alike the inevitable hour—
> The paths of glory lead but to the grave."

The Old Guard halted at Rippail, near the spot where Bessières had been slain the day before the battle of Lutzen, and there Napoleon experienced a momentary gratification in seeing a column of five thousand Austrian prisoners, with all the standards taken at Dresden, defile before him. But this enjoyment was of short duration. As the corps and regiments, in utter disorder, and for the most part mingled together, crowded past, it became painfully evident that all the Germans had left their colours; several even of the Polish regiments had passed over to the enemy; of Poniatowsky's followers, only six hundred foot-soldiers and fifteen hundred horsemen remained, and they had engaged to abide by the emperor's standards only for eight days more. Already the allies were pressing the rear of the army: Sacken's cavalry, under Wassilchikow, had made two thousand prisoners; and the great road being cut off by Giulay, who from Pegau had moved on Naumburg, it became necessary to throw bridges over the Saale, in order to gain, by a cross march, the other highway at Freyberg. Such was the emotion of Bertrand, who received the emperor at Weissenfels, and there first became acquainted, from the confusion of the columns, with the magnitude of the disaster that had been sustained, that he shed tears, and openly besought him to hasten forward, even if it were alone, to Erfurth and Mayence, and preserve in his person the fortunes of France.*

Pursuit of the allies to Freyberg.

On the day following, the retreat was continued in the direction of Freyberg; but, as they could not reach that place, the emperor passed the night in a cabin on the roadside, only nine feet square. Blucher and Sacken, continuing the pursuit, arrived the same day at Weissenfels, and immediately set about the construction of new bridges in lieu of the wooden ones, over which the French had passed, which had been destroyed. Burning with anxiety to overtake the enemy, the Prussian hussars pushed on the moment the passage was practicable, and came up with them at the passage of the Unstrutt at Freyberg, where, after a sharp conflict, the rear-guard was overthrown, with the loss of a thousand prisoners, eighteen guns, and an immense quantity of ammunition and baggage. On the same day, Giulay had a more serious affair with the enemy at the defile of Roeson. That position, which is extremely strong towards Naumburg, offers scarce any obstacles to an enemy advancing from the left of the Saale. Bertrand, accordingly, without difficulty, dislodged the enemy from it; and, once master of the defile, its strength in the other direction enabled him easily to maintain himself in it against the repeated attacks of the Austrian corps. The passage of the Unstrutt at Freyberg, however, evinced in striking colours the disorganized state of the army. Such was the accumulation of cannon and chariots on the opposite hill, that Napoleon's carriages were unable to get through, and he himself was obliged to alight and make his way on foot, which he did with extreme difficulty, through the throng. When the enemy's guns began to play on the dense mass, the most frightful disorder ensued: every one rushed headlong towards the bridges, and the bullets began to whistle over the head of Napoleon

Oct. 21.

* Lab., i., 409, 410. Rown Portefeuille de 1813, ii., 420, 421.

* Fain, ii., 452, 453. Bout., 150. Odel., ii., 44, 47. Vict et Conq., xxii., 152.

himself. Finding that he could no longer be of any service, he calmly turned aside the favourite bay horse which he had mounted, and, penetrating through several narrow and difficult defiles, reached Eckartsberg, where he passed the night in the same house from whence, six months before, he had set out, radiant with hope, to try his fortune at the head of a brilliant host on the Saxon plains. Through the whole night, the army, like a furious torrent, never ceased to roll along in wild confusion, and with dissonant cries, under the windows of the apartment in which the emperor slept, where all was still and mournful as the grave.*

Napoleon arrives at Erfurth, where Murat leaves him.

During these days the greater part of the allied army marched by the main road through Naumburg and Jena; and, passing Weimar, took post on the road to Erfurth, near Nohra, while the army of the prince royal continued its march by Merseberg, in the direction of Cassel. In this way the latter repeated exactly the pursuit of the Grand Army by Kutusoff, on the parallel line of march from Malaroslawitz to Krasnoi; and contenting themselves with harassing the rear of the French army by the army of Silesia, compelled them, by this able disposition, to recoil on the wasted line of their former advance. On the 22d, the French retreated with such expedition over the great plains which stretched from the neighbourhood of Eckartsberg to Erfurth, that even the Cossacks were unable to overtake them; and on the following day they reached the latter town, where fortified citadels gave a feeling of security to the army, while the distribution of provisions from extensive magazines assuaged the pangs of hunger which were now so severely felt. Murat there quitted Napoleon, and bent his course for his own dominions. The pretext assigned for this departure was threatened disturbances in his dominions, and the necessity of providing for their defence in the dangers with which Italy would soon be menaced. But, though these reasons were plausible, and not altogether without foundation, his real motives were very different. A secret correspondence had commenced with Metternich; and the King of Naples, in the hope of preserving his crown in the general wreck, was preparing to abandon his brother-in-law and benefactor. Napoleon, who, ever since his desertion of his post on the Vistula, in the preceding spring, had watched his proceedings with a jealous eye, had no difficulty in divining his real motives; but he dissembled these feelings, and embraced his old companion in arms, as he parted with him, with a melancholy presentiment, which was too fatally realized, that he should never see him again.†

Oct. 22.

Oct. 23.

Stay of the French army at Erfurth, October 23 and 24.

Napoleon passed two days at Erfurth entirely engrossed in the labours of his cabinet. There he composed and sent off his famous bulletin, giving the account of the battle of Leipsic; from the place, and the very hotel, where, five years before, during the conferences with the Emperor Alexander, his fortunes had attained their highest elevation,‡ he now was doomed to date the narrative of his decisive overthrow. These two days' rest had a surprising effect in restoring the spirit and rectifying the disorders of the army; and then might be seen the clearest proof how much the rapid diminution which, since hostilities recommenced, the French army had undergone, had been owing to the almost total want of magazines of provisions for their subsistence, and the consequent necessity of individual pillage: all the effects of the abominable revolutionary maxim, that war should maintain war. So indignant was the emperor at this result of physical privations, which he never felt himself, that, on witnessing the effect of the magazines of Erfurth in restoring order, he said to the officers around, "Now, only see what a set they are; they are going to the devil. I shall lose eighty thousand men from hence to the Rhine in this manner." Even in this moment, however, when his beaten and dissolving army was only held together by the temporary supply of the magazines which they passed on their march, he was dreaming of fresh projects of conquest, and said repeatedly, "From hence to the Rhine—in spring I shall have two hundred and fifty thousand combatants." He was perfectly calm and collected in his manner, however; firm and unshaken in his views; and heard with equanimity all that was addressed to him, even on the necessity of making peace with the allies—the subject, of all others, the most repugnant to his secret thoughts.*

Reorganization of the French army.

The army underwent a great change of composition during its brief sojourn at Erfurth, eminently descriptive of the awful catastrophes which had recently thinned its ranks. All that remained were formed into six corps,† the sad remains of thirteen, which, when the armistice terminated, followed the standards of the emperor. Three whole corps, viz., those of Lauriston, Regnier, and Poniatowsky, had disappeared during the catastrophe of Leipsic, and never were heard of again in the French army. Oudinot's had been dissolved after the disaster of Dennewitz; two, viz., St. Cyr's and Vandamme's, had been left in Dresden; Davoust was in Hamburg, with detachments in Torgau and Magdebourg, and Rapp still held the ramparts of Dantzic. Above a hundred and ten thousand men were left to their fate in the garrisons on the Elbe. In Magdebourg alone there were thirty thousand; in Hamburg, twenty-five; in Dresden, thirty-five; in Torgau, fourteen thousand. The garrisons of these places had been swelled to this enormous amount by the multitude of stragglers, sick and wounded men, who sought a refuge under shelter of their walls, after the retreat of the Grand Army from the Elbe; but they proved rather a burden than an advantage to their garrisons, for they brought with them the seeds of physical contagion and mental depression, from the miseries and privations of the campaign, and augmented the number of mouths which pressed upon their now straitened supplies of provisions. The whole force which the emperor brought with him from Erfurth towards the Rhine was under ninety thousand men, while twice that number were

* Fain, ii., 457, 458. Odel., ii., 50, 55. Vaud., i., 224. Lab., i. † Fain, ii., 470, 471. Jom., iv., 484, 485.
‡ *Ante*, iii., 90.

* Odel., ii., 57, 58. Fain, ii., 465, 466.
† Commanded by Victor, Ney, Bertrand, Marmont, Augereau, and Macdonald.

left blockaded in the fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula: a most extraordinary and unparalleled result of the campaign, and saying little for the general plan of operations which he had adopted.*

Continued retreat of the French, and pursuit of the allies.

The stay of the emperor at Erfurth, even for two days, filled the citizens, most of whom had been reduced to destitution by the continued exactions of the French army, with the utmost anxiety, for they were afraid that, to complete their miseries, they were to be involved in the horrors of a siege. It was necessity, however, arising from the dilapidated state of the artillery, and the disorganized condition of his troops, which alone dictated this stoppage; and no sooner were the guns and caissons replenished from the magazines of Erfurth, and the troops partially fed and arranged in different corps, than the army resumed its march for the Rhine, and on the same day reached Gotha. Blucher, with unwearied activity, followed on its traces, and not only collected all the abandoned guns and captured the stragglers, but attacked and defeated the rear-guard near that town, with the loss of two thousand prisoners. The Grand Allied Army, with the headquarters of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, followed through the Thuringian forest; but so rapid was the retreat of the French towards the Rhine, that they were unable to keep pace with them, and beyond that woody region the task of pursuing the retiring columns was devolved on the Cossacks. These formidable light troops, however, under their renowned leaders, Platoff, Orloff Denizoff, Chernicheff, and Kowaiski, continued the pursuit with indefatigable perseverance; not only were all foraging parties on either side of the road cut off, but the whole stragglers made prisoners, and a vast quantity of abandoned guns and ammunition collected at every step. The certainty of being made prisoners had no effect in deterring a large part of the army from straggling. Such were the pangs they underwent from hunger, that they were often glad of a pretence for yielding themselves to the enemy for the sake of momentary relief; and the woods, for some leagues, were filled with isolated men, great part of whom sank, from pure exhaustion, into the arms of death. With the exception of the frost and snow, the retiring army presented the same appearances as in the Moscow retreat: desertion prevailed to a frightful extent, especially among the few troops of the Rhenish Confederacy which still adhered to the fortunes of Napoleon; the road was strewed, the ditches on either side filled, with the dead bodies of men and horses who had dropped down from the effects of fatigue and famine; and so rapid was the process of dissolution in the whole army, that it was hard to say, in the last days of the retreat, whether it was not melting away as fast as the host which retreated from Moscow had done under the severity of the Russian winter.†

While Napoleon, however, was thus making by rapid strides for the Rhine, a new and unexpected enemy was arising in that quarter, who threatened to intercept his retreat, and renew on the banks of the Maine the horrors of the Beresina. Bavaria, though the last to join the alliance, had taken the most decisive steps to demonstrate her sincerity in the new cause which she had adopted. No sooner were the cabinet of Munich relieved, by the march of Augereau for Leipsic, of the apprehensions excited by the presence of his corps near their frontier at Wurtzburg, than they yielded, as already mentioned, to the solicitations of the allies, and concluded a peace with the cabinet of Vienna on the 8th of October, in virtue of which Bavaria acceded to the Grand Alliance. Military operations of the highest importance were not slow in following upon this diplomatic conversion. The Bavarian army, under Marshal Wrede, which was stationed at Braunau, opposite to the Austrian corps under the Prince of Reuss, joined itself to the latter force, and both, united, set out in the middle of October in the direction of Frankfort on the Maine, under the command of Wrede. The whole consisted of three divisions of Bavarian infantry, and two brigades of cavalry, of that state; and two divisions of Austrian infantry and one of cavalry, and numbered fifty-eight thousand combatants. On the 19th they passed the Danube at Donauwerth, and Wrede marched with such expedition, that on the 27th headquarters were at Aschaffenburg, from whence he detached ten thousand men to Frankfort; and on the 29th he took post in the forest of HANAU, stationing his troops across the great road, and blocking up entirely the retreat of the French army to Mayence.*

March of Wrede and the Bavarians to the Rhine.

Oct. 25.

Oct. 15.

The forces which Napoleon brought back with him were much more considerable in point of numerical amount; but a large part of them were so completely disorganized and depressed by the privations they had undergone during their retreat, that the contest between the two armies could not be said to be unequal. Nearly ninety thousand men had set out around his standards from Erfurth; but ten thousand had strayed from their colours, or been made prisoners in the subsequent forced marches, and when the army approached the Maine, it did not number above eighty thousand combatants. Full thirty thousand of these, also, were either stragglers, or so far in the rear as to be of no value in the shock which was approaching; so that, to clear his passage, Napoleon could not rely upon more than fifty thousand men; and his once magnificent artillery of thirteen hundred pieces was reduced to two hundred guns. They were, for the most part, however, the artillery of the Guard, second to none in Europe for vigour and efficiency; and the troops, aware of their danger, ardently desirous to get back to France, and perfectly sensible that no other way remained but what they could win at their swords' point, might be expected to fight with the courage of despair. The Guards, moreover, upon whom the weight of the contest was likely to fall, had suffered comparatively little in the late disasters; and Bertrand's corps had been an entire stranger to the disasters of the

Forces with which Napoleon advanced against him.

* Fain, ii., 466, 467. Vaud., i., 225.

† Vict. et Conq., xxii., 153. Bout., 154, 155. Fain, ii., 472, 473. Lab., i., 415, 416.

* Jom., iv., 487. Bout., 154, 155. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 153.

last two days' combat at Leipsic. The emperor, therefore, who had slept on the 29th at Langen-Schold, the chateau of the Prince of Isemberg, no sooner heard that the road to Mayence was blocked up by the Bavarian troops, than he made his dispositions for an attack.*

Description of the field of battle at Hanau.

Wrede, who had driven the garrison of Wurtzburg into the citadel, and so secured the passage of that important town on the 27th, reached Hanau with his advanced guard on the 28th, and on the day following brought up the bulk of his forces to that town, and, stretching his line across the high road leading to Frankfort and Mayence, entirely stopped the way, and soon came into communication with the Cossacks of Chernicheff and Orloff Denizoff, which hovered around the outskirts of the French army. No sooner was the junction formed than the Bavarian general arranged his troops in order of battle, and the position which they occupied was so peculiar as to be entirely different from any which had formed the theatre of combat since the commencement of the Revolutionary war. The allied army stood in front of Hanau, the right wing resting on the Kenzig, and the left, in echelon, on the road from Erfurth to Frankfort. Sixty pieces of cannon were planted in the centre between the bridge of Gelnhausen over the Kenzig and the great road, to play on the advancing columns of the enemy when they attempted to debouch from the forest. The vanguard was posted at Ruckingen, with orders to retire from that post as soon as it was seriously attacked, and fall back to the main body of the army, which was drawn up across the great road in the plain which lies between the town of Hanau and the forest of Lamboi. A large body of troops occupied the forest, to retard the advance of the enemy: that great tract of wood extends for above two leagues in breadth towards Erfurth, and is composed of old oaks, many of them as large as those in Windsor Forest, whose aged stems at times rise out of close thickets of underwood, at others overshadow with their spreading boughs beautiful vistas of greensward, where numerous herds of swine feed on the acorns; realizing thus, in the days of Napoleon, that scene of primitive nature in Northern Europe, in the time of Richard Cœur de Lion, over which modern genius has thrown so enchanting a light.†‡

Advantages and weakness of Wrede's position there.

The position which the allied army thus occupied resembled, in a military point of view, that held by Moreau at the western side of the forest of Hohenlinden; and if Wrede had been in sufficient strength to keep his ground in front of the issues from the wood, and hinder the enemy from deploying, at the same time that a division was thrown across the thickets, on the flank of the advancing columns, like that of Richepanse at Hohenlinden, he might possibly have realized the brilliant success of the great Republican general on that memorable spot.◊ But his army was not in sufficient strength to effect such an object. After deducting three battalions, left to blockade the citadel of Wurtzburg, and ten thousand imprudently detached to Frankfort, he could not bring above forty-five thousand men into the field; and with such a force it was impossible to expect that the retreat of eighty thousand combatants, with two hundred pieces of cannon, fighting with the courage of despair, could be arrested, the more especially when the head of the columns was composed of the Old and Young Guard. Nor was the position of the allies exempt from peril; for, if they were defeated—and the French army was in a condition to follow up its successes—they ran the risk of being thrown back upon the Maine, and destroyed by superior forces, in attempting to make their way across that broad and deep river.*

Commencement of the action, and forcing of the passage by the French advanced guard.

At eleven o'clock on the forenoon of the 30th the battle commenced. The French columns, preceded by a cloud of tirailleurs, advanced in dense masses—the artillery following the great road, the light troops spread out in the thicket and greensward on either side—and soon a warm fire began in the forest. The dark recesses of the wood were illuminated by the frequent flashes of the musketry: the verdant alleys were hastily traversed by files of armed men, and the action began like a magnificent hunting party in the forest of Fontainebleau. Victor's and Macdonald's corps, now reduced to five thousand combatants, headed the advance, and with some difficulty made their way, fighting as they advanced, through the wood to the plain beyond it; but when they came there, and endeavoured to deploy on its southwestern skirts, they were crushed by the concentric fire of seventy pieces of cannon, which stood before the allied line, and for four hours the French army was unable to clear its way through the narrow plain which lay between the forest and the banks of the Kinzig. During this period, however, the Guards and main body of the French army had time to come up; and Napoleon, now seriously disquieted for his line of retreat, immediately ordered a general attack on the enemy. General Curial, with two battalions of the Old Guard, dispersed as tirailleurs, were brought forward to the front, and began to engage the Bavarian sharp-shooters; the hardy veterans soon gained ground, and won not only the issues of the forest, but part of the little plain scattered with oaks which lay beyond; and to the space thus won, the artillery of the Guard, under Drouot, was immediately brought forward. This admirable officer commenced his fire with fifteen guns; but they were gradually augmented to fifty, and soon acquired a decided superiority over the batteries of the enemy, whose artillery, though more numerous, returned the fire feebly, from an apprehension of exhausting their ammunition, the reserves of which had not yet come up from Aschaffenberg. Under cover of Drouot's terrible fire, Nansouty and Sebastiani debouched with the cavalry of the Guard, which had suffered less than any other part of the army in the preceding actions, and by a vigorous charge overthrew everything that was opposed to them. Wrede, seeing his danger, col-

* Fain, ii., 472, 473. Jom., ii., 487, 488. Bout., 157, 158. Vaud., i., 227, 228.

† Personal observation. Bout., 157. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 155. Fain, ii., 475.

‡ The opening scene of the forest in *Ivanhoe*.

◊ *Ante*, ii., 120.

* Jom., iv., 487, 488. Bout., 157. Vaud., i., 229, 236. Wrede's Official Account, Schoell, Recueil, iii., 388.

lected his cavalry, and the Bavarian horse and squares endeavoured to rally behind Chernicheff's Cossacks; but although the Russian dragoons combated bravely, they were unable to withstand the thundering charges of the French cuirassiers, and the pointblank discharge of the artillery of the Guard; and the whole left wing of the allies gave way and fled towards the Kinzig, leaving the plain between the river and the wood, and the road to Frankfort, open to the enemy. As a last resource, the Bavarian general made an effort on his right; but Napoleon quickly pushed forward two battalions of the Old Guard, who arrested his advance; and Wrede, despairing of success, withdrew the shattered remains of his army behind the Kinzig, under protection of the cannon of Hanau.*

Position and danger of Napoleon during the action.

While this vehement conflict was going on at the entrance of the wood, Napoleon himself, in the depths of the forest, was a prey to the most anxious solicitude. Fresh troops were continually coming up from the rear; but the highway and alleys through the forest were already blocked up with carriages and cannon, and the increasing multitude, when no issue could be obtained, only augmented the confusion and embarrassment in its wooded recesses. Napoleon, unquiet and anxious, was, meantime, walking backward and forward on the highway, near the bend which the road makes, conversing with Caulaincourt. A bomb fell near them in a ditch bordering the highway; the latter immediately placed himself between the emperor and the danger, and they continued their conversation, as if nothing had occurred. The attendants of the emperor hardly ventured to draw their breath; but the bomb had sunk so deep in the ditch, that it was prevented from bursting. Meanwhile the forest on all sides resounded with the echoes of artillery; the eye sought in vain to measure its depths, even with the aid of the bright flashes which illuminated their gloom; the crash of the cannon-balls was heard, with frightful violence, on the gnarled branches of the oaks; and not a few of the French were killed by the fall of the huge arms which had been torn from the sides of these venerable patriarchs of the forest by the violent strokes. When Wrede's last and desperate onset was made on the French left, in particular, the combatants approached so near that their cries were distinctly heard, and the tops of the trees were violently agitated, as in a hurricane, by the bullets which whistled through their branches. The repulse of that attack by the infantry of the Old Guard removed, indeed, the danger, and opened the road to Frankfort; but the emperor, notwithstanding, did not march on with the advanced guard, but spent the night in the forest, like Richard Cœur de Lion, beside a blazing watchfire under the oaks, where, next morning, he received a deputation from the magistrates of Hanau, who came to beseech him to spare their city the horrors of an assault.††

Capture and recapture of Hanau on the 31st.

During the night after the battle, the French army defiled, without intermission, on the great road by Wilhelmstadt, from whence it moved by Hochstadt on Frankfort. But, though the Guards and principal part of the army were thus placed beyond the reach of danger, it was not so easy a matter to say how the rear-guard, and the numerous stragglers who followed its columns, were to be brought through the perilous pass between the forest and the river. Late on the evening of the 30th, the rear-guard, under Mortier, was still at Gelnhausen, on the other side of the forest; and, in order to protect his retreat, Marmont was left before Hanau, with a considerable part of the army. At two in the morning of the 31st, he began to bombard the town, and with such effect, that it was evacuated early in the forenoon by the Austrian garrison, and immediately taken possession of by the French forces. No sooner was this *point d'appui* secured on the other side of the Kinzig, than Marmont attacked the right of the allies posted behind the road to Aschaffenberg, and with such impetuosity, that it was forced to give way, and thrown back in disorder on the Maine, where it must inevitably have been destroyed, if the Guards and cuirassiers of the French army had been at hand to support the advantage. They had, however, meanwhile, passed on towards Frankfort; and Marmont, in consequence, solicitous only to secure the passage of the rear-guard of Mortier, paused in the career of success, and at two in the afternoon fell back towards Hanau, followed by Wrede, who, stung to the quick by the disaster he had experienced, himself led on his forces, and stormed that town at the head of his troops; but, in pursuing the Italian rear-guard towards the Kinzig, he received a severe wound, which obliged him to relinquish the command. At the same time, another column of the allies drove the French over the bridge of Lamboi; but, pursuing their advantage too warmly in the plain in front of the forest, they were attacked in flank by a French column issuing from the woods, and driven back with great loss. These checks, and the wound of Wrede, rendered General Tresnel, who succeeded him in the command, more circumspect: relinquishing all hope of inflicting farther injury on the retreating army, he withdrew his troops behind the Kinzig, and Marmont continued his retreat to Frankfort, where, the same night, he was joined by Mortier with the rear-guard; who, having heard an exaggerated account of the losses of the army on the preceding day, had, by marching all the preceding night by Langensibold, succeeded by a circuitous route in avoiding the scene of danger.*

Oct. 31.

The battle of Hanau cost the allies ten thou-

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 156, 157. Bout., 158, 159. Fain, ii., 477, 479. Wrede's Official Report, Schoell, Rec., iii., 389.

† Fain, ii., 478, 479. Norvin's Portefeuille de 1813, ii., 431.

‡ The field of battle at Hanau is one of the most interesting of the many spots on the Continent of Europe to which the exploits of Napoleon have given durable celebrity, as well from the circumstance of its having been the theatre of the last of his German conflicts, as the extraordinary and romantic character of the old forest where the severest part of the action took place. When the author visited this spot, twenty-five years ago, the marks of the then recent conflict were everywhere conspicuous on the huge trunks and gnarled branches of the oaks, many of which were cleft asunder or torn off their stems by the cannon-shot; while the naturally picturesque appearance of the decaying masses was singularly increased by the cavities made by the howitzers and balls, which were in many places sunk in the wood, and the ruined aspect of the broken branches, half overgrown with underwood, which encumbered its grassy glades

* Bout., 161, 162. Fain, ii., 480, 481. Vaud., 252, 253. Wrede's Official Account, Schoell, Recueil, iii., 390, 391.,

Results of the battle, and passage of the Rhine by the French.

sand men, of whom four thousand were prisoners; and the French lost seven thousand, of whom three thousand were wounded and left in the forest, from want of carriages to convey them away. The road to Frankfort resembled an immense wreck, being strewed with ammunition-wagons, broken-down guns, dead horses, and wounded men, who were abandoned in the precipitate retreat of the French army. Napoleon left Frankfort on the 1st of November: soon the red domes and steeples of Mayence appeared in view; the army defiled in mournful silence over the long bridge which it had so often passed in the buoyancy of anticipated victory; the emperor remained six days in that stronghold, to collect the ruined remains of his vast army, and then set out for Paris, where he arrived on the 9th; and the French eagles bade A FINAL ADIEU TO THE GERMAN PLAINS, the theatre of their glories, of their crimes, and of their punishment.*

Reflections on this battle.

The battle of Hanau was a dignified termination to the exploits of the French revolutionary arms beyond the Rhine, and threw a parting ray of glory over their long and successful career. Its lustre reflects in an especial manner on the Imperial Guard, by whom the victory was almost exclusively gained; and certainly no troops could, under circumstances of greater difficulty and depression, have achieved a more glorious triumph. When we reflect that the soldiers, who, after sharing in the dangers and witnessing the disasters of the greatest battle recorded in history, were obliged to toil for above two hundred miles, through a wearisome and disastrous retreat, suddenly found themselves, at its close, assailed by a fresh army, superior to that which at the moment they could array against it, and which entirely blocked up their only line of retreat—we must admit that, equally with the discipline and resolution of the Guard during the Russian retreat, their victory on this occasion demonstrates the unconquerable firmness of those iron bands, whom the discipline and victories of Napoleon had nursed up to be at once the glory, the terror, and the scourge of Europe. It throws a clear and important light upon the wisdom of Kutusoff in not attempting to stop the Imperial Guard at Krasnoi,† and contenting himself with the lesser but safer advantage of passing the succeeding columns by the edge of the sword; and on the injustice of the clamour which has been raised against Tchichagoff, because, with less than thirty thousand men, and a hundred and fifty guns, he did not succeed in stopping Napoleon at the Beresina, who had forty thousand efficient combatants, independent of as many stragglers, and two hundred and fifty guns at his disposal.† In truth, the success of the French at the Beresina, of the Russians at Culm, of the English at Corunna, and of Napoleon at Hanau, demonstrates the truth of the old adage, that it is in general well to make a bridge of gold for a flying army. Nothing is often more fallacious, in such a case, than to judge of the prostration of the strength of an army by the number of its stragglers, the disorder of its columns, the wreck of guns and ammunition-wagons which tracks its course, or the languor with which it resists when attacked by the *pursuing* enemy. All these are the beginning of ruin, but they are not ruin itself; and if their retreat is threatened, and the necessity of opening a passage at the sword's point becomes evident to every capacity, it is surprising how soon order will be resumed under the pressure of impending danger, and a desperate valour will compensate the loss of the largest amount of material resources.

* Fain, ii., 480, 481. Bout., 164. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 160, 161. † *Ante*, iii., 588. ‡ *Ante*, iii., 590.

Combat of Hochheim, and approach of the allied armies to the Rhine.

While the sad remains of the French army were retiring across the Rhine, the allied troops followed closely on their footsteps; and the forces of Central and Eastern Europe poured in prodigious strength down the valley of the Maine. On the 4th of November the advanced guards, under Prince Schwartzenberg, entered Frankfort; and on the same day the headquarters of the allied sovereigns reached Aschaffenberg. On the day following, Alexander made his entry into Frankfort at the head of twenty thousand horse, amid the universal transport of the inhabitants; and the imperial headquarters were fixed there till preparations could be made for the arduous undertaking of crossing the Rhine, and carrying the war into the heart of France. At the same time, their forces on all sides rapidly approached that frontier stream. Schwartzenberg forced the passage of the Nidde, and advanced his headquarters to Hochst, within two leagues of Mayence; while Blucher, on his right, approached the Rhine, and fixed his headquarters at Giessen. A few days after, Giulay received instructions to attack Hochheim, a small town fortified with five redoubts, which stood a little in advance of the *tête-du-pont* of Mayence at Cassel, and was garrisoned by six thousand men, under Guilleminot, supported by Morand with an equal force. So formidable, however, were the columns which the allies had destined for its assault, consisting of Giulay's column, which attacked the town itself, while Prince Alois of Lichtenstein turned its right, and threatened its communication with the Rhine, that the place was speedily carried, and the French were driven, with the loss of three hundred prisoners, into the *tête-du-pont* of Cassel, the last fortified post in that quarter which they possessed on the right bank of the Rhine.*

Nov. 4th.

Nov. 5th.

Nov. 6th.

Nov. 9th.

Winter-quarters of both parties.

This combat was the last of the campaign, so far as the Grand Armies on either side were concerned. Exhausted with a contest of such unexampled fatigue and vehemence, both commanders put their forces into winter-quarters. Those of Napoleon, entirely on the left bank of the Rhine, extended from Cologne on the north, to Strasburg on the south; but the bulk of his forces were stationed at Mayence, Coblentz, and opposite to the centre of the allied forces around Frankfort. The Grand Allied Army, as well that of Blucher as of Schwartzenberg, extended along the course of the Rhine, from Kehl to Coblentz; the army of Silesia, forming the right, opposite to Coblentz, and spreading up the hilly part of the Rhine to Ehrenbreitzen; that of Bohemia, spreading from the Maine to

* Vict. et Conq., ii., 161. Bout., 165, 166.

the Neckar, and thence to the borders of the Black Forest.*

Enthusiasm of the German troops when they approached the Rhine.

The Germans have long connected heart-stirring associations with the sight, and even the name of the Rhine. The vast amphitheatre of the Central Alps, from the snows of which that noble stream takes its rise; the sublime cataract by which it descends into the plains of Germany; the ancient and peopled cities which lie along its banks; the romantic regions through whose precipices it afterward flows; the feudal remains by which their summits are crowned; the interesting legends of the olden time with which they are connected; the vineyards which nestle in their sunny nooks; the topaz blaze of the cliffs on which the mouldering ruins are placed—have long sunk into the heart of this imaginative people, and, united to the thrilling music of Haydn, have touched the inmost chords of the German soul.† They connected it, in an especial manner, with the idea of Germany as a whole; it was their great frontier stream; it recalled the days of their emperors and independence; it had become, as it were, the emblem of the fatherland. It may easily be conceived what effect upon the armies of a people thus excited—whose hearts had thrilled to the songs of Körner, whose swords had drunk of the blood of Leipsic—the sight of the Rhine, when it first burst upon their united and conquering arms, produced. Involuntarily the columns halted when they reached the heights beyond Hochheim, where its windings spread out as on a map beneath their feet; the rear ranks hurried to the front; the troops uncovered as they beheld the stream of their fathers; tears trickled down many cheeks; joy, too big for utterance, swelled every heart; and the enthusiasm passing from rank to rank, soon a hundred thousand voices joined in the cheers which told the world that the war of independence was ended, and Germany delivered.‡◊

Final overthrow of the kingdom of Westphalia.

Nothing remained but to reap the fruits of this mighty victory, to gather up the fragments of this prodigious spoil. Yet so wide was it spread, so far had the French Empire extended over Europe, that to collect its ruins was a matter of no small time and labour. The giant was thrown down, but it was no easy undertaking to uncase his limbs and collect his armour. The rickety kingdom of Westphalia was the first of Napoleon's political creations which sunk to the dust, never again to rise. Jerome, already almost dethroned by the incursion of Chernicheff, was finally swept away by the arms of Bernadotte. Woronzow, with the advanced guard of his army, entered Cassel nine days after the battle of Leipsic; Jerome had previously abandoned that capital; the greater part of his army joined the allies, and the few who remained faithful to his cause precipitately retired to Dusseldorf, where he crossed the Rhine. He was closely followed by Winzingerode, who not only soon organized the whole kingdom of Westphalia in the interest of the allies, but overran and destroyed the Revolutionary dynasty in the Grand-duchy of Berg, which united its arms to the common standards of Germany. The army of the prince royal, united to that of Benningsen, no longer required for the great operations in the field, spread itself over the north of Germany; by Gottingen it marched to Hanover, everywhere re-establishing the authority of the King of England, amid the unanimous transport of the inhabitants, who chased away their old oppressors, the douaniers, with every mark of ignominy. Bernadotte's headquarters were established in that city, while Winzingerode spread over the Grand-duchy of Oldenberg and East Friesland; and Bulow marched to Munster, on his way to Holland, where the people were only waiting for the approach of the allied standards to throw off the French yoke, and declare their independence. Those Prussian corps, with their shoes and clothing entirely worn out by the protracted and fatiguing campaign they had undergone, were now in no condition to undertake any ulterior operation; but at this juncture a liberal supply of clothing and every necessary arrived from England, which at once restored their former efficiency, and for which they expressed their most unbounded gratitude.*

Oct. 28.

Nov. 6.

Nov. 12.

Operations against Davoust on the Lower Elbe.

Davoust, who had been left in Hamburg with twenty-five thousand French, besides ten thousand Danes, presented a more important and a more difficult object of conquest. Bernadotte wisely determined to unite his forces to those of Walmoden, in order to cut off the retreat, and secure the reduction of this powerful body of veteran troops; and with this view he broke up from Hanover on the 20th of November, and marched by Luneburg to Boitzenberg on the Elbe, where he arrived four days afterward; while Woronzow invested Harburg, and Strogonow moved against Stade. An attempt to take the latter town by escalade failed; but the French commander, fearing a repetition of the attack, withdrew his forces across the Elbe, and joined the Danes at Gluckstadt. The prince royal, now having collected forty thousand men, prepared a general attack on Davoust, who was in position behind the Stecknitz; but the French marshal, fearful of being cut off from Hamburg, quitted that position during the night, and retired behind the Bille. The effect of this retrograde movement was to separate entirely the French corps from the Danish auxiliaries; and the latter, foreseeing the perilous predicament in which their allies would soon be placed, deemed it most expedient to detach themselves from their fortunes, and, accordingly, retired to Lubeck. Thither they were immediately followed by the

Nov. 20.

Nov. 24.

Nov. 26.

Dec. 1.

Dec. 3.

* Vaud., i., 237. Bout., 167.

† "The Rhine! the Rhine! be blessings on the Rhine!
St. Rochus bless the land of love and wine!
The groves and high-hung meads, whose glories shine
In painted waves below;
Its rocks, whose topaz beam betrays the vine,
Or richer ruby glow.
The Rhine! the Rhine! be blessings on the Rhine!
Beats there a sad heart here? pour forth the wine!"

‡ Personal knowledge.

◊ The following lines were added, at this period, to the national anthem, pointing to the anxious desire generally felt to reclaim from the spoiler the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine:

"The Rhine shall no longer be our boundary;
It is the great artery of the state,
And it shall flow through the heart of our Empire."

* Lond., 200, 202, 205. Bout., 168. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 162.

allied forces. The Danish commander, finding himself menaced with an assault which he was in no condition to resist, proposed a capitulation, which was accepted, and he was permitted to rejoin the bulk of the Danish forces at Segeberg, while Davoust shut himself up in Hamburg, resolved to defend his post to the last extremity.*

Concluding operations against the Danes, and armistice with them.

The Danes, after this, retired towards their own country, followed by Walmoden; but, seeing that the allied general had imprudently extended himself too far, they gained an unforeseen advantage over him. Three battalions of Danish infantry, with two regiments of cavalry and six guns, having been vigorously charged by the Swedish horse, had laid down their arms; but the Swedish commander having imprudently left only a single squadron of hussars to guard so large a body of prisoners, they rose on their escort, and almost all escaped, leaving the guns alone in the hands of the Swedes. After this event, discreditable to both parties, the Danes retired in a body towards Kiel, pursued by Walmoden, who, in order to cut off their retreat, took post himself at Ostenrode with part of his forces, while the remainder pushed on after their line of retreat. The Danes, seeing their pursuers thus divided, quickly fell upon the corps at Ostenrode with ten thousand men, and defeated it with considerable loss. The torrent of success, however, on the part of the allies, was too violent to be arrested by such a casual check. Threatened by superior forces, the Danes shut themselves up in Rendsburg; Bernadotte advanced to Kiel; and the allies spread themselves over the whole of the south of Jutland. The Danish commander, seeing it was impossible to keep the field against such superior forces, and that the whole southern provinces of Denmark would speedily be overrun, entered into conferences with the prince royal with a view to an armistice, and the adhesion of Denmark to the allied powers. On the 15th of December an armistice was accordingly concluded, to endure for fifteen days only; but this led to negotiations with the cabinet of Copenhagen, which terminated in a peace between Denmark and the allied powers, which was signed on the 14th of January and the 8th of February, 1814, the particulars of which will afterward be given. Meanwhile, the two fortresses of Gluckstadt and Friedrichsort, near Hamburg, being excluded from the armistice, were besieged by the Swedish forces; and such activity did the prince royal display in his operations, that the latter of these fortresses was compelled to surrender on the 19th of December, with a hundred pieces of cannon and eight hundred prisoners.†

December 6. Dec. 7. Dec. 15. Dec. 19.

Operations of St. Cyr and Tolstoy before Dresden.

The principal attention of the allies, however, after the battle of Leipsic, was drawn to the city of Dresden, where St. Cyr, as already noticed,‡ had been left with thirty thousand men, when Napoleon set out in the direction of Wittenberg and Berlin. At that period, the only force left to observe the place was Count Tolstoy's, whose troops did not exceed twenty thousand men. Profiting by so considerable a superiority, St. Cyr wisely resolved to make a sortie, and throw the enemy back upon the Bohemian frontier. Four divisions, accordingly, mustering among them twenty thousand men, issued, on the 17th of October, against Tolstoy, whose forces were for the most part new levies who had never seen fire. Two divisions of the French attacked the Russians in front, while two others assailed them in flank by the side of Plauen. With such skill was St. Cyr's attack conceived, and with such vigour was it executed, that Tolstoy's men were broken at all points, and obliged to retire in disorder, which their great superiority in cavalry prevented from being converted into a flight; but, as it was, the loss they sustained amounted to twelve hundred prisoners, ten guns, and a bridge equipage, besides fifteen hundred killed and wounded. Disconcerted by this check, Tolstoy hastened to regain the Bohemian frontier, which he crossed two days after; and the garrison of Tœplitz, consisting of ten thousand Austrians, having advanced to his support, St. Cyr relinquished the pursuit and returned to Dresden, where, in the interval, all the works erected by the enemy to straiten the city had been demolished.*

Oct. 17. Oct. 19.

The blockade is resumed after the battle of Leipsic.

This advantage was considerable, and highly creditable to the talents of St. Cyr, and the valour of the troops under his command; but it was an accessory only, and did not counterbalance the great events of the campaign. It was in the plains of Leipsic that the fate of Dresden and its immense garrison was decided. When Napoleon set out from the Saxon capital for Duben, he left, for the troops it contained, only provisions for seven, and forage for three days;† and, so complete was the exhaustion of the surrounding country, that the garrison were able to add hardly anything to these scanty stores during the few days that they had regained possession of the open country. At the same time, the influx of stragglers, sick and wounded, left behind by the Grand Army on leaving the Elbe, continued unabated; all attempts to execute Napoleon's orders, by sending the maimed to Torgau, had failed, under circumstances of more than usual horror;‡ and Dres-

* Lond., 209, 210. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 163. Bout., 170, 171.

† Bout., 173, 174. Vict. et Conq., xii., 163, 164. See the Treaties in Martin's Sup., v., 673, 681.

‡ *Ante*, iv., 163.

* St. Cyr, iv., 206, 218. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 166. Bout., 177, 178. Jom., iv., 491.

† St. Cyr, iv., 202.

‡ "As soon as the wounded were apprized of the intention to remove them, they gave themselves up to transports of joy, thinking they would now at length revisit their country. In such multitudes did they crowd, or, rather, crawl, down to the quays, that the boats were in danger of sinking, and one was actually submerged, and all on board perished. Nevertheless, though a few only could be received, from the limited number of boats, nothing could prevail on these unhappy wretches to return to the hospitals. They preferred lying down in rows along the river side, to be in readiness to get into the first boat that appeared. The assemblage of these spectres, who lay out all night in the cold, presented the most hideous spectacle which a war, where such scenes were too frequent, could exhibit. But the superiority of the enemy, and the manner in which Napoleon had conducted the war, rendered the prescribed evacuation totally impossible. All the hospitals in the rear, sooner or later, fell into the enemy's hands. Three thousand were sent from Dresden in boats, but I never ascertained whether they reached Torgau."—ST. CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iv., 200, 201.

den, encumbered with agonized and useless mouths, soon found itself beset by a double amount of enemies. No sooner was the battle of Leipsic decided, than Schwartzenberg, justly eager to secure so splendid a prize as the fruit of his victory, detached Klenau, with his whole force, to re-enforce Tolstoy, who, in the mean time, had more than recruited his losses by draughts from Tœplitz, and the other garrisons and depôts in the interior of Bohemia. Their troops, fully fifty thousand strong, effected a junction on the 26th, and resumed the blockade of Dresden on the day following, when St. Cyr, in no condition to keep the field against such superior forces, was obliged to shut himself up with a dejected army, and hardly any provisions.*

Oct. 26.

Oct. 27.

The condition of the French marshal was now in the highest degree alarming, and such as might well have struck terror into the most dauntless breast. Although the troops under his orders had exerted themselves to the utmost, during the ten days that they had the command of the adjacent country, to recruit their slender stock of provisions, yet such was the total exhaustion of its resources by the previous requisitions of Napoleon, and the passage of so many vast armies over its surface, that they were barely able to maintain themselves by the most rigorous exactions, without adding anything to the miserable stores, adequate only to seven days' consumption, which Napoleon had left for their use. On the 27th of October, therefore, they found themselves shut up in Dresden with this scanty stock of provisions; while, at the same time, the depression of the troops, the almost total exhaustion of ammunition, the rapid desertion of all the German auxiliaries within the place, and the superior forces of the enemy before its walls, rendered it altogether impossible to attempt to make their way out by force of arms. During the whole of this period they were left without any orders, direct or indirect, from Napoleon, or any other intelligence than the rumours, vague and exaggerated, which prevailed as to the disaster of Leipsic. Driven to desperation, St. Cyr endeavoured to make a sortie, with fifteen thousand men, by the right bank of the Elbe, in order to effect, if possible, a junction with the garrison of Torgau or Wittenberg, and with their united force cut a way across to the Rhine.†

Miserable condition and difficulties of St. Cyr.

Nov. 6.

But the allied generals had information of his design, and were on the alert. General Wied Runkel met them with three thousand men on the 6th; and though the French were nearly five times superior in number, yet such was their physical extenuation from want, and moral depression from disaster, that they were unable to force their way through, and, after a slight combat, were thrown back again into Dresden. This check, and throwing back of mouths, proved fatal both to the spirits and resources of the garrison; discouragement became universal, escape seemed impossible, provisions of every sort were absolutely exhausted, discipline was dissolved by suffering; the miserable soldiers wandered about like spectres in the streets, or sank in woful crowds into the hospitals;* and at length, the French marshal, unable to prolong his defence, entered into a capitulation, in virtue of which the allies gained possession of the town, and the French laid down their arms, on condition of being sent back to France, and not serving against the allies till regularly exchanged. On the day following, the troops began to defile out of the town in six columns, and, after laying down their arms, proceeded on the road to France. The result showed the magnitude of the success which had been achieved, and the terrible disasters which were accumulating around Napoleon's empire since the catastrophe of Leipsic; for the number who surrendered were no less than thirty-two generals, seventeen hundred and ninety-five officers, and thirty-three thousand private soldiers, of whom twenty-five thousand were able to bear arms.†

St. Cyr in vain tries a sortie, and surrenders. Nov. 6.

Nov. 11.

The terms awarded to the French garrison were nearly the same which Napoleon, in 1796, had granted to Marshal Wurmser at the capitulation of Mantua;‡ and the allies obtained possession, by the surrender, of no less than two hundred and forty pieces of cannon. When the troops marched out, they afforded a melancholy proof of the degree to which the exactions of the emperor had strained the physical resources of France, and his total disregard of the comforts or subsistence of his soldiers; for such was the weakness of the infantry, arising from youth, fatigue, and famine,

Terms of the capitulation, which are violated by the allied generals.

* St. Cyr, iv., 227. Bout., 178. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 166.
† St. Cyr, iv., 247, 250. Bout., 177. Vaud., 241, 242.

* "Such was the famishing condition of the French troops, that they pillaged for the twentieth time the neighbouring vineyards, and cut flesh off the limbs of the wounded horses lying by the wayside. In the interior of the town misery had risen to the highest pitch. The mills were idle: there was neither grain to grind nor water to turn the wheels. The bakers had shut up their shops, having no more bread to sell: a miserable crowd surrounded their doors, demanding, with mingled threats and prayers, their accustomed supplies. Many of the poor had been for several days without bread; and, as the stock of butcher meat was also nearly expended, they were reduced to the most miserable shifts to support life. Nor were the French soldiers in any better situation: every day they killed thirty horses; and, instead of the accustomed ration of an ounce and a half of butcher meat, to which they had been long reduced, they got nothing but double the quantity of horseflesh, often so bad that the soldiers could not eat it, even though pressed by the pangs of hunger. At last, however, famine overcame this repugnance, and the miserable wretches disputed with each other the half-putrid carcasses which they found in the streets, and soon their bones were laid bare, and the very tendons of the dead animals eagerly devoured. The ravages which a contagious fever made on the inhabitants of the town added to the public distress. Not less than three hundred were carried off by it a week among the citizens alone. Two hundred dead bodies were every day brought out of the military hospitals. Such was the accumulation in the churchyards that the grave-diggers could not inter them, and they were laid naked, in ghastly rows, along the place of sepulture. The bodies were heaped in such numbers on the dead-carts, that frequently they fell from them, and the wheels gave a frightful sound in cracking the bones of the bodies which thus lay on the streets. The hospital attendants and carters trampled down the corpses in the carts, like baggage or straw, to make room for more; and, not unfrequently, some of the bodies gave signs of life, and even emitted shrieks, under this harsh usage. Several of the bodies, thrown into the Elbe for dead, were revived by the sudden immersion in cold water, and the wretches were seen struggling in vain with the waves, by which they were soon swallowed up. Medicines and hospital stores there were none, and almost all the surgeons and apothecaries were dead."—*Témoin Oculaire.* ODELEBEN, ii., 227, 238.

† St. Cyr, iv., 247, 257. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 166, 167. Bout., 178.

‡ *Ante*, i., 421.

that, by the admission of St. Cyr himself, three fourths of them would have perished before they reached the Rhine.* Such as it was, however, the capitulation was disapproved of by Schwartzenberg and the allied sovereigns, who intimated to St. Cyr that no terms of surrender could be admitted but such as provided for the garrison being conducted as prisoners of war into the Austrian States; but that, if he was dissatisfied with these conditions, the troops would be replaced in Dresden in the same situation in which they were before the convention had been concluded. This offer, which was received by St. Cyr at Altenberg, on the road to France, the day following the capitulation, was felt by him, as, indeed, it was equally by his opponents, to be perfectly illusory; as not only were the enemy now in Dresden, and had been there for seven days, but they had become acquainted with all its weak points, and, in particular, the absolute want of provisions to subsist a besieged garrison even for a single day. He rightly declined to accede, therefore, to the alternative offered of returning to Dresden; and, being unable to make any resistance, preferred being conducted, with all his followers, as prisoners of war into Bohemia; loudly protesting against this violation of the convention, as a breach of good faith and of the laws of war, which would one day recoil with fearful force on the heads of the parties who were guilty of it.†

Nov. 19.

Nov. 20.

Reflections on the breach of this convention by the allies.

This refusal, on the part of the allied sovereigns, to ratify a convention concluded by the general in the full command of their armies on the occasion, has excited, as well it might, the most vehement feelings of indignation among the French writers. There can be no doubt that it was to the last degree impolitic in Klenau to have acceded to such a convention, when escape and subsistence were equally beyond the power of the enemy; and when, by simply maintaining his position for a few days, without firing a shot, he must have compelled them to surrender at discretion. It is equally certain that, even if half the garrison reached the Rhine, they would have proved no small acquisition to Napoleon, whose greatest weakness was now likely to arise from the want of experienced soldiers, and whose necessities might render him little scrupulous in his adherence to the treaty, as to their not serving again till exchanged. But all these considerations are reasons why the capitulation should never have been entered into: they afford none to vindicate its violation. Schwartzenberg might have debarred his lieutenants from entering into any capitulation but such as contained a reservation of his sanction, but he had not done so. Klenau had full powers; and the convention, upon the faith of which the French had delivered up Dresden, surrendered their guns and laid down their arms, was clearly within his powers and province as the general commanding the siege, and was absolute, without any condition or suspensive clause. In these circumstances, it was unquestionably obligatory upon the honour of the victors, who are bound, by the most sacred of all ties, to respect the rights of those who are in their power, and have become incapable of making any farther resistance. Justice in such a case can admit of no equivocation, derived even from the most pressing reasons of expediency. Honour regards all treaties with the vanquished as debts which must be paid. The proposal to reinstate St. Cyr in the Saxon capital, after its defences and total want of provisions had become known, and his own troops were far advanced on the road to the Rhine, though the best that could be done, next to observing the convention, was plainly an offer such as the French garrison neither could nor were bound to accept. In violating this convention, the allied sovereigns did not imitate the honourable fidelity with which Napoleon observed the conditions of the capitulation of Mantua, granted to Wurmser in 1796;* but rather took a model from the cordial approbation which he gave to the unworthy fraud by which the bridge of the Danube was surprised in 1805,† or the express example which he had set of disavowing an armistice, in his own refusal to ratify that of Treviso, concluded in 1801 by his lieutenant, Brune.‡ Condemning equally such deviations from the path of honour by all parties engaged in the contest, it is with pride and gratitude that the English historian must refer to the conduct of his own country on occasion of a similar crisis; and when he recollects that the convention of Cintra, though unanimously condemned by the English people, was executed, on the admission of their opponents themselves, with scrupulous fidelity by the British government,◊ he must admit that such an honourable distinction was cheaply purchased by all the advantages which its faithful observance gave to the enemy.‖

Lord Londonderry prevents a similar capitulation being granted to Davoust.

The interest excited by the refusal, on the part of the allied sovereigns, to ratify the convention of Dresden, was, however, attended with one good effect, in preventing a similar political mistake in the case of Marshal Davoust and the garrison of Hamburg. Bernadotte, who had now assumed the command in chief in that quarter, was far from evincing the same activity and vigour in his operations against the important French army shut up in that city, which he had displayed in bringing to a conclusion hostilities with the ancient rivals of Sweden—the Danes. On the contrary, he had at this period entered into negotiations with the French marshal, the object of which was, that, upon condition of surrendering Hamburg and the adjacent forts, he was to be permitted to retire to France with all his forces. He, in the first instance, had promised Sir Charles Stewart that he would not enter into such a capitulation without his consent; but no sooner had the former been called to

* "Les soldats, trop jeunes pour supporter les fatigues d'une campagne aussi active, et des privations si longues, étaient à la vérité dans un tel état d'epuissement que la moitié, et peut-être les trois quarts n'auraient pu regagner les bords du Rhin."—ST. CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iv., 256.

† Chastellar to St. Cyr, 19th of Nov., 1813. St. Cyr to Chastellar, 20th of Nov., 1813. St. Cyr, iv., 497, 499. See Capitulation in St. Cyr, iv., 484.

* *Ante*, i., 421. † *Ante*, ii., 363. ‡ *Ante*, ii., 132.

◊ "The convention of Cintra, though condemned by public opinion in England, was executed with honourable fidelity by the English government."—FOX, iv., 356. "Look at England. She condemned the convention of Cintra, but did not the less execute its provisions with scrupulous faith."—NAPOLEON ‖ *Ante*, iii., 86.

Frankfort, to attend, on behalf of England, the conferences of the allied powers, than he sent express instructions to Walmoden to bring about a convention of such a character with Davoust. But this equivocal step did not escape the vigilant eye of the English military plenipotentiary, who no sooner received intelligence of what was in agitation, than he despatched such energetic remonstrances against the proposed measure, that the prince royal was obliged to abandon it.* And thus the same eminent and patriotic officer, who, by his moral courage on the eve of the battle of Leipsic, had gained for the allies the decisive advantage of bringing the prince royal's army up to the charge on that eventful day, now rendered to his country the not less important service of preventing a capitulation, which, by restoring twenty-five thousand veteran troops to the standards of Napoleon, might have entirely changed the fate of the war, next spring, in France.†

The fall of Dresden was shortly after followed by that of the chief other fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula. On the 21st of November, Stettin, which had been closely blockaded for eight months, and the garrison of which had exhausted their last means of subsistence, surrendered: the troops, still eight thousand strong, were made prisoners of war, and three hundred and fifty guns, on the walls and in the magazines, fell into the hands of the allies, who shortly after despatched the blockading force to re-enforce the corps of Tauenzein, to which it belonged. Fifteen hundred Dutch troops, who formed part of the garrison, immediately entered the ranks of the allies: an ominous circumstance, which presaged but too surely the revolt of Holland, which, in effect, soon took place.‡

Fall of Stettin. November 21.

Torgau was not long in following the example of Stettin, although the more recent investing of the place rendered it necessary to have recourse to an actual siege, instead of the more tedious method of blockade. On the 23d of October, Tauenzein sat down before its walls; and on the 1st of November the investiture was completed, and the trenches opened on the 22d. The approaches of the besiegers were proceeding rapidly, when an armistice was agreed to on the 28th, with a view to arranging the terms of a capitulation. When the French commander, however, discovered that an unconditional surrender was required, he broke off the conferences, and hostilities were resumed. They were not, however, of long duration. Disease, more terrible than the sword of the enemy, was making the most unheard-of ravages within the walls. Typhus fever, the well-known and never-failing attendant on human suffering, was daily carrying off the garrison by hundreds; while thousands encumbered those awful dens of misery, the military hospitals. Decimated by death, extenuated by suffering, the garrison were in no condition to maintain the place against the impetuous and repeated attacks of the allies. After a fortnight of open trenches, the outworks were carried by assault, and the rampart seriously shaken by the fire of the besiegers' artillery; and the governor, Dutaillis, finding the troops under his command incapable of manning the works, from the extraordinary ravages of fever, was obliged to surrender at discretion. Including the sick in the hospitals, the number who were captured was ten thousand, the poor remains of eighteen thousand who had sought refuge there after the retreat of the Grand Army from the Elbe; but such was the danger of contagion in that great pest-house, that the allies did not venture to enter the fortress till the 10th of January. In Torgau was taken the whole reserve park of the Grand Army, the want of which had been so severely felt at the close of the battle of Leipsic, and two hundred and eighty-seven guns; but these advantages were dearly purchased by the terrible epidemic which, issuing from its wo-struck walls, made the circuit, in the following years, of every country of Europe, until, among the Venetian paupers in 1816, and Irish poor in 1817, it encountered a starving population, where, amid equal suffering, it swept away numbers proportionally greater, into the common charnel-house of mortality.*†

Siege and fall of Torgau.

Oct. 23.

Nov. 22.

Nov. 28.

Dec. 6.

Dec. 26.

During the course of this terrible struggle on the Elbe, the fortresses on the Vistula, still remaining in the hands of the French, have almost escaped observation; but the time was now approaching when their defence, after a siege or blockade of nearly twelve months, could no longer be prolonged. Rapp, as already mentioned, had done everything which firm resolution and rigorous discipline could effect to restore order among the motley group of five-and-thirty thousand men who had taken refuge in Dantzic after the Moscow retreat, and in some degree he had succeeded. Disease, however, as usual after all these disastrous retreats, soon began to make ravages in the interior of its walls, and before the end of January, 1813, six thousand were in hospital. The garrison, however, was still so powerful, that the Russian blockading force, which was of not greater strength, and composed chiefly of landwehr, was unable to confine it within the circuit of the walls; and in the course of January and February several severe actions took place, with various success, but without the besiegers being able to complete the investment. Early in March, the

Operations before Dantzic during 1813.

Jan. 29. Feb. 6.

* "I trust your royal highness, with your wonted condescension, will permit me to express the sentiments of Great Britain on a military question in which it must feel the deepest interest. To all appearance, Denmark is now with us, and Marshal Davoust is gone. Should he escape to France by means of any capitulation, I foresee it will affix the deepest stain to the military glory of the army of the North; it would be nothing less than to transport the corps of Davoust from a fatal spot, where its destruction is inevitable, into one in which it might again appear in battle against the allies. My prince, you have loaded me with your kindness; be assured it is of your glory, of your personal interests, that I am thinking. I will answer for the opinion of my country. It is with the most sensible pain that I have recently heard, even after the assurances to the contrary which you gave me yesterday evening, that General Walmoden has received fresh orders to the effect I so earnestly deprecate."—SIR CHARLES STEWART (now Marquis Londonderry) *to the* PRINCE ROYAL, 16*th Nov.*, 1813.

† Lond., 210, 211.

‡ Bout., 179. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 167.

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 168. Bout., 186.

† The author witnessed the poor of Venice labouring under this epidemic in 1816, and the Irish prostrated by its ravages in 1817. The imagination of Dante himself never conceived anything so terrible as the scenes of wo then exhibited under that frightful scourge—the sad bequest to humanity of the ambition of the wars of Napoleon.

March 5. Russians, being re-enforced by the troops who had successfully terminated the blockade of Pillau, amounting to six thousand men, made a vigorous attack on the fortified posts held by the French in advance of the city, particularly Langenfurth, Stotzenberg, and D'Ohra; but they were repulsed, after a severe action, with the loss of fifteen hundred men.

March 24. Encouraged by this success, Rapp shortly after made a sortie to collect subsistence, which was beginning to fail, in which he in a great measure succeeded, and made himself master of a hospital of the enemy, containing several hundred sick and wounded.*

Disease, however, now came to the aid of the allies; and the accumulation of so many troops—some of them bringing the seeds of contagion with their columns into the fortress—began to produce the most fatal ravages. In the end of April, the health of the garrison having been in some degree restored, a sortie was hazarded into the island of Nehrung, the fertility and agricultural riches of which promised to afford considerable resources for the garrison. The Russians, three thousand strong, tried to stop the columns, but they were defeated with heavy loss, and the French advanced eight leagues along the island, making spoil of all its provisions, and bringing back grain in abundance to the fortress, besides five hundred head of cattle. In the course of May, however, the besieging army received considerable re-enforcements from the interior of Russia and the adjoining provinces of Prussia; and in the beginning of June the Duke of Wirtemberg, who had assumed the command, had thirty thousand combatants under his banners.

Operations there till the commencement of the regular siege in October.

April 29.

June 9. Yet, notwithstanding this, Rapp, on the 9th of June, again made a sortie at the head of fifteen thousand men; and, although defeated at some points, he succeeded in bringing considerable stores of forage and growing rye into the fortress. In this affair both parties lost about twelve hundred men. Hostilities were soon after terminated by the armistice of Pleswitz, and not again resumed till the end of August, the forces, in the intermediate period, having been revictualled every five days, by mutual commissioners appointed for that purpose, in terms of the convention. The armistice terminated on the 28th, and several obstinate conflicts took place on the following morning at the advanced posts, in the course of which, though success was balanced, the besiegers sensibly gained ground, and contracted the circle within which the posts of the besieged were confined. During the whole of September repeated sorties were made by the garrison, some of which were successful and others defeated; but the besieged, after a most honourable resistance, were at length thrown back, at all points, into the fortress; and the Duke of Wirtemberg having received considerable re-enforcements, and a regular battering-train having arrived,† operations in form commenced in the first week of October.

Aug. 10.

Aug. 29.

Sept. 16, 24, 29.

The bombardment commenced on the 8th, before the breaching batteries were ready, or any impression had been made even upon the external works of the place. With such vigour was the fire kept up, that in a short time the town was on fire in several places. During the distraction produced by these conflagrations, the principal attack was directed against the suburb called Scholtenhauser, and the redoubts which covered it; and, after a vigorous cannonade for some days, the besiegers succeeded in establishing themselves in that outwork, though after sustaining a loss of a thousand men. From this advanced position the bombardment was resumed with redoubled vigour and terrible efficacy: soon the flames broke out in eight-and-twenty different quarters; the principal magazines in the place, both of provisions and clothing, were consumed; and, notwithstanding the extent of their supplies, provisions began to grow scarce. The body of the place, however, was still uninjured: the rampart was unshaken, and the firm spirit of Rapp could not brook the idea of submission. In the beginning of November, however, the regular siege commenced, and parallels were begun to be run with great vigour; and, although the approaches of the besiegers were sensibly retarded by the heroic exploits of a small corps of volunteers, who more than once carried terror and conflagration into the centre of the besiegers' lines, yet their progress was rapid and alarming: all the external works of the place fell successively into the enemy's hands; a naval officer, who was despatched to make the emperor acquainted with the distressed state of the garrison, was unable, after the most heroic efforts, to penetrate farther than Copenhagen; desertion was taking place to an alarming extent, and all hopes of being relieved having vanished with the battle of Leipsic, Rapp at length consented to capitulate; stipulating, however, that the garrison should be permitted to retire to France, on condition of not serving again till exchanged. The garrison still consisted of sixteen thousand men, of whom about one half were French, and the remainder Germans and Poles. By the capitulation, it was provided that the ratification of the Emperor of Russia should be obtained; and he having refused to sanction the condition relative to the return of the garrison to France, the same offer was made to them as had been made to St. Cyr, that they should be reinstated in the fortress in the same position in which they were before they left it. This was strictly legal in this case, as the sanction of the emperor had been expressly stipulated for in the convention; and as it was not agreed to, Rapp and the French were conducted as prisoners of war into Russia, but almost all the auxiliaries immediately entered the allied ranks.*

Continuation of the siege, and fall of the place.

Oct. 16.

Nov. 3.

Nov. 7.

Nov 9.

Nov. 29.

The lesser places still held by France on the Vistula, having exhausted their last means of subsistence, surrendered shortly after. The

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 169, 171. Vaud., i., 244, 245. Bout., 179.

† Vaud., i., 246. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 178, 179. Dartois, Siège de Dantzic, 54, 72.

* Dartois, Siège de Dantzic, 12, 115. Vaud., i., 246. Jom., iv., 494. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 182, 185.

garrison of Zomosc, three thousand strong, capitulated on the 22d of December; that of Modlin, with twelve hundred men, three days after; so that the tricolour flag no longer waved to the eastward of the Oder. About the same time, General Dalton, who commanded the French garrison in Erfurth, finding himself not sufficiently strong to defend the wide circuit of the walls, retired into the citadel of St. Petersburg, on the rocky summit of which he still maintained his post when the city was surrendered by capitulation in the beginning of January. At the close of the campaign France retained only, of her immense possessions beyond the Rhine, the places of Hamburg, Magdebourg, and Wittenberg on the Elbe, Custrin and Glogau on the Oder, and the citadels of Erfurth and Wurtzburg. All the rest of the places garrisoned or influenced by her arms had been swept away; the Confederation of the Rhine was dissolved, and its forces marching under the allied banners; and refluent over the bridges of Mayence, eighty thousand men, with two hundred guns, sad and dejected, had retired into France—the poor remains of four hundred thousand combatants, with twelve hundred cannons, who, three months before, still held the scales of fortune equal on the banks of the Elbe. The contest in Germany was over; French domination beyond the Rhine was at an end; thirty thousand prisoners taken on the field, and eighty thousand since surrendered in garrison, constituted the proud trophies of the battle of Leipsic.*

Dec. 22. Dec. 25. Dec. 20. Jan. 6, 1814.

The universal fermentation produced in Europe by the deliverance of Germany was not long of spreading to the DUTCH PROVINCES. The yoke of Napoleon, universally grievous from the enormous pecuniary exactions with which it was attended, and the wasting military conscriptions to which it immediately led, had been in a peculiar manner felt as oppressive in Holland, from the maritime and commercial habits of the people, and the total stoppage of all their sources of industry, which the maritime war and long-continued blockade of their coasts had occasioned. They had tasted for nearly twenty years of the last drop of humiliation in the cup of the vanquished—that of being compelled themselves to aid in upholding the system which was exterminating their resources, and to purchase with the blood of their children the ruin of their country. These feelings, which had for years existed in such intensity as to have rendered revolt inevitable, but for the evident hopelessness at all former times of the attempt, could no longer be restrained after the battle of Leipsic had thrown down the colossus of French external power, and the approach of the allied standards to their frontiers had opened to the people the means of salvation. From the Hanse Towns the flame of independence spread to the nearest cities of the old United Provinces; and the small number of French troops in the country at once encouraged revolt, and paved the way for external aid. At this period the whole troops which Napoleon had in Holland did not exceed six thousand French, and two regiments of Germans, upon whose fidelity to their colours little reliance could be placed. Upon the approach of the allied troops under Bulow, who advanced by the road of Munster, and Winzingerode, who soon followed from the same quarter, the douaniers all withdrew from the coast, the garrison of Amsterdam retired, and the whole disposable force of the country was concentrated at Utrecht, to form a corps of observation, and act according to circumstances. This was the signal for a general revolt. At Amsterdam, the troops were no sooner gone than the inhabitants rose in insurrection, deposed the imperial authorities, hoisted the Orange flag, and established a provisional government, with a view to the re-establishment of the ancient order of things; yet not violently or with cruelty, but with the calmness and composure which attest the exercise of social rights by a people long habituated to their enjoyment.* The same change took place, at the same time and in the same orderly manner, at Rotterdam, Dortrecht, Delft, Leyden, Haarlem, and the other chief towns; the people everywhere, amid cries of "*Orange Boven!*" and universal rapture, mounted the Orange cockade, and reinstated the ancient authorities; and after twenty years of foreign domination and suffering, the glorious spectacle was exhibited of a people peaceably regaining their independence, and not shedding a drop of blood, and, without either passion or vengeance, reverting to the institutions of former times.†

Insurrection in Holland.

Nov. 15.

Military and political consequences of the highest importance immediately followed this uncontrollable outbreak of public enthusiasm. A deputation from Holland immediately waited on the Prince Regent of England and the Prince of Orange, in London; the latter shortly after embarked on board an English line-of-battle ship, the Warrior, and on the 27th landed at Scheveling, from whence he proceeded to the Hague. Meantime, the French troops and coast-guards, who had concentrated at Utrecht, seeing that the general effervescence was not as yet supported by any solid military force, and that the people, though they had all hoisted the Orange flag, were not aided by any corps of the allies, recovered from their consternation, and made a general forward movement against Amsterdam. Before they got there, however, a body of three hundred Cossacks had reached that capital, where they were received with enthusiastic joy; and this advanced guard was soon after followed by Gen-

Landing of the Prince of Orange, and general expulsion of the French from the country.

Nov. 27.

Nov. 23.

* Vaud., i., 247. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 180, 185. Bout., 180, 181.

* Capef., x., 278, 279. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 164, 165. Bout., 174, 175. Ann. Reg., 1813, 160, 161.

† The following proclamation, issued by the provisional government of the Hague in name of the Prince of Orange, is singularly descriptive of this memorable and bloodless revolution. "*Orange Boven!* Holland is free: the allies advance on Utrecht; the English have been invited; the French are flying on all sides. The sea is opened; commerce revives: the spirit of party has ceased—*what we have suffered is pardoned and forgiven.* Able and intelligent men have been called to the helm of government, which has invited the prince to resume the national sovereignty. We join our forces to those of the allies, to compel the enemy to make peace: the people will, ere long, have a day of rejoicing at the expense of government; but every species of pillage or excess is absolutely forbidden. Every one returns thanks to God: old times have returned. *Orange Boven!*"—See CAPEFIGUE, x., 278, 279, *note.*

eral Benkendorf's brigade, which, after travelling by post from Zwoll to Harderwik, embarked at the latter place, and, by the aid of a favourable wind, reached Amsterdam on the 1st of December. The Russian general im-
Dec. 2. mediately advanced against the forts of Mayder and Halfweg, of which he made himself master, taking twenty pieces of cannon and six hundred prisoners; while on the eastern frontier, General Oppen, with Bulow's advanced
Nov. 3. guards, carried Dornbourg by assault on the 23d, and, advancing against Arnheim, threw the garrison, three thousand strong, which strove to prevent the place being invest-
Nov. 29. ed, with great loss, back into the town. Next day, Bulow himself came up with
Nov. 30. the main strength of his corps, and, as the ditches were still dry, hazarded an escalade, which proved entirely successful; the greater part of the garrison retiring to Nimeguen, by the bridge of the Rhine. The French troops, finding themselves thus threatened on all sides, withdrew altogether from Holland; the fleet at the Texel hoisted the Orange flag, with the exception of Admiral Verhuel, who, with a body of marines that still proved faithful to Napoleon, threw himself with honourable fidelity into the fort of the Texel. Amsterdam, amid transports of enthusiasm, received the beloved representative of the house of Orange.

Before the close of the year the tricolour
Dec. 1. flag floated only on Bergen-op-zoom and a few of the southern frontier fortresses; and Europe beheld the prodigy of the seat of war having been transferred in a single year from the banks of the Niemen to those of the Scheldt.*

To complete the picture of this memorable year, there only remains to give a sketch of the Italian campaign, and of the operations of Wellington in the Spanish Peninsula. The former can be but a sketch, for the operations of the opposite armies, though numerous and complicated, led to no material result; and it was on the fields of Leipsic and Vittoria that the fate of the French Empire was decided, and on which the broad light of history requires to be thrown. Yet the narrative, how brief soever, will not be without its interest; for it will recall the memory of other days, when the fortunes of the young Republic played around the bayonets of Napoleon's grenadiers; and, after a long sojourn amid the rough sounds of the German regions, there is a charm in the sweet accents of the Italian tongue.

Operations in Italy during this campaign.

Eugene Beauharnois, as already mentioned, retired from the Grand Army in Germany when Napoleon took the command, and he arrived at Milan on the 18th of May. His first care was to organize an army in Lombardy, which might put him in a condition to inspire feelings of apprehension in the cabinet of Vienna, or resist any attempt which it might make to recover, by force of arms, its lost and long-coveted possessions in
May 10. Italy. Napoleon, by a decree early in May, intrusted the formation of the new army of Italy to his viceroy, and it was to be composed entirely of native soldiers, or conscripts from the French departments adjoining the Alps. Though this ordinance bespoke strongly the confidence of the emperor in his Italian subjects, and might be supposed to increase the patriotic spirit which was developed in the north of Italy, yet it was attended with one obvious danger, which came to tell with signal severity upon the fortunes of the Empire in its last moments—that these soldiers were bound by no tie to the tramontane regions, and might be expected all to desert if the fortunes of war should compel the French eagles to retire across the Alps. When the viceroy returned to Italy, he found only the skeletons of a few regiments, and three hundred officers and non-commissioned officers, who had been forwarded by post from Spain—the whole forces of the kingdom of Italy had perished in Russia, or been marched to the Elbe; but his energy and activity overcame every difficulty, and, by the beginning of July, fifty-two thousand men were in arms, of whom forty-five thousand infantry and fifteen hundred horse were present with the eagles.*

Eugene's dispositions and measures for the defence of Lombardy.

On the other side, the Austrians were not idle. Early in July a respectable force was collected on the frontiers of Illyria, under the orders of Field-marshal Hiller; and before the end of the month it was raised to seven divisions, mustering full fifty thousand combatants, of a description much superior to the Italian conscripts. In addition to this, they raised the landwehr of Illyria and Croatia, and, re-enforced by several thousands of these hardy mountaineers, commenced the campaign the moment they received intelligence of the armistice being denounced on the 17th of August. At this period the viceroy occupied the following positions. Two divisions, under Grenier, were stationed between Udina and Gorizia; and the remainder of the army, under Verdier, Marcognet, Gratian, and Palombini, stretched by the left, by Palma Nuova, to the bloodstained heights of Tarvis and Villach, occupying thus the whole eastern passes from Italy into Germany. Hiller's force, directly in front, extended from opposite Villach on his right to Agram on his left, where he had concentrated two divisions; and the ferment in the provinces of Croatia, ceded to France, already promised the most favourable reception to the Austrians, if they invaded that portion of the spoils which France had won from the hereditary states.†

Austrian forces, and position of both armies.

The Austrians being the stronger party, were the first to commence hostilities. On the 17th, two columns passed the frontier stream of the Save at Agram, and directed their march to Karlstadt and Fiume. General Jeannin, who commanded in that quarter, at first made preparations for resistance; but finding himself speedily surrounded by an insurrection, which broke out on all sides at the sight of the much-loved Austrian standards, he was obliged to abandon the first city and fall back on

The Austrians commence the campaign, and gain considerable successes.

* Ann. Reg., 1813, 161, 162. Bout., 175, 176. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 165.

* Vignolles, Précis des Opér. des Arm. d'Italie en 1813, 1814, 9, 12. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 188, 192. Norvin, Portf, de 1813, ii., 464, 465.

† Vignolles, 19, 24. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 192, 195. Norvin, Rec. de 1813, ii., 465, 466.

the second. This retrograde movement threw the whole Illyrian provinces into a blaze: all Croatia was soon in insurrection; the flame spread along the Dalmatian shore; and, as far as the mouths of the Cattaro, the whole mountaineers were soon in arms to throw off the yoke of France. This vehement ebullition, coupled with the numerical inferiority of Eugene, who found himself assailed by above fifty thousand German troops, for whom his newly-raised Italians were no adequate match, rendered it impossible for him to maintain his ground along the whole frontier; and, in consequence, abandoning Fiume and the whole coast of Illyria, he ascended with the bulk of his forces the course of the Isonzo, and took post in the intrenched camp at Tarvis, hoping to make good the passes till time was afforded for the armaments to be completed in his rear. Meanwhile,
Aug. 24. Villach had been evacuated by the Italian troops; but no sooner did Eugene's re-en-
Aug. 29. forcement arrive in that direction than it was retaken by three French bat-
Aug. 30. talions; again it was carried by the Austrians, and finally gained by Eugene, who established his headquarters in that city. But these advantages were obtained by denuding the right and maritime provinces, and Fiume was occupied by the Austrians under General
Aug. 29. Nugent, without opposition, in the end of August.*

Obstinate resistance of the viceroy, and his successes against them.

On the 26th of August, General Pino attacked the Austrian intrenchments on Mont Leobel; but the Italians failed entirely against that formidable bulwark, and were thrown back in utter disorder on Krainburg. Eugene brought them back to the charge in greater force, and the Austrians were driven out. The design of Hiller, at this period, was to
Sept. 2. have forced the enemy to evacuate the passes in his front in the Julian Alps, and retire behind the line of the Isonzo; and with that view, after the loss of Villach, he had fortified Fiestritz, from which point he could at pleasure either menace Tarvis or turn and descend the valley of the Upper Save. To frustrate
Sept. 6. this design, Eugene directed an attack on this fortified post, and after a sharp combat, Grenier, who commanded the assailants, carried it, with a loss to the enemy of eight hundred men. Encouraged by this success, the viceroy made a general attack on the enemy's positions at all points. He met, how-
Sept. 8. ever, with a severe check at Kaplafas, on his right, where General Belotti, with a brigade, was totally defeated, with a loss of twelve hundred men; and his right wing, disconcerted by this disaster, fell back, closely pursued by the Austrians, towards Trieste, while the insurrection in their favour spread over the whole of Istria. The viceroy was obliged, therefore, to remain on the defensive; but, like a skilful general, he turned it to the best advantage. Observing that Hiller had directed the
Sept. 15. weight of his forces to the seacoast on his left, to follow up his successes in the direction of Trieste, he moved in the same direction, and succeeded, after several actions, in expelling the enemy from Fiume, where General Pino established himself. So sudden was this attack, that the Archduke Maximilian, who was in the town at the time, with difficulty saved himself on board Admiral Freemantle's vessel.*

The French are driven back into the plain of Friuli.

These balanced successes on either side led to no decisive result, and, after a month's active hostilities, the position of the contending parties was not materially different from what it had been at their commencement. But events were now on the wing which gave a decisive advantage to the Austrians, and threw back the Italian army behind the Adige. Large re-enforcements, chiefly from the landwehr of the adjoining provinces, reached Hiller in the middle of September; he passed the Drave on the 19th of that month, and soon gain- Sept. 19.
ed considerable advantages over the di- Sept. 21.
visions of Grenier and Verdier, on the Sept. 25.
French left, in the Julian Alps. The object of this transference of active operations from the Austrian left on the seacoast, to their right in the mountains, was soon apparent: the Oct. 8.
treaty of Ried, between the cabinet of Vienna and that of Munich, secured the accession of Bavaria to the alliance—again put the house of Hapsburg in possession of the great central fortress of the Tyrol, and enabled the enemy to turn the Italian valleys by their upper extremity, amid the Alpine snows. Hiller was not slow in turning to the best account this signal advantage. Directing a considerable part
Oct. 4. of his force up the valley of the Drave, which entered Tyrol by Prunecken, and moving forward towards the valley of the Adige, by the bridge of Laditch, Brixen, and the scenery immortalized in the Tyrolese war,† he himself remained in the centre to force the fortified posts held by the enemy at Tarvis. A vigor- Oct. 7.
ous attack was made by Hiller in person
Oct. 8. on the position of Tarvis, from which, after several obstinate conflicts, the viceroy was at length driven with great loss. Despairing now of maintaining his ground in the hills, Eugene withdrew his troops, not with- Oct. 12.
Oct. 13. out considerable difficulty, down all the
Oct. 11. valleys, abandoning altogether the crest of the mountains, and concentrated them on the banks of the Tagliamento, at the entrance of the plain of Friuli; while, by a decree from Gorizia, he directed the levy of fifteen thousand additional conscripts, to supply the loss of an equal number who had perished by fatigue, sickness, or the sword, during this consuming warfare of posts in the Alps.‡

General result of the campaign, and retreat of the French behind the Adige.

The retreat, once commenced, could not readily be terminated. Encouraged by the accession of Bavaria, and the enthusiastic support of the Tyrolese, who crowded with shouts of joy to their standards, the Austrians pressed everywhere on their retiring columns; and it was soon evident that the line of the Adige was the only one where a stand could be made. In contemplation of that event, the garrison of Palma Nuova was strengthened by three battalions, that of Venice augmented to twelve thousand men; while, to

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 196, 197. Norvin's Portefeuille, ii., 466, 467.

* Norvin, Port. de 1813, ii., 467. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 203, 204. Vignolles, 24, 36.

† *Ante*, iii., 225.

‡ Jom., iv., 497. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 209, 211. Vignolles, 37, 44.

delay as long as possible the discouragement and disaffection which he was well aware the retreat of the army would produce in Italy, the viceroy determined to maintain to the last extremity the line of the Isonzo; and so long was the circuit which the troops required to make by Brixen and Trent, that he was not without hopes that the new levies might be brought forward before the enemy threatened Verona. But so rapid was the march of events, that this was soon found to be impossible. On the 25th of September, indeed, General Giflenga, with an Italian division, had gained some advantages over the enemy, and reoccupied Brixen; but the hourly-increasing strength of the Germans, whose columns were now augmented by a vast concourse of volunteers from all parts of Tyrol, soon compelled him to evacuate that town, and retreat successively by Bolzano and Lavis to Trent. The latter town was next day evacuated, and its castle invested by the victorious Austrians; while the dispirited Italians retired to Volano, and the famous defiles of the Adige above Verona. Eugene, finding his rear thus threatened, felt that the line of the Isonzo was no longer tenable. Throwing garrisons, therefore, into a few forts as he retired rapidly across the Tagliamento, and, after sustaining a severe defeat on the part of one of his divisions at St. Daniel, he arrived on the 30th at Sproziano on the Piave. Meanwhile, a bloody combat took place at Volano, which, after a gallant resistance, was carried by the Austrians, the Italians falling back to the still stronger and well-known position at the entrance of the pass of Serravalle. Here they were attacked next day: the Italian troops, now thoroughly discouraged, made a very feeble resistance, and were driven, in utter disorder, to the plateau of *Rivoli*. The recollection of Napoleon's glory was unable to arrest, even for a day, on this memorable spot, the rapidity of his fall; Rivoli was abandoned almost as soon as it had been occupied, and the enemy were driven back out of the hills to the very gates of Verona; while two days after, the citadel of Trent, after a short but active siege, surrendered with its garrison of five hundred men.*

Sept. 25. Oct. 15. Oct. 16. Oct. 23. Oct. 26. Oct. 27. Oct. 28. Oct. 31

This skilful operation of Hiller, in turning the French line of defence on the Piave by the mountains, rendered a farther retreat indispensable, and soon brought their standards in the plain back to the Adige. To cover this retrograde movement, which was eminently hazardous in the level country, in presence of a superior and victorious enemy, the viceroy on the 31st made a vigorous attack on Bassano, which had fallen into the hands of the Austrians, and the situation of which, at the entrance of the Val Sugana and the defiles of the Brenta, promised to secure the army from molestation on the side where most danger was to be apprehended, and carried the place, with a loss to the Austrians of eight hundred men. Thus secured, the Italian army continued its retreat across the plain from the Piave to the Adige,

Concluding operations of the campaign in Italy.

Oct. 31.

* Vignolles, 52, 61. Vaud., Guerre d'Italie, en 1813, 46, 54. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 214, 217.

while the grand park of artillery was directed to Vallegio and Padua. On the 4th of November, the viceroy's headquarters were established at Verona; the garrisons were withdrawn from Bassano, and all the posts to the eastward of that city; and the campaign, which had been begun on the Niemen and the Vistula, terminated on the Rhine and the Adige.*

Nov. 4.

The withdrawal of the Italian troops, however, behind this river proved fatal to the French power on the whole eastern shores of the Adriatic. General Nugent, with the left wing of the Austrian army, speedily overran the shores of the Gulf of Trieste, and invested that city in the middle of October. The operations, powerfully aided by an English squadron and auxiliary force from Sicily, were pushed with uncommon vigour; an important outwork, called the Old Powder Magazine, was carried by assault by the combined British and Austrian forces on the 22d; and the breaching batteries being then established, a most vigorous fire was kept up on the citadel, which soon produced such an effect that the works were entirely ruined, and the place being no longer tenable, surrendered at discretion on the 31st, with twelve hundred men, and very valuable magazines. Nor were the allies less successful in Dalmatia, where the Austrian troops, powerfully assisted by an insurrection of the inhabitants on the one side, and the British marines on the other, speedily overcame every resistance: so early as the middle of October, they were masters of all the forts at the mouths of the Cattan; a fortnight after, the town of Knin was taken by assault; soon after, the garrison of Sebenico revolted, and surrendered it to the Austrians; Spalatro was taken the same day, and the entire reduction of the province and eastern shores of the Adriatic effected, by the reduction of the strong fortress of Zara, which capitulated, after a severe cannonade of thirteen days, to the combined Austrian and British forces on the 9th of December. Meanwhile, Palma Nuova was besieged and Venice invested; and although the strength of the garrison of the latter, which, including the marine forces, was twelve thousand strong, and the magnitude of the flotilla, mounting above three hundred guns, which defended the lagunæ and approaches to the queen of the Adriatic, rendered its reduction a matter of time and difficulty, yet the whole Continental possessions of the old Republic, as far as the Adige, were occupied by the Austrians, whose forces extended to Ferrara and the banks of the Po.†

Surrender of Trieste and conquest of Dalmatia

Oct. 15. Oct. 31. Oct. 16. Oct. 30. Nov. 2. Dec. 9

Such was the memorable campaign in Central Europe of 1813, the most fruitful in great events, and the most momentous in its consequences, which had occurred in the annals of mankind. The armies of Cæsar or Scipio would have formed mere *corps d'armée* in its vast array; the forces of Tamerlane or Genghis Khan would have been blown to atoms by a few discharges of its stupendous artillery. Disciplined skill neither

Reflections on this campaign.

* Vignolles, 73, 81. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 219, 220. Norvin, ii., 468, 469.

† Ann. Reg., 1813, 165. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 220, 221. Vign., 94, 102.

appeared there in miniature array, as in the Grecian Republics, nor barbarian valour under the guidance of unskilled energy, as in the hosts of Bajazet or Attila. Civilization and knowledge had exhausted their resources for the contest; ambition poured forth the accumulations of ages for its support; barbaric valour strained the energy of the desert for the interests it involved. The last reserves, the arriere ban of Europe and Asia, were engaged in the struggle: on the field of battle, beside the Tartars and Bashkirs of the East, were to be seen the tender youth of Europe, only recently torn from the embraces of maternal love; in its maintenance were exhausted all that the military force of France could extort of wealth from the present sufferings of Continental Europe, and all that the industry of England had accumulated of credit during past centuries of pacific exertion. Nor were the skill and science of the leaders in this memorable struggle inferior to the prodigious forces they were called to command, or the vital interests for which they contended: the genius of Napoleon, equal to that of Cæsar or Hannibal, all but overbalanced the heroism of Alexander and the science of Gneisenau, which may fairly be placed beside that of Scipio or Epaminondas; and the cause for which they contended was not the conquest of provinces or the plunder of cities, but the liberation of the human race from unbearable oppression, or the establishment of universal dominion upon an immovable foundation.

Military ability displayed by Napoleon in this campaign.

Great as were the disasters which attended Napoleon in the course of this memorable campaign, and rapid the fall which his power made during its continuance, it may be doubted whether he ever, on any previous occasion, displayed greater abilities, either in the general conception of his designs, or in their rapid and vigorous execution. His system of strategy was the same as it had been at Austerlitz and Jena; and, if it led to very different results, it was only because he was now opposed in a totally different manner, and resisted with a spirit commensurate to the attack. His general ideas for the conduct of the campaign, both in its outset at Lutzen and Bautzen, and in its subsequent stages, during the protracted and desperate struggle on the Elbe, were distinguished by all his usual vigour of conception and boldness of execution; and although the obstinate tenacity with which he clung to that river involved him latterly in the most dreadful reverses, it is the general, and seems to be the just opinion among his ablest military historians, that, situated as he was, he could not have done better; that it was the last defensible position in which the empire of Germany could be maintained; that a retreat to the Rhine, though with undiminished forces, would immediately have been attended by the defection of all the states of the Rhenish Confederacy; and that the risks were well worth incurring, which retained one half of Europe to his standards.*

The skill of his tactics on the field of battle.

If Napoleon's conduct in tactics, and on the field of battle, during this campaign, is considered, it will often appear worthy of still more unqualified commendation. The admirable rapidity with which he took advantage of his central position on the Elbe, to defeat the formidable assault of the allied sovereigns on Dresden, was equalled by the felicitous conception of an attack next day on both wings of his opponents: a measure unlike his ordinary tactics, unlooked for by them, and therefore the more likely to meet with decisive success. Though overwhelmed by superior numbers, and a moral energy which nothing could resist, at Leipsic, the gallantry of his resistance—the heroism of his troops, are worthy of the most unreserved admiration: the more so, that they wanted the stimulus of hope, the recollection of success, and that they fought, at least on the second day, with the mournful conviction that all was lost. Much as we may admire the redoubtable conqueror who struck down his opponents with his iron gauntlet at Austerlitz and Jena, there was as much vigour and resolution displayed on the field of Bautzen or under the walls of Dresden: the central charge at Wachau was equal to that which decided the fate of Austria at Wagram; the daring intrepidity of the Beresina was again displayed in the forest of Hanau; and if his opponents had been of the same mould on the Elbe that they were at Ulm or Rivoli, the destinies of the world would have been irrevocably decided on the Saxon plains.

The signal and inexcusable errors he committed.

Nevertheless, nothing can be more certain than that Napoleon committed the most enormous errors in the course of this campaign, and that his conduct on more than one occasion was such, that if it had occurred on the part of any of his lieutenants, he would have made them lose their heads. In fact, when we recollect that, at the resumption of hostilities in the middle of August, he had four hundred thousand combatants and thirteen hundred guns concentrated under his immediate direction on the Elbe, besides three hundred thousand more who maintained the contest in Italy and Spain;* and that, of this immense force, he led back only eighty thousand men and two hundred guns across the Rhine in the beginning of November, we are at a loss, at first sight, to conceive how it was possible that, in so short a time, so vast a host, hitherto always victorious (save with England) in pitched battles, could have been so entirely discomfited and overthrown. The killed and wounded, and prisoners taken in the different battles, will not explain the difficulty, for they did not amount to a third of the number;

* "The abandonment of Dresden and Saxony would have decided the defection of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, and enabled all the allied armies to unite on the left bank of the Elbe: a fatal result, which would have taken away his last chance of fortune. On the other hand, by remaining on the Elbe, he had a central point which intercepted all the direct communications of the different allied armies, and put him in a situation to take advantage of any false manœuvres they might fall into to beat them in detail."—BOUTOURLIN, *Camp. de* 1813, 91, 92.

* The warmest panegyrists of Napoleon admit this, and even estimate at a higher amount the total of the military force then at his disposal. "His military power," says Napier, "was rather broken and divided than lessened; for it is certain that the number of men employed in 1813 was infinitely greater than in 1812. In the latter four hundred thousand, but in the former seven hundred thousand men and twelve hundred field-pieces, were engaged on different points, exclusive of the armies in Spain. Then on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe, he had powerful fortresses and numerous garrisons, or rather armies, of strength and goodness, to re-establish his ascendency in Europe."—NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, v., 431.

and although the unheeded ravages of the bivouac and the hospital always cut off more than the sword of the enemy, yet this source of diminution was common to both armies, and could have made no material difference on the fortunes of either. Napoleon managed matters so that he rendered the prize of victory enormous beyond all parallel to the conquerors. Thirty thousand prisoners on the spot, and ninety thousand more taken in the fortresses, whom it virtually surrendered to the enemy, constituted the proud trophies of the battle of Leipsic; and marvellous as were the conquests which followed the thunderbolt of Jena, they were as nothing compared to those which attended the shock of that mighty field, which at one blow prostrated the French Empire, and threw back the tricolour flag from the Vistula to the Rhine.

The faults in generalship committed by Napoleon during this campaign were of such a kind as to be inexplicable on any other footing than that they were the necessary result and natural concomitant of his system of war, when met by a worthy and adequate spirit of resistance on the part of the enemy. We have the authority of Marshal St. Cyr for the assertion, that the light troops of the allies, by the manner in which they cut off the foraging parties and intercepted the communications of the French, did them more injury while on the Elbe than they sustained in all the pitched battles put together;* and the chief of Napoleon's engineers, General Rogniat, who had access to the whole official documents at headquarters, has stated, that he lost three hundred thousand men by *famine* in Russia in 1812, and one hundred thousand by the same cause in Saxony in 1813.* It is in this incessant wasting away, the necessary result of carrying on a campaign with such enormous multitudes of men, without any adequate magazines or support of a lasting kind, save what they could extract from the suffering population among whom they were, that the real secret of the destruction of Napoleon's power is to be found; and the dreadful typhus fever, which in the close of the campaign swept off such unheard-of multitudes in the fortresses on the Elbe, was the natural result of the unexampled privations and misery to which he reduced the gallant conscripts who crowded around his standards. His panegyrists, both on this and the other side of the Channel, who follow the bulletins in ascribing his ruin entirely to the rigour of the Russian winter, would do well to explain away the fact proved by the records of the war office at Paris, that the "morning state" at Wiazma on the 3d of November, 1812, *four days before the frost began*, exhibited a total of somewhat above fifty-five thousand combatants and twelve thousand horses—the poor remains of three hundred thousand soldiers and eighty thousand cavalry, whom Napoleon had led in person across the Niemen: that is, *he had lost above two hundred and forty thousand men, under his immediate command, before a flake of snow fell.*† It is neither, therefore, in the rigour of

* "The numerous partisans of the enemy committed frightful ravages on our rear: our depôts of cavalry were obliged to fall back towards the Rhine to avoid falling into their power; many horses might have gained the army, if it had been possible to allow them to take a few days' repose; nothing could make up for the want of subsistence for the troops and replenishing to the parks. It may safely be affirmed, that these detached corps, as numerous as armies in the time of Turenne, commanded by officers skilled in that species of war, did more injury to Napoleon than the grand allied armies, and were sufficient of themselves to have consummated his ruin, if he had not instantly adopted the part of drawing near to the Rhine. The magazines were so thoroughly exhausted, that soldiers, whom a complete ration of good food could hardly have maintained in health, were reduced from the outset of the campaign to half rations, and even this scanty supply was latterly often not furnished."—ST. CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iv., 323, 324.

* "From want of magazines, Napoleon suffered to die of famine, in the space of a few months, three hundred thousand men in Russia, and a hundred thousand in Saxony. The soldiers, obliged to separate in search of subsistence, in great part never rejoined their colours: all the bonds of discipline were relaxed; the troops seized every opportunity to disband; the inhabitants of the villages, exasperated by the pillage which went on, rose up and massacred the marauders; and, in fine, in the midst of these disorders the armies disappeared, or perished from misery, especially when the war was prolonged for any considerable time on the same theatre."—ROGNIAT, *Chef de Génie à* NAPOLEON, *Art. de la Guerre*, 457.

† As this is a point of the very highest importance, involving, as it does, a decisive refutation of the assertion, so often repeated, that it was the cold of Russia which destroyed the power of Napoleon, the following details, from the morning states in the war office at Paris, are given on the subject:

	Strength on entering Russia.			Strength on November 4th (three days before the cold began).		
	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Horses.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Horses.
Imperial Guard	41,094	6,279	16,322	14,000	2,000	
1st Corps, Davoust	68,627	3,424	11,417	13,000	459	
3d do., Ney	35,755	3,587	8,039	6,000	231	
4th do., Eugene	42,430	2,368	10,057	12,000	181	
5th do., Poniatowsky	32,159	4,152	9,438	3,500	324	
8th do., Vandamme	15,885	2,050	3,477	1,200	294	
1st Corps, Cavalry, Nansouty		12,077	13,014			
2d do, Monbrun		10,436	11,125			
3d do., Grouchy		9,676	10,451			
4th do.		7,994	8,766			
General Staff, Berthier	3,075	908	1,748			
Four Corps and Staff united					1,500	
Dismounted Cavalry				500		
	239,025	62,951		50,200	4,989	
	62,951			4,989		
Grand Total of Men and Horses	301,976		103,854	55,189		12,000

Thus, at Wiazma, on the 4th of November, three days before the cold commenced, the central army, under the immediate command of Napoleon, had been reduced from 302,000 to 55,000: and its horses from 104,000 to 12,000: in other words, it had lost 247,000 men and 92,000 horses *before a flake of snow fell*; and there was only left of that immense host for the frost to act upon, 55,000 men and 12,000 horses. The following table exhibits the progressive decline of the horses belonging to the cavalry before the cold began on November 7.

	Horses of Cavalry.
Crossed the Niemen with Napoleon	85,000
Remained at Witepsk	60,000
At Borodino	45,000
At Wiazma, including the artillery horses, remained only	12,000

So that above 70,000 horses of the cavalry had already perished before the frost set in.—See *Etats de la Guerre de 1812*, given in CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de l'Empire de Napoleon*, ix., 421, 422; and *Imperial Muster Rolls in* CHAMBRAY, i., App., No. ii.

the elements nor the accidents of fortune that we are to seek the real causes of Napoleon's overthrow: but in the natural consequences of his system of conquest; in the oppressive effects of the execrable maxim that war should maintain war; and in the impatience of taxation and thirst for plunder, in the rapacious military republic of which he formed the head; which, by throwing the armies they had on foot upon external spoliation for their support, at once exposed them, the moment the career of conquest was checked, to unheard-of sufferings, and excited unbounded exasperation among every people over whom their authority prevailed.

His unaccountable errors.

After making every allowance, however, for the influence of these causes, which, undoubtedly, were mainly instrumental in producing and accelerating the overthrow of the French Revolutionary power, it must be admitted that there are some military errors which he committed in this campaign which are altogether inexplicable. The destruction of Vandamme's corps, which was the beginning of his long train of disasters, was clearly owing to his imprudence in first ordering him to march on Tœplitz, with thirty thousand men, to cut off the retreat of a hundred thousand, and then neglecting to support him, when engaged on his perilous mission, by the Young Guard at Pirna. His plan of commencing offensive operations by three armies at the same time, diverging from a centre at Dresden, was, to say the least of it, imprudent and hazardous; for each army was weakened the farther it removed from the central point; and neither, in case of disaster, could afford any rapid or immediate support to the other. On leaving the Saxon capital, he deposited his reserve park of artillery and ammunition in Torgau, separated himself from his only considerable magazine on the Elbe, in Magdebourg, and left thirty-five thousand men, who might have cast the balance in his favour in the approaching decisive contest, to stand a siege in Dresden with seven days' provision for the men and three for the horses. At Leipsic, he chose a position to fight having an impassable morass, traversed only by a single chaussée, in his rear, thereby violating what he himself has told us is the "first requisite for a field of battle, to have no defiles in its rear." When unable to conquer on the first day, he still clung to his ground, though the vast increase of the allied force rendered defeat inevitable: he made no preparation whatever for retreat, and threw no bridges over the Elster, though his engineers could have erected twenty in a single night; and he perilled his crown and his empire in a conflict with greatly superior forces in that dangerous situation, when a hundred and forty thousand of his veteran soldiers were cooped up in the fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, to be the trophy of the conqueror in case of defeat.

The generally hazardous character of his warfare.

Inexplicable as these military errors must always appear in so sagacious and clearsighted a general as Napoleon, they are yet, if minutely considered, nothing more than the natural and inevitable result of his system of war, when it was once thoroughly understood, and opposed with a vigour commensurate to the attack. He has himself told us, that on many previous occasions he had been in equal danger, from which he had nevertheless extricated himself, not only with credit, but decisive success; and the course he pursued on these occasions had been just as perilous as that which, in 1813, proved his ruin. In the marshes of Arcola in 1796; during the advance to Leoben in 1797; in Moravia, previous to the battle of Austerlitz, in 1805; in Poland, after the defeat of Eylau, in 1807; on the Danube, after the catastrophe of Aspern, in 1809, he was in equal, if not greater peril; and he extricated himself from the difficulties into which his imprudence had brought him only by a happy audacity, which paralyzed or divided his opponents when they had the means of destroying him absolutely within their grasp. He never thought of retreat; he never anticipated defeat where he was in person with the army—though he provided often carefully for it in the case of his lieutenants—but, dashing boldly forward, struck at the centre of the enemy's power, without any thought how, in case of disaster, he was to maintain his own. His own words, that "if Alexander had looked to his retreat at Arbela, or Cæsar at Pharsalia, they would never have conquered the world," reveal the ruling principle of his warfare, and explain at once his early triumphs and ultimate disasters. The wide difference between the two, in the result of the same audacious system of warfare, is to be ascribed, in a great degree, to the superior vigour and unanimity with which he was resisted in the later, to what he had been in the earlier stages of his career. It was the incomparable energy with which the people rose in arms in the latter years of the war, the concord which prevailed among the sovereigns, the perseverance with which they carried through their designs, and the disinterestedness with which they sacrificed all separate interests to the general objects of the alliance, which led to its glorious results. And without diminishing the credit due to all in this noble career, and admitting that it was on the Russian reserve that the weight of the contest in its last and most serious stages in general fell, justice must yet admit that the chief glory of the deliverance of Germany is to be ascribed to Prussia; and that, but for the incomparable energy with which her people rose against its oppressors, and which filled the allied ranks with a host of warriors, beyond all precedent great for the amount of its population,* the first onset of Napoleon on the banks of the Elbe never could have been resisted, and the grand alliance which effected the deliverance of Europe never formed.

"I shall not," says Gibbon, "be readily accused of fanaticism, yet I must admit that there are often strong appearances of retribution in human affairs." Had he lived to the present

* Prussia, after its partition, in 1807, by the treaty of Tilsit, possessed only 5,034,000 inhabitants. In 1813 she had 100,000 men in arms, and actually in the field, independent of the landsturm, or, as nearly as possible, one for every *twenty-five souls*. This is the largest proportion that occurred in any state resting on its own resources during the war; for although Great Britain had 800,000 men in arms out of a population not at that period, including Ireland, amounting to more than eighteen millions, yet of these only 500,000 were regular soldiers and sailors, the others being local militia, who were not permanently drawn from their occupations. One in a hundred in arms is the largest proportion which any country, how warlike soever, has ever been able to keep up for any length of time.—*Vide Ante*, ii., 544; and LORD CASTLEREAGH'S *Speech, 17th Nov.*, 1813. *Park. Deb.*

Memorable example of moral retribution which the Revolutionary war affords.

times, and witnessed the extraordinary confirmation of this truth which the Revolutionary contest afforded, his innate candour would probably have extorted a still more unqualified testimony to Supreme superintendence from the great skeptic of the eighteenth century. On the 16th of October, 1793, at nine o'clock in the morning, Marie Antoinette ascended the fatal scaffold, and Revolutionary crime reached its highest point by the murder of a queen and a woman, the noble and unoffending daughter of the Cæsars. On that day and that hour twenty years—on the 16th of October, 1813—the discharge of three guns from the allied headquarters announced the commencement of the battle of Leipsic, and the infliction of the greatest punishment on a nation which the history of mankind had exhibited. On the 19th of October, 1805, Revolutionary ambition beheld its greatest external triumph consummated by the surrender of Mack, with thirty thousand men, to its victorious leader on the heights of Ulm; and on that day eight years—on the 19th of October, 1813—the final blow was struck for Germany's deliverance by the swords of the fatherland: thirty thousand prisoners lowered their colours to the victors within the walls of Leipsic; and the mighty conqueror, sad and dejected, was leading back his broken and defeated host to the Rhine. On the 20th of October, 1805, Napoleon, as the brilliant array of Austrian captives defiled before him, said to those around him, "Gentlemen, this is all well; but I must have greater things than these—I want ships, colonies, and commerce." On the *very next day* after these memorable words were spoken, on the 21st of October, 1805, the united navies of France and Spain were destroyed by the arm of Nelson; the maritime war was finished by the thunderbolt of Trafalgar; and "ships, colonies, and commerce" had irrevocably passed over to his enemies. Whether these marvellous coincidences were the result of accident—of that accumulation of great events in the years of the Revolution, which rendered almost every day prolific of historic incident—or formed part of the general design of Providence for the more striking manifestation of its judgments upon the world, they are equally worthy of attention. Whatever may be thought of the coincidence of days, it was no accident which directed the march of events; it was no casual combination of chances which led Revolutionary ambition to expiate its sins on the Saxon plains; which let fall in due season the sharpened edge of German retribution; and, at the darkest period of the contest, sunk the fleets of infidelity in the deep, and righted amid the waves the destined ark of Christian civilization.

CHAPTER LXXII.

LIBERATION OF SPAIN.

ARGUMENT.

Singular Progress in the warlike Resources of France during the Revolution.—Contrast which the Progress of the Efforts of England affords during the same Period.—Difference in the Resources of the two Countries.—Causes of this extraordinary Difference.—General Unanimity in Great Britain as to the Prosecution of the War at this Period.—Argument of the Opposition against the Conduct of the Spanish War.—Reply on the Part of the Government.—Means taken for Recruiting the Army.—Vast Military Force displayed by Great Britain during this Year.—Great Amount of the Naval Force of that Period.—Prodigious Expenditure of the Year.—Revenue raised and Loans contracted during its Continuance.—Glorious Position which Great Britain occupied at this Period.—Ruinous Change introduced at this Time in the Financial System of the Empire.—Mr. Vansittart's new Plan of Finance, and Argument in support of it.—Argument of Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Tierney against it.—Reflections on this great Change in our Financial System.—Difference in the Results of the old and new System.—Answer to the Objection that new Debt was simultaneously contracted during the War.—Wellington's Efforts to reorganize his Army in the Winter of 1812.—He is created Generalissimo of the Spanish Armies.—Revolt of Ballasteros, which leads to his being deprived of his Command.—Intrigues at Cadiz, and Arrival of Wellington there.—His Reception by the Cortes, and Measures for the Prosecution of the Campaign.—Violent Democratic Passions at Cadiz, and Abolition of the Inquisition in Spain.—Enormous Amount of the Contributions levied in the Provinces under the French.—Abuse in the Government and Administration of Portugal.—Miserable Condition of the Spanish Armies.—Forces with which Wellington was prepared to open the Campaign.—Positions and Distribution of this Force.—Positions and Strength of the French Armies in the Peninsula.—Their latent Sources of Weakness and Disunion.—Operations on the East Coast of the Peninsula.—Position and Force of Suchet there.—Operations of Sir John Murray.—Battle of Castello, and Defeat of the French.—Position and Operations of the French Army to the North of the Tagus.—Great Difficulties of Joseph's Situation.—Formidable Insurrection in Biscay and Navarre.—Bloody partisan Warfare there.—Siege and Fall of Castro.—Wellington's Plan for the Invasion of Spain.—Commencement of his March.—Junction of the allied Wings on the Douro.—Graham's important March through the Mountains on the Left.—Feeble and disjointed Movements of the Armies under Joseph.—Advance of the British to Burgos.—Concentration of the French Armies in the Basin of Vittoria.—Description of the Field of Battle there.—Wellington's Force and Plan of Attack.—Position and Strength of the French Army.—Battle of Vittoria.—Rapid Progress of the British on the Right.—Forcing of the French Centre.—Graham's decisive Success on the Left.—Total Defeat of the French.—Wellington Blockades Pampeluna and Besieges St. Sebastian.—Murray's Operations in the East of Spain.—Siege of Taragona, and his Failure before that Place.—The Anglo-Sicilian Force is moved to Alicante.—Suchet abandons Valencia, and retires across the Ebro, whither he is followed by the allied Troops under Lord William Bentinck.—His Operations in Catalonia.—Siege of St. Sebastian.—Desperate Assault and Repulse of the British.—Arrival of Soult at Bayonne, and Preparations to renew the Campaign.—Relative Position and Numbers of the contending Armies at this Period.—Soult's Irruption through the Pyrenees.—Great Success in the Outset.—The British halt and give Battle in front of Pampeluna.—Arrival of Wellington, and first Battle of Sauroren.—Second Battle there, and Defeat of the French.—Their Disastrous Retreat across the Pyrenees.—Results of the Battles of the Pyrenees.—Renewal of the Siege of St. Sebastian.—Preparations for a second Assault.—Obstinate Resistance at the Breach.—The Place is carried.—Burning and Sack of the Town.—Siege and Capitulation of the Castle.—Soult advances, meanwhile, to raise the Siege.—Is Defeated at San Marcial by the Spaniards.—Views of Wellington for the Campaign at this Period.—Passage of the Bidassoa, and Invasion of France.—Obstinate Conflict at the Great Rhune.—Position and Views of Soult at this Period.—Suchet refuses to co-operate with him.—Blockade and Fall of Pampeluna.—Scandalous Violence and Intrigues of the Democratic Party at Cadiz.—Wellington Resigns the Command of the Spanish Armies, and is Reinstated by the Cortes on his own Terms.—His gloomy Views of the Peninsular Cause at this Period.—Battle of the Nivelle, and Defeat of the French there.—Soult's Position on the Nive.—Excesses of the Spanish

Troops, which cause them to be sent back into Spain.—Passage of the Nive, and Battles in front of Bayonne.—Combat of the 10th.—Desperate Battle on the 11th, under Hill.—Combat of the 12th, and final Defeat of the French.—Position of the two Armies at this Period.—Reflections on this Campaign.—Extraordinary Rapidity with which the French Power in the Peninsula was overthrown.

THE strength of France, put forth with extraordinary and unheard-of vigour at the commencement of the Revolution, subsequently exhibited the languor incident to a weak and oppressive Democratic government, was again drawn out with unexampled ability by the powerful arm of Napoleon, and finally sunk under the total exhaustion of its moral energies and physical resources, from long-continued warfare. In the year 1793, twelve hundred thousand burning Democrats ran to arms, impelled alike by political passion, external ambition, and internal starvation; and, on the principle of making war maintain war, proceeded to regenerate by revolutionizing and plundering all mankind. In the year 1799, the vehemence of this burst had exhausted itself: the armies of the Republic, sunk down to less than two hundred thousand men, were no longer able to make head against their enemies; Italy, Germany, Switzerland, were lost; and on the Var, the Rhine, and the Limmat, its generals maintained a painful and almost hopeless defensive against superior forces. The extraordinary genius of Napoleon, by skilfully directing the whole talent and energy of France into the military profession, again brought back victory to the army of the Revolution, and carried the imperial standards in triumph to Cadiz, Vienna, and the Kremlin. But there is a limit in human affairs to the strength of passion, however profoundly aroused, or the energy of wickedness, however skilfully directed. The period had now arrived when all the material resources of the Revolution were at once to fail, all its energies to be suddenly exhausted; when its external finances, deprived of the aid of foreign plunder, were to be involved in inextricable embarrassment; and its domestic resources, destitute of credit, and having exhausted every method of internal spoliation, were to become totally unproductive; when the confiscation of the property of the communities and the hospitals of the poor was to be unable to afford any relief to a yawning exchequer; and repeated levies, of three hundred thousand conscripts each, were to fail in making any sensible addition to the strength of its armies; when even the dreaded prospect of foreign subjugation was to be unable to excite any general spirit of resistance in the country; and the mighty conqueror, instead of sweeping over Europe at the head of five hundred thousand men, was to be reduced to a painful defensive, with fifty thousand, on the plains of Champagne.

Singular progress in the warlike resources of France during the Revolution.

The history of Great Britain, and the successive development of its resources during the same period, exhibit a remarkable and memorable contrast to this downward progress. In the first instance, the forces which the British Empire put forth were singularly diminutive, and so obviously disproportioned to the contest in which she had engaged, as to excite at this time unbounded feelings of surprise. The revenue raised for 1793, the first year of the war, including the loan, was under twenty-five millions; the land-forces only reached forty-six thousand men in Europe, and ten thousand in India; the sea, eighty-five ships of the line in commission.* Such was the impatience of taxation in a popular, and ignorance of war in an insular and commercial community; and with these diminutive forces, aided by a disjointed and jealous alliance, its rulers seriously expected to arrest the torrent of Revolutionary ambition, supported by twelve hundred thousand men in arms. It is not surprising that disaster, long continued and general, attended such an attempt. But, as the contest rolled on, England warmed in the fight: repeated naval triumphs roused the latent spirit of glory in her people; necessity made them submit without a murmur to increased expenditure; and magnanimous constancy, amid continued Continental reverses, still, with mournful resolution, prolonged the contest. At length the Spanish war gave her a fitting field for military exertion, and Wellington taught her rulers the principles of war, her people the path to victory. But even then, when her land and sea forces were every year progressively augmented until they had reached a height unparalleled, when taken together, in any former age or country; when her fleets had obtained the undisputed dominion of the waves, and her land-forces carried her standards in triumph to every quarter of the globe; the magnitude of her resources, the justice of her rule, the industry of her people, enabled her to carry on the now gigantic contest without any recourse to revolutionary spoliation, or any infringement either on the credit of the state or the provision for its destitute inhabitants. Instead of declining as the contest advanced, her resources were found to multiply in almost a miraculous manner: twenty years of warfare seemed only to have added to the facility with which she borrowed boundless sums, and the regularity with which she raised an unheard-of revenue; while they tended to augment the fidelity with which she had performed her engagements to the public creditors, and the sacred regard which she paid to the sinking fund, the sheet-anchor of future generations, and the poor's rate, the refuge of the present. And it will not be considered by subsequent times the least marvellous circumstance in that age of wonders, that in the year 1813, in the twentieth year of the war, the British Empire raised, by direct taxation, no less than twenty—by indirect, forty-eight millions sterling; that she borrowed thirty-nine millions for the current service of the year, at a rate of less than five and a half *per cent.*, and expended a hundred and seven millions on the public service; that she had eight hundred thousand men in arms in Europe, and two hundred thousand in Asia, all raised entirely by voluntary enlistment, and two hundred and forty ships of the line in her service; that she carried on war successfully in every quarter of the globe, and sent Wellington into France at the head of a hundred thousand combatants, while her subsidies to foreign powers exceeded the immense sum of eleven mill-

Contrast which the progress of the efforts of England affords during the same period.

* M'Culloch's Stat. of Great Britain, ii., 438. James's Nav. Hist., i., App., Table ii. Porter's Parl. Tables, i., 1.

ions sterling; and that, during all this gigantic expenditure, she preserved inviolate a sinking fund of above fifteen millions sterling, and assessed herself annually to the amount of more than six millions sterling for the support of the poor.*

Difference in the resources of the two countries.

Surprising as the contrast between the opposite progress of France and England, in finances, expenditure, and national resources, during the same contest, undoubtedly is, and memorable as is the proof it affords of the difference between the ultimate resources of a revolutionary, and a free but stable community, it becomes still more remarkable when the difference in the material resources with which they severally commenced the contest is taken into consideration. France, at the commencement of the Revolution, had a population of somewhat less than twenty-eight millions, a revenue of twenty-one millions sterling, and a debt of two hundred and forty millions; and Great Britain, including Ireland, had not a population at the same period of more than fifteen millions, her total revenue was under seventeen millions, and her debt was no less than two hundred and thirty-three millions. While, therefore, the national burdens of the two countries were about the same, the physical and pecuniary resources of France were greater, the former by nearly a hundred, the latter by about thirty per cent., than those of the British Empire. And although, without doubt, England possessed vast resources from her immense commerce and her great colonial possessions, yet in these respects, too, France was far from being deficient. Her navy at that period numbered eighty-two ships of the line, a force greater than that which now bears the royal flag of England, and which had in the American war combated on equal terms with the British fleet; her mercantile vessels were very considerable, those engaged in the West India trade alone being above sixteen hundred, and employing twenty-seven thousand sailors; while her magnificent colony of St. Domingo alone raised a greater quantity of colonial produce than the whole British West India islands, and took off manufactures to the extent of ten millions sterling yearly from the parent state.†‡

Causes of this extraordinary difference.

"When a native of Louisiana," says Montesquieu, "wishes to obtain the fruit of a tree, he lays the axe to its root: Behold the emblem of despotism." It is in this striking remark that the explanation is to be found of the extraordinary difference between the progress in the national resources, during the contest, in two states which began with advantages preponderating in favour of the one which was ultimately exhausted in the strife. Democratic despotism, the most severe and wasting of all the scourges which the justice or mercy of Heaven lets loose upon guilty man, had laid the axe to the root of French internal prosperity, and forced her people, by absolute necessity, into the career of foreign conquest, even before the war commenced with the British Empire. Spoliation had extinguished capital; the assignats had annihilated credit, confiscation ruined landed property, general distress destroyed industrial wealth. Judging from past experience, the British government not unnaturally imagined that a nation in such a state of general insolvency would have been unable to maintain the contest for any considerable time; and this, doubtless, would have been the case, if it had depended on its own resources alone for the means of carrying it on. But they did not anticipate, what experience so soon and fearfully demonstrated, the energy and almost demoniac strength which a nation, possessing a numerous and warlike population, can in such desperate circumstances acquire, by throwing itself in desolating hordes upon the resources of its enemies, after its own have been destroyed. It was this withering grasp which the French Revolution laid first upon the whole property of its own people, and then upon that of its opponents, which constituted, from first to last, the real secret of its success; and the energy which it so long developed was no other than the passions of sin, turned into this new and alluring channel. But despotic spoliation, whether at home or abroad, is still laying the axe to the root of the tree which bears the fruits of industry; and no different result can be expected, in the long run, from the one than the other. The exhaustion of the French Empire in 1814, when it had drained away the resources and exasperated the hearts of all Europe, was as complete as that of the Republic of France had been in 1795, when it had effected the destruction of property of every description within its own bounds. Whereas in England, where property, during the whole strife, was religiously respected, and the hand of the spoiler was withheld alike from the mite of the widow and the palace of the peer, the resources provided for the strife, though infinitely less considerable in the outset, were far more durable in the end; and, instead of declining and withering up as the contest rolled on, daily became greater and greater with the growth of the protected industry of her people, until they acquired a decisive preponderance over the gains of violence, and arrayed Europe in dense and burning battalions, to assert the triumph of the rule of justice over that of iniquity.

General unanimity in Great Britain as to the prosecution of the war.

The dreadful catastrophe of the Moscow campaign, the animating prospect which the resurrection of Germany afforded, the glorious successes which the campaign of Salamanca had achieved, totally extinguished the division of opinion and voice of faction in Great Britain; and all parties, though from different motives, concurred in advocating the necessity of prosecuting the war with the utmost vigour. The Whigs saw in such a system the fairest and now the only prospect of attaining the object which they had uniformly desired—the general pacification of the world; while the Tories supported it from a conviction that one vigorous effort would now put a period to the sacrifices of the nation, and give a durable ascendency to the conservative princi-

* See Porter's Prog. of Nation, 182, and ii., 290. Ann. Reg., 1813, 206, and Porter's Parl. Tables, i., 1.

† *Ante*, ii., 240.

‡ It produced no less than £18,400,000 worth of sugar and other produce, including the Spanish portion: the whole British islands at this time do not produce so much. In 1832, prior to the late disastrous changes in these islands, the value of their annual produce was about £22,000,000; now it is reduced to less than £17,000,000.—*Ante*, ii., 240; and PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i., 64.

ples for which they had so long and strenuously contended. Thus both parties, though with different objects, now combined in recommending the utmost vigour in the prosecution of hostilities; and what is very remarkable, and perhaps unprecedented in British history, the chief complaint made against government by the leaders of the popular party was, that they had yielded too much to the advice which they themselves had so long and eloquently tendered, and had not prosecuted the war with the vigour which the favourable circumstances which had occurred so imperatively required.*

Argument of the opposition against the conduct of the Spanish war.

On the part of the opposition, it was contended by Marquis Wellesley and Earl Grey, "What secret cause amid the splendid scene which has been exhibited in the Peninsula, what malign cause amid the rejoicings and acclamations of triumph, has counteracted the brilliant successes of our arms, and has converted the glad feelings of a just exultation into the bitterness of regret and disappointment? With an army in discipline and spirit superior to any that had ever before been assembled, uniting in itself qualities so various as to have never entered into the assemblage of any other species of force; with a general pronounced by the whole world to be unsurpassed in ancient or modern times—the pride of his country, the hope and refuge of Europe; with a cause in which justice vied with policy, combining all that was ardent in the one motive, with all that was sober in the other; with the admiration of the world excited by our achievements—how is it that they have terminated only in disappointment; that a system of advance has suddenly and inevitably been converted into a system of retreat; and that the great conqueror who chased the French armies from the plains of Salamanca has been pursued, in his turn, over those very plains, the scene of his triumph and his glory, to take refuge in the very positions which he held before the campaign commenced?

"The advantages of our situation in the Peninsula, during the last campaign, were very great, and totally different from what they had been at any previous period. The reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz weakened, in a great degree, the enemy's frontier lines; and this advantage was accompanied by a most extraordinary and unlooked-for failure in the means, and relaxation of the exertions, of the French in the Peninsula. The efforts of the French army were deprived of the unity of counsel, of design, and of action; distraction reigned among the generals; the exertions of their armies were wholly different from those which we have witnessed when the soul which inspired them was present, infusing its own vigour into every operation. The central government in Madrid was miserable beyond description: without power to enforce obedience, without talents to create respect or authority to secure compliance, it was at the mercy of rival and independent generals, each solicitous only for his own fame or aggrandizement, and little disposed to second each other in any operations for the public good. Here, then, was a most astonishing combination of favourable circumstances; and yet we have derived no greater benefit from them than we did from previous campaigns, when everything was of the most adverse character.

"To take advantage of these favourable contingencies, we should clearly have augmented our force in Spain to such an amount as would have enabled its general at once to have in the field a force adequate to check the main body of the French army, and another to carry on active operations. Unless you did so, you necessarily exposed your cause to disaster; because the enemy, by relinquishing minor objects, and concentrating his forces against your one considerable army, could easily, being superior on the whole, be enabled, in the end, to overwhelm and crush it. Hill never had a force of more than five thousand British, and twelve thousand Portuguese and Spaniards; yet, with this handful of men, he kept in check all the disposable forces of Soult in Estremadura: a clear proof of the vast benefit which would have arisen to the allied cause if an adequate force of perhaps double or triple the amount had been similarly employed. Now, what period could have been desired so suitable for making such an effort as that when the central government at Madrid was imbecile and nugatory, the French armies separated and disunited, Napoleon thoroughly engrossed with his all-absorbing expedition to Russia, and the British army in possession of a central position on the flank of the theatre of war, which at once menaced hostility and defied attack?

"The successes which have been gained throughout the whole campaign—and they have been not only brilliant, but in some degree lasting—were entirely owing to the skill of the general and the valour of his troops, and in no degree to the arrangement or combination at home on the part of those who had the direction of military affairs. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz were both carried with means scandalously inadequate, by intrepid daring on the part of the general, and the shedding of torrents of English blood. After the reduction of the last of these fortresses, what was the policy which obviously was suggested to the British general? Evidently to have pursued his advantages in the south, attacked Soult in Andalusia, destroyed his great military establishments in that province, and again brought Spain into active hostility, by rescuing from the grasp of the enemy its richest and most important provinces. He was prevented from doing this, to which interest and inclination equally pointed, by the necessity of returning to the north to check the incursion of Marmont into Beira, and by the notoriously unprovided state of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz to withstand a siege. With whom did the blame of not providing adequate means for the protection of the north, when the career of victory was pursued in the south, rest? Evidently with the government at home, which both neglected to send out the requisite supplies, and never maintained the British force in the field at more than half the amount which their ample resources, both military and pecuniary, would have afforded.

"When the invasion of Leon was commenced in July, and the whole disposable British force was perilled on a single throw, the defects in the combinations, and languor in the support of government, were still more conspicuous. That

* Ann. Reg., 1813, 98, 209.

irruption, attempted by forty-five thousand men into a country occupied by two hundred and fifty thousand, could be based only on the prospect of powerful co-operation in other quarters. Was any such afforded? Murray's descent on the eastern coast, with the Anglo-Sicilian expedition, was mainly relied on; but did it arrive in time to take any part of the pressure off Wellington? So far from it, though the whole arrangements for the sailing of the expedition were concluded as early as March, yet on the 15th of July he had heard nothing of its movements; and he was compelled to begin a systematic retreat—in the course of which he gained, indeed, by his own skill, a most splendid victory—but which, leading, as it did, to a concentration of the enemy's troops from all parts of the Peninsula, involved him in fresh difficulties, where the incapacity of ministers was, if possible, still more conspicuous. No sufficient efforts were made to provide the general with specie, and all his operations were cramped by the want of that necessary sinew of war. No adequate train of artillery was provided for the siege of Burgos; no means of resisting the concentration of troops from all parts of the Peninsula were afforded to him; and he was ultimately compelled, after the most glorious efforts, to relinquish all his conquests, except the two fortresses first gained, and again to take refuge within the Portuguese frontier.

"So nicely balanced were the forces of the contending parties during this memorable campaign, that there is no stage of it in which twelve thousand additional infantry and three thousand cavalry would not have ensured decisive success. Now, was such a force at the disposal of government, in addition to those which were actually on service in the Peninsula? The details of the war office leave no room for doubt on this head. During the whole of last year there were, exclusive of veteran and garrison corps, forty-five battalions of regular infantry and sixteen regiments of cavalry, presenting a total of fifty-three thousand men, besides seventy-seven thousand regular militia, two hundred thousand local militia, and sixty-eight thousand yeomanry cavalry. Can any one doubt, that out of this immense force, lying dormant, as it were, within the British islands, at least twenty-five thousand might have been forwarded to the Peninsula? And yet the whole number sent was only twenty-one thousand, of whom more than one half were draughts and recruits, leaving only ten thousand five hundred and forty-five actually sent out of fresh regiments. Why was not this number doubled—why was it not trebled? Were we looking for a more favourable opportunity than when Napoleon was absent with half his military force in Russia? Did we wait for more glorious co-operations than was afforded us during the Moscow campaign? And what would have been the effect in France if, when the shattered remains of the Grand Army were arriving on the Elbe, Wellington, with one hundred thousand men, flushed with victory, had been thundering across the Pyrenees?"*

To these able arguments it was replied by Lord Bathurst, Lord Castlereagh, and Lord Liverpool: "The confident tone assumed by the noble marquis might induce the suspicion that his brother, the illustrious Wellington, shares his opinions, and is dissatisfied with the support which he received from government during the campaign. But the fact is otherwise, and he has voluntarily written to them expressing his entire satisfaction with their conduct in this particular. The objections made are mainly founded upon this: that we have not in the Peninsular contest employed our whole disposable force; that it might have been materially augmented without detriment to the home service; but it was not the policy of this country, it was not in itself expedient, to employ its whole force upon any one foreign service, how important soever; but rather to retain a considerable reserve at all times ready in the citadel of our strength, to send to any quarter where it may appear capable of being directed to the greatest advantage. No one will dispute the importance of the Peninsular contest; but can it be seriously maintained that it is in that quarter *alone* that the dawning of European freedom is to be looked for? Is Russia nothing? Is Prussia nothing? And, with the profound hatred which French domination has excited in the north of Germany, is it expedient to put ourselves in a situation to be unable to render any assistance to insurrectionary movements in Hanover, Holland, or the north of Germany; countries still nearer the heart of the enemy's power, and abounding with a more efficient warlike population than either Spain or Portugal?

Reply on the part of government.

"When it is stated, too, that the campaign terminated with the British armies in the same quarters which they held at its commencement—this, though geographically true, is, in a military and political point, utterly erroneous. Was the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, the capture of the whole heavy artillery of the armies of Portugal and of the centre, at the former of these fortresses and the Retiro, nothing? Is it no small matter to have shaken loose the spoiler's grasp over the whole of Spain? to have compelled the evacuation of Andalusia and Granada, taken twenty thousand prisoners, and destroyed the great warlike establishments at Seville and before Cadiz, stored, as they were, with above a thousand pieces of cannon? If the expedition of Soult to the south of the Sierra Morena, contrary as it was to all military principle, while the English power in Portugal remained unsubdued, was suggested entirely by the desire to open up new and hitherto untouched fields of plunder; the loss of these provinces, the throwing back the enemy for his whole support on the central provinces of Spain, the wasted scene of his former devastation, was a proportional disadvantage to his cause, a proportional benefit to the allied operations. How many campaigns in English history will bear a comparison, not merely in brilliant actions, but in solid and durable results, with that of Salamanca? And it is, perhaps, not the least proof of its vast moral influence, that it has wrought an entire change in the views of the gentlemen opposite; and, for the first time in the history of the war, made the burden of their complaint, not, as heretofore, that too much, but that too little has been done by British co-operation for the deliverance of Europe.

* Parl. Deb., xxv., 25, 66.

"The expected co-operation of Lord William Bentinck from Sicily, certainly, did not arrive at the time that was calculated upon; but the fault there lay not with government, but in circumstances which prevented that officer from exercising in due time the discretion with which he was timeously invested, as to appearing with a powerful British force on the east of Spain in the beginning of July. The failure of the attack on Burgos, however much to be regretted, was neither to be ascribed to negligence on the part of government in forwarding the necessary stores, nor to want of foresight on the part of Lord Wellington in the preparations for its reduction, but to the accidental circumstance of its having been, unknown to the English general, strengthened to such a degree as to render it impregnable with the means which he deemed amply sufficient for its capture. He never asked for a battering-train, because he never thought it would be required; if he had done so, he could at once have got any amount of heavy guns he required from the ships of war at Santander. Even as it was, the fort would have been taken but for the accidental death of the officer who headed the assault on the 22d of September, and the still more unfortunate circumstance of his having had upon his person a plan of the siege, so that the whole designs of the British engineers became known to the enemy. The complaints made of the want of specie at Lord Wellington's headquarters are sufficiently answered by the fact, that such was the state of the exchanges from the extraordinary demand for specie on the Continent, that we lost twenty-four per cent. upon all remittances to the Peninsula, which, upon the £15,000,000 which the campaign actually cost, occasioned a farther loss of £3,000,000. But the effect of the last campaign is yet to be judged of; it is not in a single season that the French power in the Peninsula, the growth of five years' conquest, is to be uprooted. The blow delivered at Salamanca loosened their power over the whole realm: one is, perhaps, not far distant, which may totally overthrow it."*

Upon a division, Marquis Wellesley's motion for a committee of inquiry into the conduct of the war was negatived by a majority of 76, the numbers, including proxies, being 115 to 39.†

Means taken for recruiting the army.

One good effect resulted from the able exposition made by Marquis Wellesley on this occasion, of the benefits which might be expected to result from the conducting of the war in Spain on a more extended scale, and in a manner worthy of the great nation which was engaged in the strife: viz., that government were induced to make the utmost efforts, both to augment the numbers and efficiency of the regular army at home, and to increase the re-enforcements that were forwarded to Wellington in the Peninsula. For several years past, the system had been adopted of providing for the increase of the regular army, by permitting the privates of the militia to volunteer into the line, and offering them large bounties, amounting sometimes to twelve and fourteen guineas, to do so. By this means, the objectionable measure of a direct conscription was avoided, and recruits were obtained for the army of a better description than could otherwise be obtained by voluntary enlistment, and possessing the great advantage of being already thoroughly drilled and exercised. So efficacious was this system, that, joined to the warlike enthusiasm produced by the victories in the Peninsula, it produced during this year twenty-five thousand men for the army: a force which more than compensated the waste of the Spanish war, great as it was, and which was nearly double of the amount obtained by private enlistment, which had never reached fourteen thousand.*

Vast military force displayed by Great Britain during this year.

The military force maintained during this year by Great Britain, independent of the force in India, was immense; and, coupled with the vast navy which it was necessary to keep for the maritime war, in which America had now appeared as a principal enemy, presented, perhaps, the greatest aggregate of warlike strength ever put forth by any single nation since the beginning of the world. The land-forces presented a total of two hundred and twenty-eight thousand regular troops, having increased twelve thousand even after all the losses of the year 1812, besides twenty-eight thousand British soldiers in India, and ninety-three thousand militia in the British islands, in no respect inferior to the army of the line, and thirty-two thousand foreign corps in the British service. The sepoy force in India numbered no less than two hundred thousand men, presenting a total of five hundred and eighty-two thousand soldiers in arms, all raised by voluntary enlistment, and exclusively devoted to that as a profession. In addition to this, the local militia, similar to the Prussian landwehr, in the British islands amounted to no less than three hundred thousand; and the yeomanry cavalry, or landwehr horse, were sixty-eight thousand! exhibiting a total of nine hundred and forty-nine thousand men in arms, of which seven hundred and forty-nine thousand were drawn from the population of the British islands.†‡

Great amount of the naval force at that period.

Immense as these forces are, the marvel that they should have reached such an amount is much increased when the magnitude of the naval establishment kept up in the same year is considered, and the limited physical resources of the country which, at the close of a twenty years' war, made such prodigious efforts. The British navy, at the commencement of 1813—and it was kept up at the same level during the whole year—amounted to two hundred and forty-four ships of the line, of which one hundred and two were in commission, and two hundred and nineteen frigates, besides smaller vessels: making, in all, one thousand and nine ships in the service of England, of which six hundred and thirteen were in commission, and bore the royal flag! This immense force was manned by one hundred and forty thousand seamen, and eighteen thousand marines: making a total, with the land-forces, of ELEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVEN THOUSAND MEN IN ARMS, all raised by voluntary enrolment, of whom above nine hundred thousand were drawn from the population

* Parl. Deb., xxv., 66, 74, 87. † Parl. Deb., 88.

* Parl. Deb., xxiv., 346, 876.

† Martin's Colonial Hist., i., 319. Army Estimates for 1813, Parl. Deb., xxiv., 346, 867.

‡ Note A, App., ch. lxxii.

of the British islands! When it is recollected that this immense force was raised in an empire in Europe, not at that period numbering above eighteen millions of souls over its whole extent*—that is, considerably under half the population of the French Empire, which had a population of forty-two millions to work upon for its army of nine hundred thousand men, and hardly any naval force afloat to support—it must be admitted that history has not preserved so memorable an instance of patriotic exertion.†

Prodigious expenditure of the year.

But these efforts drew after them a proportional expenditure, and never at any former period had the annual charges of government in the British Empire been so considerable. The army alone cost £19,000,000; its extraordinaries, £9,000,000 more; the navy, £20,000,000; the ordnance, £3,000,000; and so lavish had the expenditure become, under the excitement and necessities of the war, that the unprovided expenditure of the year preceding amounted to no less than £4,662,000. But these charges, great and unprecedented as they were, constituted but a part of the expenses of Great Britain during this memorable year. The war in Germany, at the same time, was sustained by her liberality; and the vast hosts which stemmed the torrent of conquest on the Elbe, and rolled it back at Leipsic, were armed, clothed, and arrayed by the munificence of the British government and the resources of the British people. Portugal received a loan of two millions sterling; Sicily, four hundred thousand; Spain, in money and stores, two millions; Sweden, a million; Russia and Prussia, three millions; Austria, one million; besides warlike stores sent to Germany, to the amount of two millions more. The war on the Continent, during this year, cost in all, in subsidies or furnishings to foreign powers, ten millions four hundred thousand pounds, of which Germany alone received above six millions; and yet so little was Great Britain exhausted by these immense exertions, that she was able, at the same time, to advance a loan of two millions sterling to the East India Company. The total expenditure of the year, including Ireland, and reckoning the current vote of credit, reached the amazing and unprecedented amount of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEEN MILLIONS.‡◊

Revenue raised and loans contracted during the year.

It may naturally be asked how supplies so prodigious could by possibility be obtained during the currency of a single year, especially as the manufacturing industry of the country had for above two years been most seriously obstructed, and most grievous distress induced in many districts by the cessation of all mercantile connexion with America: first, from the Non-intercourse Act, and next, from the open hostility of the United States. As the sum raised by taxation within the year amounted, in all, to £68,800,000, a very large loan became necessary; and such were the demands upon the exchequer, that after the sum had been borrowed which appeared adequate to the whole probable necessities of the state in March, a farther and very considerable addition to the national debt had become necessary in November. The loan at first contracted in March was £21,000,000; but even this ample supply proved insufficient, and Parliament was assembled early in November to make a farther addition to the means to be placed at the disposal of the chancellor of the exchequer. An additional loan of twenty-two millions was voted in that month, of which one half was devoted to the current expenses of the year, and one half to fund an equal amount of exchequer bills, which had now become so considerable as to occasion a very serious pressure on the money market. To meet the interest and contribution to the sinking fund for these great loans, additional taxes, chiefly on tobacco, malt, and spirits, to the amount of £610,000 in Ireland, and spirits and sugar, and lesser articles in Great Britain, to the amount of £800,000, were imposed; but they were far from meeting the total interest on the sums and floating debt contracted, borrowed during the year. Yet so little were even these immense loans from affecting the public credit, or exhausting the pecuniary resources of Great Britain, that they seemed to have a directly contrary effect; the resources of the Empire rose up with the more buoyancy the greater the load was which was imposed upon them. Decisive proof of this occurred in this year; for while the loan contracted in spring was concluded at the rate of £5 10*s.* 6*d.* per cent., that in November was obtained on the more favourable terms of £5 6*s.* 2*d.* *per cent.*; and such was the competition of capitalists to obtain shares in the loan at this reduced rate, that not only were many disappointed who had come to bid, but the *premium* on it in the market next day rose three and a half *per cent.**

Nov. 15.

Glorious position which Great Britain occupied at this period.

We have now reached the highest point in the military and national glory of Great Britain. Without having ever, in the course of this arduous contest, compromised her principles or yielded to the enemy; without having touched one shilling of the sacred fund set apart for the redemption of the public debt, or infringed either upon the security of property or the provision for the poor, she had attained her long-sought-for object, and not only provided for her own security by her valour, but delivered Europe by her example. In the eloquent words of Mr. Canning, who, though in opposition to government since his rupture with Lord Castlereagh in 1809, still remained true to his principles, "What we have accomplished is, establishing the foundations upon which the temple of peace may be erected, and imagination may now picture the completion of that structure, which, with hopes less sanguine and hearts less high, it would have been folly to have attempted to raise. We may now confidently hope to arrive at the termination of labour and the commencement of repose. It is impossible to look back to those periods when the enemy vaunted, and we perhaps feared, that we should

* Population of Great Britain in 1811 12,552,044
" Ireland, probably 5,000,000
" Increase to 1813 500,000
18,052,044
—*Parl. Deb.*, xxi., 286. *Census Papers.*

† James's Naval Hist., vi., 516, Table ii.

‡ Lord Castlereagh's Speech, Nov. 17, 1813, Parl. Deb., xxvii., 132, 146. Supplies for 1813, ibid., xxvi., 577.

◊ See App. B, chap. lxxii.

* Mr. Vansittart's Speech, June 11th and Nov. 15th, 1813. Parl. Deb., xxvi., 578, 580, and xxvii., 107, 110.

have been compelled to sue for peace, without returning thanks, amid all our ebullitions of joy, to that Providence which gave us courage and heart still to bear up against accumulating calamity. Peace is safe now, because it is not dictated; peace is safe now, for it is the fruit of exertion, the child of victory; peace is safe now, because it will not be purchased at the expense of the interest and the honour of the Empire: it is not the ransom to buy off danger, but the lovely fruit of the mighty means we have employed to drive danger from our shores."*

Ruinous change introduced at this period into the Finance System of Great Britain.

"Nulla magna civitas," says Hannibal, "diu quiescere potest; si foris hostem non habet, domi invenit; ut prævalida corpora ab externis causis tuta videntur, sed suis ipsa viribus onerantur. Tantum nimirum ex publicis malis sentimus, quantum ad privatas res attenit; nec in eis quidquam acrius quam pecuniæ damnum stimulat."† Never was the truth of these memorable words more clearly demonstrated than in the financial history of Great Britain, as it preceded and as it followed this momentous year. During the whole anxieties, perils, and burdens of the contest, the government of England, directed by noble hearts, upheld by heroic arms, had adhered with unshaken constancy to the system for the redemption of the public debt: not one shilling had been diverted from this sacred purpose during the darkest, the most distressed, or the most hopeless period of the contest; and the result had been, that the sinking fund—the sheet-anchor of the nation's credit—now exceeded fifteen millions sterling, having increased to that immense amount from one million in 1786, when it was first placed on an efficient footing by Mr. Pitt.† Now, however, when the nation was about to reap the fruits of its heroic constancy; when the clouds which had so long obscured its course were dispersing, and the glorious dawn of peace and security was beginning to shine on the earth, the resolution of its rulers failed: the provident system of former days was abandoned; duty was sacrificed to supposed expediency; the fatal precedent was introduced of abandoning the protection of the future for the relief of the present; and that vacillation appeared in our financial councils, which made it painfully evident that, with the dangers of the war, its heroic spirit was about to depart.

Mr. Vansittart's new plan of finance, and argument in support of it.

This great and momentous change in our financial policy, the effects of which have been felt with such severity in later times, was thus introduced by Mr. Vansittart, on a day which deserves to be noted as among the most disastrous which England ever knew—March 3, 1813. "Towards the close of last session, in the discussions which took place on our financial situation, a general conviction seemed to prevail, that some measure of unusual severity had become necessary to take off the load which depressed public credit. Six months, however, have elapsed since that period—six months, the most momentous ever known in the history of Europe. The face of the world has been changed; and from the conflict between insatiable, unprincipled, remorseless ambition on the one side, and hardy, stubborn, though untutored patriotism on the other, have resulted consequences the most important, and hopes the most satisfactory to the cause of humanity. That necessity no longer exists, and, in consequence, the time appears to have now arrived when, without imparing our public credit—without postponing the period when the entire liquidation of our public debt may with confidence be anticipated—the nation may safely obtain some relief from the unparalleled exertions which it has made.

"It is by an alteration on the sinking fund, as it has been established by act of Parliament in 1802, that this relief, which has now become necessary, is to be obtained. The great danger of the sinking fund, which has now become an engine of such vast power and efficacy in the state, is, that it will soon come to reduce the debt too rapidly. If the contraction of loans cease, it will soon come to pay off twenty, thirty, nay, forty millions annually; and the reduction of these immense sums will not, as heretofore, be concealed or neutralized by the simultaneous contraction of debt to an equal or greater amount, but it will appear at once by the diminution to that extent of the public funds every year. Extraordinary as these results may appear, they are no more than a rigid application to the future of the experience of the past—the only safe method of reasoning that can be practised in political affairs. The sinking fund has now reached an extent of which the history of no country affords an example; but can we contemplate without alarm the prospect of paying off thirty or forty millions annually for the next thirty years, and then suddenly ceasing, which will be the case under the law as it at present stands, in consequence of the whole debt having been paid off! Such an event would produce effects upon the credit investments of the country too formidable even for imagination to contemplate. All our financiers, accordingly, have concurred in the necessity of limiting in some way or other, and at no remote period, this powerful agent of liquidation. By the original Sinking Fund Act of 1786, drawn by Mr. Pitt, this limitation was to have taken place as soon as the fund should have accumulated to four millions *per annum*. Had not that original plan been varied by the act of 1802, the public would long ere this have felt relief from the operation of the sinking fund, though only to the limited extent of the interest on four millions a year. Lord Lansdowne and all the authorities have also concurred in the opinion, that the idea of paying off thirty or forty millions a year in time of peace, which the sinking fund, if maintained to its present amount, will unquestionably do, is altogether impracticable and visionary. Relief must, therefore, at some time or other, be afforded to the public, by arresting the action of the sinking fund; and if so, the question occurs, is there any period when such relief is more loudly called for, more imperatively required, than at the present moment?

"When the sinking fund was established in 1786, the total amount of the debt was about 240,000,000; and the redemption of such a sum appeared, if not altogether hopeless, at least placed at a very remote distance. But, great as the difficulty then appeared, the firmness and

* Parl. Deb., xxvii., 145. † Liv., lib xxx., c. 44.
‡ *Ante*, ii., 387.

perseverance of the nation, pursuing this important object with undeviating resolution, have at length completely surmounted it; and the accounts upon the table prove that a sum equal to the total amount of the debt, as it existed in 1786, has been redeemed.* Instead of shifting the burden from themselves, and laying it upon posterity, the people of this country have nobly and manfully supported the load, even under the burden of increasing difficulties, which the vicissitudes of the contest have thrown upon them; and, what is still more remarkable, they have done this during a period when they paid a still greater amount in war-taxes, to prevent the growth of another debt of a similar amount during the contest: so that experience has both amply demonstrated the wonderful powers of the sinking fund in accumulating funds for the redemption of the debt, and the strong claims which the people of England now have for some relief from the burdens with which it is attended.

"Mr. Pitt not only strongly supported, but was the original author of the act of 1802; and his original design was, that after reserving as much of the sinking fund as would redeem the whole debt at par in forty-five years, the surplus, then amounting to above a million, should be applied to the public service. We have now arrived at the period when a similar relief, without impairing the ultimate efficiency of the sinking fund, may be obtained. It is proposed that the debt first contracted should be deemed to have been first discharged; and that the sinking fund created in respect of any *subsequent* loan shall be first applied to the redemption of any prior loan remaining unredeemed; while the operation of the *per centage* created for those earlier loans shall be continued for the redemption of those subsequently contracted. Thus, in the event of a long war, a considerable resource might accrue during the course of the war itself, as every successive loan would contribute to accelerate the redemption of those previously existing; and the total amount of charge to be borne by the public in respect of the public debt will be reduced to a narrower compass than under the existing mode, while the period of the ultimate discharge of the whole debt will be accelerated rather than retarded. The calculations which are laid on the table prove, that by the new plan means are provided for the total repayment of the existing debt from four to ten, and of the future debt from fourteen to twenty-seven years sooner than by the laws in force, while a very considerable surplus available to our present necessities will at once be obtained. According to the laws at present in force, the whole debt will be discharged by the year 1845, by the new plan in 1837."†

To these specious views, it was answered by Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Tierney: "The great and peculiar merit of Mr. Pitt's system of the sinking fund is, that it makes an effectual provision for the *permanent* liquidation, not only of the existing, but of every future public debt. He wished, in the event of any future war, to guard the country against the evils arising from too rapid an accumulation of debt, and consequent depression of credit; and to place us beyond the reach of that hopelessness, despondency, and alarm which had brought the finances of the country to the brink of ruin at the close of the American war. But his system has a still greater merit. He foresaw that the greatest difficulty which the statesmen of the country would have to contend with, in subsequent periods of difficulty, would be to guard against the danger of future alienation. The plan which he introduced in 1792 was intended to guard against this specific danger; and it held out to the public a guarantee, that any future debt which the state might incur, would, how great soever its amount might be, be contracted under a system of redemption, which would inevitably provide for its extinction within a period of thirty years or so after its contraction. Under this admirable system, not only the sinking fund which it provides, but the application and accumulation of that sinking fund, are so interwoven and bound up with the contract for every loan, that its redemption became a condition between the borrower and lender, until the obligation of repayment was cancelled by the extinction of the debt itself. It was made an objection to this system, that it would place the reimbursement of all future loans beyond the reach or control of Parliament; but to every thoughtful observer this very circumstance is its principal merit; for it placed the financial salvation of the country beyond the reach even of the future weakness of its rulers or people.*

Argument of Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Tierney against the new plan.

"The fundamental position in Mr. Pitt's financial system, the truth of which experience has so completely demonstrated, is, that provision should be made for every loan being redeemed from the resources provided at the time of its contraction, at latest within forty-five years. This is not founded upon any imaginary result or chimerical anticipation, but upon a rigorous application of arithmetical calculation, and is as certain as any proposition in geometry. He established a sinking fund of one *per cent.* on each loan contracted, for which provision was made in the taxes laid on to pay its interest; and it was enacted that this one *per cent.* should be regularly issued quarterly from the exchequer, to be laid out in the purchase or redemption of stock, to be invested in the name of the commissioners of the national debt; and it is demonstrably certain that this system, supposing the rate of interest to be invariably three *per cent.*, will redeem a capital equal to a hundred times its amount in little more than forty-five years. This is the fixed and certain rate of redemption at three *per cent.*, that is, when the three *per cent.* stock is at par; but it is a great and peculiar advantage of Mr. Pitt's system, that it is calculated to act more powerfully when the price of stock is depressed, by rendering the purchases of the commissioners cheaper; that is, it draws an additional element of life from the very calamities which appear to threaten the existence of the nation.

"The foundation of the new system of finance proposed by the chancellor of the exchequer is,

* Total national funded debt on the 5th of January, 1786..... £238,231,248
Redeemed before March 1, 1813..... 238,350,143
Overpaid of original debt by..... £118,895
—MR. VANSITTART'S *Resolutions, March* 3, 1813, *Parl. Deb.*, xxiv., 1092.

† Parl. Deb., xxiv., 1078, 1095.

* *Ante*, ii., 388, 390.

that Parliament is at liberty, under the act of 1792, to regulate and modify, according to its discretion, in any manner, the redemption of the debt contracted under that act, provided the final liquidation of each of these separate loans, which together constitute the aggregate of the debt, is not protracted beyond the full period of forty-five years. Is such an alteration consistent with public faith? That there is nothing in the act authorizing such an alteration in the means established for the creditor's security in the progressive liquidation of his debt, is quite apparent. Then, is there anything in the nature of the change which calls for its adoption, in the face of the express injunctions of the act to the contrary? It is plain that there is not; nay, that the reason of the thing all lies the other way. The invasion upon the sinking fund proposed lies here. The new system does not interfere with the quarterly issue from the exchequer of the one *per cent.* on each loan, as directed by the act of 1792: it is upon the concurrent application of these several one *per cents.* to the reduction of their respective loans, and upon the transfer of the stock purchased by each of these sinking funds, that the change is made. And of the magnitude of this change no clearer proof can be imagined, than that it is held forth by the chancellor of the exchequer as likely in the next four years to withdraw seven or eight millions sterling from the sinking fund to the necessities of the state; and that in twenty years it would prove equal to a loan of a hundred millions.

"The first report of the Committee of Finance in 1797 concludes with these remarkable words: 'The old sinking fund established in 1786 is no longer made applicable, by law, to the discharge at compound interest of what may then remain of the old debt; but the operation of the new sinking fund is to continue at compound interest till the new debt shall be wholly discharged.' Is it possible to express the object of the act and the intention of the Legislature more clearly than by thus drawing the distinction between the act of 1786 and that of 1792? The promised subsidy of a hundred and twenty millions is merely a golden dream. It is no doubt true, that if we choose to abandon the sinking fund, or any considerable part of it, we shall find ourselves so much the richer for present operations by doing so. Every person who is in the course of paying off a debt will find the same if he stops in the course of its liquidation, and applies all the funds destined for that purpose to his present necessities. There is nothing new in that: it has been the common excuse for wasteful improvidence from the beginning of the world. But what is to be the ultimate result of such a system? Ruin to the state, as it has been to every individual or family who ever yet pursued it.

"The real bait which is held out is, that this system will for the next three years supersede the necessity of laying on new taxes. Admitting the weight of the public burdens, and the painful duty which it is to propose any addition to them, is it not more manly and statesmanlike at once to do so, than to adopt a change in a system which hitherto has worked so admirably, and substitute for the steady operation of the sinking fund, under the present laws, which experience has so amply demonstrated to be well founded, a succession of new devices, to which no man can foresee an end? If the public necessities render it absolutely impossible to go on without having recourse to some extraordinary aid, it would be far better to mortgage the sinking fund to the extent of two millions yearly for the period, it is to be hoped short, that the war lasts, than to adopt a *permanent* change of system in a particular so vital to the national safety. Any appropriation of the sinking fund for a brief period would be preferable to such a lasting alteration on the system, and breaking in upon its efficiency and operation; whereas, by adhering to it with the constancy and resolution which have been hitherto evinced by government, we shall have the absolute certainty that a very few years of peace will accumulate its annual payments to such an amount, that, in addition to providing for the reduction of the debt to as large an extent as is desirable, perhaps twenty millions a year, we shall have the pleasing task to perform of remitting the most oppressive part of the war-taxes. To break in upon a system attended with such benefit is the most dangerous of all innovations. The present system is neither more nor less than stopping the accumulation of the sinking fund just now, to add to it hereafter. Such a precedent, once established, will shake the security of our finances to the foundation—that hereafter will never come. Some excuse will always be found for continuing the agreeable task of remitting present taxation by trenching upon the security of the future; and in the end it will be found that the first step in such a downward system is the first advance to ruin."*

The resolutions of Mr. Vansittart were agreed to without a division, and a bill passed in terms thereof.†

Reflections on this great change in our financial system.

Thus began the new system of British finance: that of shutting our eyes to the future; of considering only the exigencies of the moment; and trenching to any extent upon the interests or the security of subsequent times, provided only a stop can be put to present clamour, or a foundation laid for temporary popularity. Time, the great test of truth, has now completely demonstrated the perilous nature of this innovation, and too clearly verified Mr. Tierney's prediction, that it would prove the first step to national ruin. Nor is there, perhaps, to be found, in the whole history of human affairs, a more striking proof than the twenty-seven years immediately preceding, and the like period immediately following the year 1813, afford, of the difference between the results of that manly and provident system of government which, founded on the foresight of the thinking few, lays, often amid the clamours and misrepresentations of the unthinking many, the broad and lasting foundations of national greatness; and that conceding and temporizing policy, which, looking only to present objects and the attainment of immediate relief, secures unbounded momentary applause from the heedless multitude, by adopting measures which loosen the fabric of national power, shorten the period of national existence, and bring down upon its au-

* Parl. Deb., xxv., 286, 327, 359, 362. † Ibid., 366, 367.

thors the lasting execrations of the wise and thoughtful in every future age.

Difference in the results of the two systems.

In the twenty-seven years which elapsed from 1786 to 1813, the finances under Mr. Pitt's system were managed with manly constancy, scrupulous regard to the future, and a total disregard of present obloquy; and the consequence was, that the sinking fund rose in that short time from one to fifteen millions; and the whole debt existing at its commencement, amounting to nearly two hundred and forty millions, had been extinguished at its termination. This happened, too, although twenty years of that period were occupied with the most extensive and costly war that has occurred in the history of mankind, and an expenditure had been forced on the country which increased its revenue raised by taxation, from sixteen millions at its commencement, to sixty-eight millions at its termination. In the twenty-seven years which immediately followed 1813—from 1813 to 1840—a totally different system was followed. Tax after tax, amounting in the whole period to above forty-eight millions sterling, were repealed amid the general applause of the unthinking many, and the profound indignation of the far-seeing few; Mr. Vansittart's precedent of breaking in upon the sinking fund was readily adopted on every emergency, until the shadow even of this pillar of national credit disappeared, and for the last three years of the period not a shilling had been applied to the reduction of debt; and the nation which had begun the fund with a fixed and certain sinking fund of fifteen millions a year, in full operation and increasing at compound interest, found itself at its close without any sinking fund whatever, and a deficit which, during the last three years, had amounted to above six millions.* This disastrous change occurred, too, during a period, with the exception of the last year of its continuance, of profound and general peace; in the course of which the population of the Empire had increased fully fifty *per cent.*, its agricultural produce in a still greater proportion, its imports had nearly, and its exports more than doubled!† With truth did Sir Joshua Reynolds say, that he who aims at obtaining popularity with his contemporaries, must lay his account with the neglect or detestation of posterity.

Answer to the objection that debt was simultaneously contracted during the war.

Nor is there any solid foundation for the obvious remark, so often repeated as the justification of government and the people, during this unparalleled increase of national resources and prostration of national strength, that the sinking fund redeemed and discharged debt so largely during the first period, because other debt to a much greater amount was contracted, and that it was gradually impaired, and at last totally annihilated in the second, because the simultaneous contraction of other debt had ceased. This observation, which has been so generally made as to have deluded a whole generation, proceeds upon confounding together two things, in themselves altogether distinct and separate—viz., the provision made by Mr. Pitt for paying off, within forty-five years after it was contracted, every separate loan which he was obliged to borrow, and the simultaneous necessity to which he was exposed of contracting debt to an equal or greater amount, for the necessities of the Revolutionary war. It is no doubt true, that, if two hundred and forty millions were paid off before the year 1813, debt to more than double that amount had been contracted; and it is that fact which has so generally misled the last generation. But these two things had no necessary, or even casual connexion with each other. The funds provided for the liquidation of the former were wholly independent of the debts contracted under the necessities of the latter. If the funds for the discharge of the debt had been drawn solely, or even partly, from borrowing, unquestionably the remark would have been well founded, that you in nowise better your condition by borrowing with the right hand to pay off with the left. But this was not the case. The funds provided for the liquidation of the debt were all drawn from indirect peace-taxes, and would all have existed, if these taxes had not been repealed, after the war loans had entirely ceased. In private life we are never mistaken in such a case. If a man adopts a regimen which improves and ensures his health at ordinary times, we never think of condemning it because he accidentally takes the typhus fever, and, during its continuance, the good effects of the system are overlooked or concealed. It is by its operation in seasons independent of such extraneous calamity that we must judge of its effects; and if the indirect taxes, laid on for the upholding of the sinking fund, had not been repealed under the pressure of no necessity, but from a reckless thirst for popularity on the part of successive governments, nothing is more certain than that the debt paid off would, by the year 1840, have been above six hundred millions; and, instead of a deficit of two millions and a half, we should now have had a surplus of revenue above the expenditure of forty millions annually.*

Leaving these momentous but melancholy considerations, it is now time to resume the narrative of the glorious concluding events of the war.

Wellington's efforts to reorganize his army in the winter of 1812.

The winter which followed the campaign of Salamanca, though not distinguished by any warlike achievements, was one of extraordinary activity and unceasing efforts on the part of Wellington. The disasters in which it terminated, as well as the unceasing and protracted fatigues with which it had been attended throughout its long extent, had in a great degree loosened the bonds of discipline, and impaired the efficiency of the army; and on various occasions, during the siege of Burgos and in the subsequent retreat, it had been ob-

* *Vide* App. C, chap., lxxii., for two most instructive tables, showing the progressive increase of the sinking fund under the one system, and its progressive extinction under the other.

	1814.	1840.
† Population of Great Britain and Ireland	18,000,000	28,250,000
Exports	£53,573,234	£102,472,000
Imports	£33,755,264	£61,268,000
Shipping—Tons, British and Foreign	1,889,535	4,783,000
Revenue raised by Taxes	£68,748,363	£47,250,849

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, i., 11; ii., 98; and ii., 174; and *Finance and Parliamentary Accounts for* 1840.

* Vide *Ante*, ii., 392 and 393, where this is fully demonstrated.

served that the troops had neither fought with their accustomed spirit, nor gone through their duties with their wonted regularity. Wellington's stern but necessary reproof, which has already been mentioned,* had done much to remedy the most glaring evils which had crept in; and he was not slow in setting the first example himself of those useful reforms which he so strongly inculcated on others. Neither rank nor station had been able to screen those in fault: some had been tried, others dismissed, many allowed to retire home to avoid more painful consequences; and with such effect was the vigilant reformation which pervaded all departments attended, that the second division recovered no less than six hundred bayonets in one month. The ponderous iron camp-kettles hitherto used by the soldiers had been exchanged for lighter ones, similar to those employed in the French service; and the mules which formerly carried them bore tents instead, for the protection of the troops. The Douro had been rendered navigable above the confluence of the Agueda; a ponton train had been formed; carts of a peculiar construction, adapted for mountain warfare, had been formed; and a large supply of mules obtained, to supply the great destruction of those useful animals during the retreat from Burgos. Finally, large re-enforcements, especially in cavalry, came out during the winter from England; and before spring arrived, the army, thoroughly recruited in health and vigour during its rest in cantonments, was prepared to take the field in greater strength than it had done since the commencement of the Peninsular war.†

Wellington is appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies, and goes to Cadiz.

It was an object of not less importance to take some decisive steps for the more effectual organization of the Spanish army; and in that quarter, at length, symptoms of a considerable change were visible. The colossal fame of Wellington, the magnitude of the services he had rendered to the cause of Peninsular independence, the sight of Andalusia liberated by his victories, of Cadiz disenthralled by his arms, had at length conquered alike the sullen obstinacy of Castilian pride and the secret hostility of Democratic jealousy; and the English general was, by a decree of the Cortes, invested with the supreme command of the whole Spanish armies. Such, however, was the disorganized and inefficient state of all the forces of that monarchy, that Mr. Henry Wellesley, Wellington's brother, and the British ambassador at Cadiz, advised him not to accept the office, as it was evident that it would excite jealousy and infer responsibility, without increasing strength or conferring power. The patriotic spirit of the English general, however, and his clear perception of the obvious truth, that it was only by combining the whole strength of the Peninsula under one direction that the French could be driven across the Pyrenees, overcame the repugnance which he felt at undertaking so onerous and irksome a responsibility, and he accepted the high command. The Spanish government, however, soon found that the new commander-in-chief was not to accept the honours of his dignified situation without discharging its duties: he early remonstrated, in the most energetic terms, against the management of their armies, as calculated to destroy altogether their efficiency in the field;* and as it was evident that a very strong hand would be required to remedy such numerous and long-established evils, he required that officers should be appointed to command solely on his recommendation; that he should be invested with the absolute power of dismissal; and that the resources of the state, which were applicable to the pay and support of the troops, should be applied as he might direct. As the Cortes evinced some hesitation in acceding to these demands, Wellington repaired in person to Cadiz, where he arrived on the 24th day of December.†

Sept. 22, 1812.

The appointment of Wellington to the command of the Spanish armies led to an immediate explosion on the part of the Democratic party in Cadiz. The *Diario Mercantil de Cadiz* loudly denounced the measure as illegal, unconstitutional, and disgraceful to the Spanish character; and it speedily rallied to its cause all that party, strong in every country, but especially so in Spain, with whom jealousy of foreigners is predominant over love of their own country. Such was the clamour which they raised, that it reached the armies; and Ballasteros, a brave and active, but proud and irascible officer, openly evinced a spirit of insubordination, and wrote to the minister of war, demanding that, before the command was definitively conferred on the English general, the national armies and citizens should be consulted. Such an example, if successful, would speedily have proved fatal to the slight bonds of authority which still held together the monarchy; and the regency, sensible of their danger, acted with a vigour and celerity worthy of the cause with which they were intrusted. Don Ildefonso de Ribera, an artillery officer of distinction, was immediately despatched to Grenada, the headquarters of Ballasteros, to deprive him of his command. The dangerous mission was executed with vigour and decision: the Prince of Anglona and Ribera, supported by the corps of the Guards in his army, summoned the insurgent general to resign his command; he appealed to the other corps to resist the order, but they shrank from

Revolt of Ballasteros, which leads to his being deprived of his command.

Oct. 23.

Nov. 6.

* *Ante*, iii., 495.

† Nap., v., 503, 504. Tor., v., 139. Jom., iv., 345.

* "The discipline of the Spanish armies is in the very lowest state, and their efficiency is, in consequence, much deteriorated. The evil has taken a deeper root, and requires a stronger remedy than the removal of the causes—viz., want of pay, clothing, and necessaries—which have necessarily occasioned it. Not only are your armies undisciplined and inefficient, and both officers and soldiers insubordinate, from the want of pay, clothing, and necessaries, and the consequent endurance of misery for a long period; but the habits of indiscipline and insubordination are such, that even those corps which, by my exertions, have been regularly paid and fed for a considerable period, and seldom if ever felt any privation, are in as bad a state, and as little to be depended on, as the others. The desertion is immense, even from the troops last adverted to. If I had been aware of the real state of the Spanish army, I should have hesitated before I charged myself with such an Herculean labour as its command; but, having accepted it, I will not relinquish the task because it is laborious and the success unpromising, but exercise it as long as I possess the confidence of the authorities who have conferred it on me." —WELLINGTON *to* DON JOSEF DE CARVAJAL, *Spanish Minister at War, 4th of December*, 1812, GURWOOD, ix., 596, 597.

† Wellington to Don Josef de Carvajal, minister at war, Dec. 4, 1812, Gurwood, ix., 597. Tor., v., 122, 139.

the prospect of openly braving the supreme authority, and Ballasteros was conducted to Ceuta without bloodshed, where he was detained a prisoner; although a sense of his services, and the popularity of the stand for national command which he had made, induced the government, most wisely, not to follow up his arrest with any ulterior proceedings.*

Intrigues at Cadiz, and arrival of Wellington there.

This unwonted act of vigour on the part of the Spanish government, however, was the result of offended pride rather than roused patriotism: the retreat of Wellington into Portugal soon after renewed the spirit of disaffection in Cadiz; intrigue became more prevalent than ever; the agents of Joseph were indefatigable in their endeavours to represent the cause of independence as now evidently hopeless; and a conspiracy for delivering up the island of Leon, and proclaiming the intrusive monarch King of Spain, was set on foot, and soon acquired a formidable consistency, not only from its ramifications over the monarchy, but its embracing, beyond all question, some of the intimate friends of the Duke del Infantad, the president of the regency, and a well-known political *intriguante*, his avowed mistress.† We have the authority of Napoleon, accordingly, for the assertion, that at that epoch the Cortes treated in secret with the French; and although the intrigue had hitherto reached only a limited part of its numbers, yet it was apparent that any continuance of ill success or long protracting of the contest would speedily lead to a general defection from the cause of independence. In the midst of this maze of intrigue, Wellington arrived at Cadiz, and was received with respect by the Cortes, and loud expressions of applause from the anxious multitude.‡

Wellington's reception at Cadiz, and measures for the campaign agreed on there.

The arrival of the English general at Cadiz was shortly after followed by the intelligence of the total ruin of Napoleon's armament in Russia; the details of which, as painted with graphic power in the twenty-ninth bulletin, by a singular coincidence, arrived there on the very night of a splendid ball given by the grandees of Spain to the victorious leader, and added not a little to the general enthusiasm which prevailed. His influence with the government was not a little augmented by this stupendous event, which at that period, even more rapidly than it actually occurred, prognosticated the fall of Napoleon; and he was received by the Cortes in full assembly with great pomp on the day following, when in a plain and manly speech, delivered in the Spanish language, he unfolded his views, and energetically enforced the necessity of unanimity and concord to effect the total expulsion of the French from the Peninsula. In consequence of these efforts, a new organization was given to the Spanish armies, which was soon attended with the happiest effects. They were divided into four armies and two reserves. The first was composed of the troops of Catalonia, under the command of General Copons; Elio's troops in Murcia formed the second; the forces in the Sierra Morena, formerly under the command of Ballasteros, now under that of the Duke del Parque, constituted the third; the troops of Estremadura, Leon, Galicia, and the Asturias, including Murillo's and Carlos d'Espana's separate divisions, were placed under the command of Castanos, and afterward embraced also the guerillas of Porlier, Mina, and Longa, and formed the fourth army, which was attached to the Grand Army of Wellington on the Ebro. The Conde d'Abisbal was created Captain-general of Andalusia, and commanded the first reserve, composed of new levies formed in that province and Grenada; while Lacy was recalled from Catalonia, where he was replaced by Copons, and formed a second reserve in the neighbourhood of San Roque, in the southern extremity of the Peninsula. Having completed these arrangements, which placed the armies under better direction, and given an infinity of directions for their internal organization, Wellington returned by Lisbon, where he was received with extraordinary demonstrations of joy, to his old cantonments on the Coa, which he reached in the end of January, 1813.*

Dec. 29.

Dec. 30.

Violent Democratic passions at Cadiz, and abolition of the Inquisition in Spain.

Wellington's visit to Cadiz, though undertaken in order to bring about the more efficient organization of the Spanish armies, was attended with this important effect—that it brought forcibly under his notice the miserable state of the government at that place, ruled by a furious Democratic faction, intimidated by an ungovernable press, and alternately the prey of aristocratic intrigue and Democratic fury. He did not fail to report to the British government this deplorable state of things; but he accompanied his representations with the sage advice, which they had the wisdom implicitly to follow, on no account to interfere in the internal disputes of the Cortes and regency; but, leaving the authorities and people at Cadiz to arrange their domestic disputes, and settle their institutions in their own way, to bend their whole attention to the prosecution of the war, and the expulsion of the enemy from the Peninsula.† On the same principle, he strong-

* Tor., v., 125, 126. Nap., v., 399, 400.

† Tor., v., 39, 40.

‡ Tor., v., 39, 41. Nap., v., 399, 400. Las Casas, iv., 72.

* Nap., v., 401, 402. Tor., v., 141, 142. Gurw., x., 61.

† "The Legislative Assembly at Cadiz has proclaimed itself supreme, and divested itself of all interference with the executive government: yet the executive itself is its creature; while, by a refinement of theory, it is not possible either that the Legislative Assembly should have a knowledge of the measures of the executive, or the executive know the feelings and sentiments of the legislative. The government and legislature, instead of drawing together, are, like two independent powers, jealous and afraid of each other; and the consequence is, that the machine of government is at a stand. The whole system is governed by little local views, as propounded by the daily press of Cadiz—of all others the least enlightened and the most licentious.

"In a country in which almost all property consists in land—and there are the largest landed proprietors which exist in Europe—no measures have been adopted, and no barrier provided, to guard landed property from the encroachments, injustice, and violence to which it is at all times subject, but particularly in the progress of revolutions. The Council of State affords no such guard; it has no voice in legislation, and it neither has the confidence of, nor influence over, the public mind. Such a guard can only be afforded by an assembly of the great landed proprietors, such as our House of Lords, having concurrent powers of legislation with the Cortes; and there is no man in Spain, be his property ever so small, who is not interested in the establishment of such an assembly.

"Legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked, they are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more, the most tyrannical and un-

ly recommended to the Cortes to suspend their meditated decree for the abolition of the Inquisition; urging, with reason, that without entering into the question whether that institution should be maintained or abolished, and even admitting it should ultimately be abolished, it was to the last degree inexpedient to propose its suppression at that particular time, when half the Spanish territory was still in the hands of the enemy, and any proposal affecting that branch of the Church would be sure to alienate the clergy, who had hitherto been the chief, and latterly the sole supporters of the war. This advice was much too rational to be palatable to men inflamed with the political passions which at that period raged with such fury in the breasts of the Cortes and the populace of Cadiz: it was received, accordingly, in sullen silence; and no sooner was the English general gone, than the dissensions between the two parties broke out with more rancour than ever. Instead of bending their undivided attention to the enemy, who were still at their gates, they were almost wholly engrossed by domestic reforms. The clergy were the objects of incessant and rancorous attacks from the Democratic party; the Inquisition was abolished by a formal decree in the beginning of March; and as the clergy of Cadiz resisted the order, and the government supported them in the attempt, the Cortes instantly passed a decree, by which they suppressed the regency; and the Archbishop of Toledo, with two old councillors, Pedro Agar and Gabriel Cesiar, were installed as regents. All the clergy who resisted these violent usurpations were immediately arrested, and thrown into prison in every part of Spain; and the revolutionary press, true to its principles, immediately began to vomit forth a torrent of abuse against the English government, which had so long supported their country in its misfortunes, and the heroic general and gallant army who were even then preparing to lead them to victory.*

March 7.

March 8.

Enormous amount of the contributions levied in the provinces under the French.

The evacuation of the provinces to the south of the Sierra Morena by the French troops led to a disclosure of the enormous, and, if not proved by authentic evidence, incredible amount of the contributions levied by them during their occupation of these districts. It is proved by the accounts of the royal commissary of Joseph, the Count of Montano, that the sums levied on the different communes of Andalusia, from the period of the entry of the French into the country in February, 1810, till that of their final evacuation of it in August, 1812, a period of only two years and a half, amounted to the enormous sum of six hundred millions of *reals*,† or above twelve millions sterling, equivalent, if the difference in the value of money is taken into account, to at least thirty millions sterling in Great Britain. When it is recollected that the population of Andalusia at this period did not exceed 1,400,000 souls; that commerce of every kind was entirely destroyed by the war, and occupation of their country by the French troops; and that the whole revenue of the monarchy before the French invasion was only 178,000,000 francs, or about £7,200,000 sterling,* it must be confessed that a clearer proof of the oppressive nature of the imperial government cannot be imagined. On the little province of Jaen, to the south of the Sierra Morena, the burdens imposed during the same period were 21,600,000 reals, or above £500,000 a year; while before the war, the whole taxes, direct and indirect, which it paid, were only 8,000,000 of reals, or £160,000 a year. In the end of June, 1812, the six prefectures of Madrid, Cuença, Guadalaxara, Toledo, Ciudad Real, and Segovia, which comprised the whole of the districts over which the authority of Joseph really extended, were compelled, in addition to their ordinary imposts, which were equally severe, to furnish an extraordinary contribution of 560,000 fanegas, of which 275,000 fanegas were oats, the value of which, in whole, was not less than 250,000,000 reals, or £5,000,000 sterling! Such was the magnitude of this requisition, that it would have reduced the country to an absolute desert if the bayonets of the French had been able to extract it from the cultivators, which, fortunately, could not be entirely done. Such was the effect of these oppressive exactions, that cultivation totally ceased in many parts of the country, and the inhabitants, abandoning their homes, lived as guerillas, by plunder. All the French marshals were obliged to enjoin the sowing of the fields by positive orders, and under the severest penalties in case of neglect: seed-corn, in many cases, had to be provided for this purpose from France; prices rose to an extravagant height, and in Madrid alone, though the population at that period was not above 140,000, twenty thousand persons died, chiefly of famine, between September, 1811, and July, 1812, when the English army entered the city. The enormous amount of these contributions, which afford a specimen of the French Revolutionary system of government, at once explains how it happened that the exchequer at Paris was able to exhibit such flattering accounts of the state of its finances, so far as they were drawn from the internal resources of the Empire, how the imperial rule was so long popular among those who profited by this spoliation, and how it excited such universal and unbounded exasperation among those who suffered from it.†

Abuse in the government and administration of Portugal.

The Portuguese government, at this period, exhibited the same mixture of arrogance and imbecility which had distinguished them in every period of the war; and it was only by the incessant efforts of Wellington, aided by the able and energetic exertions of the English minister at Lisbon, Sir Charles Stewart, that the resources of the country could be extricated from private pillage, to be brought forward for the public service. During the absence of the English general in Spain, all the

just measures are the most popular. Those measures are peculiarly so which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties, under pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property excepting the justice of a Legislative Assembly possessing supreme powers."—WELLINGTON *to* DON DIEGO DE LA VEGA INFANZON, 29*th of January*, 1813, GURWOOD, x., 61, 65.

* Wellington to Don Diego de la Vega, 29th Jan., 1813, Gurw., x., 61, 66. Nap., v., 401, 406. Tor., v., 143, 210.

† The real is .54 of a franc, or somewhat below sixpence English money.—BALBI, *Geog. Univ.*, p. 1226.

* Malte Brun, viii., 133, 134.

† Tor., v., 43, 44, 99, 100.

old abuses were fast reviving, the sad bequest of centuries of corruption: the army in the field received hardly any succours, the field artillery had entirely disappeared, the cavalry was in miserable condition, the infantry reduced in numbers, desertion frequent, pay above six months in arrear, and despondency general. Nor was the civil administration on a better footing than the military service. The rich and powerful inhabitants, especially in the great cities, were suffered to evade the taxes and regulations for drawing forth the resources of the country for the military service; while the defenceless husbandmen were subjected to vexatious oppression, as well from the collectors of the revenue as the numerous military detachments and convoys which traversed the country. The irritation produced by these causes was eagerly made use of by the malecontent Democratic party, which, eager to obtain the power and consideration which was enjoyed by the Republicans of Cadiz, lost no opportunity of inflaming the public mind against the English administration, and even went so far as to accuse Wellington of aspiring to the Spanish crown, and aiming at the subjugation of the Peninsula, for the purposes of his criminal ambition. But the English general, conscious of his innocence, simply observed, that "Every leading man was sure to be accused of criminal personal ambition; and, if he was conscious of the charge being false, the accusation did him no harm." Disregarding, therefore, altogether these malignant accusations, he strained every nerve to recruit the army, correct the abuses in the civil administration, and provide funds for the army; and so ably was he seconded by Marshal Beresford in the military, and Sir Charles Stewart in the civil service, that, despite all the resistance they met with from the interested local authorities, a remarkable improvement soon became apparent. The holders of bills on the military chest at Lisbon, finding them not paid by government, became clamorous, and the bills sunk to a discount of fifteen per cent.; but Sir Charles checked the panic by guarantying payment of the bills, and granting interest till the payment was made. At the same time, the vigorous measures of Beresford checked the desertion from, and restored the efficiency of the army; the militiamen fit for service were draughted into the line; all the artillerymen in the fortresses were forwarded to the army, and their place supplied by ordnance gunners; and the worst cavalry regiments were reduced, and their men incorporated with those in a more efficient state. By these means a large addition was obtained to the military force, which proved of essential service to Wellington in the field; but the disorders in the civil administration could not be so easily rectified, and Wellington addressed a memorial on the subject to the prince regent in Brazil, which remains an enduring monument of the almost incredible difficulties with which he had to contend in preparing the means of carrying on his campaigns against the French armies in the Peninsula.*†

Bad as the condition, however, of the Portuguese troops was, that of the Spanish armies was still more deplorable; the unavoidable result of the occupation of so large a portion of the country by the enemy's forces, and the entire absorption of the attention of all classes in Cadiz with objects of personal ambition or political innovation, without any attention to the main object, the paying, equipping, and feeding of their troops. Their armies, indeed, were numerous, and the men not deficient in spirit; but they were for the most part ill disciplined, and totally destitute of clothing, stores, magazines, and organization of any kind. Their condition was thus painted at the moment by a master-hand, who had had too much reason to be acquainted with the facts which he asserts: "There is not a single battalion or squadron in the Spanish armies in a condition to take the field; there is not in the whole kingdom of Spain a depôt of provisions for the support of a single battalion in operation for one day; not a shilling of money in any military chest. To move them forward at any point now, against even inconsiderable bodies of the enemy, would be to ensure their certain destruction."*

Miserable condition of the Spanish armies.

By indefatigable exertions, however, these evils, so far as the supplies and reenforcements for the army were concerned, were overcome; and Wellington, in the beginning of May, was prepared to take the field with a much larger and more efficient force than had ever yet been assembled around the English banner since the commencement of the war. Nearly two hundred thousand allied troops were in readiness in the whole Peninsula; and although not more than the half of this great force were English, Germans, or Portuguese, upon whom reliance could really be placed, yet the remainder, being now under the direction of Wellington, and acting in concert with his army, proved of the most essential service, by taking upon them the duty of maintaining communications, guarding convoys, blockading fortresses, and cutting off light and foraging parties of the enemy, thereby leaving the Anglo-Portuguese force, in undiminished strength, to maintain the serious conflict in the front of the advance. What was almost an equal advantage, this great force, which, in the course of the campaign, came to stretch across

Forces with which Wellington was prepared to open the campaign.

* Wellington to Prince Regent of Portugal, April 12, 1813, Gurw., x., 283. Nap., v., 415, 419.

† "The transport service since February, 1812, when we took the field, has been never regularly paid, and has received nothing at all since June. To these evils I have striven in vain to call the attention of the local authorities; and I am now about to open a new campaign with troops to whom greater arrears of pay are due than when the last campaign terminated, although the subsidy from Great Britain, granted especially for the maintenance of those troops, has been regularly paid, and the revenue of the last three months has exceeded by a third that of any former quarter. The great cities and some of the small towns have gained by the war: the mercantile class have enriched themselves by the large disbursements which the army makes in money; but the customs paid at Lisbon and Oporto, and the *ten per cent.* levied on the incomes of the mercantile class, are not really paid to the state; although their amount, if faithfully accounted for to the public, would be amply sufficient for the public service. The government do nothing to arrest these evils, from a dread of becoming unpopular; and, therefore, I have offered to take upon myself the whole responsibility of the measures. I propose to remedy them, and take upon myself all the odium they may create."—WELLINGTON *to* PRINCE REGNET OF PORTUGAL, *12th of April*, 1813, GURWOOD, x., 283.

* Wellington to Spanish minister at war, March 11, 1813, Gurw., x., 181.

the whole Peninsula, from the sources of the Ebro in Biscay to its junction with the ocean, was supported on either flank by a powerful naval force, the true base of offensive operations for Great Britain, which at once secured supplies without any lengthened land-carriage, and protected the extreme flanks of the line from hostile assault.*

Distribution of these forces.

This immense force, which now, for the first time in the history of the war, brought the British army to something like an equality with the imperial legions to which they were opposed, was thus distributed. The noble Anglo-Portuguese army, now mustering seventy-five thousand combatants, of whom forty-four thousand were British, with ninety guns and six thousand horse, was on the Portuguese frontier, near the sources of the Coa, burning with ardour, and ready at a moment's warning to start against the enemy, over whom they already anticipated a decisive victory. The Anglo-Sicilian army, under Sir John Murray, was at the extremity of the line, in the neighbourhood of Alicante, and numbered sixteen thousand men, of whom eleven thousand were English and King's German Legion, upon whom reliance could be placed, and the remainder foreign troops, chiefly from the Mediterranean, in the British service. Copons's Spaniards, six or eight thousand strong, occupied the mountain country and upper ends of the valleys in Catalonia, and might be expected to co-operate with Murray in the operations on the Lower Ebro. Elio's men, twenty thousand in number, were behind Murray in Murcia; but they were as yet in a very inefficient state, and could not be trusted in presence of the enemy. The third army, under the Duke del Parque, mustered twelve thousand combatants, who were posted in the defiles of the Sierra Morena. The first army of the reserve, under the Conde d'Abisbal, was in Andalusia, and consisted nominally of fifteen thousand men; but the greater part were mere raw recruits, who were wholly unfit for active service. The only Spanish force upon which reliance could really be placed was the fourth army under Castanos in Estremadura, and on the frontiers of Leon and Galicia, which was destined to act in conjunction with the Grand Army under Wellington. It included the Spanish divisions in Estremadura, the Galicians under Giron, the Asturians under Porlier, and the guerillas of Mina and Longa. It embraced the whole troops able to take the field in the west and northwest of Spain, and mustered forty thousand combatants, who, though not equal to the encounter of the French in regular conflicts, were for the most part old soldiers, inured to hardship, and trained to irregular warfare, and who rendered, in consequence, important service in the course of the campaign.†

Position and strength of the French armies in the Peninsula.

The French forces in the Peninsula, though considerably reduced by the draughts which the necessities of Napoleon, after the disasters of Russia, compelled him to make from his veteran legions in that quarter, were still very formidable, and exhibited a sum-total of combatants both superior in number to, and incomparably more concentrated and better disciplined than, the greater part of the allied forces. The most powerful part of it consisted of the army commanded by Joseph in person, which, by drawing together the whole disposable military power of the French in the Peninsula, had compelled Wellington to evacuate the Spanish territory in the close of the last campaign. Their whole force, which, at the termination of the retreat into Portugal, was still two hundred and sixty thousand strong, was now reduced by the draughts into Germany, in March, 1813, to two hundred and thirty-one thousand, of whom twenty-nine thousand were horse. Of these, only one hundred and ninety-seven thousand were present with the eagles, and sixty-eight thousand were under Suchet in Arragon, Valencia, and Catalonia. Of the remainder, ten thousand were at Madrid; eight thousand were in Old Castile and Leon, to watch the motions of the Anglo-Portuguese army; and the rest, to the number of forty thousand, preserved the communications in the northern provinces, and maintained a painful partisan warfare with the insurrection, which had now assumed a very serious character, in Biscay and Navarre.*†

Their latent sources of weakness and disunion.

But although the French forces were thus superior in numerical amount, and greatly stronger from their concentrated position, homogeneous character, and uniform discipline, than the multifarious host of the allies to which they were opposed, yet there were many causes which tended to depress their spirit, and brought them into the field with much less than their wonted vigour and animation. It was universally felt that they had been worsted in the last campaign; that they had lost half, and the richest half, of Spain; and that their hold of the remainder had been everywhere loosened. The charm of their invincibility, the unbroken series of their triumphs, was at an end: the soldiers no longer approached the English but with secret feelings of self-distrust, the necessary consequence of repeated defeats; their chiefs, dreading to measure swords with Wellington, became nervous about their responsibility; and, anticipating defeat, were chiefly solicitous to discover some mode of averting the vials of the imperial wrath, which they were well aware would burst on their heads the moment intelligence of disaster reached Napoleon. Co-operation, there was none between the leaders of their armies. Suchet was jealous of Soult, and yielded a tardy obedience to the commands of Joseph himself; Jourdan, who commanded the army of the centre, was a respectable veteran, but wholly unequal to the task of meeting the shock of Wellington at the head of eighty thousand men; and Soult, though a most able man in strategy and the preparations for a campaign, had shown himself at Albuera unequal to the crisis of a serious battle: he laboured, also, under heavy suspicions on the part of his royal master, and he had been called to Germany to assist in stemming the torrent of misfortune on the Elbe. The disasters of the Moscow campaign were known, the fatal twenty-ninth bul-

* Nap., v., 505, 506. Tor., v., 234, 237.
† Nap., v., 505, 506. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 243. Tor., v., 233, 236. Wellington to Sir T. Graham, April 7, 1813, Gurw., x., 270.

* Belm., i., 249. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 243. Nap., v., 505, 506. Imperial Muster-rolls, ibid., 618. † App. C, ch. lxxii.

letin had been published, and its effects had become painfully visible in the march of a considerable part of the army across the Pyrenees, to be replaced only by raw battalions of conscripts, very different from the bronzed veterans who had departed. Thus the army had lost both its consistency and its spirit; its generals were at variance with each other, and each solicitous only for the objects of his separate province; and its supreme direction, divided between the distant commands, often found wholly inapplicable on the spot, of Napoleon, and the weaker judgment of Joseph and Jourdan, was little calculated to stem the torrent of disaster accumulating round a sinking empire and a falling throne.*

Operations on the east coast of the Peninsula.

It had been the sage policy of Wellington, during the winter which succeeded the campaign of Salamanca, to retain the Spanish armies, so far as it was possible, at a distance from the enemy; and rather to permit considerable districts, meanwhile, to be ravaged by the enemy's troops, than to run the hazard of blasting all the prospects of the campaign, by exposing his own ill-disciplined levies to certain destruction, by being prematurely brought into conflict with their veteran legions. On this principle, he had resolutely withstood the repeated instances of the minister of war at Cadiz, who had urged him to move forward the Duke del Parque's forces from the Sierra Morena, to rescue from devastation the southern provinces of La Mancha. Operations first commenced on the eastern coast of Spain, where Sir John Murray had landed at Alicante in the

Feb. 27. end of February, and hastened to put the army on a better footing than it had as yet attained; for so little had the British government profited by their experience of the bad effect of a change of commanders at the time of the battle of Vimiera, that no less than three different generals were called to the direction of the army in Murcia within four months. By the united efforts of Murray and Elio, the allied army was soon put into a more efficient condition, and was found to amount to twenty-seven thousand infantry, three thousand horse, with thirty-seven guns. Deeming himself now in sufficient force to commence active

March 6. operations, the English general moved forward from Alicante towards Valencia, in four columns, and, after some inconsiderable skirmishes, approached Suchet's intrenched camp behind the Xucar; but finding it too strong to risk an assault, he concentrated the bulk of his troops at CASTALLA, while a division of British troops under Roche was despatched to Alicante, with orders to embark and endeavour to make itself master of Valencia, which was defended only by a garrison of a thousand infantry and eight hundred horse, while the attention of Suchet, with the main body of his forces, was occupied by the operations in the interior on the Xucar.†

Force and position of Suchet at this period.

Suchet, at this period, had ceased to make Valencia his stronghold and *place d'armée*, and had transferred his principal magazines and military stores to Saguntum, the fortifications of which he had repaired and strengthened with the utmost care, and which was now become a most formidable point of defence. He had forty thousand admirable veterans under his command, and thirty thousand more occupied the fortresses and level parts of Catalonia, from whom re-enforcements could be drawn to resist any serious attack; but as his chief reliance for provisions was still placed on the great agricultural plains of Arragon, and the communication from them was much intercepted by the guerilla parties, a large part of this force required to be stationed in the rear to keep up his communications, and he could not muster more than sixteen thousand infantry and two thousand horse, with thirty guns, for active operations beyond the Xucar. These, however, were all tried veterans, who had never yet suffered defeat, and whose confidence was far from being broken, as that of the troops opposed to Wellington had been, by repeated disasters. Though Valencia was nominally the seat of Suchet's power, yet it was now incapable of defence; he had razed all the external defences erected by the Spaniards, and confined his hold to the old walls. His real seat of power was Saguntum; to connect which with Tortosa, he had strongly fortified Oropesa and Peniscola on the seacoast, and established a line of blockhouses for infantry in the interior, through Morilla to Mequinenza. In the double range of mountains beyond the Xucar, at Xativa and Moxente, he had established an intrenched camp, which, though not strongly fortified, was very susceptible of defence from the natural strength of its situation; and he had strong outposts at Biar and Castalla, to observe and retard the advance of the allied troops.*†

Suchet resumes the offensive, and defeats the Spanish advanced guard.

Feeling himself thus secure from the quality of his troops, and the strength of the position on which he might, in case of need, fall back; and aware, also, that Murray's advance was part of the general plan of Wellington to force the French across the Ebro, Suchet resolved to assume the offensive as soon as he learned that the detachment of Roche had been sent to Alicante. He was the more encouraged to do this, as Lord William Bentinck, alarmed at the dissensions in Sicily, and the threats of a descent by Murat,

March 29. recalled the troops sent to Alicante to menace Valencia, for the defence of that island; and thus rendered entirely abortive the project of a double attack on the posts of the

April 6. French general. Roche's English troops having embarked for Minorca in the first week of April, Suchet concentrated his troops, and attacked the Spanish advanced guard

April 11. at Yecla, which immediately fell back;

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 241, 242. Belm., i, 248, 249.

† Nap., v., 454, 457. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 254, 255. Tor., v., 250, 251.

* Suchet's Mem., ii., 303, 305. Nap., v., 450, 454. Tor., v., 251.

† "The able pacific administration of Suchet had enabled him successfully to levy the enormous war contribution of 200,000,000 of reals, or 53,000,000 francs (£2,120,000), imposed on the city and provinces, by order of Napoleon, after its surrender by Blake in 1811; and, independently of this enormous burden, Suchet's whole troops were clothed, fed, and lodged at the expense of the districts they occupied; and 25,000,000 francs (£1,000,000) were realized in the last nine months of their occupation, part of which were remitted to Madrid. Yet Suchet's government was incomparably the most lenient and best administered of any of the French marshals in Spain."—See *Memoires du Marechal* SUCHET, ii., 291, 295.

but, being overtaken in its retreat by Harispe's division, was totally defeated, with the loss of two hundred killed and fifteen hundred prisoners. On the same day, the Spanish garrison of Villena, eight hundred strong, were made prisoners, from Elio's obstinate refusal to obey Murray's order to withdraw it. Murray, upon this, concentrated his troops, and leaving Colonel Adam with the rear-guard in front of the pass of Biar, withdrew the main body of his army through that rugged defile, and took post on strong ground about three miles above the upper end of the pass, the Spaniards under Whittingham forming the left, on the rugged sierra of Castalla; the right, composed of Clinton's British division and Roche's Spaniards, on the low ground, with the bed of a torrent in their front; and the town and old castle of Castalla, on a conical hill in the centre, being occupied by Mackenzie's division, and all its approaches strongly guarded by artillery.*

Battle of Castalla, and defeat of the French.

Imboldened by the early and rapid success of his arms against the Spaniards, Suchet, after much hesitation, determined to attack the British in their position, and for this purpose to force the pass of Biar. Adam's advanced guard, consisting of two Italian regiments, a British battalion, and two troops of foreign hussars, assailed by greatly superior forces, retreated, bravely fighting, up the pass: the French pursued with great vigour, their skirmishers swarming up the rocky acclivities on either side with extraordinary agility and resolution; it was the counterpart of the forcing of the defile at Rolica by the British, in the commencement of the Peninsular war.† Alarmed at this success of the enemy, by which he lost two guns, Murray, notwithstanding the strength of his position, gave orders for a retreat; but, fortunately for the honour of England, the attack commenced before it could be carried into execution, and Suchet, for the first time in his life, was taught the quality of British troops.‡ The ascent on the left, where Whittingham's Spaniards were posted, was so rugged that it was with great difficulty that the steep was surmounted: slowly, however, the French gained ground, and in some places reached the summit, and were proceeding along it, when they met the 27th regiment, who, lying down concealed among the rocks,◊ suddenly sprang up and gave them such a volley, within pistol-shot, as sent the whole headlong, with dreadful loss, down the side of the ridge. The attack on the other points was, in like manner, repulsed by the steady valour of the English and German troops; and at length, Suchet, despairing of success, drew off his men in great confusion towards the pass of Biar.

Now was the time for the allies to have advanced in pursuit: the narrow defile, three miles long, was in Suchet's rear, and, in endeavouring to get back through the gorge, all his guns, and probably part of his army, would have been taken by a vigorous enemy thundering in pursuit. Donkin,* the quartermaster-general, who clearly saw that the decisive moment had arrived, put himself at the head of Mackenzie's division, and was gallantly assailing the French rear-guard, which strove to make good the entrance of the pass; Suchet, with his infantry, cavalry, and caissons, pellmell, had plunged into the defile in great disorder, and a vigorous effort would have thrown the whole into irretrievable confusion in its narrow windings, and given the British, in their first essay in the east of the Peninsula, a triumph as decisive, though with inferior bodies of men, as those of Hohenlinden or the Katzbach—when Murray, satisfied with the success already achieved, snatched victory from their grasp, and, in spite of the energetic remonstrances of Donkin, drew off his forces, and allowed the French to make their way through the defile unmolested. The consequence was, that Suchet brought off his whole guns and ammunition-wagons; but such had been the close and deadly fire of the British troops, that in the previous action he lost eighteen hundred men; and, what was of still more importance, his moral influence was materially weakened by having suffered a defeat in his first serious encounter with the British troops.†

After this defeat, Suchet resumed his position in his intrenched camp; and Murray, weakened by the loss of Roche's British troops, who had been recalled by Lord William Bentinck, did not feel himself in sufficient strength to resume offensive operations in that quarter till the battle of Vittoria gave a new complexion to the war.

Operations in the northern provinces.

Though Wellington had anxiously enjoined the whole Spanish generals, in every part of the Peninsula, to abstain from hostilities, and withdraw as much as possible from the attacks of the enemy, yet it was impossible to carry these directions implicitly into execution in the northern provinces. A most formidable insurrection, as already mentioned,‡ had broken out in Biscay, upon occasion of the concentration of the French troops after the battle of Salamanca, which had been powerfully supported by succours from the British fleet; and all the efforts of the French, during the winter and spring, had been unable to dispossess the insurgents from the principal stronghold which they then acquired. The guerillas had become much more experienced and systematic in their operations; their bands in the interior had swelled into small armies; they possessed several fortified posts on the coast, which enabled them to communicate at pleasure with, and receive supplies of arms and ammunition from the English ships of war, these supplies being now dealt with a judgment and liberality which proved of the most essential service. The partidas in these provinces were no longer composed of reckless and desperate

* Nap., v., 461, 462. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 255. Tor., v., 252, 253. † *Ante*, iii., 80.

‡ Vict. et Conq., xxii., 256. Sir J. Murray's Account, April 13, 1813, Gurw., x., 353. Tor., v., 254. Suchet, ii., 307.

◊ An event happened here which recalls the heroic ages of the Iliad or Amadis de Gaul. As the French were deploying their columns, a grenadier officer, advancing alone, challenged any English officer to single combat. The offer was immediately accepted by Captain Waldron of the 27th, who sprang out of his company to meet him: the hostile lines looked on without firing a shot, and at the first encounter, the Frenchman's head was cleft asunder. The 27th, with a loud shout, brought down their arms, and gave the volley which hurled the French down the steep.—NAP., v., 465.

* Afterward Sir Rufane Donkin, a most gallant and enterprising officer.

† Sir J. Murray's Account, April 14, 1813, Gurw., x., 353. Nap., v., 465, 466. Tor., v., 254, 255. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 260. ‡ *Ante*, iii., 496.

characters, who had been ruined by the events of the war, but embraced young men of the best families, who had hitherto taken no part in the contest, but whom the dreadful severities of Marshal Bessières had drawn forth into the ranks of their country.* In Biscay alone several battalions, each a thousand strong, of this description had been formed; and so completely had they succeeded in intercepting the communication along the great road from Bayonne to Madrid, that Joseph only received his despatches of the 4th of January on the 18th of March, and then by the circuitous route of Barcelona and Valencia.†‡

Napoleon's instructions on this emergency to Joseph.

This formidable insurrection excited, as well it might, the anxious attention of Napoleon, threatening as it did his principal line of communication with all his armies beyond the Pyrenees, and paralyzing the whole operations in the Peninsula, by the impossibility either of obtaining information, despatching orders, or sending succours, save under the guard of whole divisions. His instructions to meet the danger were characterized by his usual decision and ability. "Hold," said he to Joseph, "Madrid and Valencia only as points of observation; fix your headquarters, not as monarch, but as general of the French forces, at Valladolid; concentrate the armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal, around you: the allies will not, and, indeed, cannot, make any serious offensive movement for several months; wherefore it is your business to profit by their forced inactivity, to put down the insurrection in the northern provinces, to free the communication with France, and re-establish a good base for operations before the commencement of another campaign, that the French army may be in a condition to fight the allies, if they advance towards France." To enable Joseph to effect the desired pacification of the northern provinces, he was authorized to summon to Valladolid, if necessary, the whole army of Portugal; but when he came to inquire of Count Reille, its commander, how soon these directions could be obeyed, he was answered that that army, having recently remitted 3,600,000 francs, seized by force by Marmont, to France, and being totally destitute of horses and carriages,◊ was in no condition to undertake any offensive operations.

Napoleon's instructions for the suppressing of the northern insurrection.

Joseph, however, was less intent on carrying into effect these judicious instructions than on getting quit of Soult, whom he openly accused of criminal ambition; adding, that matters had come to that pass between them, that one or other must quit Spain.* In consequence of this flagrant disunion, as well as of Napoleon's own need of Soult's military abilities in the arduous German campaign on which he was entering, that marshal was summoned to Germany, where, as already noticed, he bore a distinguished part in the battles on the Elbe.† The emperor, however, incessantly urged his brother to concentrate his troops on the Ebro, and strain every nerve to put down the insurrection in the north; and, being discontented with the mode in which Caffarelli had conducted the partisan warfare there, he gave Clausel the command, and enjoined him to resume the offensive without loss of time, and strike at the enemy's principal depôts and magazines, in order to deprive them of the means of carrying on the contest.‡ Clausel assumed the command on the 22d of February; re-enforcements, nearly twenty thousand strong, from the army of Portugal, soon after arrived; and the Spaniards soon felt that they had a very different antagonist to deal with from the general who, during the winter, had permitted so serious an insurrection to grow up in the mountain districts.◊

Clausel's successful operations in Biscay.

Clausel repaired, early in the middle of March, to Bilboa, which was in a manner besieged by the guerillas, and, after some sharp fighting, drove them back into their mountain strongholds in the neighbourhood of Durango, and immediately began his preparations for the siege of Castro, the most important stronghold which they possessed on the coast, and by which they constantly communicated with the English ships of war. While he

March 15.

* *Ante*, iii., 438.

† Nap., v., 433, 434. Buquet to Berthier, Feb. 3, 1813, Belm., i., App. 109, p. 682.

‡ "If re-enforcements do not speedily arrive in Navarre, I shall not be surprised at any catastrophe that may occur. The insolence of the brigands proves the confidence they feel in their operations. I am assured it has never been so great. Their organization into battalions, and the administration of the country, is complete; it is difficult to estimate the advantages they derive from it. If from the frontiers of Portugal our armies had sent some divisions to live on the left bank of the Ebro, before the winter was over we would have purged this fine country of the brigands who infest it; and in spring these divisions, perfectly re-established, would have been able to resume their operations against the eternal enemies of the Continent. Much precious time has already been lost, and it will be necessary to do in spring what should have been done in winter. The brigands push their audacity to such a pitch as to levy contributions in the provinces occupied by our troops. My prince, the evil is great, and strong remedies are loudly called for. They are not to be found but in the development of a powerful military force."—*Lettre du* BUQUET, *Commandant de la Gendarmerie de l'Armée d'Espagne, au Prince* BERTHIER, *Vittoria, 3d Fevrier*, 1813. BELMAS, i., 682, App.

◊ Napoleon to Joseph, Jan. 29, 1813, Nap., v., 606, and Reille to Duc de Feltre, Dec. 27, 1812, Belm., i., 680.

* "The Duke of Dalmatia or myself must quit Spain. At Valencia, I had so far forgotten my own injuries, and suppressed my own indignation, that, instead of sending Soult to France, I gave him the direction of the operations of the armies; but it was in the hope that shame for the past, combined with his avidity for glory, would urge him to extraordinary exertion. Nothing of the kind, however, has happened: he is a man not to be trusted. Restless, intriguing, ambitious, he would sacrifice everything to his own advancement; and he possesses just that sort of talent that would lead him to mount a scaffold at the time he thought he was ascending a throne, because he would want the courage to strike when the crisis arrived. At the passage of the Tormes, I acquit him of treachery, because there fear alone prevented him from bringing the allies to battle; but he was, nevertheless, treacherous to the emperor, and his proceedings in Spain were probably connected with Mallet's conspiracy in Paris."—KING JOSEPH *to* NAPOLEON, *Feb. 27th*, 1813, NAPIER, v., 437, 438.

† *Ante*, iv., 72.

‡ "The partidas are strong, organized, exercised, and seconded by the general exultation produced by the battle of Salamanca. The insurrectional juntas have been revived; the posts on the coasts abandoned by the French, and seized by the English; the bands enjoy all the resources of the country, and the system of warfare hitherto pursued has favoured this progress. The French have remained always on the defensive; you must adopt a contrary system; attack suddenly, pursue rapidly; aim at the Spaniards' magazines, depôts of arms, and hospitals; disorganize the insurrection, and one or two successes will pacify the whole country."—NAPOLEON *to* CLAUSEL, *9th Feb.*, 1813, NAP., v., 486.

◊ Nap., v., 485, 489. Napoleon to Clausel, Feb. 7, 1813, ibid., v., 486.

April 1. was so engaged, however, Bilboa was again threatened by the partidas, and very nearly fell into their hands. Mina defeat-
April 5. ed one of his columns near Leria, with the loss of eight hundred men; the same enterprising chief had made himself master of Taffalla, with its garrison of five hundred men: forty thousand men were in arms in Navarre and Biscay, of which sixteen thousand were on the coast of Biscay and Guipuscoa, acting in conjunction with the British fleet; and eighteen thousand, who could unite in a day, occupied both banks of the upper part of the Ebro. It was a serious and a harassing warfare, in the face of such a force, possessing the whole mountain strongholds of the country, to attempt the siege of Castro in form, but Clausel's vigour and ability were equal to the undertaking. With this view, he divided his forces into two divisions; and while Palombini, with six thousand men, commenced the siege, Foy, with ten thousand, covered the operations; and he himself, with thirteen thousand, took post at Puenta la Reyna, in Navarre, to make head against Mina, Longa, and the numerous bands of insurgents in that quarter. Several actions ensued, in which the Spaniards were worsted; and at
May 13. length Mina himself was totally defeated in the valley of Roncal, with a thousand killed or wounded; the remainder dispersed, and the chief himself escaped with only fourteen men. He soon reassembled his scat-
May 22. tered band, however, and near Leria destroyed two regiments of French cavalry; but still the dispersion of Mina's corps, even for a time, considerably lowered the spirit of the insurgents; and Clausel, establishing his
May 25. headquarters at Pampeluna, succeeded in pacifying several of the valleys of Navarre. Meanwhile, Castro was carried by storm; and Sarrut, following up Napoleon's in-
May 29. structions, pushed forward against the depôts and magazines of the Biscayan insurgents, and nearly destroyed three of their finest battalions. But though this brilliant success attended the French arms on the coast and in Navarre, it was wellnigh balanced by the advantages gained by the enemy, who, during the absence of the main forces of the French in these flank operations, fell upon the high road from Bayonne to Burgos, and captured several of the blockhouses, putting the garrisons to the sword, insomuch that Clausel, worn out with this interminable warfare, declared it would require fifty thousand men and three months to put down the northern insurrection; and Napoleon bitterly complained that all the successes of Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, had brought neither safety to his convoys nor regularity to his couriers.*

But greater events were now on the wing; the chiefs on both sides repaired to their respective headquarters, and the mutual concentration of troops bespoke the approach of serious warfare. Joseph, who had
March 17. quitted Madrid in the middle of March with his Guards, had subsequently fixed his headquarters at Valladolid, from whence he had detached the divisions Foy, Taupin, Sarrut, and Barbot, to aid Clausel in the reduction of Biscay and Navarre. This large deduction from the main army was attended with the most important effects in the course of the campaign; for Wellington was now concentrating his forces, and the progress of spring having provided ample forage for his horses, he was prepared to march. Never had the army been so numerous or so healthy, never its spirits so high: twenty thousand men had rejoined their ranks since the troops went into winter-quarters in December, and the meanest drummer was inspired with the belief that he was about to march from victory to victory, till the French eagles were chased across the Pyrenees. Wellington's plan was to move the left wing of his army across the Douro, within the Portuguese frontier; to march it up the left bank of that river as far as Zamora, and then crossing the Esla, unite it to the Galician forces; while the centre and left, advancing from the Agueda by Salamanca, forced the passage of the Tormes, and drove the French entirely from the line of the Douro, towards the Carrion. Constantly threatening them in flank by the left wing, which was to be always kept in advance, he thus hoped the enemy would be driven back by Burgos into Biscay, and he himself would succeed in establishing there a new basis for the war, resting on the numerous and fortified seaports on the coast, and supported by the gallant mountaineers, who in such strength had maintained through the winter a bloody and equal contest with the enemy. In this way, while he advanced his forces, and drove back the enemy towards their own frontiers, he would at once draw nearer to his own resources, and intercept the whole communications of the enemy. This project was attended with this obvious danger, that the army being divided into two grand divisions, with great ranges of mountains and impassable rivers between them, either was exposed to the risk of a separate attack from the whole forces of the enemy; but Wellington relied with reason for the means of obviating this danger upon the strong nature of the country to which either might retire in case of danger, the high spirit and admirable discipline of his troops, and the universal fidelity of the peasantry, which prevented his designs from becoming known to the enemy.*

The march began on the 22d of May, and on the 23d headquarters were at Ciudad Rodrigo. Ample employment for Suchet was at the same time secured, by directions sent to Sir John Murray to embark his troops, and, landing in Catalonia, commence the siege of Taragona; a bridge equipage was prepared for the passage of the Douro; the army of the Duke del Parque advanced from the Sierra Morena into La Mancha, and that of the reserve in Andalusia broke up from Seville on the 12th, and on the 24th was to be at the bridge of Almarez, so as to threaten Madrid and the provinces in the centre of Spain; and preparations were made, as soon as the columns reached the frontiers of Biscay or Galicia, for throwing off the communications with Lisbon, and drawing the whole supplies of the army from the nearer harbours of these northern provinces. Seventy thousand Eng-

March of Wellington into Spain. May 22.

Wellington prepares to take the field, and his plan of operations.

* Nap., v., 489, 502. Belm., i., 251. Tor., v., 238, 246.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, May 5, 1813, Gurw., x., 357. Nap., v., 567, 569. Belm., i., 252. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 243.

lish and Portuguese, and twenty thousand Spaniards, were so disposed that they were all to bear in front or flank on the surprised and disjointed columns of the enemy, who would be forced back, it was hoped, in confusion, into the passes of the Pyrenees. Hope pervaded every bosom, joy beat high in every heart: the veterans marched over the scenes of their former glory, the halo of twenty victories playing round their bayonets; the new soldiers burned with desire to emulate their well-earned fame. The English commander shared the general exultation; and so confidently did he anticipate the defeat of the enemy, and the permanent transference of the seat of war to the north of the Peninsula, that, in passing the stream which marks the frontier of Spain, he rose in his stirrups, and, waving his hand, exclaimed, "Farewell, Portugal!"*

He advances by Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca across the Douro.

The march of the Duke del Parque's army and the reserve from Andalusia, which commenced ten days earlier than that of the Grand Army of Wellington, to give them time to get forward before the latter moved, was attended with the very best effect; for they spread the alarm in Madrid and New Castile before the direction of the march of the British army could be known, and, by inducing the belief that a combined attack on the capital was intended, prevented that concentration of force on the Upper Ebro by which alone the march of the British general could have been arrested. Accordingly, when the centre and right of the English army were advancing from Ciudad Rodrigo to the Douro, and Graham, with the left in advance, was toiling through the Tras-os-Montes, not more than thirty-five thousand men, with a hundred guns, were concentrated at Valladolid; and the whole French posts at Madrid, and in the valley of the Tagus, were in alarm, expecting an immediate attack
May 25. in that quarter. Thus, when danger really threatened from the side of Salamanca, no means of resisting it existed; the line of the Tormes was at once abandoned, with some loss to the retreating army in passing; three days after, the Douro was crossed by them at Zamora, and the bridge there destroyed; the British passed the Esla by the fords, and the Douro by a bridge thrown over above Zamora, and at Toro. Wellington himself, who had set
May 28. off in advance of his troops, passed the river at Miranda, by means of a basket slung on a rope stretched from precipice to precipice, several hundred feet above the foaming torrent. Graham had encountered many difficulties on his march through the mountains within the Portuguese frontier, but his vigour and perseverance, seconded by the zeal and energy of his troops, had overcome them all: forty thousand men had been transported, as if by enchantment, in ten days, through two hundred miles of the most broken and rugged country in the Peninsula; and on the 3d of June the whole army was in communication on the northern bank of the Douro, between Toro and the River Esla.†

* Nap., v., 512, 513. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 25th May, 1813, Gurw., x., 399.

† Nap., v., 520, 525. Belm., i., 252, 253. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 253, 254. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 6, 1813, Gurw., x., 421.

This formidable concentration of troops to the north of the Douro, in a line at right angles to the position which they had hitherto occupied fronting the English general, rendered the farther stay of the French army in the neighbourhood of Valladolid impossible; and a hasty, ill-arranged retreat was commenced to the Upper Ebro. Valladolid, with considerable stores of ammunition, was occupied on the 4th. On the 7th and 8th, the British army, rapidly pursuing, crossed the Carrion at various points; and pressing forward with conquering violence, and in the highest spirits at seeing the enemy thus receding before them, soon arrived at the scenes which they had passed under such disastrous circumstances, at the commencement of the retreat from Burgos, in the close of the preceding campaign. Joseph at first thought he should be in a condition to give the enemy battle on the elevated plateaux around that stronghold, and he had now assembled fifty thousand men, including nine thousand excellent horse, and a hundred guns; but the force of the inundation was too great to be thus stopped: a hundred thousand men were on his front and flank; for the guerillas of Navarre and Biscay had now drawn together in the vicinity of the British army, and rumour, as usual, exaggerating the danger, had magnified their amount to a hundred and ninety thousand combatants. The French retreat, therefore, was continued without intermission to the Ebro; the castle
June 14. of Burgos, the theatre of such desperate strife in the former campaign, was blown up, with a frightful explosion, and with such precipitation, that three hundred French soldiers, defiling under its walls at the time, were crushed by the falling ruins; and the enemy, in deep depression, continued their retreat towards Vittoria. With mingled astonishment and exultation, the allied troops triumphantly marched through the scenes of their former struggles and defeat. "Clausel's strong position, Dubreton's thundering castle, had disappeared like a dream; and sixty thousand veteran soldiers, willing to fight at every step, were hurried, with all the tumult and confusion of defeat, across the Ebro."*

Burgos is evacuated, and the French retreat to the Ebro.

In abandoning Burgos, Joseph took the road for Vittoria, by Pancorvo and Miranda del Ebro; but the consequences of this precipitate retreat now became painfully apparent, and it was evident to the whole army that it would be impossible, when pressed by a victorious enemy in rear, to engage the troops in the defiles of the Pyrenees, encumbered as they were with baggage and spoil, not of a province, but a kingdom. Under the terror produced by this unlooked-for and overwhelming force suddenly thrown on their line of communication with France, the whole French troops and civil authorities had evacuated Madrid, and taken refuge under shelter of the army; and the road from that capital to Bayonne was encumbered with an endless file of chariots, carriages, and wagons, which bore away the helpless multitude and rich stores of spoil towards the frontier. The French army, thus encumbered, exhibited a lively image of

Confusion and disorder of the French retreat.

* Nap., v., 537, 541. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 245. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 13, 1813, Gurw., x., 435. Tor., v., 261, 262.

those hosts which the luxury of Asiatic warfare has in every age accumulated round the standards of their sultans: for the riches which they carried with them were such as bespoke the regal state of a great monarchy; and the train of civil functionaries, officers of state, and ladies of pleasure, who followed the troops, recalled rather the effeminacy of Oriental magnificence, than the simple but iron bands of European warfare.*

Prodigious success of the march of the allies to Vittoria.

The secret of the astonishing success of Wellington's march consisted in his constantly keeping his left wing in advance, and by that means continually pressing round the right flank of the French; and in that way, coupled with a constant pressure in front, he compelled them to evacuate every successive position, how strong soever, which they took up between Burgos and the Ebro. The British troops, in pursuing a triumphant advance through this rocky and mountainous country, were never weary of expressing their astonishment at the prodigious strength of the positions which were abandoned, and the numerous rocky defiles, traversed only by single arches, which retarded but by a few hours the advance of the allied army. They were ignorant of the simultaneous pressure round the right wing of the French which was going forward from the advance of Graham with the British left wing, and that the most alarming accounts were constantly received at the French headquarters of the progress of the allied troops in that direction. On the 13th Graham pursued his indefatigable march through the hills at the sources of the Ebro, and on the 14th passed that river at the bridge of Rockamund and San Martin. At the same time, the Spanish guerillas from Biscay crowded in great numbers to the same quarter, and occupied all the passes in the great mountains of Reynosa which lie between the Ebro and the seacost. The effects of this decisive manœuvre were, that not only was the French main army obliged to abandon all the successive positions which it took up on the great road, but the whole seacoast of Biscay, with the exception of Bilboa and Santona, was evacuated by the enemy, and the British vessels of war, amid the enthusiastic shouts of the inhabitants, entered all the harbours. A depôt and hospital station was immediately established at Santander; the whole supplies of the army were directed thither; a new base of operations was established close to the scene of the coming contest; and Portugal, like a heavy tender whose aid was no longer required, was cut away and forgotten. Meanwhile the sweep of the allies round the extreme French right was continued with unabated vigour; the whole crest of the mountains, between the Ebro and the sea, was soon in their possession; the scarlet uniforms were to be seen in every valley; and the stream of war, descending with impetuous force down all the clefts of the mountains, burst in a hundred foaming torrents into the basin of Vittoria. With such accuracy were the marches of all the columns calculated, and with such precision were they carried into effect by the admirable troops, inured to war and all its fatigues, which Wellington commanded, that everything happened exactly as he had arranged before he set out from Portugal; and the troops all arrived at the stations assigned them, in the prophetic contemplation of their chief, in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, at the very time when the French army, heavy laden and dejected, had accumulated its immense files of chariots and baggage-wagons, under the charge of seventy thousand men, in the plain in front of that town.*

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 245. Tor., v., 264, 265, 267. Napier, v., 388, 541. Gurw., 444.

Extraordinary beauty of the scenery through which the army passed.

No words can do justice to the exquisite beauty of the scenery through which the British troops, especially those on the left wing, passed during this memorable march. The romantic valleys of the mountain region whence the Ebro draws its waters, which at every season excite the admiration of the passing traveller, were at that time singularly enhanced by the exquisite verdure of the opening spring, and the luxuriance of the foliage which in every sheltered nook clothed the mountain sides. War appeared in these sequestered and pastoral valleys, not in its rude and bloody garb, but in its most brilliant and attractive costume; the pomp of military music, as the troops wended their way through the valleys, blended with the shepherd's pipe on the hills above; while the numerous columns of horse, foot, and cannon, winding in every direction through the defiles, gave an inexpressible variety and charm to the landscape. Even the common soldiers were not insensible to the beauty of the spectacle thus perpetually placed before their eyes. Often the men rested on their muskets with their arms crossed, gazing on the lovely scenes which lay spread far beneath their feet; and more than once the heads of the columns involuntarily halted to satiate their eyes with a spectacle of beauty, the like of which all felt they might never see again.†

Accumulation of Joseph's army and baggage in the basin of Vittoria.

The immense baggage trains of Joseph's army had now fallen back into the basin of Vittoria, and seventy thousand men were assembled to protect their retreat into France. But it seemed hardly possible that even that large force could secure the safe transit of such an enormous multitude of carriages; and yet how could they be abandoned without confessing defeat, and relinquishing, at the same time, the whole ammunition-wagons and military stores of the army? The rapacity of the French authorities in Spain; the general spoliation which, from the marshals downward, they had exercised under the imperial orders in every part of the country, now fell with just but terrible force upon them: their gallant army was about to be overwhelmed by the immensity of its spoil. In retreating through Madrid and the two Castiles, the French authorities had levied contributions surpassing all the former ones in severity and magnitude; and the enormous sums raised in this way, amounting to five millions and a half of dollars, were all existing in hard cash, and constituted no inconsiderable part of the weight with which the army was encumbered. Not content with these pecuniary exactions, both Joseph and his generals had

* Nap., v., 540, 543. Wellington to Earl Bathurst, June 19, June 22, 1813, Gurw., x., 444, 446. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 245, 246.

† Recollections of the Peninsula, 173, 176, and personal knowledge.

faithfully followed the example set them by the emperor, in collecting and bringing off all the most precious works of art which adorned the Spanish capital and provinces. All the marshals, from Murat, who commenced the pillage in 1808, had gratified themselves by seizing upon the finest paintings which were to be found in convents or private palaces in every part of the country; and Marshal Soult, in particular, had, from the rich spoils of the Andalusian convents, formed the noble collection of paintings by Murillo and Velasquez which now adorns his hotel at Paris. But when Joseph and his whole civil functionaries came to break up finally from Madrid, the work of spoliation went on on a greater scale, and extended to every object of interest, whether from beauty, rarity, or antiquity, which was to be found in the royal palaces or museums. Many of the finest works of Titian, Raphael, and Correggio were got hold of in this manner, especially from the Escurial and the royal palace at Madrid; while all the archives and museums in the capital and in Old Castile had been compelled to yield up their most precious contents to accompany the footsteps of the fugitive monarch. All this precious spoil was dragged along in endless convoy in the rear of the French army; and when it halted and faced about in the basin of Vittoria, it was rather from a sense of the evident impossibility of transporting the prodigious mass in safety through the approaching defiles of the Pyrenees, than from any well-founded hope of being able to resist the shock of the Anglo-Portuguese army.*

Description of the basin of Vittoria, and the field of battle.

The basin of Vittoria, which has become immortal from the battle, decisive of the fate of the Peninsula, which was fought within its bosom, is a small plain, about eight miles in length by six in breadth, situated in an elevated plateau among the mountains. It is bounded on the north and east by the commencement of the Pyreneean range, and on the west by a chain of rugged mountains, which separates the province of Alava from that of Biscay. A traveller entering the valley from the side of Miranda del Ebro, by the great road from Madrid, emerges into the plain by the pass of Puebla, where the Zadorra forces its way through a narrow cleft in the mountain, in its descent to the Ebro, and from whence the spires of Vittoria, situated at the extremity of the plain, are visible about eight miles distant. This little plain is intersected by two ranges of hills, which cross it nearly from east to west, and afforded two very strong positions, where the French army endeavoured to stop the advance of the allies; the first being on either side of Arinez, and the second, which was a much stronger ground, was around Gomecha. Several roads from the mountains on all sides intersect each other at Vittoria, particularly those to Pampeluna, Bilboa, and Galicia; but although they are all practicable for guns, yet that which leads direct to St. Sebastian and Bayonne, through Gamarra Mayor, was alone adequate to receive the vast trains of carriages which were heaped up in and around that town. Two great convoys had already departed by this road, and were now far advanced on the way to France; but a still greater quantity, including the whole royal treasure, and all the guns and ammunition of the army, remained, and therefore it was of the highest importance to the French at all hazards to keep possession of the great road to Bayonne, and, above all, not to suffer Gamarra Mayor to fall into the hands of the enemy, while the bulk of the army on the broken ground, in the middle of the plain of Vittoria, endeavoured to arrest the advance of the allied force.*

* Tor., v., 262, 272.

Forces of the armies on the opposite sides.

The departure of the two heavy-laden convoys for France sensibly diminished the strength of Joseph's army, for they required to be guarded by strong escorts to prevent them falling into the hands of the Biscay guerillas. The guard attending the last consisted of no less than three thousand troops under General Maucune. After this large reduction, however, the French army amounted to above seventy thousand men, of whom sixty-five thousand were effective combatants, and they had one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. On Wellington's side there were only sixty thousand English and Portuguese sabres and bayonets in the field; for the sixth division, six thousand five hundred strong, had been left at Medina de Pomar, and some stragglers had necessarily fallen behind during so long and fatiguing a march as that which they had made from the Portuguese frontier. But in addition to this force, there were fully eighteen thousand Spaniards, so that the total force was above eighty thousand, with ninety guns. The strength of the French position consisted chiefly in the great number of bridges which the allied forces had to pass, over the numerous mountain streams which descend into the basin of Vittoria, some of which, particularly that of Puebla and Nanclares, to the south of Vittoria, and that of Gamarra Mayor and Ariega, to the north of that town, were of great strength, and easily susceptible of defence. The ridges, too, which cross the plain, afforded successive defensible positions, the last of which was close to the town of Vittoria. On the other hand, the weakness of their situation consisted in the single line of retreat passable for the carriages of the army, which was kept open for them in case of disaster; and the appalling dangers which awaited them if their army in the plain met with a serious reverse, and either lost the command of the great road to Bayonne, or was driven, with its immense files of ammunition and baggage wagons, into the rough mountain road leading to Pampeluna.†

British plan of attack.

Having anxiously surveyed the enemy's position on the afternoon of the 20th, and perceiving that they stood firm, and were making preparations for battle, Wellington, on his side, made his dispositions for an attack. Hill, with twenty thousand men, was to move with the right wing, at daybreak, into the great road to Vittoria, in the neighbourhood of Puebla, and advancing through the defile, which was not occupied in strength by the enemy, expand his force as he arrived in the open plain; Murillo, with his division of Spaniards, keeping on his right, on the heights

* Nap., v., 548, 549. Tor., v., 274. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 246, 247.

† Nap., v., 500, 555. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 32, 1813, Gurw., x., 466.

between the great road and the hills. The right centre, under Wellington in person, consisting of the light and fourth divisions, with Ponsonby's cavalry and the dragoon guards, were to proceed through the pass which leads to Subijana-de-Morillos, and, crossing the ridges which formed the southern boundary of the basin of Vittoria, move straight forward to their respective points of attack on the Zadorra, especially the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, and Nanclares. The left centre, comprising the third and seventh divisions, was to move by the village of Gueta, direct upon the steeples of Vittoria; Sir Thomas Graham moving from Murguia on the left, with the first and fifth divisions, Longa's Spaniards, and Anson and Bock's cavalry, in all about twenty thousand men, by the Bilboa road, so as to fall on the extreme French right under Reille, and, if possible, force the bridge of the Zadorra at Gamarra Mayor, and thus intercept the line of retreat for the army by the great road to Bayonne. The effect of these dispositions, if simultaneously and successfully carried into execution, obviously would be to cut off the retreat of the French army by the only line practicable for their numerous carriages, at the very time that they were hard pressed by the main body of the allies in front, and thus expose them to total ruin.*†

French position and order of battle.

The French order of battle, hastily taken up, without any master mind to direct it, was much less ably conceived, and bore the mark rather of the hurried defensive arrangement of several independent corps suddenly and unexpectedly assailed by superior forces, than the deliberate arrangement of a great army about to contend with a worthy antagonist for the dominion of the Peninsula. The right, which was opposed to Graham, occupied the heights in front of the Zadorra, above the village of Abechuco, and covered Vittoria from approach by the Bilboa road; the centre extended along the left bank of the same river, commanding and blocking up the great road from Madrid; the left, behind the Zadorra, stretched from Arinez to Puebla de Arganzon, and fronted the defile of Puebla, by which Sir Rowland Hill was to issue to the fight. A detached corps, under Clausel, was stationed at Logrono to secure the road to Pampeluna, on which it was already feared the army would mainly have to depend for its retreat; and Foy had been stationed in the valley of Senorio, towards Bilboa, to protect them from the incursions of Longa and the Biscay guerillas, and keep open the communications of the army in that direction. These two detachments weakened the disposable force of the French, on which reliance could be placed for the shock of battle, by more than twenty thousand men, so that not more than fifty-five thousand men could be calculated upon for the fight; but they were all veteran soldiers: they occupied a central position, so that their columns, if hard pressed, could mutually support each other; and they had a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. On the other hand, their position, if worsted, was in the highest degree perilous; for the mountain road to Pampeluna was impracticable for the multitude of carriages which thronged the plain; and it was easy to see, that if the centre of the army, which covered the great road from Madrid, was forced, its whole artillery and equipage would be lost.*

Battle of Vittoria. Success of Hill on the right.

At daybreak on the morning of the 21st, the whole British columns were in motion, and the centre and right soon surmounted the high ground which screened their night bivouac from the sight of the enemy, and their masses appeared in imposing strength on the summit of the ridges which shut in on the south the basin of Vittoria. The column on the left moved towards Mendoza, while Hill, at ten o'clock, reached the pass of Puebla, into which he immediately descended, and pressing through, began extending into the plain in front, Murillo's Spaniards, with surprising vigour, swarming up the steep and rocky ascents on his right. There, however, the French made a stout resistance; Murillo was wounded, but still kept the field; fresh troops re-enforced their line on the craggy heights, so that Hill was obliged to send the 71st, and a battalion of light infantry of Walker's brigade, to Murillo's support, under Colonel Cadogan. Hardly had he reached the summit, when that noble officer fell while cheering on his men to charge the enemy; and, though mortally wounded, he refused to be taken to the rear, and still rested on the field, watching with dying eyes the advance of his heroic Highlanders along the ridge. Still the battle was maintained with extraordinary resolution on the summit, and it was only by sending fresh troops to their support, and step by step, by force of sheer fighting, that the French were at length borne backward to nearly opposite Subijana; while Hill, in the valley below, encouraged by the progress of the scarlet uniforms on the summit on his right, pressed vigorously forward, and emerging from the defile of Puebla, carried by storm the village of Subijana, and extended his line into communication with his extreme right on the summit of the ridge.†

Progress of Wellington in the centre.

While this bloody conflict was going on on the steeps above the Zadorra on the right, Wellington himself, with the centre, had surmounted the heights in his front, and descended in great

* Murray's Instructions in Wyld's Memoirs, 100, 102. Nap., v., 554, 555. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 22d June, 1813, Gurw., x., 446.

† This is the first occasion in which the author has had an opportunity of referring to the late admirable publication of Wyld's Plans of the Peninsular Campaigns, accompanied by the valuable explanatory Memoir, which is enriched with so many of Sir George Murray's original orders and instructions, when quartermaster-general of the army. He has never travelled in Spain, and therefore cannot describe the fields of battle there from his own observation, as he has done those in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and France; but he can hardly bring himself to believe that he has not visited the scenes of Wellington's victories, so admirably graphic are Mr. Wyld's plans of the theatre on which they occurred, and so clearly do they bring before the mind the inequalities of ground and features of the country where the actions took place. It is no more than an act of justice to this magnificent publication to say, that it is more characteristic of the country which it portrays, and gives a better idea of the battles and military operations which then occurred, than any plans or maps which are to be found in the military archives or publications of any other country.

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 246, 247. Jom., iv., 348, 349. Belm., i., 254.

† Nap., v., 554, 555. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 242, 243. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 1813, Gurw., x., 447. Gazan's Official Account, Wyld's Mem., 101.

strength into the plain of Vittoria. His troops met with no serious opposition till they came to the bridges by which the rivers in the bottom were crossed; but as they were all occupied by the enemy, and the rocky thickets on their sides filled with tirailleurs, a warm exchange of musketry began, especially at the bridge of Nanclares, opposite the fourth division, and that of Villodar, by which the light divisions were to cross. The attack on these bridges was delayed till the third and seventh divisions, who formed the reserves of the centre, had come up to their ground, and they were somewhat retarded by the roughness of the hills over which they had to march; and, meanwhile, Wellington sent orders to Hill to arrest the progress of his extreme right on the summit of the ridge, in order that the whole army might advance abreast. Meanwhile, a Spanish peasant brought information that the bridge of Tres Puentes was negligently guarded, and offered himself to guide the light division over it; and the heads of the columns of the third and seventh divisions, forming the left centre, having now appeared on their ground, the advance was resumed at all points, both in the centre and on the right. Kempt's brigade of the light division, led by the brave peasant, soon gained the bridge; the fifteenth hussars, coming up at a canter, dashed by single file over, and the arch was won. It was now one o'clock; the firing was renewed with redoubled vigour on the heights above Subijana, while faint columns of white smoke, accompanied by a sound like distant thunder, showed that Graham's attack on Gamarra Mayor, in the enemy's rear, had commenced. At this moment the third and seventh divisions were moving rapidly down to the bridge of Mendoza; but the enemy's light troops and guns kept up a most vigorous fire upon the advancing masses, until the riflemen of the light division, who had got across at Tres Puentes, charged them in flank, when the position was abandoned, and the British left crossed without farther opposition. The whole French centre, alarmed by the progress which Graham was making in their rear, now retreated towards Vittoria, not, however, in disorder, but facing about at every defensible position to retard the enemy; while the British troops continued to advance in pursuit in admirable order, their regiments and squadrons surmounting the rugged inequalities in the ground with the most beautiful precision.*

Decisive success of Graham on the left.

The decisive blow, however, had, meanwhile, been struck by Graham on the left. That noble officer, who, at the age of sixty-eight, possessed all the vigour of twenty-five, and who was gifted with the true eye of a general, had started before daylight from his bivouac in the mountains on the left, and by eleven o'clock, after a most fatiguing and toilsome march over the hills, reached the heights above Gamarra Mayor and Ariega, which were strongly occupied by the French right under Reille. General Oswald, who commanded the head of Graham's corps, consisting of the fifth division, Pack's Portuguese, and Longa's Spaniards, immediately commenced the attack, and not only drove the enemy from the heights, but got possession of Gamarra Menor, which cut off the road to Durango. Gamarra Mayor was the next object of attack; and the French, aware of its importance, as commanding the great road to Bayonne, made the most strenuous efforts for its defence. At length Robinson's brigade of the fifth division burst in, bearing down all opposition, and capturing three guns; but Reille's men had barricaded the opposite end of the bridge, and their fire from the windows of the houses was so severe that they retained the opposite bank of the Zadorra. At the same time, the Germans under Halket had, in the most gallant manner, assaulted the village of Abechuco, which commanded the bridge of Ariega. It was at length carried by the brave Germans and Bradford's Portuguese; but they were unable, any more than at Gamarra Mayor, to force the bridge, and a murderous fire of musketry was kept up from the opposite sides, without enabling either party to dislodge the other from its position. But, meanwhile, General Sarrut was killed, and some British brigades pushing on, got possession of the great road from Vittoria to Bayonne, and immediately the cry spread through the French army that their retreat was cut off and all was lost.*

Retreat of the French to Vittoria.

It was no longer a battle, but a retreat; yet, in conducting it, the French soldiers maintained the high character for intrepidity and steadiness which had rendered them the terror and admiration of Europe. A large body of skirmishers was thrown out to check the advance of the pursuing columns, and fifty guns, placed in the rear, which were worked with extraordinary vigour, retarded for some time the pursuit of the British centre. Wellington, however, brought up several British batteries, and the enemy were at length forced back to the ridge in front of Gomecha. An obstinate conflict took place in Arinez, into which Picton plunged at the head of the riflemen of his division; but at length the village was carried; the 87th, under Colonel Gough, stormed Hermandad, and the French in Subijana, finding their right forced back, were obliged to retreat two miles towards Vittoria in a disordered mass. Thus the action became a sort of running fight or cannonade, which continued for six miles; but the French, notwithstanding all their efforts, were unable to hold any position long enough to enable the carriages in the rear to draw off; and as they were all thrown back into the little plain in front of Vittoria, the throng there became excessive, and already the cries of despair, as on the banks of the Beresina, were heard from the agitated multitude. Joseph now ordered the retreat to be conducted by the only road which remained open, that to Pampeluna; but it was too late to draw off any of the carriages; and "as the English shot went booming overhead," says an eyewitness, "the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose; but there was no hope, no stay for either army or multitude."† Eighty pieces of cannon, jam-

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 1813, Gurw., x., 448. Gazan's Official Account, Wyld, 102. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 213. Nap., v., 557, 559.

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 248, 249. Nap., v., 364, 365. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 1813, Gurw., x., 449. Belm., i., 254.

† Napier.

med close together near Vittoria, kept up a desperate fire to the last, and the gunners worked them with frantic energy; while Reille, with heroic resolution, maintained his ground on the Upper Zadorra; but it was all of no avail: the great road to France was lost; an overturned wagon on that to Pampeluna rendered all farther passage for carriages impracticable; the British dragoons were thundering in close pursuit, and soon the frantic multitude dispersed on all sides, making their way through fields, across ditches, and over the hills, leaving their whole artillery, ammunition-wagons, and the spoil of a kingdom, as a prey to the victors.*

Results of the battle, and prodigious amount of the spoil taken.

Never before, in modern times, had such a prodigious accumulation of military stores and private wealth fallen to the lot of a victorious army. Jourdan's marshal's baton, Joseph's private carriage, a hundred and fifty-one brass guns, four hundred and fifteen caissons of ammunition, thirteen hundred thousand ball-cartridges, fourteen thousand rounds of ammunition, and forty thousand pounds of gunpowder, constituted the military trophies of a victory, where six thousand also were killed and wounded, and a thousand prisoners taken. It at one blow destroyed the warlike efficiency of the French army, swept them like a whirlwind from the Spanish plains, and made Joseph's crown drop from his head. No estimate can be formed of the amount of private plunder which was taken on the field; but it exceeded anything witnessed in modern war, for it was not the produce of the sack of a city or the devastation of a province, but the accumulated plunder of a kingdom during five years, which was now at one fell swoop reft from the spoiler. Independent of private booty, no less than five millions and a half of dollars in the military chest of the army were taken; and of private wealth, the amount was so prodigious that, for miles together, the combatants may be almost said to have marched upon gold and silver without stooping to pick it up. But the regiments which followed, not equally warmed in the fight, were not so disinterested: enormous spoil fell into the hands of the private soldiers; and the cloud of camp-followers and sutlers who followed in their train swept the ground so completely, that only a hundred thousand dollars of the whole taken was brought into the military chest! But the effects of this prodigious booty speedily appeared in the dissolution of the bonds of discipline in a large part of the army: the frightful national vice of intemperance broke out in dreadful colours, from the unbounded means of indulging it which were thus speedily acquired; and we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that, three weeks after the battle, above twelve thousand soldiers had disappeared from their colours, though the total loss of the battle was only 5180, of whom 3308 were British; and these stragglers were only reclaimed by sedulous efforts and rigorous severity.†‡

Spoil and booty taken.

So vast was the number of ladies of pleasure who were among the carriages in the train of the French officers, that it was a common saying afterward in their army, that it was no wonder they were beaten at Vittoria, for they sacrificed their guns to save their mistresses. Rich vestures of all sorts, velvet and silk brocades, gold and silver plate, noble pictures, jewels, laces, cases of claret and champaign, poodles, parrots, monkeys, and trinkets, lay scattered about the field in endless confusion, amid weeping mothers, wailing infants, and all the unutterable miseries of warlike overthrow. Joseph himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner: a squadron of dragoons pursued the carriage and fired into it, and he had barely time to throw himself out and escape on horseback under shelter of a squadron of horse; his carriage was taken, and in it the beautiful Coreggio of Christ in the Garden, which now adorns Apsley House in London. The great convoy of pictures, however, which Joseph was carrying off, after narrowly escaping recapture, reached France in safety, having set out a day previously. The bonds contracted during so many years' occupation of the Peninsula, many of them of the tenderest kind, were all at once snapped asunder by one rude shock; and amid the shouts of joy which arose on all sides for a delivered monarchy were heard the sighs of the vanquished, who mourned the severance of the closest ties by which the heart of man can be bound in this world. Wellington, in a worthy spirit, did all in his power to soften the blow to the many ladies of rank and respectability who fell into his hands. The Countess Gazan, with a number of other wives of the French officers, were next day sent on to Pampeluna with a flag of truce, in their own carriages, which had been rescued from the spoil. But a more important acquisition was obtained in the whole archives of the court of Madrid, including a great mass of Napoleon's original and secret correspondence, an invaluable acquisition to historic truth, to which this narrative has been more than once largely indebted. It is a remarkable fact, that the battle was fought in the close vicinity of the spot where the gallant attempt of the Black Prince to establish the rightful, though savage monarch, Peter the Cruel, on the throne of Spain, five hundred years before, had been victorious; and

* Nap., v., 561, 562. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 249. Jom., iv., 350. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 22d of June, 1813, Gurw., x., 449, 450.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 1813, Gurw., x., 452, 453; and July 9, 1813, ibid., 519; and June 29, 1813, 472. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 252.

‡ "We started with the army in the highest order, and up to the day of the battle nothing could get on better; but that event has, as usual, totally annihilated all order and discipline. The soldiers of the army have got among them about a million sterling in money, with the exception of about 100,000 dollars, which were got in the military chest. The night of the battle, instead of being past in getting rest and food, to prepare them for the pursuit of the following day, was passed by the soldiers in looking for plunder. The consequence was, that they were incapable of marching in pursuit of the enemy, and were totally knocked up. The rain came on, and increased our fatigues; and I am convinced that we have now out of our ranks double the amount of our loss in the battle, and have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy have, though we have never in one day made more than an ordinary march."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *June* 29, 1813, GURWOOD, x., 473.

"By the State of yesterday we had 12,500 men less under arms than we had on the day before the battle. They are not in the hospital, nor are they killed, nor have they fallen into the hands of the enemy as prisoners: I have had officers in all directions after them, but have not heard of any of them. I believe they are concealed in the villages in the mountains."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *9th July*, 1813, GURWOOD, x., 519. The loss in the battle was just 5000; so that 7500 had straggled from the effects of the plunder.

when pursuing the French troops near Arinez, over the hill which still bears the name of the "English Hill" (Inglesmendi), the English soldiers unconsciously trode on the bones of their fathers. Twice had the fate of Spain been decided, by the aid of British blood, in the plain of Vittoria.*

The battle of Vittoria resounded like a thunderclap in every part of Spain; Madrid was finally evacuated on the 27th, and the whole French authorities and partisans of the dethroned monarch, abandoning every part of Old and New Castile, made all imaginable haste to cross the Ebro. Suchet, who, notwithstanding his defeat at Castalla and the subsequent operations of Sir John Murray, of which an account will immediately be given, still retained his retrenched position on the Xucar, was compelled, with a heavy heart, to abandon the beautiful kingdom of Valencia, and all his magnificent establishments there, in which he had ruled for eighteen months with the authority and state of a sovereign; and, leaving garrisons only in Saguntum and Peniscola, retired with all his army across the Ebro, where he distributed his forces between Taragona and Tortosa. Elio immediately moved forward and occupied Valencia. The total evacuation of all Spain south of the Ebro by the French troops necessarily rendered defenceless that very considerable portion, especially of the higher classes, in its central provinces, who had adhered to the fortunes of the French dynasty, and were known in the Peninsula by the contemptuous name of *juramentados*; and there was every reason to fear that the Cortes, having them now in their power, would hasten to gratify alike their long-cherished indignation and present appetite for gain, by condemning a large portion of them to the scaffold, and confiscating their estates. To guard against this danger, Wellington, amid his martial toils, addressed to the Cortes a long and able memoir, enforcing the propriety of granting, with a few exceptions, a general amnesty to those of the opposite party, and supporting it by a detail of the various circumstances which had so long rendered the contest to all appearance hopeless, and thereby extenuated, if they could not altogether excuse, their adherence to the intrusive monarch. The principles contained in this memoir, discriminating, humane, and politic, will not, by future ages, be deemed the least honourable monument to the fame of Wellington; and they came with singular grace from a victorious general in the very moment of his highest triumph—when he had rescued the country from the foreign yoke whose partisans he was thus shielding from the natural indignation of their countrymen.†‡

Evacuation of Madrid and Valencia by the French, who retire behind the Ebro. June 27.

July 5.

July 9.

On the day of the battle, Clausel, with his division, fourteen thousand strong, quitted Logrono, and, taking the road to Vittoria, arrived at the gates of that town late at night, after the conflict was over, and when it had fallen into the hands of the British. Fearful of being cut off, he immediately retired, and, marching all night, fell back towards Saragossa, but halted at Logrono to receive intelligence, where he remained till the evening of the 25th. This long delay had wellnigh proved fatal to him, and undoubtedly would have done so, if the march of the British, immediately after the battle, had not been retarded by the heavy rains which fell for two days, and the relaxation of discipline occasioned by the prodigious spoil they had taken. No sooner was Wellington informed of Clausel's position than he marched in person, with eighteen thousand men, by Tafalla upon Logrono, while twelve thousand were directed upon that town from the side of Salvatierra, and Mina followed on the enemy's rear. The French general was made aware of his danger just in time to escape being surrounded; and, setting out with all imaginable expedition, he retreated by Calahorra and Tudela upon Saragossa, where he arrived on the 1st of July, making a forced march of sixty miles in forty hours. Thence he retreated by Jaca, and through the passes of the Pyrenees into France, closely followed by Mina, who managed the pursuit with such ability, that Clausel, though superior in number, was obliged to sacrifice a large portion of his heavy artillery and baggage before he found a refuge within the French territory.*

Imminent danger and narrow escape of Clausel.

While Clausel was making this narrow escape

* Tor., v., 280, 281. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 250, 251. Southey, vi., 173.

† Wellington to Don Juan O'Donoju, June 11th, 1813, Gurw., x., 431. Tor., v., 298.

‡ "I am the last person who will be found to diminish the merit of the Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the country during the severe trial which I hope has passed, particularly of those who, having remained among the enemy without entering their service, have served their country at the risk of their lives. But, at the same time that I can appreciate the merit of those individuals, and of the nation at large, I can forgive the weakness of those who have been induced by terror, by distress, or by despair, to pursue a different line of conduct.

"I entreat the government to advert to the circumstances of the commencement, and of the different stages of this eventful contest; and to the numerous occasions in which all men must have imagined that it was impossible for the powers of the Peninsula, although aided by Great Britain, to withstand the colossal power by which they were assailed, and nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness of the country at the commencement of the contest, upon the numerous and almost invariable disasters of the armies, and upon the ruinous disorganization which followed; and let them decide whether those who were witnesses of these events are guilty, because they could not foresee what has since occurred. The majority are certainly not guilty in any other manner; and many, as I have above stated, now deemed guilty in the eye of the law, as having served the pretended king, have, by that very act, acquired the means of serving, and have rendered important services to their country.

"It is my opinion that the policy of Spain should lead the government and the Cortes to grant a general amnesty, with certain exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in the two views of the effort now making, failing or succeeding, in freeing the country from its oppressors. If the effort should fail, the enemy will, by an amnesty, be deprived of the principal means now in his hands of oppressing the country in which his armies will be stationed. He will see clearly that he can place no reliance on any partisans in Spain, and he will not have even a pretence for supposing that country is divided in opinion. If the effort should succeed, as I sincerely hope it may, the object of the government should be to pacify the country, and to heal the divisions which the contest unavoidably must have occasioned. It is impossible that this object can be accomplished as long as there exists a large body of the Spanish nation, some possessing the largest properties in the country, and others endowed with considerable talents, who are proscribed for their conduct during the contest; conduct which has been caused by the misfortunes to which I have above adverted."—WELLINGTON *to* DON JUAN O'DONOJU, *Spanish Minister at War*, GURWOOD, x., 431, 432.

* Nap., v., 571, 572. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 252. Tor., v., 288, 290.

Operations against Pampeluna and Foy's division.

from the right wing of the allied forces, the centre, under Hill, pursued the main body of the routed army, which retired by Pampeluna and up the valley of Bastan into France, in the deepest dejection, with only one gun in their whole array, hardly any ammunition, and no baggage, military chest, or papers of any description; insomuch that the whole muster-rolls and pay-sheets of the army were lost, and their organization, as a military force, was at an end. The blockade of Pampeluna was immediately formed by the English general, into which a garrison of six thousand men had been thrown by the retreating army. Meanwhile, Graham, with the left wing, moved against Foy, who, with his division, was in the neighbourhood of Durango during the battle, and who immediately after set about collecting the small garrisons in Lower Biscay, with a view to a general retreat to St. Sebastian. He arrived in Tolosa with twelve thousand men almost at the same time with Sir Thomas Graham; but, having succeeded in making his entrance first, he barricaded the streets, and maintained himself there, with the aid of a fortified blockhouse, with great resolution, till nightfall, when the entrance was forced by the British troops, amid the cheers of the inhabitants, and the enemy retired to Irun with the loss of four hundred men. Graham's loss, however, was nearly as severe; and the vigour of Foy's resistance had gained time for his convoys to retire across the Bidassoa into France, whither he followed a few days afterward, and Giron had the felicity of chasing the last French in that quarter from the Spanish territory. At the same time, the forts of Passages, with their garrison of a hundred and fifty men, were surrendered to Longa; Castro-Urdiales was evacuated, the garrison taking refuge in Santona; and the Conde d'Abisbal, who had come up with the army of reserve from Andalusia, carried by storm the forts of Pancorvo, garrisoned by seven hundred men, which commanded the great road in the rear between Burgos and Vittoria.*

July 25.

June 25.

July 1.

Nothing remained to complete the entire expulsion of the French from the northwestern provinces of Spain but to root them out from the fortified strongholds of Santona, Pampeluna, and ST. SEBASTIAN, which were the only fortresses in that quarter which they still held in the Peninsula. Pampeluna was already closely invested by Hill; and Graham lost no time in investing the latter fortress, which has acquired such celebrity from the dreadful assaults of which it shortly after became the object. Before, however, the British outposts could reach the town, Foy had succeeded in throwing in considerable re-enforcements; and the garrison, swelled by detachments that took refuge there by sea, from Guetaria and other fortified posts on the coast which were abandoned, amounted to three thousand men, and was under the command of Emmanuel Rey, one of those rare characters whose resolution and constancy, unshaken amid misfortune, are fitted to arrest or stay the fall of empires.

* Tor., v., 284, 288. Nap., v., 569, 571. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 252. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 3d of July, 1813, Gurw., x., 501.

Description of St. Sebastian.

St. Sebastian is situated upon the extremity of a low sandy peninsula, which, curved in the form of a horseshoe, nearly surrounds the bay which forms its harbour, while on the other side it is bounded by the opening into which the Urumea stream empties its waters. Immediately behind the town, at the extremity of the curved peninsula, stands a conical hill four hundred feet high, the craggy base of which is washed by the ocean, while its summit is crowned with the old castle of La Mota. The southern face of this hill, which overlooks the town, is separated from it by a range of defensive works covered with batteries; so that the mountain called Monte Orgullo could hold out after the town was taken. The land front of St. Sebastian, stretching across the isthmus, is three hundred and fifty yards broad, and consists of a lofty solid curtain of masonry, with a flat bastion in the centre, covered by a hornwork, having the usual counterscarp, covered way, and glacis. But the flank defences, running along the peninsula and facing the Urumea, consist merely of a simple rampart wall, ill flanked, without either ditch, counterscarp, outwork, or external obstacle of any kind; and this wall, such as it is, is exposed, from its summit to its base, to a fire from the Chofre range of sandhills on the right of the Urumea, at the distance of from five hundred to a thousand yards. It could not be said, therefore, to be a strong place. and, in fact, it had no pretensions to more than a third-rate fortress; and in addition to this, at the time of the battle of Vittoria it was nearly dismantled, as many of the guns had been removed to form battering-trains, or arm smaller fortified posts on the coast: there were no bomb-proof casements nor palisades, the wells were in bad order, and the place was supplied with water by a single aqueduct, which was cut off the moment the investment was formed. The Urumea is fordable for two hours before and after high water, so that troops during that period can approach by the dry sands the foot of the sea scarp wall of the town. Aware of this circumstance, Marshal Berwick, when he besieged St. Sebastian in the last century, threw up batteries on the Chofre sandhills, to breach the eastern face of the town's sea-wall, while approaches were pushed along the isthmus, to prevent the approach to the beach being impeded; and it was on the footsteps of that accomplished commander that the British engineers now prepared to tread.*

Commencement of the siege by Sir T. Graham, and defensive measures of the governor.

The population of St. Sebastian, which usually does not exceed eight thousand souls, had been more than doubled by the influx of Spanish families, most of them composed of persons of consideration and station, who had taken office under Joseph's government, and fled there, after the wreck of Vittoria, as the only stronghold which still held out for the intrusive monarch in the northern provinces. The governor being made aware, at the same time, by General Foy, that he was about to retire into France, and that St. Sebastian must look to its own resources, was grievously oppressed by this load of useless mouths,

* Jones's Sieges, ii., 13, 14. Nap., v., 66, 67. Belmas's Sieges, v., 591, 593.

who yet were of such a station that he could neither render them serviceable nor treat them with severity; and he used all his influence, therefore, to get them to depart for France, which, by land and sea, was immediately accomplished. Delivered of this extraneous load, it was the first care of the French governor to occupy the Convent of St. Bartholomew, which is situated at the end of the isthmus, opposite to the land face of the fortress, in order to destroy all the buildings in it which might furnish a shelter to the besiegers. Fortifications were commenced at that point, in order to render it an outwork that might retard the enemy; the wooden bridge over the Urumea, which connected the town with its eastern shore, was burned; several houses in the suburbs destroyed, to make room for the firing place; the wells cleared out; palisades hastily run up in front of the outworks; and every preparation made for a vigorous defence; while all the women and children were ordered instantly to leave the place. But the British, on their side, were not idle. Graham rapidly approached with a besieging force, about ten thousand strong; and as the Spanish troops were repulsed in an attack on the Convent of St. Bartholomew, advances were made against it in form. Meanwhile, the garrison were re-enforced by troops from Guetaria, who arrived by sea during the night; and they succeeded in mounting seventy-six heavy guns upon the ramparts, the greater part of which were on the face fronting the peninsula. The approaches, however, against the Convent of St. Bartholomew were vigorously carried on; and Wellington, having visited the works, gave his sanction to the advice of Major Smith, the chief of the engineers before Sir R. Fletcher arrived, that that outpost should first be carried, and the main attack then directed against the eastern face of the sea-wall of the town, which faced the Urumea, as had been done a century before by Marshal Berwick.*

June 28.

June 29.

The breaching batteries against the Convent of St. Bartholomew were begun on the night of the 10th, and on the night of the 13th twenty guns of heavy calibre opened their fire. On the forenoon of the 17th, the convent, being nearly laid in ruins, was assaulted by a part of the 9th British and three companies of the Royals, under the command of Colonel Cameron, and detachments of the Portuguese. The assault of this isolated and elevated stronghold presented an animating spectacle, for it lay exposed to the guns both of the besiegers and of the fortress, and between the two sides sixty pieces of heavy cannon directed their fire upon the assailants or the convent, during the time the assault was going on. After a gallant resistance, however, the place was carried, amid loud cheers from the British troops who watched the contest from the opposite shore. But the assailants, carried away by their ardour, pursued the fugitives into the fortress, and thus sustaining some loss from the fire of the ramparts, were glad to seek shelter among the ruined walls of the convent. No sooner was this advanced post gained than the British established batteries on the height where the convent was placed, to annoy the enemy by a fire from that side; and, meanwhile, the main batteries were erected on the Chofre sandhills, on the right bank of the Urumea. The approaches were pushed with great activity on that side, and speedily armed with heavy cannon landed from the ships; and on the night of the 20th of July, the breaching batteries commenced their fire at the distance of about 800 yards; while a more distant battery on the Monte Olia sent its plunging shot across the Urumea, a distance of 1500 yards, with great effect, upon the same point. The effect of the concentrated fire of these batteries was soon very apparent: a considerable part of the wall came down with a tremendous crash; and the besieged, who were now obliged to husband their ammunition, were seen to be indefatigable in their efforts to intrench the place inside the breach, and render the counterscarp, after it was carried, incapable of descent. At ten o'clock on the 21st, a flag of truce to surrender was held out, but the governor refused to receive it. The fire was consequently resumed, and with such extraordinary vigour, that the ten heavy pieces on the nearest Chofre sandhills discharged three hundred and fifty rounds in fifteen and a half hours of daylight, being at the rate of about twenty-five discharges an hour, or one in every two minutes and a quarter—a rapidity of fire, to be sustained for so long a time, which is perhaps unexampled in artillery practice. The flanking batteries on the Convent of St. Bartholomew, and in front of the Monte Olia, were also very destructive, and on the 23d a mortar battery and two sixty-eight pound carronades were turned upon the defences of the great breach with such effect, that the whole parapets near it were speedily destroyed, and the adjoining houses in the inside took fire and burned with extraordinary fierceness. The breach being now plainly practicable, the assault was ordered for the morning of the 24th; but so frightful was the conflagration at daybreak, that it seemed impossible for the assailants to penetrate into the town in that quarter, and therefore it was deferred till night, when the fall of the tide might again render the Urumea fordable, and it was hoped the fire would be abated by the houses being consumed. During the whole of the 24th, the besiegers' batteries kept up an incessant fire on the breach, as well with bombs and cannon-shot as with shrapnell shells, then for the first time used in war, which did very great mischief to the besieged; but they, on their side, were not idle, and turned to the best account the breathing-time thus afforded for making preparations against the assault. Live shells were placed along the top of the rampart, ready to be rolled down on the English troops as they thridded their way from the bridge. The houses behind the burning edifices were loopholed, and filled with troops; and heavy guns, loaded with grape-shot, placed on either side of the bridge, to cut down the assailants if they won the summit of the flaming ruins.*

July 20.

July 21.

July 22.

July 23.

July 24.

No sooner was it dark on the 24th than the storming column, consisting of two thousand

Storming of St. Bartholomew, and breaching of the fortress.

* Belm., iv., 695, 704. Jones's Sieges, ii., 14, 19. Nap., vi., 68, 71.

* Jones's Sieges, ii., 28, 37. Belm., iv., 618, 623. Nap., vi., 75, 79.

Unsuccessful assault on the place.

men, under Major Fraser, Colonel Greville, and Colonel Cameron, silently defiled out of the trenches, and advanced with a swift pace over the intervening ground lying between them and the river. The ground, however, as it was dark, proved extremely difficult to pass over; it was strewed with rocks, covered with slippery seaweed, which much impeded the march of the column; the water, when they reached the Urumea, was up to the soldiers' armpits; and when they got to the opposite side, they had to pass, for a considerable distance, immediately under the foot of the rampart, to the left of the breach, exposed to all the flaming projectiles which could be rolled down upon them from its summit. The column, however, advanced with great resolution, and got through the water unperceived by the enemy; and before they reached the foot of the rampart on the opposite side, a globe of compression, which had been run into an old drain near the counterscarp and glacis of the hornwork which flanked the breach, exploded with tremendous violence, and shook all that part of the defences. The garrison, astonished at this event, abandoned the flanking outwork; and the advancing column, though severely galled by the firing flank of the British batteries on the other side of the Urumea, which, by firing too low, struck their own men, succeeded in reaching the foot of the breach without any very serious loss from the enemy. Major Fraser of the Royal Scotch, and Lieutenant Jones of the engineers, were the first to mount the breach, followed by a few brave men; and if the remainder of the column had come up in quick succession, as was expected, the place would have been taken in a quarter of an hour; for the enemy, thunderstruck at the rapidity of the advance, had retreated behind the ruins of the burning houses, and the pass might at that moment have been easily won. But the troops, who came straggling up irregularly and in small bodies, as they made their way over the rocks and through the water, did not support the gallant party in advance so quickly as was expected; and, meanwhile, the enemy, recovering from their consternation, opened a tremendous fire from all sides, as well upon the troops who had mounted the breach as those who were struggling at its foot, and wending their difficult way between the rising flood and the rampart. The heroic Fraser was killed amid the flaming ruins into which he had penetrated; Jones stood, with a few brave soldiers, alone for some time on the breach, expecting aid, but none came up; and before the arrival of the scaling-ladders to escalade the ramparts, they were almost all killed or wounded. Colonel Greville and Colonel Cameron exerted themselves to the utmost to lead the troops up the breach; and Lieutenant Campbell of the 9th twice mounted it, almost alone, and was twice wounded. At length the fire became so dreadful, that the troops who had crossed the river got into inextricable confusion; and the whole column fled across the Urumea in disorder, after sustaining a loss of five hundred and twenty men, including the gallant Sir Richard Fletcher, who was severely wounded. The rising tide threatened to drown all the wounded who lay between the flood and the rampart; in consequence of which, a flag of truce was displayed by the British for an hour, at daylight, to enable the enemy to rescue the wounded from their perilous situation; and, with admirable humanity, the French answered the appeal, and brought the whole of the maimed safe over the breach into the hospitals, where they were placed beside their own wounded men, and tended with equal care during the remainder of the siege.*

Wellington arrives and turns the siege into a blockade.

As soon as Wellington received intelligence of this bloody repulse, he repaired to St. Sebastian from his headquarters near Pampeluna; and convinced, from the experience he had now had of the quality of the enemy, that the place was not to be carried without a very considerable addition to the means of attack, which the present exhausted state of the besiegers' ammunition would not permit, it was determined to suspend active operations, and convert the siege into a blockade, until the arrival of the supply of warlike stores from Portsmouth, which had been written for a month before, and was hourly expected. They did not arrive, however, in consequence of adverse winds, for a considerable time; and, meanwhile, a vehement irruption was made by the French force into Spain, which wellnigh broke through the investment of Pampeluna, raised the siege of St. Sebastian, snatched from Wellington the fruits of his glorious victory, and, by damping the hopes of the allied sovereigns in Germany, after the repulse at Dresden, altered the whole face of the war. These disastrous consequences were prevented solely by the heroic resistance of a few British brigades, the daring intrepidity of their leaders, and the happy arrival of Wellington at the scene of danger, at the very moment when farther resistance appeared hopeless. Such is the value of time in war, and such the magnitude of the consequences which often flow from the heroism or pusillanimity of a single regiment or brigade!

July 25.

Napoleon sends Soult with supreme powers to Bayonne.

No sooner did Napoleon receive intelligence at Dresden of the battle of Vittoria, than measuring at once, with prophetic eye, the extent of the danger, he despatched Soult, as already mentioned, from his headquarters in Germany, to take the command of the whole French forces now assembled in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, under the title of lieutenant of the emperor.† The danger, great as it was, appeared to Napoleon more threatening than it actually proved; for it is now known that, so utterly unprepared were the enemy for the rapidity of Wellington's success, that Bayonne, at the time the English standards approached the Bidassoa, was wholly unprovided for a siege; the guns were not even mounted on the ramparts; and if the English general had been aware of its defenceless state, he might, by pushing on, have made himself master of that great frontier fortress almost without firing a shot.‡§

* Belm., iv., 623, 626. Nap., vi., 80, 83. Jones's Sieges, ii., 37, 41. Graham's Desp., July 27, 1813, Gurw., x., 589. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 272, 273.

† *Ante*, iv., 108. ‡ Vict. et Conq., xxii., 264.

§ In consequence of a blind confidence in his [Napoleon's] good fortune, which a long series of uninterrupted triumphs can hardly excuse, Bayonne, the most important fortress on the southern frontier, was not at this moment beyond the reach of a *coup-de-main*. Struck with astonishment, the civil and military authorities had taken no steps whatever

Soult arrived at Bayonne on the 13th of July, and immediately commenced the most active measures for putting that fortress in a state of defence, and reorganizing the wreck of several different armies which were now assembled around its walls. These consisted of the remains of the once formidable armies of the south of Portugal, of the north, and of the centre; but although not a third of any of these immense hosts now remained, yet, being all united together under one head, and having a very narrow frontier to defend, they still presented a formidable force to repel the attacks of the enemy. From the imperial muster-rolls, it appears that the whole force which Soult now had at his disposal in the neighbourhood of Bayonne amounted to 114,000 men, of whom ninety-eight thousand were present with the eagles—and of these seventy thousand infantry, and above six thousand cavalry, were ready for active operations in the field—and the remainder formed the garrisons of St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, Santona, and Bayonne.* The forces in Catalonia, at the same time, under Suchet, were about sixty-six thousand; so that Napoleon still had one hundred and fifty-six thousand men present under arms to oppose the allies in the Peninsula or on the French frontier, and Soult alone had eighty-six guns at his command. But although the physical resources of his army were thus great, it was very deficient in spirit and organization: long marches had exhausted the strength, and continued defeats broken the spirit of the soldiers; the divisions of so many different armies were blended together without any proper arrangement or direction; and vast numbers of soldiers, stragglers from regiments which had been destroyed or lost sight of, were huddled together in disorderly masses, without arms, or officers to direct their movements.†

Forces which Soult found there.

But Soult was one of those persons whose resolute and persevering character is eminently qualified to infuse his own spirit into such a disorderly body of troops, and remedy all the defects in organization, equipment, and direction, which previous mismanagement had occasioned. Although his eye for tactics in the field was not of the quickest kind, and he was far from possessing the rapidity of conception and decision of execution which distinguished Napoleon, Ney, and Wellington on the field of battle, yet he was unrivalled in the ability with which he effected the reorganization of his armies and laid out his plans of strategy, and second to none in the tenacity with which he clung to their execution under circumstances when, to all others, they appeared all but desperate. Had he possessed the vigour of Ney on the field of battle, he would have been a perfect general; had he been less inclined to acts of rapacity, his character as a man would have been comparatively unsullied. Although not of a strong make, and subject to a natural defect in the foot, which might be supposed to injure his seat on horseback,* yet he was capable of enduring the most severe fatigue, and was unwearied in the diligence with which he set himself to work to execute any mission with which he was intrusted, or repair any disasters with which he was called upon to contend. Although he subsequently held the most important situations in the royal councils of France, and was more than once intrusted by its sovereign with the supreme direction, both of civil and military affairs, on the most important occasions, yet his fame as a general will mainly rest upon the admirable ability with which he struggled against Wellington in the campaign on which we are now about to enter, on the Pyrenees and in the south of France; and the interest of the contest between these two great commanders is not a little enhanced by the cordial union which, long after the termination of the struggle, prevailed between them, and the constancy with which they exerted their great influence in their respective countries to preserve the blessings of peace, when the popular passions on either side were ready to rekindle the flames of war.

Character of Marshal Soult.

The first care of this great commander, upon taking the direction of the army, was to provide for the immediate security of Bayonne, which was in no condition to make any resistance to the enemy. The ramparts were instantly lined with guns, the ditches cleared out, the decayed parts of the wall hastily repaired, and palisades run up to prevent the approach of the enemy to the outworks. The army was next divided into three wings: the right being placed under the orders of General Reille; D'Erlon had the command of the centre, and Clausel of the left wing. The cavalry, which was not numerous, was arranged in two divisions—one of dragoons and one of hussars. This force occupied the whole northern issues of the passes of the Pyrenees, from the pass of Roncesvalles on the east, to the mouth of the Bidassoa on the west; and Soult himself established his headquarters at Ascain, where he was indefatigably engaged in organizing his forces and completing his arrangements; while Wellington's headquarters were nearly opposite at Lezaca, within the Spanish territory. With such vigour were Soult's labours conducted, and so admirably was he seconded by the spirit of the inhabitants of Bayonne, and of the adjoining province of Bearn, that in less than a fortnight his preparations were complete, and he was in a condition to take the field. He resolved immediately to re-enter the Spanish territory and direct his march to Pampeluna, the garrison of which had not now remaining provisions for more than ten days; while that of St. Sebastian was hourly expected to sink, if the siege were not raised, under the impetuous assaults of the British soldiery. Wherefore, after issuing a spirited proclamation to his troops—in which he ascribed their misfortunes to the faults of their commanders, and, without disguising the merits of the British general and army,† promised again to lead them to victory‡—his whole army

His division of his forces, and preparation for the campaign.

for its defence, and the English would have got possession, without firing a shot, of that important fortress, if they had been aware of its situation, and had had the boldness to continue their pursuit through the Pyrenees beyond the pass of Bioba."—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, xxii., 264. See also PELLOT, 23, 24. * See App. D.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1, 1813, Gurw., x., 576. Belm., i., 261, 262. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 264, 266. Nap., vi., 68, 69. Belm., i., 261, 262.

* One of his legs was clubfooted.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1, 1813, Gurw., x., 576. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 265. Belm., iv., 262, 263.

‡ "While Germany was thus the theatre of great events, that enemy who, under pretence of succouring the inhabi-

was put in motion at daybreak on the 25th, being the very day on which Wellington was engaged at St. Sebastian in inspecting the works after the failure of the first assault.

Position and strength of the British army.

The allies mustered, in all, seventy-two thousand combatants of the Anglo-Portuguese army, of whom seven thousand were cavalry, besides twenty-five thousand Spaniards.* The relative force of the contending armies, therefore, was not materially different, the more especially as the numerous National Guards whom the French general could summon to his standard, of great service in mountain warfare, and well acquainted with the intricacies of the passes, fully compensated the Spanish troops at the command of the English general. Both armies occupied a line about eleven leagues in length, from the sea on the left, to the mountains on the westward of the pass of Roncesvalles on the extreme right. But there was this difference between the two —and it was a difference which came to be of vital importance in the outset of operations— that although the British were on the higher ground, and occupied passes difficult of access, yet the columns posted in them, separated from each other by inaccessible ridges, could only communicate with, or receive support from each other by a roundabout march of some days in the rear; while the French, who were grouped in the plain, from which access was easy from one part of the line to another, could at pleasure throw the weight of their force against the weakest part of the allied line, and overwhelm it by a vehement irruption, with superior forces, before succour could by possibility be obtained, by the long circuits in the rear, from the remoter parts of their position.*

Having concentrated his troops and selected his point of attack, Soult, at daybreak on the 25th, with thirty-five thousand combatants, ascended the French side of the pass of Roncesvalles, while D'Erlon with the centre, twenty thousand strong, threatened the British centre by the Puerta de Maya, at the head of the valley of Bastan; and Villatte, with eighteen thousand, remained in observation on the Bidassoa. Soult's object in this measure was to accumulate forces on Wellington's right more rapidly than the English general could collect forces to oppose him; to relieve Pampeluna, for the revictualling of which he had collected a large convoy; and then turning to his own right, descend upon St. Sebastian and the forces covering the siege, at the same time that his centre and right forced the allied positions in their front. To facilitate this operation, great efforts had been made in the preceding days to smooth the ascent to the pass of Roncesvalles, and three hundred bullocks were in readiness to assist in dragging the guns up the long and toilsome ascent. Sixty pieces of artillery accompanied the centre and left, and the troops each carried provisions for four days' consumption. Though the British officers at the outposts were on the alert, from the movements they observed among the enemy, yet so well had the concentration of the French troops been masked by the intervening heights, and concealed by the peasantry, that they were far from being prepared for the furious onset by which they were suddenly assailed. At daybreak on the 25th, Clausel, with three divisions, mustering full eighteen thousand men, commenced an attack on Byng's brigade and Murillo's Spaniards, little more than five thousand strong, who occupied an elevated position five thousand feet above the level of the sea, and on the summit of a craggy ridge of rock at Altobiscar, commanding the higher parts of the pass. The steep ascent soon rung with louder notes than the bugles of Charlemagne, for the British troops, undismayed by the multitude of assailants, made a vigorous resistance: the musketry pealed sharp and long among the rocks, and the advancing columns fell fast beneath the deadly fire which issued from above the clouds. But the French, electrified by the presence of Soult, and burning to efface the recollection of their former defeats, advanced with the utmost intrepidity, and toiled far up the steep; still, however, the British made good the summit, until intelligence was received in the evening that Murillo, assailed by superior forces, had fallen back on the right, while the assailants on the left were making way along the summit of the Airola ridge; wherefore the strong position of the Altobiscar was abandoned, and the British general, united to Cole's division, which had come up from the left during the night, evacuated the great ridge, and descended on the opposite side towards the general rendezvous of the troops in that quarter, in the valley of Zubiri.†

Irruption of the French into the Pyrenees, and their success in the pass of Roncesvalles.

tants of the Peninsula, has, in reality, devoted them to ruin, was not inactive. He assembled the whole of his disposable forces—English, Spaniards, and Portuguese—under his most experienced officers; and, relying upon the superiority of his numbers, advanced in three divisions against the French forces assembled upon the Douro. With well-provided fortresses in his front and rear, a skilful general, enjoying the confidence of his troops, might, by selecting good positions, have braved and discomfited this motley levy. But, unhappily, at this critical period, timorous and pusillanimous counsels were followed. The fortresses were abandoned and blown up, hasty and disorderly marches gave confidence to the enemy, and a veteran army—small, indeed, in number, but great in all that constitutes the military character—which had fought, bled, and triumphed in every fortress in Spain, beheld its glory tarnished, and itself compelled to abandon all its acquisitions—the trophies of many a well-fought and bloody day. When, at length, the indignant voice of the troops arrested this disgraceful flight, and its commander, touched with shame, yielded to the general desire, and determined giving battle near Vittoria, who can doubt, from this generous enthusiasm—this fine sense of honour—what would have been the result had the general been worthy of his troops? had he, in short, made those dispositions and movements which would have secured to one part of his army the co-operation and support of the other?

"Let us not, however, defraud the enemy of the praise which is due to him. The dispositions and arrangements of their general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive. The valour and steadiness of his troops have been praiseworthy; yet do not forget that it is to the benefit of your example they owe their present military character; and that, whenever the relative duties of a French general and his troops have been ably fulfilled, their enemies have commonly had no other resource than flight. Soldiers! I partake your chagrin, your grief, your indignation: I know that the blame of the present situation of the army is imputable to others; the glory of repairing it is your own. The emperor's instructions are, to drive the enemy from yonder lofty heights, which enable him proudly to survey our fertile valleys, and chase him beyond the Ebro. If won, the Spanish soil must bear your tents, and from thence your resources be drawn. No difficulties are insurmountable to your valour and devotion."—SOULT *to his Soldiers*, 22d July, July, 1813, GURWOOD, x., 577.

* See App. C, chap. lxxi.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 1st August, 1813, Gurw., x., 578, 579. Nap., vi., 93, 94. Belm., i., 262, 263.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 1, 1813, Gurw., x., 579. Nap., v., 108, 113. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 267. Pellot's Guerre des Pyrénées, 23, 24.

Description of the Puerta de Maya.

While the pass of Roncesvalles was thus forced on the allied right, the Puerta de Maya, in the centre, had also been the theatre of a sanguinary conflict. D'Erlon had, early in the morning, put himself in motion on the same day, to attack that pass at the head of the valley of Bastan, and thus pour down by another road on the British blockading force around Pampeluna. Hill was there with the second division; and the ground at the summit of the pass was exceedingly strong, consisting of an elevated valley, three miles broad, flanked by lofty rocks and ridges on either side, and presenting scenery of the grandest description. The vale of Estevan, indeed, which leads to it, has at first an air of fertility and beauty; but it narrows as it rises towards the north, and is soon lost in the gloom and desolation of the frontier. Mountains are there crowded together in all varieties of savage magnificence: here crested with gray and jagged rock, there rounded and green upon the summits, to which the panting traveller is led by long and winding paths. The sides of the rugged barrier are strewed with vast masses of black rock, detached by winter's frosts from the cliffs above; the roads are narrow and stony; the fastnesses into which they lead, dark and shadowy; and the solitary traveller, in traversing them, in general hears only the dash of the waters, which descend in numerous cascades on all sides, or the scream of the eagles, which float high in the firmament above.*

Combat there, and defeat of the British.

The better to conceal his real intentions, Count d'Erlon, early on the morning of the 25th, made some demonstrations against the small passes of Espegne and Lareta, which lie to the right of that of Maya, and were guarded by the Portuguese; and under cover of these movements, he skilfully brought forward his main body, long concealed from view by the great road leading direct from Urdax up the pass, and they were near the summit before they were perceived. The alarm guns were instantly fired; the pickets were driven in with heavy loss, and the light companies slowly retired, firing quickly as they fell back, with the most exemplary steadiness. Breathless with running up the Spanish side, from the bivouacs a little below the summit, the British regiments now came up. The 34th and 50th first arrived by companies, and immediately began to fire; and soon after the 92d appeared, and the Highlanders, at home among the rocks, long kept the enemy at bay by the most devoted courage.† But the enemy increased rapidly, and fought well; two thirds of the 92d were at length struck down, and the ascent was literally blocked up by the prodigious piles of the slain. Other regiments, particularly the 71st and 82d, were brought up, and maintained the pass long and bravely against the enemy; but it was all in vain: they were literally forced back, and sullenly retreated across the ridge, still resolutely combating. So long-continued and obstinate was the fight, that the whole ammunition of the 82d was exhausted; and at length, as they still kept their ground, they were reduced to roll down stones on the enemy. In this desperate condition, the allies were driven back to the last ridge of the pass, and were on the point of abandoning the crest of the mountain altogether, when Barnes, with a brigade of the 7th division, came up from Echallar, and, by a brilliant charge with the 6th regiment, drove the French back to the first summit of the range. In this disastrous and bloody combat, the allies had fifteen hundred men killed, wounded, and made prisoners; the French lost, by their own admission, as many; but they won the pass, and took four pieces of cannon.*

Advantages gained by Soult on this day's operations.

So far, the most brilliant success had crowned Soult's operations: he had, unknown to the British, accumulated the bulk of his forces against his right, and thrown himself in such strength on the two principal passes leading to Pampeluna, that they were both won. Final success seemed inevitable; for, if the allies had been unable to make good the summit of the hill with all the advantages of ground in their favour, it was not to be expected that they could arrest the victorious enemy in the course of the rapid descent, not above twenty miles in length from either of these passes, to the ramparts of Pampeluna. If the French generals had been as well aware as Soult was of the inestimable importance of time in all, but especially mountain warfare, it is more than probable that this would have been the result, and a new aspect been given to the campaign, and possibly the fortunes of the war, by the raising of the siege of St. Sebastian and the blockade of Pampeluna. But D'Erlon, satisfied with having won the Puerta de Maya, remained there on the night of the 25th, without following up his successes; and Reille's three divisions, which had received orders to march from St. Jean Pied-de-Port for Airola and Lindous on the preceding day, lost much precious and irreparable time in incorporating some conscripts which had come up with their respective regiments, so that they did not ascend the rocks of Airola in time to seize that important pass before the British troops had got through. Thus, though the crest of the mountains was won, no decisive blow had been struck; and the allied and French troops, after nearly equal mutual slaughter, were wending their way down the valleys on the southern slope of the Pyrenees.†

Retreat of the British to the neighbourhood of Pampeluna.

On the morning of the 26th, Soult's march was retarded by a thick fog which hung on the higher parts of the mountains; he at length, however, got into motion, and descended the valley in pursuit of the British; but he soon found that in mountain warfare, though the as-

* Scherer, ii., 234.

† The heroism of the 92d regiment on this occasion was the object of deserved admiration to the whole army. "The stern valour of the 92d," says Napier, "*principally composed of Irishmen*, would have graced Thermopylæ." No one can doubt the justice of this eulogium on the regiment; but the statement of its being composed principally of Irishmen is a mistake, arising from misinformation on the part of the gallant colonel. The author has ascertained, from inquiry of its officers, particularly Lieutenant-colonel Macdonald, that at that period nine tenths of the whole corps were Scotch Highlanders.—See NAPIER, vi., 122, and *App. E*, chap. lxxii., where the proportion of Irish and Scotch in the regiment are given; and *United Service Journal* for October, 1840, p. 42.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1, 1813, Gurw., x., 579. Scherer, ii., 247. Nap., v., 118, 122. Pellot, 26, 27. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 267, 268.

† Pellot, 25, 26. Nap., vi., 113, 114. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 268.

July 26. sailant may have the advantage in the first onset, difficulties accumulate around him as he advances, if opposed by a resolute and persevering adversary. Cole, who was retreating down the valley from Roncesvalles, met Picton, who had hurried to the scene of danger in advance of his division, which, however, had crossed the hills and reached Zubiri, a few miles in his rear. Thither the British generals immediately retreated, with some sharp combats in the rear-guard; and the two divisions united, now mustering eleven thousand bayonets, offered battle on the ridge in front of Zubiri; but Soult declined to attack, being desirous, before he did so, of being joined by D'Erlon or Reille's divisions; and, as they did not come up before night, he let fall some expressions of displeasure, discovering a secret apprehension of failure. Next day, Picton,

July 27. with both divisions now under his command, continued his retreat towards Pampeluna, desiring to concentrate his forces and give battle at SAUROREN, four miles in front of that fortress. Hill, finding his right uncovered, and being severely weakened by the combat of Maya, followed in the same direction down the valley of Bastan; and the mountain passes in the centre and right of the British position being now all abandoned, alarm and dismay spread far and wide in the rear. All the valleys leading down to Navarre were filled with baggage-wagons, mules, artillery, and convoys, falling back in confusion; and rumour, with its hundred tongues, everywhere spread the report that an irreparable disaster had been sustained. Meanwhile, the garrison of Pampeluna, taking advantage of the alarm, made a sally; O'Donnell, who commanded the blockading force, immediately spiked his guns and destroyed his magazines, to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands; and he would have raised the blockade entirely, had not Don Carlos d'Espana fortunately come up at the moment with his corps, and restored some sort of order in the besieging force.*

Wellington's measures on hearing of these disasters.

Wellington was on his way back from St. Sebastian when he received intelligence of Soult's irruption—but only of the one at the pass of Maya; and as he did not conceive it possible that, with no larger force than D'Erlon had, he would attempt to penetrate the British lines, he thought that attack was only a feint, and that the real attempt would be made on the Lower Bidassoa to raise the siege of St. Sebastian. In the course of the night, however, correct accounts arrived of the Roncesvalles and Maya combats; and he immediately adopted the same measures as Napoleon had done at Mantua in 1796, and Suwarrow at the same fortress in 1799,† by ordering Graham instantly to raise the siege, embark the stores and guns, and hasten, with all his disposable forces, to the support of Giron, in a defensive position previously selected for battle, on the southern side of the Bidassoa. These orders were punctually executed; and, meanwhile, Wellington set out on horseback with the utmost speed to join Picton and Cole's divisions in their position in front of Pampeluna. As he entered the village of Sauroren, he saw Clausel's division moving along the crest of the mountain opposite, which made an alteration of his dispositions advisable. He immediately dismounted, wrote the necessary orders in pencil on the parapet of the bridge, sent them off by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the only one of his staff who had been able to keep up with his racing speed, and rode alone up the ascent to join the British troops. The moment he was descried a shout was raised by the nearest battalion, which spread along the line till the very mountain re-echoed with the clang; and the French generals, startled by the sound, paused in their advance till they ascertained the cause of the tumult. The generals on the opposite sides were within sight of each other. Soult was so near, that his features, with the aid of a telescope, even were visible. "Yonder," said Wellington, "is a great commander; but he is a cautious one, and will delay his attack till he ascertain the cause of these cheers; that will give time for the sixth division to arrive, and I shall beat him." And so, in effect, it proved:* no serious attack was made that day, and before the next such re-enforcements arrived as enabled Wellington to resume the offensive and complete his victory. A sharp fire of musketry along the front of the line, indeed, commenced at six o'clock in the evening; but a dreadful storm soon after arose, and prevented any important operations on either side till the following day.

Battle of Sauroren, July 28.

Early on the morning of the 28th, the sixth division, to the infinite joy of their comrades, came up, and considerable re-enforcements had arrived during the night: the whole allied centre, now thoroughly aroused, being directed to the scene of danger on the right. The position which the allies occupied was very strong, and such as seemed well adapted to arrest the march of a successful enemy, and turn the flood-tide of victory into ebb. Their troops were drawn up in two lines, both on very strong ground: the first, posted on the summit of the ridge of Oricain, stretched in the form of a convex semicircle, from the village of that name on the left to Zabaldica on the right, and was about two miles in length, covered on the right flank by the River Guy, and on the left by the torrent Lanz. On this ridge, the guns from which commanded the roads down the valleys on either side, stood the fourth division, under Cole; while the sixth division was drawn up across the Lanz in the valley on the left, and entirely blocked up the approach to Pampeluna in that direction; and the Spaniards, under Murillo, held in strength the crest of the ridge on the extreme right, above the Esteriba, the valley where the River Lanz flows. The second line was posted on a still more rugged ridge, which runs entirely across the valley, and is cleft asunder by two narrow openings, through the left of which the Lanz makes its way between overhanging rocks, while through the one on the right the Guy descends; and these two streams, uniting in the rear of the ridge, form the Arga River, which, a mile farther on, washes the ramparts of Pam-

* Nap., vi., 123, 125. Scherer, ii., 248. La Pene, Camp. des Pyrénées, 32, 34. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 268. Robinson's Life of Picton, ii., 218, 219.

† *Ante*, i., 409; ii., 28.

* Nap., vi., 129, 130. Pellot, 28, 29. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 268. Robinson's Life of Picton, ii., 219, 226. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1, 1813, Gurw., x., 580, 581.

peluna. On this strong ground, the front of which is uncommonly bold and abrupt towards the north, Picton's division was placed; his right in front of Huarte—which village lies immediately behind the opening through which the Guy flows—his left, communicating with the Spaniards under O'Donnell, who had been hurried up from the lines before Pampeluna, stretched on the heights across the gap formed by the Lanz, and in front of the village of Villaba.*†

Battle of Sauroren, and defeat of the French on the right.

The rocks on which the first line stood consisted of huge piles, standing one above another, like the ruins of gigantic castles half gone to ruin; and none but the troops inured to the perils of the Peninsular warfare would have thought of assailing them. Soult's men, however, were equal to the task. Having minutely surveyed the ground, he resolved upon an attack; being unaware, from the hilly ground which concealed their march, of the arrival of the sixth division, and having learned from deserters that Hill, with three fresh divisions and a Portuguese brigade, was expected at latest on the following morning. D'Erlon's men had not yet come up; so that his forces did not exceed, after the losses in the advance, thirty-two thousand men. Not more than eighteen thousand of the Anglo-Portuguese army were assembled; but the Spaniards were ten thousand more, and the great strength of the position compensated for the inferiority in the quality of the latter of these troops. About midday on the 28th, the anniversary of the battle of Talavera, the French tirailleurs, with the most admirable gallantry, began to swarm up the steep; while Clausel's division, in the valley of Lanz, burning with ardour, poured down the sides of the stream in one impetuous mass, even before the signal for attack was given. But just as it had turned Cole's left, and was preparing to double upon his rear, a Portuguese brigade of the sixth division appeared on the heights on its right flank; while the broad lines of the English uniforms, emerging from behind the same ridge, stood in battle array in its front! Time there was none, either for deliberation or retreat: the British in front opened a heavy fire on the head of the column; the Portuguese on the right poured in their shot on the one flank, while two brigades of the fourth division, descending from their rocky fastness on the left, smote the other with redoubled fury. Thus fiercely assailed at once in front and both flanks by an enemy heretofore invisible, the French columns recoiled, still bravely combating, and strewed their numerous slain along the line of their retreat.‡

July 28.

Dreadful contest in the centre and on the right.

While this bloody repulse was going on upon the British left in the valley of the Lanz, a conflict of unequalled severity was raging along the top of the ridge in the centre and right. Without any proper unity in their efforts, but with surpassing valour, Clausel's other divisions rushed up the steep face of the mountain; and undismayed by a plunging fire, which in many cases swept off half their battalions, worked their toilsome way up to the top. In some instances their extraordinary gallantry met with deserved, though but temporary success. The seventh Portuguese Caçadores shrunk from the terrible encounter on the summit, and the French established themselves for a few minutes on their part of the left of the ridge; but Ross's British brigade, instantly advancing, charged with a loud shout, and hurled them down the steep. Again they returned, however, re-enforced, to the charge: another Portuguese regiment on Ross's right wing having given way, the French penetrated in at the opening; and that heroic brigade, assailed at once in front and flank, was compelled to give ground. Instantly the assailants stood on his position on the summit, the line began to deploy to a considerable breadth on either side, and the crest of the mountain, enveloped in cloud and flame, seemed already won. In this extremity, Wellington ordered up Byng's brigade, which advanced in double-quick time; the 27th and 48th were brought down from the higher ground in the centre; with indescribable fury, they charged the crowded masses on the summit, and the whole were rolled in wild confusion over the rocks, and lost half their numbers under the British bayonet. In the course of this desperate conflict, the gallant fourth division surpassed all its former exploits; every regiment charged with the bayonet,* some of them four different times, and the heroic Ross had two horses shot under him. Meanwhile, Reille's division, on the left of Clausel's third division, had environed the right of the position above the Guy stream, where Murillo's Spaniards were placed; and, mounting fiercely the hill-side, dislodged them, after a brave resistance, from their ground on the left of the 40th British regiment. A Portuguese battalion, gallantly advancing, took its place in their room beside that noble corps, which waited in stern silence until the French set their feet on the broad summit; "but when their glittering arms appeared over the brow of the mountain, the charging cry was heard, the crowded mass was broken to pieces, and a tempest of bullets followed its flight. Four times this assault was renewed, and the French officers were seen to pull up their tired men by the belts, so fierce and resolute were they to win. But it was the labour of Sysiphus. The vehement shout and shock of the British soldiers always prevailed; and at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, and hearts hopeless from repeated failures, they were so abashed, that three British companies sufficed to bear down a whole brigade."†

Soult deters and resumed his former position on mines to retreat.

Disconcerted by this bloody repulse, Soult drew off his forces, towards evening, and resumed his former position on a range of hills opposite to Wellington's. Just then the heads of D'Erlon's columns began to appear on the right; that general having, during the action, penetrated to

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 1st Aug., 1813, Gurw., x., 580, 581. Nap., vi., 132, 133 Robinson's Picton, ii., 219. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 269. Pellot, 29.

† If Wyld's admirable plans of this battle be consulted, this description will be readily understood.

‡ Nap., vi., 136, 137. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 1st August, 1813, Gurw., x., 581. Scherer, ii., 251. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 269.

* The 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23d.—Gurw., x., 582.

† Nap., vi., 138, 140. Pellot, 29, 30. Scherer, ii., 251, 252. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 269. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1, 1813, Gurw., x., 582.

within a league of Pampeluna and been prevented from reaching that fortress, chiefly by the violent fire which he heard in his rear, which induced him to remeasure his steps. It was too late to think of resuming the contest; the strength of Wellington's position had been proved: twelve thousand men on the first ridge, who alone had been engaged, had defeated all the efforts of twenty-five thousand, who had mounted to the assault with the most heroic bravery, and they were weakened by the loss of three thousand men. Hill's divisions, it was well known, would come up during the night; and before the morrow, fifty thousand men, posted on the strongest positions, would be ready in front of Pampeluna to dispute the farther progress of the French troops. With a heavy heart, therefore, Soult gave orders for a retreat at all points on the following day, to the infinite grief of the garrison of Pampeluna, who, hearing the cannon so near them, and on some heights even seeing the French uniforms, had deemed their deliverance at hand, and already raised the shouts of joy on their crowded ramparts. They had made, however, good use of the temporary suspension of the blockade, and exerted themselves so diligently in sweeping the adjacent plain for supplies while O'Donnell's troops were absent, that they were enabled to prolong the defence above a month longer than would have been otherwise practicable.*

Movement on both sides following the battle. July 29.

Though obliged to relinquish his design of relieving Pampeluna, Soult had not yet, however, abandoned all hope of gaining something by his irruption; and accordingly, on the 29th, instead of falling back by the direct road towards Roncesvalles, by which he had entered, he manœuvred on his right, with the view of throwing the weight of his forces towards St. Sebastian, and raising the siege of that fortress, now that the whole centre and right of the British army was concentrated on the extreme right in front of Pampeluna. With this view he, during the night of the 29th, occupied in strength the crest of the ridge lying to the westward of the Lanz, thus connecting their centre in position with their right, destined to commence the offensive movement against Sir Rowland Hill. On his side, Wellington, perceiving that, although preparations for retreat were making, yet the troops in his front stood firm, being now re-enforced by Hill's three divisions, and having fifty thousand men in hand, of whom thirty-five thousand were English and Portuguese, resolved to assume the offensive, and drive the enemy from their advanced position. With this view, he ordered Lord Dalhousie to possess himself with his division of the ridge in front of his position, which turned the enemy's right; while Picton with his division was to move forward to turn their left, by descending from the ridge of Sauroren, and advancing by Zobaldica up the valley of the Guy. Arrangements were, at the same time, made for attacking the enemy's central position, opposite the heights which had been the theatre of such a bloody conflict on the preceding day, as soon as the effect of these flank operations began to appear. These movements were all made with the utmost precision, and proved entirely successful. Before daylight broke, Dalhousie was at the head of his division (the 7th), cheering them up the rugged paths which led to the lofty ridge they were to gain, on the right bank of the Lanz: the enemy's corps were driven before them like chaff, and the rays of the sun glittered on the British bayonets on the summit of the range. Murillo's Spaniards and Campbell's Portuguese speedily followed, exhibiting an imposing mass of fifteen thousand combatants on the crest of the mountains, on the enemy's extreme right; while, at the same time, a general attack was made by the British centre, which now descended from its stronghold above the village of Sauroren, on the French centre, which still held its old position on the heights to its left. Picton, at the same time, pressed forward with his division up the valley of the Guy, on the extreme right; and, not content with driving Reille's men in his front before him up the pass, detached a brigade, which scaled the heights on the left of the French position. The effect of these advances and attacks, which were all made at the same time, and with that enthusiastic ardour which springs from the universal transport at returning victory, was to force the enemy to abandon entirely his position, and retreat up the valleys of the Lanz and the Guy towards Olague and Zubiri. Sauroren was now carried by storm by Byng's division and Madden's Portuguese, amid deafening cheers, and fourteen hundred prisoners made. The whole valley was filled with smoke, which appeared to Dalhousie's men on the heights like agitated foam in the hollow; while the roar of the cannon and rattle of the musketry were re-echoed with awful effect from mountain to mountain. This general attack relieved the pressure on Hill, who had been assailed on the extreme British left by such superior forces, early in the morning, that he was driven, with considerable loss, from the range of heights which he occupied to another in his rear in front of Marcalain; but Dalhousie's able movement compelled the enemy to retire in their turn; and at length, both parties, thoroughly exhausted, sunk to sleep on their stony beds above the clouds. The allies in this day's combats lost nineteen hundred men, of whom two thirds were Portuguese, upon whom the weight of the action had fallen, and to whom its chief glory belonged; but the French were weakened by an equal number killed and wounded; and, in addition, three thousand prisoners were made, and great numbers dispersed and lost in the woods and ravines.*†

Retreat of the French across the frontier.

Soult, after this disastrous defeat, continued his retreat on the day following, with all possible expedition, up the valleys of the Lanz and Guy; but he was now in a most hazardous situation: his

* Pellot, 30, 31. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 269. Nap., vi., 139, 140. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 1, 1813, Gurw., x., 582, 583. Scherer, ii., 251, 252.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 1, 1813, Gurw., x., 584, 585. Nap., vi., 146, 149. Pellot, 33, 34. Robinson's Picton, ii., 225, 226. Jom., iv., 500.

† Five-and-twenty years ago, the author received a most interesting account of these days' actions from his noble and lamented friend, Lord Dalhousie, who bore so distinguished a part in them. The lapse of that long period has taken nothing from the vividness of the impression produced by his graphic narrative, from which the preceding detail is in great part taken, and which perfectly coincides with the positions of the troops as laid down in Wyld's admirable plans of these battles.

troops were all worn out with excessive toil; his fighting men were reduced to thirty-five thousand; Foy, with eight thousand whom he had rallied, was retiring up the Guy towards Zubiri, entirely separated from the main body, which was slanting down towards the Bidassoa; and the baggage, artillery, and caissons could scarcely be hoped to be preserved while recrossing the rugged summits of the Pyrenees. Graham, with twenty thousand, was ready to stop him on the side of St. Sebastian; and it was only by an extraordinary exertion of skill and coolness that his army in these circumstances was preserved from total ruin. He directed his retreat, not by the valley of Bastan towards the Puerta de Maya, as D'Erlon had entered, but by the pass of Donna Maria, towards the Elisondo and the valley of the Upper Bidassoa. At the latter pass, his rear-guard made a stand in a very strong defile to gain time for the carriages and artillery in their rear to get on; but Hill turned the left of the gorge and Dalhousie the right, and, after a vigorous resistance, the enemy were driven from their stronghold in utter confusion, and with very severe loss. Meanwhile, Byng pushed on, and in the Elisondo captured a large and valuable convoy of provisions, and, rapidly advancing, reoccupied the Maya pass. Wellington's troops had now almost entirely enclosed Soult's main body in a net, from which it seemed impossible for him to escape: for his soldiers, unconscious of their danger, were grouped close together in the deep and narrow valley of Estevan: three British divisions and one Spanish, under Wellington, were on his right flank, concealed by the mountains; Hill was close behind him; Dalhousie held the pass of Donna Maria, which he has just won; Byng was at Maya, at the head of the valley; the light division would in two hours block it up at Estevan; and Graham was marching to close the only other exit from the valley by Vera and Echallar. Dispirited and worn out as his men were, Soult was in no condition to force any of these formidable defiles, defended by victorious troops, and his surrender seemed inevitable. So hopeful was the English general of such a result, that, screened by the rocks from behind which he surveyed the whole valley, he prohibited his men from issuing forth to capture Soult himself, who was seen riding in a careless way along its bottom, lest the catastrophe should awaken the French army from its perilous dream of security, and issued the strictest orders that not a man should show himself from behind the ridge which concealed them from the enemy. At this moment, when every bosom beat high with exultation at the expected glorious trophy of their valour they were so soon to obtain, in the surrender of a whole army, with a marshal of France at its head, three British marauders issued from their concealment to plunder in the valley. The sight of the red coats was not lost upon Soult, who instantly perceived the imminence of his danger: his whole army was immediately put in motion, and hurried towards the passes leading to the Lower Bidassoa, which they got through just before the Spaniards under Longa, or the light division, could come up to close the terrible defiles! Such is war: the disobedience to orders by three soldiers saved France from the greatest calamity, and deprived England of the greatest triumph, recorded in the annals of either monarchy.*

July 31.

It soon appeared from what a fearful danger the emerging of these marauders from this retreat had delivered the French army. In their last march to the defiles of Echallar, when the army was hurrying forward to win the pass before the enemy, great part of the French army, now thoroughly discouraged, broke its ranks and dispersed. Soult, who was endeavouring to form a rear-guard to arrest the pursuit of the enemy, was seized with indignation when he beheld the disorderly bands which in wild confusion came hurrying forward. "Cowards," said he, "where are you flying to? You are Frenchmen, and you are running away! In the name of honour, halt and face the enemy!" Stung by these reproaches, twelve hundred men rallied under the directions of the marshal and his aids-de-camp, and formed a sort of rear-guard; but the remainder fled on without intermission, and the torrent of fugitives rolled impetuously down, with the roar and whirl of a mighty rapid, to the defiles of Yanzi and Echallar. Before they got there the head of the column was as much disordered as the rear; the weather was oppressively sultry; and though the great body of the bewildered mass found vent during the night by the latter defile, yet a frightful scene ensued next day, when Reille's divisions were rolling through by the gorge of Yanzi. The French were there wedged in a narrow road, between inaccessible rocks on the one side and the river on the other. While struggling through this dreadful pass, the head of the light division reached the summit of the precipice, and immediately began firing down on the dense throng. Indescribable confusion followed: the cavalry drew their swords, and charged through the pass; the infantry were trampled under foot; numbers, horses and all, were precipitated into the river; some, in despair, fired vertically up at the summit of the cliffs; the wounded implored quarter as they were rolled over the brink, and hung suspended, yet bleeding, on the branches of trees over the roaring torrent. So piteous was the scene, that many even of the iron veterans of the light division ceased to fire, or discharged their pieces with averted gaze. With such circumstances of horror did the last columns of that mighty host leave Spain, who but a few days before had mounted the pass of Roncesvalles buoyant with spirit, and in all the pride of apparently irresistible strength! And yet the disaster, great as it was to the French arms, would have been still greater if all the men had been able to reach their ground at the time assigned them; for Longa's division, if they had come up in time, would have rendered the pass of Yanzi altogether impassable to the disorderly torrent of Soult's masses;† and though the light division marched forty miles in nineteen hours, and bore their extraordinary fatigues with surprising spirit, yet, if they had not lost their way

Dreadful disaster in the defiles of Echallar.

Aug. 1.

* Nap., vi., 154, 156. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1, 1813, Gurw., x., 585, 586. Pellot, 34, 35.

† Cooke's Narrative, 84, 87. Pellot, 34, 35. Nap., vi., 158, 161. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 4th August, 1813, Gurw., x., 597, 598.

in the wilds, they would have been two hours earlier at the perilous bridge, and none of Reille's division would have escaped.

Glorious combat at Echallar.

Next day the French troops, at all points, evacuated the Spanish territory, and both armies nearly resumed the positions they had held before Soult's irruption took place. Before they recrossed the frontier, however, an incident occurred, which showed, in a striking manner, how the steadiness of the bravest troops may be shaken, even in a short time, by a series of disasters. Clausel's divisions were the last which remained on the Spanish territory; and he occupied a strong position, with the rearguard, in the Puerto de Echallar. Wellington immediately determined to dislodge him; and for this purpose the fourth division was marched from Yanzi to attack his front, the seventh division against his left, and the light against his right. Barnes's brigade of the seventh division, however, having a shorter distance to march over, arrived on the ground before the other divisions had come up; they were fifteen hundred against six thousand, and the enemy held a position as strong as the rocks of Sauroren. Such was the spirit, however, with which the British army was now animated, that this handful of heroes actually assaulted and drove the enemy from the rugged heights, amid the enthusiastic cheers of the whole troops who witnessed this heroic exploit. And yet the French were the same men who, a few days before, had all but won, against similar natural difficulties, the bloody steeps of Sauroren. Clausel's men, thus dislodged, fell back to a strong ridge beyond the pass of Echallar, covered by the Ivantelly Rock, which was strongly occupied. But they were not permitted to rest in this last stronghold. As evening came on, and a dark mist crowned the cloud-capped summit of the cliff occupied by the French, the riflemen of the 43d, whom Colonel Barnard led to the attack, were soon lost to the view; but the sharp clang of musketry resounded in the clouds, and ere long a British shout was heard from the shrouded summit, and the last French were hurled in confusion down the steep from the Spanish soil.*

Result of the battles of the Pyrenees.

The irruption of Soult into the Spanish territory does the highest honour to his persevering character, and skill in the movements of strategy which preceded the final shock; but it may be doubted whether his vigour and firmness at the decisive moment were equal to the ability of his previous conceptions. With an overwhelming force he had thrown himself on the British right, and gained such success before succour could arrive, that the issue seemed no longer doubtful, when victory was snatched from his grasp, and a succession of disasters brought on the French arms, attended, in the end, with the most decisive effects upon the ultimate issue of the war. There can be no doubt that the vigour with which the stroke, thus happily conceived, was followed up at the decisive moment, was by no means proportioned to the felicity of its original conception. Soult was in front of the rocks of Sauroren, with thirty thousand men, on the evening of the 26th, when only two divisions, eleven thousand of the Anglo-Portuguese, were assembled to stop his progress. Had he attacked that night or next day with such a preponderance of force, it can hardly be doubted that he would have succeeded; and, supported by the ramparts of Pampeluna, he might have seen with indifference the arrival of the sixth, and all the subsequent divisions of the British army which came up on the 28th and 29th. Wellington's right wing was, undoubtedly, in one sense outgeneralled—that is, it was assailed by a force greatly superior to that anticipated, or for which it was prepared—and the troops at the Maya pass were clearly surprised; but this is unavoidable in mountain warfare, where the attacking party may select his own point of onset, and the attacked cannot, from intervening ridges, obtain succour till after a long time, and a painful circuit in the rear; and Soult experienced the same, in his turn, in the forcing of his position shortly after on the Nive. On the other hand, the rapidity with which the British general gathered up all his forces to the menaced point; the firmness with which he held his ground in the first instance against a vast superiority of force; and the admirable combinations by which, in the subsequent advance, he defeated all Soult's attempts, and all but made him prisoner with thirty thousand men, are worthy of the highest admiration, and justly place the battles of the Pyrenees among the most brilliant of Wellington's martial achievements. The French loss, from the time of their entering Spain on the 25th of July, till their evacuating it, was not less than fifteen thousand men, including four thousand unwounded prisoners; that of the British was seven thousand and ninety-six men, of whom four thousand seven hundred and fifty-six were British soldiers; but, what was very remarkable, such was the effect of the trumpet of war in bringing back the stragglers, loosened by the Vittoria plunder, to their standards, that the muster-rolls after the battles exhibited only fifteen hundred less than those taken before they commenced.*†

Renewal of the siege of St. Sebastian.

The first object which occupied the attention of the English general after the defeat of Soult's irruption was the renewal of the siege of St. Sebastian, which had been so rudely interrupted. The governor had made good use of the breathing-time thus afforded him by the cessation of active operations, in repairing the breaches in the sea-wall, retrenching the interior parts of the rampart, and taking every imaginable precaution against a second assault. In particular, he had constructed out of the ruins of the houses which had been destroyed, immediately behind

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 3, 1813, Gurw., x., 597, 598. Nap., vi., 161, 162.

* Wellington to Sir T. Graham, August 4, 1813, Gurw., x., 592. Belm., i., 265; and to Earl Liverpool, August 4, 1813, Gurw., x., 596.

† "That vain attempt cost the French army nineteen hundred killed, eight thousand five hundred and forty wounded, and two thousand seven hundred prisoners; in all, thirteen thousand one hundred men."—BELMAS, *Journaux des Sièges dans la Peninsule*, i., 265. The prisoners taken were really four thousand, which shows that this estimate is, in some respects, below the truth, though founded on official documents, and probably very near it. See WELLINGTON *to* LORD LIVERPOOL, *4th of August*, 1815, where he says, "Their loss cannot be less than fifteen thousand, and I am not sure if it is not twenty thousand; we have four thousand prisoners."—GURWOOD, x., 597.

the great breach, a second or interior rampart, parallel to the outer, very thick, and fifteen feet high, with salient bastions, which it was hoped would entirely stop the progress of the enemy, even if they won the front wall. During the intermission of active operations, the efforts of the English were confined to a blockade position taken up on the heights of St. Bartholomew, which were much strengthened, and a distant fire upon the men engaged in these vast undertakings; and they lost two hundred Portuguese in a sally made by the garrison in the night of the 26th of July. But when Soult was finally driven back, matters soon assumed a very different aspect. The heavy guns which had been shipped at Passages were all relanded, and again placed in battery; a fleet of transports, with twenty-eight additional pieces of great calibre, and immense stores, arrived at Portsmouth, and they were soon succeeded by as many more from Woolwich; and the battering-train, with the guns landed from the ships, now amounted to the large number of a hundred and eighteen pieces, including twelve sixty-eight pounders. By the night of the 25th this immense train of artillery was all in readiness, and fifty-seven pieces actually in the batteries; and on the morning of the 26th they reopened their fire with a roar so awful, that, re-echoed as it was from all the rocks and precipices in the wooded amphitheatre around, it seemed as if no force on earth could withstand the attack. The fire continued without intermission for the next four days, and before the 30th sixty-three guns were in constant practice; two wide breaches were gaping, and seemed easy of ascent; the fire of the place was almost entirely silenced, and three mines had been run in front of the advanced batteries on the isthmus, close under the sea-wall, in order to counteract any mines of the enemy near the great breach. Still the brave governor, after informing Soult of his desperate situation, was resolute to stand a second assault, although his resistance of the first had fulfilled to the letter Napoleon's general orders; and the storm was ordered for the 31st at noonday.*

July 26. Aug. 19. Aug. 23.

At two in the morning of the 31st, the three mines were exploded under the sea-wall, and brought it completely down. At this awful signal the brave garrison all repaired to their posts, each armed with several muskets; and, relying on the successful resistance of the former assault, confidently anticipated the defeat of the present. Nor was their confidence without reason; for, notwithstanding the vastly increased means now at the disposal of the besiegers, they had not yet beat down the enemy's parapets nor established a lodgment in the hornwork, so that the assaulting columns would be exposed when near the breach to a destructive fire in flank: a fatal error, contrary to Vauban's rules, and which was only washed out by torrents of British blood. Dissatisfied with the steadiness of some of the troops at the former assault, Wellington had brought fifty volunteers from fifteen regiments in the first, fourth, and light divisions; "men," he expressed it, "who could show other troops how to mount a breach." Leith, however, who had resumed the command of the fifth division, by whom the former assault had been made, was urgent that his men should be allowed the post of honour, and they were accordingly placed under General Robinson to head the attack, supported by the remainder of the same division, and the seven hundred and fifty volunteers from the other regiments of the army. Major Snodgrass, of the 52d, had, on the preceding night, forded the Urumea alone, opposite the smaller breach, clambered up its face at midnight, and looked down on the town! After the troops in the trenches were all under arms, deep anxiety pervaded every bosom; and before orders were given for the forlorn hope to move forward, the excitement felt had become almost intolerable. The heroic band took its station at half past ten; the tide, which all watched, was fast ebbing; the enemy's preparations were distinctly visible—the glancing of bayonets behind the parapets, the guns pointed towards the breach, the array of shells and fire-barrels along its summit, told but too clearly the awful contest which awaited them. Little was said in the assaulting columns; the bravest occasionally changed colour; the knees of the most resolute smote each other, not with fear, but anxiety; and time seemed to pass with such leaden wings, that the watches were looked to every half minute. Some laughed outright, they knew not why; many addressed a mental prayer to the throne of grace. The very elements seemed to have conspired to increase the impressive character of the moment: a close and oppressive heat pervaded the atmosphere, lowering and sulphurous clouds covered the sky, large drops fell at intervals, and the very animals, awestruck by the feeling of an approaching tempest, were silent in the camp and on the hills.*

Commencement of the assault.

Noon had barely passed, when, the tide being considered sufficiently fallen, the signal to advance was given. Silently the men moved forward, and not a shot was fired till the column had reached the middle of the stream, when such a tempest of grape, musketry, and canister was at once opened upon it, as well-nigh choked the Urumea with the killed and the wounded. With dauntless intrepidity, however, the survivers pressed through the now crimsoned waves, and soon gained the strand on the opposite side, headed by the gallant Lieutenant M'Guin of the 4th, who led the forlorn hope, and rushed on, conspicuous from his plume, noble figure, and buoyant courage. Two mines were exploded rather prematurely by the enemy under the covered way of the hornwork; but they crushed only twenty men, and the column, bounding impetuously forward, streamed up the great breach, and soon reached its summit. There, however, they were assailed by a dreadful tempest of grape, shells, and hand-grenades, while the head of the column found it impossible to get down into the town, as the reverse of the breach consisted of a wall twelve or fourteen feet high, the bottom of which was filled with sword blades placed erect, and every kind of offensive obstacle; while the newly-construct-

Dreadful assault of the breaches, which is repulsed.

* Jones's Sieges, ii., 48, 70. Belm., iv., 630, 638. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 2, 1813, Gurw., xi., 61, 62, 63. Graham's Official Account. Subaltern, 48, 49.

* Gleig's Subaltern, 51, 54. Nap., vi., 197, 199. Graham's Official Account, Gurw., xi., 62, 63.

ed rampart within, and the ruins of the houses burned on occasion of the former assault were lined with grenadiers, who kept up so close and deadly a fire, that the whole troops who reached the summit were almost instantly struck down. Still, fresh troops pressed on; the Urumea incessantly resounded with the splash of successive columns hurrying forward to the scene of carnage, until the whole fifth division was engaged; the volunteers from the different corps, who had with difficulty been restrained, were now let loose, and rushed on, calling out that they would show how a breach should be mounted. Soon the crowded mass made their way up the face of the ruins, won the summit, and, with desperate resolution, strove to get over by a few ruined walls, which connected the back of the old with the front of the new rampart. Vain attempt! A steady barrier of steel awaited them on the other side: the bravest who got across were bayoneted or thrown down into the gulf below, and after two hours of mortal strife, the heroic defenders still made good the dreadful pass, and not a living man was to be seen on the breach. As a last resource, Major Snodgrass, with his Portuguese battalion, volunteered to make a simultaneous assault on the lesser breach; but here, too, the slaughter was dreadful—a shower of grape smote the head of the column, and the obstacles proved insuperable, even to the most ardent valour. Matters seemed desperate: the Urumea was rapidly rising, and would soon become impassable; the great breach was choked with the dead and the dying; and already the shouts of victory were heard from the French ramparts.*

In this extremity, Graham, having consulted with Colonel Dickson of the engineers, adopted one of the boldest, and yet, with his artillerymen, safest expedients recorded in military annals. He ordered that the whole guns of the Chofre batteries should be brought to bear upon the high curtain above the breach in the demi-bastions, from which the most destructive fire issued; while the British soldiers at the foot of the rampart remained quiescent, or lay down, while the shot flew only two feet over their heads! In a few minutes, forty-seven guns were in this manner directed with such effect on the traverses, that they were in great part broken down, and the troops who manned them were obliged to retire to more distant cover; and yet so accurate was the aim, that not one man among the assailants was struck. Twenty minutes after this fire had commenced, one of the shells from the British batteries exploded among the numerous train of fire-barrels, live shells, hand-grenades, and other combustibles, which the garrison had arranged along the ramparts for the close defence of their traverses and interior works; the flame ran along the walls, and soon the whole exploded with a bright flash, succeeded by a smoke so dense as to obscure all vision. Three hundred brave Frenchmen were blown into the air by this awful catastrophe, which, like the blowing up of the L'Orient at the Nile, so impressed both sides, that for a minute not a shot was fired either from the ramparts or the batteries. At length, as the smoke and dust cleared away, the British troops, seeing an empty space before them, rushed forward, and, with an appalling shout, made themselves masters of the first traverse. The defenders, however, even at this terrible moment, soon rallied, and a fierce conflict, breast against breast, bayonet against bayonet, ensued at the top of the high curtain; and for some time the result seemed still to be doubtful. At length, however, the increasing numbers and vehemence of the assailants prevailed over the stern resolution of the besieged. The French colours on the cavalier were torn down by Lieutenant Gethin of the 11th; the hornwork and ravelin on the flank of the great breach were abandoned; while about the same time, Snodgrass, with his valiant Portuguese, stormed the lesser breach; and the bulk of the garrison, now everywhere overpowered, were rapidly driven from all their interior retrenchments, and sought refuge with the governor in the castle, leaving seven hundred prisoners rescued from instant death, in the hands of the victors.*

And now commenced a scene which has affixed as lasting a stain on the character of the English and Portuguese troops as the heroic valour they displayed in the assault has given them enduring and exalted fame. The long endurance of the assault, which had continued in mortal strife for three hours, the fearful slaughter of their comrades which had taken place at the breaches, had wrought the soldiers up to perfect madness; the battle which occurred the same day with the centre and right wing at San Marcial prevented fresh columns of troops from being introduced, and, as not unusual in such cases, while they spared their enemies who were made prisoners with arms in their hands, the soldiers wreaked their vengeance with fearful violence on the unhappy inhabitants. Some of the houses adjoining the breaches had taken fire from the effects of the explosion; and the flames, fanned by an awful tempest of thunder and lightning, which burst on the town just as the ramparts were carried, soon spread with frightful rapidity; while the wretched inhabitants, driven from house to house as the conflagration devoured their dwellings, were soon huddled together in one quarter, where they fell a prey to the unbridled passions of the soldiery. Attempts were at first made by the British officers to extinguish the flames, but they proved vain amid the general confusion which prevailed; and soon the soldiers broke into the burning houses, pillaged them of the most valuable articles they contained, and, rolling numerous spirit-casks into the streets, with frantic shouts emptied them of their contents, till vast numbers sunk down like savages, motionless, some lifeless, from the excess. Carpets, tapestry, beds, silks, and satins, wearing apparel, jewelry, watches, and everything valuable, were scattered about upon the bloody pavements, while fresh bundles of them were continually thrown down from the windows above to avoid the flames, and caught with demoniac yells by the drunken crowds beneath. Amid these scenes of disgraceful violence and unutterable wo, nine

* Jones's Sieges, ii., 73, 78. Belm., iv., 639, 641. Rey's Official Account, ibid., 719, 720. Graham's Official Account, Gurw., xi., 62, 63. Subaltern, 55, 57.

* Jones's Sieges, ii., 77, 80. Graham's Official Account, Gurw., xi., 63. Rey's Official Account, Belm., iv., 720; and ibid., iv., 641, 643. Subaltern, 57, 58. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 271, 272.

tenths of the once happy, smiling town of St. Sebastian were reduced to ashes; and, what has affixed a yet darker blot on the character of the victors, deeds of violence and cruelty were perpetrated hitherto rare in the British army, and which cause the historian to blush, not merely for his country, but his species.*

Reflections on these atrocities.

Let not the French writers fear that such atrocities will be palliated or excused because they occurred beneath the English standard. Justice knows no distinction of country; humanity acknowledges no excuse for cruelty; and they are purposely transcribed from the contemporary records, as an eternal, damning blot on the past, and warning to the future.† A consideration of these mournful scenes, combined with the recollection of the mutual atrocities perpetrated by both parties on each other in England during the wars of the Roses, the horrors of the Tyrone rebellion in Ireland, the cold-blooded vengeance of the Covenanters after the battle of Philiphaugh in Scotland, the systematic firing and pillage of London during Lord George Gordon's riots in 1780, and the brutal violence in recent times of the Chartists in England, suggest the painful doubt whether all mankind are not at bottom the same, in point of tendency to crime, when exposed to the influence of the same temptations; and whether there do not lie smouldering beneath the boasted glories of British civilization, the embers of a conflagration as fierce, and devastation as wide-spread, as those which followed and disgraced the French Revolution.

Siege and capture of the citadel.

Though the town of St. Sebastian was taken, the citadel remained to be reduced; and such was the tenacity and hardihood of the governor and his brave adherents, that, hopeful of deliverance from the effort they were aware Marshal Soult was to make in their favour, they still held out even on that wasted and half-ruined stronghold. The rugged nature of the ground rendered it almost impossible to carry trenches up the rocky face of Monte Orgullo, and the Duke of Berwick, in consequence, had, in 1719, consumed nineteen days in a bombardment to induce the garrison to surrender. Wellington, however, having visited the works on the 1st of September, resolved to push the approaches, notwithstanding these natural obstacles, and at the same time try the effect of a bombardment and cannonade on the castle. A heavy fire was kept up from mortars till the 8th, when the breaching batteries from the side of the town having been completed, a tremendous fire was opened from sixty pieces of heavy artillery, which played with such effect, that everything in the castle was torn up or destroyed before it. The English prisoners suffered even more than the garrison from this terrific tempest: for the governor, now irritated by the sufferings of his followers, would not permit the black flag to be hoisted to avert the fire from the hospital where they were confined. At length the brave governor, having exhausted all his means of defence, was obliged to surrender at discretion, with 1756 men, including 535 wounded in the hospital; and the Spanish flag, amid a salute of twenty-one guns, was hoisted from the citadel.* Sept. 9.

Reflections on the siege, and losses it occasioned to the allies.

The siege of St. Sebastian, a third-rate fortress, garrisoned only by three thousand men, hastily got together during the tumult of defeat which succeeded the battle of Vittoria, cost the allied army three thousand eight hundred men, two thousand five hundred of whom, including seventeen hundred and sixteen British, were struck down in the final assault;† and it detained the army sixty-three days, of which thirty were open trenches, and thirty-three blockade. It gave time to Soult to reorganize his army, and make two desperate attacks: one towards Pampeluna; another, which shall be immediately noticed, on the Bidassoa, to re-establish his affairs; and delayed, by above three months, the invasion of the southern provinces of France. The allies expended on the siege no less than 71,000 rounds of ammunition, and were obliged to place seventy heavy guns in battery. It must be admitted, that a stronger proof can hardly be imagined of the vital consequence of fortresses in war, or of the decisive effect which the courageous defence, even of an inconsiderable stronghold, often has upon the fortunes of a campaign, or the fate of a monarchy. The defence of the French governor and garrison was skilful and heroic in the highest degree, and justly entitles them to place their prolonged resistance among the brightest military glories of their country. But, notwithstanding all their exertions, the place must have fallen in half the time, if it had not been for obvious faults, both in the conduct

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 278, 279. Subaltern, 59, 61. Nap., vi., 205, 206. Southey, vi., 240.

† "Oh wretched day! oh cruel night! The troops seemed to neglect the most ordinary precautions in a place recently taken, and, with one end of it still in the enemy's hands, to give themselves up to the most unheard-of excesses. Pillage, assassination, rape, were pushed to an incredible pitch; and the fire, which broke out early in the night, after the enemy had retired to the castle, put the finishing stroke to this scene of wo. On all sides were heard cries of distress from women who were violated, without regard either to tender youth, respected family, or advanced years; women were outraged in presence of their husbands, daughters dishonoured in presence of their parents; one girl was the victim of the brutality of a soldier on the corpse of her mother! Other crimes, more horrible still, which our pen refuses to record, were committed in that awful night; and the disorders continued for some days after, without any efficient steps being taken to arrest them. Of above six hundred houses of which St. Sebastian consisted on the morning of the assault, there remained at the end of three days only thirty-six."—*Manifeste par la Junte Constitutionale chapitre ecclesiastique et les habitans de St. Sebastian*—given in *Vict. et Conq.*, xxii., 278, 279, and in BELMAS, iv., 469, App. Yet Wellington had done all in his power to save the town; he had purposely avoided a bombardment to spare the citizens; and both he and Graham, as well as the officers engaged, did their utmost to stop the fire and avoid the disorders; but all their efforts were ineffectual, from the impossibility of bringing up fresh soldiers to occupy the town after the assault, as is usual in such cases, from the employment of the whole troops not engaged in it, on the same day, at the battle on the Bidassoa.—See WELLINGTON *to Spanish Minister at War*, 17*th Sept.*, 1813, GURW., x., 353. Sept. 8.

* Jones's Sieges, ii., 83, 91. Nap., vi., 207, 209. Rey's Official Account, Sept. 7, 1813, Belm., iv., 739, 742. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 281, 282.

† The French engineer, Belmas, in his elaborate and accurate work on the Sieges in the Peninsula, makes the total allied loss in the siege 5069, and quotes Graham's Despatches for his authority. This, however, is a mistake: the loss of the troops employed in the siege was exactly 3800; and the larger amount is arrived at by the French author including, by mistake, in the returns the Spaniards, 1436 in number, who were killed and wounded on the 31st of August, at the heights of St. Marcial, on the Bidassoa.—See BELMAS, iv., 728; and GRAHAM'S *Despatches, with the loss in the Siege*, GURWOOD, xi., 66, and x., 590; and JONES, ii., 89.

of the siege, and those who had the direction of forwarding supplies to carry it on, from Great Britain. The first assault in July should have succeeded, and would have done so, if the troops who composed the rear of the column had duly followed the advance of their heroic leaders. The last assault was rendered so murderous as it was, chiefly because the engineers had not adopted the precaution of knocking away the parapets of the traverses which commanded the breach, before they declared it practicable; and of the facility with which this might have been done, and the vast effects with which it was attended, decisive proof is to be found in the statement of Colonel Jones, "that the tremendous enfilade fire on the high curtain, while the troops were at the foot of the breach, though only maintained for twenty minutes, had dismounted every gun but two. Many of the pieces had their muzzles shot away; the stone parapets were damaged; the cheeks of the embrasures knocked off; and the terrepleine cut up and strewed with headless bodies."*

Delay in sending out stores for the siege from England.

But more than all, the authorities at home were to blame for not sending out military stores in time to carry on the siege. They were written for, in the end of June, by Wellington, but did not arrive till the 18th and 23d of August; and it was this long delay which enabled the governor to erect those formidable interior retrenchments which proved so fatal to the allies in the second assault. They came out in profusion, indeed, when they did come, but it was too late; the enemy had turned to too good purpose the prolonged delay thus afforded him.† Men could not be more zealous than the British government were, at this period, in the prosecution of the contest, and none ever made such stupendous efforts to carry it on as they did in this year; but they were still insensible to the value of time in war, and bore, in their best combinations, too much of the character of their Saxon ancestors, of whom Athelstane the Unready is the true personification. So frequently has this ignorance of the simplest principles of military combination on the part of government marred the greatest efforts, or disconcerted the best-laid enterprises of the British nation, that it deserves the serious consideration of all those who have the direction of the studies of youth, whether some instruction on the subject should not form part of elementary education to all those, at least, who are likely, from their station or prospects, to be called to the supreme direction of affairs.

Soult's attempt to raise the siege.

Soult was not unmindful of his promise to attempt a serious diversion for the relief of the distressed garrison of St. Sebastian. Before daylight on the 30th of August, he crossed the Bidassoa by the fords between the destroyed bridge on the great road and Andara, with Villatte and Reille's corps, mustering eighteen thousand combatants; while Clausel, with twenty thousand men, was concentrated in the woods behind the Bayonnette Mountain; and Foy, with seven thousand was ready to support the attack. Little ground required to be gained to raise the siege; for it was only eight miles from the point of passage, Oyarsun, from whence the invading force might at once advance upon the rear of the besieging force. Notwithstanding all the secrecy of his preparations, however, Wellington received intimation of his designs, and made his dispositions accordingly. Re-enforcements to the amount of five thousand had arrived from England, including the brigade of guards which had just come up from Oporto; and the greater part of the stragglers from Vittoria had now rejoined their colours, so that the army was stronger than it had been before the battles in the Pyrenees; but though he brought up the British troops to the close vicinity of the scene of action, so as to be ready to support their allies in case of any disaster, he wisely determined to make a trial of the Spaniards, in a strong position, to guard the entrance into their own territory. With this view, he stationed the troops of that nation, composing the fourth army, about eighteen thousand strong, on the heights of SAN MARCIAL, on the southern side of the Bidassoa, already illustrated by a severe action between the Spaniards and French in the beginning of the Revolutionary war.* Longa's men were in reserve at a little distance in the rear, with the Portuguese of the fourth division, and the British brigades of the same division ready to support them. Thus, nearly thirty thousand men in all might be brought to stop the progress of the enemy; but the uncommon gallantry and steadiness of the Spanish troops rendered all assistance needless, and left them the whole weight and glory of the fight.†

Defeat of the French by the Spaniards. August 31.

Though Soult's troops were collected on the 30th, it was not till the 31st that the attack was made. At daybreak on that morning, Reille's columns crossed by the fords above Biriatru,

* Jones's Sieges, ii.

† Wellington remonstrated again and again, in the most energetic terms, against this inexplicable delay in forwarding supplies. "Your lordship will see, by my report, that we are still waiting for the battering-train; and we have thus lost sixteen days in the month of August, since I should have renewed the attack upon St. Sebastian if I had had the means. This is a most important period in the campaign, particularly for the attack of a place in the Bay of Biscay. How we are to attack Bayonne afterward I am sure I do not know. A British minister cannot too often have under his view the element by which he is surrounded, and cannot make his preparations for the operations of a campaign at too early a period."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, 18*th August*, 1813, GURWOOD, xi., 12.

"In the attack of a maritime place some assistance is usually received from the navy by the army; but the naval force on this coast is too weak to give us any of the description I require, and for the want of which we shall now be so much distressed. The soldiers are obliged to work in the transports, to unload the vessels, because no seamen can be furnished; and we have been obliged to use the harbour boats of passages, *navigated by women*, in landing the ordnance and stores, because there was no naval force to supply us with the assistance we should have required in boats. If we had a sufficient naval force, we might, if the weather permitted, make an attack from the sea at the same time that we should make the attack upon the breaches from the walls. This would, at all events, divide the enemy's attention, and would probably prevent much of the loss in the assault of the breaches, if it did not tend to ensure the success of the assault. If the navy of Great Britain cannot afford more than *one frigate and a few brigs and cutters*, fit and used only to carry despatches, to co-operate with this army in the siege of a maritime place, the possession of which, before the bad season commences, is important to the army as well as the navy, I must be satisfied, and do the best I can without such assistance."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, 19*th August*, 1813, GURWOOD, xi., 1819.

* *Ante*, i., 283.

† Tor., v., 324, 325. Nap., vi., 221, 225. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 274. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 2, 1813, Gurw., xi., 67

and soon got footing on the opposite bank, where they made themselves masters, without much difficulty, of a small battery; but when they came to ascend the opposite hill, which is there covered with brushwood, and is uncommonly steep, they fell into disorder, and, before they could recover themselves, were charged by the Spaniards, who in firm array descended upon them with such vigour, that they were driven headlong down. During this conflict, the French had succeeded in throwing a bridge across, under cover of some guns they had placed on the heights on their own side, about a mile farther up, and Villatte's reserve advanced to the support of their defeated comrades. Encouraged by this assistance, Reille's men again advanced to the charge; and one brigade even succeeded in gaining the Chapel of San Marcial on the summit at the left of the line; upon which Wellington ordered up the 85th regiment to repel the attack, and himself rode forward with his staff to the menaced point. Upon seeing him, the Spanish troops, without waiting for the English succour which was approaching, set up a loud shout, and rallying on their own reserve, which was brought forward, returned to the charge, and dashed the French down the hill so vehemently, that they were in great part driven into the river, and several ponton boats which had come across were sunk by the fugitives who crowded into them. Thus the Spaniards had the glory, which Wellington carefully acknowledged, of defeating, by their unaided efforts, an attack by a powerful body of the enemy. At the same time, Clausel crossed over higher up, near Vera, with three divisions, and immediately commenced an attack on Inglis's Portuguese brigades. The latter were driven, by the vast superiority of the enemy's force, from the heights which they at first occupied, but rallied on those of San Antonia, which they succeeded in maintaining; and Wellington, having brought up Kempt's brigade to his support, ordered Dalhousie to advance in the same direction, who sent forward Barnes's brigade before daylight next morning. Clausel, upon this, fearful of having his retreat cut off, fell back across the river on the following morning, by forcing the bridge of Vera, of which the allies had regained possession; and Soult, despairing of success, drew back his forces at all points on the same day, and with no small difficulty and heavy loss, in consequence of the swelling of the river by the dreadful tempest which came on at night, regained the French side of the Bidassoa.*

Results of this action.

In this untoward affair, Soult lost about three thousand six hundred men, including General Vandermaens, killed, and four other generals of inferior note wounded. The allied loss was two thousand six hundred and eighty-three, of which no less than one thousand six hundred and eighty were among the Spanish troops: a clear proof that with them had rested the heat and glory of the day. But, what was of far more importance, the French weakness was now clearly demonstrated to both armies, their inability to keep the field established by decisive evidence, and the spirit of the Spanish troops greatly augmented by having defeated them, unsupported, in a pitched battle. On the very day on which the whole efforts of Soult, with all his disposable forces, had been in this manner defeated by a part only of the allied army, St. Sebastian had fallen before the assault of the British soldiery; and as Marshal Soult, from the heights on the north of Bidassoa, which still bear the name of Louis XIV., beheld, amid the whirlwind tempest which fell upon his retreating columns, the destruction of all his hopes of offensive warfare, he could in the distance perceive the glancing of the fires and volumes of smoke, which, like a burning volcano, bespoke at St. Sebastian the fatal termination of the assault.*

Nothing remained to complete the expulsion, in this quarter, of the French from the Spanish territory but the surrender of Pampeluna; and till that event took place, the British general resolved to suspend all offensive operations. But, meanwhile, success deserted the English, and unwonted disgrace was incurred in the east of the Peninsula; as if to demonstrate that victory was still the reward only of persevering and resolute conduct, and to mark, by the force of contrast, what they owed to the chief who had so long apparently chained it to their standards.

Operations in the east of Spain.

With a view to establish a good base for operations at the mouth of the Ebro, and at the same time hinder Suchet from despatching any succour to resist the general offensive movement which he was meditating in the northwest of the Peninsula, Wellington directed Sir John Murray, early in May, to embark the great bulk of his troops at Alicante, and attempt a descent near Taragona; in the hope either of regaining that fortress, or, at all events, drawing Suchet back for its defence from his advanced position on the Xucar, and withdrawing the beautiful and fertile province of Valencia from the imperial domination. To aid him in its reduction, a powerful battering-train of fifty guns was placed at his disposal; and as Admiral Hallowel, with a squadron of the Mediterranean fleet, was at hand, both to facilitate his disembarcation and aid in the operations, it was hoped they would prove successful, before an adequate French force could be collected from beyond the Ebro to raise the siege. The troops placed at Murray's disposal for this purpose were very considerable, consisting of the British and foreign divisions which had come from Sicily, Wittingham and Roche's Spaniards, and the most efficient part of Elio's and the Duke del Parque's armies; but the first only were to be embarked for Catalonia, the latter being left to threaten the French positions covering Valencia on the Xucar. The forces embarked at Alicante were somewhat above fourteen thousand, of which eight thousand were British and German foot, and fifteen hundred British and German cavalry and artillery; the remainder being Spanish and Sicilian infantry.††

This army embarked at Alicante on the 31st of May, and arrived with a fair wind in the neigh-

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 1, 1813, Gurw., xi., 71. Nap., vi., 233. Pellot, 52.

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 274. Belm., i., 266. Pellot, 52, 53. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 1, 1813, Gurw., xi., 71. Nap., vi., 223, 234.

† Wellington's Instructions to Murray, April 14th, 1813, Gurw., x., 297. State, 17th June, 1813, Nap., vi., 704.

‡ App. K, chap. lxxii.

First operations against Taragona, which are successful.

bourhood of Taragona on the 3d of June, where they were immediately landed by the active co-operation of Admiral Hallowel, the intrepid captain of the Swiftsure at the Nile.* They had thus gained the start entirely of Suchet, who could not possibly be up for a week to come, for he had a hundred and sixty miles to march; and, meanwhile, the besiegers, with the ample means at their disposal, might make themselves masters of Taragona, the works of which were in a very dilapidated state, and which was defended only by sixteen hundred men. Fort Olivo, the scene of such desperate conflicts on occasion of the former siege,† was occupied, as well as the heights of Loretto, without resistance, the first day. An expedition was at the same time despatched under Colonel Prevost to attack San Felippe de Balaguer, a strong fort perched on a rock, which commanded and blocked up the only carriage road from Tortosa to Taragona; and the fire of two mortars, which were with great difficulty brought up to bear on the fort, having blown up its magazine, the governor surrendered at discretion, with two hundred and sixty men. This early success greatly elevated the spirits of the allied army, and they confidently anticipated the immediate capture of the main fortress; for its works, incomplete, ill flanked, without palisades or casements, could not have withstood a vigorous attack; and, once taken, a few hours' breaching with the noble battering-train which they possessed would have brought down the wall of the town, and a general assault might have been made with every prospect of success.‡

June 3.

June 6.

But the general is the soul of an army, and no valour or skill on the part of the officers and men employed can supply the want of resolute determination on the part of the general-in-chief. There is no reason to doubt the personal courage of Sir John Murray; but he proved himself destitute of the rarer qualities of firm resolution, moral courage, and confidence in his followers, which are indispensable in a commander. His troops were brave, and such was the spirit with which they were animated, that an Italian regiment, which at Alicante had been ready to go over to the enemy, now volunteered to head the assault on Fort Royal. But the general was far from sharing the confidence of his followers: he had despaired of victory even in the moment of glorious triumph at Castalla, and he was not likely to be more sanguine when in front of the bastions of Taragona. The operations were by no means pushed with the rapidity which circumstances required, and the ample means at his disposal rendered practicable. The guns, though close at hand, were not put into the batteries till the 11th, and, though the order to assault the outworks was given that night, it was countermanded; orders for embarking the guns were given, and, when half executed, countermanded. Thus the precious time, when the place might have been carried, was lost in irresolution; and, meanwhile, the intelligence of the approach of formidable bodies

Murray delays the assault, and is obliged to raise the siege.

to raise the siege completed the embarrassment of the English general. On the 11th, eight thousand French, under Maurice Mathieu, began their march from Barcelona, and intelligence was received that Suchet was approaching the Col di Balaguer from Valencia with nine thousand more, including Copons's mountain-bands, who had drawn into the neighbourhood of Taragona; Murray had twenty thousand men, whereof one half were British and Germans on whom reliance could be placed; but, instead of pushing the siege with this respectable force, which would have taken the place before either army could have got up, Murray gave orders for the embarcation of the troops and battering-train. It began on the 12th, and was not completed till next day, when the French had not yet arrived even within sight of Taragona. The soldiers and sailors could not conceal their indignation at abandoning the guns, nineteeen in number, which were left in the advanced batteries—for they were part of the time-honoured train which had torn down the ramparts of Badajoz.*†

After the troops had got on board, Murray disembarked part of them near Balaguer, in hopes of cutting off a French brigade which lay there; but finding it had escaped, he again put to sea, and steered for Alicante, while Copons retired with his Spaniards into the mountains, and the French entered Taragona amid the shouts of the garrison. Meanwhile, Lord William Bentinck arrived from Sicily, though without troops, and took the command. A violent storm, which overtook the fleet and wrecked some of the transports, prevented the soldiers being all disembarked before the 27th; and, meanwhile, Elio and the Duke del Parque, with twenty-five thousand men, attacked in two columns Habert, who, with nine thousand, maintained the line of the Xucar; but they were defeated at both their points of attack, with the loss each of some hundred men. Thus everything seemed disastrous on the eastern coast; and, to complete the untoward state of affairs, Lord William Bentinck had come alone from Sicily, fearing a descent from Murat in that island; though, after having entered into secret negotiations with the allies, he soon after set out for Saxony, where, as already mentioned, he bore an important part in the battle of Dresden. But the triumphs of the French were not of long duration. On the 27th, intelligence was received of the battle of Vittoria, accompanied by orders, which were a necessary consequence of that event, for Suchet entirely to evacuate Valencia, and retire behind the Ebro. He immediately made preparations for abandoning the province, and left Valencia, with a heavy heart, on the 5th of July, which was entered, four days afterward,

The army returns to Alicante, and Lord W. Bentinck assumes the command.

June 15.

July 5.

July 9.

* *Ante*, i., 513. † *Ante*, iii., 419.

‡ Nap., vi., 14, 15. Murray's Official Despatch, 9th June, 1813, Gur., x., 482.

* Murray's Official Despatch, June 14, 1813, Gurw., x., 486. Nap., vi., 19, 21. Tor., v., 294, 295. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 259, 260.

† Murray, after this disaster, was deprived of the command, and, when he returned to England, brought to a court-martial after the peace, which acquitted him of the serious charges preferred against him for his conduct on the occasion, but found him guilty of want of judgment. There was no harm in this: vindictive prosecutions are of no service in military affairs; it is the judgment of posterity which is the real reward or punishment of public conduct. Sir John was a man of talent, and had many estimable qualities: the fault lay in his appointment to a situation for which he was wholly disqualified.

by Lord William Bentinck; but, faithful to the positive instructions of Napoleon to keep a tenacious grasp of all his conquests, he left twelve hundred men in Saguntum, five hundred in Peniscola, and four thousand five hundred in Tortosa: a fatal error, the counterpart of the emperor's obstinate retention of the fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder during the German campaign, and to which, more than any other cause, the little subsequent success of Suchet in the field is to be ascribed.*

Bentinck follows him to the Lower Ebro.

It was Suchet's first intention, when he retired behind the Ebro, to have marched upon Saragossa, and, forming with the troops left in that province, to have united with Clausel, and, together, threatened the right flank of Wellington. But the rapid retreat of the latter general from Saragossa, by Jaca, into France, totally disconcerted this well-conceived project. The plain of Arragon being entirely inundated with guerillas, while Wellington's masses in Navarre were on its flank, he felt it necessary to concentrate his forces in Catalonia and on the Lower Ebro, and, accordingly, gave orders for the evacuation of Saragossa and the fortresses of Arragon, the troops retiring to Mequinenza, Lerida, and Tortosa. Bentinck followed with the Anglo-Sicilian army; but it was soon found, however, by the British general, that though his forces were of considerable numerical amount, yet they were not of such a composition as to enable him to hazard offensive operations, without the utmost caution, beyond the Ebro. He had, indeed, thirty thousand men nominally under his orders; but of these the British and Germans, not quite ten thousand strong, could alone be relied on. Elio and Roche, with ten thousand more, were at Valencia, in a very destitute condition; and the Duke del Parque, with twelve thousand, was several marches in the rear; and his troops, though paid by British subsidies, were, from the inherent vice of procrastination common to all the Spaniards, almost as unprovided as the former. Decaen, however, at this moment was himself in nearly as difficult a situation; for the news of the battle of Vittoria had again roused all the upper valleys of Catalonia, and the insurrection, nourished by supplies from the English fleet off Palermo, was making rapid progress. Thus neither party were in a condition to undertake any operation of importance; and though Suchet had sixty-eight thousand of the best troops of the Empire at his command, they were so scattered over the numerous fortified posts and cities which the emperor had ordered him to garrison and maintain, that he was little more than a match in the field for Bentinck with his motley array of thirty thousand.†

The evacuation of Arragon and Valencia, like that of all the other places which had been under the dominion of the French armies, revealed the extraordinary system of forced contributions and organized plunder, by which they had so long succeeded in maintaining their ascendency in Europe without any sensible addition to the burdens of France itself. Immediately after the occupation of Valencia in the end of 1811, the French marshal, as already mentioned, had imposed an extraordinary contribution of 200,000,000 reals, or about £2,000,000 sterling: a burden equal, if the value of money be taken into consideration, to at least £5,000,000 in Great Britain. The half of this enormous requisition entirely exhausted the whole money, gold, silver plate, and jewels of the province, and the remainder was taken in grain, stuffs, clothing, and other articles necessary for the subsistence of the troops. Next year the burden was fixed at 70,000,000 reals, or £750,000, equal, in like manner, to £1,500,000 in England; but by the vigour of the French marshal's government, and the regularity and justice of his rule in the distribution and exaction of these enormous burdens, nearly the whole was brought, chiefly in kind, into the imperial treasury. Arragon at first, after the capture of its capital, had been subjected to enormous burdens, great part of which was irrecoverable from their excessive magnitude; but from the time that the regular government of Suchet began, the impositions were more uniform, and amounted to about four times what the province had paid in the most flourishing days of the old monarchy. While these facts illustrate in the clearest manner the oppressive nature of the imperial government, and explain the unbounded exasperation which it everywhere excited in Europe, as well as the long enthusiasm which it awakened in France itself, it must at the same time be added, to the honour of Marshal Suchet, that he carried this onerous system into execution with far more attention to the interests and wishes of the inhabitants than any of the other French marshals; that no private plunder disgraced his footsteps, or military disorders rendered hateful his government; that, unlike the other parts of Spain, the monuments of the fine arts remained untouched in Valencia during his administration; and that, despite the grievous weight of the burdens he was obliged to impose, such was the protection to industry which he simultaneously afforded, that the receding footsteps of the French army were beheld with regret by the grateful inhabitants.*

Bentinck besieges Tarragona, and is compelled to raise the siege.

Bentinck long hesitated whether he should commence active operations in Catalonia with the siege of Tortosa or Taragona; but he at length determined for the latter, chiefly in consequence of the facilities for carrying it on which the vicinity of the sea and the Mediterranean squadron afforded. Having crossed the Ebro accordingly, he sat down before the place in the end of July with ten thousand good troops; while the Spanish armies, about twenty thousand more, but of very indifferent quality, were drawn to the neighbourhood to cover the siege. Suchet was long unable to collect any sufficient force to interrupt his operations; but having, at length, formed a junction with Decaen, he advanced at the head of thirty thousand men to raise the siege. Bentinck was at the head of an equal force, but twenty thousand of them were Spaniards, upon whom no reliance could be placed; and he therefore wisely declined battle, retreating to the defiles of the Hospitalat, near the Col

Aug. 15.

* Tor., v., 290, 299. Suchet's Mem., ii., 324, 326. Nap., vi., 40, 41. Duc de Feltre to Suchet, 18th May, 1813, Suchet, ii., 324.

† Suchet, ii., 328, 334. Nap., vi., 44, 49 Vict. et Conq., xxii., 262, 263.

* Suchet, ii., 290, 298, and i., 279, 314. Tor., v., 304, 306

di Balaguer; and Suchet, without pursuing him, passed on to Taragona, which he entered on the 18th, and immediately blew up the fortifications and brought away the garrison. Such was the strength of the ancient masonry, the work of the Romans, that it was with no small time and labour that the demolition was effected. Having destroyed these renowned bastions, he retired to the neighbourhood of Villa Franca and the Ilobregat, while Decaen was sent into Upper Catalonia; and Taragona, with its ruined battlements and fertile fields, was occupied by the British forces.*

Aug. 18.

Gradually, after this, the British army gained ground, and the French were cooped up into more contracted limits within the war-wasted province of Catalonia. On the 5th of September, the advance entered Villa Franca, and Suchet retired altogether into the Ilobregat, leaving Tortosa, Lerida, and Mequinenza, now blockaded by the Spanish troops, to their own resources. An event, however, ere long occurred, which showed that it was not without reason that Bentinck, with his heterogeneous array of troops, had hitherto avoided a general engagement with the admirable veterans of Suchet. On the 12th of September, twelve hundred German and British infantry, with two British and two Spanish guns, under Colonel Adam, and three battalions of Sarsfield's Catalonians, occupied, twelve miles in advance of Villa Franca, the position of Ordal, a ridge which rose gradually from a deep and impassable ravine, crossed by a noble bridge in front. Suchet, hearing that this advanced guard, not more, in all, than three thousand men, was not adequately supported, conceived the design of cutting it off. For this purpose, the divisions Harispe and Habert were put in motion at nightfall, by bright moonlight passed the bridge without resistance, and at midnight suddenly assailed the allied advanced guard at all points. The second battalion of the 27th, who were on the right, were first assailed; but the men, who were lying beside their muskets in battle array, instantly started up and fought fiercely; and the Spaniards, who were next attacked in the centre, made a most gallant resistance. Harispe's men, however, crossing the bridge in great numbers, soon turned the allied flank; Adam was wounded early; Colonel Reeves, who was second in command, was also soon struck down; and, amid all the confusion of a nocturnal combat, the troops, without any recognised leader,* fought with great fury in detached bodies, but without any general plan. At length the Spaniards in the centre were broken, the 27th regiment turned and forced through, and the whole dispersed, four guns being taken. Captain Waldron, with eighty of the 27th, and Captain Müller, with the like number of Germans, effected their retreat by the hills; but all the rest were dispersed or slain, and the total loss was not less than a thousand men.

Unfortunate combat at the pass of Ordal.

Sept. 12.

Encouraged by this blow, which seems to have been induced by undue confidence on the part of both Bentinck and Adam, in thus exposing an advanced guard without support to the blows of superior bodies of the enemy, Suchet pursued his march, and came up at eight o'clock with the main allied army near Villa Franca; but they retreated in admirable order, and a charge of their cavalry was stopped with remarkable resolution by Lord Frederic Bentinck, at the head of the 28th dragoons and German horse, who engaged in single combat, and wounded Colonel Myers of the French horse, and defeated them with the loss of three hundred men. Great numbers of the missing at the pass of Ordal, who had been supposed to be taken, rejoined their colours two days afterward; but this disaster had the effect of causing the allied army to retire to the neighbourhood of Taragona, while the Catalonians fell back to Igualada. While the campaign in the east of Spain was thus checkered with misfortunes, yet it had a most important effect on the issue of the campaign, and clearly demonstrated on what erroneous principles Napoleon's defensive system of retaining garrisons in so many fortresses was founded; for, during a period when Soult was pressed by superior forces in the Western Pyrenees, and France itself was menaced with invasion, sixty-eight thousand of the best soldiers of the French Empire were kept in check by ten thousand British and German troops, supported by twice that number of ill-disciplined Spaniards; all pressure on Wellington's right flank from that formidable body was prevented, and the whole of Valencia and half of Catalonia rescued from their grasp by a motley array, which could not for three days have kept the field in presence of his united forces.*

The allies retire to Taragona. September 13.

Meanwhile, Wellington, having completed his preparations, and received considerable re-enforcements both from England and the hospitals, from whence the wounded men were discharged in such extraordinary numbers, and with such rapidity, under the influence of the mental excitement produced by continued and glorious success,† as to excite the astonishment of the whole army, was taking measures for an invasion of France. He was desirous, indeed, himself not to hazard that attempt at the present moment, for several reasons: Pampeluna, though again closely blockaded, and now severely distressed for provisions, had not yet fallen; and till that event took place, not only could the blockading forces not be reckoned on to support the allied army in its advance, but he himself could not be considered as solidly established on the Spanish frontier. The Spanish troops who were acting in co-operation with his army were fully forty thousand, and they had now acquired, from acting with the Anglo-Portuguese forces, a far superior degree of con-

Reasons which at this period induced Wellington to desire not to invade France.

* Nap., vi., 50, 54. Tor., v., 328, 331. Suchet, ii., 334, 338.

† Bentinck's Official Account, Gurw., xi., 147, 148. Suchet, ii., 341, 343. Nap., vi., 57, 59. Tor., v., 331, 332.

* Suchet, ii., 342, 345. Bentinck's Official Account, September 15, 1813, Gurw., xi., 147, 148. Nap., vii., 57, 59. Tor., v., 332, 333. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 306, 310.

† "We have gained on the strength of the 76th, 84th, and 85th regiments, 1797 rank and file, and 800 recruits; and 500 British and 1500 Portuguese from the hospitals last week, and we are gaining some every day. We are now as strong as we were on the 25th of July, before the battles of the Pyrenees, and in a short time we shall be within 5000 or 6000 as strong as we were before the battle of Vittoria. The troops are uncommonly healthy; indeed, there is no sickness among them."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *25th August*, 1813, GURW., xi., 45.

sistence and efficiency than they had ever before attained during the war; but still there were many circumstances in their condition which rendered them likely to prove at least as dangerous as serviceable to an invading army. In spite of all the representations of Wellington, which had been as energetic as they were innumerable, the government at Cadiz, wholly engrossed with Democratic ambition, had taken no efficient steps to provide for their armies; they were neither clothed nor paid, and in great part depended for their subsistence upon the British rations; and there was too good reason to fear that, if they entered France, they would rouse a national resistance, by the license with which they retaliated upon its inhabitants the misery which their own countrymen had so long suffered at their hands. The Cortes, inflamed almost to madness by the incessant efforts of the Republican press at Cadiz, who now dreaded nothing so much as the success of the allied arms, did all in their power to thwart the designs of Wellington for the common cause; the excesses at St. Sebastian afforded too plausible a ground, which was amply taken advantage of, for inflaming the popular passions against the English general; they were represented as not the designless work of the unbridled soldiers, but a deliberate attempt of an heretical nation to destroy a mercantile community, of which they were jealous. Wellington himself was openly accused of aspiring to the crown of Spain, and to such a height did the mutual recriminations rise, that he more than once offered to resign the supreme command; and, despairing of success with such lukewarm or treacherous allies, advised the British government to demand St. Sebastian as a hostage, and, if refused, to withdraw their forces altogether from the Peninsula.*†

Although the British government were far from being insensible to the cogency of these arguments, yet they wisely determined to follow Wellington's advice, in cautiously abstaining from all interference with the regency and Cortes at Cadiz, how criminal or absurd soever their conduct might be, and to bend all their efforts to the vigorous prosecution of the war; yet they were induced, by other considerations of a still higher importance, to urge their general to undertake the immediate invasion of the south of France. The coalition in Germany, they were well aware, was still very nearly matched by Napoleon; the disasters at Dresden had wellnigh dissolved his heterogeneous materials; and therefore so important an event as the invasion of France by the British forces might be expected to produce a moral effect of the highest importance throughout Europe. Wellington, who at that period had little confidence in the stability of the Grand Alliance, and looked, not without reason, to the security of the Peninsula as the main object of his efforts, was desirous that his troops, or a principal part of them, should be turned against Suchet in Catalonia, in order that, during the absence of Napoleon with the greater part of his forces in Germany, the important strongholds in that province, an effectual barrier against France in the East, might be recovered to the Spanish monarchy. But the English government, looking to the general interests of Europe, and the probable effect of the measure on the determinations of the allied sovereigns on the Elbe, decided otherwise; the invasion of

By desire of the British government, he undertakes it.

* Wellington to the Spanish Minister at War, August 30, 1813, Gurw., xi., 56, 57; to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 5, 1813, ibid., xi., 90, 91; and xi., 172, 200; xi., 327, 349.

† "More than half of Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a year; and the whole of Spain, excepting Catalonia and a small part of Arragon, since the month of May and June last. The most abundant harvest has been reaped in all parts of the country; millions of money, spent by contending armies in the Peninsula, are circulating everywhere; and yet your armies, however weak in numbers, are literally starving. The allied British and Portuguese army under my command have been subsisted—particularly latterly—almost exclusively upon the magazines imported by sea; and I am concerned to inform your excellency that, besides money for the pay of all the armies, which has been given from the military chest of the British army, and has been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies, in order to enable them to remain in the field at all; and, notwithstanding this assistance, I have had the mortification of seeing the Spanish troops on the outposts obliged to plunder the nut and apple trees for subsistence; and to know that the Spanish troops, employed in the blockade of Pampeluna and Santona, were starving upon half an allowance of bread, while the enemy whom they were blockading were, at the same time, receiving their full allowance.

"It cannot be pretended that the country does not produce the means of maintaining the number of men necessary for its defence; those means are undoubtedly superabundant; and the enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at the expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely longer than are necessary for its defence.

"Sir, the fact is notorious, that there is no authority in the country to enforce the law and the due payment of the contributions to government; and the officers of the Hacienda do not perform their duty.

"They are infinitely more numerous than is necessary, and their maintenance exhausts the revenues which ought to be employed in the maintenance of the troops on the frontiers. I have sent to your excellency's office proofs that some branches of the revenue cost 70 and 80 per cent. to collect them.

"It must be obvious to your excellency that matters cannot go on long as they are. The winter is approaching, and no magazines, or other provision of any kind, have been made for the Spanish troops, who, as I have above stated, have not at present even enough for their daily subsistence."—WELLINGTON *to the Spanish Minister at War, 30th of August*, 1813, GURWOOD, vol. xi., p. 56, 58.

"Our character is involved in a greater degree than we are aware of, in the Democratical transactions of the Cortes, in the opinion of all moderate and well-thinking Spaniards, and, I am afraid, with the rest of Europe; and if the mob of Cadiz begin to move heads from shoulders, as the newspapers have threatened Castanos, and the assembly seize upon landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more than discountenance them.

"It is quite impossible that such a system can last. What I regret is, that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballasteros positively intended it; and I am much mistaken if O'Donnell, and even Castanos, and probably others, are not equally ready. If the king should return, he also will overturn the whole fabric, if he has any spirit; but things have gone so far, and the gentlemen of Cadiz are so completely masters of their trade of managing that assembly, that I am afraid there must be another convulsion; and I earnestly recommend to the British government to keep themselves clear of the Democracy, and to interfere in nothing while the government is in their hands, excepting in carrying on the war, and keeping out the foreign enemy."—WELLINGTON *to* EARL BATHURST, *5th of Sept.*, 1813, GURWOOD, vol. xi., p. 90, 91.

"In consequence of the existing regency of Spain having departed from all the engagements entered into with me by the late regency after repeated personal discussions, and notwithstanding that I had received what I conceived was a confirmation of the engagements, and a declaration to adhere to them by the existing regency, I thought it proper, on the 30th of August last, to resign the command of the Spanish armies; which resignation, I have been informed, by a despatch from the minister at war of the 22d of September, has been accepted by the regency, and I continue to exercise the command only till the new Cortes shall have been assembled."—WELLINGTON *to* EARL BATHURST, *5th of October*, 1813, GURWOOD, vol. xi., p. 164.

France, even before Pampeluna had fallen, was resolved on; and Wellington, like a good soldier, set himself to execute, to the best of his ability, an offensive campaign, which, on military principles, he deemed premature.*

Description of the French position on the Bidassoa.

Soult's position on the northern side of the Bidassoa consisted of the base of a triangle, of which Bayonne was the apex, and the great roads running from them to Irun on the seacoast, and St. Jean Pied-de-Port in the interior, were the sides. The interior of this triangle was filled with a mass of rugged, and in great part inaccessible mountains, affording little means of subsistence to troops, and presenting ridges and passes at every step capable of arresting an invading army. The French army was stationed on the summit of the last ridge of this wild and rocky district, which immediately overlooked the valley of the Bidassoa, and various parts of it were strengthened with fieldworks; while the summit of the Rhune Mountain, the highest part of the ridge terminating in a peak, surrounded on three sides by inaccessible precipices, and to be reached only from the eastward by a long, narrow ridge on the top of the rocks, was crowned with a complete redoubt. All the hill roads which penetrated through this strong position were commanded by works, the greater part of which were nearly completed; and the position, flanked by the sea on the one side, and the Rhune Mountain, which rose to the height of 2800 feet, and overlooked all the neighbouring hills, on the other, could hardly be turned on either side. Wellington, nevertheless, determined to hazard an attack, and he first intended to have made it in the middle of September, immediately after the castle of St. Sebastian fell; but the excessive storms of rain which afterward came on, and swelled the Bidassoa into a raging torrent, rendered it impossible to attempt the crossing of the fords till the beginning of October; and the state of the tides, upon which the thridding through them was mainly dependant, would not permit the passage being attempted till the 7th of that month. Soult, not expecting that Wellington would attempt to force his strong positions in this quarter, had not above fifteen thousand men immediately in front of the Bidassoa; as, in truth, he did not regard the heights in front as the principal part of his position, but it was in the fortifications on the Nive in their rear that the principal line of defence was constructed, by which he hoped to prevent the invasion of the south of France. The French general had recently been joined by sixteen thousand new conscripts, who were distributed through the veteran corps of the army, so that his numerical force was little inferior to what it had been before the battle of the Pyrenees; but this accession of force was fully counterbalanced on the allied side by the arrival of three thousand fresh troops from England, and the approach of the Andalusian army of reserve under the Conde d'Abisbal, fully twelve thousand strong, which bore an important part in the action which followed.†

* Nap., vi., 239, 246. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Gurw., xi., 132, 176.

† Belm., i., 266, 267. Soult to the Minister at War at Paris, Oct. 26, 1813, ibid., 692, 694. Nap., vi., 246, 252. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 9, 1813, Gurw., xi., 176.

Wellington's dispositions for forcing the passage.

The troops which Wellington employed in the attack were very considerable, and proportioned rather to the strength of the enemy's position than the actual force he had at his command to defend it. Graham, with the first and fifth divisions of Lord Aylmer's brigade, and a brigade of Portuguese, commanded the left wing, and received orders to cross the Bidassoa by the fords immediately above and below the sites where the bridge on the great road from Paris to Madrid formerly stood; Major-general Alten, with the light division, and Longa and Giron's Spaniards, were to cross the upper fords, and attack the Bayonnette Mountain and the Pass of Vera; while on the right the army of reserve of Andalusia, under the command of General Giron, was to attack the enemy's posts on the mountain of La Rhune, while the fourth and sixth divisions were in reserve to support them, if necessary. Altogether, the English general directed twenty-four thousand men against the Lower Bidassoa, and twenty thousand against the Rhune Mountain and its adjacent ridges.*

Commencement of the attack, and forcing of the French right.

The night preceding the attack was unusually stormy and tempestuous. A thunderstorm rolled down from the summit of the Rhune Mountain, and broke with the utmost violence on the French positions on the Lower Bidassoa. During the darkness and storm, Wellington advanced a number of his guns up to the heights of San Marcial, while the troops and pontons were brought down, still unperceived, close to Irun, at the mouth of the Bidassoa; and the troops who were to cross over farther up were moved close to the respective points of passage, which were no less than ten in number, in order to be able simultaneously to commence the attack on the French position. All the tents of the allied army on the hills were left standing, and the pontons, which had been brought down to the water's edge, were carefully concealed from the enemy's view. At seven o'clock, Lord Aylmer's brigade, which led the advance on the right, suddenly emerged from behind their screen, and advanced with a rapid pace towards the sands adjoining Irun, and immediately all the guns on the heights of San Marcial commenced their fire along the whole line; and so completely were the enemy taken by surprise, that Marshal Soult was passing troops in review in the centre of his position at the moment when the first guns were heard at the Lower Bidassoa. He immediately set out at the gallop in that direction; but, before he could arrive in its vicinity, the positions had been carried, and the British were solidly established in the French territory. From the summit of San Marcial seven columns could be seen descending rapidly from the heights, and advancing with beautiful precision and a rapid step towards the fords of the Bidassoa. Those on the upper parts of the stream descended at once into the enemy's fire; but those on the lower wound, like huge snakes, through the level sands, and were in some places almost immersed in water before they reached the firm ground on the opposite side. The

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 9, 1813, Gurw., xi., 176. Murray's General Orders in Wyld's Memoirs, 120, 130, 133.

surprise, however, was complete, and the enemy on the heights opposite made no very strenuous resistance. Several redoubts in the sand-hills were taken, and seven pieces of cannon captured. A much more obstinate resistance was made, however, at the Mountain of Louis the Fourteenth, and the heights of the Croix des Bouquets, which was the key to the whole position in that quarter, and towards which both parties brought up their troops and guns with the greatest rapidity. The Germans, who first made the attack on this point, were repulsed with severe loss; but the 9th regiment, under Colonel Cameron, at this moment came up, and stormed the post with the utmost gallantry; the French falling back at all points, and in great confusion, on the high road towards Bayonne; and it was only by the arrival of Soult at this moment, with the reserve and several guns, that order was in part restored.*

The French are driven from their position on the left.

While this rapid and important success was achieved on the left, Alten, with the light division, having forded the river, attacked the enemy's intrenchments in the Pass of Vera; and Giron, with the Andalusians, was led against the mountain of La Rhune. Taupin's division guarded the stupendous rocks in front of the allies which were to be assailed; while the sixth division, under Cole, who were posted on the heights of St. Barbara, formed an imposing reserve, full in view of the French troops, and ready to co-operate at a moment's warning in the attack. The French troops in this quarter were posted on the summit of enormous rocky ridges, one of which, called by the soldiers the Boar's Back, projected, like a huge redoubt, far into the valley of Beira. No sooner did Clausel, who commanded there, however, hear the first cannon-shots on the Lower Bidassoa, than he hurried four regiments up to the summit of the Great Rhune, and advanced with the remainder of his forces to the support of Taupin on the ridges beneath. But before he could arrive, the action in that quarter was decided. Soon after seven o'clock, the Boar's Back was assailed at both ends; at its western extremity, that is, on the British right, by Giron's Andalusians, and on the left, towards the British centre, by Colonel Colborne, at the head of the 43d, the 95th, and the 52d, and a Portuguese brigade of light troops. Soon the slopes of the mountain were covered with men and fire, while the dark forests at the bottom of the ravines were filled with volumes of white smoke, that came curling up out of their inmost recesses. The Portuguese Caçadores were the first who made the attack, but they were overmatched by the French, who, rushing out of the redoubt at the summit, hurled them over the rocky slopes with great violence; but in the middle of their pursuit, the 52d regiment suddenly emerged from the wood, and startled the victorious French by the apparition of the red uniforms. At this sight the French wavered and fled, closely followed by the British regiment, who entered the redoubt with them. Following up his success, Colborne next attacked the second intrenchment, which was carried with equal impetuosity, and 400 prisoners were taken. Meanwhile, Giron's Spaniards, on the right, had also worked their way with great difficulty up the eastern end of the Boar's Back, and stormed some intrenchments which the enemy had thrown up in that quarter. They were repulsed, however, in the attack of the strong position of the Hermitage, from the summit of which the enemy rolled down immense rocks, which made huge gaps in the assailing companies. On this rugged height the French succeeded in maintaining themselves all night; but as soon as the mist had cleared away on the following morning, Wellington directed an attack by Giron's Spaniards by the eastern ridge, which alone was accessible. This important and difficult operation was performed with the utmost gallantry by the Andalusians, who drove the enemy from one fortified post in the rugged slopes to another, till the Great Rhune itself was in a manner environed by enemies. Clausel, upon this, fearful of being cut off, drew off his regiments from that elevated position in the night, and on the following morning the whole ridge occupied by the enemy, from the summit of La Rhune to the seacoast, was in the hands of the allies.*

Reflections on this battle.

Though not so celebrated as some of his other achievements, there is none which reflects more lustre on Wellington as a general than this extraordinary action. With assiduous care, the French had for more than a month fortified their mountain position in the Pyrenees; it was guarded by an army as numerous, so far as the regular troops on either side were concerned, as those of the British general; and the heights on which the French were placed far exceeded the far-famed steeps of Torres Vedras in strength and ruggedness. From this all but impregnable position they had been driven in a single day, by an enemy who, to reach it, had to ford a difficult and dangerous river, forming, as it were, a vast wet ditch to the intrenchment. Great as was the spirit evinced by the whole troops, Spanish as well as British or Portuguese, who had been engaged, it was not by their efforts alone that the battle was won. It was the combinations of the general which rendered their attacks irresistible. It was the secrecy of his preparations, and the suddenness of his onset, which carried the enemy's position on the Lower Bidassoa. It was the admirable combinations, which threw an overwhelming force against the rocks in the centre, which won the dizzy heights of La Rhune. In defence of their rocky intrenchments, the French were far from displaying their wonted spirit and vigour; and, what is very remarkable, the same troops who had ascended with so intrepid a step the crags of Sauroren, now abandoned with little resistance the loftier rocks of the Bayonnette: a remarkable proof of the old observation, that the French are much better adapted for offensive than defensive warfare, and how much the courage of the bravest troops may be lowered by a long series of defeats. In this battle the allies lost about 1600 men, of whom one half were Spaniards. The French were weakened by not more

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 9, 1813, Gurw., xi., 177. Nap., vi., 254, 258. Subaltern, 94, 104. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 283. Pellot, 57, 58.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 9, 1813, Gurw, xi. 177, 178. Nap., vi., 264, 267. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 283, 284. Pellot, 60, 61 Tor., v., 364, 366

than 1400, their troops, during the greater part of the fighting, being protected by the intrenchment which they defended. But this was of little consequence. The enemy's intrenched position, upon which they had so long laboured, had been lost; the territory of the great nation was violated; and a vast hostile army, for the first time since the Revolution, permanently encamped within the territory of France. And thus was England, which throughout the contest had been the most persevering and resolute of all the opponents of the Revolution, and whose government had never yet either yielded to the victories or acknowledged the chiefs of the Revolution, the first of all the forces of Europe who succeeded in planting its victorious standards on the soil of France.*

Wellington's noble and humane conduct on entering France.

The first care of Wellington, after the army was established within the French territory, was to use the most vigorous measures to prevent plundering on the part of his troops, and to establish that admirable system of paying regularly for the supplies of the army, which, as much as the bravery of the British soldiers, had contributed to his previous successes. The better to effect these objects, he issued a noble proclamation to his troops, in which, after recounting the incalculable miseries which the exactions of the French soldiers had brought upon Spain and Portugal, he declared that it would be unworthy of a great nation to retaliate these miseries upon the innocent inhabitants of France, and, therefore, that plundering and every species of excess would be rigorously punished, and supplies of every kind paid for with the same regularity as they had been in the Peninsular kingdoms.† Neither the Spanish troops nor the French peasantry at first gave any credit to this proclamation, so utterly at variance was it with the system by which the former had been accustomed to suffer, and the latter to profit, during the Peninsular campaigns. But Wellington was at once serious in his intention and resolute in his determination; and he soon gave convincing proof of both by instantaneously hanging several soldiers, both British and Spanish, who were detected in the act of plundering; at the same time, the perfect regularity with which supplies of all kinds were paid for with ready money in the English camp, awakened the covetous feelings of the French mountaineers, who hastened to profit by the prolific stream of war, which, fortunately for them, had entered their valleys; meanwhile, fourteen French peasants, who had been taken near the pass of Echallar firing on the British troops, were conducted to Passages as prisoners of war, where they were embarked for the British islands. The effect of this stroke was incalculable, for the peasants could not deny its justice, or accuse the British general of harshness when treating them as prisoners of war; while, at the same time, the idea of being carried to England appeared like an exile to the world's end to these simple mountaineers. Thus, impelled by terror on the one hand, and attracted by love of gain on the other, the peasantry generally laid aside all feelings of hostility, and the English dollars succeeded in revealing stores of subsistence in the mountains, which all the rigour of the French requisitions had been unable to discover.*†

Contrast presented by the French requisitions.

What rendered the impression of this conduct the greater upon the French peasantry, was the wide contrast which the conduct of their enemies thus presented to that which was at the same time pursued by their own defenders in the French army. The revolutionary generals, now for the first time thrown back upon the territory of France, had no means which the government of Paris would sanction for the subsistence, clothing, and often pay of the troops, but by forced requisitions on the countries in which they were cantoned. This system did admirably well, and was in the highest degree popular in France, as long as the requisitions fell on foreign countries; but the case was very different now when they were driven back into their own territory, and these oppressive burdens had to be borne by themselves. Their eyes were suddenly opened with appalling effect to the injustice which they so long practised upon others. When the whole arrondissements around Bayonne, accordingly, were laid under contribution for the support of Soult's army, and these demands were necessarily repeated as the wants of the troops called for fresh supplies, their indignation knew no bounds; and such was the general exasperation, that already they were contrasting these enormous revolutionary burdens with the comparatively light weight of the old *Corvées*, which had been so much complained of before the Revolution. Soult, indeed, did his utmost to prevent plundering, and even executed an officer and some soldiers who had been detected pillaging some houses in Sarre,

* Nap., vi., 268, 269. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 9th Oct., 1813, Gurw., xi., 179.

† "The officers and soldiers of the army must recollect that their nations are at war with France solely because the ruler of the French nation will not allow them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget that the worst of evils suffered by the enemy, in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal, have been occasioned by the irregularities of the soldiers, and their cruelties, authorized and encouraged by their chiefs, towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country.

"To revenge this conduct on the peaceful inhabitants of France would be unmanly, and unworthy of the nations to whom the commander of the forces now addresses himself; and, at all events, would be the occasion of similar and worse evils to the army at large, than those which the enemy's army have suffered in the Peninsula, and would, eventually, prove highly injurious to the public interests.

"The rules, therefore, which have been observed hitherto in requiring, and taking, and giving receipts for supplies from the country, are to be continued in the villages on the French frontier; and the commissioners attached to each of the armies of the several nations will receive the orders from the commander-in-chief of the army of the nations respecting the mode and period of paying for such supplies."—WELLINGTON'S *Proclamation, 8th of October, 1813*, GURWOOD, xi., p. 169.

* Pellot, 80. Tor., v., 366. Nap., vi., 268. Gurw., xi., 169.

† The system which the allies adopted on entering France was eminently calculated to render the inhabitants favourable to their operations: money, the sinews of war, was as abundant with them as it was wanting with us; they scattered it abroad with profusion, and took nothing without paying for it with hard cash on the spot. The English knew well that that affected generosity would do us more mischief than their arms; and, in point of fact, they thus obtained resources which we had been incapable of discovering. The peasants, who could not reason, were rapidly seduced by that politic conduct, and received as friends the army of the stranger whose footsteps sullied the soil of their country, and whose arms were stained with the blood of their brethren.—PELLOT, *Mémoires de la Guerre des Pyrénées*, p. 80.

immediately after the action; but this was not the evil that was complained of: it was the forced requisitions; in other words, the organized rapine of government, that was the real evil that was so sorely felt. And thus, while the English army spread wealth and prosperity around its cantonments, the presence of the French was known only by the oppressive weight of the military exactions by which they were maintained; and such was the magnitude of these burdens, and the exasperation which they excited among the peasantry of the country, that Soult's principal commissary, Pellot, has not hesitated to ascribe chiefly to that cause the general indisposition manifested by the rural population of France, during the invasion of 1814, to support the cause of Napoleon.*†

Distress and capitulation of Pampeluna.

When Wellington found himself once established in the territory of France, he immediately began strengthening his position with fieldworks, facing towards the north, in order to be the better able to resist any attacks Soult might make to expel him from the French soil. He waited only the surrender of Pampeluna to resume offensive operations; but such had been the activity which the governor had displayed in replenishing his magazines during the short interruption of the blockade by the battle of Sauroren, that it was not till two additional months had expired that his resources were exhausted. The garrison had confidently expected to be delivered on the 25th of July, and gazed with silent rapture on the mountains of Zubiri and Esteribar, which reflected at night the glow of the French bivouacs; but these hopes gradually died away as the fire receded on the day following, and their aching eyes beheld no friendly columns surmounting the nearest ridges of the Pyrenees; and on the 30th, the blockading forces resumed their old position, and the blockade became more strict than ever. Early in August, the Galicians, about nine thousand strong, replaced O'Donnell's Andalusians in the blockade; while Mina, with ten thousand more, lay in the defiles of the Pyrenees to intercept the garrison, in case they should escape the vigilance of the troops around the town. With such vigilance, however, was the blockade conducted, that during the three months it lasted the garrison never once received even a letter from their comrades. In the middle of October, the governor, who had conducted the defence with the most persevering constancy, put his troops on scanty rations of horseflesh; and on the 26th, his resources being now exhausted, and the garrison subsisting only on the most revolting reptiles and unwholesome plants which grew on the ramparts,‡ negotiations were entered into for a surrender. Cassan, the governor, at first proposed to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to retire into France with six pieces of cannon; but this was positively refused, as Wellington's instructions were peremptory that the garrison must surrender at discretion. Upon this refusal hostilities were resumed, and the governor undermined some of the bastions, threatening to blow them up, and cut his way, sword in hand, to France, as Brennier had done at Almeida three years before. But three days more of hunger so tamed the spirit and reduced the strength of the garrison, that they were unequal to such an effort: Wellington's orders were positive, if such an attempt were made, to give no quarter to the governor or officers, and to decimate the garrison. Fortunately for the glory of England, and the fame of her chief, it was not necessary to have recourse to such extremities, which, in the case of the soldiers and inferior officers at least, would have been of very doubtful legality: on the 31st the garrison surrendered at discretion, to the number of three thousand, including eight hundred sick and wounded, and were made prisoners of war.*

Oct. 15.

Soult's designs, at this period, of foreign operations.

Santona now was the only fortress which remained to the French in the north-west of Spain; and though Lord Aylmer, with his gallant brigade, was ordered to embark at Passages to aid in the reduction of that place, yet circumstances prevented the design being carried into effect, and it continued blockaded to the end of the war. Meantime, Soult was at first anxious to abandon the lines in front of Bayonne, and proposed to debouch by Jaca with fifty thousand men into Arragon, unite with Suchet, who, he thought, might join him with thirty thousand more and a hundred pieces of cannon, and, with their combined forces, again invade Spain, maintaining the war on the resources of that country, instead of the now exhausted provinces of the south of France. But this project, which afforded by far the most feasible plan for averting from the imperial dominions the horrors of invasion, was rendered abortive by the obstinacy of Napoleon, in insisting upon the retention of so many fortresses in Catalonia by Suchet; which so reduced his effective force in the field, that, after providing a body of men to watch the Anglo-Sicilian army, he could not operate in Arragon with any respectable body. Suchet, accordingly, at once agreed to Soult's proposals, and declared his willingness to ascend the Ebro with thirty thousand men and a hundred guns, to co-operate with him in driving the allies over that river, but only on condition that he got the artillerymen and draught horses of Soult's army sent to Catalonia, his own being absorbed in the fortresses; which was out of the question, as it would have entirely paralyzed Soult himself; and, moreover, he declared that he must, in conformity with the emperor's instructions, return, as soon as the English were driven across the Ebro, to his principal duty, that of watching

* Pellot, 39, 42, 79.

† The system of forced requisitions conceals, under the appearance of a just division of the burdens of war, an inexhaustible source of abuses. It weighs exclusively on the rural proprietors, while the capitalist, who has no productions, escapes it altogether. This system, born of the Revolution, applicable, perhaps, under a popular government, exasperates the mind under the rule of a single monarch. I do not hesitate to say that it is one of the causes which has chiefly contributed to render the departments subjected to requisitions so impatient of the government of Napoleon; the people incessantly pronounced, with loud groans, the words requisition and corvée.—PELLOT, *Commissaire-général de Guerre dans les Pyrénées, en* 1813, p. 39.

‡ Dogs and cats were esteemed a luxury; rats and mice had long been sought out with avidity; and several soldiers had died from eating the roots of hemlock which grew on the ramparts.—BELMAS, iv., 774.

* Belm., iv., 776, 779. Jones's Sieges, ii., 5, 11. Nap., vi., 290, 294. Wellington to Don Carlos de Espana, 20th of Oct., 1813, Gurw., xi., 210. Tor., v., 368, 369.

over the fortresses in Catalonia.* Thus, this project of joint operations came to nothing; and, meanwhile, Wellington's passage of the Bidassoa, and invasion of France, rendered all idea of offensive hostilities in the Peninsula out of the question, and fixed the theatre of war permanently in the south of France: a striking proof of the wisdom of the British government in urging, against Wellington's opinion, that bold undertaking.†

Description of Soult's position on the Nivelle.

Soult made good use of the month's respite afforded him by the prolonged resistance of the garrison of Pampeluna to strengthen to a most extraordinary degree his position on the Nivelle. It consisted of three lines of defence, one behind another, which equalled those of Torres Vedras in strength and solidity. They ran along a line of hills forming the northern boundary, for the most part, of the valley of the Nivelle, and stretched from the sea and St. Jean de Luz on the right, to Mount Daren on the left: from thence to St. Jean Pied-de-Port, the line was protected by a ridge of rocks, so rugged that neither army could pretend to cross them. Numerous fieldworks, constructed on every eminence, especially on the right, where the great road to St. Jean de Luz and Bayonne crossed the ridge, protected the line in every part where it appeared to be not adequately secured by the obstacles of nature. A second line, in rear of the former, ran from St. Jean de Luz on the right to Cambo on the left, and embraced the camps of Espelette and Suraide, and the camp of Sarre, the principal points where the enemy's forces were assembled. A third line was established behind Santa Pe, on the road to Ustaritz, but the redoubts on it were only commenced. Those on the two former were completed, and armed with heavy guns drawn from the arsenal of Bayonne. Soult having been re-enforced by sixteen thousand conscripts, had eighty thousand effective combatants under his orders, of whom seventy thousand were in the field, and could be relied on for active operations. The right, near St. Jean de Luz, under Reille, consisted of three divisions of infantry: Clausel, in the centre, guarded the redoubts behind Sarre with three divisions; the left, under D'Erlon, of two divisions, was behind D'Ainhoa. Foy, with his division, was on the extreme left, between St. Jean Pied-de-Port and Bidarray, to threaten the allied right, and act as circumstances might require.*

Wellington's plan of attack.

The heavy rains usual in the end of autumn having fallen, and fine weather returned, Wellington, on the 9th of November, prepared for a general attack. After carefully surveying the enemy's position, Wellington judged that it was weakest in the centre, in the opening between the Rhune Mountain and the bridge of Amotz, over the Nivelle; and it was there, accordingly, that he resolved to make his principal effort. His plan of attack was thus arranged. Hill, with the right wing, consisting of the second and sixth divisions, under Stewart and Clinton, Murillo's Spaniards, and two Portuguese brigades, was to assail the enemy's left, behind D'Ainhoa. The right centre, under Beresford, consisting of the third, fourth, and seventh divisions, under the command of Generals Colville, Le Cor, and Cole, was to direct their attack against the redoubts in front of Sarre and the heights behind it, supported on the left centre by Giron's Spaniards, who were to attack the slopes situated to the westward of Sarre. General Alten, with the light division and Longa's Spaniards, was, in the first instance, to attack the heights of La Petite Rhune, which the enemy still held as an advanced redoubt in front of the middle of his line, and, having carried them, co-operate in the general attack on the centre; while Sir John Hope, who had succeeded Graham in the command of the left wing, consisting of Freyre's Spaniards, was to engage the enemy's attention by a feigned attack on their right, near the sea, on the hills in front of St. Jean de Luz. Thus Hill and Beresford's corps, forming a mass of forty thousand admirable infantry, of whom above thirty thousand were British and Portuguese, were to be thrown on the weakest part of the enemy's line in the centre, near the bridge of Amotz, between Clausel's and D'Erlon's corps. It will be seen from these directions how many of England's best generals, Picton, Dalhousie, Leith, Oswald, and others, were absent from ill health, or other unavoidable causes; but, on the other hand, the posts

* "Informed as you are, by the letters of the Duke of Dalmatia, of the part assigned in his projects to the armies of Arragon and Catalonia, you will from this moment take measures to concur with all your disposable means in the general plan of joint operations; so as to be in a condition, the moment that I transmit to you his majesty the emperor's sanction, to take the field: *taking care, however, to leave the fortresses of Catalonia and Arragon well garrisoned, and in the best possible state of defence.*"—DUC DE FELTRE, *Minister de la Guerre, au* DUC D'ALBUFERA, *13th of Sept.*, 1813, SUCHET, ii., 454. *Pièces Just.*

"In examining the dispositions which your excellency has ordered to meet the case of the army being ordered to commence active operations, his majesty sees, as well as your excellency, grave objections to the plan as at present combined. It leaves the frontier altogether unguarded; and whatever movement you may execute with a corps in the field, *the first and indispensable condition to its commencement is, to leave a strong garrison in Barcelona, Figueras, and Puycerda.*"—DUC DE FELTRE *au* DUC D'ALBUFERA, *15th of Nov.*, 1813, SUCHET, ii., 457.

"On the 7th of October, Lord Wellington crossed the Bidassoa, and transported the war into the French territory. By that stroke everything was changed, and offensive operations became no longer possible to the French armies. Marshal Suchet, however, conceived he would still have time to succour the distant garrisons in the east of Spain; and he flattered himself he should be in a condition at their head to make an effort and march upon the Ebro. The minister at war entered into his views; and the emperor himself, when he returned to Paris, breaking the silence which he had previously preserved on the projects submitted to him, seemed to approve of their execution. *Unhappily, he directed that, when the army marched, a portion of it should be left in garrison at Barcelona, Figueras, and Puycerda.* The Duc d'Albufera beseeched in vain for the combinations promised, in that event, to enable him to march. He received proofs of confidence, but no increase of force. He grieved at seeing the precious time pass away while nothing was done: he desired not less ardently than the government to deliver the garrisons, but he had not the means of realizing his wishes."—SUCHET, *Mémoires*, ii., 348, 349.

Colonel Napier (vi., 282, 284) represents the failure of this well-conceived project, of joint operations on the part of Soult and Suchet, as the result of the latter throwing unnecessary and unfounded difficulties in the way of its execution. But it is plain, from the correspondence above quoted, that it in reality arose from the invincible repugnance which the emperor felt to give up any of the great fortresses his arms had conquered; which necessarily deprived Suchet of the means of carrying it into execution, and was part of the same system which caused him to lose such noble armies in the garrisons on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula.

† See Belm., i., 267. Soult to Duc de Feltre, Oct., 1813, ibid., i., 693. Suchet, ii., 348, and App., 454, et subseq.

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 286, 287. Pellot, 70, 71. Nap., vi., 332, 333. Tor., v., 370

assigned to the Spaniards in the fight told how sensibly their discipline and efficacy had improved under Wellington's directions in the course of the campaign.*

Battle of the Nivelle, and storming of the Petite Rhune.

The action began at daylight by an assault on the enemy's fortified outworks on the Lesser Rhune, which was so far in advance of their main line, that it required to be carried before the general attack could commence. This fort, perched on a craggy summit, surrounded on three sides by precipices two hundred feet high, was accessible only on the east by a long narrow ridge, which in that direction descended towards Sarre, in the valley of the Nivelle. The troops destined for this operation, consisting of the light divison under Alten on the left, and Giron's Andalusians on the right, had been formed, concealed from the enemy, as near as possible to their respective points of attack, on the evening of the 9th; and at the signal, on the following morning, of three guns from the lofty summit of Atchubia, they sprang up; the level rays of the sun glanced on ten thousand bayonets, and immediately the shaggy sides of the Petite Rhune rang with the thunder of cannon, and was enveloped in smoke. The French fired fast from the summit of their inaccessible cliffs; but the 43d, which headed the attack of the light division, pressed boldly upward, and the first redoubt was soon carried. From thence to the second was an ascent almost precipitous, to be surmounted only by narrow paths, which, amid the steep crags, wound up to the summit. There a desperate conflict, bayonet against bayonet, man against man, ensued; but the enthusiastic valour of the 43d overcame every opposition, and the fort was won. Upon this, the French retreated to their last stronghold, at the summit of the Petite Rhune, called the Donjon; but here the impetuous assault of the 43d was stayed by a natural ditch or cleft in the rocks, fifteen feet deep. Soon, however, the Portuguese Caçadores came to their aid: the 52d threatened them on the other side, and the outer works were abandoned. Upon this, the 43d, with a loud shout, leaped down into the clefts in a minute: the old walls were scaled, and the British colours planted on the highest summit of the castle. At the same time, Kempt, though sorely wounded, kept the field, and expelled the enemy from the elevated plateau from which La Petite Rhune arose; and the French, driven out of all their advanced positions, fell back in great confusion to their main line of defence behind Ascain, leaving a battalion, which was made prisoners, at the summit of the mountain.†

Progress of the action on the right, and in the centre.

While the rocky summits of the Lesser Rhune were thus wrested from the enemy, the fourth and seventh divisions in the right centre, under Beresford, moved against the redoubt of St. Barbara and Grenada, and eighteen guns placed in battery against them soon sent such a stream of shot upward into the works, that the garrison, upon seeing the troops advancing with the scaling-ladders, leaped down from their intrenchments and fled. Far on the right, Hill, after a long and difficult night's march, had got, a little before seven, to the front of the enemy's extreme left, and, after driving them from their rugged positions immediately opposite, near Urdax, inclined upward, and, with the aid of the sixth division, soon approached the broken ground where D'Erlon's redoubts were placed, near the bridge of Amotz. To the spectator on the Petite Rhune, which overlooked the whole of this complicated battle-field, it presented a scene of unequalled grandeur. Far to the right, Hope's Spaniards were coming into action, and a hundred guns below, answered by as many on the summits of the rocks, made a deafening roar in the lesser hills near the sea; while in the centre and right, fifty thousand men, rushing like an impetuous torrent down the slopes of the Atchubia Mountain, with loud shouts chased the receding French divisions into the lower grounds near the Nivelle.*

The enemy's troops, retreating at various points at the same time through broken ground, and having their line of defence pierced through in many places, were in no condition to resist this terrible onset, and gave way in a manner that proved that long-continued disaster had weakened their spirit. Clausel's divisions in the centre, in particular, yielded in a manner which called forth the severe animadversions of that general and Marshal Soult.† Clinton, with the sixth division, broke through all the works guarded by D'Erlon's men, which covered the approaches to the bridge of Amotz, and then wheeling to the right, attacked and carried in the most gallant style the enemy's redoubts behind D'Ainhoa, so as entirely to turn their defences in that quarter. The Portuguese division and Byng's brigade, with equal vigour, stormed the redoubts to which they were opposed in front of D'Ainhoa; and the French of D'Armagnac's division, finding that their line of defence was entirely broken through, set fire to their huts, and retreated behind Santa Pe, nearly two leagues to the rear. The rough nature of the ground caused the French left to fall into confusion while executing this retrograde movement; and Abbé's division, which stood next on the line, was entirely uncovered on its flank, and exposed to the most imminent danger. That brave general, however, stood firm, and for a short time arrested the flood of conquest; but D'Erlon, seeing his danger, at length ordered him to retreat. Couroux's division, which extended from Sarre to Amotz, was at the same time broken through at several points by the third and sixth divisions, and their gallant commander mortally wounded. Though occasionally arrested by the formidable redoubts which lay in their way, the flood of war did not the less roll impetuously on, until these isolated landmarks, cut off from each other, were overwhelmed, as a stream-tide, breaking on rock-bestrewed shores, rushes round the black mass-

* Murray's General Orders, Wyld, 142, 143. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 13, 1813, Gurw., xi., 280, 281. Tor., vi., 371, 372.

† Nap., vi., 338, 341. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 288. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 13, 1813, Gurw., xi., 281, 282.

* Nap., vi., 342, 343. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 267, 268. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 13, 1813, Gurw., xi., 281, 282. Tor., v., 372, 373.

† "General Clausel was the first to declare, with regret, that the divisions under his orders had not in all cases done their duty. If they had fought with the ardour which they had evinced in previous combats, and subsequently showed, the enemy, in spite of his superiority of number, would not have forced our lines without a loss of 15,000 or 20,000 men."—PELLOT, *Guerre des Pyrénées*, 73.

es which obstruct its rise, till, surrounded by the foaming surge, they are finally submerged.*

Rout of the French right centre, and completion of the victory.

Clausel's right wing, however, forming the French right centre, consisting of Taupin's division and a large body of conscripts, still stood firm; and the position, resting on three large redoubts near Ascain, which they occupied, was such as to afford a fair prospect of rallying the fugitives, and still retrieving the day. But at this critical juncture the light division, which had won the Petite Rhune, pressing forward with unabated vigour, led by the gallant 52d, attacked Taupin's front; and Longa's skirmishers, having turned the Smaller Rhune and approached their flank, the French, seized with a sudden panic, broke and fled. Four regiments of the whole division alone remained unbroken; and the seventh and fourth British divisions quickly assailed them in front and flank, and they were put to the rout. The signal-post redoubt, the strongest in the whole French line, situated on a high hill in the centre, was now left to its fate, and Colborne, at the head of the 52d, advanced to storm it; but two attacks were repulsed with heavy loss, though on the third, the garrison, seeing themselves entirely cut off and surrounded, surrendered at discretion. During this rout of the right centre, Clausel's divisions fled through the Nivelle in great disorder; and Soult, in extreme alarm, hurried from St. Jean de Luz, with all his reserves, to endeavour to arrest the progress of defeat. Wellington, upon seeing the force which was thus ready to be thrown upon the flank of his victorious centre when hurrying on in the tumult of success, wisely halted the fourth and seventh divisions, and Giron's Spaniards, upon the northern slope of the heights they had won, looking down upon the enemy's camp at Sarres. No sooner, however, had the sixth division, which was in reserve, come up, than the pursuit was renewed: the whole British centre crossed the Nivelle, drove the enemy from the heights beyond it, which formed his second line of defence, and established themselves on that advantageous ground, about two leagues in advance of the position occupied by them in the morning. Upon this, the enemy's right, under Reille, which had been engaged all day with Freyre's Spaniards, fell back also, and St. Jean de Luz and Ascain were evacuated; and the whole line of the Nivelle, with its superb positions and six miles of intrenchments, fell into the hands of the allies.†

The French retire to the intrenched camp in front of Bayonne, November 11.

Next morning the victors advanced in order of battle at all points. Hope, with the left, forded the Nivelle above Bidart; Beresford, with the centre, moved direct upon Arbonne; and Hill, with the right, occupied Espelette and Suraide, and approached Cambo. During the battle on the preceding day, Foy, who, with his division, was in front of the Puerto de Mayas, had gained some success against Mina and Murillo's Spaniards, to whom he was opposed, and captured a considerable part of their baggage; but the defeat of the main army obliged him also to fall back, and he effected his retreat, not without difficulty, by Cambo and Ustaritz, on the following day. Soult had now rallied his army in his third line of intrenchments, about eight miles in rear of the first; but the troops were too dispirited, and the works in too unfinished a state to think of defending them; wherefore, abandoning that line also altogether, he retired into the intrenched camp he had constructed in front of Bayonne, leaving the whole intermediate country in the hands of the allies. In this battle Wellington lost 2694 men; but the loss of the French was 4265, including 1400 prisoners. They abandoned fifty-one pieces of cannon, and all their field magazines; and, what was of more importance, the great mountain barrier, on which they had been laboured assiduously for three months, was broken through and captured, the allies were firmly established in the French territory, with the harbour of St. Jean de Luz to bring supplies of all sorts into the heart of their cantonments, and the flames of war had been seen lighted upon the summit of their mountain screen, far and wide through the plains and valleys of France.*

Wellington's efforts to repress pillage among his troops.

Though Wellington, however, had thus driven the French from their position and gained very considerable extension for the cantonments of his troops, yet his situation was far from being free from anxiety, and even peril. He was uneasy for his right flank as long as Soult held, which he still did, the *tête-du-pont* over the Nive, at Rothsay; and, in consequence, Hill received orders to menace it on the 16th. This was accordingly done, and at his approach the French retired across the river and blew up the bridge, which effectually secured his right flank. But the disorders of the Spanish and Portuguese soldiers in the Spanish villages, as well as the pillaging of the British, were a more serious and durable subject of anxiety. With the latter, plunder was the result merely of the passing desire of gain and intoxication; but with the former it was a deeper feeling, for it was founded on a profound thirst for vengeance, arising from the innumerable evils of a similar description which the French troops had inflicted upon every part of the Peninsula. There was hardly a soldier in the Spanish or Portuguese armies who could not tell the tale of a parent or brother murdered, a sister or daughter ravished, or a patrimony destroyed, from the violence of the French soldiers, or the more lasting scourge of their contributions; and they not unnaturally imagined that, now that they had got into France, it was their turn to indulge in the same excesses, and satiate at once their thirst for vengeance and desire for plunder, on the blood and the property of the wretched inhabitants.† Plundering, accordingly, im-

* Victor et Conq., xxii., 288, 289. Nap., vi., 342, 345. Pellot, 72, 73. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 13, 1813, Gurw., xi., 282, 283.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 13, 1813, Gurw., xi., 282, 283. Nap., vi., 349, 351. Tor., v., 372, 373. Victor et Conq., xxii., 288, 289.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 13, 1813, Gurw., xi., 284. Belm., i., 268. Victor et Conq., xxii., 290, 291. Pellot, 73, 74. Nap., vi., 352, 353.

† "We ran up, and found a poor old French peasant lying dead at the bottom of the garden. A bullet had passed through his head, and his thin gray hairs were dyed with his own blood. A Caçadore rushed out and attempted to elude us. On entering, we saw an old woman, the wife of the peasant, lying dead in the kitchen. The desperate Portuguese did not attempt to deny having perpetrated these

mediately began. On the very day of the battle, Freyre's and Longa's soldiers began pillaging Ascain the moment that they entered it, and murdered several of the inhabitants; Mina's battalions on the right, some of which had shaken off all authority, dispersed themselves, marauding through the mountains; and the Portuguese and British soldiers of the left had begun the same disorders, and two persons had been killed in one small town. Natural as the feelings were which led to these excesses on the part of the Peninsular soldiers, they were utterly abhorrent to the disposition of Wellington: they were subversive of the principles on which he had throughout maintained the contest, and were only the more dangerous, that they arose from such deeply-moved passions of the human heart. Immediate and decisive, accordingly, were the measures which he adopted to remedy the evil. On the 12th, though in hourly expectation of a battle, he put to death all the Spanish marauders he could take in the act; and as the Peninsular generals were tardy or reluctant in carrying his orders into execution, and even remonstrated against them, he at once sent the whole Spaniards, except Murillo's division, which had conducted itself properly, out of France, obliging Freyre's Galicians to retire into Biscay, Giron's Andalusians into the valley of Bastan, and Longa's men over the Ebro; while Mina's mutinous battalions were disarmed and sent across the Pyrenees. By these vigorous measures he deprived himself, at a period when he much required it, of the aid of twenty-five thousand now experienced troops; but the effect was decisive: it marked the lofty character of the man who would rather arrest success, even at its flood-tide, than purchase it by iniquity; it restored his authority in the army, and at once checked its excesses; and, by dissipating the fears of the French peasantry, brought them back to their homes, where, finding the strictest discipline established, and everything paid for in ready money, an amicable intercourse was immediately established between them and the invaders.*

But although the disorders with which he was immediately surrounded were effectually checked by these energetic steps, it was not so easy a matter for the English general to make head against the dangers which were accumulating in his rear, and which threatened to snatch the fruits of victory from his grasp at the very time when they were within his reach. The Democratic government at Cadiz, actuated by the furious passions and insatiable ambition which could not fail to be engendered by vesting the supreme power in an assembly elected by the universal suffrage of an old community, was indefatigable in its efforts to throw obstacles in his way, and excite the national passions against him. A slight reverse would have blown the flame thus kindled into a conflagration; and it was only by the unbroken series of his successes that the Peninsular confederacy, at the moment when it had triumphed over all its external enemies, was prevented from falling the victim to unworthy jealousy and prejudiced ambition. To such a length did they carry their hostility, that, though Wellington had nominally forty thousand Spaniards under his orders, he did not venture to advance them into France, because their total state of destitution rendered pillage almost unavoidable; and immediately after he had borne the British standards in triumph across the Pyrenees, he was so thwarted in all his designs by the Democratic leaders at Cadiz, that he actually resigned the general command of their armies, and recommended to the British government entirely to withdraw their army from the Peninsula if their demands were not acceded to.* Nor were his difficulties less formidable at Lisbon, where the ample British subsidy was so dissipated by official corruption, that not one half of it reached its proper destination: the muleteers of the army were two years, the soldiers nine months in arrear of their pay; the magazines empty; the stores deficient; although the subsidy was amply sufficient to have kept all these services in plentiful circumstances. Fortunately, the Spanish authorities had still sufficient recollection of their defeat to appreciate the consequences of being left to their own resources: the resignation of Wellington was not accepted; the stern measure of sending back the marauders to Spain restored discipline to the Peninsular armies; and Wellington was again enabled, with undiminished force, to renew the career of victory in the south of France.†

Wellington prepares to force the passage of the Nive.

While Wellington was thus experiencing, in the rancour and jealousies which were accumulating in his rear in the Peninsula, which he had delivered, the baseness of factious opposition, and the usual ingratitude of men to

murders: he seemed, on the contrary, wound up to a pitch of phrensy: 'They murdered my father,' said he; 'they cut my mother's throat, and they ravished my sister before my eyes; and I vowed, at the time, I would put to death the first French family that fell into my hands: you may hang me if you will, but I have kept my oath, and care not for dying.' He was hanged, however; indeed, no fewer than eighteen were suspended, on this and the following days, to the branches of trees. Such extreme measures were necessary to check the ardent thirst for vengeance in the Peninsular soldiers."—*Subaltern*, 146.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 27, 1813, Gurw., xi., 325. Nap., vi., 366. Wellington to Freyre, Nov. 14, 1813, Gurw., xi., 287, 288. Beauchamp, Guerre de 1814, ii., 31, 32

* "It is quite clear to me that, if we do not beat down the Democracy at Cadiz, the cause is lost; how that is to be done, God knows."—WELLINGTON *to* SIR H. WELLESLEY, *16th Oct.*, 1813, GURW., xi., 200.

"The persons who propagate the libels against the British army in Spain are not the people of the country, but the officers of government, who would not dare to conduct themselves in this manner if they did not know that their conduct would be agreeable to their employers. If this spirit is not checked, we must expect that the people at large will soon behave to us in the same manner; and we shall have no friend, or none who will avow himself as such, in Spain. A crisis is approaching in our connexion in Spain; and, if you do not bring the government and nation to their senses before they go too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might expect from the services you have rendered them. I recommend to you to complain seriously of the conduct of government and their servants: to remind them that Cadiz, Carthagena, and, I believe, Ceuta, were garrisoned with British troops at their own earnest request, and that, if they had not been so garrisoned, they would long ere this have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and Ceuta of the Moors. I recommend to you to demand, as a security for the safety of the king's troops against the criminal disposition of the government and their servants, that a British garrison should be admitted to St. Sebastian, with the intimation that, if this demand is not complied with, the troops should be withdrawn. And, if this is not conceded, I recommend you to withdraw the troops, be the consequences what they may, and to be prepared accordingly."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *27th Nov.*, 1813, GURW., xi., 327.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 27, 1813, Gurw., xi., 327. Nap., vi., 424, 434.

those from whom they have received inestimable services, he was preparing to follow up his successes over Marshal Soult, and confound his Democratic calumniators at Cadiz by fresh obligations. His vast army, eighty thousand strong even after the Spaniards were withdrawn, and powerful artillery and cavalry—the former numbering a hundred pieces, and the latter eight thousand six hundred sabres—were restrained in the contracted space which they occupied, and he was anxious to extend his cantonments, and gain possession of more fertile districts, by forcing the passage of the Nive, and throwing the enemy entirely back under the cannon of Bayonne; but the heavy and long-continued winter rains, which in the deep clay of Bearn rendered the roads knee deep, and wholly impassable for artillery or chariots, prevented him from undertaking any offensive operations till the end of the first week in December. At that period, however, the weather cleared up, and the Nive having become fordable, he brought up fifty pieces of cannon, and the passage of the river was attempted: an effort which led to one of the most desperate and sanguinary actions of the war.*

Soult's position in front of Bayonne.

Soult's situation on the Nive, though strong, was full of difficulties. Bayonne, situated at the confluence of that river and the Adour, commanded the passage of both; and though a weak fortress of the third order, it had now, from its situation, and the intrenched camp of which it formed a part, become a point of first-rate importance. The camp, being commanded by the guns of the fortress immediately in its rear, could not be attacked in front; on which account the French general stationed only his centre there, composed of six divisions under D'Erlon. The right wing, consisting of Reille's two divisions and Villatte's reserve, was stationed to the westward of the fortress on the Lower Adour, where there was a flotilla of gunboats; and the approach to it was covered by a swamp and artificial inundation. The left, under Clausel, posted to the westward of Bayonne, stretched from its right to the Nive, and was protected partly by an inundation, and partly by a large fortified house, which had been converted into an advanced work. The country in front consisted of a deep clay, much enclosed and intersected by woods and hedge-rows, and four divisions of D'Erlon's men occupied it beyond the Nive, in front of the Ustaritz, and as far as Cambo; the remainder being in reserve, occupying a strong range of heights in front of Mousserolles, stretching from Villefranque on the Nive almost to Old Moguerre on the Adour. The great advantage of this position was, that the troops, in case of disaster, might securely find refuge under the cannon of Bayonne; while the general-in-chief, having an interior and protected line of communication through that fortress, could at pleasure, like Napoleon at Dresden, throw the weight of his forces from one flank to another, when unforeseen and unguarded against, upon the enemy.†

His political difficulties.

But although, in a military point of view, the position of Soult was thus favourable, his political situation was very different; and it required all his perseverance and vigour of administrative powers to make head against the difficulties which were hourly accumulating round the sinking empire. His soldiers, though depressed by defeat, were still brave and docile: it was the difficulty of procuring supplies which was the real evil; it was the system of making war maintain war which now pressed with terrible but just severity on the falling state. Money, there was none to be got from headquarters in Paris; and the usual resource of the imperial government on such emergencies to levy contributions, however warmly and unanimously approved of so long as they were laid on other countries, was now complained of as the most intolerable of all grievances when they fell upon themselves. Nor is it surprising that this universal indignation burst forth when the imperial system of government came to be really felt in France itself; for we have the authority of official documents for the assertion, that in Navarre, for some years before the French were driven out of the country, the requisitions had often amounted to two hundred *per cent.* of the whole income of the landowners and farmers. So oppressive were the exactions of the French authorities felt to be, that numbers migrated into the British lines, where they were not only subjected to no such burdens, but found a ready and well-paid market for all their commodities. An official letter written from Bayonne at this period said, "The English general's policy, and the good discipline he maintains, does us more harm than ten battles: every peasant wishes to be under his protection." The conscripts raised in all the southern provinces were indeed marched in great numbers into Bayonne; but the ancient spirit of the imperial armies was gone; they deserted by hundreds at a time, although every possible care was taken to treat them with gentleness, to spare their inexperienced frames, and to set them only on duty in the interior of the fortress.*

Wellington's dispositions for the attack.

Having taken his resolution to force his adversary's position in front of Bayonne, Wellington made the following dispositions for the attack: Sir John Hope and General Charles Alten, with the first, fifth, and light divisions, Vandeleur's cavalry and twelve guns, in all twenty-four thousand combatants, were to drive back the French advanced posts along the whole front of the intrenched camp from the Nivelle to the sea. On the right, Sir Rowland Hill, with the second and Portuguese divisions, Vivian and Victor Alten's cavalry, and Ross's horse artillery, was to put himself in motion in the night between the 8th and 9th, so as to pass the Nive by the fords of Cambo at daybreak on the latter day, and advance by the great road from St. Pied-de-Port towards Bayonne. At the same time, Beresford, in the centre, with the third and sixth divisions, was to cross the Nive by bridges to be thrown over it during the night; while the fourth and seventh divisions were to be in reserve a little in the rear, concealed from the enemy, but ready to support any part of the line

* Vict. et Conq., xxii., 291. Nap., vi., 368, 369. Pellot, 79, 80.

† Vict. et Conq., xxii., 290, 291. Nap., vi., 369, 370. Belm., i., 269.

* Soult's Corres. MS. in Nap., vi., 506, 507. Pellot, 79, 80. Toreno, v., 369.

which might require it. The main attack was to be made by the centre and right; the principal object of the advance by Hope on the left was to acquire an accurate view of the nature of the enemy's works between Bayonne and the sea on the Lower Adour. Wellington's object in these movements was not to force the intrenched camp before Bayonne, which, from its being under the guns of that fortress, could not be effected without very heavy loss; but to place his right upon the Adour, after crossing the Nive, whereby the enemy, already distressed for provisions, would lose the means of communication with the interior by the aid of that river, and would be compelled to fall back to other and more distant quarters, from which to draw his resources.*

Forcing of the Nive in the French centre and left.

The requisite preparatory movements having been made with perfect accuracy on the night of the 8th, a huge fire, lighted on a height behind Cambo at daybreak on the 9th, gave the signal of attack. The French had broken down the bridges at Ustaritz in the centre; but the island which connected them was in the possession of the British, and the passage was immediately forced under cover of a heavy fire of artillery, and D'Armagnac's division, which lay opposite, driven back by the sixth division. At the same time, Hill's troops, under the cover of artillery, forced the passage on the right above and below Cambo, and drove the French left wing back on the great road from St. Jean Pied-de-Port to Bayonne. With such vigour was this onset made, that Foy, who commanded in that quarter, was separated from his men, and driven across the fields, with a few followers, towards Hasparen. No sooner, however, did the French troops behold the bale-fire lighted behind Cambo, than they all flew to arms, and Abbé's division, which was nearest, soon joined Foy's men, and their united forces took a position on a range of heights running parallel to the Adour, with Villefranque on their right. At the same time, Hope, with the left wing, moved forward by the great road from St. Jean de Luz towards Bayonne, drove in all the enemy's advanced posts after a vigorous resistance, and approached so near to his intrenchments under that fortress as completely to achieve the object intrusted to him in the general plan of operations. Shortly after noon, the Portuguese of the sixth division having come up, Hill attacked D'Armagnac's troops at Villefranque and the heights adjoining, and, after some sharp fighting, and one repulse, drove them out of the former, and established himself in strength on the latter, the French retiring amid a heavy rain, by deep and almost impassable roads, towards Bayonne.†

Soult's able plan for retrieving his affairs.

The passage of the Nive was now forced, the French left driven under the cannon of Bayonne, and the English general established in a position from whence he could at pleasure, by a slight extension of his right, intercept the navigation of the Upper Adour, the great artery by which the French army was supplied, and the chief object of the attack to cut off. But though this passage had thus been surprised, and the operations successful, his situation had become one of no inconsiderable peril. The Nive, flowing in an oblique direction from southeast to northwest, cut his army in two; while Soult, with his troops concentrated in the intrenched camp, and enjoying ample means of communicating at pleasure, by the bridges of Bayonne, from the one bank to the other, might, unknown to the allies, throw the weight of his forces on either half of their army, when deprived of the means of co-operation from the other. He immediately resolved to take advantage of this singular good fortune, and did so with an ability and decision which would have done honour to Napoleon himself. During the night he drew back the whole of his troops into the intrenched camp, yielding thus to the allies the ground they had won on his left, and permitting them to extend themselves to the Adour, and intercept his principal communications by that river. But, while thus abandoning in appearance the whole objects of the contest, he was preparing a blow which was calculated to effect, and had wellnigh produced, a total change in the fortunes of the campaign. He gave orders in the night for the whole troops to hold themselves in readiness to start at daylight; and, early on the morning of the 10th, he issued forth on the left of the Nive, with nearly his whole disposable forces—after providing for the defence of the intrenched camp and the fortress—about sixty thousand strong, to assail one half of the allies, not mustering more than thirty thousand combatants.*

Situation of the British left and centre at this period. December 10.

At daylight, this formidable apparition burst upon the British left, by which such an onset, after the success of the preceding day, was wholly unsuspected. Hope's troops, with the exception of Wilson's Portuguese, deeming the contest over, had retired to their cantonments: the first division was at St. Jean de Luz, six miles from the outposts; the light division had orders to retire from Bussussary to Arbonne, but had fortunately not begun to move, nearly four miles in the rear; and the fifth division was near Bidart, so that the troops were scattered in a way of all others the most favourable for being cut up in detail. The British brigades which were left in front occupied, indeed, a strong position, stretching along the ridge of Barroilhet, on the left of the great road to the Bidassoa, and along the ridge of Arcangues on its right; and the country in that direction, much intersected by woods and hedgerows, and capable of being traversed, like La Vendée, only by narrow and deep roads, was very susceptible of defence; but the risk was extreme that the light division, not more than six thousand in number, would be crushed before any succour could arrive for its support. The chateau and church of Arcangues, and the village of the same name, constituted strong points of defence; and three tongues of land extended from its front to the northward, by which the enemy must approach; they were held by the 52d, the pickets of the 43d, and the Riflemen, while the valleys between them were clothed with copsewoods,

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Dec. 14, 1813, Gurw., xi., 365. Murray's Gen. Orders in Wyld, 147. Wellington to Sir J. Hope, Dec. 9, 1813, Wyld, 150.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Dec. 14, 1813, Gurw., xi., 365, 366. Nap., vi., 373, 374. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 291, 292.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Dec. 14, 1813, Gurw., xi., 367, 368. Nap., vi., 375, 376. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 293. Belm., i., 269.

which were almost impenetrable. Intrenchments had been ordered to be constructed on a great scale, to strengthen this part of the position; but they were only traced out, and the fourth division, the nearest support, was several miles in rear of the light.*

Desperate combats at Arcangues and Bidart.

In these circumstances, if Soult had adhered to his original design of massing his whole army together on the plateau of Bussussary, and falling at once on the light division at Arcangues, it must inevitably have been destroyed. But in the night he changed his plan, and, instead of concentrating his force on one point, divided it into two corps; the one of which, under Clausel, advanced against Arcangues, while the other, led by Reille, moved against Hope by the great road to the Bidassoa. A heavy rain fell in the night; and it was some time after daybreak ere the enemy, whose vast accumulation of force in front of Arcangues was wholly unsuspected, were observed to be lining the hedgerows, and silently stealing up the wooded hollows in front of Arcangues. Kempt, who was with the pickets, no sooner observed these ominous symptoms than he gave orders to occupy the church and village with his reserves, and there was barely time to complete these preparations when the enemy were upon them. Issuing from the woods and the hollows with loud cries, and all the restored confidence of victory, the French fell upon the pickets on all the tongues of land in front of Arcangues in overwhelming numbers, and the assured anticipation of success. To maintain their ground against such vast odds would have exposed themselves to certain destruction; and the 43d, 52d, and Rifles, with a Portuguese regiment, fell swiftly back along the tongues for above a mile, firing all the way; but no sooner had they reached the open ground at their extremity in front of Arcangues, than these incomparable troops suddenly united their seemingly routed bodies, faced about, and presented an impenetrable front to their pursuers. The French, with loud cries, and extraordinary enthusiasm at their now unwonted success, advanced to the attack, and Soult brought up a battery of twelve guns directly in front of Arcangues, which opened a heavy cannonade on the church and village; but the 43d, Rifles, and Portuguese, by an incessant and well-directed fire of small arms, made good their post, while the 52d held the open ground on the left, towards the great road, with invincible courage.†

Bloody conflict on the left at Barrouilhet.

While this desperate conflict was going on in the centre, in front of Arcangues, a still more sanguinary and doubtful fight had commenced on the left, at Barrouilhet. There the attack was so wholly unexpected, that the first division, and Lord Aylmer's brigade, were at St. Jean de Luz and Bidart, six miles in the rear, when the action commenced about nine o'clock. At that hour, Reille, with two divisions, attacked a Portuguese brigade in Anglet, the advanced post of the left, and soon drove them out of that village, and pursued them with heavy loss to the ridge of Barrouilhet, where they rallied on Robinson's brigade of the fifth division, and stood firm. A confused but desperate and bloody conflict immediately ensued along the whole line in that quarter; as the assailants, hot and vigorous with their success, pushed through the openings in the hedges, at some places successful, in others vigorously repulsed. But by degrees the troops from the rear came up: Lord Aylmer's brigade of the Guards, and Bradford's Portuguese, arrived in breathless haste, and relieved Robinson's men, who, by this time, had suffered severely; and Sir John Hope, who received a severe contusion, with his whole staff, set a noble example of ability, coolness, and devoted valour. Thus time was gained; and, meanwhile, Wellington, who, during the night of the 9th, had been on the right bank of the Nive, alarmed by the heavy fire on his left, repaired in person, at daybreak, to the threatened side of the river, and made the third and sixth divisions cross, while Beresford threw another bridge to facilitate the passage. As soon as he arrived near Arcangues, and saw how matters stood, he ordered up, in addition, the fourth and seventh divisions; and the sight of these imposing masses, which now appeared on the field, so disconcerted Soult, that he suspended all farther attacks, and both parties rested on their arms on the field of battle. Just before dark, however, the two fresh divisions of Taupin and Maransin having arrived in the centre, Clausel made a fresh attack on the village of Arcangues, and the allies were so worn out and reduced in number by incessant fighting all day, that the village and mayor's chateau were both carried; the Portuguese broke and fled, and some of the British regiments began to waver. At that moment, Wellington himself rode up to the troops at the foot of the church: "You must keep your ground, my lads," cried he; "there is nothing behind you—charge!" Instantly a loud shout was raised; the fugitives on the flank rallied and re-formed line; a volley was poured in, the bayonets levelled, and the enemy were driven, still obstinately fighting, out of the village and chateau, which remained in possession of the British, as one bull, his horns close locked in his adversary's, is fairly mastered and pushed back by the superior strength of his antagonist.*

Three German regiments pass over to the allies in the night.

Soult's blow, ably conceived and bravely executed, had now been delivered, and failed; the attack of his concentrated masses on the allied left had been met and driven back by a small part only of the British force. But that indefatigable officer did not yet hold himself beat: instead of being disconcerted by his repulse, he immediately set about fresh combinations to recall victory to his standards. But in the night a disheartening reverse occurred, strikingly characteristic of the sinking fortunes of Napoleon. Two German regiments, one of Nassau and one of Frankfort, came over to the allies, and were received with unbounded joy, drums beating and arms presented by the British battalions, who were drawn up to receive them. They were not deserters, but acted in obedience to the command of their prince, who,

* Nap., vi., 377, 379. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 393. Pellot, 82, 83.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec., 1813, Gurw., xi., 367. Subaltern, 183, 185. Nap., vi., 381, 383. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 294.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Dec. 14, 1813, Gurw., xi., 367, 368. Nap., vi., 385, 386. Gleig's Subaltern, 188, 189. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 294, 295. Pellot, 83, 84.

having joined the ranks of Germany's deliverers on the Rhine, now sent secret instructions to his troops in Soult's army to do the same. Several other German regiments were in Catalonia, and both generals immediately sent advices of what had occurred to the rival chiefs in that province—the one hoping to profit, the other to take warning from the occurrence. Before the intelligence arrived, however, Suchet had already, by the emperor's orders, disarmed the troops of that nation, two thousand four hundred strong, in his army—with a heavy heart, for they were among the best soldiers he had: so that they were merely lost to the French, but not gained to the allies. Those which joined Wellington were immediately embarked at Jean de Luz, and soon after rejoined the ranks of their countrymen on the banks of the Rhine.*

The forenoon of the day following, the 11th, passed without any considerable action; but about two o'clock Wellington ordered the 9th regiment to make a reconnoissance on the left towards Pucho, which led to a sharp skirmish at that point; in which the 9th, being at first unsupported, was at first worsted, but at length, with difficulty, brought off by the aid of some Portuguese which Hope advanced. Soult, upon this, seeing the British unprepared, ordered a general attack on the ridge of Barrouilhet; and he did so with such vigour and celerity, that the French quickly got into the midst of the British position before they were ready to receive them, and a confused action began with great animosity in the village of Barrouilhet and adjoining wood. General Hope, however, soon came up with the 85th regiment; and that noble officer, whose overflowing courage ever led him to the front, where the fire was hottest and the danger greatest, was to be seen among the troops, his lofty figure overtopping all the motley throng with which he was surrounded, animating his men by his voice and example.† By great exertions he at length restored order, and the enemy were repulsed, with a loss of about six hundred on each side; but the fifth division, being now exhausted with fatigue, and much reduced in numbers, was relieved by the first in the front of the position.‡

Soult passes over again to attack Hill on the right of the Nive.

Nothing but a severe cannonade, which consumed fruitlessly four hundred men on each side, took place on the 12th; and Soult, seeing that the bulk of the enemy's forces were now concentrated on the left of the Adour, resolved to renew his attack on the British right, under Hill, on the right bank of that river. With this view, in the night of the 12th, he again drew the bulk of his forces through Bayonne; and leaving only two divisions and Villatte's reserve in the intrenched camp on the left bank of the Nive, crossed over with seven divisions to the right bank, in order to crush Hill, who had now two divisions only and some brigades: in all, fourteen thousand combatants, with fourteen guns, in that quarter. The advantages of the French marshal's position singularly favoured this operation; for his internal line of communication, from the one bank to the other, by the bridge of boats above Bayonne, was three quarters of a league only in length, while Wellington's, on the outer circle, was no less than three leagues. In this way he succeeded, before daylight on the 13th, in placing thirty-five thousand combatants in Hill's front on the right of the Nive at St. Pierre, while seven thousand more menaced his rear. In expectation of this attack, Wellington ordered the sixth division to cross at daylight again to the right of the Nive, and the fourth division, and a part of the third, were soon after moved in the same direction, by the bridge which Beresford had thrown across two days before; while a division of Galicians were brought forward to St. Jean de Luz, and one of Andalusians from the Bastan to the rear of the British army at Itzassu, and fed from the British magazines; but before any of these succours approached, Hill had, by the native valour of his men, defeated the whole efforts of his antagonists, three times more numerous than themselves.*

Position of Hill's corps.

His force was stationed on both sides of the high road from Bayonne to St. Pied-de-Port, and occupied a line about two miles in length. The centre, consisting of Ashworth's Portuguese and Barnes's British brigade, was strongly posted on a rugged conical height, one side of which was broken with rocks and brushwood, while the other was closed in by high and thick hedges, with twelve guns pointing directly down the great road by which the enemy were to advance. The left, under Pringle, occupied a wooded and broken ridge, in the middle of which was the old chateau of Villefranque; the right, under Byng, was posted on the ridge of Vieux Moguerre, nearly parallel to the Adour. The French occupied with their pickets a range of counter-heights, nearly parallel, at the distance of about a mile. Between the two armies was a wide valley or basin, open, and commanded in every part by the allied guns; while the roads were too deep, and the soil too wet, for the action of cavalry. The position was intersected in its centre by the great road to St. Pied-de-Port, as that at Waterloo by the chaussée leading through La Belle Alliance to Charleroi. The heavy rains during the night so swelled the Nive, that Beresford's bridge of boats was swept away; and, though it was soon restored next morning, yet, during the early and most critical period of the action, Hill's corps was entirely separated from the remainder of the army.†

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec., 1813, Gurw., xi., 368. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 296. Nap., vi., 387. Suchet, ii., 357. Subaltern, 193.

† "I have long entertained the highest opinion of Sir John Hope, in common, I believe, with the whole world; and every day's experience convinces me of his worth. We shall lose him, however, if he continues to expose himself to fire as he has done in the last three days: indeed, his escape was then wonderful. His hat and coat were shot through in many places, besides the wound in his leg. He places himself among the sharp-shooters, without, as them, sheltering himself from the enemy's fire."—Wellington *to* Colonel Torrens, *Dec.* 15, 1813, Gurw., xi., 371. The author has a melancholy pleasure in recording these lines to the memory of his noble kinsman, now no more; whose private worth and patriotic spirit, when in the management of his great estates, as Earl of Hopetoun, have enshrined his memory as imperishably in the hearts of his friends and tenantry as his public services have in the annals of his country.

‡ Nap., vi., 388, 389. Pellot, 84. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec., 1813, Gurw., xi., 369.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec., 1813, Gurw., xi., 369. Nap., vi., 389, 392. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 296. Pellot, 84, 85.

† Nap., vi., 392, 393. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 297. Pellot, 85.

French order of attack.

A thick mist on the morning of the 13th enabled Soult to form his columns of attack unperceived by his adversary, and they were extremely formidable. In front, on the great road, came D'Erlon, leading on D'Armagnac's, Abbé's, and Daricau's infantry, with a large body of cavalry and twenty-two guns; next came Foy's and Maransin's men, and behind the other two divisions in reserve. These huge and dark masses, closely grouped together on the high road and fields immediately adjoining, at one time entirely shrouded in mist, at another dimly descried through openings of the vapour, seemed of portentous magnitude. With dauntless hearts, however, the little army of the British beheld the imposing array, albeit well aware that the bridge of the Nive had been swept away, and that no succour would be obtained till the day was far spent. At half past eight the sun broke forth; Soult immediately pushed forward his light troops, and drove in the allied pickets in the centre, which fell back towards St. Pierre. Abbé attacked them with great vigour; D'Armagnac, standing off to the left, directed his troops against Vieux Moguerre and Byng's men; the sparkling line of fire soon crept up the slopes on either side of the basin, and the more distant hills re-echoed with the roar of forty guns, which were worked with extraordinary vigour.*

Battle of St. Pierre, and imminent danger of the British.

Abbé's onset in the centre was pushed with such energy, that Ashworth's Portuguese were soon driven in; and the 71st, which were sent with two guns to their aid, were likewise forced to give ground; but the 50th having advanced to their support, the French, in their turn, were repulsed. The enemy, upon this, brought up a strong battery of cannon, which played on the British centre with such effect that it was seriously weakened; and Abbé, seeing the impression, pushed forward a deep and massy column, which advanced with great vigour, in spite of a crashing cannonade which tore its front and flanks, drove back the Portuguese and 50th, and won the crest of the hill in the centre. Barnes, upon this, brought up the 92d Highlanders, who were in reserve behind St. Pierre; and that noble corps, charging down the highway, soon cleared away the skirmishers on either side, and, driving home, met the shock of two French regiments which were advancing up the causeway, but which soon wavered, broke, and fled, closely followed by the mountain plumes. Soult immediately advanced his guns on either side, the shot from which plunged through the flanks of the pursuing mass, while fresh regiments were brought up to arrest its advance. Despite all their valour, the Highlanders were unable to resist this accumulation of enemies. The French corps in front advanced steadily forward with admirable resolution, and the 92d were borne back desperately fighting, but in disorder, to their old ground behind St. Pierre. The Portuguese guns, upon this, drew back to avoid being taken; the French skirmishers everywhere crowded forward to the summit. Barnes fell, badly wounded; the Portuguese gunners, who had resumed their post in the rear, fell so fast beside their pieces, that their fire was almost extinguished. The 71st were withdrawn from the field, gnashing their teeth with indignation at being taken out of the battle; the 3d, on the right, had yielded to the impetuous attack of D'Armagnac; nothing but the thick hedge in their front prevented Ashworth's Portuguese from being driven from their ground; and already the once dreaded, but long unheard, cries of victory resounded through the French lines.*

Hill restores the action by supporting the centre.

Then was seen in its highest lustre what can be effected in war by individual firmness and resolution, and how vital are the duties which, at the decisive moment, devolve on the general-in-chief. No sooner did Hill, who had stationed himself on a mount in the rear, from whence he could survey the whole field of battle, behold the critical position of the centre and right, and especially the retreat of the 71st and 3d regiments, than he descended from his eminence, and in person led on one brigade of Le Cor's Portuguese infantry to support Barnes's men in the centre, while the other was despatched to aid the right on Vieux Moguerre against D'Armagnac. Meanwhile, the right wing of the 50th, and Ashworth's Caçadores, spread out as skirmishers behind the impenetrable hedge, and still with the most heroic courage made good their post; the 92d, in consequence, had time to reform behind St. Pierre; and their gallant colonel, Cameron, led them again down the road with colours flying and music playing. At this sight the skirmishers on the flanks again rushed forward; the French tirailleurs were in their turn driven back, and the 92d charged at a rapid pace down the highway, until they met the solid column of French infantry, in all the pride of victory, marching up. For a moment the dense mass stood firm; a shock with crossed bayonets seemed inevitable, when suddenly the enemy wheeled about and retired across the valley to their original position, hardly pursued by the victors, who were so thoroughly exhausted with their desperate encounter as to be ready to drop down with fatigue. At the same time, the brave 71st, indignant at being withdrawn from the fight, returned to aid the tartan plumes with such alacrity, and were so gallantly supported by Le Cor's Portuguese, headed by Hill and Stewart, that the enemy on the right centre also were overthrown, though not without heavy loss, among whom was Le Cor himself, who fell severely wounded.†

Progress of the battle on the two wings, which are at length victorious.

While this terrible conflict was going forward in the centre, D'Armagnac, on the British right, with the aid of six pieces of horse artillery, had all but carried the ridge of Vieux Moguerre, where Byng bravely struggled against vastly superior forces. But just as that division, with Foy's, which had now also come up, had established themselves on the summit, and appeared in threatening masses on the right of the British centre, the brigade of Portuguese, so opportunely detached by Hill, arrived in double quick time to their support. These admirable troops, ascending the reverse slope of the ridge under a raking fire from the

* Nap., vi., 395. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 297 Pellot. 85

* Pringle's Memoir, 37, 39. Nap., vi., 395, 397. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 297, 298. Belm., i., 270.

† Pringle's Memoir, 39, 43. Nap., vi., 397, 398. Vict et Conq., xxii., 297, 298.

French guns, now established on the summit, succeeded in rallying the 3d regiment; and, both united, charged again up the hill with the utmost gallantry, and with loud shouts won the top. At the same time, Soult was obliged to withdraw D'Armagnac's reserve to support Abbé in the centre; and Byng, now more feebly opposed, succeeded in re-establishing himself in a solid manner on the Partouhiria range. Meanwhile, Daricau, on the British left, maintained a brave and balanced contest on the hills of Villefranque with Pringle's brigade, who stoutly stood their ground; but the repulse of Abbé in the centre rendered it impossible for the gallant Frenchman to maintain the advanced position he had attained, and his own losses having been very severe, he was obliged to fall back, like the rest, to his original position on the other side of the basin.*

The arrival of Wellington with the other divisions completes the victory.

Thus the victory was complete at all points before the other divisions came up from the left bank of the Nive; but at half past twelve, the sixth division, which had marched without intermission since daylight, and crossed by the re-established bridge of boats behind Villefranque, appeared, led on by Wellington in person, in imposing strength, on the mount in the rear from which Hill had descended; and they were soon followed by the fourth and third divisions, and some brigades of the seventh, who were seen hurrying forward in great haste from the bridge. At this joyful sight, the wearied British, forgetting their fatigues, resumed the offensive at all points. Buchan and Byng's brigades, with loud cheers, hurled D'Armagnac and Foy's divisions down the Partouhiria slope; and the centre, rushing impetuously forward, enveloped and carried all the advanced positions still held by the enemy in front of St. Pierre, taking two guns, which had galled them excessively from the beginning of the fight. In vain Soult hurried to the front, and, exposing his life like the meanest of his followers, besought his men, by the remembrance of their past glories, and the sight of the present dangers of their country, to return to the charge. Nothing could withstand the onward movement of the British; and the French, baffled at all points, recoiled to the ground they had held before the action commenced. The battle now died away, first to a declining interchange of musketry, and then to a distant cannonade; and before night, Soult, despairing of success in any farther attacks, withdrew his troops into the intrenched camp, and himself crossed with Foy's division to the right bank of the Adour, to guard against any attempts on the part of the enemy to cross that important river.†

Results of the battle.

This desperate battle, one of the most bloody and hard fought which had occurred in the whole course of the Peninsular war, cost the British two thousand five hundred, and the French three thousand men The total loss of the allies, rom the time when the passage of the Nive commenced, was six hundred and fifty killed, three thousand nine hundred and seven wounded, and five hundred and four prisoners; in all, five thousand and nineteen; and this included five generals, Hope, Robinson, Barnes, Le Cor, and Ashworth, wounded: a clear proof of the obstinate nature of the conflict, and of the stern necessity which had compelled the chiefs to expose themselves as much as the humblest soldiers. The French lost six thousand men, killed or wounded, on the field, besides two guns, the hard-earned trophies of the fight at St. Pierre: including the German troops who came over on the night of the 10th, they were weakened by eight thousand five hundred men. But, what was of still more importance, they had lost the object for which they fought: the allies had crossed the Nive, and were established in strength on the left bank of the Upper Adour; the navigation of that river was intercepted; and Soult, with all the advantage of an intrenched camp and fortress in his rear, with an interior and central line of communication for his troops, had not only been unable to obtain any durable advantage over the portions of the allied army which he had successively assailed with his whole force, but he had been deprived of his principal line of communications, and disabled, as the event soon proved, from continuing in his defensive position under the cannon of Bayonne.*

Great advantages of Wellington's winter-quarters.

The good effects of the ground which Wellington had won with so much toil and bloodshed, soon appeared in the extended cantonments for his troops, and the enlarged comforts of his men. While the French army, cooped up in its intrenched camp, was deprived of all communication on either side by the Adour, and driven for their forage and support upon the vast and desolate *landes* of Bordeaux, traversed only by land-carriage, and yielding almost nothing for the support of an army, the British troops, comfortably established in Urogne, St. Jean de Luz, and the other towns on the coast, drew ample supplies from the sea on the one side, and the rich fields of Bearn, the birthplace of Henry IV. and the garden of France, on the other. St. Jean de Luz was declared a free port, and, by a special proclamation, protection was afforded to all vessels, even French, which had been or might be found in the Nivelle or the Adour, or in any harbours on the coast of France. By these wise and disinterested measures, joined to the admirable discipline established among his troops, and which he rigorously maintained, and their constant payment for everything in ready money,† Wellington, indeed,

* Pringle's Memoir, 47, 52. Nap., vi., 398, 400. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 298, 299.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th December, 1813, Gurw., xi., 369. Nap., vi., 399, 400. Vict. et Conq., xxii., 299, 300. Pellot, 85, 87.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec., 1813, Gurw., xi., 371. Belm., i., 270. Pellot, 89. La Pene, 72.

† "I do not believe that the union of the two nations depends on pillage; but if it does, I declare, for one, that I desire neither the command nor the continuation of such a bond, founded on plunder. I have lost twenty thousand men in this campaign; and I have not done so in order that either General Murillo, or any other general, should come here to pillage the French peasants; and, as long as I command, I will not permit it. If you are resolved to pillage, look out for another commander than me; for, as long as I am at its head, I declare aloud I will not permit it. You have large armies in Spain; if you desire to plunder, take away the command from me. Enter France, and I will withdraw into Spain; you know well you would be driven out in fifteen days, having neither magazines, money, nor anything requisite to carry on a campaign. France, rich as it is, would never maintain your troops if it is given up to plunder; even those who go on the principle of levying contributions to make war maintain war are well aware that the first thing to do is to stop private disorders. I am

deprived himself of much prize-money which would otherwise have fallen to his lot,* but he secured ample supplies of all sorts for his soldiers. The harbour of St. Jean de Luz was speedily crowded with the pendants of all nations, wafting in profusion everything requisite for the maintenance of his army; while the peasants of Bearn brought their produce more regularly to the British market than they had ever done to that of Bayonne. This admirable conduct, indeed, proved a severe drain upon the British finances, especially as all the payments required to be made in specie; it threw the army, in consequence, seven months into arrear, and accumulated debt to an immense amount in every part of the Peninsula; but Wellington and the government had the firmness to adhere to it with scrupulous fidelity under every difficulty, and their constancy was not without its reward. It entirely stopped the growth of a national war in the south of France, which the pillage of the Spaniards at one period was beginning to excite; it sent the conscripts home by thousands from the tricolour standards; and, by the prodigious contrast which it afforded to the ruinous requisitions of Napoleon, contributed to prepare that general indignation at his government which so soon after hurled him from the throne.†

Reflections on the battles in front of Bayonne.

The battles in front of Bayonne afford one of the most remarkable examples which the whole annals of war have preserved of the importance of an interior line of communication, and the prodigious effect which the skilful use of that advantage can afford in the hands of an able general. Like Napoleon around Mantua in 1796, or in the plains of Champagne in 1814, Soult contrived by means of this circumstance, with an army inferior, upon the whole, to that of his adversary, to be always superior at the point of attack; and such was the weight of the columns which he thus hurled in succession at different parts of the British force, that he more than once all but gained a decisive advantage, and reft from Wellington the fruits of all his conquests beyond the Spanish frontiers. This close approximation to success, also, was attained with troops disheartened by long-continued defeat, and against an enemy flushed with an unparalleled series of victories, and against a commander who never was outdone in the sagacity with which he divined the intentions of his opponent, and the rapidity with which he moved his forces to counteract them. On the other hand, the ultimate defeat of all these efforts, though planned with the utmost ability, and executed with surpassing gallantry by a comparatively small body of the allied troops, proves what so many other events in the war conspire to demonstrate, that a certain degree of firmness in the generals, and courage in the troops, which are thus assailed by the powers of strategy, will generally counterbalance all their advantages, and that it is to the want of these qualities among his opponents, as much as his own genius, that the triumphs of Napoleon in Italy and Champagne are to be ascribed.

Reflections on Soult's conduct in the campaign.

Soult's conduct in the campaign, from the time that he assumed the command in the middle of July, was a model, so far as the general direction of its movements is concerned, of vigour and ability; and probably no other commander in the French army excepting the emperor could, with the same means, have made a resistance equally obstinate and protracted. When it is recollected, that when he took the command of the army in the middle of July at Bayonne, he found it routed and disorganized, and in such a state of depression as to be almost unequal to any active operations, and that in the end of December he was still under the walls of the same fortress, after having, in the intervening period, fought seven pitched battles, and sustained a loss of thirty thousand men, it must be admitted that a more glorious example of tenacious resolution and patriotic resistance is not to be met with in the long and melancholy annals of military exploits. His immediate resumption of the offensive, and advance towards Pampeluna, is one of the happiest instances that ever occurred of a defensive, maintained by a vigorous offensive warfare; and though defeated both then, and in the subsequent engagements on the frontier, by the admirable promptitude and moral courage of his antagonist, yet, in prolonging the contest for such a considerable period, he evinced resources of no ordinary kind. In the execution of his admirable projects, however, in the actual shock of battle, he did not by any means display the same capacity; and if he had evinced as much vigour at Sauroren on the 26th of July, or at Bussussary on the 10th, or St. Pierre on the 13th of December, as he showed ability in the previous conception of the movements which led to these battles, the result might have been different, and the British arms been rolled back with defeat behind the Ebro.

And on Wellington's glorious successes.

The campaign of Vittoria is the most glorious, both in a moral and political point of view, which is to be found in the British annals. When we reflect that at its commencement the English forces were still on the Coa and the Agueda, and the French armies occupied more than one half of Spain, including the whole of its northern fortresses, and that at its conclusion they had been wholly expelled from Spain, the mountain barrier of the Pyrenees forced, and their troops maintaining a painful defensive warfare on the banks of the Adour—it is hard to say whether

the best friend of the soldiers and their real interests when I prevent them from destroying both by pillage. I could also say something in justification of my conduct on political considerations; but I have said enough, and I repeat it. I am altogether indifferent whether I command a large or a small army; but, be it large or small, it must obey me, and there must be no pillage."—WELLINGTON *to* GENERAL MURILLO, *24th Dec.*, 1813, GURWOOD, xi., 396.

* "The proclamation which I issued, declaring that private property should be respected on entering France, has been applied by their owners to the vessels taken in the Nivelle and the Adour; and though I had not such an application in my contemplation when I issued it, yet, as far as I am concerned, who, in personal interest, may be considered a principal party, I am desirous, for the general good, that it should be so applied, and that the owners of these vessels should retain their property. If the law-officers of the crown construe the proclamation otherwise, as applying only to property ashore, I request the authority of his royal highness the prince regent to issue another proclamation, to protect the vessels found in the rivers and ports of France belonging to persons remaining in these houses, as described in my proclamation of November last."—WELLINGTON *to* EARL BATHURST, *8th Jan.*, GURWOOD, xi., 423, 424.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Jan. 8, 1814, Gurw., xi., 423, 425.

we have most cause to admire the ability of the chief who, in so short a time, achieved such unparalleled successes—the hardihood of the soldiers who followed him, unwearied, through such toils and dangers, or the strength of the moral reaction which, in so brief a space, produced such astonishing results. They must appear the more wonderful when it is recollected that, at the commencement of the campaign, the Anglo-Portuguese army could muster only seventy thousand combatants, and the British and Germans in Valencia ten thousand more; that the Spaniards were incapable of being trusted in serious conflict, while the French had one hundred and ninety-seven thousand men present with the eagles, not, as in former campaigns, disseminated over an immense surface from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, but concentrated in the plains of Old Castile and the north of Spain, and in possession of all its frontier fortresses. In three months, the vast fabric, erected with so much toil and bloodshed during five years of previous warfare, was overthrown, and the French armies, which so long, in the pride of irresistible strength, had oppressed the Peninsula, were driven, like chaff before the wind, into their own territories. The march from the frontiers of Portugal to the Ebro, with the left constantly in advance, so as to compel the French to evacuate all the defensive positions which they took up; the skill with which the troops were disposed who gained the decisive battle of Vittoria; the moral courage and quick determination which arrested the torrent of Soult's successes in the Pyrenees; the persevering energy which broke through the mountain barrier of France, and established the British standards under the walls of Bayonne—are so many examples of the highest military ability, which never were surpassed. But it would have been in vain that her chief was endowed with all these rare qualities, if the troops of England which he commanded had not been adequate to the duties to which they were called; but such was the admirable state of discipline and efficiency to which the British and Portuguese soldiers had now arrived, and such the heroic spirit with which they were animated, that it may safely be affirmed they never were surpassed in the annals either of ancient or modern war.

Comparative merit of England and Spain in the struggle.

The national historians of Spain and Great Britain differ widely, and will probably always differ, as to the comparative merit to be assigned to the efforts of their respective nations for the deliverance of the Peninsula; and the French military writers, more jealous of the fame of the descendants of those who fought at Cressy and Agincourt than of the comparatively dim light of Spanish glory, are anxious to ascribe it chiefly to the consuming effects of the guerilla warfare. Perhaps the English military historians, and those especially who were actually engaged in the conflict, and witnessed the innumerable defeats of the Spanish armies, and the unworthy jealousy with which they were actuated, both towards the generals and troops of this country, have gone into the other extreme, and both unduly overlooked the patriotic ardour, and underrated the military influence of the indomitable spirit of hostility to French aggression, which for so long a period animated a large portion of the Peninsular people. Impartial justice will probably ascribe to both their due share in this glorious deliverance: it will admit that the power of Spain was utterly prostrated until England entered as a principal into the strife, and that the prolonged resistance of its people was mainly owing to the necessity of concentrating the French troops on the Portuguese frontier from the effects of Wellington's victories; but that, notwithstanding all the heroism of the Anglo-Portuguese army, and all the ability of its chief, it never could have effected the deliverance of the Peninsula against the forces, generally three, often four times superior, of the French Empire, unless the indomitable perseverance and resolute hostility of the Spanish character had come to their aid, by the distraction which they occasioned to the French armies.

Peculiar moral lustre with which England was encircled from the contest.

But there is one glory connected with the Peninsular war which the British Empire shares with no other power, and which the biographer of Wellington is entitled to claim as exclusively his own. During all the difficulties of the contest, and in the midst of the almost overwhelming embarrassments which arose from the long continuance and oppressive burdens of the war, England never adopted the odious revolutionary principle of drawing the resources for the contest from the country in which it was carried on; and from first to last firmly, to her own great immediate loss, repudiated the maxim that war should maintain war. Whatever she did, she did with her own forces, and from her own means alone: no ravaged country had to rue the day when her standards appeared among them; no wasted realm showed where her armies had been; no tears of the fatherless and the widow, mourning cold-blooded massacres, dimmed the lustre of her victories. If disorders occurred, as occur they did, and occur they will, it was against her system of warfare, and despite the utmost efforts of her chief. With unconquerable constancy, Wellington and the British government adhered to this noble system, in the midst of pecuniary difficulties which would have crushed any other man, and financial embarrassments which would have overwhelmed any other nation. During all this time, Napoleon's generals and armies were revelling in wealth and affluence, and France itself was enjoying comparatively light taxation, the fruit of the unbounded and systematic extortion which they practised in all the countries which their armies occupied. But mark the end of these things, and the final opposite effect of the gains of oppression and the rule of justice upon the fortunes of nations. Napoleon, driven with disgrace behind the Rhine and the Pyrenees, was unable to protect even the mighty empire he ruled from the aroused and universal indignation of mankind; while Wellington, commencing from small beginnings, had at length burst, with an overwhelming force, through the mountain barrier of the south, liberated the whole Peninsula from the oppressor's yoke, and planted his victorious standard, amid the blessings of a protected and grateful people, on the plains of France.

CHAPTER LXXIII.

EUROPE IN ARMS AGAINST FRANCE.—NOVEMBER, 1813, JANUARY, 1814.

ARGUMENT.

Prodigious Results of the Campaign of 1813.—Approaching Trial of the Revolutionary Forces by Misfortune.—Return of Napoleon to Paris, and his first Measures there.—General and intense Discontent which was now accumulating in France.—Deplorable State of the Armies on the Rhine. — Terrible Epidemic which broke out among them. — Great Levies of Conscripts in the Autumn of 1813 in France. — Napoleon's Speech in the Council of State. — Decree ordering a Levy of 300,000 Men.—Napoleon Resolves to abandon the Line of the Rhine.—Alarming Fermentation and Discontent in the Interior of France. — Opening of the British Parliament, and pacific Declarations of the Prince Regent.—Naval and Military Preparations of Great Britain.—Enormous Expenses of the Year. — Prodigious Sums provided for its Service. — Causes of this extraordinary financial Wealth of Great Britain. — The heroic Spirit of the Nation. — Combination of other Causes which produced this Result.—Propositions of the Allied Sovereigns from Frankfort as to a general Peace.— Noble Declaration of the Allies from that Town.—Napoleon's Devices to elude accepting these Terms.—Opening of the Session in the Legislative Body.—Eloquent Speech of Napoleon on this Occasion. — Unexpected and violent Opposition which breaks out in the Chamber of Deputies. —Lainé's Report in the Chamber.—Remarkable Statements which it contained.—Napoleon resolves to dissolve the Chamber, and his Speech to the Council of State on doing so.—His Decree dissolving the Chamber.—His violent Invective against the Deputies at the Tuileries — Measures of Napoleon for the Defence of France.—Treaty of Valençay, by which Ferdinand is restored to the Spanish Crown. — Its Terms. — But it is not ratified by the Regency and Cortes.—Napoleon consents to liberate the Pope, but does not in fact release him.—Negotiations of Murat with Napoleon and the Allies.—He joins the latter, and invades the Roman Territories.—Incipient Defection of Eugene Beauharnois. — Treaty between Denmark and the Allied Powers. — Important Military Confederacy of Germany. — Accession of the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to the new League.—Treaties at Frankfort for regulating this Confederacy.—Negotiations with Switzerland. — The Allies enter the Swiss Territory. — Completion of the Grand Alliance against France.—Immense Forces accumulated by the Allied Powers.—Grand Army of Prince Schwartzenberg.—Strength and Composition of the Army of Silesia. — Army of the Crown-prince of Sweden. — Napoleon's Forces to oppose the Invasion.—Their Distribution.—Hesitation of the Allied Generals at the Idea of invading France. — Plan of Invasion proposed by Alexander, and agreed to by the other Sovereigns. — Line of Invasion from Schwartzenberg's Army.—Plan of Blucher's Invasion.—Operations assigned to the Crown-prince of Sweden.—Feeling of the Allied Armies at this Period.—Incipient Divisions among the Allied Chiefs. — Noble Proclamation of the Emperor of Russia to his Troops on crossing the Rhine.—Reflections on the moral Character of the War.

Prodigious results of the campaign of 1813.

THE astonishing results of the campaign of 1813 appeared more fully when the crash of arms was over, and the alternations of hope and fear no longer distracted the mind from the contemplation of the revolution which it had effected. When the campaign had terminated —when the remains of the Grand Army, mournful and defeated, had wended their way across the Rhine, and the once triumphant Peninsular armies, refluent through the passes of the Pyrenees, had finally abandoned the fields of Spain —the magnitude of the change was such, that it seemed beyond the power of any earthly forces, how great soever, to have effected. Little more than three months had elapsed since four hundred thousand French, flushed with recent victory, were grouped around the fortresses of the Elbe; while two hundred thousand, proud of their expulsion of the British from the plains of Castile, were prepared to maintain on the Tormes or the Ebro the dominion of the Peninsula. Of this immense host, not more than eighty thousand had regained the left bank of the Rhine, and hardly as many remained to arrest the invader on the Adour and the Pyrenees; the remainder had sunk under the sword of the enemy, or wasted away under the horrors of the bivouac and the hospital, or were shut up, without a hope of escape, in the German fortresses. The few who had regained their native land bore with them the seeds of contagion, and a sadness of feeling, which rendered their presence a source of weakness rather than strength to their suffering countrymen. The vast and splendid fabric of the French Empire had disappeared like a dream: its external influence, its foreign alliances, had vanished; the liberated nations of Europe, amid shouts of triumph and songs of gratulation, were crowding in arms to overwhelm its remains; and the mighty victor, reft of all his conquests, was left with no greater resources than the old monarchy of Louis, now nearly drained of its military defenders, to make head against so many iron bands, whom former wrongs had roused to resistance, and recent heroism led to victory.

Approaching trial of the Revolutionary forces by misfortune.

The forces of the Revolution had hitherto basked only in the sunshine of prosperity—so feeble and ill concerted had been the assault of the European powers in 1793, that even the tumultuary arrays which the fervour of the Convention had called forth, and the guillotine of the Committee of Public Safety had retained at their standards, were sufficient to repel them; and the hydra, which might with ease have been crushed in its cradle, was permitted to grow up till it had encircled every monarchy of Europe in its folds. But the period had now arrived when this long career of prosperous, was to be succeeded by a still more striking train of adverse fortune; when the forces of Europe, instead of being arrayed with France against England, were to be arrayed with England against France; when disaster, long continued and universal, was to break in pieces the vast supremacy of former times; and when the iron was to enter into the soul, not merely of the sinking nation, but of every family and individual of which it was composed. This, then, was the real test of the strength and constancy of the Revolution: the period had arrived when the passions of success were no longer to animate, the blaze of victory no longer to allure; but when the stern approach of adversity could be met only by the inherent strength of heroism, or the willing sacrifices of duty. The moment is interesting beyond any other which had occurred in the progress of the contest: for the touchstone was now to be applied to the power, resting on the passions of the World, which had so fearfully shaken those

which were based on the fervour of Heaven; and France was to go through the ordeal from whence had issued the spirit which defended the ramparts of Saragossa, and the devotion which fired the torches of Moscow.

Napoleon set out for Paris from Mayence early in November, and arrived at St. Cloud on the 9th of that month. For the second time within the year, he had reached his capital defeated and forlorn, with his army lost, his power shaken, and his glory dimmed. How disastrous soever the circumstances of his empire were, the energy of the emperor was equal to the emergency. His first care was to convoke the Council of State; and to them he made a candid and true statement of the magnitude of his losses, and the necessity of vigorous measures to avert the dangers by which they were threatened. To them, also, he communicated the terms—which will be immediately mentioned—on which the Allied Sovereigns at Frankfort had declared their willingness to treat for peace. The Council, consisting of the secretaries of state, Talleyrand and Molè, implicitly adopted the views of the emperor—which were in themselves obviously well founded—that, in the emergency which had arisen, it was indispensable to have recourse to a dictatorship, and that vast sacrifices must be demanded of France. The emperor gave the first example of such a sacrifice, by ordering thirty millions of francs (£1,200,000) to be taken from his vaults in the Tuileries for the public service; and he speedily gave earnest of what he expected of his subjects, and of the dictatorial power he was about to assume, by issuing, of his own authority, and without any legislative sanction, a decree, by which thirty additional centimes, that is, nearly a third, was added to the land, window, and door tax—the personal tax on movables was doubled, and three fifths added to the excise duties and the salt-tax. Although these additions to the taxes were plainly illegal, as wanting any legislative sanction, even according to the shadow of constitutional freedom which remained to France under the imperial régime, they were the only means which remained of replenishing the public treasury, which, from the cessation of all external requisitions, and the enormous expenses of the late campaign, was totally exhausted: the confiscation of the funds of the communities and the hospitals of the poor, decreed at the beginning of the year,* had not produced half the sum expected, as few purchasers could be found, and even it was altogether drained away; public credit was ruined; the three per cents were at forty-five; the bank actions of one thousand at three hundred and four; and no capitalist could be found in France who would advance the government five pounds.†

Return of Napoleon to Paris, and his first measures there. Nov. 9.

Nov. 10.

Nov. 11.

But, however indispensable these illegal stretches might be to provide funds for the immediate necessities of the state, they were by no means equally acceptable to the nation; and the time had now come when the unparalleled disasters of the last two years, and the continual drain which the taxes and conscription had occasioned on the wealth and population of the Empire, had produced a general feeling of discontent, which neither the influence of the imperial government could stifle, nor its terrors overawe. The feelings of natural affection had been subdued, and the woful destiny of the young conscripts concealed, so long as "conquest's crimson wings mocked the air with idle state;" but, when the victories of the Empire were at an end, and the armies, instead of advancing continually to fresh conquests, were thrown back with terrific slaughter on their own frontiers; when no marshal's baton in distant prospect could allure the young conscript, but the gloom of the hospital, or the starvation of the bivouac, rose up in grim array to terminate his career in a few months; when relief from domestic taxation, and the means of foreign aggrandizement, were no longer to be attained by the advance of their conquering arms to hitherto untouched fields of plunder, but increase of burdens, and the prospect of themselves suffering from pillage, were imminent from the threatening hosts which were ready to pour into their territory; the minds of the people were of necessity turned into a new direction, and they became sensible of the real tendency and necessary effects of the imperial government. A general feeling of horror, accordingly, especially at the conscription and the excise-tax, now became general in the community: the opinion spread widely that the war was endless, and its exhaustion insupportable; the unbending character and known ambition of the emperor seemed to preclude all hope of a termination being put to it, save by the destruction of France itself; wishes in secret were formed for a change of government, as the only means of escaping from such a multitude of evils; several pieces, containing lines which might be applied to existing circumstances, were prohibited, in consequence, from being represented at the public theatres; defamatory couplets* circulated, and were eagerly received in society; and one in particular, found affixed in the Place Vendôme to the pedestal of the column of Austerlitz, which then, as now, had the statue of the emperor on its summit, had an inscription terribly characteristic of the feeling of the time; for it bore, that "if the blood which he had shed were collected together in that square, it would reach his lips, so that he might drink it without stooping his head."††

General and intense discontent which was accumulating in France.

It was not surprising that this feeling of horror should have pervaded the community of France; for the calamities which had now fallen upon the army, in consequence of the disastrous issue of the late campaign, were extreme.

Deplorable state of the army on the Rhine.

* *Ante*, iv., 35.

† Decree, Nov. 11, 1813, in Cap., x., 298. Fain, MS. de 1814, p. 1.

* Such as, "Napoleon est mauvais jardinier; car il a laissé géler ses grenadiers, et flétrir ses lauriers." The "Tableau Parlant" was prohibited at the theatres, for fear of the application of the line, "Il avait autrefois fait des conquêtes, ce qu'aujourd'hui il ne peut pas."—See CAPEFIGUE

† "Tyran! juché sur cette chaise,
Si le sang tu fis verser
Pouvait tenir en cette place,
Tu le boirais sans te baisser."

Another inscription, in huge letters, was found in the morning affixed to the Tuileries: "Fonds à vendre—Pas cher—Fabrique des Sires."—CAPEFIGUE, x., 4.

‡ Cap., x., 2, 4. Lab., ii., 3, 5.

On returning to Paris, Napoleon had inserted a statement in the *Moniteur*, that the reorganization of the army was rapidly advancing; that the marshals had received re-enforcements to enable them to maintain impregnable the barrier of the Rhine; that the artillery had repaired its losses; the National Guards were crowding into its fortresses; and that all the efforts of the allies would be shattered against that bulwark of art and nature. But in the midst of all this seeming confidence, the real state of the army on the frontier was very different; and disaster, wide-spread and unparalleled, had overtaken the shattered remains of the host which had wended its way back from the Elbe. Though the country through which that retreat had been conducted was rich and cultivated, the season temperate, and the marches not, in general, of unusual length, yet the deplorable effects of Napoleon's system of carrying on war without magazines, or provision of any kind for a retreat, had reduced the troops to the most woful state of destitution. The first corps which passed along the road consumed everything on its line, and within reach of the stragglers on either side, to the distance of several miles; and those which came after, as on the Moscow retreat, could find nothing whatever whereon to subsist. Magazines there were none between the Elbe and the Rhine, a distance of above two hundred miles, except at Erfurth; and the supplies there only maintained the troops during the two days that they rested within its walls. During the fifteen days that the retreat lasted, the men were left to search for subsistence as they best could, along an already wasted and exhausted line; and the consequence was, that they straggled, from necessity, over the whole country, and arrived on the Rhine half starved, in the deepest dejection, and bearing with them the seeds of a frightful epidemic, which soon proved more fatal even than the sword of the enemy.*

Terrible epidemic which broke out among them.

Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine, who had hitherto known war only by its excitement and its glories, when they beheld this woful crowd, refluent by the bridge of Mayence into the French territory, and spreading like a flood over the whole country. But their number was so considerable, that even the zeal and charity of the inhabitants, which were taxed to the utmost, were unable to provide any effectual remedy for their distresses. In the fortified towns, where the great mass of the fugitives, armed and unarmed, found a refuge, their situation, though at first superior, was ere long still more deplorable. The dreadful typhus fever, which they brought with them from the scenes of their suffering in the German plains, soon spread to such a degree among the exhausted crowds who sought shelter within their walls, that in a few days not only the greater part of the military, but a large proportion of the citizens, were prostrate on the bed of sickness. The churches, the hospitals, the halls of justice, the private houses, were soon filled with a ghastly and dying multitude, among whom the worst species of fever spread its ravages, and dysentery wore down extenuated forms to the lowest stage of weakness. Such was the mortality, that for several weeks at Mayence it reached five hundred a day. The exhalations arising from so great a multitude of dead bodies, which all the efforts of the inhabitants could not succeed in burying, were such, that they ere long poisoned the atmosphere, and spread an insupportable and pestilential odour through the whole city. The churchyards and ordinary places of sepulture being soon overcharged, and interment in coffins out of the question, from the multitude of dead bodies which abounded on all sides, they were thrown promiscuously into vast trenches dug in the public cemeteries, which were rapidly heaped up to a height exceeding that of the walls which enclosed them; and, when this resource failed, they were consigned to the Rhine, the stream of which wafted them down, as from a vast field of carnage, to the German Ocean; while the shores of the Baltic were polluted by the corpses, which, borne by the waters of the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, from the vast charnel-houses which the fortresses on their banks had become, bespoke the last remains and final punishment of the external government of the Revolution.*†

* Lab., ii., 3–5. Cap., x., 237, 239.

The internal government of Marie Louise, as regent, after the departure of the emperor for the German campaign, had been sombre and monotonous, little calculated either to distract the attention or dispel the increasing anxieties of the people. She went through, with docility, all the external forms which were required by her elevated situation; and, alike incapable of apprehending either the duties or the perils with which it was attended, submitted with the same impassable temper to the unbounded flatteries with which she was surrounded, and the fearful demands she was compelled to make on the blood of her subjects. In August she obtained a temporary respite from the formal duties which oppressed her in the capital by a journey to Cherbourg, where she had the gratification of beholding the last stone put to that vast construction, partly built, partly excavated from the solid granite, which, commenced by the patriotic spirit of Louis XVI., and continued by the unwearied perseverance of Napoleon, was destined to rival the noble harbours on the opposite coast, from whence the fleets of the proud Albion issued forth to give law to the waves. The feet of the empress were the last which pressed the solid granite of the basin before the new element was let in. But sterner duties soon awaited her. Immediately after her return to Paris, she was made the organ by which the emperor demanded a conscription of thirty thousand men from the Southern departments, and, a month after, another of two hundred and eighty thousand from the whole Empire, which were immediately voted by the Senate: in all, three hundred and ten thousand. They were ordered to be taken in the following proportions: viz., one hundred and twenty thousand from the class attaining the legal age in 1814 and pre-

Great levies of conscripts in the autumn of 1813 in France.

Aug. 19.

Sept. 7.

Oct. 10.

* Lab., ii., 6, 7. Cap., x., 297.

† See *Tableau des Hopitaux pendant la Dernière Campagne de Napoleon*, par J. B. A. HAPDE, Ex-directeur des Hopitaux Militaires, Paris, 1815.

ceding years, and the remainder from those reaching that age in 1815; in other words, who were now *two years* under the legal age of nineteen to twenty-one. So vast had been the consumption of life in the French army, even anterior to the overthrow of Leipsic, in this disastrous campaign on the Elbe and in the Pyrenees, and so fearful the inroads which the insatiable ambition of the Revolution had now made upon the blood and strength of the Empire, that the military population of the proper age was exhausted, and additional troops could be raised only by seizing upon youths of seventeen and eighteen years old, hardly capable of bearing arms, and altogether unfit to withstand the fatigues of a campaign.*

Napoleon's speech in the Council of State.

These ample supplies of men, however, were wholly insufficient to meet the wants of the Empire, after the disasters of Leipsic had thrown them back behind the Rhine, and the invasion of Wellington had laid bare the defenceless condition of the Southern frontier. In the Council of State, the day after his arrival, Napoleon unfolded the danger of his situation with manly sincerity, and enforced his demands with nervous eloquence. "Why," said he, "should we fear to speak the truth? Has not Wellington invaded the South? Do not the Russians menace the North? What shame! and the nation does not rise in a mass to chase them away. All my allies have abandoned me: the Saxons betrayed me on the field of battle; the Bavarians endeavoured to cut off my retreat. Never talk of peace till I have burned Munich. The same triumvirate which partitioned Poland has arrayed itself against France: we can have no truce till it is defeated. I demand three hundred thousand men: with what remains of my armies, I shall then have a million of soldiers. Councillors, what we require is energy: every one should march; you are the chiefs of the nation; it is for you to give an example of courage. Every one speaks of peace; that word alone strikes my ear, while everything around us should resound with the cry of war!"†

Nov. 10.

Decree ordering a levy of 300,000 men. November 15.

On the day following the Senate was assembled, and the demand on the emperor's part of three hundred thousand men brought forward by the orator of government, Fontanes, whose brilliant elocution and sounding periods were well calculated to throw a deceitful veil over the devouring requisitions of the Revolution. Napoleon's own words breathed a nobler spirit. "A year ago," said he, "all Europe marched with us; at present, it all marches against us: that is because the opinion of the world is formed by France or England. We should, then, have everything to fear, but for the power and energy of the nation—posterity will admit that, if great and critical circumstances were presented, they were not above France and me." The levy required was decreed as soon as the project was presented: it was ordered to be taken, not, as in former cases, by anticipation from the young men who would arrive at the age liable to the conscription in the succeeding years, but by *retrospect*, from the classes who had undergone the ordeal of the conscription in former years, from 1803 downward. Thus, within little more than two months, successive levies were demanded from the French people, now reduced almost to their ancient limits, of more than six hundred thousand men: an awful proof of the consumption of human life occasioned in their last stages by the wars of the Revolution. The change in the classes declared liable to the conscription is very remarkable: it indicates the consciousness of government of the arrival of a period when the dreadful destruction of life by the campaigns of 1793 and 1794 had rendered it impossible to draw additional supplies from the young men born in these or the succeeding years, and when it had become indispensable to recur to those who had come into being before the revolutionary scythe had begun to sweep away at once the strength of one generation and the hopes of the next.*†

Napoleon resolves to abandon the line of the Rhine.

Preparations to resist the dreaded invasion were immediately ordered by Napoleon: engineers were despatched to the principal fortresses on the northern frontier, with instructions to repair the walls, arm the ramparts, fortify the bridges and passes, and make every possible preparation for a vigorous defence. But when they arrived there, and became acquainted, by ocular inspection, with the deplorable state and reduced numbers of the army, as well as the total want of any preparation, either in the way of magazines, provisions, or artillery, for putting the frontier fortresses in a state of defence, they were soon convinced that it was altogether impossible to think of defending the line of the Rhine. That great frontier stream, above five hundred miles in length, extending from the foot of the Alps to the sands of Holland, presented, indeed, a most formidable line of defence, if guarded by three or four hundred thousand men; but it was altogether impossible to maintain it with sixty or seventy thousand soldiers, worn out with fatigue, depressed by defeat, with a frightful contagion thinning their ranks, and no magazines to replenish their military stores. It was resolved, therefore, to make no attempt to defend the Rhine, but to fall back at all points across the Vosges Mountains. But the allies were not aware of this resolution: they were ignorant of the weakness and losses of the French army, and paused before the majestic stream which had so long been the frontier of their empire, when they had only to have crossed it to have wrested from the enemy, without firing a shot, nearly a third of France.‡

Alarming fermentation and discontent in the interior of France.

Serious, however, as were the external dangers which menaced the Empire, they were neither the only ones, nor the most pressing, which awakened the anxiety of the emperor. The fermentation in the interior was still more alarming; and it had now become painfully evident that the Revolutionary gov-

* Decrees, Sept. 7 and October 10, 1818, Moniteur; and Goldsmith's Recueil, vi., 517 and 386. Cap., x., 248, 249.

† Lab., ii., 9.

* Decree, Nov. 15, 1813, Moniteur; and Goldsmith's Recueil, vi., 544.

† *Vide Ante*, iv., 32, *et seq.*, where the effect of the conscription on the male population of France—a most curious and interesting subject—is fully discussed.

‡ Fain, Camp. de 1814, 2, 3. Lab., ii., 10, 11

ernment, deprived of the stimulus of external success, was tottering to its fall. The correspondences of the prefects over all France at that period were very remarkable, and clearly bespoke the agitation and uncertainty of the public mind: the conscription, in particular, excited universal alarm, extending, as it now did, not only to those who arrived at the legal age in the course of the year, but to those who had attained that age during the ten preceding years, and who had hitherto deemed themselves secure from farther molestation; while the enormous increase of the excise and assessed taxes, which practically amounted to more than a half, diffused universal consternation—the more so, that it was levied by the sole authority of the emperor. Already the price of a substitute for the army had risen to four or five hundred pounds; the last conscription at once doubled it, and in some instances as much as twelve hundred were given. Families of respectability spent their whole property, the savings of a long lifetime, to save their sons from destruction: it was universally understood, what, in truth, was the fact, that the purchasing of a substitute for the conscription was bribing one man to sacrifice his life for another. In proportion as the dangers of military service increased, desertion from the ranks of the conscripts became more frequent, and its punishment more severe: the prefects were incessantly occupied in enforcing the laws with the utmost rigour against refractory conscripts; long files of them were everywhere to be seen marching along the roads to their places of punishment, with haggard visages, downcast eyes, and a four-and-twenty pound shot chained to their ankles; while great numbers, especially in the mountain districts, driven to desperation by the alternative of such a punishment, or death in the field or in the hospitals, fled to the hills and formed roving bands, which subsisted by plunder, and already bade defiance to the gendarmes and local authorities. Alarmed at the accounts he received from all quarters of this growing disaffection, the emperor adjourned the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, which by a decree, dated from Gotha during the retreat from Leipsic, stood summoned for the 1st of December, to the 19th of that month, in the hope that, in the interim, the negotiations which had commenced with the allies at Frankfort might have taken a favourable turn, and that he might be able to present some prospect, at least, to satisfy the universal desire which was felt for peace; while, to prevent the growing disaffection from affecting the voice of the deputies, a decree was passed by the Senate, vesting, in defiance of the Constitution, the nomination of president of the chamber in the emperor, and prorogating the seat of such of the deputies as had expired, and required to be filled up anew, so as to prevent any new elections in the present disturbed state of the public mind.*

While France was thus reaping, in the utter prostration of public credit, entire exhaustion of the blood of the nation, and universal anxiety which prevailed, the natural consequence of domestic revolution and external aggression, England exhibited, at the same period, a memorable example of the very opposite effects, flowing from a strictly conservative system of government, and afforded a proof of the almost boundless extent of the resources which a country at once orderly and free can develop during the most protracted and arduous struggle. Parliament assembled in the beginning of November, and the speech from the throne dwelt with marked, but not undeserved, emphasis upon the extraordinary successes which had signalized the last memorable campaign; and concluded with the important declaration, "that no disposition to require from France sacrifices of any description, inconsistent with her honour or just pretensions as a nation, will ever be, on the part of his royal highness the prince regent or his allies, an obstacle to the conclusion of peace." The address in answer, moved by the adherents of ministers, was agreed to in both houses without a dissenting voice; so wonderfully had the glorious concluding successes of the war stilled, both in the Legislature and the nation, the furious passions which tore both at its commencement. Lord Liverpool, the prime minister, declared that, in considering the conditions of a general pacification, "it would be the policy of England to give full security, not only to her friends, but her enemies; and that the cabinet would not countenance any demand from them which, in their situation, they would not be willing to concede."*

Opening of the British Parliament, and pacific declarations of the prince regent.

Nov. 4.

Though the language of government, however, was thus pacific, yet, like prudent statesmen, who know that the olive branch is in vain tendered with one hand if the sword is not at the same time unsheathed in the other, they not only admitted no relaxation in their warlike efforts, but made preparations for carrying on the contest on a still more colossal scale than in the preceding campaign. A hundred and forty thousand seamen, including thirty-one thousand marines, were voted for the sea service; the ships of the line in commission were ninety-nine; the total number of vessels of war which in that year bore the royal flag was one thousand and three, of which no less than two hundred and thirty-one were of the line, and six hundred and forty-four in commission. The regular land-forces consisted of two hundred and thirty-seven thousand men, and the regular militia of eighty-three thousand, all of which were obtained by voluntary enrolment; besides two hundred and eighty-eight thousand of the local militia, who were raised by conscription from the population of the British islands. The land-forces in India were two hundred thousand, and forty thousand militia in Canada were under arms, and actively and bravely engaged with the enemy; so that altogether England in this, the twenty-first year of the war, carried on hostilities with one million and fifty-three thousand men in arms.† It is not the least sur-

Naval and military preparations of Great Britain.

* Cap., x., 250, 257. Lab., ii., 10, 11. Decree, Nov. 15, 1813, Goldsmith, vi., 545; and Moniteur, Nov. 16.

* Parl. Deb., xxvii., 22, 42. Ann. Reg., 1813, 200, 201.

† Sailors and Marines 140,000
Regular Army 237,000
Regular Militia 83,000
Yeomanry Cavalry 65,000
Local Militia 288,000
Carried forward....813,000

prising circumstance of these marvellous times, that, with the exception of the local militia, which were imbodied only for a few weeks in the year, and the persons composing which never permanently left their homes, the whole of this immense force was raised by voluntary enrolment; three or four candidates were to be found applying for every vacancy in the Indian army; and the casualties of the British army in Europe, which amounted to twenty-five or thirty thousand annually, were entirely filled up by enlistment, or volunteering from the regular militia: a sytem which had been attended with the very best effects, and which had yielded, in the last six years, no less than a hundred thousand admirable soldiers to the troops of the line. To extend and improve upon this disposition, a bill was passed early in this session of Parliament, authorizing twenty-seven thousand men to be raised by volunteering from the militia in one year: a measure which, with the ordinary recruiting, which was taken at sixteen thousand, would produce at least forty thousand men to meet the wants of the year. By such gentle means was the stupendous force brought together which now carried on the war victoriously in every quarter of the globe, and with so small a consumption of life were the victories gained which now shook to its centre the iron empire of France.*

Enormous expense of the year.

But this immense force could only be maintained by a proportional expenditure; and, great as had been the financial efforts of Great Britain during the former year, they were yet exceeded by the colossal exertions of the present. The cost of the army alone, ordinary and extraordinary, rose to the enormous amount of thirty-three millions, besides four millions and a half for the ordnance; the navy required nearly twenty-two millions; and the interest on the national debt and exchequer-bills, with the sinking fund, was no less than forty-three millions; the loans to Continental states were ten millions; eight millions were advanced to Ireland; and, altogether, the expenditure of the year reached the enormous amount of one hundred and seventeen millions. The necessity of carrying on the war with the utmost vigour, at once by land and sea, both in Europe and America, from the coincidence of the termination of the Continental with the commencement of the Transatlantic contest; the vast expense of the campaign in the south of France, at the same time that the war was prosecuted by British troops in the Netherlands, and all the armies of Europe were arrayed in British pay on the banks of the Rhine, sufficiently explain the causes of this vast expenditure;†‡ and certainly no policy could have been so shortsighted, even in a financial point of view, as that which, at such a crisis, would have hesitated at straining every nerve to improve to the utmost the advantages already gained, and bringing the contest to an immediate and glorious termination.

Prodigious sums provided for the service of the year.

But if it is easy to assign the causes of the vast expenses of the last year of the war, it is a very different matter to explain how the nation was able to bear it; and, in truth, of all the marvels of this period, the most marvellous is the way in which funds were provided by the British Empire for the gigantic expenditure of the concluding years of the war. When we recollect that the finances of France, supported as they still were by the industry of forty-two millions of persons, and aided as they had so long been by the contributions levied from one half of Europe, were at this period utterly bankrupt, and that it was only by the aid of the great reserved fund in the vaults of the Tuileries that the most pressing demands on the treasury could be met, we are at a loss to conceive how it was possible for the British Empire, with a population not at this period, including Ireland, of so much as eighteen millions, by any means to have raised the enormous funds which were annually poured into the public treasury; yet no difficulty whatever was experienced in this particular. The permanent revenue for the year 1814 amounted to nearly forty-four, the war-taxes to thirty millions sterling; thirty-six millions were raised by loan, including that provided for Ireland; and the ways and means reached altogether the enormous sum of ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVEN MILLIONS, independent of above six millions, which was annually raised from the landed property of England for the support of the poor. But this marvel, great as it is, is much enhanced when it is recollected that, such was the unshaken credit and inexhaustible capital of Great Britain, that these prodigious loans were raised, in this the twenty-first year of the war, at the low rate of £4 12*s.* 1*d.* of annual interest; and that even on these reduced terms, such was the competition of the lenders, and rise of the funds and script, at the time the bidding was going forward, that no less than a million of stock was thereby saved to the public—the lenders being inscribed for so much stock in the five and three per cents., and immense fortunes realized to the lucky contractors.*†

Causes of this extraordinary financial wealth of Great Britain.

The Continental writers, struck with astonishment at this growing and expansive power in the British finances, which no demands, how great soever, were able to exhaust, have generally concurred in referring it to the effect of the war itself, which secured to the English merchants the commerce of all civilized nations, and rendered London the centre of the wealth, not only of the British Empire, but of the whole globe. English writers, equally amazed at this extraordinary phenomenon, have sought an explanation of it in the great addition which at this period was made to British industry by the introduction of the steam-engine, and the vast improvements introduced into the machinery for cotton manufacture, and have repeated, again and again, the striking observation, that James Watt stood forth the real conqueror of Napoleon. Without disputing,

Brought forward....	813,000
Native Indian Army	200,000
Militia in Canada.....	40,000
	1,053,000

—Lord Castlereagh's Speech, Nov. 11, *Ann. Reg.*, 1813, 203; and *Parl. Deb.*, xxvii., 86, 87.

* Lord Castlereagh's Speech, Nov. 11, 1813, Parl. Deb., xxvii., 86, 87. Ann. Reg., 1813, 202, 203.

† Budget for 1814. Ann. Reg., 1815, 342; and Parl. Deb., xxx., i., ii., App. ‡ See Appendix A, chap. lxxiii.

* Parl. Deb., xxviii., 66, 67, and xxx., App., 2–5; and Ann. Reg., 1813, 34. † See Appendix A, chap. lxxiii.

however, that these causes had a material effect in counteracting the influence of the many circumstances which, during the progress of the contest, had at various periods tended so powerfully to depress the springs of British industry, it may safely be affirmed, that the influence of this concentration of foreign commerce and growth of manufacturing industry has been much overrated, and that it is in other causes that the true solution of this extraordinary phenomenon is to be found. The coincidence of the American Non-Importation Act, passed in February, 1811, with the exclusion of British commerce from almost the whole Continent by the Berlin and Milan Decrees, had reduced the British exports to a most alarming degree in that year; and though the opening of the Baltic harbours, by the war of 1812, and of those of Germany and the Adriatic by that of 1813, had a powerful effect in counteracting these causes of depression, yet the closing of the North American market, which took off, even at that period, manufactured goods to the amount of fourteen millions annually, had a most prejudicial effect upon every branch of industry; and neither the exports nor imports, accordingly, of 1812 or 1813 had equalled what they had previously been in 1809 and 1810. And those who are accustomed to refer the stupendous financial efforts of Great Britain at the close of the war to the monopoly enjoyed at that period by British commerce, which has been since shared with other nations, or the vast recent growth of its cotton manufactures, will be probably surprised to learn that, at that period, our exports and our imports were not more than a third of what they have since become; that our tonnage little exceeded a half of what it now is; and that the population of the Empire was eleven millions less than the amount which it has attained at this time.*

The heroic spirit of the nation.

The true explanation of this extraordinary and unparalleled phenomenon is to be sought for, not in any casual or accidental circumstances which at that period poured any extraordinary stream of wealth into the British islands, but in the industrious character of their inhabitants, the long protection from foreign aggression which they had enjoyed, the free, and yet tempered spirit of their internal constitution, and the heroic spirit with which they were animated in the latter years of the contest. It is not any casual or passing advantage or monopoly, enjoyed for a few years by its merchants or manufacturers, which can enable a country to maintain a war for twenty years with the most powerful nations in the world, and in its concluding years spend from a hundred and ten to a hundred and twenty millions annually, without raising the rate of interest, or exhausting its national resources. Centuries of pacific exertion, the accumulations of long protected industry, the energy of a free constitution, the security of habitual order, an industrial national character, the influence of long-established artificial wants, and unbounded natural advantages, both for agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, must combine to produce such an astonishing result.

Combination of many causes which produced this result.

England had made good use of this extraordinary combination of advantages during the whole course of the contest; her industry, constantly protected, alike from foreign aggression and domestic spoliation, had flourished amid the revolutionary devastation, or military oppression, of other nations; her agriculture, keeping pace with the rapid growth of her population, had even outstripped the wants of the people, and for the first time for nearly a century, had rendered the Empire, in ordinary seasons, independent of foreign supplies for food; while her commerce and manufactures, enjoying a virtual monopoly of all the lucrative intercourse which the dreadful contest which was raging had left to mankind, though inconsiderable in amount to what they have since become, were attended in general with large profits, and occasioned a vast accumulation of wealth in a comparatively small number of hands. But, though due weight is by no means to be denied to these concurring circumstances, they were not the most important causes which conspired to produce this extraordinary result; they merely brought to maturity the crop prepared by centuries of previous regulated freedom, protected industry, and natural advantages. And all these causes, powerful as they were, would have failed in producing the result, if they had not been aided at the decisive moment by a noble constancy in the government, and spirit in the people, which made them face difficulties and undertake burdens which would have been deemed unbearable in any other age or country, and poured forth the long accumulations of British wealth in the cause of mankind with a profusion which must ever render this the most glorious and animating period of British history.

Propositions of the allied sovereigns from Frankfort as to a general peace.

While Great Britain and France were thus severally preparing for the final struggle which was to decide the great contest between Revolutionary and Conservative principles, the allied sovereigns, assembled at Frankfort, adopted a measure which, more than any other, tended to elevate their cause in the estimation of mankind, and to sever from Napoleon the support of the French people. The Baron Saint Aignan, ambassador of France at the court of Saxe-Weimar, had been made prisoner during the advance of the allies to the Rhine, and in the first moment of his capture he had been received with marked kindness by Metternich, who assured him, in the most emphatic terms, of the anxious wish of the allied powers, and more especially his own sovereign, for a general peace. Five days subsequent to their arrival at Frankfort, they sent for the count, and after again re-

Nov. 9.

* Table showing the Population, Exports, Imports, and Tonnage of the British Empire, in 1811, 1812, and 1814, and in 1836, 1837, and 1838. Records of 1813 destroyed by fire:

Years.	Population of Great Britain and Ireland.	Exports. Official Value.	Imports. Official Value.	Tonnage, British and Foreign.
1811	17,580,000	£28,799,120	£26,510,186	2,072,244
1812	17,830,000	38,041,573	26,163,431	Records destroyed by fire.
1814	18,000,000	53,573,234	33,755,264	1,889,535
1836	26,280,000	97,621,549	57,230,968	3,556,697
1837	26,560,000	85,781,669	54,737,501	3,383,965
1838	27,000,000	105,170,549	61,268,320	4,099,039

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, i., 11; ii., 98 and 174; and *Finance Accounts for* 1840, and PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, ix., 43, 44.

iterating in person, in the strongest terms, their pacific inclinations, despatched him to Paris with a private letter from the Emperor Francis to his daughter Marie Louise, and a diplomatic note from the whole sovereigns, in which they stated the terms on which they were willing to open negotiations. The basis of these terms was, "that France was to be restricted to its natural limits between the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; that Spain should be restored to its ancient dynasty; and that the independence of Italy and Germany should be secured, under princes of their native families. If these terms were agreed to, M. de Saint Aignan was assured that England would make great sacrifices, and would recognise every liberty of commerce and navigation to which France had any right to pretend, and that nothing hostile to the dynasty of Napoleon would be insisted on." Nov. 9.

To these propositions Maret replied, on the part of the French emperor, that "a peace concluded on the basis of the independence of all nations, as well in a Continental as a maritime point of view, had been the constant object of his majesty's solicitude;" and he specified the city of Manheim, on the right bank of the Rhine, which he proposed should be declared neutral, and made the seat of the negotiations. But he did not say whether or not the French emperor would accede to the basis proposed; which omission was justly complained of by Metternich in his reply, as rendering nugatory any negotiation which might be commenced. To this Maret replied that, in admitting as the basis of the whole the independence of all nations, the French emperor had, in effect, admitted all for which the allies contended; and with this explanation Metternich professed himself entirely satisfied.* Nov. 16. Nov. 25. Dec. 2. Dec. 10.

Hitherto everything seemed to augur well for the opening of the negotiation; and, the better to express the views with which they were animated, the allied sovereigns published a declaration, dated Frankfort, 1st of December, 1813, detailing the principles on which they were willing to treat with Napoleon, and the objects for which the alliance contended; and the whole history of the world does not contain a more noble instance of justice and moderation in the moment of triumph than is exhibited in that instrument. "The allied powers," it declared, "desirous of obtaining a general peace on a solid foundation, promulgate in the face of the world the principles which are the basis and guide of their conduct, their wishes, and their determinations. The allied powers do not make war on France, but on that preponderance which, to the misfortune of Europe and of France, the Emperor Napoleon has long exercised beyond the limits of France. They desire that it should be powerful and happy; that commerce should revive and the arts flourish; that its territory should preserve an extent unknown under its ancient kings: because the French power, great and strong, is in Europe one of the fundamental bases of the social edifice; because a great people can only be tranquil so long as they are happy; because a brave nation is not to be regarded as overthrown because, in its turn, it has experienced reverses in an obstinate and bloody struggle, in which it has combated with its accustomed valour; but the allied powers wish themselves to be happy and tranquil—they wish a state of peace, which, by a wise division of power, by a just equilibrium, may hereafter preserve their people from the calamities without number which for twenty years have oppressed Europe. The allied powers will not lay down their arms before they have attained that great and beneficent result; they will not lay them down till the political state of Europe is of new secured, before the immutable principles of justice have resumed their ascendant over vain pretensions, and till the sanctity of treaties has at length secured a real peace to Europe."*

Noble declaration of the allies from Frankfort.

When sentiments so elevated and generous were promulgated openly by the allied powers, it might reasonably have been expected that the negotiations would have been immediately opened by the French government; and certainly never was a defeated monarch and nation invited in such a way to concur in the general pacification of the world. Instead of this, however, Napoleon, by every art, protracted it as much as possible; and, six weeks after M. de Saint Aignan had been despatched with these pacific overtures, the negotiations had not even got the length of naming plenipotentiaries. The basis agreed to by Napoleon was accepted by the allies on the 10th of December, but the letter notifying their acceptance was not even answered by Caulaincourt on the part of France till the 6th of January; and before that time arrived, the Rhine was crossed at all points, and the war carried into the French territory; and the negotiation, in consequence, only commenced at Chatillon at a later period of the campaign. In truth, Napoleon was desirous only to gain time to complete his defensive preparations in his own dominions; and nothing was farther from his intention than to withdraw behind the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; and although the other allied powers were really desirous of an accommodation, yet Alexander was strongly impressed with the idea—which experience soon proved to be well founded—that no real peace was practicable with the French emperor, and that the wisest policy was to await the course of military events, and not fetter themselves by any engagements which might prove prejudicial, in the event of ulterior success, in the great measures which were in preparation. Thus the negotiation which opened under such favourable auspices came at this time to nothing; for this plain reason, that the views of the leaders on both sides were so much at variance, that the difference between them could be adjusted only by the sword.†

Napoleon's devices to elude accepting these terms.

* Rapport de le Baron Saint Aignan, 9th Nov., 1813. Note de Saint Aignan, 9th Nov. Duc de Bassano au Prince de Metternich, 16th Nov., 1813. Réponse de Metternich, 25th Nov., 1813. Lettre de M. le Duc de Vienne au Prince de Metternich, 2d Dec., 1813. Réponse de Metternich, 10th Dec., 1813. All contained in the *suppressed Moniteur* of 20th of January, 1814, and given in FAIN, MS. de 1814, 46–57. *Pièces Justificatifs.*

* Declaration, Dec. 1, 1813, Ann. Reg., 1813, 442; and Schoell, Recueil, ii., 357. Monts., vii., 278.

† Metternich to Caulaincourt, Dec, 10, 1813; and Caulaincourt to Metternich, Jan. 6, 1814, Fain, 57, 58. Danilefsky, Camp. de 1814, 2, 3.

Opening of the session of the Legislative Body.

One reason why Napoleon went, in appearance at least, into this elusory negotiation, was in order to have the benefit of the statement to the Chamber of Deputies, who were summoned to meet on the 19th of December, that negotiations were in progress, without being fettered by any engagement, or the acceptance of any distinct basis of peace. That assembly met, accordingly, at that period; but soon evinced a spirit so refractory, that he found it impossible to carry on the government until they were adjourned. The clamour was too loud, and the spirit of discontent and despair which now prevailed in almost every part of France too deep-seated and profound, to be either stifled by the seductions or overawed by the terrors of the imperial authority. Napoleon opened the session in person, with great pomp. "Splendid victories," said he, "have illustrated the French armies in this campaign; defections without a parallel have rendered those victories unavailing, or turned them against us: France would now have been in danger, but for the energy and union of the French. In these momentous circumstances, my first thought has been to summon you around me: my heart has need of the presence and affection of my subjects. I have never been seduced by prosperity —adversity will find me superior to its strokes: I have often given peace to the nations when they had lost everything; with a part of my conquests I raised up thrones for monarchs who have since abandoned me. I had conceived and executed great designs for the happiness of the world. A monarch and a father, I feel that peace adds to the security of thrones as well as that of families. Nothing on my part is an obstacle to the re-establishment of peace: you are the natural organs of the throne; it is for you to give an example of energy which may dignify our generation in the eyes of posterity. Let them not say of us, they have sacrificed the first interests of their country; they have submitted to laws which England has sought in vain, during four centuries, to impose upon France. I am confident that, in this crisis, the French will show themselves worthy of themselves and of me."*

December 19.

Eloquent speech of Napoleon on this occasion.

M. de Fontanes, the orator of government, answered in his wonted style of sonorous and dignified eloquence, concluding with the exhortation "to rally round the diadem, where the lustre of fifty victories shines through a passing cloud. Fortune is never long wanting to nations which are not wanting to themselves." Napoleon replied, "I will make, without regret, the sacrifices required by the basis proposed by the enemy: my life has but one object, the happiness of the French. Meanwhile, Bearn, Alsace, and Franche Comté are invaded; the cries of that part of my family agonize my heart—I call the French to the assistance of the French! I call the Frenchmen of Paris, of Brittany, of Normandy, of Champagne, of Burgundy, and of the other departments, to the assistance of their brethren! Shall we abandon them in their misfortune? Peace and the deliverance of our country should be our rallying cry. At the sight of a whole people in arms the stranger will fly, or sign peace on the terms which he himself has proposed. The time has gone past when we could think of recovering our conquests."*

Unexpected and violent opposition which breaks out in the Chamber of Deputies.

In the Senate everything went on smoothly, and nothing indicated any distrust of, or opposition to the government. But in the Chamber of Deputies matters soon assumed a very different aspect. Notwithstanding the pains which had been taken by the nomination of a president, the Duke of Massa, by the emperor, and the filling up of all the vacant seats, twenty-three in number, by the same authority instead of the legal mode of election, it soon appeared that a large party in that assembly were animated with a spirit which it was impossible to control. The first serious business which was committed to the Senate and the Chamber was the nomination by each of a committee, to whom the documents connected with the negotiations which had been opened with the allied powers should be submitted. That appointed by the Senate, consisting of Talleyrand, Lacepede, Fontanes, and others, entirely in the interest of government, gave no umbrage to Napoleon. But the list circulated by authority, for the adoption of the deputies, met with a very different reception. It was rejected by a considerable majority, and a committee instead appointed, consisting of persons heretofore, with the exception of one, Lainé, unknown, and over whom the court possessed little influence. It was easy to foresee, from this commencement, that, in the present excited state of the public mind, a contest of a very serious kind awaited the emperor with his own legislature.†

Lainé's report in the Chamber of Deputies. December 28.

In effect, it broke out sooner than could have been anticipated. The committee appointed to consider the diplomatic instruments communicated to them immediately commenced their labours; and their report, drawn by Lainé, was communicated to the chamber, in a secret meeting held on the 28th. This report bore, "that, to prevent the country from becoming the prey of foreigners, it was indispensable to nationalize the war; and this could not be done unless the nation and its monarch were united by closer bonds. It has become indispensable to give a satisfactory answer to our enemies' accusations of aggrandizement: there would be real magnanimity in a formal declaration that the independence of the French people, and the integrity of its territory, is all that we contend for. It is for the government to propose measures which may at once repel the enemy, and secure peace on a durable basis. These measures would be at once efficacious, if the French nation were persuaded that the government, in good faith, aspired only to the glory of peace, and that their blood would no longer be shed but to defend our country and secure the protection of the laws. But these words of 'peace' and 'country' will resound in vain, if the institutions are not guarantied which secure these blessings. It appears, therefore, to the commission to be indispensable that, at the same

* Discours de Nap., Dec. 19, 1813, Moniteur, Dec. 19; and Goldsmith's Recueil, vi., 558.

* Thib., ix., 468. Moniteur, Dec. 22, 1813. Goldsmith, vi., 57. † Thib., vi., 468, 469. Monts., vii., 292.

time that the government proposes the most prompt and efficacious measures for the security of the country, his majesty should be supplicated to maintain entire the execution of the laws, which guaranty to the French the rights of liberty and security, and to the nation the free exercise of its political rights."*

Remarkable statements which it contained.

"The Confederation of the Rhine is an alliance useful only to the Germans: a powerful hand secured them independence. If they prefer the chains of Austria, why not abandon them to their desires? As to Holland, since the allies insist on the conditions of Luneville, we may withdraw without regret from provinces difficult to preserve, in which the English interest exclusively prevails, and to which the English commerce is the price of existence. Have these countries not been so impoverished by the war, that we have seen patrician families withdraw from them, as if pursued by a devastating scourge, to carry elsewhere their industry and their riches? We have need, without doubt, of courage to make the truth known to our emperor; but, with whatever perils the attempt is attended, we will incur them rather than betray his confidence: we would rather endanger our own lives than the existence of the nation.

"Let us attempt no dissimulation: our evils are at their height; the country is menaced on the frontiers at all points; commerce is annihilated, agriculture languishes, industry is expiring; there is no Frenchman who has not, in his family or his fortune, some cruel wound to heal. The facts are notorious, and can never be sufficiently enforced. Agriculture, for the last five years, has gained nothing; it barely exists, and the fruit of its toil is annually dissipated by the treasury, which unceasingly devours everything to satisfy the cravings of ruined and famished armies. The conscription has become, for all France, a frightful scourge, because it has always been driven to extremities in execution. For the last three years the harvest of death has been reaped three times a year! a barbarous war, without an object, swallows up the youth, torn from their education, from agriculture, commerce, and the arts. Have the tears of mothers and the blood of generations thus become the patrimony of kings? It is fit that nations should have a moment's breathing-time; the period has arrived when they should cease to tear out each other's entrails; it is time that thrones should be consolidated, and that our enemies should be deprived of the plea, that we are forever striving to carry into the world the torch of revolution."†

Napoleon resolves to dissolve the Chambers, and his speech to the Council of State.

The reading of this report conjured up a perfect storm in the chamber. It was so long since the words liberty and political rights had been heard within its walls, that the courtiers started, as if high treason had been spoken in their presence. The president, Regnier, interrupted the report. "Orator," said the nominee of Napoleon, "what you say is unconstitutional." "In what?" replied he; "there is nothing unconstitutional here but your presence." The debate was adjourned to the 30th, and a majority of four fifths voted an address to the emperor, and that Lainé's report should be printed and distributed. Napoleon instantly ordered the printing to be stopped, the proofs already thrown off to be seized, and refused to receive the address. He summoned the Council of State, and thus broke forth: "Gentlemen, you are aware of the state of affairs, and the dangers of the country. I thought it fit, without being under any obligation so to do, to make a confidential communication to the Chamber of Deputies on the state of the negotiations, because I wished to associate them with my dearest interests. They have taken advantage of that communication, to turn an arm against me, that is, against the country. Instead of aiding me by their efforts, they restrain my own. An imposing attitude on our part can alone repel the enemy—theirs attracts him. Instead of presenting to him a front of brass, they lay bare our wounds: they demand peace with great cries, when the only possible means of obtaining it is by seconding me in war. They complain of me; they speak of their grievances; but what time, what place, have they chosen for bringing them forward? Is it not in family, and not in presence of the enemy, that they should treat of such subjects? Have I, then, been inaccessible to them? Have I shown myself incapable of listening to reason? Matters have come, however, to such a pass, that a decisive part must be taken. The Legislative Body, instead of uniting with me in saving France, does all it can to precipitate its fall; it betrays its duties. I fulfil mine: I dissolve it."*

His decree dissolving the Chambers.

He then caused to be read a decree, which he proposed to issue, declaring that two fifths of the Legislative Body had already exhausted their powers; that another fifth, on the 1st of January, would be in the same situation; and, therefore, that the Legislative Body was prorogued till the elections were completed. "Such," resumed the emperor, "is the decree which I propose to issue; and if I were assured that this very day the people of Paris, in a body, were to come to massacre me in the Tuileries, I would not the less persevere in it—for it is my duty. When the French people intrusted me with their destinies, I considered the laws given me to govern them; if I had deemed them insufficient, I would not have accepted the charge. They need not suppose that I am Louis XVI. When I became emperor, I did not cease to be a citizen. If anarchy is to be instilled anew, I will abdicate, and mix in the crowd to enjoy my part in the sovereignty, rather than remain at the head of affairs, when I can only endanger all, without protecting any. My determination is conformable to the law: if all would now discharge their duty, I would be invincible behind it as in face of the enemy."†

His violent invective against the Chambers at the Tuileries.

On the day following, being the 1st of January, 1814, on occasion of the public reception of the authorities in the Tuileries, Napoleon broke forth in a strain of vehement invective against the Legislative Body: "Gentlemen," said he, "you have it in your pow-

* Thib., ix., 468, 469. Bucher et Roux, Hist. Parl., xxxix., 458.

† Bucher et Roux, Parl. Hist. de France, xxxix., 457, 458.

* Thib., ix., 469, 470. † Thib., ix., 470, 471.

er to do much good, and you have done nothing but mischief. Eleven twelfths of you are good, the rest are factious. What do you hope for by putting yourselves in opposition? To gain possession of power? But what are your means for doing so? Are you the representatives of the people? I am so: four times I have been invoked by the nation, and four times I have had the votes of four millions of men for me. I have a title to supreme authority which you have not. You are nothing but the representatives of the departments of the nation. Your commission has been guided by the spirit of the Gironde: M. Lainé is a conspirator, an agent of England, with which he is in correspondence by means of the advocate De Seze; the others are actuated by factious motives. I will keep my eye on M. Lainé; he is a bad man. Your report is drawn up with an astute and perfidious spirit, of the effects of which you are well aware. Two battles lost in Campagne would not have done me so much mischief.

"I have immolated my passions, my pride, my ambition, to the good of France. I was in expectation that you would appreciate my motives, and not urge me to sacrifices inconsistent with the honour of the nation. Far from that, in your report you mingle irony with reproach: you tell me that adversity has given me salutary counsels; how can you reproach me with my misfortunes? I have supported them with honour, because I have received from nature a strong and fierce character; and if I had not possessed that ardent temperament of mind, I would never have raised myself to the first throne in the universe. Nevertheless, I have need of consolation, and I expected it from you: so far from giving it, you have endeavoured to cover me with mud; but I am one of those men whom you may kill, but cannot dishonour. Is it by such reproaches that you expect to restore the lustre of the throne? What is the throne? Four pieces of gilded wood covered with a piece of velvet. The real throne has its seat in the nation: you cannot separate the two without mutual injury; for the nation has more need of me than I have of the nation. What could it do without a chief and without a guide? When the question was how we could repel the enemy, you demand institutions, as if we had them not! Are you not content with the Constitution? If you are not so, you should have told me so four years ago, or postponed your demand to two years after a general peace. Is this the moment to insist on such a demand? You wish to imitate the Constituent Assembly, and commence a revolution? Be it so. You will find I will not imitate Louis XVI.: I would rather abandon the throne; I would prefer making part of the sovereign people to being an enslaved king. I am sprung from the people: I know the obligations I contracted when I ascended the throne. You have done me much mischief: you would have done me still more, if I had allowed your report to be printed. You speak of abuses, of vexations. I know, as well as you, that such have existed: they arose from circumstances and the misfortunes of the times. But was it necessary to let all Europe into our secrets? Is it fitting to wash our dirty linen in public, instead of the privacy of our families? In what you say there is part truth and part falsehood. What, then, was your obvious duty? To have confidentially made known your grounds of complaint to me, by whom they would have been thankfully received: I do not love those who have oppressed you more than you do yourselves. In three months we shall have peace: the enemy will be chased from our territory, or I shall be dead. We have greater resources than you imagine: our enemies have never conquered us—never will. They will be chased across the frontier quicker than they have entered it."*

Measures of Napoleon for the defence of France.

The dissolution of the Chambers immediately followed this violent apostrophe, which paints the character of Napoleon better than volumes of ordinary history. Although, however, he had been so vehement in his menaces, and had denounced M. Lainé, in particular, as sold to England, and a traitor to his country, yet no arrests or measures of severity followed. The deputies retired without molestation to their departments; and the emperor, engrossed in military preparations, forgot this transient ebullition of resistance in the Legislature, or prudently dissembled his resentment, lest he should extend still farther a flame which he could not extinguish. Vast preparations were made for resisting the enemy: commissioners were sent down to all the departments to hasten the levies of men, accelerate their equipment and arming, take measures for the equipment and provisioning of the fortresses, and, where invasion was threatened, effect a levy *en masse*. A decree of the 4th of January fixed the budget at 1,176,800,000 francs, or £47,000,000 sterling; and, in order to provide for this immense sum, fifty *per cent.* was ordered to be added to the land-tax; and the duties on doors and windows, as well as the personal and assessed taxes, were doubled by the sole authority of the emperor. The commissioners sent down to the provinces on these momentous missions, however, though invested with very ample powers, were men little calculated to move the masses; being, in general, old generals, or worn-out functionaries of the imperial court, who had no feeling in common with the great bulk of the community; but even if they had been endowed with the energy of Danton or the fire of Mirabeau, the passions were extinct in the nation, the time was past when it was possible again to revive the Revolutionary fever; a sombre feeling pervaded all classes that the wars of Napoleon were endless, and that a change of government or dynasty could alone put a stop to the ceaseless effusion of human blood. And soon the rapid advance of the allies rendered all these defensive preparations of little avail; and the occupation of a third of France by their victorious armies reduced the resources and weakened the influence of the emperor, as much as it augmented the physical means and swelled the moral strength of his antagonists.†

Jan. 4, 1814. January 9.

The presence of external danger at this period extorted from Napoleon two important concessions in foreign diplomacy, which, of themselves, were calculated to have effected an en-

* Bucher et Roux, Hist. Parl. de France, xxxix., 460, 461.
† Thib., ix., 476, 479. Decrees, Jan. 4, and Jan. 9, 1814, Goldsmith, vi., 584, 587. Cap., x., 330, 334.

tire alteration in the relations of the European states to each other, and implied a total abandonment, on his part, of the principal objects of his Continental policy.

Treaty of Valençay, by which Ferdinand is restored to the Spanish crown.

The first of these was the treaty of Valençay, by which he agreed to the liberation of Ferdinand VII. from his confinement in France, and his restoration to the throne of Spain. The coincidence of the invasion of the south of the Empire by Wellington, with the climax of discontent which the Democratic leaders at Cadiz had raised against their English allies, from the glorious successes of their arms, and the entire liberation of the Peninsula from the invader's yoke, naturally suggested to the French emperor the hope that, by relinquishing all thoughts of retaining Joseph on the throne of Spain, and restoring the imprisoned monarch to his dominions, he might not only break the sword of Wellington in his hands, but convert the exasperated Jacobins of Cadiz into useful allies. The sacrifice required was equal to nothing; for Joseph was already bereft of his dominions, and had recently arrived at Paris, accompanied only by a few baggage-wagons, laden with the riches of the Escurial, the poor remains of a lost crown, dishonoured throne, and plundered realm. By the advice of Talleyrand, Napoleon immediately abandoned his disconsolate brother to his fate, and opened a negotiation with Ferdinand, the object of which was to restore him to his dominions, and re-establish peace with Spain on such terms as might be most likely to embroil that power with its English allies. The negotiation was not long of being brought to a conclusion. Ferdinand, wearied of his long detention at Valençay, was overjoyed at the prospect of regaining his liberty and his dominions on any terms; and he had little scruple in agreeing to any terms which were exacted of him, conscious that they would, at all events, procure for him his liberation; and that, if any of them should prove burdensome, he could avail himself of the plea that the treaty was concluded under the coercion of captivity, and was no longer binding on him or the nation after he had regained his independence.*

Terms of the treaty of Valençay.

It was in the middle of November, immediately after the return of Napoleon from Leipsic, that this negotiation was commenced under the direction of Maret, and by the intervention of M. Lafoust, an able diplomatist who had long been ambassador of France at the court of Joseph, and had there acquired an accurate knowledge of the secret springs of influence in the Spanish councils. The emperor wrote to Ferdinand

Nov. 11.

in conciliatory and flattering terms; representing that the affairs of his empire had inspired him with the desire to terminate at once the affairs of the Peninsula, to put an end to the anarchy which had so long desolated its provinces, and terminate that fatal ascendency which England, for its own selfish purposes, had converted into the means of diffusing universal ruin over its kingdoms. Ferdinand replied, in

Nov. 21.

cautious terms, that he could not treat without the consent of the Spanish nation, or at least of the regency; and that, rather than treat without its deputies, he would spend all his life at Valençay. The Duke de San Carlos, however, was sent shortly after to the captive monarch, who was no sooner assured of the intention of Napoleon really to liberate him from his captivity, than he agreed to everything that was required of him. The treaty was concluded on the 11th of December, and stipulated the recognition by the emperor of Ferdinand as King of Spain and the Indies; that the English troops should retire from the Spanish dominions; that Port Mahon and Ceuta should never be ceded to Great Britain; that the high contracting parties should mutually guaranty each other's dominions, and maintain the rights of their respective flags, agreeably to the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht; and that the late monarch should receive an annuity of thirty millions of reals (£300,000), and two millions of reals (£20,000) yearly to the queen-dowager, in case of her survivance. The treaty provided for its ratification by the regency established at Madrid. Thus had Napoleon and Talleyrand the address, at the conclusion of a long and bloody war, in which their arms had been utterly and irretrievably overthrown, to procure from the monarch whom they had retained so long in captivity terms as favourable as they could possibly have expected from a long series of victories; and thus did the sovereign, who had regained his liberty and his crown by the profuse shedding of English blood, make the first use of his promised freedom to banish from his dominions the allies whose swords had liberated him from prison, and placed him on the throne.*

It is not ratified by the regency and Cortes.

The result, however, both disappointed the hopes of the French diplomatists and saved the honour of the Spanish nation. The spirit of the Peninsular Revolution, as Wellington often remarked, was essentially anti-Galician; and though the Democrats of Cadiz, in the ardour of their pursuit of absolute power, had evinced the most inveterate hostility against the English general and his gallant army, and even gone so far as to open secret negotiations with Joseph for the recognition of his title to the crown, provided he subscribed the Republican Constitution of 1812,† yet they recoiled from actual submission to France, and refused their ratification to a treaty, extorted from their sovereign while in a state of captivity, which was calculated to arrest their arms in the moment of victory, and stain the honour of a contest which already resounded through the world. The regency and the Cortes, accordingly, had the virtue to refuse their ratification of the treaty; and although Napoleon, hoping to distract or paralyze the Spanish armies, sent Ferdinand back into Spain, where he arrived by the route of Catalonia on the 19th of March, yet the

March 19.

treaty, as it remained without ratification, made no change in the military operations, and Spain took an honourable part in the war, down to the final overthrow of the power of Napoleon.‡

* Cap., x., 310, 311. Thib., ix., 442, 443.

* Cap., x., 310, 311. Thib., ix., 442, 443. Napoleon to Ferdinand, Nov. 11, 1813. See the Treaty in Martens, i., 654. N. R.

† See *Ante*, iv., 213.

‡ Nap., vi., 511. Wellington to General Clinton, Jan. 27, 1814, Gurw., xi., 480.

Napoleon consents to liberate the pope, but does not in fact release him.

A similar feeling of necessity induced Napoleon shortly after to recede from another favourite object of his ambition, and consent to the liberation of the pope from his long and painful confinement at Fontainebleau. The whole of Christendom had long been scandalized at the prolonged imprisonment of the supreme pontiff, and the French emperor had felt the consequence of the profound indignation which it had excited, in the inveterate hostility of the Peninsular nations, as well as the readiness with which Austria had united her forces to those of the alliance. With the double view, accordingly, of depriving his enemies of this envenomed weapon of hostility, and propitiating Austria—from the diplomacy of which he never ceased to expect secret favour, in consequence of the matrimonial alliance—he made secret overtures to the pope at Fontainebleau early in January; and, what was not a little extraordinary, the person first charged with the delicate mission was a lady of rank belonging to the court of Marie Louise, the Marquise Anne Brignole, of Sienna. She had several interviews with his holiness in November; but the pope was firm in declining to come to any accommodation till he was restored to Rome; and he persisted in the same refusal, when the Archbishop of Bourges formally offered, two months afterward, on the emperor's part, to restore the Holy See as far as Perugio. He replied, that the restitution of his dominions was an act of justice which Providence would work out for itself, and which could not be the fit subject of a treaty while the pope was detained, to the scandal of Christendom, in a state of captivity. He added, "Possibly our faults render us unworthy to behold again the Eternal City; but our successors will recover the dominions which appertain to them. You may assure the emperor that we feel no hostility towards him: religion does not permit it; and, when we are at Rome, he will see we shall do what is suitable." The necessities of the emperor rendered it indispensable for him to disembarrass himself of the presence of the pope, even although he could not extort from him any concessions of territory to prop up his falling empire; and accordingly, four days afterward, on the 22d of January, Pius VII. was conveyed away from Fontainebleau towards the south of France, by Montauban and Castelnaudary. Yet even in this act of concession the grasping disposition of the emperor was rendered apparent: he delayed, on various pretexts, the passage of the supreme pontiff through the south of France, hopeful that a return of fortune to his arms might enable him to retain so precious a prisoner in his power; when Paris was taken by the allied armies, he was still detained at Tarascon, near the mouth of the Rhone; and the final order for his deliverance proceeded from the provisional government which succeeded upon the fall of Napoleon.*

Nov. 15.

Jan. 18.

Jan. 22.

Negotiations of Murat with Napoleon and the allies.

Negotiations of an important character at the same time were going on, between both Napoleon and the allied powers, with Murat, king of Naples. That brave but irresolute prince, seeing clearly the approaching downfall of the emperor, and actuated as well by his own inclinations as the ambition of his queen, Caroline, who, after having tasted of the sweets of royalty, had little inclination to share in the ruin of her brother and benefactor, was desirous above all things, by one means or other, to secure, and, if possible, strengthen, in the coming catastrophe, his own throne. With this view, after the overthrow of Leipsic, when the external fortunes of the emperor were evidently sealed, while he still kept up a confidential correspondence with Napoleon, he advanced a column of troops to Ancona, which he occupied, proclaiming loudly his resolution to establish the independence of Italy. At the same time he secretly opened a negotiation with Prince Metternich, and it was evident that he would join his arms to whichever party bid highest for his alliance. To Napoleon he held out that matters had now arrived at that pass when it was necessary to take a decisive part; that the menacing position of the English in Sicily rendered it wholly impossible for him to hazard the bulk of his forces to the north of the Po; but that, if the emperor would guaranty to him the whole Italian provinces to the south of that river, and unite them all into one monarchy, he would rekindle the flame of independence in Italy, and raise such a spirit in the Peninsula, that Austria would never cross the Adige.* To Metternich he at the same time represented that the ambition of Napoleon was insatiable, as his infatuation was incurable, and that he would willingly enter into a coalition of the allied sovereigns, provided he were guarantied the possession of his Neapolitan dominions. Napoleon having returned no answer to his last and urgent demand for the establishment, in his favour, of a sovereignty embracing the whole territories to the south of the Po, he soon came to terms with the allied powers, and early in January concluded a treaty, by which it was stipulated that he should be guarantied in his Italian dominions, and join their forces on the Po with thirty thousand men.†

Dec. 25.

Jan. 11, 1814.

No sooner was this treaty signed than Murat

* Artaud, Vie de Pie VII., ii., 362, 371. Cap., x., 312, 313.

* "Your majesty need not indulge the hopes you have formed of seeing me pass the Po; for if I put that river between my army and my own dominions, I should have no means of resisting the fermentation which now prevails in Romagna, Tuscany, and my own states. Be assured, sire! the proclamation of the independence of Italy, forming one single power of all its states to the south of the Po, would save that country; without such a measure it is lost beyond redemption: it will be partitioned anew, and your sublime design of emancipating the Italian Peninsula, after having covered it with glory, is forever lost. Put at this moment the provinces beyond the Po at my disposal, and I will engage that the Austrians shall never cross the Adige. The enemy at present shake the Italians by speaking to them of independence; the hope which they have in their armies has hitherto obviated the effect of these propositions; but will they continue proof against such seductions if the King of Naples does nothing to realize their hopes, and continues, on the contrary, to maintain the yoke of the stranger? It is mere delusion to suppose they will. Will your majesty explain yourself on this vital point? Time presses; the enemy is daily re-enforced. I am constrained to silence, and the season approaches when I, in my turn, will be driven to make a choice, and forced to join the enemy. Sire! in the name of all you hold dearest in the world—in the name of your glory—delay no longer. Make peace! make it on any terms!"—MURAT *to* NAPOLEON, 25*th December*, 1813, CAPEFIGUE, x., 544, 545, *note*.

† See the Treaty in Martens, N.R., i., 660. Cap., x., 343, 344.

He joins the latter, and invades the Roman territories. January 19th.

prepared to act in conformity to it, and on the 19th of January entered Rome at the head of 20,000 men. The slender French garrison retired into the castle of St. Angelo; and thus was the second city in Napoleon's empire wrested from him by the arms, not of his enemies, but his brother-in-law and lieutenant, the old comrade and friend whom he had raised from a private station to the throne of Naples! Murat accompanied this invasion by an energetic proclamation, in which he outstripped the most inveterate enemies of France in his denunciation of the perfidy and violence of the Revolutionary government.

Jan. 16, 1814.

"Soldiers! as long as I could believe that the Emperor Napoleon combated for peace and the happiness of France, I fought by his side; but now it is no longer possible to give credit to that illusion. The emperor breathes nothing but war. I would betray the interests of my native country, of my present dominions, and yourselves, if I did not at once separate my arms from his, to join them to those of the powerful allies whose magnanimous intentions are to re-establish the independence of nations and the dignity of thrones. Soldiers! there are but two banners in Europe: on the one are inscribed Religion, Morality, Justice, Law, Peace, and Happiness; on the other, Persecution, Artifice, Violence, Tyranny, War, and Mourning to all nations." A caustic, though just expression, but which sounds strangely coming from a child of the Revolution!*

Incipient defection of Eugene Beauharnois.

In the general fever of anxiety to preserve the dignities and possessions they had acquired, hardly any member of Napoleon's family escaped unsullied. Even Eugene Beauharnois, though both a more exalted and blameless character than Murat, was not uninfected by the contagion: although he wrote publicly that "he would not separate himself from his benefactor," yet he in secret received overtures from the allies, and subsequently sent a plenipotentiary to Chatillon, to attend to his separate interests. What ultimately prevented this negotiation from coming to maturity was not any disinclination on his part to come to an accommodation, but the impossibility of reconciling his pretensions to his Italian dominions with the ambitious views of Austria over that part of the Peninsula. All heads were swept away by the torrent; every former obligation, how great soever, was forgotten. Among the rest, the Princess Eliza, Napoleon's sister, endeavoured to save her fortune in the general wreck: her uneasiness at the prospect of a downfall was extreme, and she lent a ready ear to the suggestion of Fouché when he passed through Florence, on his way back from the honourable exile which the emperor had assigned him at Rome and Naples: "Once Napoleon is dead, everything will fall into its natural place, and they will leave you your beautiful Palazzo Pitti."†

Treaty between Denmark and the allied powers.

In the North of Europe a more honourable constancy in misfortune was exhibited; but the march of events was irresistible; and even the warmest allies of the French were at last compelled to abandon their fortunes, and range themselves on the side of the European confederacy. The Danes, whom jealousy of Russia, not less than the bitter recollection of their capital twice taken by the English, had inspired with a strong predilection for the French alliance, and who had exhibited, like the King of Saxony, an honourable fidelity to their engagements during the general defection of 1813, were unable any longer to continue the contest. Entirely severed from the armies of Napoleon by the evacuation of Germany after the battle of Leipsic; unable either to succour or derive assistance from the corps of Davoust, shut up in Hamburg; pressed by the army of the Crown-prince of Sweden on the south, and the fleets of England on the north, the Danish monarchy was menaced with immediate destruction, and the cabinet of Copenhagen had no alternative but to submit, even on the hard terms of submitting to the cession of Norway. After a short negotiation, accordingly, a treaty was concluded between Denmark and the allied powers, by which it was stipulated that the former should join the coalition against France, and bring to its support a corps, the strength of which was to be afterward determined, to operate in the north of Germany. The King of Denmark agreed to the cession of Norway to Sweden, the King of Sweden, on his part, engaging to maintain the rights and privileges of its inhabitants inviolate; and, in exchange for this painful sacrifice, the Duchy of Pomerania, with the island of Rugen, were ceded by Sweden to the Danish crown. Thus was accomplished the first permanent cession of a kingdom in the North of Europe, consequent upon the wars of the French Revolution; and although history cannot contemplate without regret the violent transference of a brave and ancient people from the government of their fathers to a stranger rule, yet the mournful impression is much alleviated by the reflection that Denmark obtained, to a certain extent at least, an equivalent, adjacent to its own territories; that the Scandinavian Peninsula was thus for the first time united under one dominion, and a power all but insular established in the Baltic, which, with the support of the British navy, may possibly be able to maintain its independence in future times, even beside the colossal power which overshadows the North of Europe.*

Jan. 14, 1814.

Important military confederacy of Germany.

While the grand confederacy was thus strengthening itself by fresh alliances on the shores of the Baltic and the Mediterranean, and the last allies of the French domination were breaking off from its sinking empire, the great central power of Germany was rising with portentous energy at the call of patriotism; and the military strength of its inhabitants, roused to the highest pitch by the trumpet of victory, was directed with consummate talent to the prosecution of the last and greatest object of the war—the final subjugation of the power of Napoleon, and the extrication of Europe from the thraldom of the Revolution. The accession of Bavaria to the coalition, on the eve of the battle of Leipsic, had already been followed by that of

* Thib., ix., 496. Cap., x., 343, 344.
† Cap., x., 344. Fouché, Mem., ii., 254, 255.

* See the Treaty in Martens, Sup., i., 66; and in Schoell, iv., 227.

all the lesser powers which formed part of the Rhenish Confederation; and the great outwork which had been erected with so much effort by Napoleon, to form the advanced post of France against Europe, had already become the outwork of Europe against France. The whole population welcomed the allied troops as deliverers, transports beat in every bosom, joy beamed from every eye; and before even the energy of the allied cabinets could arrange the different governments in their confederacy, the people had everywhere made common cause with their armies. A few of the princes, particularly the Grand-duke Charles of Dalberg, Prince Isenberg, and the Prince of La Layen, held out for the French, and their dominions were, in consequence, occupied by the allied troops; but all the others gladly ranged themselves under the banners of the victorious powers. Already, on the 21st of October, before the sovereigns separated from Leipsic, a convention had been entered into for the organization of the whole forces of Germany against the common enemy, and the best development of these resources for the purposes of the war; and a central administration formed, to direct the efforts and regulate the contributions of the states. At the head of it was placed Baron Stein, whose energy and wisdom had so early prepared in Prussia the means of resistance to the French domination.*

Oct. 21.

The formal accession of the leading princes of the Confederacy of the Rhine was soon obtained to the new league. On the very day after the convention was signed at Leipsic, the King of Wirtemberg concluded a treaty with the allies, and his contingent was fixed at twelve thousand men: the Duke of Saxe-Weimar signed his accession on the 1st, the Duke of Darmstadt on the 2d of November; and the whole lesser princes, with the exceptions above mentioned, followed their example. The Elector of Hesse stood in a somewhat different situation, as he was not a member of the Rhenish Confederacy, as his states had been swallowed up in the rickety kingdom of Westphalia; and he was accordingly admitted into the grand alliance by a separate treaty in the beginning of December, which immediately restored him to the possession of all his ancient dominions, with the exception of the bailiwicks of Dorheim, which had been assigned to the Grand-duke of Darmstadt. The contingent of the Elector of Hesse was fixed at twelve thousand men. The respectable but unfortunate King of Saxony had been treated with unwonted severity by the allied sovereigns after the battle of Leipsic: none of them, excepting the Crown-prince of Sweden, had visited him in his misfortunes; and he had been conveyed away, a prisoner, to Berlin, where he remained, uncertain of the fate which awaited him. But the whole civil and military resources of Saxony were at the disposal of the grand alliance; and its soldiers, borne away by the torrent, marched as cheerfully in the ranks of the Fatherland as those of the states which had gained most by the crusade for its deliverance.†

Accession of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to the new league. October 22.

Nov. 1 and 2.

Dec. 2.

* Schoell, x., 334, 337. Hard., xii., 257, 261.
† Schoell, x., 533, 543. Martens, xii., 643 and 649.

It was both a delicate and complicated work to arrange into one organized whole the various members of the Rhenish Confederacy, and, after adjusting the pretensions, determining on the reclamations, and smoothing down the jealousies of its numerous princes, to combine the whole into one effective league for the prosecution of the war. The general enthusiasm, however, which prevailed rendered these difficulties much less formidable than they would have been at any other time; and the previous organization of Napoleon presented a machine ready made, and of most skilful construction, which was now applied with fatal effect against himself. By two treaties concluded at Frankfort on the 18th and 24th of November, the important objects of providing for the maintenance of the Grand Army, and regulating the contingents to be furnished by all the German princes who had joined the confederacy, were accomplished. To effect the first object, each of the princes of the old Confederacy of the Rhine engaged to provide at once, on his own credit, a sum equal to the gross revenue of his dominions; and the payments were to be made in instalments every three months, till the whole was paid up. The sum-total thus raised at once on credit was 17,116,500 florins, equal to 44,252,000 francs, or about £1,750,000 sterling. In addition to those ample payments in money, the most effective measures were taken to draw forth the military power of the whole states forming the Germanic Confederacy. The contingent of each state was taken at the double of that which it had furnished to the Confederation of the Rhine; the one half to be provided in troops of the line, the other half in landwehr; and in addition to this, corps of volunteers were permitted, and the landsturm, or levy *en masse*, organized and made ready for action, in all the countries which seemed to require such extraordinary precautions. The troops thus raised amounted, independent of the forces of Bavaria, which were thirty-five thousand strong, to upward of a hundred thousand, besides an equal amount of landwehr, and they were divided into six corps. Of these, Saxony furnished twenty thousand; Hanover and Hesse, twelve thousand; Wirtemberg, twelve thousand; and Baden, eight thousand.* The most minute regulations were laid down for providing the requisite supplies, hospitals, and provisions for this vast aggregation of men. So universal and wide-spread was the organization which had now arisen for arraying Europe in a defensive league against France, and so unanimous the concord which the oppressions of the Revolution had established among nations so various, interests so opposite, and animosities so inveterate.†

Treaties at Frankfort, in November, for regulating the German Confederacy against France.

Nov. 18 and 24.

Nothing remained now but to detach Switzerland from the French alliance, and from the great salient bastion of the Alps threaten France on the side where its defences were weakest, and the least precautions had been taken by preceding sover-

Negotiations with Switzerland.

* See Appendix B, chap. lxxiii., for a detailed account of the forces furnished by each of the states of the new German Confederacy. SCHOELL, *Histoire des Traités de Paix*, x., 357.
† Schoell, x., 353, 358. Martens, xii., 619 and 626; and Schoell, Recueil, ii., 58.

signs to guard against foreign invasion. The Helvetic Confederacy, like all weak states, without being either strongly attached to, or exasperated against France, were desirous to preserve their neutrality, and anxiously sought to prevent their country from becoming the theatre of war. Aware of the great importance of securing the frontier of the Jura from insult, if not by the attachment, at least by the interests of his mountain neighbours, Napoleon had studiously avoided both insult and injury to them, and forborne to draw those resources from their territory which the proximity of its situation and warlike character of its inhabitants placed within his reach. They had neither been plundered and insulted like the Prussians, nor denationalized like the Tyrolese: the conscription of men had been far from oppressive, and the cantons had felt the war rather in the obstruction it occasioned to foreign commerce than any peculiar exactions with which it had been attended. An extraordinary diet, assembled at Zurich, had already, in the middle of November, proclaimed the neutrality of the Republic, and sent a body of troops to the frontiers to cause them to be respected. The French emperor readily acceded to a neutrality which promised to secure France from invasion on the side where it was most vulnerable, and immediately withdrew his troops from the canton of Tuino, which they had occupied. But the allied sovereigns were not disposed to be equally forbearing, for it was as much their interest to make their attack from the side of the Alps as it was that of their adversary to avoid it; and accordingly, having resolved to occupy part of the Swiss territory with their troops, they despatched M. Libzettern and Count Capo d'Istrias to the Helvetic Diet, to endeavour to obtain their consent to such a proceeding.*

Nov. 18.

But Austria had taken the initiative in this important negotiation. On the 8th of December, M. de Schrant, the envoy of the cabinet of Vienna at the Helvetic Confederacy, presented a note to the diet, in which he declared the allied sovereigns were resolved to extricate them from their degrading state of dependance, which had now reached such a height, that their orators were obliged to pronounce an annual eulogium on their oppressors. On the 20th of December, M. Libzettern and De Schrant, the Austrian envoy, presented to the diet a note, in which they declared that the intention of the allied sovereigns was to deliver Switzerland from that state of dependance which, under the specious name of protection, had so long kept them in a state of thraldom; that, in carrying these intentions into execution, they must of necessity enter the Helvetic territories; that they could not recognise a neutrality which existed only in name, but that they would interfere in no respect in their internal government; and that, from the moment that their independence was really established, they would rigidly observe their neutrality. To this note was annexed the order of the day, which, on the following day, Prince Schwartzenberg was to issue on entering the Swiss territory.† This decisive step at once destroyed the influence which, under the name of mediation, the French emperor had so long exercised in the states of the Helvetic Confederacy; and as it was followed, next day, by the entrance of the allied forces in great strength into their territories, it produced an immediate effect in the Swiss councils. Eight days afterward, a majority of the deputies of the old cantons, viz., Uri, Schwytz, Lucerne, Zurich, Glarus, Zug, Fribourg, Bale, Schaffhausen, and Appenzel, declared the constitution introduced by Napoleon by his act of mediation, annulled,* and promulgated the important principle, that no one canton should be subjected to the government of another canton—a declaration which, by virtually raising the hitherto dependant cantons of St. Gal, Thurgovia, Argovia, and the Pays de Vaud, to the rank of independent members of the confederacy, laid the foundation of a more extended and equal confederacy in future times. On the 31st of December, the allied sovereigns issued a declaration, in which they called on the Swiss to take up arms to aid in the recovery of their independence; and at the same time come under a solemn engagement not to lay down their arms till the independence of the Swiss Confederacy was secured, and placed under the guarantee of the great powers, and till the portions of it, especially the Valais, which had been seized by the French emperor, were restored to their rightful owners. In these changes, although the aristocratic cantons, especially that of Berne, went cordially along with the allied powers, yet the Swiss, as a whole, were rather passive submitters to, than active auxiliaries of, their arms; but so equitable was the constitution which they ultimately established, and so complete the independence they have since enjoyed under it, that the Helvetic States have no cause to regret the transient evils which the passage of the allied forces through their territory occasioned.†

Dec. 29.

Dec. 31.

Thus was at length accomplished that great

The allies notify their intention to enter the Swiss territory to the Diet, Dec. 8.

Dec. 21.

* Schoell, x., 359, 361. Jom., iv., 521.

† "The irresistible march of events in a war, which just and enlightened men cannot view in a different manner, and the necessity of consolidating and securing the happy results which have hitherto flowed from it, have led the allied armies to the frontiers of Switzerland, and forced them, to continue their operations, to traverse a part of its territory. The necessity of this step, and the vast results dependant on it, will probably furnish a sufficient vindication of it to all reasonable men; but that necessity, great as it is, would not have appeared a sufficient justification in the eyes of the allied powers if Switzerland had been really in a situation to maintain a true and real neutrality; but it is so little in that situation, that all the principles of the law of nations authorize them to regard as null the neutrality they have proclaimed. The allied sovereigns recognise, as the most sacred principle of the law of nations, the right of every state, how inconsiderable soever, to assert and maintain its independence: they are so far from contesting that principle, that it is the basis of all their proceedings; but no state can pretend to neutrality which is not in a condition to assert, and has in fact asserted, its independence. The pretended neutrality of a state which is habitually governed by external influence is but a name; and while it secures to one belligerant the advantages of a substantial alliance, it exposes the other to the evils of a real hostility. When, therefore, in a war, the object of which is to impose limits to a menacing and preponderating power, such a neutrality serves as a shield to injustice, and a barrier to those who strive for a better order of things, it must disappear with the evils which have created it. No one can contest that such is the actual position of Switzerland towards the allied powers on the one hand, and France, whose southeastern frontier it covers, on the other."—*Declaration of the Allied Powers to the Swiss Diet, 21st Dec.*, 1813, SCHOELL, *Recueil*, ii., 8, 12.

* See *Ante*, ii., 263.

† See Schoell, Hist. des Trait., x., 362, 364; and Recueil, iv., 31–42; ii., 1–5, 20.

Completion of the Grand Alliance against France.

confederacy which the prophetic mind of Pitt had long foreseen could alone extricate Europe from the fetters of the French revolutionary power, but which the selfish ambition and blind jealousies of the European states had hitherto prevented them from forming. From the rock of Gibraltar to the shores of Archangel—from the banks of the Scheldt to the margin of the Bosphorus—all Europe was now arrayed in one vast league against France, which was reduced entirely to its own resources. From the kingdom of Italy it could not expect succour, but might rather anticipate demands for assistance: all its other allies were now arrayed against it; and the power which, only eighteen months before, had headed a crusade of all the western states of the Continent against the independence of Russia, was now reduced to combat with its own unaided forces the combined military strength of all Europe! An astonishing change to be produced in so short a time, and strikingly characteristic of the oppression of that military tyranny which could thus, in so brief a space, reconcile interests so discordant, still jealousies so inveterate, and combine forces so far severed by language, race, and political institutions!

Immense forces accumulated by the allied powers.

But the efforts of the allied cabinets, and the enthusiastic spirit which universally prevailed among their people, had now accumulated forces so prodigious for the invasion of France, that nothing in ancient or modern times had ever approached to their magnitude. By the universal arming of the people, and establishment of the landwehr in all the German States, an enormous military force had been collected, which enabled the allies, without materially weakening their military force on the Rhine, to blockade all the fortresses on that river and the Elbe which were still in the hands of the French, and thus irrevocably severed from the French Empire the numerous garrisons, still mustering above a hundred thousand combatants, which were shut up within their walls. The absurdity of Napoleon clinging with such tenacity to these advanced posts of conquest, isolated in the midst of insurgent nations, when he was contending for his very existence in his own dominions, became now strikingly apparent; they at once detached from his standards a vast army, which, if collected together, might have enabled him still to make head against his enemies, but which, in the foreign fortresses, served as so many beacons scattered through the enemy's territory, which at once recalled the recollection of past oppression, and indicated the undiminished resolution to resume it. This extraordinary resolution on the part of the French emperor to abandon, even in his last extremity, none of the strongholds which he held in any part of Europe, and which cost him, from first to last, a hundred and eighty thousand of his best troops, whom it compelled to surrender to bodies, little superior in number, of ill-disciplined landwehr and militia, which beleaguered their walls, was, beyond all doubt, one of the greatest causes of his fall; and it affords a memorable example of the manner in which revolutionary ambition overleaps itself, and throws its votaries down on the other side.

Grand Army under Prince Schwartzenberg.

The forces which the allied powers had collected by the end of December to co-operate in the projected invasion of France and Italy, were thus disposed. The Grand Army, still under the immediate direction, as in the former campaign, of Prince Schwartzenberg, numbered two hundred and sixty thousand combatants; and, even after deducting the usual number of sick and non-effective, might be expected to bring two hundred thousand sabres and bayonets into the field. Its composition, however, was heterogeneous, and though it boasted the Imperial Guards of Russia, Prussia, and Austria within its ranks, and had the *élite* of the forces of those great military monarchies around its standards, yet it was far from being powerful and efficient, as a whole, in proportion to its gigantic numerical amount. It comprised the Austrian corps of Bubna, Lichtenstein, and Giulay; the Wirtembergers, under the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg; the Bavarians and German confederates, under Marshal Wrede; the Austrian Guards and reserves, commanded by Prince Hesse-Homberg; and the confederates, under Prince Philippe of Hesse-Homberg and Count Hochberg. But though these German troops were little short of two hundred thousand strong, and some of them were a noble array, yet the main strength of the army consisted in the Russian and Prussian Guards, and the Russian reserves under the Grand-duke Constantine and Count Milaradowitch. These noble troops, nearly forty thousand strong, the very flower and pride of the allied host, with the Russian corps of Wittgenstein, twenty thousand more, all bronzed veterans who had gone through the war of 1812, formed a reserve, in itself a powerful army, which, in the end, operated with decisive effect upon the fate of the campaign. This army was destined to act on the side of Switzerland and Franche Compte, where there were no fortresses, excepting Besançon Huningen and Sarre Louis, to arrest the progress of an invading army. But, though the line of its invasion was thus comparatively smooth, and it was so formidable from its numerical strength and the quality of a part of its force, this huge array was seriously paralyzed by the presence of the allied sovereigns at its headquarters, by the consequent subordination of military movements to diplomatic negotiation, and by the known cautious and circumspect character of its commander-in-chief.*

Strength and composition of the army of Silesia.

The second army, still called the army of Silesia, under the orders of the celebrated Blucher, was composed of four veteran corps, of which two were Prussian, under the command of D'York and Kleist, and two Russian, under the direction of Langeron and Sacken. To these had recently been added two corps of German confederates, one commanded by the Electoral Prince of Hesse-Cassel, and the other by the Duke of Saxe-Coburg. The total amount of this army was one hundred and thirty-seven thousand, of which upward of fifty thousand were Russians inured to war and flushed with victory, and nearly forty thousand Prussian conscripts burning with the ardour of the war of deliverance. This army was stationed on

* Schoell, x., 378, 379. Plotho, iii. Beil., i.

the northeastern frontier of France, between Mayence and Coblentz, and threatened it on the side of the Vosges Mountains and Champagne; in which, though a double line of formidable fortresses guarded the frontier, yet, if they were blockaded, no natural barrier of any strength was interposed, after the Rhine was passed, between that river and Paris; and a vigorous invasion might with certainty be anticipated from the admirable quality of the troops of which it was composed, and the enterprising character of its chief.*

Army of the Crown-prince of Sweden.

The third army, which was destined to co-operate in the invasion of France, was under the command of the Prince Royal of Sweden. It comprised the Russian corps of Winzingerode, and the Prussian of Bulow, each of which was thirty thousand strong; the corps of German confederates under the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, that of the confederates commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, each of which was thirty thousand; fifteen thousand of Walmoden's men; the Swedish auxiliaries, twenty thousand; and nine thousand English, who took a part in the campaign on the banks of the Scheldt. This army mustered, in all, one hundred and seventy-four thousand combatants, of whom a hundred and twenty thousand, after deducting the sick, and troops blockading the garrisons, might be relied on for operations in the field. But, although this army was thus formidable in point of numerical amount, and the Russian and Prussian corps which it comprised were second to none in experience and valour, yet the positions of the troops, the variety of nations of which they were composed, and the peculiar political situation of their commander-in-chief, rendered it doubtful whether they would render any very efficient services in the course of the campaign. They lay on the Lower Rhine, between Cologne and Dusseldorf, with the iron barrier of the Netherlands, still in the enemy's hands, right in their front; and, though a large proportion of the fortresses of which it was composed were unarmed or ill provisioned, yet others, particularly Antwerp, might be expected to make a formidable defence, and would require to be besieged by considerable forces; and, though the abilities of Bernadotte were unquestionable, and he had, on more than one occasion, rendered important services in the course of the preceding campaign, yet his disinclination, in itself natural and unavoidable, to push matters to extremity against his old country and comrades, was very apparent; and the hopes, which he in secret nourished, of being called, on the fall of the present dynasty, to the throne of France, rendered him in the last degree unwilling to be associated in the minds of its people with the days of their national humiliation or disaster.†

The allied reserves.

Independent of these immense armies, the allied powers had collected, or were collecting, a variety of reserves, which in themselves constituted a mighty host. They consisted of the Austrian reserve, twenty thousand strong, under the Archduke Ferdinand of Wirtemberg; the Russians who were before Hamburg, to the number of fifty thousand, under Benningsen; the Russian reserve, commanded by Labanoff, of fifty thousand, who were collecting in Poland; the Prussian landwehr, engaged in the blockade of the fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder, to the number of fifty thousand men; the Prussian reserve, twenty thousand strong, who were collecting in Westphalia, under Prince Louis of Hesse-Homberg; and the Russian and Prussian force blockading Glogau, in number about fifteen thousand —in all, two hundred and thirty-five thousand; which, with the three grand armies of Schwartzenberg, Blucher, and the Crown-prince of Sweden, already assembled on the frontier of the Rhine; eighty thousand Austrians, who, under Marshal Bellegarde, were destined to act in the north of Italy; and a hundred and forty thousand British, Portuguese, and Spaniards, who, under the guidance of Wellington, were assailing the south in Bearn and Catalonia, formed a mass of A MILLION AND TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND MEN, which was prepared to act against the French Empire.*† A stupendous force! such as had never before been directed against any power in the annals of human warfare; formidable alike from its discipline, its experience, and the immense train of military munitions with which it was furnished; animated by the highest spirit, united by the strongest bonds; stimulated alike by past suffering and present victory; and guided by sovereigns and generals who, trained in the school of misfortune, were at length cordially united in the resolution, at all hazards, to terminate the fatal military preponderance of the French Empire.‡

Napoleon's forces to oppose the invasion.

To oppose this crusade, Napoleon had a most inadequate force at his disposal; not that he had not used the utmost exertions, and made use of the most rigorous means, to recruit his armies, or that his conscriptions on paper did not exhibit a most formidable array of combatants; but the physical strength and moral constancy of his empire were alike exhausted, and his vast levies now brought but a trifling accession of men to his standards. Since the first of September, 1812, that is, during a period of sixteen months, he had obtained from the Senate successive conscriptions to the amount of twelve hundred and sixty thousand men, in addition to at least eight hundred thousand who were enrolled around his banners at the commencement of that period; but of this immense force, embracing on paper at least above *two millions* of combatants, hardly two hundred and fifty thousand could now be assembled for the defence of the Empire; and of these not more than two hundred thousand could, by any possibility, be brought forward in the field. Five hundred thousand had perished or been made prisoners in the Russian campaign; three hundred thousand in the war in Saxony; two hundred and fifty thousand

* Plotho, iii. Beil., ii. Schoell, x., 380, 381.
† Plotho, iii. Beil., iii. Schoell, x., 381, 382.

* Schoell, x., 381, 382. Plotho, iii. Beil., iv.
† Viz., Grand Army under Schwartzenberg 261,650
Army of Silesia under Blucher 137,391
Army of the North under Bernadotte 174,000
Russian, Prussian, and Austrian Reserves 235,000
Austrians in Italy under Bellegarde 80,000
British and Portuguese in France 78,000
Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish armies in Catalonia 62,000
Total acting against France 1,028,041
—SCHOELL, *Traités de Paix*, x., 382, 383. For a detailed account of this immense force, see *Appendix* C, chap. lxxiii.
‡ Plotho, iii., App. Schoell, x., 381, 382.

had disappeared in the two last Peninsular campaigns; nearly a hundred thousand were shut up in the fortresses on the Elbe or the Oder; a still greater number had sunk under the horrors of the military hospitals in the interior; and the great levy of five hundred and eighty thousand in October and November, 1813, had, from the failure of the class to which it applied, in consequence of the conscription having now reached the *sons* of the generation who had been cut off by the dreadful campaigns of 1793 and 1794, proved so unproductive, that the emperor could not, with the utmost exertions, reckon upon the support of more than three hundred and fifty thousand men in the field, to defend the frontiers of his wide-spread dominions, and make head on the Rhine, on the Jura, and on the Garonne, against such a multitude of enemies.*

Distribution of Napoleon's forces.

Such as they were, these forces were thus distributed. Sixty thousand men were blockaded in Hamburg, Magdebourg, and Torgau; and forty thousand in the fortresses on the Oder, the Vistula, in Holland, and Italy; fifty thousand, under Eugene in Italy, maintained a painful defensive against the Austrians under Marshal Hiller; while a hundred thousand, under Soult and Suchet in Bearn and Catalonia, struggled against the superior armies of Wellington and Bentinck. The real army, however, which the emperor had at his disposal to resist the invasion of the allies on the Rhine, did not exceed a hundred and ten thousand men; and this force was scattered over an immense line, above five hundred miles in length, from the Alps to the frontiers of Holland, so that at no period of the campaign could he collect above sixty thousand combatants at a single point. Agreeably to his usual system of never acknowledging in his actions the reality of his resources, and possibly in the hope of deceiving his enemies by the imposing array of his force, this comparatively diminutive host was divided into eight corps; but they were but the skeleton of the Grand Army, and many of its regiments could not muster two hundred bayonets. Victor, with nine thousand infantry and three thousand five hundred horse, guarded the line of the Rhine from Bale to Strasbourg; Marmont, with ten thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry, was stationed along the same river from Strasbourg to Mayence. That important fortress itself, with the observation of the Rhine from thence to Coblentz, was intrusted to Count Morand, with eighteen thousand combatants; from thence to Nimeguen the frontier was guarded by Macdonald, with eighteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; while Mortier, with the Imperial Guard and reserve cavalry, still mustering eleven thousand infantry and seven thousand horse, lay on the Yonne. Ney, with his five divisions, hardly amounting to ten thousand foot-soldiers, occupied the defiles of the Vosges Mountains; and Augereau, with twelve thousand, was stationed at Lyons. Thus, not more than seventy-five thousand infantry and fifteen thousand horse could be relied on to withstand the shock of above three hundred and fifty thousand allies, who could immediately be brought into action; and even after taking into view the reserves forming in the interior, and the depôts at Metz, Verdun, Paris, Troyes, and other places, to which every disposable sabre and bayonet was directed, not more than a hundred and twenty thousand men could possibly be mustered to withstand the threatened invasion, and of those not more than one half could ever be assembled in a single field of battle.*†

Hesitation of the allied generals at the idea of invading France.

Notwithstanding their great superiority of force, the allied sovereigns hesitated before they undertook the serious step of crossing the Rhine; and opinions were much divided as to the proper place to be adopted when the enterprise was resolved on. The physical weakness of the French Empire, the exhausting effects of the long-continued drain upon its military population, the despair which had seized upon the minds of a large portion of its people, from the entire failure of the large efforts they had made to maintain their external dominions, were in a great measure unknown to the allied generals; and they still regarded its frontiers as they had been accustomed to do when Napoleon led forth his conquering bands to humble or subjugate every adjoining state. The catastrophes of two campaigns, how great soever, could not at once obliterate the recollection of twenty years of triumphs; and France, in its weakness, was now protected by the recollection of its departed greatness, as the Grand Army, at the close of the Moscow retreat, had been saved from destruction by the halo which played around the names of its marshals; or as the Lower Empire had so long been sheltered by the venerable letters on its standards, which, amid the servility of Asiatic despotism, recalled the glorious recollections of the Senate and people of Rome. Such was the influence of these feelings, that it required all the enthusiasm excited by the triumph of Leipsic, and all the personal influence and vigour in council of Alexander, to overcome the scruples of the allied cabinets, and lead to the adoption of a campaign based upon an immediate invasion of France with the whole forces of the coalition.‡

Plan of invasion proposed by Alexander, and agreed to by the allied sovereigns.

It was at first proposed that Schwartzenberg's army should cross the Rhine, enter Switzerland near Bale, and enter Italy; to co-operate with the Austrian army in Lombardy, under Bellegarde, while Blucher was to enter near Mayence; and the ar-

* Fain, Camp. de 1814, 28, 31. Schoell, x.

* Vaud., i., 116, 117. Koch, Camp. de 1814, i., 47, 49, 131, 132. Cap., x., 331. Plotho, iii. Beil., v.

† The aggregate of these forces was as follows:

Blockaded in the fortresses on the Elbe		60,000
" " " in Holland, Italy, and on the Oder		40,000
In Italy, under Eugene		50,000
In Bearn, under Soult		70,000
In Catalonia, under Suchet		30,000
At Lyons, under Augereau		12,000
Grand Army under Napoleon, viz.:		
Victor	12,500	
Marmont	10,200	
Morand	18,000	
Macdonald	21,000	
Mortier	18,000	
Ney	10,000	
		89,700
Reserves in the Interior		30,000
		381,700

—See KOCH, *Tableau*, No. III. and IV., and VAUDONCOURT'S *Campagne de* 1814, i., 116, 117.

‡ Danilefsky, Camp. of 1814, 10, 14. Lond., 215, 216.

my of the North, under Bernadotte, threatened the northern frontier on the side of Flanders. But, though this plan was warmly approved by the cabinet of Vienna, which was more intent on effecting or securing the important acquisitions which seemed to lie open to its grasp in Italy than on pushing matters to extremities against Napoleon and the grandson of the Emperor Francis, yet it by no means coincided with the views of Alexander, who was thoroughly convinced of the necessity of striking home at the centre of the enemy's power, and had in secret become convinced that no lasting accommodation could be looked for as long as that great warrior remained on the throne of France. He not only, therefore, strongly urged at Frankfort the immediate resumption of offensive measures on the most extended scale, before France had recovered from its consternation, or Napoleon had gained time to recruit his shattered forces, but proposed the plan of invasion, of all others the best calculated to concentrate the whole forces of the alliance against the centre of the enemy's power, and bring the war to an immediate and decisive issue. This plan consisted in moving the Grand Army, under Schwartzenberg, into Switzerland, and causing it to enter France by the side of Bale and the Jura, while Blucher moved direct from the neighbourhood of Mayence on Paris, and the Prince Royal of Sweden penetrated through the fortresses of Flanders into Picardy and Artois. In this way, not only would France be assailed by the most powerful of the allied armies on the Swiss frontier, where very few fortresses existed to check its advance; but each of the vast invading hosts would act on its own line of operations, had a ready retreat in case of disaster, and yet would be constantly converging towards a common centre, where the last and decisive blow was to be struck. It was a repetition, on a still greater scale, of the plans laid down for the preceding campaign in the conferences of Trachenberg; Switzerland being now the salient bastion which Bohemia had formerly been, and Blucher and Schwartzenberg having nearly the same posts assigned to them in Champagne and Flanders, as on the banks of the Elbe and the sands of Prussia.*†

The advantages of this plan was so obvious, that it at once commanded the assent of the allied generals; and, in the middle of December, the troops over the whole line were put in motion in order to carry it into effect. The Grand Army of Schwartzenberg lay close to Switzerland: that of Silesia extended along the line of the Rhine, from Manheim to Coblentz. The former was intended to enter France by the road through the Jura, from Bale, by Vesoul, to Langres: a city of the highest importance in a strategetical point of view, as being the place where several roads from the south-east and eastern frontier intersect each other. But the prodigious mass of this army, which, after every deduction, was above two hundred thousand strong, could not advance by a single road, and required to effect its ingress by all the routes leading across the Jura from Switzerland into France. It was divided, accordingly, into five columns, which were directed to move by different roads towards Paris and the interior. The first, under Count Bubna, after entering Switzerland by Bale, was to advance by Bearne and Neufchatel to Geneva, and thence descend the course of the Rhine to threaten Augereau, who occupied Lyons with twelve thousand men. The second, commanded by Count Giulay, was to move direct on the great road, through Montbeliard and Vesoul, to Langres. The third, under Lichtenstein, was intrusted with the blockade of Besançon, the only fortress of importance which required to be observed on the Jura and Swiss frontier. The fourth, under Colloredo, was to march on Langres, by Giulay's left, at the same time that it detached two divisions, or half its force, to blockade Auxonne, and advance by Dijon to Auxerre. The fifth, led by Hesse-Homberg, consisting of the Austrian reserves, followed on the same road through Dijon to Chatillon; while the sixth and seventh, under the Prince of Wirtemberg and Marshal Wrede, who had now entirely recovered of his wound received at Hanau, were to cross the Rhine below Huningen, and at Bale; and, after leaving detachments to blockade the fortresses at Huningen, Befort, and New Brisach, move on by Colmar towards Nancy and Langres. Lastly, the eighth, under Barclay de Tolly, with the splendid Russian Guards and reserves, was to take the direction from Bale to Langres, as a reserve to Giulay and Wrede; and the ninth, under Wittgenstein, was to cross the Rhine at Fort Louis, below Strasbourg, and, after leaving detachments to observe Strasbourg and Landau, advance towards the Vosges Mountains; and, after crossing them, take the direction of Nancy.

Line of invasion for Schwartzenberg's army.

* Dan., 14, 17. Alexander to Bernadotte, Oct. 29, 1813, ibid.

† "Here," said Alexander, "is the plan proposed by me, and entirely approved by the Austrian and Prussian commanders-in-chief: Offensive operations on the part of the Grand Army between Mayence and Strasbourg offer many difficulties, as we cannot leave the fortresses behind us without observation. By entering France on the side of Switzerland we meet with incomparably fewer difficulties, that frontier not being so strongly fortified. Another advantage attending this movement is the possibility of turning the viceroy's left wing, and thereby forcing him to a precipitate retreat. In that case, the Austrian army of Italy may advance on Lyons, so as to form a prolongation of our line, and, by means of its left wing, connect our operations with those of the Duke of Wellington, whose headquarters are now at Oleron. In the mean time, Blucher, with one hundred thousand men, may form an army of observation on the Rhine; and, without confining himself to observation, may cross that river near Manheim, and manœuvre against the enemy till the Grand Army reach the field of action. All the four armies, viz., the Grand Army, that of Italy, Blucher, and Wellington, will stand on one line in the most fertile part of France, forming the segment of a circle. The four armies will push forward, and, diminishing the arc, will thus draw near its centre—that is, Paris, or the headquarters of Napoleon. Meantime, your royal highness may advance on Cologne and Dusseldorf, and thence in the direction of Antwerp, by which you will separate Holland from France, and oblige Napoleon either to abandon that important fortress, or, if he endeavour to retain it, materially to diminish, by the numerous garrison which it will require, the effective strength of his armies. The grand object is not to lose a moment, that we may not allow Napoleon time to form and discipline an army, and furnish it with supplies, our business being to take advantage of the disorganized state of his forces. I entreat your royal highness not to lose a moment in putting your army in motion, in furtherance of the general plan of operations." —ALEXANDER *to* BERNADOTTE, 29*th Oct.*, 1831, DANILEFSKY, *Camp. de* 1814, 17, 18. A grand design! very nearly what was ultimately carried into effect, and a memorable proof of the foresight and ability of the Russian emperor, especially when it is recolleetcd it was written only ten days after the battle of Leipsic.

Thus, this great army was to be spread over an immense line nearly three hundred miles in breadth, from Strasbourg to Lyons, occupying the whole country between the Rhine and the Rhone; and, how vast soever its force might be, there was reason to fear that, from their great dispersion, no very powerful body could be collected on any one point, and that possibly it might be outnumbered by the comparatively diminutive, but more concentrated troops of the French emperor.*

Plan of Blucher's invasion.

Blucher's army, at the same time, received orders to prepare for active operations, and it was accordingly brought, about Christmas, 1813, to the close vicinity of the Rhine, between Coblentz and Darmstadt. Unbounded had been the impatience of the ardent veteran at the delay of two months which had succeeded the advance of the allies to the Rhine; and he never ceased to urge upon the allied sovereigns that they should not give Napoleon time to recover from his defeats, but move, with the utmost expedition, across the Rhine to Paris. At the same time, however, with a caution which could hardly have been expected from his impetuous character, he dissembled his wishes, and, in the hope of throwing the enemy off their guard, spread abroad the report that the invasion of France was to take place on the side of Switzerland, and that he, much to his regret, was merely to maintain a defensivs position on the right bank of the Rhine; and, with that view, busily employed himself in purveying for the wants of his troops, as in winter-quarters. At length, on the 26th of December, the long-wished-for orders arrived, and the Prussian general immediately made preparations for concentrating his troops and crossing the Rhine. His instructions were of the simplest description: to cross the river, form the blockade of Mayence, and, without heeding the other fortresses on the Moselle and the Meuse, to push forward, without halting, across France into Champagne, so as to be in readiness, by the 26th of January, to join Prince Schwartzenberg between Arcis and Troyes.†

Plan of operations assigned to Bernadotte.

These were the armies which were destined to commence immediate operations for the invasion of France; but the force of the Prince Royal of Sweden was also concentrated on the Lower Rhine, and was intrusted with a subordinate, but very important part in the general plan of operations. It was well known that this ambitious prince, distracted between his obligations to the allies, and hopes of being advanced by them, upon Napoleon's fall, to the throne of France, was very much at a loss how to proceed, and felt great reluctance at engaging in any invasion which might imbitter the feelings of the French people in regard to him, and endanger the brilliant prospects which he flattered himself were opening on his career. Aware of these peculiarities in his situation, the allied sovereigns assigned to Bernadotte and his powerful army the less obtrusive, but still important part of completing the conquest of Holland, delivering Flanders, besieging Antwerp, and, in general, pressing Napoleon on his northeastern frontier.

To co-operate in these important operations, so interesting to England, and involving the very matters connected with the Scheldt which had originally led to the war,* Sir Thomas Graham, who had returned to England, from ill health, after the passage of the Bidassoa, was despatched with nine thousand British troops to Holland, and landed at Rotterdam in the end of December. The movements of the prince royal, however, were to the last degree tardy: it was long before his operations against the Danes on the north of Germany were concluded; and all the ardour of the generals under his command could not bring forward his numerous columns to co-operate in the general attack upon France, until, fortunately for the common cause, the firmness of Lord Castlereagh overcame his repugnance, and two of his corps were brought up at the decisive moment to re-enforce Marshal Blucher, and rendered the most important service to the cause of Europe.†

Feelings of the allied armies at this period.

The whole troops which were assembled for the final operations of the war were animated with the highest spirit, and buoyant with the most sanguine expectations. More even than the awful catastrophe of the Moscow campaign, the result of the German contest had roused an enthusiasm, and spread a confidence among the allied troops, which, under adequate guidance, rendered them invincible. The disasters of the French could no longer be ascribed to the cold. Inequality of numbers could not palliate repeated defeats on equal fields; unconquerable spirit in the patriot ranks, irresistible ardour in the commencement of the campaign, had evidently supplied the want of military experience, and overwhelming force prostrated consummate talents at its close. Confidence, therefore, was now founded on solid grounds; the long military *prestige* of the imperial armies had passed over to the other side; it is by the last events that the opinion of the great bulk of men is always determined. To the ardent passion for liberation which had characterized the war of independence, had succeeded, now that the deliverance had been effected, another desire, scarcely less general, and to warriors, perhaps, still more exciting—that of obliterating the recollection of former defeats by the magnitude of present triumphs, and making the enemy drain to the dregs the cup of humiliation they had so long held to their own lips. Indescribable was the ardour which this desire awakened in the allied ranks: all had wrongs to avenge, insults to retaliate, disgraces to efface; and all pressed on with equal eagerness to effect the hoped-for consummations. The Russians were resolute to return at Paris the visit paid to them at Moscow; the Austrians, to retaliate on the French the destruction of the ramparts of Vienna; the Prussians, to replace the sword of the Great Frederic at Sans Souci by the sabre of Napoleon from the Tuileries. In fine, the common feeling in the allied armies at this period cannot be better expressed than in the words of Marshal Blucher, in a letter written on the 31st of December, 1813: "At daybreak to-morrow morning I shall cross the Rhine; but, before do-

* Dan., 21, 23. Vaud., i., 122, 123.
† Vaud., i., 118, 119. Dan., 23, 24. Koch, i., 105, 106.

* See *Ante*, i., 191.
† Lond., 27. Dan., 19. Alexander to Bernadotte, Oct. 29, 1813, Dan., 18.

ing so, I intend, together with my fellow-soldiers, to wash off, in the waters of that proud river, every trace of slavery. Then, like free Germans, we shall set foot on the frontiers of the great nation which is now so humble. We shall return as victors, not as vanquished, and our country will hail our arrival with gratitude. Oh! how soothing to us will be the moment when our kinsmen shall meet us with tears of joy!"*

Incipient divisions among the allied chiefs.

But, although the forces of the alliance were thus vast, and the spirit of its armies elevated, no small anxiety pervaded the mind of its chiefs; and the great objects of the confederacy, when on the point of accomplishment, never were nearer being frustrated. Success was already beginging to spread its usual seeds of discord among the sovereigns; separate interests were arising with the prospect of common spoil; ancient animosities reviving with the cessation of common danger. The Emperor of Austria, naturally solicitous for the continuance in the hands of his daughter and her descendants of the sceptre of France, had communicated to his cabinet an anxious desire to postpone, by all means in their power, the adoption of extreme measures against Napoleon; and the whole address of Metternich was employed to attain the object of humbling the once dreaded conqueror sufficiently to render him no longer formidable to his neighbours, and tractable to their wishes, without actually precipitating him from the throne. The Emperor of Russia, on the other hand, actuated by no such interest, more intimately acquainted with the character of the French emperor, and smarting under the recollection of severe wrongs, both personal and national, which he had experienced at his hands, was strongly impressed with the necessity, at all hazards, of prosecuting the war with the utmost vigour against him; and never ceased to maintain that it was by such means only that the peace of Europe could be secured, and the independence of the adjoining states placed on a solid foundation. In this opinion, the King of Prussia, who, when he drew the sword, had thrown away the scabbard, and whose dominions lay immediately exposed to the first burst of returning vengeance on the part of Napoleon, entirely acquiesced; but still the weight of Austria, the talents of Metternich, and the necessity of not hazarding anything which might break up the confederacy, rendered the adoption of the bolder game a matter of great difficulty; and more than once, in the course of the short campaign which followed, had wellnigh frustrated the principal objects of the alliance. The danger was the more imminent, that serious jealousies were already breaking out among the lesser powers in Germany as to the manner in which their separate interests were to be arranged after the great debate of the Revolution had subsided; that the pretensions of Russia to Poland, of Prussia to Saxony, and of Austria to Italy, were already exciting no small disquietude among far-seeing statesmen; and that even among the diplomatists of England, at the allied headquarters, a considerable difference of opinion existed as to the course to be pursued in future, Lord Aberdeen deferring to the views of Metternich, that, to preserve a due equipoise in Europe, peace on reasonable terms should be concluded with the French emperor; and Sir Charles Stewart, with Lord Cathcart, being inclined to the bolder counsels of Lord Castlereagh, which tended to the entire dethronement of Napoleon, and held that no lasting peace could be looked for in Europe without "the ancient race and the ancient territory" for the French nation.*†

Proclamation of the Emperor of Russia to his troops on crossing the Rhine.

But, whatever germes of future division might be arising in the allied councils, there was no stay in the moral torrent which now rolled with impetuous violence towards the French frontier, and no change in the noble sentiments with which their chiefs strove to animate their warriors. It was in these words that, on the eve of crossing the Rhine, Alexander thus addressed his troops: "Warriors! Your valour and perseverance have brought you from the Oka to the Rhine. We are about to cross that great river, and enter that proud country with which you have already waged so cruel and bloody a war. Already have we saved our native country, covered it with glory, and restored freedom and independence to Europe. It remains but to crown these mighty achievements by the long-wished-for peace. May tranquillity be restored to the whole world! May every country enjoy happiness under its own independent laws and government! May religion, arts, science, and commerce flourish in every land for the general welfare of nations! This, and not the continuance of war and destruction, is our object. Our enemies, by pouring to the heart of our dominions, wrought us much evil; but dreadful was the retribution: the Divine wrath crushed them. Let us not take example from them: inhumanity and ferocity cannot be pleasing in the eyes of a merciful God. Let us forget what they have done against us. Instead of animosity and revenge, let us approach them with words of kindness, with the outstretched hand of reconciliation. Such is the lesson taught by our holy faith: Divine lips have pronounced the command, 'Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you.' Warriors! I trust that, by your moderation in the enemy's country, you will conquer as much by generosity as by arms, and that, uniting the valour of the soldier against the armed with the charity of the Christian towards the unarmed, you will crown your exploits by keeping stainless your well-earned reputation of a brave and moral people."‡

Memorable words! not merely as breathing the noble feelings of the sovereign who thus, in the moment of victory, stayed the uplifted hand

* Blucher to his Son, Dec. 31, 1813, Dan., 24.

* Lond., 241, 253. Dan., 3–10. Cap., x., 335, 336, 366.

† "If Napoleon were forced from the throne of France, much difference of opinion might exist on the great question of a successor. I was clearly of opinion that the re-establishment of the Bourbons would be more acceptable in England than any other arrangement which could possibly be made. Others maintained that it might be policy to keep Bonaparte on the throne, with his wings clipped to the utmost, in preference to restoring the hereditary princes, who might again assume a sway similar to the times of Louis XIV., and become formidable alike to England and the powers on the Continent. The difficulty at this crisis consisted in fixing upon the fundamental principles to be adopted, and the points to be obtained; and it seemed indispensable that the government of England should send their minister of foreign affairs to the theatre of action, as no one could act with the same advantages."—LORD LONDONDERRY'S *War in Germany*, 244.

‡ Dan., 15, 16.

Reflections on the moral character of the war.

of conquest, and sought to avenge the desolation of Russia by the salvation of France; but as indicating the spirit by which the contest itself was animated on the part of the allies, and the strength of that moral reaction which, based on the principles of religion, had now surmounted all the interests of time, and communicated its blessed spirit even to the stern warriors whose valour had delivered the world. When Napoleon crossed the Niemen, he addressed his followers in the words of worldly glory; he struck the chord which could alone vibrate in the hearts of the children of the Revolution: he said of Russia, "Fate drags her on; let her destinies be fulfilled."* When Alexander approached the Rhine, he spoke to his soldiers in the language of the Gospel; he strove only to moderate the ferocity of war: he ascribed his victory to the arm of Omnipotence. Such was the spirit which conquered the Revolution; this, and not the power of intellect, it was which delivered the world; and when Providence deemed the time arrived for crushing the reign of infidelity, the instruments of its will were not the forces of civilization, but the fervour of the desert.

CHAPTER LXXIV.

LAST STRUGGLE OF NAPOLEON IN FRANCE. JANUARY—APRIL, 1814.

ARGUMENT.

Remarkable Coincidence of the Passage of the Rhine in the Fall of the Roman and the French Empires. — Different Characters of the two Invasions. — Passage of the Rhine, and Invasion of France.—Entrance of Schwartzenberg into Switzerland and the Jura.—Line of March of the different Columns. — Operations of the Army of Silesia. — General Result of these Movements. — Operations of the Army of Bernadotte. — General Result of the whole Invasion. — Preparations of Napoleon to meet the Invasion.—His final Dispositions before setting out for the Armies.—His touching Speech to the National Guard at Paris. — Arrival of the Emperor at Chalons, and his first Measures.—He assumes the Offensive, and marches against Blucher.—Preparatory Movements on both Sides.—Napoleon drives the Russians into Brienne. — Successful Attack on the Town and Castle of Brienne.—Imminent Danger of Blucher on this Occasion. — Result of the Battle, and imminent Danger of Napoleon.—Concentration of the Grand Army and the Army of Silesia. — Order of Battle on either Side. — Battle of Brienne.—Great Success of the Russians on the Right and Centre.—Napoleon's last Attack and final Defeat. — Results of the Battle, and desperate Condition of Napoleon.—Great Exultation in the Allied Army at their Success. — Desperate Condition of the French Army in their Retreat. — Dilatory Movement of the Allies in Pursuit.—Imprudent Dislocation of their Forces.—Retreat of the French from Troyes, and its Occupation by the Allies. —Extreme Depression in the French Army.—Fresh Organization of their Cavalry.—Napoleon resolves to attack Blucher on his Advance to Paris.—Movements of Blucher in Champagne. — Extraordinary Difficulties in the Passage across the Country.—Combat of Champaubert.—Total Defeat of the Russian Division.—Great Effects of this Victory, and Measures of Napoleon to follow it up.—His Movements in Consequence.—Perilous situation of Sacken.—Battle of Montmirail.—Actions on the Day following the Battle. — Heroic Devotion of Sacken to his Orders.—Kleist joins Blucher, who advances towards Sacken. — Battle of Vauchamps.—Glorious Retreat of Blucher.—His imminent Danger.—Disastrous Termination of the Battle. —Results of the Action. — Napoleon crosses over to the Valley of the Seine.—Occupation of Troyes by the Allied Armies.—Commencement of a Movement in Favour of the Bourbons. — Extraordinary Oblivion of the Royal Family of France during the Revolution.—Royalist Organizations still existing in the Country. — Fortunes of Louis XVIII. and the Count d'Artois during this Time. — Subsequent Migrations of the Royal Family. — Reception and Establishment of Louis the XVIII. in Great Britain.—He lands and remains in England. — General Movement of the Royalists in France.—Interview of the Royalist Leaders with Alexander. — Operations of the Allied Grand Army on the Seine. — Their Advance to Montereau.—Junction of the Army of Napoleon with Victor and Oudinot. — Advance of Napoleon, and Combat of Nangis. — Defeat of Pahlen.—Pursuit of the Bavarians to the Bridge of Montereau. — The Allies propose an Armistice. — Napoleon rises in his Demands at the Congress, and tries to Negotiate separately with Austria.—Description of Montereau. — Battle of Montereau. — Defeat of the Allies, who are driven beyond the Seine. — Results of the Battle, and general Retreat of the Grand Allied Army. — Discontent of the Emperor Napoleon at his Generals. — Disgrace of Marshal Victor. — Napoleon's Steps for following up his Successes. — Advance of the Crown-prince of Sweden to the Rhine. — Advance of Winzingerode, and Description of Soissons. — Storming of Soissons, which is afterward evacuated by the Russians, and reoccupied by the French. —Concentration of the Allied Armies in front of Troyes. —Napoleon offers Battle to Schwartzenberg, who declines it, and retreats from Troyes. — Armistice of Lusigny.— Reoccupation of Troyes by Napoleon, and Execution of M. Goualt. — General Result of these Successes on the Part of Napoleon.—Errors of the Allied Generals.—Lord Castlereagh at the Council at Bar-sur-Aube.—Plan of the Campaign agreed to there.—Decisive Effect of Lord Castlereagh's Interposition.—Second Separation of the Grand Army and the Army of Silesia.—Opening of the Congress of Chatillon.—The British Government send Lord Castlereagh.—Views of Great Britain in this Negotiation.—Instructions to Lord Castlereagh from the British Cabinet. —Nothing said concerning the Restoration of the Bourbons, or Restoration of Poland. —Views of the English and Russian Governments concerning the Bourbons. — Division of Opinion regarding Poland. — Napoleon's Instructions to Caulaincourt.—Commencement of the Congress.—Napoleon gives Caulaincourt full Power after his Defeat at La Rothiere.—Conditions proposed by the Allied Powers.—The full Powers are recalled by Napoleon, who rises in his Demands with his subsequent Successes. — He orders Eugene to evacuate Italy, and then retracts the Orders. — General Feeling of Despondency at Paris. —Treaty of Chaumont. — Its Terms, and great Effect on the Congress.—Advance of Blucher to Meaux. — Combat of Bar-sur-Aube.—Victory of the Allies there. — Wound and Character of Wittgenstein. — Schwartzenberg at length advances. — His Plan of Attack. — Defeat of the French at La Guillotiere. — Extraordinary Inactivity of the Grand Army after these Successes.—Retreat of Blucher to Soissons. — Perilous Situation of his Army from that Town holding out. — Its Capitulation extricates him from his Difficulties.—Junction of Blucher with Winzingerode and Bulow. — Napoleon's Decrees calling on the French People to rise *En Masse*.—He crosses the Aisne, and follows Blucher to Craon. — Description of the Field of Battle.—Blucher's Dispositions.—Unsuccessful Assault on Soissons. — Napoleon's Dispositions for the Battle. — Commencement of the Action. — Desperate Struggle on the Plateau, which at length ends in the Russians retreating. — Their glorious Retreat. — Impregnable Position which they at length take up. — Results of the Battle. — Reflections on it, and the extraordinary Gallantry displayed. — Napoleon on the Night after the Battle.—Both Parties take Post at and around Laon. — Description of the Position of Laon, and of the Allied Army. — Sublime Spectacle witnessed from the Ramparts of the Town. — Combats on the first Day until Marmont comes up.—Arrival of that Marshal, and Blucher's Measures to overwhelm him.—Nocturnal Surprise and Defeat of his Corps. —Napoleon prepares to retreat.—Reflections on this Battle.—Napoleon halts at Soissons, and Blucher remains at Laon. — Capture of Rheims by St. Preist. — Advance of Napoleon to retake it.—Its Recapture by the Emperor.— Defeat of the Allies, and his Entrance into the Town.— His Residence there, and last Review of his Troops.

"ON the 31st of December, 406," says Gibbon, "the united and victorious army of the Suevi, the Vandals, and the Burgundians, cross-

* See *Ante*, iii., 545.

Remarkable coincidence of the passage of the Rhine in the fall of the Roman and French Empires.

ed the Rhine, when its waters were most probably frozen, and entered without opposition the defenceless provinces of Gaul. This memorable passage of the Northern nations, who never afterward retreated, may be considered as the fall of the Roman Empire in the countries beyond the Alps; and the barriers which had so long separated the savage and civilized nations of the earth were from that fatal moment levelled with the ground."* On that day fourteen hundred and seven years, at midnight, on the 31st of December, 1813, the united and victorious army of the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, at the same place crossed the same river; and that memorable passage may justly be regarded as the fall of the French Empire beyond the Rhine! History has not preserved a more striking example of the influence of physical and lasting causes on the fortunes of the human species, or of that permanent attraction which, amid all the varieties of religion, civilization, language, and institutions, impels the brood of winter to the regions of the sun.

Different characters of the two invasions.

But if this extraordinary coincidence demonstrates the lasting influence of general causes on the migration and settlements of the species, the different character and effects of the two invasions show the vast step which mankind had made in the interval of fourteen hundred years which separated them. "The banks of the Rhine," says Gibbon, "before the barbarians appeared, were crowned, like those of the Tiber, with elegant houses and well-cultivated farms; and if a poet descended the river, he might express his doubt on which side was situated the territory of the Romans. This scene of peace and plenty was suddenly changed into a desert, and the prospect of the smoking ruins could alone distinguish the solitude of nature from the desolation of man. The flourishing city of Mentz was surprised and destroyed, and many thousand Christians were inhumanly massacred in the church; Worms perished after a long and obstinate siege; Strasbourg, Spires, Rheims, Tournay, Arras, Amiens, experienced the cruel oppression of the German yoke; and the consuming flames of war spread from the banks of the Rhine over the greater part of the seventeen provinces of Gaul. That rich and extensive country, as far as the ocean, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, was delivered to the barbarians, who drove before them, in a promiscuous crowd, the bishop, the senator, and the virgin, laden with the spoils of their houses and altars."† The same provinces were invaded fourteen hundred years after by the confederated Austrians, Prussians, and Russians, the descendants of those whose track had been marked by such frightful devastation; but how different the inroad of the civilized and Christian from the rude and barbarian host! No sacked cities marked the progress of Alexander's march—no slaughter of unarmed multitudes bespoke the triumph of the allied arms; the plough and the anvil plied their busy trade in the midst, even, of contending multitudes; and, but for the occasional ruin of houses, or wasting of roads, on the theatre of actual conflict, the traveller would have been at a loss to tell where the once fiery track of invasion had passed.* The changes of time make no alteration on the durable causes which direct the progress of conquest, or determine the ultimate fate of empires, but they modify, in the most important manner, their spirit and effects; they have not averted the swords of Northern valour, but tempered its blade, and mitigated its devastation.

Passage of the Rhine, and invasion of France, Dec. 31, 1813.

On the 26th of December, orders were secretly despatched to the different corps of Blucher, communicating the time and place of crossing the Rhine; and the troops were brought up in the succeeding day to their respective points of destination. Sacken was to effect his passage near Manheim, by means of a flotilla which had been collected at the confluence of the Neckar; D'York and Langeron, on a bridge of boats at Caubé, near Bacharach; while St. Preist was to force his way across opposite to Coblentz, by means of the boats on the Lahn, and by the aid of the island of Niederworth, opposite to that town. During the night of the 31st, Sacken's corps, which had the King of Prussia at its headquarters, assembled at the spot where the Neckar falls into the Rhine. On the opposite bank was a redoubt, which commanded the mouth of that river and the town of Manheim, and which it was necessary to carry before a bridge of boats could be established. At four on the following morning, a party of Russian light infantry was embarked in boats and rafts, and, favoured by the thick darkness, succeeded in crossing to within a few yards of the opposite bank before they were discovered. The French immediately opened a vigorous fire of cannon and musketry, and successive detachments of the Russians required to be brought over before the work could be carried; while the bright flashes of the guns illuminated the opposite bank, and displayed the dense masses of the invaders on the German shore, crowding down to the water's edge, burning with ardour, but in silent suspense awaiting the issue of the enterprise. At length the redoubt was carried at the fourth assault, and its garrison, consisting of three hundred men, made prisoners; and the rising sun showed the Russians established on French ground, and in possession of the redoubt. Strains of martial music, resounding from all the regiments, now filled the air; and the King of Prussia, coming up to the victors, was greeted with loud cheers, and the passage proceeded without interruption. By six o'clock in the evening the ponton bridge was completed, and the whole corps passed over; while, at the same time, Blucher in person, with Langeron and D'York, crossed the Rhine without opposition at Caubé, and St. Preist effected his passage at Coblentz with very little fighting. In one of the squares of the city, the prefect, on the occupation of Moscow by the French, had erected a monument, with the inscription, "To the Great Napoleon, in honour of the Immortal Campaign of

* Gibbon, ch. 30. † Gibbon, ch. 30.

* A few weeks after hostilities had ceased, the author visited the theatre of war at Paris and in Champagne, especially in the vicinity of Soissons, Craon, and Lahnstein, the scene of such obstinate and repeated conflicts in March, 1814. No traces of devastation were to be seen, except a few burned houses and loopholed walls in the place where severe fighting had actually occurred.

1812." Colonel Mardenke, who had been appointed Russian commander of Coblentz, left the monument untouched, but under the inscription caused the following words to be written: "Seen and approved by the Russian Commander of Coblentz in 1813."*

Entrance of Schwartzenberg into Switzerland and the Jura. December 21.

The Grand Army under Schwartzenberg had entered the French territory at a still earlier period. On the night of the 20th of December, six Austrian columns passed the Rhine, between Schaffhausen and Bâle, and immediately inundated the adjacent districts of Switzerland and France. This immense body, above two hundred thousand strong, shortly after pursued, under their different leaders, their respective destinations: Bubna, with his corps, which was the left wing, marched by the flat country of Switzerland towards Geneva; Hesse-Homberg, Colloredo, Prince Louis of Lichtenstein, with Giulay and Bianchi, forming the centre, took the great road by Vesoul towards Langres; while Wrede, the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, and Wittgenstein, with their respective corps, which composed the right wing of the army, crossed below Bâle, and between that town and Strasbourg, and moved across Lorraine and Franche Comté, until they arrived abreast of the centre, on the road to Langres. None of these corps met with any opposition. Victor, who had not above ten thousand combatants at his disposal, after providing for the garrisons of the fortresses on the Upper Rhine, was unable to oppose any resistance to such a prodigious inundation; it spread almost without resistance over the whole level country of Switzerland, and, surmounting the passes of the Jura, poured, with irresistible violence, into the plains of Lorraine.†

March of the different columns. December 30.

The march of the different columns met with hardly any interruption. Count Bubna arrived in ten days before Geneva, which capitulated without resistance, the garrison being permitted to retire into France; and after occupying that city, he sent out detachments, which made themselves masters, with as much ease, of the passes of the Simplon and the Great St. Bernard: thus interposing entirely between France and Italy, and cutting off the communication between Napoleon's forces and those of the viceroy on the plains of Lombardy. The French garrison retired to Lyons, whither they were followed, early in January, by the Austrian commander, who, however, did not deem himself in sufficient strength to attack Augereau, who was now at the head of fifteen thousand men in that important city, and contented himself with observing it at a little distance, and occupying the whole course of the Aisne from the Lake of Geneva to its walls. Meanwhile, the centre, in great strength, pressed forward on the high road from Bâle to Paris, by Montbeliard, Vesoul, and Langres. Vesoul was entered early in January; Besançon, Befort, Huningen, were invested a few days afterward; while Victor, wholly unable to withstand the concentrated masses of five corps of the enemy, numbering eighty thousand sabres and bayonets in their ranks, and finding himself inadequate to the task assigned him by Napoleon of defending the passes of the Vosges Mountains, fell back, after some inconsiderable skirmishes, towards the plains of Champagne. In vain Mortier was ordered up by the emperor to support him on the road to Paris by Troyes: even their united forces were inadequate to make head against the enemy; and on the 16th, the important town of Langres, the most valuable, in a strategetical point of view, in the whole east of France, from the number of roads of which it commands the intersection, was abandoned by the two marshals, and immediately taken possession of by the allied forces.*

Jan. 3. Jan. 17. Jan. 7, 9, 11, and 13. Jan. 17.

Operations of the army of Silesia.

While the southeastern provinces of France were thus overrun by the allies under Schwartzenberg, the progress of the army of Silesia, led by the impetuous Blucher, on the side of Mayence, was not less alarming. The cordon of troops opposed to them, in no condition to withstand such formidable masses, fell back at all points towards the Vosges Mountains. Marmont, who had the chief command in that quarter, retired on the 3d of January to Kayserlautern, so often the theatre of sanguinary conflict in the earlier periods of the war; and, unable to maintain himself there, retreated behind the Sarre, the bridges of which were blown up, and shortly after took a defensive position between Sarre-Louis and Larquemine. But the two corps of D'York and Sacken having concentrated in his front, he did not feel himself in sufficient strength to withstand an attack, and resumed his retreat towards the Moselle. Blucher, upon this, divided his army into two parts, D'York being intrusted with the pursuit of Marmont, and the observation of the powerful fortresses of Metz, Thionville, and Luxembourg, while he himself, with Sacken's corps, marched to and occupied the opulent and beautiful city of Nancy, the keys of which he sent, with a warm letter of congratulation, to the Emperor Alexander. Meanwhile, Langeron, with his numerous corps, forming not the least important part of the army of Silesia, having crossed the Rhine at Bengin on the 3d, had completed the investment of Mayence and Cassel, detaching only one of his divisions, that of Olsoofief, to support his veteran commander. But Blucher himself, burning with ardour, advanced, with indefatigable activity, though the force under his immediate command was reduced, by the numerous detachments and fortresses to be blockaded in his rear, to less than thirty thousand men. With this inconsiderable body, wholly composed, however, of Russian veterans, he not only opened up a communication by his left with the Grand Army at Langres, but himself pushed on to Brienne, which he occupied in force, his advanced column being even moved forward to St. Dizier, which was taken after a sharp conflict with Marmont's rear-guard.†

Jan. 3. Jan. 7. Jan. 9. Jan. 25.

General result of these movements.

Thus, in twenty-five days after the invasion of the French territory had commenced, the allied armies had succeeded, almost without firing a shot,

* Dan., 25, 26. Koch, i., 106, 107. Vaud., i., 129. Fain, 24.
† Koch, i., 74, 82. Dan., 20, 21. Vaud., i., 120, 124.

* Fain, 23, 25. Koch, i., 80, 87. Vaud., i., 151, 153. Dan., 21, 22.
† Dan., 27, 28. Vaud., i., 148, 151. Koch, i., 107, 125.

in wresting a third of it from the grasp of Napoleon. The army of Silesia had conquered the whole country from the Rhine to the Marne, crossed the former frontier stream, as well as the Sarre, the Moselle, and the Meuse; passed the formidable defiles of the Vosges and Hundsruck Mountains, and finally descended into the open and boundless plains of Champagne: Schwartzenberg's forces had in a month crossed the Upper Rhine, and traversed part of Switzerland, surmounted the broad and lofty ridge of the Jura, and wound in safety through its devious and intricate valleys; overrun the whole of Franche Comté, Lorraine, and Alsace, descended into the plains of Burgundy, and entered into communication, by means of its right wing, with the army of Silesia, along the valley of the Meuse, while its left had occupied Geneva and the defiles of the Aisne, and threatened Lyons on the banks of the Rhone. Thus their united forces stretched in an immense line, three hundred miles in length, in a diagonal direction across France, from the fronties of Flanders to the banks of the Rhone: all the intermediate country in their rear, embracing a third of the old monarchy, and comprehending its most warlike provinces, was occupied, its fortresses blockaded, and its resources lost; and the vast masses of the allies were converging from the southeast and north to the plains of Champagne, and the vicinity of Chalons, already immortalized by the dreadful battle decisive of the fate of Europe, which had taken place there, fourteen hundred years before, between Attila and the forces of the Roman Empire under Aëtius: a striking proof of the permanent operation of those general causes which, amid every variety of civilization, military skill, and era of the world, bring the contending hosts which are to determine its destinies to the same theatre of conflict.*

Movements of the army of Bernadotte.

The army of the Crown-prince of Sweden, which threatened France on the side of Flanders, though not so far advanced as the hosts of Blucher and Schwartzenberg, was still making some progress, and caused sensible disquiet to the French emperor. Of that army, only three corps were ready to take a part in the war; the remainder, with the crown-prince himself, who was in no hurry to approach the theatre of final conflict, being still in Holstein, or the neighbourhood of that duchy. These three corps, however, were slowly advancing to the theatre of action: the first, commanded by the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, had crossed at Arnheim, and was moving through Flanders; another, under Bulow, was before Antwerp, where it was supported by a body of nine thousand British troops under Sir Thomas Graham; and part of a third, under Winzingerode, was at Dusseldorf, on the Rhine; but the remainder did not reach France till the middle of February. Chernicheff, who commanded Winzingerode's advanced guard, was burning with anxiety to cross the river; and at length, though with no small difficulty, extracted a reluctant consent from his more circumspect commander to attempt the passage at the confluence of the Roer. It was effected with little difficulty on the 12th of January: the French, astonished with the boldness of the enterprise—undertaken in open day, of crossing a broad river surcharged with masses of ice, in the front of armed redoubts—opposing hardly any resistance. Winzingerode's corps now slowly advanced towards Brussels; and Macdonald, who commanded the French forces in that quarter, fell back in all directions. Juliers was speedily evacuated; Liege soon after blockaded, and in a few days taken by the Cossacks; while Macdonald abandoned all the country between Brussels and the Rhine, and concentrated his forces at Namur. A division of three thousand foot and six hundred horse, despatched by General Maison from Antwerp to endeavour to drive the Cossacks out of Liege, was defeated, after an obstinate engagement, at St. Tron, near the gates of that city, by Benkendorf and Chernicheff: a success which not only secured the possession of the town, but, what was of still more importance, gave the allies the command of the passage of the Meuse. Discouraged by this check, General Maison made no farther attempt to retard the advance of the enemy: Macdonald retired, in obedience to the commands of Napoleon, towards Laon, abandoning all the open country of Flanders to the enemy, and leaving Antwerp to its own resources. Namur was immediately occupied by Winzingerode, but he was compelled to halt there some days, in consequence of the small amount of force, now reduced to thirteen thousand men, which the necessity of blockading so many places in his rear left at his disposal. Bulow, meanwhile, formed the blockade of Antwerp, and Macdonald was rapidly falling back towards Laon and Chalons; so that the whole forces of the allies occupied a vast line, above five hundred miles in length, from Antwerp to Namur, Brienne, Langres, and Auxonne, to Lyons, extending from the banks of the Scheldt to those of the Rhone.*

Jan. 12. Jan. 15. Jan. 18. Jan. 24. Jan. 26.

Thus, within a month after they had commenced the invasion of the French territory, the allies had gained in appearance, and in one sense in reality, very great advantages, without either sustaining loss or experiencing resistance. Above a third of France had been conquered; the resources of that large portion of his dominions in men and money, not only lost to Napoleon, but in part, at least, gained to the invaders; and the *prestige* of his invincibility seriously shattered by so wide an inroad upon the territory of the great nation. But, on the other hand, to a commander possessed of the military talent and discerning eye of the French emperor, his situation, though full of peril, was not without its advantages, and he might with reason hope to strike, upon the plains of Champagne, strokes equal to the redoubtable blows which first laid the foundation of his fame on the Italian plains. The force at his disposal, though little more than a third of that which was at the command of the allies, was incomparably more concentrated: his troops were all stationed within the limits of a narrow triangle, of which Paris, Laon, and Troyes formed the angles; while the vast armies of his opponents, stretching across France from the Scheldt to the Rhone, were alike unable either to combine their movements

General result of these operations.

* Koch, i., 125. Dan., 29, 34. Vaud., i., 147, 155.

* Koch, i., 127, 135. Dan., 29, 33.

with accuracy, or succour each other in case of disaster. The views of the cabinets which directed them were by no means in union: Austria, leaning on the matrimonial alliance, was reluctant to push matters to extremities, if it could by possibility be avoided; Russia and Prussia, influenced by no such connexion, were resolute to push on, at all hazards, to Paris; and the councils of England, which in this diversity held the balance, were divided between the expedience of taking advantage of the present commanding position of the allied armies to secure a glorious peace, and the chance, by pursuing a more decided policy, of precipitating the revolutionary dynasty from the throne. Thus it might reasonably be expected that the military councils of the allied cabinets would be as ruinous as their diplomatic divisions; and Napoleon entertained sanguine hopes that, while the Austrians, in pursuance of the temporizing system of Metternich, hung back, the Russians and Prussians, led by the bolder views of Alexander and Blucher, might be exposed to attack with equal chances, and possibly at an advantage.*

Preparations of Napoleon to meet the invasion.

An attentive observer of the prodigious flood of enemies which was inundating his territories, Napoleon was, during the first three weeks of January, 1814, indefatigable in his efforts to prepare the means of arresting it. He was first informed of the invasion of his territories when coming out of his cabinet on his way to the meeting of the Legislative Body, which has been already described.† Preserving his usual firmness, he said, "If I could have gained two months, the enemy would not have crossed the Rhine. This may lead to bad consequences; but alone I can do nothing: if unaided, I must fall; then it will be seen that the war is not directed against me alone." His exertions were mainly employed in organizing and despatching to the different armies, the conscripts who were daily forwarded to Paris from the southern and western provinces of the Empire, and replacing the garrisons in the interior, from which they were drawn, by National Guards, or levies who had not yet acquired any degree of military consistency. These troops, as they successively arrived, were reviewed with great pomp in the Place Carrousel; but their number fell miserably short of expectation, and evinced, in the clearest manner, that the military strength of the Empire was all but exhausted. The better to conceal his real weakness, and in the hope of imposing at once on his own subjects and his enemies, the most pompous account of these reviews was uniformly published next day in the *Moniteur*, and the numbers who had defiled before the emperor announced at four or five times their real amount; insomuch, in a single month, more than two hundred thousand men were enumerated, and it would have been supposed the emperor was about to take the field with a force as great as that with which he had combated the preceding year on the Elbe. But no one knew better than the emperor the real amount of the troops at his disposal; and the moment they had defiled before the windows of the Tuileries, every sabre and bayonet were straightway hurried off to the armies in front of the allies, which, according to old usage, were divided into eight corps, though they did not in all muster above a hundred thousand effective combatants in the field. Yet so great was his dread, even in this extremity, of Democratic excitement, that it was only on the 8th of January—a fortnight before he set out to take the command of the army—that, by a decree, he again organized a National Guard in Paris; and, when he did so, especial care was taken, by the nomination of Marshal Moncey to the command, and by the selection made, both of officers and privates, to fill its ranks, to show that it was established rather to guard against internal agitation than foreign aggression, and that the real enemy it was intended to combat was to be found, not in the bayonets of the allies, but the pikes of the Fauxbourg St. Antoine.*

Napoleon's final dispositions before setting out for the army. January 20.

Previous to setting out to take the command of his troops, Napoleon made his final dispositions for the government during his absence from the capital. To announce his immediate arrival with the army, he sent forward Berthier some days before he himself set out, and, meanwhile, he organized with Savary and the Council of State the means of maintaining tranquillity in the capital, and ensuring the direction of affairs. The regency was conferred by letters patent on the Empress Marie Louise; but with her was conjoined on the day following his brother Joseph, under the title of Lieutenant-general of the Empire. Jan. 23. On the 23d he prepared a military solemnity, calculated to rouse the national feelings in the highest degree. It was Sunday; and, after hearing mass, the emperor received the principal officers of the National Guard in the apartments of the Tuileries. The Jan. 24. empress preceded him on entering the apartments; she was followed by Madame de Montesquieu, who carried in her arms the King of Rome, then a lovely infant of three years of age. His blue eyes and light hair bespoke his German descent; but the keen look and thoughtful turn of countenance betrayed the mingled Italian blood. He wore the uniform of the National Guard, his golden locks fell in luxuriant ringlets over his rounded shoulders, and his little eyes beamed with delight at the military garb in which he was now, for the first time, arrayed.†

His touching speech to the National Guard at Paris.

Napoleon took the child by the hand, and advancing into the middle of the circle, with his head uncovered, and a solemn air, he thus addressed them: "Gentlemen, I am about to set out for the army: I intrust to you what I hold dearest in the world—my wife and my son. Let there be no political divisions; let the respect for property, the maintenance of order, and, above all, the love of France, animate every bosom. I do not disguise that, in the course of the military operations which are to ensue, the enemy may approach in force to Paris; it will only be an affair of a few days: before they are passed I will be on their flanks and rear, and annihilate those who have dared to violate our country." Then, taking the no-

* Dan., 33, 34. Koch, i., 135, 136. † *Ante*, iv., 271.

* Fain, 26, 27. Thib., ix., 481. Cap., x., 331, 332.
† Fain, 44. Cap., x., 534.

ble child in his arms, he went through the ranks of the officers, and presented him to them as their future sovereign. Cries of enthusiasm rent the apartments; many tears were shed: a sense of the solemnity of the moment penetrated every bosom, and cold indeed must have been that heart which did not then thrill with patriotic ardour. The apartment where this memorable scene occurred was the same which, twenty years before, had witnessed the degradation of Louis XVI., when that unhappy monarch had been compelled to put on the red cap of liberty, and Napoleon, then a boy at college, had witnessed with such indignation the tumultuous assemblage which thronged the gardens of the Tuileries.* Revolution had run its course; in the very spot where its excesses commenced its chief was doomed to drink the bitterest draught in the waters of affliction. On the following day Napoleon made all the necessary preparations for his departure, burned his most secret papers, and gave his final instructions to Joseph and the Council of State. At three in the morning of the 25th, he embraced the empress and his son FOR THE LAST TIME, and set out for the army: he never saw them again.†

Arrival of the emperor at Chalons, and his first measures there.

Count Bertrand, in the absence of Berthier, accompanied Napoleon in his carriage; they breakfasted at Chateau-Thierry, and arrived in the afternoon at Chalons-sur-Marne, where the headquarters of the army were established. The presence of the emperor, as usual, restored confidence both to the troops and the inhabitants, which the long-continued retreat and near approach of the enemy to the capital had much impaired. Cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" broke from the crowds which assembled to witness his passage through any of the towns which he traversed; with them were mingled the exclamation, "A bas les droits reunis;" they did not cry "A bas la conscription:" a deplorable proof of the selfishness of human nature; they strove rather to save their own money than the blood of their children. Napoleon spent the evening in receiving accounts from his officers of the position of the troops, and the progress of the enemy. They were sufficiently alarming. The Grand Army of Prince Schwartzenberg, descending by several roads from the Vosges Mountains, was pressing in vast numbers through the plains of Burgundy, and already threatened Troyes, the ancient capital of Champagne; Blucher had passed Lorraine, reached St. Dizier, and was rapidly stretching, in communication with the Grand Army, across to the Aube. The French troops, falling back on all sides, were converging towards Chalons; Victor and Ney, after having evacuated Nancy, had already reached Vitry-le-Français; while Marmont was between Saint Michel and Vitry behind the Meuse. Twenty days of continued retreat had brought those scattered bands, which lately had lain along the line of the Rhine, from Huningen to Bâle, to within a few leagues of each other, in the plains of Champagne. Disorder and confusion, as usual in such cases, were rapidly accumulating in the rear. Crowds of fugitives, which preceded the march of the columns, crossed, and spread consternation among the advancing bodies of conscripts which were hastening up from Paris; and already that dejection was visible among all ranks which is at once the forerunner and the cause of national disaster.*

Napoleon assumes the offensive, and marches against Blucher.

By the concentration of the retiring columns, however, Napoleon had collected about seventy thousand effective combatants, of whom fifteen thousand were admirable cavalry; and, although part of these were still at a considerable distance from the centre of action, yet he wisely resolved at once to assume the offensive. Twelve hours only were devoted to rest and preparation at Chalons, and on the 26th headquarters were advanced to Vitry. Early on the following morning the march was resumed; and at daybreak the advanced guards met the leading Cossacks of Blucher's army, which were moving from St. Dizier, where they had passed the night, towards Vitry. The Russians, wholly unprepared for any such encounter, were taken at a disadvantage, and worsted, and the victorious French re-entered St. Dizier, which had been some days in the hands of the allies, where they were received with the most lively enthusiasm. The allied generals, meanwhile, inspired with undue confidence by the long-continued retreat of the French troops, and ignorant of the arrival of the emperor at Chalons, were in a very unprepared state to receive an encounter. Blucher, with characteristic impatience and recklessness of consequences, had divided his army into two divisions: he himself, with twenty-six thousand men, having advanced to Brienne, where headquarters were established; while D'York, with twenty thousand Prussians, was at St. Michel on the Meuse, and Sacken was at Lesmont, fifteen miles distant. Thus Napoleon, by his advance to St. Dizier, had cut the army of Silesia in two, and he had it in his power either to fall on one of these detached corps with an overwhelmning force, or to defile towards Chaumont and Langres, to repel Schwartzenberg and the Grand Army. He resolved to adopt the former plan, justly deeming Blucher the most resolute as well as formidable of his opponents, and the one, therefore, whom it was both most probable he might take at a disadvantage, and the most important that he should disable by an early disaster. He continued, therefore, his march against the Prussian general without interruption, plunged without hesitation into the forest of Der, which could only be crossed in that direction by deep country roads; on the 28th he reached Monteriender, and on the day following, at daybreak, the army was advancing in great spirits against Blucher, who lay within half a day's march, at Brienne, wholly unconscious of the approaching danger.†

Jan. 26.

Preparatory movements on both sides.

Had Napoleon reached the Prussian general before he had received any intimation of his approach, it is certain that a great disaster would have befallen him; for he had only under his immediate command two divisions of Olsoofief's corps, that of Sacken being at Lesmont, at a considerable

* *Ante*, i., 124.

† Fain, 44, 45. Cap., x., 534, 535. Moniteur, January 25, 1814.

* Fain, 61, 66. Vaud., i., 176, 179. Jom., iv., 524, 525.

† Jom., iv., 526. Fain, 70, 71. Dan., 51, 52. Vaud., i., 186, 187.

distance. About noon, however, an officer was brought in prisoner with despatches, which proved to be of the highest importance, as they contained an order from Napoleon to Mortier to draw near and co-operate in a general attack on Blucher at Brienne. This at once revealed the presence of the emperor, and the imminence of the danger. The Prussian general instantly sent off orders to Sacken to advance to his support with all possible expedition; and prepared himself to retire towards the Aube if he was attacked by superior forces, as his whole cavalry was already across that river, and the open plains of Champagne exposed the infantry to great risk if combating without that arm. At this critical moment, when he was every instant expecting to be attacked, Count Pahlen's cavalry of Wittgenstein's corps, belonging to the Grand Army, appeared in rear, and, on Blucher's request, immediately marched forward to the front of Brienne, and, forming on the road by which the enemy was expected, covered Sacken's movement from Lesmont. Intelligence of Napoleon's advance at the same time reached Schwartzenberg at Chaumont; and Alexander, who had arrived there that very day from Langres, immediately gave instructions to Barclay, with the Russian guards and reserves, to come up with all possible expedition from the rear, and sent out orders in all directions for the concentration of the Grand Army. But before the orders could be received the blow had been delivered, and Blucher had been exposed to a rude encounter in the chateau of Brienne.*

Napoleon drives the Russians into Brienne, January 29.

The French troops encountered the most serious obstacles, and underwent dreadful fatigue all the 28th, in forcing their way through the deep and miry alleys of the forest of Der. The frost, which it was expected would have removed every difficulty, had given way, and the thaw which succeeded had rendered the execrable cross roads all but impassable. It was only by the greatest efforts that the guns and artillery-wagons could be dragged through; but by the zeal and ardour of the peasants of the forest, who harnessed themselves to the guns, and toiled night and day without intermission, the difficulties were at length overcome, and on the morning of the 29th the troops were extricated from the wood, and on their march across the open country to Brienne. The curate of Maizieres acted as their guide; he had escaped from the hussars of the Prussians, and threw himself before Napoleon, who recognised in him an old college companion at Brienne, whom he had not seen since they studied together, equal in rank and prospects, twenty-five years before! Soon the troops approached the town, and discovered the Prussians drawn up in successive lines in front of its buildings, and strongly occupying with their artillery the beautiful terraces which lie along its higher parts. Brienne stands on a hill sloping upward to the castle, which stands on an eminence adjoining its summit; and its streets, after the manner of those in Genoa and Naples, rise in successive tiers above each other to the highest point. Olsoofief's guns, with Pahlen's dragoons, occupied, as an advanced guard, the great road between it and Maizieres; and it was absolutely necessary, at all hazards, to keep possession of that line, as it commanded the only access by which Sacken could effect his junction with the commander-in-chief. This duty was most gallantly performed by these brave officers, and the ground allotted to them strenuously maintained, from two in the afternoon, when the action commenced, till the whole of Sacken's corps had defiled through the streets, and effected its junction with the infantry of Olsoofief in rear, when they gradually retired towards the lower part of the town.*

Successful attack on the town and castle of Brienne, January 29.

Encouraged by the retreat of the enemy's rear-guard, Napoleon now pressed vigorously on with all the forces he could command; and, from the successive arrival of fresh troops while the action was going on in front of the town, they were very considerable. His numerous guns were hurried forward to the front, and, opening a concentric fire on the town, discharged a shower of bombs and shells, which speedily set it on fire, and reduced a considerable part of its buildings, including the college where Napoleon had been educated—where he had passed the happy, and, as yet, unambitious days of childhood, and where he had learned the art of war, which he now let loose with such devastating fury on the scenes of his infancy. A column of infantry, amid the flaming tempest, burst into the town, and charging, amid the spreading conflagration, through the streets, took twelve Russian guns. A battery, however, which Sacken established, commanding the French left, checked the advance of the troops destined to support this vigorous onset; and Pahlen and Wassilchikow's dragoons, charging the assailants in flank, they not only lost the guns they had taken, but were driven out of the town with the loss of eight pieces of their own. The fire continued with great vigour on both sides till nightfall, but the town remained in the hands of the Russians; gradually it slackened as darkness overspread the horizon; and Blucher deeming the battle over, retired to the chateau to rest a few hours after his fatigues, and survey from its elevated summit the position of the vast semicircle of watchfires which marked the position of the enemy to the west of the town.†

Imminent danger of Blucher on this occasion.

He was still on the top of the building, when loud cries were heard in the avenues which led to it, immediately succeeded by the discharge of musketry, and vehement shouts at the foot of the castle itself. The old marshal had barely time to hasten down stairs, accompanied by a few of his suite, when it was carried by a body of French grenadiers, who, during the darkness, had stole unperceived into the grounds of the chateau. In his way to the town, he was told by a Cossack, who came riding up at full speed with the accounts, that the French had again burst into the town; and, by the light of the burning houses, he distinctly perceived a large body of the enemy coming rapidly towards him at a trot. Even in this extremity, however, the indignant marshal would only consent to turn

* Jom., iv., 526, 527. Dan., 51, 52. Fain, 70, 71. Vaud., i., 184, 185.

* Dan., 54, 55. Fain, 72, 73. Vaud., i., 185, 187. Jom., iv., 526, 527. Personal observation.

† Dan., 54, 55. Vaud., i., 188, 189. Fain, 72. Beauchamps, i., 185, 186.

aside into a cross lane, where he was leisurely proceeding off at a walk, when Gneisenau, seeing that the enemy were rapidly gaining upon him, said, "Can it be your wish to be carried in triumph to Paris?" The field-marshal, upon this, put spurs to his horse, and with difficulty regained his troops. About the same time, several French squadrons charged along the street, with loud hurrahs, where Sacken was issuing orders. There was neither time nor avenue to escape, and, with great presence of mind, he backed his horse into the shadow of a house in the street, which was the darker from the glare of the flames behind it, while the furious whirlwind drove past; the dragoons, in their haste, taking no thought of, nor even observing him, who two months afterward was governor of Paris! Blucher, upon this, ordered the town to be cleared of the enemy, which was immediately done; but though Olsoofief advanced to the attack of the castle, he was always repulsed with loss: the assailants, from the light of the burning houses, being distinctly seen, while the defenders were shrouded in darkness. At two in the morning, the Prussian field-marshal drew off his whole force to the strong position of Trannes, on the road to Bar-sur-Aube, where the Grand Army was; and the smoking and half-burned ruins of Brienne remained entirely in the possession of the French.*

In this bloody affair the Russians only were engaged: both parties fought with the most determined resolution, and each sustained a loss of about three thousand men: a great proportion, considering the numbers who fought on either side. It is a remarkable circumstance, characteristic of the desperate chances of the death-struggle which was commencing, that at the very time when Blucher and Sacken so narrowly escaped being made prisoners, Napoleon himself was still nearer destruction; and a Cossack's lance had all but terminated the life which still kept a million of armed men at bay. The bulk of the French army was bivouacking in the plain between Maizieres and Brienne, and the emperor, after having inspected their positions, was riding back, accompanied by his suite, to the former town, in earnest conversation with General Gourgaud, when General Dejean, who commanded the patrole in front, suddenly turned and cried aloud, "The Cossacks!" Hardly were the words spoken, when a party of these enterprising marauders dashed across the road: Dejean seized the foremost, and strove to plunge his sabre in his throat. The Cossack, however, disengaged himself, parried the blow, and continuing his career, made, with his lance in rest, at the horseman with the cocked-hat and gray riding-coat, who rode in front. A cry of horror arose in the emperor's suite: Corbineau threw himself across the lancer's path, while Gourgaud drew his pistol and shot him dead, so near Napoleon that he fell at his feet! The suite now rapidly came up, and the Cossacks, ignorant of the inestimable prize almost within their grasp, and seeing the first surprise had failed, dispersed and fled. On the day following, the emperor, perceiving that the enemy had entirely evacuated Brienne, transferred his headquarters to its castle. The sight of the scenes of his youth, and of the sports of his boyhood, recalled a thousand emotions, to which they had long been strangers, in his breast; the past, the present, and the future flitted in dark array before him; and he strove to allay the melancholy of his reflections by magnificent projects for the future restoration of Brienne, and the establishment of a palace or a military school, or both, in the much-loved cradle of his eventful career.*

Results of the battle, and imminent danger of Napoleon.

Jan. 30

Meanwhile, the allied generals, now thoroughly alarmed, made the most vigorous efforts to concentrate their forces. Early on the morning of the 30th, the whole Grand Army marched to Trannes, with the exception of Wittgenstein and Wrede's corps, which were ordered to Passy and St. Dizier to cover the right, and open up a communication with D'York's corps, which was approaching from that direction. At the same time, Blucher's troops were drawn together from all quarters; and the allies, having now drawn together an overwhelming force in the two armies, resolved to give battle. Above a hundred thousand men were assembled under the immediate command of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, without counting Colloredo's men, twenty-five thousand more, who were at Vandœuvres during the action, and Wittgenstein's detached corps. The 31st passed over without any offensive movement on either side, while the allied troops were rapidly coming into line: an inactivity on the part of Napoleon so inexplicable, considering that he was inferior in force, upon the whole, to his antagonists, and therefore was certain to lose by giving them time to concentrate, that Alexander, more than once, was led to doubt whether he was really with the opposite armies. Meantime the allies, in admirable order, took up their ground, and their generals, from the heights of Trannes, which overlooked the whole adjacent country, anxiously surveyed the theatre of the approaching battle. The centre, consisting chiefly of Blucher's Russians, was posted on the elevated ridge of Trannes, with Barclay de Tolly's reserve behind it; the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg's corps composed the right wing, which stood at Getanie; Giulay's Austrians formed the left, with Colloredo in reserve. With great delicacy, Schwartzenberg intrusted the general command of the whole to Blucher, who had commenced the conflict with such spirit on the preceding day. Meanwhile, Napoleon, finding himself overmatched, and that the allied army, instead of being surprised in detail, was perfectly prepared and hourly increasing in strength, made dispositions for a retreat; but previous to this it was necessary to restore the bridge of Lesmont, the only issue by which his columns could recross the Aube. The French line was drawn up directly opposite to that of the allies, and extended from Dionville on the right, through La Rothiere and La Giberie in the centre, to Chaumenil on the extreme left; forming the two sides of a right-angled triangle, facing outward, of which La Giberie was the turning-point.†

Concentration of the Grand Army and the army of Silesia, Jan. 31.

* Fain, 73, 74. Dan., 55, 56. Jom., iv., 526, 527. Vaud., i., 189, 191. Lab., ii., 156, 157.

* Fain, 74, 76.

† Dan., 62, 63. Vaud., i., 196, 197. Fain, 76, 77. Burgh., iii., 112.

Perceiving that, contrary to his previous custom, Napoleon remained motionless awaiting an attack—a striking indication of the altered state of his fortunes—Schwartzenberg gave orders to Blucher to commence the battle, and it took place on the 1st of February. The weather was dark and gloomy: a cold wind, swelling at intervals into fitful gusts, driving heavy snow showers before it, rendered everything invisible till one o'clock in the afternoon, when the sky cleared, and the receding mist discovered the French army, about fifty thousand strong, drawn up in order of battle. Gerard commanded the right, Marmont the left, and Napoleon himself directed the centre, having Mortier, Ney, and Oudinot, in reserve, immediately behind it. To distinguish the allied troops, who belonged to six different sovereigns, and were in every variety of uniform, from the enemy, orders were given that they should all, from the general to the private soldier, wear a white band on the left arm. The adoption of this badge made General Jomini suggest to Alexander that it might give rise to surmises as to the intentions of the allied sovereigns regarding the Bourbons. "What have I to do with them?" replied the Czar: a striking proof how much even those who are intrusted with the supreme direction of affairs are themselves impelled in the most important events by a power of which they are the unconscious and unforeseeing instruments.*

Order of battle on either side.

The monarchs now gave the orders to attack; and Prince Schwartzenberg having sent a confidentjal officer to inquire of Blucher what plan of attack he would recommend, instead of specifying movements, he replied, "We must march to Paris; Napoleon has been in all the capitals of Europe: we must make him descend from a throne which it would have been well for us all that he had never mounted. We shall have no repose till we pull him down." Meanwhile, Giulay advanced on Dionville, the Prince of Wirtemberg on La Giberie, Sacken on La Rothiere, Wrede on Morvilliers. So heavy was the ground, that Niketin, who commanded Sacken's artillery, was obliged to leave half his guns in position on the ridge of Trannes, and harness the horses belonging to them to the other half, thirty-six in number, with which he advanced to the attack. Ten horses were in this way got for each of the heavy guns, six to the light, and five to the caissons; and with this additional strength the cannon were dragged through the deep clay, and formed in line under a heavy discharge from the French artillery. The infantry destined for their protection being still far in the rear toiling through the miry fields, Napoleon caused a large body of horse to charge the guns; but the Russian cannoniers, with admirable coolness, placed the charges under cover of their cloaks close beside the guns, to save time in carrying them; and having done so, ceased firing till the horse were within six hundred yards, when they opened so tremendous a discharge that the assailants quickly were obliged to retreat. Snow then fell with such thickness that the nearest objects were no longer visible; and, during the darkness, the additional men and horses were sent back for the thirty-six pieces left behind at Trannes, which were brought to the front before the darkness cleared away.*

Battle of Brienne, Feb. 1.

While this was going on in front, the infantry and cavalry of Sacken's corps approached, and the action commenced at all points. The Prince of Wirtemberg drove the enemy from a wood which they occupied in front of La Giberie, and, thridding his devious way through a narrow path between fishponds, at last reached the open country, and immediately commenced an attack on the village of La Giberie and Chaumenil, which were carried after a bloody struggle. Napoleon, upon this, directed a portion of his guards and reserves to regain these important posts, which formed, as it were, the salient angle of his position, and supported their attack by the concentric fire of a large part of his artillery. The efforts of these brave men proved successful, and the villages were regained; but the prince returned to the charge in front, supported by Wrede, who assailed them in flank, and by their united efforts the villages were regained and permanently held by the allies. Meanwhile, Sacken, in the centre, led his troops in beautiful array against La Rothiere and the French batteries adjacent; so steady was their advance, that the infantry were in many places headed by their regimental bands. Count Lieven, with the vanguard, pushed the attack with such vigour that he reached the Church of La Rothiere, around which a bloody conflict arose, although the snow fell so thick that the combatants were frequently obliged to suspend their fire, from being unable to see each other. At this critical moment the Russian dragoons, under Lanskoy and Pantchenlidzeff, advanced, broke the French cavalry, and, following up their success, charged and captured a battery of twenty-eight guns in the enemy's centre. At the same time, the Prince of Wirtemberg made himself master of a battery of nine guns between La Giberie and La Rothiere, turned short to his left, attacked the latter village in flank, and expelled the French from every part of it, while Wrede carried Chaumenil and twelve guns on the extreme left of the line. Thus the French centre and left were entirely broken through and beaten; and, although their right still stood firm at Dionville, and had repulsed all the attacks of Giulay's Austrians, yet the battle, before six o'clock, seemed to be clearly decided in favour of the allies.†

Great success of the Russians on the right centre.

Napoleon, however, had been too long a victorious general to despair as yet of the contest. Oudinot came up opportunely from the neighbourhood of Lesmont with two fresh divisions; and the emperor, putting himself at the head of the dragoons of Colbert and Piri, and bringing up every disposable gun he had left, directed a general attack on La Rothiere. Perceiving the concentration of the French forces at this decisive point, Blucher put himself at the head of his reserves, and advanced to sustain the encounter. It was late in the evening when these two redoubtable antagonists met in arms, the

Napoleon's last attack, and final defeat.

* Dan., 64, 65. Vaud., i. 196, 197. Burgh., 112, 113. Kausler, 476.

* Dan., 66, 67. Burgh., 112, 113. Vaud., i., 248, 250. Beauch., i, 196, 197.

† Dan., 67, 68. Lab., ii., 161, 162. Koch, i., 250, 252. Burgh., 114, 118.

shades of night already overspread the field, which was only partly illuminated by the feeble rays of the moon. The first attack of the French was irresistible: the village was carried amid loud cheers; but the Emperor of Russia immediately brought up the grenadier regiments of Little Russia and Astrakan, which again drove the enemy out at the point of the bayonet, the whole grenadier corps and cuirassiers of the guard being brought up to support the assault. In the struggle which ensued the division Duhesme was almost entirely destroyed; both parties fought with the most invincible resolution. Napoleon and Blucher in person directed the attacks; but at length the French were overpowered and driven out of the village; while at the same time, Giulay, on the extreme right, at midnight, after a sixth assault, carried Dionville. The whole villages and ground held by the French in the commencement of the battle were now in the hands of the allies; and Napoleon, seeing the day irrecoverably lost, gave orders to burn La Rothiere, and drew off his shattered troops to Brienne, under cover of the thick darkness of a winter's night.*

Results of the battle, and desperate condition of Napoleon.

The cause of Napoleon appeared now altogether desperate. He had suddenly collected his troops and made a desperate irruption into the heart of the enemy's armies; but, instead of striking any of his former terrible blows, he had met only with the most obstinate resistance: his onset had served as the signal for the concentration of their vast armies, and he had finally been defeated in a pitched battle on the ground which he himself had chosen. In the last action he had lost six thousand men, including a thousand prisoners, and seventy-three pieces of cannon, wrested from him in fair fight; while the allies were only weakened by two thirds of that number: the *prestige* of a first battle was not only lost by him, but gained by his opponents; nine thousand of his best soldiers had fallen, or been made prisoners, since hostilities had recommenced; discouragement, almost despair, was general in his ranks, and it was difficult to see how the future advance of a host of enemies was to be arrested, when less than a half of their armies had defeated so well-conceived and daring an enterprise by his whole disposable force. Nor did subsequent events weaken the force of this impression: on the contrary, they strongly confirmed it, and seemed to presage the immediate dissolution of the French power. Napoleon returned at midnight to Brienne, and such was his anxiety lest the enemy should take advantage of the confusion of his retiring columns to make a nocturnal attack, and complete his ruin, that, not content with incessantly asking if there was anything new, he himself stood for some hours at the windows of the chateau of Brienne, which overlooked the field, anxiously watching to see if any unusual movement around the watchfires indicated the commencement of an irruption. Nothing, however, prognosticated such an event; the flames were steady, and gradually declined as night advanced; and at four on the following morning, the emperor, satisfied he was not pursued, gave orders for a retreat by Lesmont to Troyes.*

* Dan., 68, 69. Lab., ii., 162, 164. Vaud., i., 252, 253. Koch, i., 183, 186. Burgh., 117, 118.

Great exultation in the allied army at this success.

This first and most important victory gained on the soil of France over the arms of Napoleon, produced the most unbounded transports in the allied armies. During the progress of the action, Alexander and Frederic William were spectators from the heights of Trannes of the success of their arms, and testified the most lively sense of their gratitude to the victorious generals and chiefs by whom it had been effected. "Tell the field-marshal," said the former to Blucher's aid-de-camp, "that he has crowned all his former victories by this glorious triumph." The day after the battle, the sovereigns, ambassadors, and principal generals supped together; and Blucher, striking off, in his eagerness, the necks of the bottles of Champagne with his knife, quaffed off copious and repeated libations to the toast, drank with enthusiasm by all present, "Nach Paris." Yet, although such were the anticipations which universally prevailed, and not without reason, of an immediate march to Paris, it may be doubted whether Blucher made as much of the superiority of force as he might have done; and whether Napoleon in his place would not have converted the success at La Rothiere into a total and irrecoverable defeat. Certainly, if the position of the French army, forming the two sides of a right-angled triangle facing outward, with the Aube, traversed only by a single bridge at Lesmont, in its rear, and that of the allies, pressing them with superior forces on both sides up against the impassable river, be taken into consideration, it might have been expected that more decisive results would have been obtained; and, in fact, they would have been secured, if, instead of directing the weight of his attacks against La Rothiere and La Giberie in front, the Prussian marshal had more strongly supported the assault, which in the end proved decisive, of Wrede on Chaumenil and Morvilliers in flank.†

Desperate condition of the French army in their retreat.

In truth, however, such were the discouragement and disaster which resulted to the French army from this calamitous action, that it brought Napoleon to the very brink of ruin. On the day after the battle, the army defiled in great confusion over the bridge of Lesmont; and Marmont, who was left with twelve thousand men to cover the retreat, soon found himself beset, as Victor had been at the Beresina, by Wrede's corps, above twenty thousand strong. It was only by the most vigorous exertions, seconded by the heroic devotion of his followers, that the brave marshal succeeded in repelling the repeated attacks of the Bavarians, urged on to the charge by the personal direction of the Emperor Alexander, who exposed himself in the thickest of the fight. In the afternoon a thick snowstorm suspended the combat, and Marmont took advantage of it to withdraw his troops across the river, and the Russians, disconcerted by this bloody encounter, gave no farther molestation to their retreat. Nevertheless, it proved to the last degree disastrous to the French. On the day following, Napoleon, with all

Feb. 2.

Feb. 3.

* Fain, 78, 79. Jom., iv., 527, 528. Dan., 70, 71.
† Koch, i., 186, 187. Dan., 73, 74.

his forces, fell back to Troyes, the capital of Champagne, where Mortier, with his corps, was already established, erecting barricades, running up palisades, establishing batteries, breaking out loopholes in the houses of the suburbs, and making every preparation for a vigorous defence.*

Dilatory movements of the allies in pursuit.

The situation of the town of Troyes, containing twenty-two thousand inhabitants, in the midst of an immense plain at the confluence of the Barce and the Seine, was such as to render it little capable of standing a siege, while at the same time it afforded opportunities, on the right bank of the latter river, of keeping even a superior enemy several days at bay. Napoleon resolved to make use of it for this latter temporary purpose, to gain time for the farther concentration of his troops; and in this endeavour he was much aided by the dilatory conduct of Schwartzenberg in continuing the pursuit. The Austrians, Bavarians, and Wirtembergers, who, from the direction which the retiring French army had taken, found themselves foremost in following it, were so tardy in their movements, that they literally lost sight of the enemy, and for two days it was unknown at headquarters whether the main body of the French army had retreated in the direction of Arcis, Chalons, or Troyes. Already the secret reluctance of the Austrian cabinet to push matters to extremity against Napoleon, which exercised so powerful an influence on the fortunes of the campaign, was becoming very apparent; yet, notwithstanding this slackness in the pursuit, such was the effect of a retrograde movement upon the spirits of the French soldiers, more susceptible than any in Europe of vivid impressions, and such the effect produced on the minds of the young conscripts, by the hardships they had undergone since they took the field in that rigorous weather, that six thousand deserted their colours, and disappeared during the retreat to Troyes; and the army reached that town fifteen thousand weaker than when Napoleon, a week before, had given the signal of advance from Chalons.†

Imprudent dislocation of the allied armies. February 2.

The future plan of operations resolved on by the allied sovereigns on the 2d of February, at the castle of Brienne, and which proved so disastrous in its consequences as to have well-nigh rendered abortive all the vast efforts which had been made for the invasion of France, was, that the Grand Army and army of Silesia, instead of acting together, or in concert, when their mass was irresistible, *should separate*, and act on different lines of operation: Blucher, with the army of Silesia, moving upon Chalons, and thence following the course of the Marne to Paris, through Chateau-Thierry and Meaux, while Prince Schwartzenberg was to move on to Troyes, and descend the valley of the Seine by Montereau to the same capital. Want of provisions and of forage, which already began to be severely felt, if such an enormous multitude of men and horses was kept united, was the reason assigned for this most imprudent dislocation; as if any reason, short of absolute necessity, could justify the division of the two armies to such a distance that they could not render aid to each other, in the presence of such a general as Napoleon, still at the head of seventy thousand men, in a central position between them. It would seem as if, forgetting that the concentration of the two armies the autumn before had wrought out the deliverance of Germany, and that their recent union had all but secured the conquest of France, they were determined to give every facility to a prolongation of the war, and to afford to the French emperor an opportunity for dealing out, on the right and left, those redoubtable blows by which, fourteen years before, he had prostrated Wurmser and Alvinzi on the banks of the Adige.*

Retreat of the French from Troyes, and its occupation by the allies.

The disastrous consequences of this separation of force were speedily apparent. It was not that Schwartzenberg had not ample troops at his disposal in his own army to crush Napoleon; but that, separated from Blucher and the army of Silesia, the daring resolution was wanting in all but Alexander, which could alone lead to decisive results. Austrian diplomacy, anxious to save the French emperor from a total fall, now, as on so many former occasions, became predominant over military councils; and Napoleon, relieved from all disquietude on the side of the Grand Army, was able to turn his undivided attention to the strokes which he meditated against the army of Silesia. No sooner, therefore, did he receive intelligence of the separation of the two armies, and that Blucher, in obedience to his instructions, was moving towards Chalons-sur-Marne, while Schwartzenberg's huge masses were slowly drawing around Troyes, than he resolved to descend the course of the Seine towards Paris, and facilitate his junction with the re-enforcements of veteran troops which were approaching, drawn from the army of Soult; in the hopes that, when he had in this manner repaired his losses, he would be enabled to strike a blow with effect against the flank of the army of Silesia, when advancing towards the capital. With this view, he allowed his troops to repose during three days at Troyes; and so imposed upon the enemy by the good countenance which he maintained in front of that town, and by a vigorous sortie which he made beyond the Barce, that the Austrian general deemed it necessary to draw back his headquarters to Bar-sur-Aube, and throw two corps across the Seine, in order to make a general attack at once on both banks. Napoleon had no intention of risking a general engagement where he stood; and his troops having somewhat recovered from their fatigues, he broke up with his whole army early on the morning of the 6th, and reached Nogent on the road to Paris on the following evening. The headquarters of the allied army were immediately advanced, and on the 7th were established in Troyes, which they took the most anxious precautions to preserve from pillage or disorder of any sort.†

Feb. 5.

Feb. 6.

Though the retreat of the French army down the Seine to Nogent was a prudent measure, profoundly calculated, and which speedily led to the most brill-

Extreme depression in the French army.

* Koch, i., 196, 197. Dan., 73, 75. Jom., iv., 528.

† Koch, i., 197, 199. Dan., 74, 75. Fain, 81, 83. Burgh., 119, 120.

* Dan., 74, 75. Burgh., 120, 124. Koch, i., 191. Jom., iv., 533.

† Fain, 84, 85. Dan., 77, 78. Burgh., 122, 123. Koch, i., 201, 203.

iant results, yet it produced, at first, the most ruinous effects upon the army. The hopes of the soldiers were entirely dissipated by this long-continued retreat; it was seriously feared that Paris itself would, ere long, be abandoned: the cause of Napoleon and of the Revolution seemed at an end. They felt the same despair as the Russians had done in retiring from Smolensko towards Moscow. The troops marched in sullen and gloomy silence over the wet and dreary roads: the ominous question, "Where are we to halt?" was in every mouth. Nor were the spirits of the troops revived when they reached Nogent, and the army, receiving orders to halt, made preparations, by mining the bridge, loopholing the houses, and barricading the streets, for disputing the passage of the Seine. Moreover, the most disquieting intelligence was received from all quarters: the defection of Murat was announced from Italy; Antwerp was blockaded by the Anglo-Prussian army; Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle were occupied; Brussels had been evacuated; Flanders was lost; General Maison was rapidly falling back to the old frontiers of the monarchy; while the unresisted march of Blucher to Chalons, which he had occupied on the 5th, clearly indicated a resolution to march on Paris by a route by which it was most assailable, and where scarcely any force existed to arrest his progress. The troops, profoundly affected at having so long to retire before the enemy, were now deserting by crowds; the sides of the road were covered with arms, cloaks, and haversacks, thrown down in despair; twelve thousand conscripts had soon left their standards, making the total loss since hostilities recommenced not less than twenty thousand; and the despatches from Caulaincourt, who was engaged in the conferences which had been opened at Chatillon, announced that the demands of the allied sovereigns, rising with the successes of their arms, were no longer limited, as at Frankfort, to the recognition of the frontier of the Rhine, but pointed to the reduction of France within the ancient limits of the monarchy.*

Fresh organization of the French cavalry.

Such was the magnitude of the losses which the French army had sustained since the opening of the campaign, especially in cavalry, that a fresh organization of that arm, to conceal the frightful chasms in its ranks, had become necessary. It took place at Nogent, and continued unchanged till the conclusion of the war. The cavalry had been divided into six corps; but such had been the enormous amount of its losses, that even with the aid of successive remounts, sent from the depôts in the interior, it could only now make out four, of which two were composed only of three divisions each; Grouchy obtained the general command of the whole, and the corps under him were intrusted to Count Bordesoulle, Count St. Germain, Count Milhaud, and the Count de Valmy. In addition to this, there was the cavalry of the Guard, consisting of five divisions, under Laferrierre, Desnouettes, Colbert, Guyot, and Defrance; and such was the activity displayed in pushing reenforcements into this service, that it soon numbered in its ranks fifteen thousand admirable cavaliers. The skeleton of a new corps of infantry was also formed, under Oudinot, on the Seine below Nogent, and at Bray, composed of the divisions Leval and Boyer de Rebeval, which were now coming up from the army of the Pyrenees, and various bodies of conscripts hurried forward from the depôts in the interior.*

Napoleon resolves to attack Blucher on his advance to Paris.

It was in these disastrous and all but desperate circumstances that Napoleon conceived and executed one of those hardy, yet prudent measures, which have justly rendered his name immortal. Rightly judging that he need not disquiet himself about the Austrians, whose slow and methodical movements, ever kept subordinate to the mysteries of diplomacy, were now more than ever circumspect, from the peculiar position of their emperor making war on his own son-in-law, he cast his eyes on Blucher, whose bolder movements, since the separation of the armies, were both more fitted to excite solicitude and afford opportunity. The progress of the Prussian marshal, since he had been left at liberty to act for himself, had been so rapid as to have excited the most lively apprehensions in the breasts of the Parisians. Hardly an hour elapsed that the most alarming intelligence was not received from the seat of government. The Russians and Prussians, with their ardent chief at their head, were advancing by forced marches towards the capital, and driving before them a confused and trembling crowd of peasants, women, and children, who fled at the approach of these northern barbarians. In this extremity, with disaster pressing him on every side, and the enemy's advanced posts within a few marches of the capital, Maret and all his councillors earnestly besought the emperor to accept even the rigorous conditions proposed by the allies, and make peace. But after a night passed in reflection, he replied, "No, no! we must think of other things just now. I am on the eve of beating Blucher. He is advancing on the road to Montmirail. I am about to set off. I will beat him to-morrow—I will beat him the day after to-morrow: if that movement is attended with the success it deserves, the face of affairs will be entirely changed, and then we shall see what is to be done."†

Movements of Blucher in Champagne.

The positions occupied by the army of Silesia at this juncture were singularly favourable to such an enterprise. Blucher, with the corps of Sacken and Olsoofief, which fought at La Rothiere, had, in obedience to the instructions he had received, moved, on the 3d, through St. Ouen on the road to Chalons. Meanwhile, D'York attacked that town, which was garrisoned by a detachment of Macdonald's corps, and, after a sharp conflict, made himself master of it. Macdonald, who was encumbered with the grand park of Napoleon's army, consisting of a hundred guns dragged by peasants' horses, upon this retired to Epernay, towards Paris; and Blucher no sooner heard of the direction of his march, than he resolved to cut him off, and for this purpose directed his troops to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, where the two great

Feb. 3.

Feb. 4.

* Fain, 84, 86. Dan., 76, 78. Koch, i., 202, 203. Burgh., 123, 124. Lab., ii., 172.

* Koch, i., 208. Vaud., i., 294, 295.
† Fain, 90, 91. Dan., 96. Lab., ii., 181, 182.

roads from Chalons to Paris meet. The better to compass this design, which seemed to promise entire success, he ordered D'York to follow the French marshal by the highway through Chateau-Thierry and Epernay; Sacken was directed through Bergeres on MONTMIRAIL; and he was to be followed at the distance of a day's march by Olsoofief, who was commanded to remain at CHAMPAUBERT till farther orders. The field-marshal himself halted at Virtus, almost without troops, to await the coming up of Kleist's corps, which was hourly expected at Chalons. With the three corps united he proposed to fall on Macdonald's troops, and, having destroyed them and taken the convoy of guns, push direct on the capital, where the utmost consternation already prevailed. Sacken's advanced guard had reached La Ferté-sous-Jouarre: the crowd of fugitives was pouring in wild disorder into Meaux; already the litters of the wounded, and the disbanded conscripts, were beginning to be seen in Paris, where the public streets were almost deserted, in the apprehension of an impending calamity. No uneasiness filled the field-marshal's breast, during this rapid advance, as to his left flank, though Napoleon lay in that direction, as he deemed him sufficiently occupied with watching the motions of the Grand Army; as Nogent, where the headquarters of the French were established, was thirty miles distant; and as the only approach to it was through deep cross-roads, by the marshy bank of the Petit Morin, apparently impassable at that inclement season of the year.*

Feb. 5. Feb. 6.

Having taken his resolution, the emperor instantly gave orders for carrying it into execution; and, leaving Victor at Nogent with fourteen thousand men, to keep the Austrians in check, and Oudinot at Bray-sur-Seine at the head of ten thousand, with orders to delay them as long as possible at the passage of that river, he resolved himself to set out with the *élite* of his army, about forty-five thousand strong, for Sezanne, with the intention of falling perpendicularly on the line of Blucher's march, and destroying his scattered columns. On the 9th he broke up, with this design, from Nogent, and slept at Sezanne, half way across, with the Imperial Guard, and on the following day moved on towards Champaubert. But the difficulties of the passage proved greater even than had been anticipated, and it required all the vigour and authority of the emperor to overcome the insubordination of his troops, and conquer the difficulties of the enterprise. The spirits of the soldiers, already severely depressed when they arrived at Nogent, were sunk to the lowest degree by the hardships and difficulties of this cross march, for which no object was apparent, and which seemed to have been undertaken for no other purpose but to lay open to the Austrian Grand Army the undefended road to the capital. Murmurs were universal; insubordination bordered on mutiny; it was openly said, both by officers and men, that the emperor had lost his head, and that he was fast hurrying the empire to destruction. Marmont, who headed the advance with his corps, found the roads so dreadful, that the artillery drivers all reported that it was impossible to get the guns through; and, notwithstanding all the efforts of the officers, the cannon and wagons stuck fast in the deep clay forest of Traçonne, and Marmont, despairing of success, was remeasuring his steps. When this was reported to the emperor, he replied, "You must still advance, even if you leave the whole cannon behind you." The marshal was instantly ordered to face about and resume his march, and push through at all hazards; couriers were despatched in all directions to the mayors of the adjacent communes to procure horses, that they might aid in extricating the artillery; and such was the patriotic ardour with which the assistance was furnished, that the guns and caissons were at length got through. The disorders and discouragement of the troops, however, had now reached their acme from this accumulation of difficulties; pillage became universal, and, being exercised without mercy on the people of the country, gave rise to the most violent exasperation; and the emperor, after long shutting his eyes to these excesses, had at length his attention forcibly drawn to them by the destruction of a chateau, in the neighbourhood of Nogent, belonging to his own mother. Napoleon, justly incensed, issued a severe proclamation, in which he declared he would hold the generals and officers responsible for the conduct of their troops;* but the evil still continued with very little abatement, and, by preventing any cordial assistance from the peasantry to the soldiers, was one main cause of the fall of Napoleon. It arose from a deeper source than any regulation of discipline could rectify—the habits of systematic extortion to which the armies of the Revolution had been trained; and was, in fact, the reaction of Napoleon's favourite maxim, that war should maintain war, upon himself and his own subjects.†

Feb. 9.

Extraordinary difficulties of the passage across the country.

Early on the morning of the 10th, Marmont passed the defiles of St. Gond under the eyes of the emperor, and immediately directed his march against the village of Baye, which was occupied by a detachment of Olsoofief's corps. That general, with his gallant Russians, was lying at Champaubert in perfect security, and dreaming of nothing less than being assailed on his left flank, in which direction, from the position of Schwartzenberg's army, and the difficult nature of the intervening country, no danger appeared to be apprehended. Meanwhile, Marmont reached the summit of the height which overlooks the valley of Petit-Morin, and beheld the Russians, about five thousand strong, with twenty-four guns, busy in preparing their breakfasts, wholly unconscious of their approaching peril. Napoleon immediately rode up to the front, and, overjoyed at his success, ordered a general at-

Combat of Champaubert.

* Dan., 95, 97. Lab., ii., 180, 182. Fain, 90, 91. Vaud., i., 280, 283, 292, 293.

* "The emperor has to express his displeasure to the army at the excesses to which it abandons itself. Such disorders are always hurtful; but they become criminal when committed in our native country. From this day forward, the chiefs of corps and the generals shall be held entirely responsible for them. The inhabitants are flying on every side, and the troops, instead of being their country's defenders, are becoming its scourge."—*Proclamation, 8th Feb.*, 1814. DANILEFSKY, 95.

† Dan., 95, 97. Koch, i., 208, 209. Fain, 92, 93. Vaud., i., 294, 303.

tack. The Russian general, though astonished beyond measure at this unexpected apparition on his flank, drew up his men with great steadiness to resist. Some prisoners, however, taken in the skirmish near Baye, having mentioned that the emperor was with the troops, he despatched repeated couriers to Blucher to demand assistance, and know whether he should retreat; but the field-marshal directed him to maintain himself where he was, and that succour was unnecessary, as it was impossible that he could be assailed by more than a flying detachment of two thousand men. Thus left to his own resources, the brave Russian, though well aware he had to deal with an overwhelming force, led on by the emperor in person, prepared himself, like a good soldier, to maintain his post to the last extremity.*

Total defeat of the Russian division.

Napoleon, seeing that the enemy stood firm, made dispositions for attacking him at once in front and both flanks. Lagrange, with his division, followed by that of Ricard, crossed the marshes of St. Gond, carried the bridge of St. Prix, and drove the Russian advanced posts close into Champaubert, where they rallied, under protection of their main body and artillery, which opened a most vigorous fire. Meanwhile, the French cavalry at a greater distance passed the marsh, and having gained the high road leading from Champaubert to Montmirail, turned and attacked the Russians on their right flank, while Lagrange's division menaced their left. Despairing of maintaining his position against such an accumulation of enemies, Olsoofief sent half his guns to the rear, and, forming his men in column, marched in person to force the passage towards Etoges and Montmirail, while Poltoratsky, with a brigade, was left to defend Champaubert to the last extremity. This little band defended itself with desperate resolution till its ammunition began to fail, when they were obliged to retreat out of the village and retire across a plain, with the view of reaching the shelter of a wood at a little distance. As he drew near to this cover, Poltoratsky perceived that it was already in the hands of the enemy, and he was received by them with a volley of musketry. Meanwhile, the horse artillery of the French made fearful chasms in the Russian ranks: their cavalry charged in at the openings, and the wearied square dragged its toilsome way along, moistening every step with its blood. At length, having exhausted its last cartridge, the whole of this devoted band was overpowered and made prisoners. Meanwhile, Olsoofief himself, finding the road to Etoges occupied by the French with superior forces, struck off to the left, and endeavoured to make his way across the fields towards Montmirail; but his guns stuck fast in the deep mud, so that the enemy had time to surround the detachment, which, having wholly exhausted its ammunition, was in great part made prisoners, with the commander himself. General Corneloff, however, with General Udom, disdained, even in this extremity, to surrender; but collecting the remains of the corps, about two thousand strong, with twelve guns, they succeeded in breaking through the enemy, and at midnight reached Portabincon with their colours and honour unsullied.*

Great effects of this victory, and measures of Napoleon to follow it up.

In this disastrous affair the Russians lost three thousand men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides twelve guns and seventeen caissons, while the French were only weakened by six hundred men. But the moral effect of the triumph was much more considerable; and it was such, that it had wellnigh neutralized the whole effect of the previous successes, and rendered problematical the final result of the invasion. The French troops, who had been reduced to the lowest point of depression by the long-continued retreat, were elevated beyond measure by this brilliant success, which, achieved with so little loss, seemed to recall, in the midst of disaster, the brilliant days of Arcola and Rivoli. By this daring and felicitous cross-march, the initiative had been regained by the French emperor; he had achieved the greatest feat in strategy—that, with a force inferior, upon the whole, to his adversaries, of being greatly superior at the point of attack; he had broken in upon the line of advance of the army of Silesia, and could at pleasure turn with a concentrated array upon any of its scattered columns. The French soldiers, intelligent beyond any other in Europe, immediately perceived the immense advantages which this brilliant cross-march had secured for them; the depression of the retreat, the disaster of La Rothiere, the fatigues of the preceding days, were forgotton. Napoleon no longer appeared the insane ruler, hurrying blindfold on destruction, but the consummate commander, who prepared amid adversity the means of regaining prosperous fortune; and that general confidence was felt which, more either than numbers or experience, in general contributes to military success.†

Napoleon's measures in consequence.

Napoleon felt the whole impulse of the returning tide of victory, which had now set in to his arms. Poltoratsky, the Russian general, who had been made prisoner, having been brought before him, he exclaimed, "I now tell you that, as I have routed you to-day, I will annihilate Sacken to-morrow; on Thursday, the whole of Wittgenstein's advanced guard will be disposed of; on Friday, I will give Blucher a blow from which he will never recover, and I then hope to dictate peace to Alexander on the Vistula. Your old fox Kutusoff deceived me by his march on our flank: the burning of Moscow was a barbarous act—it was the work of the Russians. I took Berlin, Madrid, and Vienna, and no such thing happened." "The Russians," replied Poltoratsky, "don't repent of that sacrifice, and are delighted with its results." "Leave the room, sir," replied the emperor, stamping with his foot. On that very night he despatched orders to his plenipotentiary Caulaincourt, at the congress which was sitting, to gain time and *sign nothing*, as he was on the eve of the most important events. Next morning he announced his success to Macdonald, with orders to him to discontinue his retreat; and himself set off by daybreak to attack Sacken at Montmirail, leaving the corps of Marmont before Etogos to

Feb. 11.

* Dan., 100, 102. Koch, i., 234, 235. Vaud., i., 304, 305. Fain, 93.

* Dan., 102, 104. Lab., ii., 187, 189. Fain, 93. Koch, i., 235, 239. Plotho, iii., 176.
† Lab., ii., 189. Fain, 93. Koch, i., 239, 240.

watch Blucher, who lay at Virtus anxiously awaiting the arrival of Kleist's corps to enable him to resume the offensive. By this blow, Napoleon had cut the Silesian army into two parts, and interposed with fifty thousand men, to which his own army was now augmented, between its severed wings.*

Perilous situation of Sacken.

Sacken's situation was now very critical. He had received an order from Blucher, late the night before, to remeasure his steps through Montmirail, and rejoin him in the plains of Virtus; and the field-marshal had ordered D'York to join him, but the rapidity of the emperor's movements anticipated the execution of either of these orders. At the very time that Napoleon moved from Champaubert to Montmirail, Sacken was on his way to it, marching back from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, where he had reached on his advance to Paris; but the French were beforehand, and Montmirail was occupied by their advanced guard before the Russians approached it. Thus anticipated and intercepted in his attempted movement to rejoin his commander-in-chief, the Russian general had no alternative but to prepare for the combat. This he did the more willingly, as he relied on the approach and co-operation of D'York, who was near Chateau-Thierry, and who, he was aware, had received orders to join him without loss of time. Trusting with too great confidence to this assistance, Sacken, instead of inclining to his left, as he might have done, to facilitate his junction with D'York, resolved to push straight on, and endeavour to force his passage through the opposing columns, by the valley of Petit Morin. He formed his troops, in consequence, in order of battle: the centre on the great road from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre to Montmirail; the right on the village of Marché, near the river of the Petit Morin; and the left in the open ground towards the village of Fontenelle, where it was hoped they would speedily be joined by D'York's corps coming up from Chateau-Thierry.†

Battle of Montmirail, Feb. 11.

In proportion as the French troops came up to Montmirail they marched out of the town, and, forming on the opposite side, commenced the action with the Russian troops. The fire began at eleven o'clock, and soon became extremely warm on both sides; forty pieces of cannon arrayed along the allied front long kept the French at bay, and the village of Marché, where Scherbatof commanded the Russian right, was three times taken and retaken at the point of the bayonet. Meanwhile D'York himself arrived, but reported that his troops could not appear on the ground till three o'clock, and that his whole artillery had been left at Chateau-Thierry, from the experienced impossibility of dragging it forward in the wretched state of the roads. At the very time that this depressing intelligence was received by the allies, Mortier came up with the Old Guard, the Cuirassiers, and the Guards of Honour, to the aid of the French; and Napoleon having now got his reserves in hand, and seeing the decisive moment arrived, ordered a general attack on the whole of Sacken's line, but taking care to direct the weight of his force against the Russian left near Fontenelle, in order to throw it back on the centre, and cut off the enemy from the line of their junction with D'York or approach to Blucher. If the attack was vigorous, however, the defence was not less obstinate: ranged behind hedges and in farm-offices, the Russian tirailleurs long retarded the advance of the enemy, and when, at length, they were forced back, the mutual fury of the combatants led them, with loud cries on both sides, to the decisive shock of the bayonet. Success was varied in this dreadful encounter: in some places the French were forced back, in others they penetrated the Russian line; but at this decisive moment Napoleon ordered up the Cuirassiers and Guards of Honour to charge the half-broken masses of the enemy. As these gallant cavaliers defiled past the emperor, he said to them, "Brave young men! there is the enemy! Will you allow him to march to Paris?" "We will not allow him!" exclaimed the horsemen, shaking their sabres aloft, and rending the air with their cries; and instantly breaking into a charge, fell upon the enemy with such fury that the victory in that quarter was speedily decided. In vain D'York now came up with several brigades of Prussians, though without artillery, which could not be dragged through the deep clay; they, too, were broken by the French cavalry, and shared the general ruin. Ney and Mortier carried the farm of Greneaux amid vehement cheers, and drove the Russian left back upon the centre, which, with the right, retired across the fields towards Chateau-Thierry, covered by Vassiltchikoff's dragoons, which, with the utmost gallantry, repulsed the repeated charges of the French cuirassiers.*

Actions on the day following the battle. February 12.

In this bloody combat the allies lost three thousand men killed and wounded and a thousand prisoners, besides nine guns, which stuck fast in the mud, and could not be drawn off when the corps retreated. The French loss did not exceed one thousand. It was only by the utmost exertions, and harnessing fifty hussars and hulans, with long ropes, to each gun, that the remainder were got away during the darkness and confusion, while torches were displayed every hundred yards to illuminate the gloom. Napoleon passed the night at the farm-house of Greneaux, sleeping on the straw from which the enemy's dead had just been removed, in the midst of smoking ruins, yet weltering in their blood, and next morning by daybreak he was on horseback, at the head of his Guards, to pursue the allies. The Prussian general, Horn, was stationed to keep the enemy in check with twenty-four squadrons, which had not hitherto suffered in the conflict. He arranged these troops in two lines, the first of which charged the enemy. They were received, however, with such vigour by Ney, at the head of the French dragoons, that the first line was at once routed and driven back upon the second, which was also thrown into confusion, and fled. Immediately the French cavalry pushed on, and swept round the squares of Russian infantry,

* Dan., 106, 108. Lab., ii., 189, 190. Koch, i., 239. Plotho, iii., 178, 179.

† Dan., 109, 110. Koch, i., 240, 241. Plotho, iii., 179, 180. Lab., ii., 189, 190.

* Dan., 111, 112. Koch, i., 240, 241. Fain, 94, 95. Lab., ii., 192, 193. Vaud., i., 312, 322. Plotho, iii., 180, 182.

which had barely time to form in rear of the horse; but two of them were broken in the tumult, and three pieces of cannon taken, besides a thousand prisoners. Meanwhile, however, the main body of the Russians and Prussians succeeded in crossing the Marne and breaking down its bridges, which prevented the farther pursuit of the enemy, and placed them, for the moment, at least, in a situation of security; but in this day's combat they had lost two thousand more of their best soldiers, besides several guns abandoned in the retreat, making their total loss in the two days seventeen guns, five standards, and six thousand men.*

Heroic devotion of Sacken to his orders.

By directing his course to the left, and marching on the first day straight to Chateau-Thierry, without seeking to encounter Napoleon at all, there can be no doubt that Sacken might have avoided this serious disaster, and joined Blucher with his forces untouched; but his orders from the field-marshal were precise, to march to join him by Montmirail; and, like a good soldier, he obeyed his instructions, though to the evident destruction of himself and his troops. Well, therefore, did he merit the encomium of the biographer of Blucher: "Sacken may have committed an error of judgment on this occasion, but it was the error of a hero too confident of his own strength: we had few generals equal to him; only such as he might hope to vanquish Napoleon."†

Kleist joins Blucher, who advances towards Sacken. February 12.

While the emperor in person was gaining these splendid successes against the corps of Olsoofief and Sacken, Blucher was remaining at Virtus, with hardly any troops at his disposal, anxiously waiting for the arrival of Kleist and Kaptsevitch's corps. It may be conceived with what impatience the impetuous veteran remained in this state of forced inaction, when fresh accounts of Napoleon's successes were every hour received; when the fugitives from Champaubert were coming straggling in, and the distant roar of the cannon at Montmirail announced Sacken's danger. But notwithstanding his ardent desire to join his comrades, and, if he could not avert their calamities, to share their fate, he was unable to move a single step in advance, from his total want of cavalry, and the presence of Marmont with a corps of fifteen, which report had magnified to thirty thousand men, at Etoges, directly between him and his lieutenants. At length, however, Kleist and Kaptsevitch having arrived, and the remains of Olsoofief's corps and two regiments of cuirassiers having joined, he advanced to Etoges at the head of twenty thousand combatants, which Marmont evacuated at his approach, retiring towards Chateau-Thierry, where Napoleon lay with the main body of his forces. An interesting scene had occurred in that town on the preceding day. The inhabitants, on the night of the action in front of the town, after the combat of Montmirail, had been overwhelmed by a mass of fugitives in disorder, who vented their rage and vexation at their defeat by every species of pillage and rapine, which all the efforts of the Russian and Prussian officers had been unable to restrain. Proportionally vivid was their joy on the following morning, when the town was evacuated by the enemy, and the indignant inhabitants, yet smarting under the brutality to which they had been subjected, went out in crowds along the banks of the Marne to meet their deliverers. Men, women, and children laboured assiduously to restore the bridges which the Russians had destroyed in their retreat, and to reconstruct a passage to their own soldiers; and when, at length, the boats were collected, the planks laid, and the troops began to defile across, loud shouts rent the air, and a confused multitude, of all ages and both sexes, rushing forward, embraced, with tears of joy, the gallant warriors whose valour had delivered them from their oppressors.*

Feb. 13.

Napoleon was no sooner informed of the advance of Blucher to Etoges, and thence towards Montmirail, than he set out from Chateau-Thierry on the evening of the 13th, with his Guards and the greater part of his forces, and arrived at the latter town at eight on the morning of the 14th. Marmont had just evacuated, after considerable fighting, the village of VAUCHAMPS, and was retreating along the road to Montmirail, when the well-known ensigns of the Guard were seen on the highway, and a powerful body of cuirassiers announced the presence of the emperor! Instantaneous was the effect of this intelligence upon the spirit of the troops: it seemed as if the wand of a mighty enchanter had given an electric shock to every soldier on the field. Immediately the retreat was suspended: the cavalry, hurrying to the front, charged with boldness and rapidity; the skirmishers fell back, and gave place to deep columns of infantry, boldly advancing to the attack; the batteries were re-enforced, and fired with increased vivacity; aids-de-camp were seen galloping in all directions; and the air resounded with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* It was now the Prussian general's turn to halt, and make his dispositions for defence. Zeithen, who headed the vanguard, was soon forced back in disorder upon the main body, which had barely time to form square when a numerous body of cavalry thundered upon it. The Prussian cuirassiers were speedily overthrown, and the dazzling line of horsemen, headed by Grouchy, swept round the squares on two sides: one was broken and made prisoners, but the others received them with a sustained rolling fire, and the charge was repulsed. As the increasing numbers, however, and augmented boldness of the enemy, left no doubt of the presence of the emperor with an overwhelming superiority of force, Blucher felt the necessity of a retreat, and commenced it in squares, the artillery being placed in the intervals, with Kleist on the right and Kaptsevitch on the left.†

Battle of Vauchamps. Feb. 14.

Glorious retreat of Blucher. February 14.

And now commenced a combat, which has shed as immortal a lustre on the steadiness of the Russian and Prussian troops as the previous brilliant successes had secured for the French emperor and army. The retreat was conducted

* Plotho, iii., 183, 184. Dan., 113, 114. Koch, i., 252, 253. Vaud., i., 325, 327.

† Varnhagen von Ense, Feldzug von Blucher, 274.

* Lab., ii., 196, 197. Koch, i., 235, 236. Dan., 115. Fain, 97. Plotho, iii., 185, 186.

† Dan., 116, 117. Lab., ii., 200, 201. Fain, 98, 99. Plotho, iii., 187, 188.

along the high road, which traverses a flat and open country, running in a straight line, as is usual in that part of France, between rows of lofty elms.* On this *chaussée* the artillery retired, firing incessantly as it receded on the pursuers, while the squares of infantry marched abreast of it in the fields on either side. Slowly, and in perfect order, the Russian squares fell back without either hurry or disorder, as on a field-day at St. Petersburg; and truly then appeared in their highest lustre the marvels of military discipline. In vain the French cuirassiers, with devoted gallantry, and animated by the presence of the emperor, swept round the steady walls of steel, and, approaching to the very edge of the bayonets, strove to force their way in, wherever the discharge of their cannon tore up a chasm, or the fall of the wounded presented an opening. Instantly closing to the centre, these noble veterans still preserved their array unbroken, and the squares, though sorely diminished, and leaving a stream of blood, flowing from the dead and the wounded, along their path, yet presented an undaunted front to the enemy. Entranced with the spectacle, Blucher, forgetting his own danger, gazed on the scene, and, halting his horse, exclaimed, "See how my brave Russians fight!" Thus combating, they reached Champaubert; but after passing through that town, the danger thickened; and such were the perils with which they were beset, that the bravest almost gave themselves up to despair.†

Imminent danger of Blucher.

While the Russian troops were delayed by defiling through the narrow causeway of Champaubert, Napoleon, who had a body of seven thousand admirable horse at his command, had despatched General Grouchy, at the head of three thousand of the swiftest among them, by a circuit round the village; and, by great exertions, that indefatigable officer had so far outstripped the slower march of the allied column, encumbered as it was by artillery and caissons, that he had gained the high road two miles in advance, and was established in force on it before the allies had extricated themselves from the houses. Meanwhile, Generals Bordesoulle and St. Germain closely followed the rear of the retreating column; and turning it on both flanks as it emerged into the meadows on the other side of the town, charged repeatedly, though without success, on three faces at once, the now wearied and almost exhausted body. By a continued fire of cannon and musketry, however, the allies succeeded in clearing the way through their constantly increasing enemies; and they had got to within half a mile of Etoges, where the danger would cease, from the country being no longer practicable for cavalry, when all at once, on surmounting an eminence just as the sun set, they beheld Grouchy's horsemen drawn up in battle array before them, and his last rays glanced on the long line of cuirasses, which, stretching far across the road on either side, seemed to present an impassable barrier to their farther advance. At this appalling sight, the boldest held his breath in the allied ranks—total defeat appeared to be inevitable—the mighty heart of Blucher shuddered at the thought, that not himself only, but the whole corps, with Prince Augustus of Prussia, were on the point of being made prisoners. "Let us die rather!" said that gallant prince, drawing his sword, and preparing to charge headlong upon the enemy. With mournful resolution, Blucher stood in the front of the squares, in hopes of falling before he witnessed the disgrace of his country. "If you should be killed here," said his aid-de-camp, Nostitz, "do you really think history will praise you for it?" Struck with these words, the field-marshal turned his horse's head, and said to Gneisenau, "If I do not perish to-day, then am I destined to live long, and I still hope to repair all."*

Its disastrous termination.

That there was no hope, except in forcing their way through at the point of the bayonet, was evident to all, from the commander-in-chief to the meanest private; and worthy indeed of a hero were the means which Blucher took to effect it. He commanded the drums to beat, the colours to be displayed, and, with all the pomp and circumstance of war, the troops to bear down in a solid mass upon the enemy. Cheered by the martial sound, fresh vigour was inspired into the soldiers' breasts; the artillery and infantry opened such a fire in front, that the *chaussée* was cleared, and the weighty column, preceded by its guns, marched into the forest of sabres. Had the horse artillery, which Grouchy had ordered to follow him, been able to keep pace with the cavalry, the whole column, with the commander-in-chief, must have been made prisoners, but it had stuck fast in the mud; the cavalry alone, without infantry or guns, was unable to withstand the shock, and the main body got through, with the commander-in-chief, Prince Augustus, and their whole staff. Enraged, however, at seeing their prey thus escaping them, Grouchy's horsemen closed on either side with such fury on the last squares, which had exhausted their ammunition, that several were broken, two Russian battalions cut to pieces, and two Prussian regiments made prisoners. The Russian horse artillery were in the most imminent danger; but their commander, Colonel Shusherin, formed the cannoniers in line, and, headed by Blucher, charged, sword in hand, right through the French cavalry, and got clear off. At length the wearied and bleeding column reached Etoges, where it was hoped rest and safety would be found; but there fresh combats awaited it. At ten at night, after it was quite dark, Marmont, at the head of his corps, which was comparatively fresh, suddenly commenced an attack on General Udom's brigade, which was reposing near the entrance of the town, broke it during the confusion of a nocturnal combat, and took several guns. Following up his success, the French marshal pushed on amid frightful confusion, and a second time the allies found the line of their retreat to Bergeres interrupted. But despair gave them almost supernatural strength. Firing and manœuvring were out of the question. In deep masses, and with loud hurrahs, they rushed upon the enemy, trampled them under foot, and, marching over their bodies, arrived at midnight at Bergeres.

* Personal observation.

† Dan., 116, 117. Varnhagen von Ense, 362. Vaud., i., 333. Koch, i., 260, 261.

* Dan., 117, 118. Lab., ii., 200, 202. Plotho, iii., 188, 190. Koch, i., 260, 262. Beauch., i., 280, 282.

The pursuit was now at end: order was in some degree restored to the regiments; and, after a few hours' rest, the retreat was continued to Chalons, where the remains of this once splendid array arrived on the evening of the 15th, and at length found repose under cover of the Marne.*

In this terrible combat, Blucher, whose force at the commencement of the action did not exceed twenty thousand soldiers, lost seven thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners, or above a third of the troops engaged, fifteen guns, and eight standards. The prisoners, in number about two thousand five hundred, were almost entirely Prussians; for, though several Russian squares were pierced through, and a dreadful loss sustained by them under the French sabres, hardly a man was taken; the Muscovites sternly combating to the very last, even when their ranks were broken, and farther resistance in a military point of view was unavailing. The French loss did not exceed twelve hundred men. After the battle, the remains of the army of Silesia converged together from Chalons and Chateau-Thierry, behind the shelter of the Marne, and collected their shattered bands in cantonments on the northeast of that river, but weakened by the loss of full twenty thousand men since Napoleon's fatal irruption had commenced, six days before, from the side of Sezanne.†

Results of the action.

Feb. 15.

The night after the battle of Vauchamps, Napoleon returned to Montmirail, where he slept; and, deeming nothing done while anything remained to do, instead of giving repose to his wearied troops, which had now marched and fought for six days incessantly, he sent advices to Victor and Oudinot that he would debouch on the following day in the valley of the Seine in their rear, by Guignes. The extreme badness of the cross roads, from the valley of the Marne to that of the Seine, having rendered this impossible by the direct line, he left his other troops in the neighbourhood of Chateau-Thierry and Montmirail, to watch the broken remains of the army of Silesia; and he himself, with his faithful Guards and cuirassiers, whom nothing could exhaust, took the route of Meaux, from whence on the following morning he turned to the left, and moved on Guignes, through the forest of Brie, by the *chaussée* of Fontenay. Meanwhile, all Paris was thrown into transports of joy by the successive arrival of couriers, who brought intelligence of the victories of Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps; the bulletins, which exaggerated these glorious successes, diffused a universal enchantment; the genius of the emperor seemed to have restored the days of Arcola and Rivoli; while a long column of seven thousand prisoners, taken in these combats, who were conducted along the Boulevards, preceded by military music and almost triumphal pomp, gave confirmation strong of the reality of the emperor's achievements.‡

Napoleon crosses over to the valley of the Seine.

Feb. 15.

Feb. 16.

When these memorable events were in progress on the banks of the Marne, changes, attended in the end with still more important consequences, were taking place on the shores of the Seine. The allied sovereigns had made their entry into Troyes on the 7th of February, without resistance, a few hours after Napoleon, with his troops, had left it. Although the ancient capital of Champagne had much declined, under the government of Napoleon, from its former splendour, when it had forty thousand souls within its walls, and could not now boast of above twenty thousand inhabitants, yet its occupation was of the highest importance, both for the physical necessities and moral influence of the allied arms. Not only had the town itself considerable resources, especially for the sick and wounded, whose number was now very considerable in their army, but being the centre where all the roads and communications of the province met, or intersected each other, it afforded the most valuable facilities for the procuring of provisions, which the concourse of such prodigious bodies of men and horses had now rendered a matter of very considerable difficulty, even in the heart of France. While the advanced guard of this army, consisting chiefly of the Wirtembergers and Bavarians under Wrede, defiled along the road to Paris on the traces of Napoleon, the bulk of their army, which was now concentrated together, passed through the town for twelve hours together, exhibiting a stupendous proof of the strength of the allied forces; for at the end of that time, independent of two corps which were pursuing the French, a hundred thousand men were encamped around the walls of Troyes.*

Occupation of Troyes by the allied arms.

Feb. 7.

But the entrance of the allied armies into this city was followed by a political movement of still higher importance, and which, in the end, exercised a most important influence on the fortunes of the Revolution and the ultimate fate of Napoleon. It was here that the first movement in favour of the RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS took place.

Commencement of a movement in favour of the Bourbons.

Twenty-one years had now elapsed since the blood of Louis XVI. had flowed on the Place Louis XV., and England, amid the storm of indignation excited by his fate, had been drawn unwillingly into the contest; and such had been the whirl of events which had immediately succeeded, and such the pressing interest of the glories and catastrophes which had since occurred, that the recollection of that illustrious race had almost been lost in France, and their name had disappeared from the page of European history. The ancient loyalty of the monarchy, indeed, still burned in the bosoms of a few highly-descended nobles in other parts of the Empire, and in many generous breasts in all classes in La Vendée; and the clergy in great part still nursed in secret a predilection for the ancient race, as for the ancient faith; but the young and active part of the population, almost all who could influence thought or determine action, had been whirled, willingly or unwillingly, into the vortex of the Revolution. An entire generation of the ancient no-

Extraordinary oblivion of the royal family of France during the Revolution.

* Dan., 118, 119. Koch, i., 261, 265. Beauch., i., 282, 284. Plotho, iii., 188, 190. Lab., ii., 202, 204.

† Plotho, iii., 190. Dan., 119. Koch, i., 264.

‡ Koch, i., 267, 270. Fain, 100, 104. Dan., 120, 121.

* Lab., ii., 170, 172. Beauch., i., 228, 230. Cap., x., 382, 383.

bles had expired under the edge of the guillotine, perished amid the horrors of the revolutionary prisons, or melted away, amid poverty and oblivion, in foreign lands. Warm as had been the sympathy, generous the hospitality, with which the emigrants had been at first received in every part of Europe, and especially in England, the rapidity of subsequent events, the intensity of subsequent interests, had been such, that they were now in a great measure forgotten. Numbers of them had taken advantage of the amnesty of Napoleon to return to their beloved country, not a few had yielded to the seductions of his antechambers, and settled down in the Tuileries under the shadow of the imperial, as they had done under the royal, *régime*. Above all, the total destruction of their properties had deprived them of almost all influence both at home and abroad; for although the sufferings of those who have been the victims of spoliation may at first excite a warm feeling of indignation, yet it insensibly gives way in process of time to the experienced inconvenience of relieving their necessities. It is rare to see a feeling of pity which can long survive repeated demands for money. The general irreligion and consequent selfishness of all the more elevated or influential classes in France, both before and since the Revolution, had deprived the cause of ancient loyalty of its only source of lasting support—a sense of duty springing from obligations superior to this world. Thus, though there were still many Royalists, especially in the provincial towns of France, they were wholly powerless as a political party; they were regarded by the active and energetic portion of the people rather as a respectable relic of the olden time than as a body which could ever again rise to power in the state; and it may safely be affirmed that, without external aid, the cause of the restoration was hopeless in France, unless, possibly, from the suffering produced by a long course of disastrous revolutions.

Royalist organization existing in France.

Notwithstanding all this, however, a certain organization in favour of the exiled family had throughout all the Revolution existed in the country, and it had recently acquired greater vigour and efficiency from the unexampled disasters which seemed to threaten the imperial dynasty with ruin. The principal ramifications of this quiescent conspiracy, as might naturally have been expected, were to be found in La Vendée, Brittany, and in the south of France; but it was not without its leaders and adherents in the capital. There some of the principal partisans of the Revolution, true to the polar star of worldly ambition, were anxiously watching the progress of events; and without as yet engaging in any overt act against the reigning dynasty, were secretly preparing to abandon their principles and their benefactor, and range themselves on the side of whatever party might appear likely to gain the ascendency in the crisis which was approaching. The vast fabric of Napoleon's power, based on the selfish passions, and strengthened by the gales of worldly success, was already beginning to break up, even in its centre, on the approach of adversity. But independent of these discreditable, though powerful allies, a noble band of elevated and generous spirits, alike untainted by the crimes and unseduced by the allurements of the Revolution, were bound together by the secret bond of fidelity to misfortune. Their number, indeed, as might be expected in a selfish and irreligious age, was small; but their courage was great, their constancy respectable, and their power in a crisis might be expected to be far beyond what their physical strength or political influence would have prognosticated. The proceedings of this Royalist association at Bordeaux were under the direction of M. Taffard de St. Germain, and included the heads of many of the noblest families in the south and west of France, especially the Duke de Duras, M. Adrien de Montmorency, M. de la Rochejacquelin, and M. de la Ville de Beaugé; while the committee in Paris embraced the Dukes de Fitzjames and De la Tremouille, M. Polignac, and M. Sosthene de la Rochefoucault. Though this Royalist confederacy subsisted in secret throughout all the changes of the Revolution, the Consulate, and the Empire, yet its proceedings had never assumed an active character till the misfortunes of Napoleon, and the retreat of the imperial armies across the Rhine, afforded a prospect of a speedy political revolution. Then active conferences commenced in profound secret at the Chateau d'Usse in Tourain, a seat of the Duke de Duras; while the Duke de Fitzjames, and other leaders at Paris, entered the National Guard of that capital, which the emperor had recently called out, to be in a situation to take advantage of any crisis that might be approaching.*

Fortunes of Louis XVIII. and Count d'Artois during this time.

While the Royalist party, during the long and dreary years of revolutionary ascendency, were thus in silence adhering to their principles, and waiting the return of more prosperous fortune, the exiled prince, afterward Louis XVIII, retired from one place of asylum to another as the French power advanced, till at length he was entirely driven from the Continent of Europe, and forced to take refuge on the British shores. He had, in the first instance, after dwelling a few months at Hamm, established himself with his court of emigrants at Verona, where he assumed the title of Regent of France; and his proceedings were mainly under the direction of a zealous and indefatigable royalist, the Count d'Entraigues. Meanwhile the Count d'Artois was at St. Petersburg, where his credit was so high with the Empress Catharine, that the regency was recognised, and he received a splendid sword from her majesty, with the hope "that it might open him the gates of France, as it had done to his ancestor Henry IV." The Count d'Artois, however, was a generous man, but not a soldier or the leader of an army; he showed so little zeal in the cause, that a project, which at one period had been agitated, of intrusting to him the command of thirty thousand Russians, to act on the coast of La Vendée, was abandoned; and he returned to London, where he sold the sword for £4000, and distributed the price among the most necessitous of his companions in misfortune. Subsequently, the reluctance which that prince evinced to put himself at the head of the expe- 1795.

1793.

* Beauch., ii., 44, 47. Cap., i., 262. Hist. de la Restauration, i., 262, 264.

dition to Quiberon Bay, and his return from Isle Dieu, without landing, to England, contributed powerfully to the disasters of that ill-fated enterprise, and called forth the loudest complaints from the gallant Chouan chiefs.*†

Subsequent migrations of the royal family.

Meanwhile, Louis XVIII., under the name of the Count de Lille, lived frugally and in retirement at Verona, until the near approach of Napoleon's victorious arms, in 1796, obliged him to quit the territories of the Republic, which he did after having in vain solicited the suit of armour which Henry IV. had presented to the Senate of Venice. He afterward established himself at Blanckenbourg, where various efforts were made, which have already been mentioned, without success, to induce Bonaparte to play the part of General Monk, and facilitate the restoration of the royal family to the throne of France. The implication of the Royalists, however, in the conspiracy of the Club of Clichy, in 1797,‡ rendered it necessary for Louis XVIII. to retire farther from the wrath of the enraged Republicans; and he withdrew to Mittau in Livonia, where he enjoyed a pension of 200,000 roubles, or £25,000, a year, from the Emperor Paul, which sufficed for the expenses of the exiled court.

1799. He was here joined by the Duke and Duchess d'Angouleme, the former of whom had served with credit in the Royalist corps of the Prince of Condé, while the latter brought to that distant solitude the recollection of the Temple, and the sympathy and commiseration of all Europe. The sudden and unlooked-for conversion, however, of the fickle Paul to the alliance of the First Consul, immediately brought about a rigorous order to the august exiles to quit the Russian dominions in the depth of winter. They sought refuge in Prus-

Jan. 21, 1801. sia, where they were only admitted as private individuals; while, during the whole time, the Count d'Artois remained in the asylum he had obtained from the British government, in the palace of Holyrood House, at Edinburgh. Louis XVIII. subsequently passed into Sweden, where he issued from Colmar, on the shores of the Baltic, a solemn pro-

Dec. 2, 1804. test, which has been already given, against the assumption of the imperial dignity by Napoleon.◊ He returned, on the breaking

1805. out of the war between Russia and France, in 1805, to his former residence at Mittau; but the peace of Tilsit, and subjection of Russia to the influence of France, having rendered that asylum no longer secure, he resolved to seek a last refuge on the British shores, and for that purpose embarked, with the whole royal family except the Count d'Artois, who was already at Holyrood, on board the Swedish frigate Fraya, and reached Yarmouth in the middle of August, 1807.‖

His reception and establishment in Great Britain.

The arrival of the illustrious exiles threw the British cabinet into some perplexity. Not that they had the slightest hesitation as to giving them that refuge in misfortune which it is at once the first duty and noblest privilege of an independent state to extend to suffering innocence; but that the *character* in which they were to be received involved an important question, which had never been fairly mooted since the commencement of the war, and the decision of which might exercise an important influence upon its ultimate issue, as well as the unanimity with which it was now prosecuted by the British nation. This was nothing less than the question, whether the object of the war was to effect the restoration of the Bourbons to the French throne, or simply to provide security and maintain independence for the British nation. If the Count de Lille was recognised and treated as Louis XVIII., king of France, it would involve the British government either in an interminable war with Napoleon, or the abandonment of a sovereign whose title they had expressly and solemnly recognised; and it would afford the opposition a pretext, of which they would gladly avail themselves, for representing the war, not as one of defence and necessity on the part of England, but of aggression and injustice, to force upon France a dynasty of which the majority of the nation disapproved. There appeared, also, not a little inconsistency in a nation which had itself assumed the right of choosing its rulers, now denying that right to another; and in the descendants of the house of Brunswick proclaiming to the world their recognition of the indefeasible right of that of Bourbon. Above all, it was of importance not to change the object of the war, which never had been to force a government upon an unwilling people, but solely to prevent that people from forcing one upon its neighbours; not to create a crusade for legitimacy, but to stop one for revolution. Influenced by these considerations, the majority of the British cabinet, after an anxious deliberation which lasted three days, ranged themselves on the side of Mr. Canning, who resisted the recognition of the illustrious stranger as king; and, by a cabinet minute, he was informed that he should receive a secure and honourable asylum in Great Britain, but that he must not expect an express acknowledgment of his title to the throne.*†

Aug., 1807.

Louis XVIII. lands, and remains in England.

Louis XVIII. accordingly resided in England, till the fall of Napoleon, as a private but illustrious individual, and largely participated in the hospitality which its nobles and people have ever bestowed upon greatness in misfortune. He at first dwelt in Gosfield Hall, a seat of the Duke of Buckingham, where he was soon after joined by the Duke and Duchess d'Angouleme and the Duke de Berry; but, in 1810, he quitted that residence for Hartwell, another seat of the same noble family, where he remained

* Cap., Hist. de la Restauration, i., 68, 72.

† "Sire! The cowardice of your brother has ruined all. He could not appear on this coast but to lose or save everything. His return to England has decided our fate. Nothing remains for us now but to die in vain for your majesty."—CHARETTE *to* LOUIS XVIII., 14*th July*, 1795. CAPEFIGUE, *Historie de la Restauration*, i., 89.

‡ *Ante*, i., 487. ◊ *Ante*, ii., 237. ‖ Cap., i., 172, 195.

* Cap., i., 194, 195. Ann. Reg., 1808, 274.

† "If the chief of the Bourbon family consents to live among us in a manner suitable to his actual situation, he will find a secure and honourable asylum; but we are too well aware of the necessity of securing for the war in which we are engaged the unanimous support of the English people to do anything that might endanger the popularity which has hitherto attended the war. By recognising Louis XVIII. as king, we should only offer a favourable occasion to the enemies of the government to accuse it of introducing foreign interests into a war of which the object is purely British security."—*Cabinet Minute, Aug.* 27, 1808. Given in CAPEFIGUE, i., 195.

till the restoration. The Count d'Artois, meanwhile, continued to sojourn, with a small suite, at the ancient palace of Holyrood House, Edinburgh. By a singular coincidence, but strongly descriptive of the vicissitudes of time, the heir-apparent to the French throne, and who afterward mounted it only to feel the bitterness of royalty, spent the long and dreary years of exile in the ancient seat of the Stuart family, in the towers which had witnessed the distresses of Mary, the most beautiful queen of France, and the most unfortunate of the queens in Britain; and in the halls where fortune for a brief period had cast upon Charles Edward, when contending, on the principle of legitimacy, with the aid of a gallant people, for the throne of his fathers, the splendours of royal elevation and the sunbeam of chivalrous devotion.*

General movement of the Royalists in France.

But, how unwarlike soever the dispositions of the Bourbon princes might be, and seriously as they might prefer the pacific retreats of Hartwell and Holyrood to the cares and the honours of royalty, the time at length arrived when it was no longer possible for them to remain in privacy; and when, willing or unwilling, they were of necessity forced into action. The approach of the allied armies to the Rhine—the passage of that river, and successful invasion of the eastern departments—the establishment of Wellington in the southern states of France, both roused into activity the dormant flame of loyalty in the provinces, and loudly called for the appearance of one or more princes of the royal blood on the soil of the monarchy, to combine the scattered efforts of its adherents, and assert the pretensions of the exiled family to the throne. Moreau had been looked to by them as a second Pichegru: proclamations were prepared to be addressed by him on the Rhine to Napoleon's soldiers; his death was regarded at Hartwell as the greatest calamity which had been sustained by them since the execution of Louis XVI. At the moment when the allied armies crossed the Rhine, Louis XVIII. addressed a proclamation to the Senate, calling on them to co-operate with him in overturning the tyranny of Napoleon; and circulated widely a secret address among all persons in authority whose dispositions were thought to be favourable—a letter, in which, like a man who knew the character of the persons with whom he had to deal, he spoke little of honour or loyalty, but much of titles, dignities, and offices to be preserved, and injuries forgot.† Application was at the same time made to the British government for the Bourbon princes to be permitted to join the different armies on the French territory; and the cabinet of St. James, after much deliberation, proceeding from a desire to do nothing which might indicate a disposition to coerce the wishes of the French people in the choice of their government, granted them permission to go, but as simple volunteers only. The current of events, however, ran too strongly to be arrested by these prudential measures, how judicious soever they may have been; the princes set out under this permission, restricted as it was; the Comte d'Artois left Holyrood House, and landed at Rotterdam on the 2d of February; from whence he proceeded towards the headquarters of the allied armies, by Bâle, Vesoul, and Langres; the Duke d'Angouleme embarked for Spain, to join the headquarters of Wellington in the south of France, to be in readiness to take advantage of any Royalist movements that might occur in that quarter; while the Duke de Berry set sail for Jersey, to be at hand, in case of the outbreak of a Royalist insurrection, which was thought to be in preparation in Brittany and La Vendée.*

Feb. 2, 1813.

Interview of the Royalist leaders at Troyes with Alexander.

It was at this critical moment that the allied monarchs entered Troyes, and for the first time were brought in contact with the Royalists of France. In common with all its other provinces, the few remaining adherents of the ancient *régime* had received a great impulse in that city, which was the residence of the principal Royalist families of the east of France, from the rapid progress of the allied arms. The retreat of Napoleon towards Paris after the disastrous battle of La Rothiere, seemed to presage, by universal consent, his approaching fall. Several Royalist gentlemen, resolved to commence the movement, accordingly assumed the white cockade after the allies entered Troyes, and earnestly solicited an interview with the Emperor Alexander, which was at length granted. The Marquis of Widranges and M. Goualt were the persons who spoke on the occasion: they had suspended on their breasts the cross of St. Louis and white cockade, the wearing of which was forbidden in the Empire under pain of death. "We entreat your majesty," said they, "in the name of all the respectable inhabitants of Troyes, to accept with favour the wish which we form for the re-establishment of the royal house of Bourbon on the throne of France." "Gentlemen," replied Alexander, "I receive you with pleasure; I wish well to your cause, but I fear your proceedings are rather premature. The chances of war are uncertain, and I should be grieved to see brave men like you compromised or sacrificed. We do not come ourselves to give a king to France; we desire to know its wishes, and to leave it to declare itself." "But it will never declare itself as long as it is under the knife," replied the marquis: "never, as long as Bonaparte shall be in authority in France, will Europe be tranquil." "It is for that very reason," replied the Czar, "that the first thing we must think of is to beat him—to beat him—to beat him." Alexander's humane prudence would appear to have been inspired by the spirit of foresight on this occasion; for the day on which

Feb. 11.

* Cap., i., 180, 196.

† "The king, availing himself of every opportunity of making known to his subjects the sentiments with which he is animated, has charged me to give, in his name, to —— all the assurances which he can desire. His majesty is well aware how much —— has in his power, not only in endeavouring to shake off the yoke which oppresses him, but in seconding one day, by his intelligence, the authority destined to repair such a multitude of evils. The promises of the king are nothing but the consequences of the engagements he has undertaken in the face of Europe, which are: to forget the errors of his subjects, to recompense services, stifle resentments, legitimatize rank, consolidate fortunes; to bring about, in short, nothing but an easy transition from present calamities and alarms to future tranquillity and happiness."—LE COMTE BLACAS, *Hartwell*, 1*st Dec.*, 1813. See CAPEFIGUE, *Hist. de la Restauration*, i., 250.

Cap., Hist. de la Restauration, i., 249, 253. Beauch., i., 40–54.

this conversation occurred at Troyes was the very one which was marked by the catastrophe at Champaubert. The Marquis Widranges, disappointed in his hopes of obtaining a declaration in favour of the Bourbons from the allied sovereigns, went on to Bâle, where he joined the Count d'Artois, while M. Goualt, unhappily for himself, remained at Troyes. At the same time, a person styling himself St. Vincent, but who, in reality, was the Marquis de Vitrolles, one of the most devoted adherents of the ancient dynasty, arrived at the allied headquarters, bearing credentials, setting forth that he was entirely worthy of confidence, from persons high in authority in Paris, and entreating the monarchs to advance rapidly to the capital. But the issue was still too doubtful in the theatre of arms, and the divisions of the diplomatists too wide in the cabinet, to permit of any decided step being yet taken by the allied sovereigns in favour of the Royalist cause.*

Operations of the allied Grand Army on the Seine.

While the cause of the restoration in France was thus rather adjourned than damped, by the prudent ambiguity of the monarchs at Troyes, operations of a tardy and indecisive character, but still attended with important effects, had taken place on the side of the Grand Army, on the banks of the Seine. Instead of pushing military operations with vigour, and following closely the army of Napoleon down the Seine, Schwartzenberg, acting under the direction of his cabinet, which was desirous, above all things, to gain time and avoid precipitating matters against Napoleon till the throne was at all events secured for his descendants, put the main body of his army into cantonments, contenting himself with sending forward the corps of Wittgenstein and Wrede to follow on the traces of the retreating French. From Troyes to Paris, one road goes by Sens, Montargis, Nemours, and Fontainebleau, by the left bank of the Seine the whole way. But Napoleon having retired by the right bank, or eastern side of that river, it was necessary for the pursuing army, if it proposed to keep its wings abreast on both banks, and keep on the trace of the retreating army, to force the passage of the Seine at Nogent, Bray, or Montereau, the only points below Troyes on the road towards Paris where there are stone bridges capable of affording a secure passage to artillery: all these bridges were in possession of the French, and strongly guarded; Oudinot and Victor lay on the opposite bank, after the departure of Napoleon, with twenty-two thousand men, a body which was, however, fast increasing by conscripts hurried up from Paris. But such was the superiority of the allied forces, that these inconsiderable bodies of men could not have stood a day before them, if they had pressed on in good earnest for the French capital.†

Advance of the allies to Montereau and Fontainebleau, Feb. 11.

At length, having allowed his troops to repose four days around Troyes, to the infinite annoyance of Alexander, who burned with anxiety to push the war with vigour, Schwartzenberg, on the 11th, gathered up his gigantic limbs, and put his columns in motion to follow up the enemy. The Prince of Wirtemberg took Sens by assault after a sharp conflict; and, on the same day, General Hardegg, with the vanguard of Wrede's corps, attacked the rear of the enemy near Romilly, and drove him into Nogent, which was stormed, after a most gallant resistance, by General Bourmont, and evacuated next day, after the bridge over the Seine had been destroyed. The prisoners made in these conflicts having given the important information that Napoleon, with the main body of his forces, had diverged towards Sezanne, in the direction of Blucher's army, and that an inconsiderable cordon of troops alone remained in his front, Schwartzenberg resolved to act with more vigour. He accordingly, next day, crossed the corps of the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg and General Bianchi (who had succeeded Prince Colloredo in the command of his corps in consequence of the prince having been disabled on the 6th by a wound) over the Seine at Bray and Pont-sur-Seine, and moved them upon Provins and Montereau. The establishment of these powerful corps in that quarter, where there was no force of any magnitude to oppose them, led to the most important results, and showed how speedily the war, at this period, might have been terminated by a vigorous and concerted movement of the whole allied forces. Moret was occupied next day: Nemours was taken by Platoff, with a whole battalion: Seslavin, with his light horse, made himself master of Montargis, and pushed on his advanced posts to the gates of Orleans: the palace and forest of Fontainebleau fell into the hands of the Cossacks: Auxerre was taken by assault, and its garrison, which endeavoured to cut its way through the attacking force, put to the sword. The whole plain between the Seine and the Loire was inundated with the enemy's light troops, which already showed themselves beyond Fontainebleau on the road to the capital. Montereau was strongly fortified by the Austrians, while Schwartzenberg's headquarters were advanced to Nogent, between which and Bray the immense reserves of the allied Grand Army were placed. Paris was in consternation: already the reserved parks and heavy baggage of Victor had reached Charenton, within a few miles of its gates; the peasants of the vast plain of La Brie, flying to the capital, reported that uncouth hordes with long beards, armed with lances, cut down trees on the sides of the highways, and roasted oxen and sheep whole, over fires kindled with their wood, which they devoured half raw; and fame, magnifying the approaching danger, already announced that two hundred thousand Tartars and Calmucks were approaching to sack and lay waste the metropolis of science and the arts.*

Feb. 12.

Feb. 13.

Feb. 14 and 15.

Such was the alarming state of affairs to the south of the capital, when Napoleon, at the head of his indefatigable Guards and cuirassiers, came across to the valley of the Seine, by Guignes, through the forest of Brie. The advanced guard of this array found the roads covered with wagons converging from

Junction of the army of Napoleon with Victor and Oudinot. Feb. 16.

* Cap., i., 255, 259. Dan., 78. Beauch., i., 240, 246. Koch, i., 205.

† Dan., 94, 95. Koch, i., 279, 282. Burgh., 123, 124. Jom., iv., 538, 539.

* Koch, i., 286, 291. Beauch., i., 294, 308. Burgh., 138, 139. Dan., 134, 135.

all quarters towards the capital, filled with the trembling inhabitants, who were flying before the Cossacks. Instantly the living loads were disburdened; the wagons filled with the soldiers, or laid aside, and their horses harnessed to the guns; and every horse and man that could be pressed from the adjacent villages attached to the vehicles to hurry them forward. It was full time. The plain of La Brie was covered with fire and smoke; the retiring columns under Victor and Oudinot, severely pressed by the enemy, were straining every nerve to preserve the cross road to Chalons, by which Napoleon had promised to arrive; but so great was the superiority of the enemy, that it was doubtful whether they could maintain their ground for another hour, in which event the junction of the two armies would have been rendered impossible. No sooner were the well-known standards of the cuirassiers seen, than a loud shout announced the arrival of the emperor; cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" ran, like an electric shock, along the line; the retreat was stopped at all points; already the retiring columns were preparing to turn on their pursuers; while the allies, sensible, from the change, of the presence of Napoleon, instantly became as cautious and circumspect as they had recently before been confident and audacious. Wearied with their unexampled exertions, the troops were halted where they had thus checked the advance of the enemy; soon the soldiers sunk into sleep on the very ground where they stood, and the headquarters of the emperor were established in the village of Guignes, where he passed the night.*

Advance of Napoleon, and combat of Nangis. February 17.

In the course of the night, and early on the following morning, large re-enforcements joined the French headquarters from the army of Spain. The arrival of these bronzed veterans, upon whose steadiness perfect reliance could be placed, and the successive coming up of the corps which had inflicted such wounds on the army of Silesia, enabled the emperor, on the following morning, to resume the offensive at the head of fifty-five thousand men. Orders were given to the troops to collect bread for three days' march; the knowledge that they were about to resume the offensive under the direction of Napoleon, coupled with their marvellous successes over the army of Silesia, had restored all their wonted enthusiasm to the soldiers; they marched as to assured victory. By daybreak, the forward movement commenced at all points. Oudinot, supported by Kellerman's dragoons, pressed on the retiring columns of Wittgenstein, in the direction of Nogent; Macdonald advanced towards Bray; Gerard pushed the Bavarians with the utmost vigour back on Villeneuve, Le Comte, and Donne Marie; while Victor was despatched towards Montereau, with orders to make himself master of its important bridge over the Seine that very night. Count Pahlen, who was at Mormant, with Wittgenstein's advanced guard, consisting of three thousand infantry and eighteen hundred horse, was now in a most hazardous situation; for he was well aware he would be the first victim of the French emperor's furious attack, and yet his orders were to remain where he was, as the arrival of Napoleon on the Seine had never been contemplated. In this extremity he remained all night under arms, resolved to give battle to the last extremity. Shortly after daybreak the tempest was upon him, and he began slowly, and in the best order, to retreat towards Nangis, the infantry in squares, with the horse, and some weak regiments of Cossacks and a few guns, to protect the flanks and rear.*

Defeat of Pahlen.

For two hours the retreat was conducted with perfect regularity, notwithstanding the incessant fire of the French horse artillery, and attacks of their cavalry; but at length the assaults became more frequent, and the veteran cuirassiers under Milhaud, who had just come up from Spain, burning with desire to restore the lustre of their arms, charged on three sides at once with such vehemence, that the cavalry were entirely routed, the guns taken, and the infantry broken. The defeat was now irretrievable; so complete was the disorder, that Wittgenstein himself, who came up with re-enforcements, was swept away by the torrent, and narrowly escaped being made prisoner. Eleven guns and forty caissons were captured, and two thousand one hundred men were made prisoners, besides nine hundred who fell on the field of battle. So complete was the destruction of some of the Russian regiments, that that of Silenguinsk, which was not broken till after it had gallantly repulsed repeated charges of cavalry, alone lost one thousand three hundred and fifty-nine men; and it, with that of Revel, which suffered nearly as much, ceased to exist, and were marked in the muster-rolls as "sent to Plotsk to be recruited." Yet, though deeply affected by such a chasm in his devoted followers, Alexander retained no rancour towards Pahlen; and seeing him for the first time at the barrier of Paris after the combat, said to him, "You think I am angry with you; but I know you were not in fault." The field of battle presented a striking proof of the profound and wide-spread excitement which this terrible contest had awakened throughout the world; for it showed the bodies of the hardy steeds of Tartary, and the fiery coursers of Andalusia, which had fallen in combat almost under the walls of Paris.†

Pursuit of the Bavarians to the bridge of Montereau. February 17.

While this bloody combat was occurring under the eye of Napoleon on the left, the Bavarians in the centre rapidly retreated from their position at Villeneuve le Comte; and such was the fatigue of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, which was intrusted with their pursuit, that they were unable to follow them. Oudinot, however, and Macdonald pressed vigorously on Hardegg's corps, which also fell back, and took many prisoners and a large quantity of baggage. Victor, following up the Bavarians, came upon the division posted on the heights of Valjouan. They were immediately attacked in the most vigorous manner in front by General Gerard, and in rear by Bordesoulle, and soon broken. Nothing but the failure of Gener-

* Fain, 102, 103. Dan., 148. Lab., ii., 217, 218. Koch, i., 300, 305.

* Dan., 150, 151. Koch, i., 310, 313. Lab., i., 218, 219. Fain, 104. Vaud., i., 377, 379.

† Vaud., i., 377, 379. Koch, i., 312, 313. Lab., i., 218, 219. Dan., 152, 153.

al l'Heritier, who neglected to charge the fugitives, as he might have done, when first thrown into disorder, preserved the Bavarian division from total ruin; as it was, they only made their escape in the greatest disorder, and after sustaining a very considerable loss. Such, however, was the exhaustion of Victor's troops from the excessive fatigue which they had lately undergone, that he was unable to follow out his directions, by making himself master of the town and bridge of Montereau; in consequence of which, the Bavarians, who had rallied under the protection of some squadrons of Schwartzenberg's hulans, effected their retreat across the Seine at that place, though weakened by the loss of two thousand five hundred men. The enemy occupied in force the town of MONTEREAU, and the castle of Surville, which commanded the bridge. Their troops consisted of two Austrian divisions under Bianchi, and the Wirtembergers, in all about eighteen thousand men.*

The allies propose an armistice.

When Schwartzenberg was made acquainted, which he was on the evening of the 17th, with these disasters which had befallen the two corps of Wittgenstein and Wrede, which had been pushed across the Seine, he immediately summoned a council of war, which was attended by the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. It was evident to all that the misfortunes had been owing to the separation of the army of Silesia from the Grand Army; it was resolved, therefore, as soon as possible, to reunite them in the direction of Troyes, and give battle in front of that town. For this purpose orders were given to fall back at all points, while Blucher was directed, as soon as his troops were in a condition to resume offensive operations, to incline to his left, so as to facilitate the proposed junction. At the same period, principally to gain time, a flag of truce was despatched from the allied headquarters to Napoleon, to say that they were surprised at the offensive movement made by the French army, as they had agreed to the terms of peace proposed by Caulaincourt at Chatillon, and had given orders to their plenipotentiaries to sign the preliminaries accordingly; and they proposed, in consequence, an immediate suspension of hostilities.†

Napoleon rises in his demands at the Congress, and tries to negotiate separately with Austria.

Colonel Parr, who bore the flag of truce from the allied headquarters, arrived at those of Napoleon late on the night of the 17th. The circumstance of the allies proposing terms of accommodation after these defeats, coupled with the fact of a letter having been written by the Empress Marie Louise to her father, determined him to seize the opportunity of opening a communication direct with the Emperor Francis. The Council of State, which had assembled at Paris to deliberate on the terms offered at Chatillon, which will immediately be considered, had been, with the exception of one voice, unanimously of opinion that they should be accepted. Napoleon, however, had always determined, in his own mind, to make the negotiation entirely dependant on the progress of military events, and he, accordingly, gave the strongest injunctions to Caulaincourt, however near he might come to the point, to avoid committing himself to any treaty without his special authority. The successes at Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps, had entirely confirmed him in these ideas; and the very night the first advantage was gained he had written to Caulaincourt to try and gain time, and, above all things, to *sign nothing*. His recent successes still farther elevated his hopes, and he wrote from Nangis to the Emperor of Austria, on the same night, that he was extremely anxious to enter into a negotiation; but that, after the brilliant advantages he had gained, he now looked for more favourable terms than had been proposed at Chatillon; while to Caulaincourt he at the same time wrote that the *carte blanche* he had formerly received was merely to save Paris, which appeared to be endangered after the battle of La Rothiere; but that extraordinary successes had since been gained; that the necessity no longer existed; and, in consequence, his extraordinary powers were recalled, and henceforth the negotiation would pursue its ordinary course. Having done this, he resolved to delay for some days closing with the allied advances towards an armistice, and to follow up with the utmost vigour the tide of success which was now setting in his favour.*

Description of Montereau.

Situated twenty leagues to the south of Paris, at the confluence of the Seine and the Yonne, the town of Montereau presents one of the most agreeable objects in France to the gaze of the traveller. The part which lies on the left bank of the Yonne, which is the most considerable, is joined to the right bank by a bridge of stone. Another bridge, famous for having been the theatre of the murder of the Duke of Burgundy, in 1419, unites the opposite banks of the Seine. These two rivers, which unite at Montereau, with the numerous barks which carry on their active navigation, give the town a gay and joyous aspect, which is increased by the smiling appearance of the vineyards and meadows which adjoin it on the south and east, and the country houses and villas which glitter around it in the sun. The traveller who approaches from the side of Paris involuntarily halts on the summit of the heights of Surville, which overhang the town on the northern bank, to gaze on the lovely scene which lies spread out, like a map, beneath his feet; he would do well to remember that there, beside the little cross adjacent to the chateau, stood Napoleon during the LAST, and not the least brilliant of his many victories. On the evening of the 18th the French troops assembled in imposing masses on these heights, which completely commanded the bridges and town beneath; the artillery of the Guard was placed on either side of the road near the cross, and the emperor took his station in person amid the guns, to direct their fire, for the enemy still held the town. He had strongly barricaded the bridges, and everything presaged a bloody conflict.†

It was not, however, till late in the day, and

* Vaud., i., 315, 318. Koch, i., 315, 318. Plotho, iii., 212, 214. Burgh., 141, 142.
† Burgh., 143. Dan., 154. Koch, i., 319. Fain, 105.

* Fain, 105, 106, and 94. Burgh., 144.
† Personal observation. Beauch., i. 304, 305. Cap., Hist. de l'Empire, x., 390, 391. Koch, i. 320, 321.

Battle of Montereau, Feb. 18.

after a severe conflict, that these important heights fell into the hands of the French troops. Bianchi, fully sensible of their importance, had, during the night, occupied them in force with the troops of Wirtemberg, strongly supported by artillery; and Victor, who in the morning commenced the attack on the position, was repulsed, and his son-in-law, the brave General Chateau, killed, when in person leading on the grenadiers to the assault. Gerard, who was now directed to supersede Victor in the command of his corps, next advanced to the attack; and, undismayed by the fire of forty pieces of artillery which the German batteries vomited upon him from the heights of Surville, bravely and repeatedly led his troops to the very mouth of the guns. But it was in vain: still the undaunted cannoniers made good the post assigned to them, and noon was far past, and evening at that inclement season was fast approaching, while yet the heights were in the hands of the enemy. Then Napoleon came up with the artillery and cavalry of the Guard at the gallop, and, desirous of profiting by the few hours of daylight which still remained, he instantly brought forward forty pieces of the reserve artillery, and disposed his redoubtable Old Guard and cuirassiers to aid the renewed attack of Gerard with all their forces. Thirty thousand men, supported by eighty pieces of cannon, now marched fiercely forward, under the very eye of the emperor, amid cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Despairing of maintaining his post, which was only defended by twelve thousand men, against such an accumulation of forces, the Prince of Wirtemberg drew his men off towards the bridge in his rear; yet at first in good order, and presenting an undaunted front to the imperial cavalry, which now thundered in close pursuit. But, by degrees, as they descended the southern and steeper face of the heights towards the bridges, and got entangled in the hollow way through which the road passes to them, they fell into confusion, and infantry, cavalry, and artillery, breaking their array, rushed headlong to the only issue by which they could hope for escape from the bloody sabres of the cuirassiers.*

Defeat of the allies, who are driven beyond the Seine.

The Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, however, at this dreadful moment exerted himself with equal skill and resolution to stem the torrent; he was at one time nearly enveloped by the French cavalry on the bridge, fighting with his own hand to gain time for the troops to cross over; and by the vigour which he displayed, and noble example which he set, succeeded in enabling the greater part of them to get in safety to the other side, where they were received by Bianchi with his hitherto untouched Austrian divisions. Meanwhile, Napoleon had established himself, with the artillery of the Guard, on the now abandoned heights of Surville, and soon sixty pieces of cannon opened a close and concentric discharge on the dense masses which were crowding over the bridge. Such was the eagerness of the emperor to direct their fire, that he resumed, after twenty years' cessation, his old occupation as a gunner; and, as at the siege of Toulon, in 1793, himself levelled and pointed a cannon. Meanwhile, the Austrian batteries below, on the opposite bank, replied with vigour to the fire of the French pieces; and the old cannoniers of the Imperial Guard, hearing the whistle of the bullets above their heads, besought the emperor to retire from the front to a situation of less danger. "Courage, my friends," he replied: "the bullet which is to kill me is not yet cast." Protected by the fire of such a powerful artillery on the heights above them, the mere discharges of which shivered every pane in the windows in the neighbouring chateau of Surville to pieces, the French chasseurs pressed so rapidly on the last columns of the Wirtembergers, that there was no time to fire the trains with which the bridge was undermined; the pursuing horsemen crossed over, pellmell, with the fugitives, the division of Duhesme rapidly passed after them, and, amid the shouts of the inhabitants, drove the enemy entirely out of Montereau; the allies retiring, after having destroyed the bridge over the Yonne, which stopped the pursuit, in the direction of Sens.*

Results of the battle, and general retreat of the Grand Allied Army.

This bloody combat, which was one of the most obstinately contested of the campaign, and inferior to none ever directed by Napoleon in brilliancy and valour, cost the French three thousand men killed and wounded, principally in consequence of the destructive fire of grape, so long kept up by the Wirtemberg artillery from the heights of Surville; but the loss of the enemy was as great in killed and wounded, and they had to lament, in addition, above two thousand prisoners, six guns, and four standards. "My heart is relieved," said Napoleon, on beholding the flight of the allies across the bridge: "I have saved the capital of my empire." Great, indeed, was the moral effect of these repeated successes of the emperor, both upon his own and the allied armies. It restored the *prestige* of his name, the magic of his renown, which the long-continued disasters in Russia and Germany had sensibly dimmed; the young conscripts deemed themselves invincible under his direction; the veterans began to recount the glories of Austerlitz and Jena. Confounded by such a succession of disasters as had befallen their arms in so many different quarters, within so short a period, the allied generals began seriously to fear that the star of Napoleon was again in the ascendant, and to resume, in the Austrian councils at least, their former dread of his arms. Orders were immediately issued to the whole army to retreat to a concentrated position in front of Troyes, where it was proposed to join Blucher and give battle; the Seine was repassed at all points; Fontainebleau, Nemours, and Montargis, were evacuated; and the allied host, retiring before the enemy, was soon assembled, still above a hundred thousand strong, between Nogent, Bray, and Troyes.†

Discontent of the Emperor Napoleon at his generals.

Wonderful as these successes were, they by no means came up to the expectations of the emperor. His discontent was visible; his disappointment broke out on all occasions, and

* Koch, i., 321, 324. Beauch., i., 314, 316. Plotho, iii., 216, 217. Burgh., 145.

* Burgh., 146. Fain, 107, 108. Plotho, iii., 216. Koch, i., 323, 324. Beauch., i., 315, 317.

† Fain, 107, 108. Burgh., 146, 147. Dan., 157. Koch, i., 326, 327.

he was in an especial manner misled in his ideas of what might have been effected by the achievements of the troops who fought under his own eyes. When in presence of Napoleon, no fatigues could exhaust, no dangers appal, no difficulties impede them; they made, without murmuring, almost superhuman exertions; but they were by no means either equally confident, or equally energetic, under the direction of his lieutenants; and they not unfrequently sunk under the exhaustion of the unparalleled activity by which he was now striving to make genius supply the want of numbers. He never could be brought, however, to comprehend this difference; he expected the troops to achieve, under all circumstances, as much as he saw they did when animated by his own presence; and never failed to ascribe to the weakness or indecision of the officers in command the failure of any enterprise on which he had calculated as likely to produce brilliant results. His affairs were now so critical, that he could not afford to gain only half success; nothing short of continued victory could extricate him from the host of enemies by whom he was encircled; and he was well aware that even an inconsiderable failure in any serious combat might be attended by the most calamitous results. A sense of this both inflamed his expectation and increased his violence; the most vehement ebullitions of wrath frequently took place against officers at the head of their troops; and even his oldest and most esteemed marshals were rendered the victims of a disappointment, which was entirely owing to his expecting from them more than it was in the power of human strength to achieve.*

Disgrace of Victor and Montbrun.

Victor was the first victim of these unbounded expectations and irritable mood of the emperor. That marshal, as already noticed, had been ordered to push on to Montereau on the evening of the 17th, and doubtless great results might have been expected from the seizure of that important post and bridge over the Seine, at a time when two corps of the allies, receding before Napoleon's columns, were still on the right bank of the river. In truth, however, Victor's men were so completely worn out with fatigue, that they were unequal to the task of carrying the position on the night when they arrived before it. Such, however, was the emperor's wrath at the attack not having been made, that he that very night deprived Victor of the command of his corps, which he conferred on Gerard. Next evening, after the combat at Montereau was over, the unhappy marshal presented himself before Napoleon to reclaim against his dismissal; but he was received with such a storm of invective, directed not only against himself, but the duchess, his wife, whom he accused of keeping aloof from the empress, and leaguing with the enemies of the court, that it was only by recalling to his recollection the Italian campaigns, where they had begun the career of arms together, that he succeeded so far in appeasing his wrath as to obtain, in lieu of his corps, which had been conferred upon Gerard, the command of two divisions of the Guard.†

Nor were inferior officers spared by the wrath which thus prostrated the marshals of the Empire. L'Heritier was publicly reproached for having failed to charge at the decisive moment at the combat of Nangis; Guyot, for having allowed some pieces of the artillery of the Guard to be surprised in bivouac the night before; General Dejean, one of the most distinguished officers of artillery, for having permitted the cannon ammunition to run short in the hottest of the fire at the heights of Surville; even the heroic Montbrun suffered the most cutting taunts for having, without resistance, abandoned the ridges and forest of Fontainebleau to the Cossacks. There can be no doubt that part of these reproaches were, in some degree, well founded, though others were altogether unjust; but the necessity of making any of them public at this critical juncture was not equally apparent; and it was evident to all, both that the emperor's fatigue and anxiety had fearfully augmented the natural violence of his temper, and that the necessities of his situation had made him expect and calculate on achievements, both from his officers and soldiers, which it was beyond human strength to effect.*

Napoleon's steps for following up his successes.

The day after the battle Napoleon remained at Surville, while his advanced guards in all directions followed the allied Grand Army up the valley of the Seine, towards Sens, Bray, and Nogent. Conceiving that Schwartzenberg's retreat was now decidedly pronounced, and being well aware of the nervousness of the Austrian generals about their lines of communication, he at the same time wrote to Marshal Augereau to resume the offensive at Lyons, and threaten the rear of the Grand Army from the side of Macon. That marshal's force, which originally, as already mentioned, consisted of twelve thousand men, had been considerably augmented by two divisions of iron veterans, drawn from Suchet's army in Catalonia, and the levies in Dauphiny and Savoy, which were commanded by Generals Marchand and Serras; and these re-enforcements had enabled him to assume so threatening an attitude at Lyons, that General Budna, who commanded the extreme Austrian left in that quarter, which did not muster above fifteen thousand sabres and bayonets, had been under the necessity of evacuating the valley of the Rhone below the Jura, and concentrating his forces in the neighbourhood of Geneva. The communication over Mont Cenis with the viceroy's army in the Ital-

* Fain, 108, 109. Koch, i., 315.

† "At the conclusion of the conference, in which he had made no impression on the emperor, Victor said that, if he had committed a military fault, he had expiated it dearly by the stroke which had cut off his son-in-law, General Chateau. At that name Napoleon evinced the warmest emotion; he heard only the grief of the marshal, and strongly sympathized with it. Victor, then resuming confidence, protested anew that he would not leave the army. 'I will shoulder a musket,' said he; 'Victor has not forgot his old occupation: I will take my place in the Guard.' These words at length disarmed the emperor. 'Well, Victor,' said he, stretching out his hand, 'remain with us. I cannot restore to you your corps, which I have bestowed on Gerard; but I give you two divisions of the Guard: go, now, take command of them, and let there be no question between us.' . . . Yet he so far was imbued with his feelings of resentment, that in the bulletin, dated that day, giving an account of the combat of Montereau, he said, 'General Chateau will die, but he will die at least accompanied by the regrets of the whole army: a fate far preferable to that of a soldier who has only purchased the prolongation of his existence by surviving his reputation, and extinguishing the sentiments which French honour inspires in the circumstances in which we are placed."—FAIN, *Campagne de* 1814, 111–113, and *Moniteur*, 20*th Feb.*, 1814.

* Fain, 109, 110. Moniteur, Feb. 20, 1814.

ian plains had been re-established, and the course of the Soane to Macon was entirely cleared of the enemy. Napoleon, therefore, indulged sanguine hopes, and not without reason, that he would be able, by means of this auxiliary force, so to straiten the rear, and cut up the communications of the Grand Army, that their farther stay in France would be rendered impossible: already he dreamed of fresh conquests beyond the Rhine; and in his exultation more than once said, "I am nearer Munich than the allies are to Paris."*

Advance of the Crown-prince of Sweden to the Rhine.

But while Napoleon was, not altogether without reason, calculating upon these vast results from his successes, and looking to the incursions of his lieutenants to threaten the flanks and rear of the weightiest of his opponents, his own rear was menaced, and a new enemy was descending from the North, who, in the end, came to tell with decisive effect upon the fortunes of the campaign. Notwithstanding the reluctance of Bernadotte to prosecute in person the invasion, and the long time which he had consumed in the separate contest with Denmark in the south of Jutland, the time had now arrived when it was no longer possible for him to avoid appearing, if not in person, at least by means of his generals, on the great theatre of action.† The most urgent requisition had been made to him by the Emperor Alexander to bring his forces into action; and as the peace with Sweden, and blockade of Davoust in Hamburg by Benningsen's powerful army of reserve, forty-five thousand strong, which had been directed there after the battle of Leipsic, left him no longer an excuse, he was obliged, however reluctant, to advance towards the Rhine. On the 10th of February he arrived at Cologne, Feb. 12. from whence, two days afterward, he published a proclamation to the French people, in which he vindicated his invasion of his native country, by the anxious desire which he felt that it should no longer continue, as it had been, the scourge of the earth; and on the solemn assurance which he declared he had received from the allied sovereigns, that they made war on France only to secure the independence of other states. Meanwhile, Bulow, who commanded his advanced guard, had hitherto been unable to make any impression on Antwerp, even though aided by Sir Thomas Graham and eight thousand English troops; but he had been more successful at Bois-le-Duc, which was delivered up to him, with a hundred and fifty heavy cannon on its ramparts, by the inhabitants of the place. And Winzingerode, having received considerable re-enforcements at Namur, the siege of Antwerp was converted into a blockade; Bulow united the best part of his forces to those of the Russian commander, and both together took the road by Avesnes for Laon.‡

Advance of Winzingerode to Laon, and description of Soissons.

To reach the latter town, it was indispensable, in the first instance, to gain possession of the former, as it covered the road by which Laon was to be approached: but Chernicheff, with the Russian advanced guard, appeared before Avesnes at daybreak on the 9th of February, and it surrendered without resistance, with its weak garrison of two hundred men. By this capture four hundred English and Spanish prisoners, taken during the Peninsular war, were set at liberty. Feb. 10. Napoleon had never expected that the allies would have entered France on this side, and the frontier fortresses were wholly unprovided with the means of making any resistance. Rheims opened its gates the very next day; and Feb. 11. the whole country between the Sarre and the Meuse, in the rear, disgusted with the intolerable exactions of the French armies, received the allies with open arms. But these easy successes led to another of a more difficult and important character. Soissons, commanding as it does the only bridge in that quarter over the Aisne, and lying on the great road from Laon to Paris, as well as several other roads which intersect each other in its centre, is a fortress which, in a strategetical point of view, is of the very highest importance. It is an old town, adorned by a massy Gothic church, and surrounded by antiquated walls, which, however, had been armed and repaired, and put in a respectable posture of defence. Green and level meadows immediately adjoin it on all sides; but they are confined to the vicinity of the river, and at the distance of half a mile on either side the road ascends the slopes of the more elevated plateau, on the summit of which it generally runs, and from the brows of which plunging shot may be sent by artillery into the town beneath, to which the cannon on its ramparts, pointed upward, were little calculated to make an effectual reply. Notwithstanding this disadvantage, however, the capture of the place was not likely to be an easy enterprise, as Napoleon, sensible of its importance, had intrusted its defence to the brave General Rusca, one of his old companions in arms in the Italian campaigns, who had under his command the depôt of six regiments of the line, a thousand National Guards, and a hundred gendarmes; in all, about four thousand five hundred men.*

Storming of Soissons.

Notwithstanding the resistance which might be expected from so determined a character as General Rusca, at the head of so respectable a force, General Chernicheff offered to carry it by a *coup-de-main*, and, for this purpose, only demanded the advanced guard, consisting of four thousand five hundred men, with eighteen pieces of cannon. Though by no means sanguine of success, Winzingerode permitted the attempt to be made, throwing on Chernicheff the whole responsibility in case of failure—the usual resource of weak men who have to act with resolute. Chernicheff, accordingly, set out with his small but gallant band, and on the descent of the plateau from the side of Laon towards the valley of the Aisne, fell in with the French advanced guard, two thousand strong, consisting Feb. 12. chiefly of National Guards, which was speedily put to the rout, and driven down the slope across the meadows into Soissons, with the loss of five hundred men. The Russians advanced, after this success, to within cannon-shot of the place, but purposely delayed the attack till next

* Fain, 113, 115. Lab., ii., 224, 225. Vaud., i., 391, 395. † *Ante*, iv., 189.
‡ Lab., ii., 106, 108. Dan., 121, 122. Koch, i., 275.

* Personal observation. Dan., 124, 125. Koch, i., 276, 277. Lab., ii., 208, 209.

day, in order to throw the enemy off their guard, by leading them to suppose that there were nothing but Cossacks and light troops, incapable of attempting an assault before the place. Early on the following morning preparations for storming were made, and Chernicheff resolved to direct his principal attack against the *tête-du-pont*, and from thence force his way into the town. The infantry was directed to advance by the highway from Laon, while a detachment of light troops was despatched to take possession of a public-house, about ninety yards from the walls, to the right of the great road; and the Cossack regiments, each preceded by six pieces of artillery, advanced in a semicircle towards the walls, so as to distract the enemy as to the real point where an attack was to be made. These dispositions, executed with remarkable precision, proved entirely successful. The light infantry speedily made themselves masters of the public-house, and from its roof and windows kept up such a fire on the bridge head, that it was abandoned, and the columns of infantry, advancing rapidly in pursuit, attempted to carry the gate, but was repulsed with loss. While re-forming his men for a second assault, signs of sudden disorder were observed on the rampart; and the Russians, though as yet ignorant of the cause, immediately took advantage of it to run two petards up to the gates, which blew them partially off their hinges, and the light infantry, quickly running up, completed their destruction. The whole body of the assailants then rushed in, and pushed on with such vigour, that very little farther resistance was attempted; three battalions succeeded in making their escape by the gates on the opposite side towards Compeigne, which were not invested; but fourteen guns and three thousand six hundred men fell into the hands of the victors. The confusion on the rampart had been occasioned by the death of General Rusca, who was killed by a cannon-ball while bravely encouraging his men; and with him all presence of mind, on the part of the garrison, seemed to have been extinguished.* Feb. 13.

The capture of this important strategetical point, which Napoleon regarded of such value that he had commenced the tracing out of a great intrenched camp, capable of containing his whole army, in its vicinity, was a severe blow to him, and would have been immediately attended by the most important consequences, were it not for the succession of disasters which at this very time were befalling the army of Silesia, which rendered it extremely hazardous for the Russian general to pursue his success any farther on the road from Laon to Paris. The capture of Soissons made Chernicheff acquainted with these important events; and, at the same time, Winzingerode received orders from Blucher to march to Rheims, in order to be at hand to form a reserve for his forces, so grievously weakened by the bloody campaign of the last three weeks. Chernicheff, therefore, wisely concluded that to retain Soissons would be to expose its garrison to certain destruction from the victorious French armies, now at no great distance; and, at the same time, weaken his detachment to such a degree as to endanger the whole. He therefore, though with bitter regret, abandoned his brilliant conquest the very day he had made it, and marched in the direction of Rheims, where he joined Winzingerode. Meanwhile, a detachment of Mortier's troops reoccupied Soissons, which was again put in a posture of defence, and Sacken, D'York, and Langeron joined Blucher at Chalons, where the veteran marshal was indefatigably engaged in reorganizing and concentrating his army. With such success were his efforts attended, and such was the magnitude of the resources still at his disposal, that by the 18th of February he had collected forty-five thousand infantry and fourteen thousand cavalry, with which he was ready to renew active operations.*

Which is evacuated by the Russians, and reoccupied by the French.

Napoleon, on the second day after the conflict of Montereau, put his army in motion, and ascended the course of the Seine to Bray and Nogent. Everywhere the allied columns retired before him. At the latter town he found the most deplorable traces of the ravages of war, and decisive marks of the desperate stand which Bourmont, with his devoted rear-guard, had made ten days before against the attacks of the allies. The walls were pierced with cannon-balls: many streets in ruins: everywhere the traces of conflagration and destruction. In the midst of these disasters, the Sisters of Charity had remained at their post, tending alike, with heroic devotion in the public hospital, the wounded and suffering among their friends and their enemies. During this day's march, good order was preserved in the allied columns, and the artillery and chariots, favoured by a clear, bright frost, which made the fields everywhere passable, even for the heaviest carriages, were all brought off in safety. But on the succeeding days, the usual symptoms of disorder and confusion appeared in the retreating host. The converging of so many different columns and such innumerable carriages towards one highway necessarily produced great difficulty; and the allied troops, long accustomed to victory, loudly murmured at a retreat before a force of little more than half of their own. The resolution, however, of the allied sovereigns to concentrate their forces, and accept battle in front of Troyes, had been definitively taken; Blucher was already in full march across from the banks of the Marne to the valley of the Seine to join them; the retreat was continued on the 21st towards Troyes, and on the evening of that day a hundred and forty thousand men were assembled between Mery, Arcis, Sur Aube, and Sommesous, covering all the approaches to Troyes. Such was the vigour with which Blucher reorganized his beaten army, that he appeared at the rendezvous at Mery with fifty thousand men and three hundred pieces of cannon.† Concentration of the allied armies in front of Troyes. Feb. 20. Feb. 21.

Napoleon made no attempt to prevent the junction of the grand allied and Silesian armies. He remained several days at Nogent, employed in making a new distribution of his troops, and

* Dan., 127, 129. Koch, i., 277, 278. Lab., ii., 208, 209. Vaud., ii., 24, 27.

* Dan., 128, 130. Koch, i., 275, 277. Lab., ii., 208, 209. Vaud., i., 399, 400.

† Burgh., 148, 149. Fain, 116, 117. Dan., 157, 161, 162. Koch, i., 330, 333.

Napoleon offers battle to Schwartzenberg, who declines it, and retreats from Troyes. February 22.

in sending orders to Augereau at Lyons, by whom he hoped the decisive blow against the rear of Schwartzenberg would be struck. That general, surprised at the inactivity of the French emperor, made a grand reconnoissance with ten thousand horse on the 22d, which brought on a heavy cannonade, but it led to nothing decisive; and the French, without being seriously molested, took up their line of battle between Pony and Le Goez, in sight of the Grand Army, which stood in front of Troyes, stretching on both sides of the Seine, from Mongue on the right to Villacerf on the left. A great battle was expected on both sides, and each made preparations to receive it. But the spirit of the two armies was widely different. The recent extraordinary success of the French had restored all their former confidence to the soldiers; their trust in the star of the emperor had returned; and, though well aware of the numerical superiority of their opponents, they had witnessed the confusion and precipitance of their retreat, and felt assured of victory. On the other hand, the allies were depressed by the little fruit which they had derived from so many successes; they were mortified at the defeats they had recently sustained from an army not half their number, and felt no confidence in the ability or firmness of the Austrian commander-in-chief, at the head of so multifarious an array, to withstand the sudden and weighty strokes of Napoleon. Above all, despondency and vacillation had possessed itself of the generals at headquarters; they were dismayed at the prospect of a long retreat, through a hostile population, to the Rhine; and the Austrian officers, in particular, felt all their wonted apprehensions at the army of Augereau, which report had magnified to forty thousand men, falling on their long line of communication towards the Jura. "The Grand Army," said they, "has lost half its numbers by the sword, disease, and wet weather; the country we are now in is ruined; the sources of our supplies are dried up; and all around us the inhabitants are ready to raise the standard of insurrection. The loss of a battle, in such circumstances, would draw after it a retreat to the Rhine, where, in all probability, we should be met by the corps of Marshal Augereau, who has forty thousand men under his command. It has become indispensable to secure a retreat to Germany, and wait for re-enforcements from thence, as well as arrest the progress of the enemy in the south, before we think of resuming offensive operations." In the council of war held at Troyes on the 23d, these opinions prevailed with the majority, as is invariably the case where a serious decision is devolved upon a body the *smallness* of whose numbers throws upon each individual a sense of responsibility without the credit of decision; and the bolder councils of the Emperor Alexander, who strongly urged that they should fight a great battle and resume the offensive, were overruled. The retreat was, accordingly, continued all night through Troyes, which was abandoned next day; and, as confusion and disorder soon spread to an alarming extent in the retiring columns, it was deemed advisable to offer Napoleon an armistice, for which purpose Prince Wentzel Lichtenstein, one of Schwartzenberg's officers, was despatched to his headquarters.*

Feb. 23.

Napoleon received the aid-de-camp in the hamlet of Chartrés, where he had passed the night. He brought, along with the proposal for an armistice, an answer from the Emperor Francis to the private letter which he had written to him six days before from Nangis: a sure proof that the separate interests of Austria were beginning to disjoint the alliance. This letter contained the most conciliatory expressions; admitted that the plans of the allies had been seriously deranged; and concluded with stating that, in the rapidity and force of his strokes, the emperor recognised the former great character of his son-in-law. As usual with him on such occasions, Napoleon entered into a long and confidential conversation with Prince Lichtenstein; and, after it had continued a considerable time, asked him whether the reports were well founded which were in circulation as to the intention of the allied sovereigns to dethrone him and replace the Bourbon family on the throne of France. Prince Lichtenstein warmly repelled the idea, and assured the emperor that the reports were altogether destitute of foundation: Napoleon, however, professed himself by no means satisfied with these explanations, and protested that the presence of the Duke de Berry in Jersey, of the Duke d'Angouleme at Wellington's headquarters, and, above all, of the Count d'Artois in Switzerland, in the rear of the Grand Army, was little calculated to allay his apprehensions on this head. Towards evening the officer was sent back with a haughty letter from Berthier to Schwartzenberg, in which he stated that "the assurances given to your highness of its being the wish of Austria to bring about a general pacification had induced the emperor to accede to the proposal." The plenipotentiaries appointed to conclude the armistice were, Count Shuvaloff on the part of Russia, Duca on that of Austria, and Rauch for Prussia; and Lusigny was the place fixed on for the conference. The principal conditions were, that the passes of the Vosges Mountains were to remain in the hands of the allies; and that the line of demarcation between the two armies was to be the line of the Marne, as far as Chalons, for the Grand Army, and thence along the course of the Vele till it joins the Aisne, for that of Silesia. But so confident was Napoleon in the returning good fortune of his arms, that, contrary to the wishes of the Austrians, he would not consent to a suspension of hostilities while the conferences for an armistice were going on; and Alexander, who was strongly averse to the armistice, took advantage of this circumstance to direct Winzingerode to pay no attention to any intimation he might receive of a suspension of hostilities till he received a special order from the emperor himself.†‡

Armistice of Lusigny. February 24.

* Dan., i., 162, 165. Burgh., 148, 150. Fain, 117, 119.
† Dan., 166, 167. Fain, 122, 123. Burgh., 155, 157.
‡ It was not without the most vigorous remonstrances on the part of Blucher and Alexander that this perilous resolution to retreat was at this period taken by the allied council. On being informed of the intention of the Austrian generalissimo to retreat from before Troyes, the old marshal became literally furious: openly charged him with bribery and treachery, and declared he would on no account

Reoccupation of Troyes by Napoleon, and execution of M. Goualt.

A lamentable catastrophe attended the return of good fortune to the cause of Napoleon, and stained, if it did not disgrace, his arms. On the evening of the 23d, the French advanced posts appeared before the gates of Troyes, and notwithstanding the sort of truce which existed, some skirmishing took place between the videttes on either side. During the night, however, the town was entirely evacuated by the allied troops, and at daybreak on the following morning Napoleon entered it, without opposition, in the the midst of his Guards. The middle and poorer classes, who were unanimous in favour of his government, received the emperor with unbounded enthusiasm, although the higher classes, who were for the most part attached to the exiled dynasty, remained aloof. As he passed through the streets, crowds surrounded him, striving to kiss his hand or touch his horse, and, with loud acclamations, saluted him as the saviour of his country. The first thing he did was to order the arrest of the Marquis de Widranges and M. Goualt. The former had set out some time before for Bâle, and so escaped; but the latter, in spite of all the entreaties of his friends, had persisted in remaining in Troyes, being unwilling to leave his wife, who could not be moved, and to whom he was tenderly attached. He was immediately arrested, and brought before a military commission, and condemned to death. M. Duchatel, with whom the emperor was lodged, threw himself at his feet, and, with M. Goualt's family, implored pardon, reminding him how much a deed of clemency would add to the lustre of his victory. But the emperor, though often inclined to mercy when the first fit of passion was over, on this occasion was inexorable, and the unfortunate nobleman was left to his fate. At eleven at night he was led out, by torchlight, surrounded by gendarmes, to the place appointed for public executions; on his back and his breast were affixed a placard, with the words, written in large characters, "Traitor to his country;" and he died with heroic firmness, without permitting his eyes to be bandaged, and protesting with his last breath his devotion to his king and country.*

Napoleon had now performed the most extraordinary and brilliant military achievements in his long and eventful career. Recovering his army, by the force of his resolution and the energy of his character, from the lowest point of depression, he had at once arrested the course of disaster, after an apparently decisive defeat, and struck the most terrible blows against the armies of his adversaries. Suddenly stopping his retreat, crossing the country, and falling perpendicularly on the line of march of the army of Silesia, he had surprised the Prussian marshal in a straggling and unguarded situation, where his scattered corps fell an easy prey to the superior force which he directed against them. At Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps, he had inflicted a loss of full twenty thousand men on that iron band of veterans, without being weakened on his own side by more than a fourth part of the number; while at Nangis and Montereau he had stopped the advance of the Grand Army, weakened them by fully twelve thousand men, and thrown back their victorious standards across the Seine. Such was the terror produced by his arms, that irresolution and circumspection had succeeded to boldness and decision in the allied councils: the intrepid advice of Alexander and Blucher was disregarded; and a hundred and forty thousand of the bravest troops in Europe abandoned the capital of Champagne, retreated ignominiously before sixty thousand, and concluded by soliciting an armistice from them. When it is recollected that these marvellous results were gained by a force which never could bring above seventy thousand sabres and bayonets into the field, against a host of more than double that number, composed of the veteran soldiers who had saved Russia and delivered Germany, and that, though thus inferior upon the whole, he was always superior at the point of attack, it must be admitted that a more brilliant series of military movements is not recorded in history; and that, if none other existed to signalize his capacity, they alone would be sufficient to render the name of Napoleon immortal.

General result of these successes on the part of Napoleon.

It must at the same time be observed, that the genius of the French emperor was seconded to a wish by the opposite and contradictory qualities of the two commanders-in-chief of the allied armies. Blucher, daring, impetuous, and confident, was hastening on to Paris, with his columns so far dissevered, and so incapable of supporting each other in case of danger, that they seemed at once to invite a flank attack, and defy mutual co-operation; while Schwartzenberg, slow, methodical, and circumspect, was alike disqualified to lend him any assistance in case of need, or relieve him from the pressure of the enemy by the vigour of his own operations. Thus, the former was as likely to run headlong into hazard as the latter was, by never daring, never to win; the extreme anxiety of the one for a vigorous advance exposed him as much to danger as the strong disposition of the other for the favourite Austrian manœuvre of a retreat disabled him from obviating it. The great merit of the French emperor—and, situated as he was, it was a merit of the very highest kind—consisted in his clear appreciation of the opposite qualities of these two commanders; in the genius which made him perceive

Errors of the allied generals.

retreat with him, but would separate and march direct on Paris, in order to compel Napoleon to give up the pursuit of the Grand Army, and turn his forces against that of Silesia. Alexander, on being informed of these intentions, approved of them, but directed the field-marshal previously to give the details of his plan. Blucher immediately, with his own hand, wrote out on a torn sheet of paper the following note: "1. The retreat of the Grand Army will cause the whole French nation to take up arms, and the French who have declared for the good cause will suffer. 2. Our victorious armies will lose heart. 3. We shall retreat into a country where there are no supplies, and where the inhabitants, being forced to give up their last morsel, will be reduced to despair. 4. The Emperor of the French will recover from the consternation into which he has been thrown by our successes, and will, as before, recover the confidence of the nation. Most heartily do I thank your majesty for the permission you have given me to resume the offensive. I flatter myself with the hopes of success if your majesty will give positive orders to Generals Winzingerode and Bulow to place themselves under my command. Joined by them, I will march on Paris, fearing neither Napoleon nor his marshals, should they come to meet me."—Danilefsky, 171, 172.

* Fain, 129, 131. Lab., ii., 247, 249. Beauch., ii., 23, 25.

that the hardihood of the one would expose him to perils, while the circumspection of the other would admit of his being almost entirely neglected; and in the moral courage which, refusing to be subdued even by the most serious disasters, saw in them only the germe of false confidence to his antagonists, and the opportunity of recalling victory to the imperial standards for himself.

Lord Castlereagh at the council at Bar-sur-Aube.

Matters, however, had now arrived at that point, from the moral effect of these successes on the councils of the majority of the allies, that the success of the invasion of France, and, with it, the holding together of the grand alliance, hung by a thread; and the influence of Alexander, great as it was, was unable singly to stem the torrent of despondency, or retain the allied army in that intrepid course, from which alone ultimate salvation to the cause of Europe could be hoped. At this crisis, however, he received the most vigorous co-operation from the moral courage of LORD CASTLEREAGH; and it was to the combined firmness of these two great men that the triumph of the alliance is, beyond all question, to be ascribed.

Plan of the campaign agreed to at Bar-sur-Aube.

On the 25th of February the allied sovereigns assembled at the house of General Knesebeck, at Bar-sur-Aube, as from illness he was unable to leave his apartment, or attend the council elsewhere. Besides the sovereigns, the following persons were present: Prince Volkonsky, Baron Diebitch, Count Nesselrode, Princes Schwartzenberg and Metternich, Count Radetsky, Lord Castlereagh, and Prince Hardenberg. At this council Alexander strongly supported, as he had always done, the policy of vigorous operations, and openly announced that he would authorize Blucher to recommence the offensive, notwithstanding the armistice of Lusigny, which did not extend beyond the Grand Army, if he could be re-enforced by the corps of Bulow and Winzingerode, the former of which was still in Flanders, though on the French frontier, while the latter was in the neighbourhood of Laon. But here a very great, and what appeared to the majority of the council an insurmountable difficulty, presented itself. These corps belonged to the army of Bernadotte, and took their orders only from him; that prince had not yet passed Liege: a long and tedious negotiation appeared unavoidable before he could be brought to consent to such a dislocation of the troops hitherto under his direct command; his evident and well-known backwardness at co-operating in the invasion of France rendered it certain that he would do everything in his power to prevent the transference of the largest and most efficient part of his army to so inveterate an enemy of his country as Marshal Blucher; while, at the same time, the precarious situation of the alliance, and the evident hesitation of Austria, rendered it a matter of extreme hazard to take any steps which might afford him a pretext for breaking off from it: yet a decision required to be come to without an instant's delay, for Napoleon had not consented to any suspension of military operations during the conferences. Alexander strongly urged the expedience of withdrawing the corps of Winzingerode, Bulow, and Woronzow, from Bernadotte's command; but he concurred with Schwartzenberg in holding that this was *impossible* without his previous consent; and the majority of the council inclined to this opinion. Upon this, Lord Castlereagh inquired of the most experienced officers present whether, in a military point of view, this change was indispensable to the success of the proposed operation. They answered that it was: upon this he immediately stated that, in that case, the plan must be adopted, and the necessary orders given immediately; that England had a right to expect that her allies would not be deterred from a decisive course by any such difficulties as had been urged; that, if necessary, he would withhold the monthly subsidies from the crown prince till he consented to the arrangement; and that he took upon himself the whole responsibility of any consequences that might arise, so far as regarded that prince. Such was the weight of England as the universal paymaster, at that period, in the alliance, as well as the deserved influence of her representative from his personal character; and such the effect of this manly course, adopted at the decisive moment, that it prevailed with the assembly. The requisite orders were given that very day, that "the Grand Army should retreat to Langres, and there, uniting with the Austrian reserves, accept battle; and that the army of Silesia should forthwith march to the Marne, where it was to be joined by the corps of Winzingerode, Bulow, and Woronzow, and immediately advance to Paris." It is not going too far to assert, that to this resolution, and the moral courage of the minister who brought it about, the downfall of Napoleon is immediately to be ascribed.*†

* Earl of Ripon to Lord Londonderry, July 6, 1839. Dan., 173. Schwartzenberg's General Orders, Feb. 26, 1814, given in Burgh., 169, 171.

† As this is a point of the very highest importance, the following extract from a very interesting letter from the Earl of Ripon, who was confidentially engaged with Lord Castlereagh at that period, to his brother, the present Marquis of Londonderry, is subjoined: "From Napoleon's central position, between the armies of Blucher and Schwartzenberg, he was enabled to fall, with his main strength, upon each of them singly; and experience had proved that neither of them was separately adequate to withstand his concentrated efforts. Blucher's army was much inferior in number to Schwartzenberg's, and the thing to be done, therefore, was to re-enforce Blucher to such an extent as might ensure the success of his movements. But where were these re-enforcements to be found? There was nothing immediately at hand but a body of Russians under St. Preist, who were on their march to Rheims, to join the corps to which they belonged in Blucher's army; and they were manifestly insufficient for the purpose. But there were two other strong corps, one of Prussians under General Bulow, and one of Russians under Winzingerode, who were on their march into France from Flanders, and might be brought forward with decisive effect. They belonged, however, to the army of the Crown-prince of Sweden, who had not at that period, I think, crossed the Rhine; they were under his orders, and he was very tenacious of his authority over them; and when it was suggested that the only mode of adequately re-enforcing Blucher was by placing these corps at his disposal without a moment's delay, the difficulty of withdrawing them from Bernadotte's command, without a previous and probably tedious discussion with him, was represented by a great authority as *insurmountable*. Lord Castlereagh was present when this matter was discussed at the council; and the moment he understood that, militarily speaking, the proposed plan was indispensable to success, he took his line. He stated, that in that case the plan *must* be adopted, and the necessary orders *immediately* given; that England had a right to expect that her allies would not be deterred from a decisive course by any such difficulties as had been urged, and he boldly took upon himself the *whole responsibility* of any consequences that might arise, as far as regarded the

Decisive effect of Lord Castlereagh's interposition.

It was not, however, without the utmost difficulty that this decisive resolution was adopted by the allied sovereigns. The majority of the council maintained that it would be most advantageous for both armies to retreat. Alexander decidedly opposed this opinion; adding that, rather than do so, he would separate from the Grand Army, with the guards, grenadiers, and Wittgenstein's corps, and march with Blucher on Paris. "I hope," added he, turning to the King of Prussia, "that your majesty, like a faithful ally, of whose friendship I have had so many proofs, will not refuse to accompany me." "I will do so with pleasure," answered that brave prince; "I have long ago placed my troops at your majesty's disposal." "But why should you leave me behind you?" added the Emperor Francis. But these protestations of the allied sovereigns, how honourable soever to themselves, determined nothing: the necessity of the Grand Army retreating was universally admitted; the separation of Wittgenstein and the Russians would have sent it headlong across the Jura, and probably dissolved the alliance. It was Lord Castlereagh's interposition, by providing the means of adequately re-enforcing Blucher *without weakening or dislocating the Grand Army*, which really determined the campaign; and so satisfied was Alexander of this, that the moment the plan was agreed to, he wrote a note to Blucher with his own hand, in pencil, informing him that the corps of Winzingerode and Bulow were now placed under his orders, and authorizing him to act according to his discretion, on the sole condition of observing certain rules of military prudence. At the same council, it was determined to form out of the German and Austrian reserves, which were about to cross the Jura, combined with the corps of Bianchi, a fresh army, to be called the army of the South, fifty thousand strong, which was to be placed under the direction of Prince Hesse-Homburg, and was to march on Macon, drive back Augereau, and secure the flank and rear of the Grand Army from insult; while Bernadotte and the Duke of Saxe-Weimar were to remain in the Low Countries, and complete the reduction of Antwerp, and the few other strong places which held out for the emperor in Flanders.*

Separation of the Grand Army and the army of Silesia.

No sooner had this council broken up, than messengers were despatched in all directions with the orders which had been agreed on at that memorable conference. The two armies, so recently united, again separated: the huge masses of the Grand Army slowly retired towards Langres; and Blucher, overjoyed Feb. 26. at being liberated from the paralyzing command of Schwartzenberg, joyfully resumed his way towards Chalons and the Marne, followed by the great body of the French army, the corps of Oudinot and Macdonald alone being despatched on the traces of the Grand Army. As soon as Blucher perceived that the weight of Napoleon's force was directed against him, he despatched a messenger to inform Schwartzenberg of the fact; and the retrograde movement of the Grand Army, the leading columns of which had passed Chaumont, Feb. 27. and were rapidly approaching Langres, was stopped, and preparations made for again resuming the offensive, in order to relieve the army of Silesia from the dangers which threatened it. Meanwhile, that gallant host, unwearied in combat, and burning with desire to efface the disgrace it had lately received, rapidly descended both banks of the Marne. Marmont, obliged to evacuate Sezanne, was driven by La-Ferté-Gaucher on La-Ferté-sous-Jouarre, whither Mortier also had retired before the advancing corps of Winzingerode. Already the fugitives were appearing at Meaux; Paris was in consternation; and Napoleon, alarmed at the danger of the capital, set out suddenly from Troyes on the morning of the 27th, with his Guards and cuirassiers, to accumulate his forces against his veteran but unconquerable antagonist.*

While these military movements, every one of which seemed to bear the fate of Europe on the sword's point, were in progress, negotiations of the most important kind were going on between the allied powers and the French emperor; and a treaty of alliance had been formed, which again cemented and placed on a secure basis their recently somewhat disjointed alliance.

Opening of the Congress of Chatillon. February 4.

It has been already mentioned, that in answer to the allied declaration from Frankfort, and the proposals for an accommodation, of which M. De St. Aignan was the bearer, Napoleon had signified his readiness to treat; and after some delays on both sides, CHATILLON was fixed on as the place for the conferences, which was declared neutral ground, and the Congress opened there on the 4th of February. The great influence of England at this period in the alliance might be seen from the number of plenipotentiaries assigned to her in this memorable assembly: they were Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart,† on the part of Great Britain; Count Razumoffski on the part of Russia; Count Stadion for Austria; and Baron Humboldt on that of Prussia. Caulaincourt singly sustained the onerous duty of upholding, against such an array of talent and energy, the declining fortunes of Napoleon. But though both parties professed an anxious desire to come to an accommodation, yet their views were so various, that it was not difficult to foresee that, as in the preceding year at Prague, the Congress would be little more than a form, and the sword must in reality determine the points in dispute between them. Both proceeded on the principle of making the terms which they demanded dependant on the aspect of military affairs; and both, in consequence, readily agreed to the Congress continuing its labours in the midst of the din of the surrounding conflict. Alexander from the outset upheld this principle, and strenuously maintained that the terms proposed at Frankfort should not be adhered to after the great

Crown-prince of Sweden. His advice prevailed: the battle of Laon was fought successfully, and no farther efforts of Bonaparte could oppose the march of the allies to Paris, and their triumphant occupation of that city. It is not, then, too much to say, that the vigour and energy displayed by Lord Castlereagh at this crisis decided the fate of the campaign."—LORD RIPON *to* MARQUIS LONDONDERRY, *July* 6, 1839, *given in an Appendix to the Marquis's Letter to Lord Brougham, in answer to his Strictures on Lord Castlereagh*, p. 57, 58.

* Dan. 174, 175. Koch, i., 348, 349.

* Fain, 138, 139. Koch, i., 350, 357. Dan., 176, 178.

† Now Marquis Londonderry.

successes of the campaign, and the conquest of a third of France, by the allied forces, had opened to them new prospects, which they could not have entertained before they crossed the Rhine. Napoleon, during the first alarm consequent on the battle of La Rothiere, had given Caulaincourt full powers to sign anything which might prevent the occupation of Paris by the victorious allies; but no sooner had victory returned to his standards at Montmirail and Champaubert, than he retracted these concessions, enjoined his plenipotentiary to strive for delay, as his prospects were daily brightening, and directed him, above everything, to "sign nothing without his special authority."*

The British government send Lord Castlereagh.

The vast importance of the Congress which was about to open had early impressed upon both the Continental and British cabinets the necessity of sending a minister to take the principal direction of the negotiations who might wield unfettered the whole powers of the government. General Pozzo di Borgo was, accordingly, sent to London in the close of 1813, and the British government at once acquiesced in the propriety of the plan. Lord Harrowby was at first talked of; but the risk of delay in his case, from the necessity of corresponding with the foreign office in London, were such, that it was deemed indispensable to send the minister for foreign affairs himself. No one could have been found in any rank better qualified than Lord Castlereagh for the task. His high-bred manners, conciliatory disposition, and suavity of temper, were as much fitted to give him influence in the allied cabinets, as his clearness of intellectual vision, firmness of character, and indomitable moral courage, were calculated to add vigour and resolution to their councils. He received his instructions as to the terms to which he was to agree from a cabinet council before leaving the British shores; and they exhibit, when compared with the principles which England had maintained throughout the contest, a memorable instance of constancy in adverse, and moderation in prosperous fortune.†

Views of Great Britain in this negotiation.

England had no demands either to recede from or augment since the war commenced. Her object throughout had been, not to force an unpopular dynasty on an unwilling people; not to wrest provinces or cities from France, in return for those which she had so liberally exacted from all the adjoining states; not even to make her indemnify Great Britain for any part of the enormous expenses to which she had been put during the war: but simply to provide *security for the future*; to establish a barrier alike against the revolutionary propagandism and military violence of her people; to compel her rulers and armies, whether republican or imperial, to withdraw within their own territories, and neither seek to disturb foreign nations by their principles, nor subdue them by their power. For the attainment of these objects, she had uniformly maintained that no security was so desirable, because none was so likely to be effectual, as the restoration of the former line of princes, with whom repose was practicable, and to whom "conquest" was not, according to Napoleon's maxim, "essential to existence;" but she had never regarded that as an indispensable preliminary to an accommodation, nor even put it forward on any occasion, from first to last, as the basis of a treaty with the existing rulers of France. In a word, England had nothing to do but to revert to and enforce those principles which she had submitted to the cabinet of St. Petersburg before the contest began,* which she had announced to Napoleon when first seated, flushed with the triumph of Marengo, on the consular throne;† and which had formed the basis of the grand alliance projected by Mr. Pitt in 1805, shortly before the dreadful catastrophe of the Austerlitz campaign.‡ She did so accordingly; she demanded neither more nor less. So memorable an instance of constancy in adverse, and moderation in prosperous fortune, does not occur in the whole annals of mankind. We admire the magnanimity of the Romans, who refused to treat with Hannibal when encamped within sight of the Capitol, till he had first evacuated the territories of the Republic; we pay a just tribute to the heroism of Alexander, who surrendered the ancient capital of his empire to

* Dan., 2, 14, 82. Lond., 276. Fain, 93. 94.
† Lond., 273, 274. Cap., x., 365, 366. Burgh., 61.

* "The terms offered to France should be, the withdrawing her arms within the limits of the French territory, the abandoning her conquests, the rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, and the giving, in some unequivocal manner, a pledge of her intention no longer to foment troubles or excite disturbances against foreign governments. In return for these stipulations, the different powers of Europe who should be parties to this measure might engage to abandon all measures or views of hostility against France, or interference in her internal affairs, and to maintain a correspondence and intercourse of amity with the existing powers of that country, with whom such a treaty may be concluded."—LORD GRENVILLE, *Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 29th Dec.*, 1792. *Ante*, i., 190.

† "The best and most natural pledge of the abandonment by France of those gigantic schemes of ambition, by which the very existence of society in the adjoining states has so long been menaced, would be the restoration of that line of princes which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home, and consideration and respect abroad. Such an event would alone have removed, and will at any time remove, all obstacles in the way of negotiation or peace. It would confirm to France the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient territory; and it would give to all the other nations of Europe, in tranquillity and peace, *that security* which they are now compelled to seek by other means. But, desirable as such an event must be, both to France and the world, it is not to this mode exclusively that his majesty limits the possibility of secure and solid pacification. His majesty makes no claims to prescribe to France what should be the form of her government, or in whose hands she shall vest the authority necessary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation. He looks only to the security of his own dominions and those of his allies, and to the general safety of Europe. Whenever he shall judge that such security can in any manner be attained, as resulting, either from the position of the country from whose internal situation the danger has arisen, or from such other circumstances, of whatever nature, as may produce the same end, his majesty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his allies the means of a general pacification."—LORD GRENVILLE *to* M. TALLEYRAND, *January* 5, 1800. *Parl. History*, xxxiv., 1199, 1201, and *Ante*, ii., 62.

‡ "The views of his Britannic majesty and of the Emperor of Russia, in bringing about this alliance, are pure and disinterested. Their chief object, in regard to the countries which may be conquered from France, is to establish, as much as possible, their *ancient rights*, and to secure the well-being of their inhabitants; but, in pursuing that object, they must not lose sight of the general security of Europe, on which, indeed, that well-being is mainly dependant." Then follows a specification of the disposal to be made of the *conquests* of France, in the event of the alliance succeeding in wresting them from that power; without a syllable either as to despoiling her of any of the ancient provinces of the monarchy, or interfering in the remotest degree with its internal government.—MR. PITT'S *Note to the* EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, *January* 11, 1805. SCHOELL, *Histoire des Traités de Paix*, vii., 59, and *Ante*, ii., 309.

the flames, rather than permit it to be sullied by the presence of the spoiler; we acknowledge the glory which is shed over Spain by the undaunted resolution of her Cortes never to negotiate with Napoleon, even when the remnant of her armies was shut up within the walls of Cadiz. But these were instances of constancy in adverse, not moderation in prosperous fortune. To have maintained for twenty years a contest, often unaided, with an enemy possessing more than double her own resources; to have neither arrogated to, nor receded from, her principles during that long period; to have advanced no pretensions in victory which she had not maintained in defeat; to have concluded peace with her inveterate enemy when her capital was in her power, and her emperor dethroned, and exacted no conditions from the vanquished on which she had not offered to maintain peace before the contest commenced*—this is the glory of England, and of England alone.

Conformably to these principles, the instructions of Lord Castlereagh from the British cabinet contained no projects for the partition of any part of France as that monarchy existed in 1789, prior to the commencement of the Revolution, but the most ample provision for the establishment of barriers against its future irruption into Europe. The reduction of France to its ancient limits; the formation of a federative union in Germany, which might secure to the meanest of its states the protection of the whole; the re-establishment of the Swiss Confederacy, under the guarantee of the great powers; the restoration of the lesser states of Italy, intermediate between France and Austria, to a state of independence; the restoration of Spain and Portugal under their ancient sovereigns, and in their former extent; in fine, the restitution of Holland to separate sovereignty, under the family of the Stadtholders, with such an addition of territory as might give it the means of maintaining that blessing—such were the instructions of the English cabinet in regard to the general restoration of the balance of power in Europe, in so far as France was concerned; and in these propositions all the allied powers concurred. With a view, however, to the especial security of England, two additional provisions were insisted upon, upon which the British cabinet was inflexible. The first of these was, that no discussion even, derogatory to the British maritime rights, as settled by existing treaties, or the general maritime law of Europe, should be admitted; the second, that, in the event of any new arrangements being deemed advisable for the future frontiers of France, they should not embrace Antwerp, Genoa, or Piedmont: the first of which was justly considered essential to the maritime security of England; the second, to the independence of the Italian States, on which side, as no general confederacy was contemplated, the greatest danger might in future be apprehended.*

Instructions to Lord Castlereagh from the English cabinet.

In these instructions, however, two important points were purposely left undecided; not because they were overlooked, or their importance not fully appreciated, but because their solution was involved in such difficulty, and was so dependant on future contingencies, that no directions previously given could possibly prove applicable to the subsequent march of events. These were the restoration of the Bourbons and the future destiny of Poland.

Restoration of the Bourbons, and arrangement concerning Poland.

On the first of these points the instructions contained no specific directions, because it was the intention of England, not less than of the other allied powers, not to interfere with the wishes and intentions of the French people. Lord Castlereagh, indeed, in conformity with the declared purpose of British diplomacy ever since the commencement of the war, made no concealment of his opinion, either in or out of Parliament,† that the best security for the peace of Europe would be found in the restoration of the dispossessed race of princes to the French throne; and "the ancient race and the ancient territory" was often referred to by him in private conversation as offering the only combination which was likely to give lasting repose to the world; but it was as little his design as it was that of the British cabinet to advance these views as a preliminary to any, even the most lasting, accommodation. Such a reaction, to have any likelihood of being durable, and to avoid exciting the immediate jealousy of Austria for the succession of Napoleon's son, could only be founded upon a movement in France itself, and such a manifestation of opinions within its limits, as might render it evident that no chance remained of a continuance of the crown in the Bonaparte family. The views of Alexander were entirely the same at this period, so far as regarded the government of France; and his able diplomatist, General Pozzo di Borgo, when sent to London to induce the British government to send Lord Castlereagh to the allied headquarters, thus expressed himself to the Count d'Artois, who pressed him to explain the ideas of the Czar on the subject of the Bourbon family: "My lord, everything has its time; let us not perplex matters. To sovereigns you should never present complicated questions. It is with no small difficulty that they have been kept united in the grand object of overthrowing Bonaparte: as soon as that is done, and the imperial rule destroyed, the question of dynasty will present it-

Views of the English and Russian governments regarding the Bourbons.

* "England will never consent that France should arrogate to herself the power of annulling at pleasure, under cover of a pretended natural right, of which she makes herself the sole judge, the political system of Europe, established by solemn treaties, and guarantied by the consent of all the powers. She will never see with indifference France make herself, either directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbitress of Europe. If France is really desirous of maintaining peace and friendship with England, let her renounce her views of aggression and aggrandizement, *and confine herself within her own territory, without insulting other governments, disturbing their tranquillity, or violating their rights.*"—LORD GRENVILLE *to* M. CHAUVELIN, *the French Envoy, Feb.* 5, 1793. *State Papers, No.* 1, *Ann. Reg.*, 1793, and *Ante*, i., 190.

* Hard., xii., 318, 320. Cap., x., 366.

† "Every pacification would be incomplete if you did not re-establish on the throne of France the ancient family of the Bourbons; any peace with the man who had placed himself at the head of the French nation could have no other final result but to give to Europe fresh subjects of divisions and alarms—it could be neither secure nor durable; nevertheless, it was impossible to refuse to negotiate with him, when invested with power, without doing violence to the opinion of Europe, and incurring the whole responsibility of the continuance of the war."—LORD CASTLEREAGH'S *Speech in Parliament, 29th June*, 1814, *Parl. Deb.*, xxviii., 458.

self; and then your illustrious house will spontaneously occur to the thoughts of all."*

Division of opinion regarding Poland.

But, though entirely in unison on this momentous subject, the cabinets of England and Russia were far from being equally agreed as to another subject, which, it was foreseen, would speedily present itself for discussion on the overthrow of Napoleon, and that was the future destiny of Poland. That the old anarchical Democracy of that country, with its stormy comitia, *liberum veto*, internal feuds, and external weakness, could not be restored, if the slightest regard was felt either for the general balance of power in Europe or the welfare of that gallant, but distracted people, was evident to all. But what to do with Poland, in the powerful and now victorious monarchies by which it was surrounded, all of whom, it might be foreseen, would be anxious to share its spoils, was not so apparent. In a private conversation with Sir Charles Stewart at this period, the Emperor Alexander openly announced those views, in regard to the annexation of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw to his dominions, which subsequently occasioned such difficulty at the Congress of Vienna. He stated that his moral feelings, and every principle of justice and right, called upon him to use his power to restore such a constitution to Poland as would secure the happiness of so noble and great a people; that the abandonment of seven millions of his Lithuanian subjects for the attainment of such an object, if he had no guarantee for the advantage he was thence to derive for Russia, would be more than his imperial crown was worth; and that the only way of reconciling these objects was by uniting the Lithuanian provinces with the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, under such a constitutional administration as Russia might appoint. He communicated, at the same time, the same project to Prince Metternich. Thus early did the habitual ambition of that great power show itself in the European Congress; and so clearly, according to the usual course of human affairs, were future difficulty and embarrassment arising out of the very magnitude of present successes.†

Napoleon's instructions to Caulaincourt.

The instructions of Napoleon to his plenipotentiary, Caulaincourt, were of a very different tenour, and such as sufficiently evinced the unlikelihood that the Congress would terminate in any permanent accommodation: "It appears doubtful," said he, "whether the allies really wish a peace; I desire it, but it must be solid and honourable. France, without its natural limits, without Ostend, without Antwerp, would be no longer on a level with the other powers of Europe. England, and all the other allied powers, have recognised at Frankfort the principle of giving France her natural boundaries. The conquests of France within the Rhine and the Alps can never compensate what Austria, Russia, and Prussia have acquired in Finland, in Poland, or what England has seized in India. The policy of England, the hatred of the Emperor of Russia, will carry away Austria. I have accepted the basis announced at Frankfort, but it is probable by this time the allies have other ideas. Their negotiations are but a mask. The moment that they declared the negotiations subject to the influence of military events, it became impossible to foresee their probable issue You must hear and observe everything. You must endeavour to discover the views of the allies, and make me acquainted with them, day by day, in order that I may be in a situation to give you more precise instructions than I can give at present. To reduce France to its ancient limits is to degrade it. They are deceived if they suppose that the misfortunes of war will make the nation desire such a peace: there is not a French heart which would not feel its disgrace before the end of six months, and which would not make it an eternal subject of opprobrium to the government which should be base enough to sign it. Italy is untouched, the viceroy has a fine army: in a few days I shall have assembled a force adequate to fight several battles, even before the arrival of the troops from Spain. If the nation seconds me, the enemy is marching to his ruin; if fortune betrays me, my part is taken: I will not retain the throne. I will neither degrade the nation nor myself, by subscribing degrading conditions. Try and discover what are Metternich's ideas. It is not the interest of Austria to push matters to extremity: yet a step, and the lead will escape her. In this state of affairs, there is nothing to prescribe to you. Limit yourself, in the first instance, to hear everything, and inform me of what goes on. I am on the eve of joining the army; we shall be so near, that scarce any delay will occur in making me acquainted with the state of the negotiations."*

Commencement of the Congress.

When the views of the opposite parties were so widely at variance, it was not likely that the negotiations could lead to any result, or serve as more than a pretext to both parties for regulating the terms insisted on, according to the aspect of military affairs; yet were the conferences nearer leading to the conclusion of a peace, at their outset, than could possibly have been anticipated. The Congress opened on the 3d of February, at Chatillon; and, from the great weight of Lord Castlereagh at the allied headquarters, the utmost union was soon brought to prevail between the leading ministers of the great powers. In the outset, Napoleon, by means of Caulaincourt, endeavoured to open a private communication with Prince Metternich; but the answer of that able statesman damped the hopes he had hitherto so confidently entertained of detaching Austria from the alliance,† while, at the same time,

Jan. 23.

* Cap., x., 367. Hard., xii., 318, 322. Private information.

† Lond., 275, 276.

* Napoleon to Caulaincourt, Jan. 4, 1814, Cap., x., 369, 370.

† "I received yesterday evening the confidential letter of the 23d, which your excellency has addressed to me. I have submitted it to the emperor, my master, and his imperial majesty has resolved to make no use of its contents—it will remain forever unknown; and I pray your excellency to believe that, in the existing state of matters, any confidence reposed in our cabinet is beyond the reach of any abuse. I have a pleasure in making known to you this assurance, in a moment of such immense importance for Austria, France, and Europe. The conduct of my sovereign has been uniform and consistent. He has engaged in this war without hatred; he pursues it without resentment. The day that he gave his daughter to the prince who then governed Europe, he ceased to behold in him a personal enemy. The fate of war has since changed the attitude of all. If the Emperor Napoleon will listen in these moments to the voice of reason; if he will consent to seek his glory in the happiness of a great people, in renouncing his former ambitious policy, the emperor will with pleasure revert to the feelings he en-

it sufficiently proved that the cabinet of Vienna was anxious to retain him on the throne, if it could be done consistently with the liberties and security of the other states in Europe. Caulaincourt replied in terms dignified and melancholy, lamenting that Count Stadion, instead of Prince Metternich, was not the minister intrusted with the interests of Austria at the Congress, to counterbalance the influence which Lord Castlereagh might exercise in its deliberations; and conjuring him, if he would avert the last calamities on the beloved daughter of his emperor, to exert his efforts to bring about a fair and equitable peace.* Metternich replied: "M. Caulaincourt has conceived erroneous ideas concerning Lord Castlereagh. He is a man of a cool and just mind, without passions, who will never permit himself to be governed by coteries. It would be unfortunate if, in the outset of the Congress, prejudices should be entertained against the individuals engaged in it. If Napoleon really wishes for peace, he will obtain it on reasonable terms." This separate and confidential correspondence between Metternich and Caulaincourt, unknown to the other members of the Congress, but yet without disturbing the unanimity of its resolutions, continued the whole time it sat: a singular circumstance, indicating at once the strength of the separate interests which had led Austria into such a proceeding, the extremely delicate nature of the negotiations which were in dependance, and the exalted honour which, in spite of such prepossessions, prevented her from swerving, in the final result, from her pledged faith and the general interests of Europe.†

Napoleon gives Caulaincourt full powers after the defeat of La Rothiere.

The battle of La Rothiere, and retreat of the French army from Troyes, produced a most important effect upon the views of Napoleon at the Congress which had recently been opened. Justly alarmed for his capital, which seemed now to be menaced by an overwhelming force, and aware of the perfect unanimity which prevailed between the plenipotentiaries of the allied sovereigns,‡ he at length gave Caulaincourt those full powers which he had so anxiously solicited; and authorized him to sign anything that might appear necessary to avoid the risk of a battle, and save Paris from being taken.* It was not, however, without the utmost difficulty that this great concession was extorted from the emperor; and the manner in which it occurred is singularly characteristic of the mingled firmness and exaltation of his mind: Caulaincourt had represented to him by letter, on the 31st of January, the absolute necessity of his receiving precise and positive instructions at the opening of the Congress: "The fate of France," said he, "may depend on a peace or an armistice, which must be concluded in four days. In such circumstances I demand precise instructions, which may leave me at liberty to act." When this letter was received, Maret, with tears in his eyes, entreated the emperor to yield to necessity, and give the full powers which were so urgently demanded. Instead of answering, Napoleon opened a volume of Montesquieu's works, containing the grandeur and fall of the Romans, which lay in his cabinet, and read the following passage: "I know nothing more magnanimous than the resolution which a monarch took who has reigned in our times (Louis XIV.), to bury himself under the ruins of his throne rather than accept conditions unworthy of a king. He had a mind too lofty to descend lower than his fortunes had sunk him; he knew well that courage may strengthen a crown, but infamy never." Maret, with earnestness, represented "that nothing could be more magnanimous than to sacrifice even his glory to the safety of the state, which would fall with him." "Well, be it so," replied the emperor, after a pause: "let Caulaincourt sign whatever is necessary to procure peace: I will bear the shame of it, but I will not dictate my own disgrace." In two hours after the full powers were despatched.*

Conditions proposed by the allied powers, February 7.

The allied powers were unanimous in the terms which they proposed to France; and, after the preliminary formalities had been gone through, they were fully developed in a note lodged in their joint names, on the 7th of Feb-

tertained when he gave him the daughter of his heart; but if a fatal blindness shall render the Emperor Napoleon deaf to the unanimous voice of his people and of Europe, he will deplore the fate of his daughter, but not arrest his course." —*Confidential Letter*, METTERNICH *to* CAULAINCOURT, *29th Jan.*, 1814, given in CAPEFIGUE, *Hist. de l'Empire de Napoleon*, x., 372, 373.

* "The arrival of the allied troops at Paris would be the commencement of a series of changes which Austria assuredly would not be the last to regret. If the war is to terminate by our overthrow, has Austria nothing to regret in such a catastrophe? What profit is she to acquire, what glory to win, if we are overwhelmed by all the armies of Europe? You, my prince, have a boundless harvest of glory to reap; but it is to be gained only by your remaining the arbiter of events, and the only way in which you can do so is by an immediate peace."—CAULAINCOURT *to* METTERNICH, *8th February*, 1814, CAPEFIGUE, x., 372.

† Cap., x., 373, 374. See the whole, in Fain, 279, 309.

‡ "Sire! I am here, at Chatillon, opposed to four diplomatists, counting the three English for one. They have all the same instructions, prepared by the secretaries of state of their respective courts. Their language has been dictated to them in advance: the declarations which they tender are all ready made; they do not take a step nor utter a word which has not been preconcerted. They are desirous of a protocol, and I am not disinclined to it; so precious are the moments, and yet so great the hazard, by a false step, of ruining all. I set out with my hands bound: I have just received a letter full of alarms; and I now find myself invested with full powers. I am at once reined in and spurred on: I know not the cause of this extraordinary change."—CAULAINCOURT *to* NAPOLEON, *Feb.* 6, 1814; FAIN, 289; CAPEFIGUE, x., 375, 376. It is not surprising that Caulaincourt was at a loss to conceive the cause of this sudden change; for so inveterate was the habit of Napoleon to conceal the truth, and deal in falsehoods, even with his most confidential servants, that only two days before, in his letter to Caulaincourt, detailing the battle of La Rothiere, he had said, "Schwartzenberg's report is a piece of folly: *there was no battle:* the Old Guard was not there: the Young Guard did not charge; a few pieces of cannon have been captured by a charge of horse; but the army was in march for the bridge of Lesmont when that event arrived; and had he been two hours later, the enemy would not have forced us."—NAPOLEON *to* CAULAINCOURT, *Feb.* 4, 1814, *in* HARDENBERG, xii., 332. The words in italics are *omitted* in Fain's quotation of that letter. See FAIN, 285. *Pièces Just.*

* "I am authorized, duke, to make known to you that the intention of the emperor is, that you should consider yourself as invested with all the powers necessary, in these important circumstances, to take the part which you shall deem advisable to arrest the progress of the enemy. I have sent you a letter with the needful powers which you have solicited. At the moment when his majesty is about to quit this city, he has enjoined me to despatch to you a second, and to make you aware, in express terms, that his majesty gives you *carte blanche* to conduct the negotiations to a happy issue—to save the capital, and avoid a battle, on which depend the last hopes of the nation."—MARET *to* CAULAINCOURT, *Troyes, 5th Feb.*, 1814; FAIN, 286, 287; *Pièces Just.* † Hard., xii., 333, 334. Cap., x., 375.

ruary. They were to this effect: "Considering the situation of Europe in respect to France, at the close of the successes obtained by their arms, the allied plenipotentiaries have orders to demand that France should be restricted to *her limits before the Revolution*, with the exception of subordinate arrangements for mutual convenience, and the restitution which England is ready to make for such concession: as a natural consequence of this, France must renounce all direct influence beyond the future limits of Germany, Italy, and Switzerland." Such was the consternation produced by the battle of La Rothiere, that Caulaincourt, two days afterward, wrote in reply, "I wish to know whether, by consenting to the terms which the allies have proposed, that France shall be restricted to her ancient limits, I will immediately obtain an armistice: if by such a sacrifice an armistice can immediately be obtained, I am ready to make it; nay, I shall be ready, on that supposition, to surrender immediately a portion of the fortified places which that sacrifice must make us ultimately relinquish."*

Feb. 9.

To all appearance, therefore, the Congress at this period was on the eve of producing a general peace; and an armistice, as the first step towards it, might hourly be expected. At this critical juncture, however, a letter was forwarded to the plenipotentiaries from the Emperor of Russia, requesting a suspension of these sittings for a few days, till he had an opportunity of concerting with his allies upon the terms to be demanded; and they were accordingly adjourned to the 17th. The fate of the world depended on this delay; for, when the conferences were resumed, events had occurred which rendered all accommodation impossible between the parties, and irrecoverably threw them back upon the decision of the sword. Napoleon, who had with great difficulty been brought to give full powers to Caulaincourt to treat after the disaster of La Rothiere, no sooner saw the advantages which the ill-judged separation of the Grand Army from that of Silesia would give him, than he resolved to retract his concessions, and again trust all to the hazard of arms. He received intelligence of the terms demanded on the 9th at Nogent, when he was just on the eve of setting out on his expedition to Sezanne, which terminated in so disastrous a manner for Blucher. Perceiving the advantage which this movement was likely to afford, he broke out in the most vehement manner to Maret and Berthier, against the disgraceful nature of the terms which were demanded. "What!" said he, with indescribable energy, "do you urge me to sign such a treaty, and trample under foot my coronation oath, to preserve inviolate the territory of the Republic? Disasters unheard of might compel me to relinquish the conquests I myself have made: but to abandon those also made before me; to betray the trust made over to me with such confidence; to leave France, after so much blood has been shed and victories gained, smaller than ever! Could I do it without treachery, without disgrace? You are fearful of a continuation of the war; and I am still more afraid of dangers, yet more certain, which you do not perceive. If we renounce the frontier of the Rhine, it is not merely France which recedes, but Austria and Prussia which advance. France has need of peace; but such a one as they seek to impose upon it would be more dangerous than the most inveterate war. What would I be to the French if I had signed their humiliation? What could I answer to the Republicans of the Senate when they came to ask me for the frontiers of the Rhine? God preserve me from such affronts! Write to Caulaincourt, since you will have it so, but tell him that I reject the treaty. I prefer to run the greatest risks of war."*

They are departed from by Napoleon.

When such were the feelings of Napoleon on setting out upon his expedition against Blucher, it was not to be expected that his disposition would be rendered more pacific by his unexpected and brilliant successes over that commander. No sooner, accordingly, was the first of these victories—that at Champaubert—gained, than Napoleon wrote to Caulaincourt that a brilliant change had taken place in his affairs; that new advantages were in preparation; and that the plenipotentiary of France was now entitled to assume a less humiliated attitude. Meanwhile, the privy council at Paris, to whom the propositions of the allies at Chatillon had been referred, unanimously reported that they should be agreed to. The emperor, however, dazzled by the brilliancy of his victories over Blucher, wrote to the Emperor of Austria, on the 17th, from Nangis, that he was as anxious as ever for an accommodation; but that the advantages which he had now gained entitled him to demand less unfavourable terms; while to Caulaincourt he wrote, on the same day, that the extraordinary powers he had received were only intended to avoid a battle and save the capital; that now that danger no longer existed, and, consequently, the negotiation would resume its ordinary course of proceeding, and he was to sign nothing without the express authority of the emperor.†‡

He rises in his demands with his subsequent successes. February 10.

Feb. 13.

Feb. 17.

This brilliant change in his fortunes not only induced Napoleon to resume the powers to treat which he had conferred on Caulaincourt, but led to another step on his part, in the end at-

* Caulaincourt to Metternich, Feb. 9, 1814. Fain, 293. Hard., xii., 337.

* Fain, 87, 89.

† Fain, 84, 106. Napoleon to Caulaincourt, Feb. 17, 1814. Fain, 297.

‡ "I gave you *carte blanche* only to save Paris and avoid a battle, which was then the only hope of the nation. The battle has taken place; Providence has blessed our arms. I have made 30,000 or 40,000 prisoners, taken two hundred pieces of cannon, a great number of generals, and all this without almost a serious encounter. Yesterday I cut up the army of Prince Schwartzenberg, and I hope to destroy it before it has repassed the frontiers. Your attitude should continue the same: you should do everything to procure peace; but my intention now is, that you should sign nothing without my authority, because I alone know my own position. Generally speaking, I will only consent to an honourable peace, such as on the basis proposed at Fraukfort. My position is certainly better now than it was at that time. They could then set me at defiance; I had gained no advantages over them, and they were on the verge of my territories. Now I have gained immense advantages over them; so great, indeed, that a military career of twenty years, and no small celebrity, can exhibit no parallel to it; still I am ready to cease hostilities, and to allow the enemy to retire peaceably, if they will conclude peace on the basis of Frankfort." At the end of this letter, these words were added in the handwriting of Napoleon: "*Ne signez rien, ne signez rien.*"—NAPOLEON *to* CAULAINCOURT, *February 17th*, 1814, FAIN, 297, 298. *Pièces Just.*

Napoleon orders Eugene to evacuate Italy, and then countermands the order. Feb. 5.

tended with not less fatal effect upon his fortunes. During the first moment of alarm consequent on the battle of La Rothiere and retreat from Troyes, he had written to Eugene Beauharnois to the effect that the crisis had now become so violent in France, that it was plain the contest would be decided there; that all subordinate considerations had now become of no importance; and, therefore, that, after leaving garrisons in a few strongholds, he should immediately withdraw his whole forces across the Alps, and hasten to the decisive point on the banks of the Seine. This order, worthy of Napoleon's genius, and in strict conformity with his system of war, would have brought forty thousand experienced veterans on the rear of the Austrian Grand Army at the most critical period of the campaign, and, in all probability, prevented the advance to Paris and dethronement of the emperor. But the successes over Blucher restored to such a degree his confidence in his good fortune, that he wrote to Eugene, the very night after the battle of Montmirail, forbidding him to retire, and assuring him that he was singly adequate to the defence of France. Nay, so far was he transported by the sanguine views which he now entertained of his affairs, that he resumed his ideas of German conquest, and openly said to those around him, "I am nearer Vienna than the allies are to Paris." Thus, the only effect of these successes was to restore the naturally rigid and unbending tone of his character, to revive his projects of universal dominion, cause him to reject the throne of old France offered him by the allies, and induce him to hazard all on the still doubtful issue of military operations.*

Feb. 12.

General feeling of despondency at Paris.

But whatever confidence Napoleon himself might feel in the continued appeal to arms, the same feeling was far from being shared by the authorities, or more enlightened part of the inhabitants of Paris. When the couriers, indeed—succeeding one another, adorned with laurel, and announcing with tenfold exaggeration the really marvellous victories of the emperor—entered the courts of the Tuileries; and, still more, when the long files of Russian and Prussian prisoners were conducted with all the pomp of war, and amid the strains of triumphal music, along the Boulevards, the multitude loudly cheered the emperor, and hope in the revival of his star was again awakened in many breasts. But, amid all this seeming congratulation, no return of real confidence was generally felt. Experience soon showed that victory attended only the arms of the emperor in person; that, while he was successful in one quarter, the enemy was pressing on in another; and it seemed next to impossible, in the end, that the gallant band of veterans whom he commanded should not be worn out by the forces, always twice, often three times more numerous, by which they were surrounded. By the more intelligent and far-seeing of the community, even his victories were more dreaded than his defeats; the latter led to humiliation and peace, but the former tended to confidence and war; and it was already felt that a continuance of the contest, in the present exhausted state of France, was a greater evil than any possible calamities by which it might be terminated. In the Senate, in particular, these ideas were violently fermenting; every one distrusted his neighbour, because he was conscious of vacillation in himself; all confidence in the stability of the imperial throne was at an end; even the most prudent were beginning to speak aloud as to the emperor being the sole obstacle to peace. Strange rumours were in circulation as to Joseph and the empress proposing to make peace independent of the emperor; and the selfish and ambitious, anticipating an approaching convulsion, were looking about for the safest harbour in the storm.*

Treaty of Chaumont. March 1.

But upon the allied powers the change in the diplomatic language of Caulaincourt, in obedience to the instructions he had received, coupled with the evident danger to the liberties of Europe from the returning fortune and increasing audacity of Napoleon, produced effects of the very highest importance. They now saw clearly that they had no chance, not merely of success, but of existence, but in perfect unanimity and the most vigorous warfare. The exulting expressions of Napoleon, that he was nearer Vienna than the allies were to Paris, had not been lost upon the assembled ministers; and Lord Castlereagh, in particular, had been indefatigable in his efforts to convince the Austrian ministers that they would infallibly be the first object of the French emperor's wrath if his victorious legions should again cross the Rhine. In these views he was strongly supported by the Emperor Alexander, who, in a memoir submitted by him to the allied sovereigns on the 15th of February, both manfully combated the despondings views then so general at the allied headquarters as to the critical nature of their situation, and developed the noblest and most luminous views as to the moral nature of the contest in which they were engaged, which had yet been uttered since the commencement of the war. Metternich cordially supported the same ideas; the successes of Napoleon against Blucher had awakened all his former apprehensions of his power; he now feared more for Vienna than for the fall of Marie Louise, and was desirous to prove the sincerity of his imperial master in the great objects of the alliance.† The

* Koch, i., 269. Beauch., i., 328.

* Savary, iii., 237. Cap., x., 406, 407.

† Alexander's opinions, recorded in this memorable state paper, are deserving of the most profound attention, as demonstrating both the admirable views which he entertained on the nature of the contest, and the high moral courage by which they were sustained: "Victory having brought us to Frankfort, the allies offered to France conditions of peace, which were *then* considered proportionate to the successes which they had obtained; at that period, these conditions might have been called the object of the war. I strongly opposed the proposals to negotiate then; not because I did not desire peace, but because I thought that time would offer us more favourable opportunities, when we had proved to the enemy our superiority over him. All are now convinced of the justice of my arguments; for to it we are indebted for all the incalculable difference between the terms offered at Frankfort and at Chatillon—that is, the restoration by France of territories without which Germany and Italy would be lost on the first offensive movement.

"The destruction of the enemy's political power does not constitute the grand aim of the efforts which it remains for us to make; but it may become so, if the fortune of war, the example of Paris, and the evident inclination of the inhabitants of the provinces of France, shall give the allies

result of their united efforts was the TREATY OF CHAUMONT, one of the most remarkable diplomatic acts of modern times, and which presented an impassable barrier to the ambition and efforts of France.*

Terms of the treaty. March 1.

By this treaty it was stipulated that, in the event of Napoleon refusing the terms which had been offered him—viz., the reduction of France to the limits of the old monarchy, as they stood prior to the Revolution—the four allied powers, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England, should each maintain one hundred and fifty thousand men in the field; that, to provide for their maintenance, Great Britain should pay an annual subsidy of five millions sterling, to be equally divided between the three Continental powers, besides maintaining her own contingent complete from her own resources. It was provided, also, that each power should have a commissary at the headquarters of the different armies; that if any of the allied powers was attacked, each of the others should forthwith send to its assistance an army of sixty thousand men, including ten thousand horse, besides forwarding additional troops, if required; that if England chose to furnish her contingent, or any part of it, in foreign troops, she should pay annually twenty pounds sterling for every foot-soldier, and thirty for every horseman; that the trophies should be divided equally, and no peace made but by common consent; that none of the contracting parties should enter into engagements with other states but to the same end: in fine, that this treaty should be in force for twenty years, and might be renewed before the expiration of the same period.†

Secret articles of the treaty.

In addition to these public stipulations, several secret articles were inserted in this treaty, which eventually proved of the highest importance to the future reconstruction of the states of Europe, after the deluge of the French Revolution had subsided. It was agreed, 1st. That Germany should be restored in the form of a federal union, comprising all the powers of which it was composed; that Switzerland should be independent, under the guarantee of the allied powers; Italy divided into independent states; Spain restored to Ferdinand VII., with its ancient limits; Holland enlarged in territory, and formed into a kingdom for the Prince of Orange. 2d. Power was reserved to Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and the Prince of Orange, to accede to the present treaty. 3d. That, considering the necessity which might exist, even after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace, to keep in the field, during a certain time, forces adequate to carry into effect the arrangements which the allied powers might agree upon for confirming the peace of Europe, the high contracting parties agree to concert among themselves the requisite provisions, not only regarding the necessity, but the importance and distribution of the forces requisite for this purpose; but under this limitation, that none of the powers should be obliged to keep such forces for this end on foot for more than a year without their express consent.*

Great effects of this treaty on the Congress.

The conclusion of this treaty was a virtual dissolution of the Congress of Chatillon; for it established so wide a difference between the views of Napoleon and the allied powers, and confirmed the latter so strongly in their determination to contend to the uttermost for the reduction of France to its ancient limits, that, opposed as these views were to the firm resolution of Napoleon to hold out for the frontier of the Rhine, all prospect of an accommodation was at an end. The Congress continued to sit for three weeks after: the allied powers firmly insisting on the relinquishment by France of all its conquests since the Revolution; and Caulaincourt, under Napoleon's direction, constantly shifting his ground, and endeavouring to elude such rigorous conditions. It was not with his own good-will, however, that the French plenipotentiary insisted on these terms; for he saw, as clearly as possible, the immense risks which the emperor was running by holding out for the frontier of the Rhine, and throwing all on the hazard of arms to obtain it, and represented in the most urgent, though respectful, terms, the necessity of bending to the force of circumstances, and accepting the monarchy of Louis XIV. as the price of pacifying Europe.†

the possibility of openly proclaiming it. I do not share the opinion of the allies on the greater or less degree of importance attached by them to the *dethronement of Napoleon*, if that measure can be justified on grounds of wisdom. On the contrary, I should consider that event as the completion of the deliverance of Europe; as the brightest example of justice and morality it is possible to display to the universe; finally, as the happiest event for France itself, whose internal condition can never be without influence on the tranquillity of her neighbours. Nobody is more convinced than I am of the inconstancy of fortune in war; yet I do not reckon a partial failure, or even the loss of a battle, as a misfortune which should in one day deprive us of the fruit of our victories; and I am convinced that the skill of our generals, the valour of our troops, our superiority in cavalry, the re-enforcements which are following us, and the force of public opinion, would never allow us to fall so low as some seem to apprehend. I am by no means adverse to continuing the negotiations of Chatillon, or giving Caulaincourt the explanations he desires regarding the future destiny of Europe, provided France would return to her old frontiers. As to the armistice which is requested in the letter to Prince Metternich, I conceive this proceeding of the French plenipotentiary to be contrary to the existing usages of negotiations, and the proposal to be advantageous only to the enemy. I am as much convinced as ever, that all probability is in favour of a successful issue, if the allies keep to the views and obligations by which they have been hitherto guided with reference to their grand object, *the destruction of the enemy's armies*. With a good understanding among themselves, their success will be complete, and checks will be easily borne. I do not think that the time has yet arrived for us to stop short; and I trust that, as in former conjunctures, new events will show us when that time shall have arrived."—*Memoir to the Allied Sovereigns by the* EMPEROR ALEXANDER, *15th Feb.*, 1814, DANILEFSKY, p. 88, 90.

* Cap., x., 397, 400. Hard., xii., 351. Dan., 189, 191.

† See the Treaty in Martens, N. R., i., 683; and Hard., xii., 352. Schoell, Hist. des Trait. de Paix, x., 417.

* Hard., xii., 353. Schoell, x.

† "The question about to be decided is so important; it may have at the instant consequences so fatal, that I regard it as a paramount duty to recur again, even at the risk of displeasing your majesty, to what I have already so frequently insisted on. There is no weakness, sire, in my opinion; but I see the dangers which menace France and the throne of your majesty, and I conjure you to prevent them. We must make sacrifices; we must do so immediately: as at Prague, if we do not take care, the opportunity of doing so will escape us; the circumstances of this moment bear a closer resemblance to those which there occurred than your majesty may be aware. At Prague peace was not concluded, and Austria declared against us, because we would not believe that the term fixed for the closing of the Congress would be rigorously adhered to. Here the negotiations are on the eve of being broken off, because you cannot believe that a question of such immense importance may depend on such or such an answer which we may make before a certain day. The more I consider

Napoleon, however, was inexorable: all the efforts of his diplomatist, after the plenary powers he had granted during the alarm after the battle of La Rothiere had been recalled on the 17th of February, not only failed in convincing him of the necessity of descending from his ideas of the Empire, but even of extracting from him any definite statement of the terms on which he himself was willing to come to an accommodation; he was evidently determined to cast all on the decision of the sword, and impressed with the belief that his genius, or his star, would extricate him from his present, as they had done from so many other perilous circumstances.* War, in consequence, recommenced with more activity than ever: the armistice of Lusigny, even in its application to the operations of the Grand Army, to which it was expressly confined, proved little more than a shadow; while by a singular contrast, characteristic of the manners of modern Europe, the most polished forms of courtesy were observed at the Congress of Chatillon, the choicest wines of the Rhone and Champagne, the most delicate viands of Paris, passed, as if by enchantment, through the French lines, to enrich the diplomatic dinners, which succeeded each other without the interruption of a day; the allied plenipotentiaries strove, by the most delicate attentions to M. Caulaincourt, to assuage, for a few moments at least, the overwhelming anxiety with which he was oppressed; and French ladies of rank and beauty added the charm of female fascination to the assembly of hostile diplomatists, intent on the overthrow of their country.†

Advance of Blucher to Meaux. Feb. 27.

While this important negotiation was going on at Chatillon, military operations of the most active kind had been resumed between Napoleon in person and the army of Silesia, which had now, under the direction of Blucher, advanced beyond La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and almost to Meaux, in the direction of Paris. Napoleon was no sooner informed of the danger which menaced the capital, than he set out, as already mentioned,‡ at daybreak on the morning of the 27th of February, from Troyes, for Arcis-sur-Aube and Sezanne, to follow on the traces of the Prussian marshal. Blucher had some days before marched in the same direction, having on the 25th crossed the Aube at Anglure, and on the two following days advanced, Feb. 27. driving Marmont before him, to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, where the French marshal effected his junction with Mortier, who had retired from the neighbourhood of Soissons before the approaching corps of Winzingerode and Woronzoff, which were now moving forward to co-operate with the army of Silesia, in conformity with the plan agreed on at Bar-sur-Aube on the 23d.* The light troops of the Russians were directed by Blucher to make an attack on Meaux, while, to deceive the enemy as to his real intentions, the Prussians were ordered to repair the bridges over the Marne, which had been burned by the French at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and, crossing over, menace the French marshal on that side. In pursuance of these orders, Sacken's light troops took possession, with little resistance, of that part of Meaux which is situated on the left bank of the Marne; but at the very time that he was making preparations to force his passage across to that part of the town which is on the right bank, Marmont and Mortier, who were too experienced to be diverted from the decisive point of the Paris road by the feint at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, arrived in breathless haste, and instantly manning the old walls, which had been deserted by the National Guard who formed the garrison of the town, made every preparation for a vigorous defence. Their opportune arrival obliged Sacken to defer his attack till the following morning; and in the course of the night Blucher Feb. 28. received intelligence from Tettenborn that the French emperor, in person, was marching on his rear by Sezanne. He immediately drew off his troops, and moved next day in the direction of Soissons, with a view to unite with Winzingerode and Woronzoff, and give battle to Napoleon. It was full time he should be interrupted in his career, for three days more would have brought him to the gates of the capital, where the roar of Sacken's cannon, during the attack on Meaux, was distinctly heard, and startled the multitude at the very moment that the cannon of the Invalides were announcing the victories over the Grand Army at Nangis and Montereau.†

Combat at Bar-sur-Aube. Feb. 27.

The departure of Napoleon from Troyes was soon made known to the outposts of the Grand Allied Army by the languor and inactivity with which their rear-guard was pursued. This, coupled with the intelligence which Schwartzenberg received, at the same time, of the advance of Blucher towards the Marne, induced him, at the earnest request of the King of Prussia, who was justly alarmed for Blucher when the whole weight of Napoleon was directed against him, to resume the offensive on the great road from Troyes to Chaumont. With this view, early on the morning of the 27th, the corps of Wrede and Wittgenstein, mustering about thirty-five thousand sabres and bayonets, were drawn up opposite to Bar-sur-Aube, on the road leading to Chaumont. Oudinot commanded the French in that quarter, who, though consisting nominally of two corps of infantry and two of cavalry, could

what has passed, the more I am convinced that, if we do not go into the *contre-projets* demanded, and insist upon modifications on the basis of Frankfort, all is closed. I venture to say, because I feel, that neither the glory of your majesty nor the power of France depends on the possession of Antwerp, or any other point of our new frontiers." —CAULAINCOURT *to* NAPOLEON, *Chatillon, 6th of March*, 1814. FAIN, 301, 302. *Pièces Just.*

* Pendant ces négociations (à Chatillon) je ne conçois pas comment je ne suis pas devenu fou. Le temps des illusions était passé. L'actualité était devorante; *et à mes lettres je ne recevais que des réponses evasives*, alors qu'il eut faller traiter à tout prix. L'avenir nous restait: à present il ne nous reste qu'un tombeau. Mes lettres n'étaient qu'une pâle copie de ce que je disais à l'Empereur dans nos entretiens particuliers. J'insistai pour qu'il me donnât son ultimatum sincère, afin que je fusse en mesure de terminer invariablement avec les plenipotentiaires alliés, qui eux avaient reçu certainement des instructions positives. Il me faut être vrai, car ceci est devenu de l'histoire: *L'Empereur ne répondait jamais cat goriquement à cette demand.* Il éludait, avec une merveilleuse adresse, de livrer le secret de sa pensée intime; cette manière est un des traits saillants de son genre d'esprit."—*Souvenirs de* CAULAINCOURT, i., 302, 329, 330.

† Lond., 277, 278. Burgh., 155, 162. Hard., xii., 356, 359. Fain, 302 303. ‡ *Ante*, iv., 317.

* *Ante*, iv., 317.

† Dan., 201, 202. Koch, i., 358, 360. Fain, 141, 142. Plotho, iii., 265, 271.

not bring above seventeen thousand men into the field; so that the allies were more than two to one. The French, nevertheless, made a gallant defence. They were skilfully posted across several ravines, which descend from Bar towards the Aube, in such a manner that they could be reached only along the plateaus which lay between them, where the ground being narrow, the superiority of the attacking force was not likely to be so severely felt. Wittgenstein's plan was to attack the enemy in front with Gorchakoff's corps, while Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, supported by Pahlen's horse, menaced their flank. The French, however, commenced the action by storming the height in front of Ailleville, which formed the connecting point between their front and flank attack. Upon this, Wittgenstein ordered up Gorchakoff's corps, supported by Pahlen's cuirassiers, to retake that important point. The cavalry were repulsed; but, after a severe struggle, the Russian infantry succeeded in regaining the height. Upon this turning-point being gained, a general attack along the whole allied line, the one half of which was perpendicular to the other, took place. Meanwhile, Pahlen's cuirassiers had been detached towards Sevigny, in order to threaten the enemy's communications, and thus Gorchakoff's men were exposed without adequate support to the furious charge of Kellerman's dragoons. These splendid troops, just arrived from Spain, speedily routed the Russian hussars, and threw their whole centre into such disorder, that Wittgenstein could only avert total defeat by concentrating his artillery at the menaced point; and he in haste sent orders to Pahlen to remeasure his steps, and bring up his heavy squadrons to the support of the wavering part of the line.*

Victory of the allies.

Highly excited by this brilliant success, the veteran Peninsular squadron threw themselves, with the utmost gallantry, on the Russian batteries in the centre; but the experienced Russian gunners allowed them to approach within a hundred steps, and then opened such a tremendous pointblank discharge of grape, that four hundred horsemen were in a few minutes stretched on the plain, and the remainder recoiled in disorder. At the same time, Schwartzenberg, who had come up in person, ordered two brigades of cavalry and one of infantry from Wrede's corps to support the centre; and, conceiving that part of the line now adequately secured, sent orders to Pahlen to wheel about a second time and resume his original march to Sevigny and Dolancourt, to threaten the enemy's left flank. At the same time, Wrede, who had now come into action, commenced a vigorous attack on Bar-sur-Aube itself, on the French right; so that both their flanks were menaced. These movements of necessity compelled Oudinot to retreat; but, in order to gain time to effect it in order, his troops made the most vigorous resistance at all points, especially at Bar, which was the theatre of a most sanguinary conflict. Pahlen's brilliant dragoons, kept marching and countermarching all day without taking any part in the combat, did not arrive in time to molest their passage of the Aube at Dolancourt; and thus the French effected their retreat before nightfall, without being deprived of either guns or standards; but they sustained a loss of three thousand men, of whom five hundred were prisoners. The allied loss was about two thousand; but they gained Bar-sur-Aube; and, what was of far more consequence, restored the credit and spirit of the Grand Army, and arrested a retreat to the Vosges Mountains, or possibly to the Rhine.*

Wound and character of Wittgenstein.

Count Wittgenstein was severely, Prince Schwartzenberg slightly wounded in this action; and the former being obliged to retire for a season from active operations, was succeeded in the command of his corps by General Raeffskoi. But for his loss the Russian service would have had no cause to lament any circumstance which brought the indomitable hero of Smolensko† more prominently forward; but the wound which compelled Wittgenstein to withdraw was a serious injury to the allied cause, and a great misfortune to himself; for it occurred at the most critical period of the contest, and four weeks more would have shown the saviour of St. Petersburg the dome of the Invalides. Though the jealousy of the Russian troops at a foreigner holding the supreme command, and the ill success which attended his arms when acting as generalissimo at Lutzen, prevented his being prominently brought forward in the latter stages of the war, he throughout bore a distinguished part in its achievements, and contributed much, by the boldness of his advice, to sustain, when it was much required, the vigour of the allied councils. Daring, impetuous, often inconsiderate, he was the Marcellus, if Barclay de Tolly was the Fabius, of the Russian army; like Blucher, he was ever desirous to advance, and uniformly supported the most daring measures; in action, his buoyant courage never failed to bring him into the foremost ranks, and his frequent wounds attest how fearlessly he shared the dangers of the meanest soldiers. He could not be said to be a great master of strategy, and his want of circumspection in adequately supporting his advanced columns frequently exposed his troops to serious reverses, of which the combat at Nangis had recently afforded an example;‡ yet was this very peculiarity of his temperament, directing, as he did, troops so firm and resolute as the Russians, often of the most essential service to his country and the general cause of Europe. His obstinate resistance and unconquerable vigour on the Dwina unquestionably saved St. Petersburg during the first part of the campaign of 1812; his daring advance against Napoleon's right at Lutzen all but exposed that great conqueror to total defeat; and his able retreat at Bautzen snatched victory from his grasp when it was all but already seized. The alacrity and fidelity with which, in subordinate situations, he subsequently conducted his own corps, both in 1813 and 1814, proved that his patriotism was superior to all unworthy considerations of jealousy; while his last achievement in the campaign of Bar-sur-Aube, for which he was made a fieldmarshal, had the most important effect in reviving the spirit of the Grand Army, and re-

* Koch, ii., 1, 8. Burgh., 165, 166. Dan., 179, 180. Fain, 143. Plotho, iii., 240, 243.

* Vaud., ii., 75, 80. Koch, 1, 8, 11. Burgh., 160, 161. Dan., 179, 180. Plotho, iii., 241, 244.

† *Ante*, iii., 554.

‡ *Ante*, iv., 308.

storing vigour and unanimity to the allied councils.*

Schwartzenberg at length advances.

Although, however, the successful result of this battle sufficiently proved that Napoleon, with the main body of his army, was absent, and that a thin curtain of troops alone stood in front of the Grand Army, yet it was impossible at first to infuse an adequate degree of resolution into their direction. The retiring columns of Oudinot were hardly at all pursued: Prince Schwartzenberg assigned as a reason, that he could not advance till he was informed of the direction and tendency of Macdonald's corps, which was advancing near Vandœuvres. This corps, however, proved so weak, that it was met and repulsed by the cavalry alone of Count Pahlen and Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg; and intelligence having been received on the 1st of March that Napoleon, with the main body of his forces, was at Arcis-sur-Aube on the preceding day, following fast on Blucher's traces, it became evident that the plan of the campaign agreed on at Bar-sur-Aube, on the 25th of February, could no longer be adhered to, and he was in a manner forced into more vigorous operations. On the same day that this information was received from the army of Silesia, a general reconnoissance with the cavalry took place towards Vandœuvres, and it was ascertained that the enemy were in force in no direction. Orders were at length given for a general advance. Headquarters were, on the day following, advanced to Bar-sur-Aube; the retreat was stopped at all points, and preparations were made for attacking the enemy immediately, in the position which he occupied along the Barce, and, if possible, drive him from Troyes. Oudinot and Macdonald had now collected all their forces in that position, and did not appear disposed to relinquish it without a combat.†

March 1.

March 2.

Plan for the combat. March 3.

The attack took place on the 3d, and was maintained with great vigour at all points. The French united corps, which were all under the command of Marshal Macdonald, mustered thirty-five thousand combatants, of which nearly nine thousand were cavalry. The great preponderance of this arm, and the desperate use the French generals had made of it at Bar-sur-Aube, rendered the allies cautious in their movements; but their great superiority of number rendered success a matter of certainty, for they had already sixty thousand men in the field, without bringing up the Imperial Guards or reserves from the neighbourhood of Chaumont. The position which the French marshal had chosen, strong, and on the elevated plateau of Laubrissel, was inaccessible in front and flank in ordinary times, by reason of the morass with which it was surrounded; but it was by no means equally defensible during the hard frost which had for nearly two months prevailed over all Europe at that time, and rendered the deepest marshes as easy of crossing as the smoothest plain. Taking advantage of this circumstance, Schwartzenberg directed Wrede to attack the position in front by the great road to Vandœuvres, which passed through it, while Wittgenstein's corps, now under Gortchakoff, assailed it on the right, and the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg and Count Giulay menaced it on the left, by the road from Bar-sur-Seine to Troyes.*

Defeat of the French at La Guillotiere. February 3.

At three o'clock the signal was given by the discharge of two guns from Wrede's corps, and the troops all advanced to the attack. Hardly were the first rounds of artillery fired, when, seeing that Prince Eugene's movement was rapidly turning them, the French on the extreme left began to retreat. The Russian cuirassiers under Pahlen instantly dashed forward, and broke two battalions which had not time to form square; and, passing on, attacked a park of artillery which was just entering Troyes, dispersed the drivers, and took the greater part of the guns. General Gerard, who lay sick among the carriages, was only saved from being made prisoner by the intrepidity of a few sappers, who came up to his rescue. Upon this, Count St. Germain's dragoons were brought up, and these admirable troops, charging home, not only checked Pahlen's men, already blown by their success, but retook several of the guns. Soon, however, the deep and heavy masses of the allied infantry came up, each column preceded by a formidable array of artillery. Gerard, who commanded the centre, seeing he was certain of being turned by both flanks if he remained where he was, soon gave orders for a retreat, and the plateau of Laubrissel, the key of the position, was abandoned. Schwartzenberg, perceiving that the retreat was commencing, ordered Wrede, with his Bavarians, to storm the bridge of La Guillotiere over the Barce, which was done in the most brilliant style, and rendered the position accessible in front at all points. The French now retreated on all sides, and after sustaining, with various success, repeated charges of the allied horse, withdrew wholly into Troyes, which they abandoned next day by capitulation, having in this action suffered a loss of nine pieces of cannon, and two thousand men, of whom fifteen hundred were made prisoners; while the allies had not to lament the loss, in all, of more than eight hundred.†

March 4.

Extraordinary inactivity of the Grand Army after these successes.

Everything now conspired to recommend vigorous operations to the Grand Army; its credit was restored, and its spirit revived by the successful issue of the last two actions; its retreat had been arrested, and turned into a victorious advance; the ancient capital of Champagne had again fallen into its hands; Napoleon was absent, and the troops opposed to it, dejected and downcast, were hardly a third of its own numerical amount. By simply advancing against an enemy in no condition to oppose any resistance to such an operation, Paris would be menaced, the pressure on Blucher removed, the circle of operations narrowed, and the emperor at length compelled to fight for his dominions and crown, against the united force of both armies, under the very walls of his capital. To complete the reasons for vigorous hostilities, the negotiations for an armistice at Lusigny were broken off on the very day on which Troyes was retaken, Count

March 4.

* Dan., 181, 182.
† Burgh., 173, 174. Dan., 185, 187. Koch, ii., 13, 21. Plotho, iii., 246, 247. Vaud., ii., 87, 90.

* Koch, ii., 20, 23. Dan., 187. Burgh., 174.
† Plotho, iii., 249, 251. Koch, ii., 26, 29. Vaud., ii., 91, 95. Dan., 187, 188. Burgh., 175, 176.

Flahaut's propositions on that subject being deemed wholly inadmissible by the allied powers. The Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh were indefatigable in their efforts, after this period, to rouse the Austrian commander-in-chief to more active operations, so loudly called for, not more by the obvious advantage to be gained, than by the not less obvious danger to the army of Silesia to be averted by immediately commencing them.* But all their efforts were in vain; for the next fortnight, big, as we shall immediately see, with the most important events between the Aisne and the Marne, the Grand Army—full eighty thousand strong, even after the two corps sent to Lyons had been deducted, flushed with victory, within six days' march of the capital, with only thirty thousand enemies in its front—remained in a state of almost total inaction, leaving the destinies of Europe to hang on the swords, comparatively equally balanced, of Napoleon and Marshal Blucher! On the 5th, indeed, headquarters were advanced to Troyes; the French marshals retired, as Napoleon had done a month before, behind the Seine, and were posted at Bray, Nogent, and Montereau, with the headquarters at Provins; the victorious corps of Wrede, Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, and Wittgenstein, now under Raeffskoi, were advanced to Sens, Nangis, and Pont-sur-Yonne; and the Russian reserves were brought up from Chaumont to the neighbourhood of Montierender. But in these positions they were kept wholly inactive till the 13th, when, in consequence of the great successes of the army of Silesia, a forward movement, though with the usual caution of Schwartzenberg, was attempted. But the Austrian generalissimo is not responsible for this, on military principles, inexplicable delay; diplomacy here, as so often during the war, restrained the soldiers' arms; and the cabinet of Vienna, distracted between its desire to reduce France to the frontiers of 1792, and yet preserve the throne for the grandson of the Emperor Francis, still clung to the hope that, by delaying bringing matters to extremities, Napoleon might be brought to see his situation in its true light, and conclude a peace on such terms as might still leave his dynasty on the throne.†

Retreat of Blucher to Soissons.

Very different, however, was the system of warfare which was pursued on the banks of the Aisne, where Blucher, with the iron bands of the army of Silesia, singly bore the whole weight of Napoleon's power. No sooner did the veteran marshal receive intelligence of the emperor's approach, than, with all imaginable expedition, he gathered together his forces, and forthwith commenced his march across the Marne, the bridges of which he broke down, in the direction of Soissons. Napoleon, counting the moments in his impatience, urged on the advance of his troops from La Ferté-Gaucher; the soldiers, in high spirits and burning with ardour, gallantly seconded his efforts, and forty thousand men, pressing on with ceaseless march, promised soon to bring on a fearful collision with the enemy. But it was too late. As the leading columns reached the heights above La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and the valley of the Marne lay at their feet, they beheld the rear-guard of the army of Silesia vanishing in the distance on the other side of the Marne, the whole bridges of which were broken down. It was necessary to restore them before the pursuit could be renewed, and this required four-and-twenty hours. Headquarters, therefore, were established at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and Napoleon in person repaired the following morning to the spot to hasten the reconstruction of the bridges, at which the engineers laboured with such assiduity, that the troops began to cross over on the evening of the same day. Meanwhile, couriers were despatched to Paris to tranquillize the inhabitants, whom the cannonade at Meaux had thrown into the utmost consternation, with the joyful intelligence of the retreat of the allies; while Blucher, who proposed to fight at Dietchy, on the left bank of the Aisne, and had given orders to Winzingerode and Bulow to meet him there for that purpose, toiled on amid dreadful rains, and by deep cross-roads, rendered almost impassable by the sudden breaking up of the frost, to gain the appointed place of rendezvous.*

March 2.

Perilous situation of Blucher from Soissons holding out.

It was not so easy a matter as the Prussian general supposed for Bulow and Winzingerode to get across to Dietchy; for the only bridge over the Aisne at this time, flooded by the thaw, was at Soissons, and it was a fortified town, held by a considerable French garrison. The justice of the *coup-d'œil*, which had made Chernicheff some weeks before select it as the scene of his brilliant assault, was now manifest; but the whole fruits of that success had been lost, and the town regained to the enemy, from the retreat consequent on the disasters of Blucher's army. Bulow and Winzingerode, in obedience to the orders sent them from Bar-sur-Aube on the 25th, had united on the 2d near Soissons, on the opposite side of the river: their forces amounted to fifty thousand veterans, so that they would double the numerical strength of the army of Silesia. But Soissons held out, notwithstanding repeated summonses to surrender; the strength of its works, which had been considerably increased since Chernicheff's extraordinary *coup-de-main*, seemed to defy an immediate assault; and yet the situation of Blucher—on the opposite bank with Marmont, with whom his rear-guard had that day a severe encounter, which cost him five hundred men, and Mortier pressing on his rear, and Napoleon threatening

March 2.

* "The emperor considers that the advance of the Grand Army to Sens is drawing us away from the enemy, and that it is therefore indispensable to direct all our forces to the right towards Arcis, between that town and Vitry; and, at all events, to re-enforce them with the reserves, which should be ordered to move forward."—ALEXANDER *to* SCHWARTZENBERG, *8th March*, 1814. "In consequence of intelligence received from Field-marshal Blucher, the emperor considers it indispensable to begin to move by the right, between Arcis-sur-Aube and Vitry."—ALEXANDER *to* SCHWARTZENBERG, *11th March*, 1814. "I hasten to communicate to your highness the reports received from Count St. Preist. His majesty has charged me to inform you that, according to his opinion, it is now more necessary than ever to act on the offensive. Henceforth your hands will be completely unbound, and you may act according to military calculation."—VOLKONSKY, *Alexander's Aid-de-camp, to* SCHWARTZENBERG, *12th March*, 1814. DANILEFSKY, 194, 195.

† Burgh., 176, 179. Koch, ii., 34, 39. Plotho, iii., 251, 258. Dan., 190, 194.

* Dan., 203, 204. Fain, 144, 147. Koch, i., 368, 370. Plotho, iii., 275, 281.

his flank—was extremely perilous. In this emergency, the Prussian marshal sent forward the pontoon-train to Busancy on the Aisne, with the most experienced engineers in his army, to select points for throwing bridges across; but to attempt such an operation during the darkness of a winter night, with sixty thousand French, led by Napoleon, thundering in pursuit, was obviously attended with no common hazard.*

Capitulation of Soissons extricates him from his difficulties.

In this dilemma, the Prussian marshal was delivered from his difficulties in a way so remarkable, that it almost savoured of the marvellous. There were fifteen hundred Poles in Soissons, the brave but now inconsiderable remnant of the followers of Poniatowsky, under the command of General Moreau.† They had received special orders from Napoleon to defend the place to the last drop of their blood, as the blocking up that issue to the army of Silesia out of the country between the Marne and the Aisne, formed a part of the able plan which he had conceived for its destruction. The allied generals had resolved to attempt to storm the place on the following morning; but during the night, under the pretence of purchasing some wine for the use of the generals, they sent an officer into the town to propose a capitulation. This skilful diplomatist, Colonel Lowernstown, having with some difficulty, and not without sustaining great danger from the sentries, who repeatedly fired upon him, contrived to make his way into the town, so worked upon the fears of the governor, by representing that two strong corps were prepared to assault the place on the following morning, and would infallibly put the whole garrison to the sword, that he prevailed on the governor and council of war, whom he found assembled, to capitulate. Moreau proposed that the garrison should be allowed to take the guns, six in number, with them; and, after some feigned opposition on the part of Lowernstown, this was admitted. Winzingerode gladly acceded to the proposed terms; and it having been observed by some one present that it was unusual to give an enemy, voluntarily evacuating a fortress, more than two guns, Woronzoff justly remarked "that, in the present circumstances, the surrender of Soissons was of such importance, that it would be even allowable to make the French commandant a present of some of our own guns, on the single condition of his evacuating the fortress on the instant." The capitulation was accordingly agreed to, and Woronzoff in person led his troops immediately after, at noon on the 3d, to take possession of the city gates.‡

Junction of Blucher's army with Winzingerode and Bulow.

Napoleon expressed, as well he might, the utmost indignation at this disgraceful capitulation; the moment he received intelligence of it, he directed the governor, Moreau, to be forthwith delivered over to a military commission. The importance of the advantage thus gained to the allies was soon apparent; for hardly were the city gates in the possession of the Russians, when the sound of Marmont and Mortier's cannon was heard thundering on Blucher's rear-guard, and, soon after, the heads of his columns, weary and jaded, and in great confusion, began to arrive, and they defiled without intermission through the fortress all night. It may fairly be concluded, therefore, that the opportune surrender of Soissons saved the Prussian marshal, if not from total defeat, which the distance at which the great body of Napoleon's forces still were rendered improbable, at least from most serious embarrassment and loss in crossing the river. On the day following, the whole army passed over in safety, and effected their junction with Bulow and Winzingerode's men, on the summit of the plateau overlooking Soissons, on the road to Laon. The veterans of the Silesian army, almost worn out with two months' incessant marching and six weeks of active hostilities, with hardly any shoes on their feet, tattered greatcoats on their backs, and almost empty caissons, presented a striking contrast to the splendid array, untarnished uniforms, and well-replenished artillery and baggage-wagons of Bernadotte's corps. This important junction raised the strength of the united army to a hundred thousand men, of whom twenty-four thousand were admirable horse; and infantry and cavalry alike were tried veteran troops, well known in the preceding campaign on the Elbe. Blucher resolved no longer to retreat, but give battle on the summit of the elevated plateaus which lie between the Aisne and the Marne, adjacent to the highway from Soissons to Laon.* March 3. March 4.

Napoleon's decrees calling on the French people to rise *en masse*. March 5.

And now an event occurred which throws an important light on the moral government of the world, and illustrates the inexpedience, even for present interests, of those deviations from the rules of justice and humanity which it is the highest glory of civilization to have introduced into the ruthless code of war. Irritated at the escape of the army of Silesia from the well-laid scheme which he had devised for its destruction, and anxious to engage the masses of the people, hitherto passive and inert in the midst of the hostile armies, in a guerilla warfare on the flanks and rear of the invaders, Napoleon issued two proclamations from Fismès, by the first of which he not only authorized, but enjoined, every Frenchman to take up arms, and fall on the flanks and rear of the invading armies; while, by the second, the penalties of treason were denounced against every mayor or public functionary who should not stimulate, to the utmost of his power, the prescribed insurrectionary movements on the part of the people.†

* Dan., 204, 205. Fain, 147, 149. Koch, i., 373, 374. Plotho, iii., 280, 283.

† Not, of course, the great general of the same name who fell at Dresden.

‡ Dan., 207, 209. Plotho, iii., 283, 284. Koch, i., 374, 376. Vaud., ii., 15, 16.

* Vaud., ii., 17, 25. Koch, i., 376, 379. Dan., 210, 211.

† "All the French citizens are not only authorized to take up arms, but required to do so; to sound the tocsin as soon as they hear the cannon of our troops approaching them; to assemble together, scour the woods, break down the bridges, intercept the roads, and fall on the flanks and rear of the enemy. Every French citizen taken by the enemy, who shall be put to death, shall be forthwith avenged by the shooting of a prisoner from the enemy.—NAPOLEON." "All the mayors, public functionaries, and inhabitants, who, instead of stimulating the patriotic ardour of the people, shall strive to cool them, and dissuade them from all the measures of a legitimate defence, shall be considered as traitors and treated as such."—NAPOLEON, *5th March*, 1814, *Moniteur*, *March* 6, 1814, and GOLDSMITH'S *Recueil*, vi., 645.

Thus was Napoleon himself driven, by a just retribution, and the consequences of the atrocious system of universal invasion and systematic oppression which the Revolutionary armies had so long pursued, to adopt the very same measures of defence which he had so often denounced in his enemies, and for obeying which he had, in sullen revenge, shed so much noble and heroic blood. The guerilla warfare to which he now called the French, and which, of course, led to severe and sanguinary proclamations, in reprisal, by the allied generals, was no other than the very system for pursuing which he had, in the outset of his career, shot the magistrates and principal citizens of Pavia in cold blood, and gave up that beautiful city to pillage;* and to repress which he had sanctioned the bloody proclamations of Soult† and Augereau,‡ denouncing the punishment of death against every Spanish peasant found in arms in defence of his country; and the still more infamous decree of Bessières, affixing the same penalty not only to the people, not soldiers, taken in arms, but "against the *fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, children, and nephews*, of all individuals who have quitted their domiciles, and do not inhabit the villages occupied by the French."◊‖ Impelled by stern necessity, the mighty conqueror was now obliged to sign with his own hand the condemnation of his previous cruelty; to canonize the memory of the many brave men whom he had doomed to death for doing what he now enjoined; to expose to similar suffering the people who had been the instruments and sharers in his oppression. Providence has a clear mode of dealing with the sins of men, which is, to leave them to the consequences of their own iniquities.

Napoleon crosses the Aisne, and follows Blucher to Craon.

Determined to come to blows with the army of Silesia, notwithstanding the great accession of strength which it had just received, in the hopes that he might disable it, for a time at least, from resuming the offensive, while he turned his strength against the vast but unwieldy masses of the Grand Army, Napoleon gave orders for a general advance. With this view, General Corbineau, with a considerable body, was detached in the night of the 4th from Fismès to Rheims, of which he took possession without resistance on the following day; and on the same day the advanced guard was moved to Berry-au-Bac, where the cross-road from Rheims to Laon passes the Aisne by a bridge recently constructed. The whole army was immediately moved in that direction; and Nansouty, having fallen in with the rear-guard of the enemy, drove it back to Corbeny with some loss. As soon as the passage of the Aisne was fully effected, couriers were despatched to Mezieres, Verdun, and Metz, with instructions to stimulate the authorities to rouse the peasantry; but though the latter in many places showed a disposition to rise in obedience to the emperor's proclamations, and not unfrequently fell upon the detached parties of the allies with hardly any leaders, yet the former, foreseeing his approaching end, hardly ever made the slightest attempt either to direct or encourage their efforts. Meanwhile the army approached Laon, by the road from Berry-au-Bac, to the ground where Marshal Blucher had taken post on the plateau of CRAON, on the narrow neck of land which extends from the road from Soissons to Laon, to which the enemy were now advancing from Berry-au-Bac to the same town.*

March 7.

The position thus chosen was a plateau nearly a mile and a half long, but not half a mile broad, bounded on either flank by steep slopes leading down to the ravines of Foulon and D'Ailes, the sides of which, difficult of ascent to infantry, were wholly impracticable for cavalry or artillery. The river Lette flowed nearly in a straight line in the bottom of the ravine to the north; at the distance of a mile from the southern edge of the plateau, the Aisne ran in a deep and nearly parallel channel from east to west; but the immediate declivities of the position were drained by a multitude of feeders, which flowed rapidly down at right angles to the central bed of these two streams. A cross-gully of no great depth, but a most formidable obstacle on a field of battle, extended at right angles to the ravines, along the front of that part of the plateau which Woronzoff chose for his first stand; and two others of irregular forms running each half way across it, afforded, like so many bastions and ditches, positions of considerable strength in rear. The upper part of the hollows on either side was filled with woods; that of Vauder lying to the north, and the Bois-de-Blanc Sablon to the south, neither of which was pervious to cavalry or artillery. The neck of the plateau, and strength of the position, was across it from D'Ailes to Paissy, and at that point it was little more than five hundred yards broad: a narrow space for a battle to be fought on which the fate of France, and, perhaps, of Europe, would depend.†

Description of the field of battle.

Blucher's dispositions.

It was far from being his whole army, however, which Blucher had assembled in this strong position. His situation was full of difficulty, especially considering the sudden and desperate strokes which his antagonist was wont to deliver, the admirable quality of the troops at his command, and the variety of points he himself was called on to defend. It was necessary, in case of disaster, and for the sake of his communications, to cover Laon, the bulwark of the roads to the Netherlands; to defend the central position at Craon, and, at the same time, to keep possession of the important fortress of Soissons, commanding the principal passage of the Aisne and the great road to Paris, the object of all his efforts. This last stronghold, forming the extreme right of his line, was now threatened with instant assault by Marmont and Mortier, to whom Napoleon had given peremptory orders instantly to carry it at all hazards. To provide at once for these different objects, and, at the same time, carry into effect his intention of giving battle to the French emperor, the following dispositions were made by Marshal Blucher: Bulow, with his whole corps, was sent off to

* *Ante*, i., p. 405.
‡ December 28, 1809.
‖ *Ante*, iii., p. 438.
† August 13, 1810.
◊ June 6, 1811.

* Koch, i., 388, 391. Dan., 217. Fain, 154, 155.
† Personal observation. Koch, i., 389, 390. Vaud., ii., 31, 32. Plotho, iii., 288, 289. Beauch., i., 395

defend Laon: the infantry of Winzingerode, under Woronzow and Strogonoff, were charged with the defence of the plateau of Craon; while Winzingerode, at the head of ten thousand horse and sixty pieces of horse artillery, followed by Kleist and Langeron, was to pass the Lette, and by cross-roads fall on the right wing or rear of the French. D'York was posted on the highway between Soissons and Laon, to afford succour to any point which might require it; and the defence of Soissons was intrusted to Rudzewitch, with six thousand men of Langeron's corps.*

Unsuccessful assault on Soissons. March 5.

The first attack was made on this important fortress, the loss of which had been the subject of such unbounded mortification to the emperor. At daylight on the morning of the 5th, the enemy's troops were seen approaching, in deep columns, by the road of Chateau-Thierry. Rudzewitch immediately made his preparations, and rode round the ranks, reminding his men of what they owed to their sovereign and the honour of the Russian arms. At seven the enemy commenced the attack on the fauxbourgs; but they were repulsed with loss. Returning, however, to the charge, they made themselves masters of a considerable part of the houses beyond the walls, and a desperate action, within pistol-shot, ensued in the streets, near to the foot of the ramparts, which was maintained with the greatest resolution on both sides. Transported with ardour, the French, in many places, unroofed the houses of which they had made themselves masters, hoisted up their guns with ropes, on the outside, to the topmost story, and from thence, as from the moving towers of antiquity, battered the summit of the walls, nearly on an equal footing. But it was all in vain. The invincible Russian grenadiers, with heroic resolution, made good their post against their gallant antagonists, threefold more numerous than themselves; the guns on the bastions maintained their superiority over those of the enemy, somewhat below them, in the suburbs; and after the whole day had been consumed, and fifteen hundred men lost to either side in this furious assault, the French marshal drew off, leaving Rudzewitch in possession of his bloodstained ramparts.†

Napoleon's dispositions.

Disappointed in his hopes of turning the allied position by carrying Soissons on its right flank, Napoleon now resolved to hazard a direct attack upon the plateau in its front. Had his army been composed of the soldiers of Arcola or Rivoli, he would have formed his troops into a dense column, and assaulted the Russians on the neck of the narrow tongue of land, as his grenadiers had forced the dikes in the swampy plains of Verona. But with the exception of the divisions Friant and Christiani's of the Old Guard, with the cuirassiers, they were of a very different description, being, in great part, conscripts and young troops, almost worn out with the incredible efforts they had already made in the campaign, and who were not always to be relied on except in the presence of the emperor. In consequence of this, Napoleon felt the necessity of supplying by combination what was wanting in strength; and with this view he made the following dispositions: Ney was charged with the principal attack, which was to be directed against the enemy's right flank, upward from the slope descending to the valley of the Lette, and he had under his command part of Victor's corps and the dragoons of the Guard; while Nansouty, with the Polish dragoons and Excelmans's division, was to climb the steep on the left of the enemy, from the side of Oulche and the feeders of the Aisne. The main attack along the neck of the plateau, led by Victor, at the head of the infantry of the Guard, was under the direction of Napoleon in person; and, by bringing up column after column on that narrow plain, he hoped to force the position, despite its natural advantages, when the heads of his columns showed themselves on either flank. His force actually on the field, and engaged with the enemy, amounted to forty thousand men; the Russians were only twenty-seven thousand; but they had the advantage of a very strong position, had not been exhausted by previous combats in the campaign, and were the very flower of the Russian army. By a singular chance, the result of the previous movements which had taken place, both parties had passed each other, and now wheeled about to fight: the Russians with their faces to the Rhine, the French with theirs towards Paris.*

Commencement of the battle.

Soon after nine o'clock on the morning of the 7th, two of the enemy's columns appeared on the front of the plateau towards Craon, while a third, without guns, entered the ravine on the left. Blucher, at the same time, received intelligence that Winzingerode's corps of horse artillery and cannon, which was destined to turn the French flank, and execute the decisive attack, so far from having yet reached Fetieux, their place of destination, were still far in the rear, from having been impeded by the excessive badness of the roads. He instantly ordered Kleist's men to take the start of Winzingerode, and press on direct for that place; while he himself set out in person after Winzingerode, to endeavour to overcome the difficulties which impeded him, leaving Sacken on the neck of land to combat Napoleon. The French forces, preceded by a hundred guns, soon approached in dense masses along the plateau. Shortly the fire of artillery became extremely violent on both sides; for the Russian cannon, consisting of sixty pieces, was admirably posted, and kept up a dreadful discharge, with unerring precision, both in front and flank, on the deep French columns advancing along the neck of the plateau. The French cannon, greatly superior in number, but by no means so advantageously placed, replied with the greatest vigour; their shot, admirably directed, ploughed through the Russian masses, which, drawn up in three lines, almost close together, presented an infallible mark to their gunners, and not a piece was fired without producing a corresponding chasm in the opposite ranks. But nothing could shake the firmness of Woronzow's troops: whole files were mowed down; but the men never wavered, and, with the steadiness which discipline superadded to

* Koch, i., 386, 387. Dan., 218. Plotho, iii., 290.

† Dan., 215, 216. Beauch., i., 391, 392. Vaud., i., 27. Plotho, iii., 286.

* Dan., 219, 222. Koch, i., 389, 391. Vaud., i., 31, 34. Plotho, iii., 290. Kausler, 398, 399.

native courage alone can give, calmly fronted the tempest of death in obedience to their Czar and their oaths. At length the attacking columns recoiled in this fearful strife, and Victor's troops, after sustaining a dreadful loss, withdrew beyond reach of the fire.*

Desperate action on the plateau, which at length ends in the Russians retreating.

Meanwhile, Ney, on the Russian left, no sooner heard the cannon-shot on the crest of the plateau, than, transported with ardour, he redoubled the vigour of his attack. The hamlet of D'Ailes was carried after hard fighting, and his tirailleurs, driving the Russian light troops before them, were seen climbing the steep on the left of the plateau. At the same time an attempt was made by Nansouty, with six battalions of infantry, to mount the summit on the right from the side of Oulche. The depth, however, of the ravine on that flank, the badness of the roads, and the well-directed fire of six guns planted on the edge of the plateau, at the top of the declivity, rendered the attack abortive. No sooner, however, did the emperor perceive Ney's vanguard appearing on the summit, than he ordered Victor to advance again in a heavy close column along the neck of the position. With such vigour did this column rush forward, supported by Ney's men on their right, in spite of the fire of forty-eight guns on their front and flank, that one of the Russian batteries on the left was carried; but it was only a few minutes in the enemy's possession, for the 19th light infantry, and regiment of Shirvan, rushed forward and retook it with the bayonet, hurling the French with loud shouts down the steeps. But the extreme rapidity and violence of the fire now caused, after four hours' fighting, a want of ammunition to be felt in the Russian lines; and Sacken, alarmed by the increasing masses of the French, especially in the valley on his left, and the non-appearance of Blucher or Winzingerode in their rear, as had been expected, twice sent orders to Woronzow to retreat. The brave Russian, however, finding he could still make good his post, and wisely judging that he ran less danger by standing still in his strong position and continuing the contest, than retreating in face of such a force as Napoleon commanded, still maintained his ground. But at length Sacken, having received instructions from Blucher to fall back with all his forces to the central position at Laon, gave Woronzow positive orders to retreat.†

Glorious retreat of the Russians.

It was at two o'clock in the afternoon that this hazardous movement commenced. Woronzow formed his men with admirable steadiness, even under the fire of a hundred French guns, in squares, and ordered the retreat in ordinary time by alternate squares; the artillery in the openings, and the dismounted guns, two-and-twenty in number, with such of the wounded as could be removed, in front of the retreating column. As soon as Napoleon perceived the retreat commencing, he hurried forward all his guns to his own front, redoubled his fire upon the retiring column, and ordered up the whole dragoons and cuirassiers along the neck of the plateau to charge. So vehement was their onset, so loud the cries and clatter of the rushing horsemen, that it was at first thought all was lost on the right; but when the smoke cleared away, the steady squares were seen pursuing their march unbroken; and Benkendorff, with the hussars and Cossacks, bravely charged the French horse, and checked the pursuit. As the retreat continued, however, and the Russians came past the neck to a wider part of the plateau, the danger became greater, because the more extended surface of the level ground enabled the French cavalry to turn the Russian flanks. At this critical moment, however, Vassiltchikoff came up with Lanskoy's hussars and Dochakoff's dragoons of Sacken's corps. These incomparable troops instantly charged the pursuing horse, and drove them back in their turn. So narrow was the ground in some places, that the horse were obliged to halt and open out, in order to let the infantry and guns get through; and, instantly closing when they had passed, faced about against the pursuers. Several of the Russian regiments of cavalry charged in this manner, in less than an hour, eight different times.*

Impregnable position taken up by the Russians in the rear.

Meanwhile the Russian troops were approaching the second neck of the plateau, in the rear both of the former and of the wider space between them; and while the cavalry retarded the advance of the enemy, the whole guns of Sacken and Woronzow's corps which were not dismounted, sixty-four in number, were placed upon it. The ground was singularly calculated to give efficiency to their fire; for it was at once flanked on either side by perpendicular rocks which could not be scaled, and rose by a steep slope in the narrow isthmus between them, so as to afford the means of placing the cannon in a double row, one behind and the other above, in such a manner, that, like the upper and under decks of a ship at sea, they could both fire at the same time. On this slope the guns were placed; thirty-six in the first line, twenty-eight in the second opposite to the intervals between the first, and about twenty feet above them. When everything was in readiness, the infantry were marching back slowly, and with perfect regularity, abreast of the first line of guns, when they faced about and dressed in a line with the mouths of the pieces; while the cavalry, now almost worn out, rapidly withdrew to the right and left, and retired behind the artillery. Great was the astonishment of the French when the screen of horsemen cleared away, and they beheld this close mass of enemies ready to receive them. They were nothing daunted, however, by the sight. Drouot formed the terrible artillery of the Guard in front of this second position, and calmly moved on in the midst of the guns, on foot as he was wont, against the double tier of cannon; and immediately behind him the lofty grenadier caps of the Imperial Guard were seen in dense and formidable array. But all their efforts were in vain. With dauntless intrepidity, indeed, the Old Guard continued to press on along the narrow ridge; but the thicker their columns became the greater was the havoc, until their advance was literally impeded by heaps of the

* Kausler, 400. Dan., 223, 224. Koch, i., 391, 392. Vaud., ii., 32, 33.

† Dan., 223, 224. Koch, i., 393, 396. Kausler, 400. Plotho, iii., 290. Vaud., ii., 33, 35.

* Dan., 225, 226. Kausler, 400. Vaud., i., 35, 37. Koch, i., 394, 396.

dead and the dying. The Russian artillery, worked with extraordinary rapidity, fired, by alternate guns, round shot and grape from the first line, and round shot and grenades from the second; and such was the precision of their aim, that the assailants never succeeded, notwithstanding the most heroic efforts, in passing the dreadful strait. This awful cannonade lasted only twenty minutes; when Drouot, finding the position unassailable, drew off his guns, and the fire ceased. Soon after, Woronzow, having by this stand gained time for his cavalry, wounded, and carriages, to reach the great road from Soissons, himself followed with the rear-guard, to which the garrison of the former town was joined, and the whole fell back to the environs of Laon.*

Results of the battle.

Such was the terrible battle of Craon, the most obstinately contested, if we except Albuera and Culm, of the whole Revolutionary war, and in which it is hard to say to which side of the heroic antagonists the palm of victory is to be awarded. The French were greatly superior in number, for, as Sacken's infantry was never engaged, nor even in sight, the whole troops who fought on the Russian side did not exceed twenty thousand; while Napoleon had nearly forty thousand actually under fire. But this disproportion, great as it was, appears to have been counterbalanced in the result by the incomparable strength of Woronzow's position, which rendered numerical superiority of little avail, and the admirable disposition of his guns, which, both at the commencement and close of the action, gave the Russian artillery, though inferior in number, a decided advantage over that of the French. Trophies of victory there were none to boast of by either party; the French won the field of battle, but it was covered only with the dead or the dying: no prisoners, cannon, or standards were made on either side; and the field itself was yielded, not to the attacks, impetuous as they were, of Napoleon's grenadiers, but to the general policy of the campaign, which, after Winzingerode's circular march against the French rear had failed, induced the Prussian field-marshal to direct a general concentration of his forces in the noble position of Laon. The loss on both sides was enormous; and, save at Albuera, unprecedented, in proportion to the number of troops engaged, in the whole war: the Russians were weakened by six thousand killed and wounded; but, on the side of the French, no less than eight thousand brave men, being nearly a fifth of the troops engaged, had fallen. Woronzow deservedly had the order of St. George, of the second class, immediately conferred upon him by a grateful sovereign: wounds and death were the only returns which now remained for French deeds of heroism. Victor was severely lacerated by a cannon-ball in the thigh; Grouchy, Nansouty, Boyer, and two others, more slightly.†

Reflections on this battle, and the extraordinary gallantry displayed.

Had Winzingerode's attack, supported by Kleist in the rear, not been prevented from taking place by the extraordinary difficulties which impeded his march, Napoleon's career would, in all probability, have been terminated at Craon, as it afterward was at Waterloo. His last reserves had been engaged on the plateau: he had no troops in hand to oppose to any fresh attack; and the apparition of ten thousand horse, followed by Kleist and Langeron's corps, in his rear, would have proved fatal. It cannot be denied that Blucher erred egregiously in dispersing his army so much before the battle; and that, considering that his forces, upon the whole, were double those of his antagonist, it afforded the most decisive proof of his having been outgeneralled, or singularly ill used by fortune, that, at the decisive point, the French outnumbered his troops engaged in the same ratio. Proportionally greater was the credit due to the heroism of Woronzow and his unconquerable soldiers, who overcame all these obstacles, and contended on equal terms, during the whole day, against Napoleon, at the head of double their forces, including his redoubtable Guards and cuirassiers. Innumerable were the deeds of heroism performed by officers and men on both sides: Ney, Mortier, and Victor combated on foot at the head of their troops, and were always to be seen in the thickest of the fire, animating the troops by their voice and their example; Woronzow repeatedly, during the retreat, threw himself into the squares, and in person gave the word of command to fire, when the French had come within fifty paces; Major-general Ponect, severely wounded, stood before his brigade on crutches, and positively refused to retire till the line was directed to fall back; the regiment of Shirvan, having exhausted its cartridges, and being surrounded by the French cavalry, thrice forced their way through with fixed bayonets, bringing with them their dead colonel, and all the officers who had been either killed or wounded: Dochakoff, on being mortally wounded, exclaimed to his regiment, "Halt, Courlanders!" and breathed his last.*

Napoleon on the night succeeding the battle.

While the cavalry were on the road to Laon, Napoleon traversed in the gloom of the evening the bloodstained summit of the plateau, and then descended into the valley of the Aisne, to seek a hamlet wherein to pass the night, and found it in the village of Bray. His spirit was unusually depressed, as well by the bloody and unsatisfactory issue of the action, as the intelligence which he received the same evening from Chatillon, announcing the firm determination of the allies to break up the conference, unless the fundamental principle of reducing France to its ancient limits was agreed to. The emperor was not prepared for such unanimity on the part of the allied plenipotentiaries; he still clung to the hope that Austria would break off. He refused, however, to yield to those terms, and a messenger was despatched with instructions to Caulaincourt to present a counter project, and strive to gain time. "I see clearly," said he, "that this war is an abyss, but I will be the last to bury myself in it. If we must wear the fetters, it is not I who will stretch out my hands to receive them." He was deeply depressed, however, by the issue of the action, and wrote that night to Joseph at Paris: "The Old Guard alone stood firm; the rest melted like snow." So strongly was Na-

* Dan., 226, 228. Kausler, 401. Plotho, iii., 290, 291. Koch, i., 399, 401. Vaud., i., 35, 37.

† Koch, i., 401, 402. Kausler, 401. Dan., 229. Fain, 158. Vaud., ii., 37.

* Dan., 229, 232. Koch, i., 301, 302.

poleon irritated by the desperate state of his affairs, that he gave orders, in one of his fits of fury, to shoot some Russian prisoners, probably in retaliation for some peasants slain, which, before he relented, was unhappily carried into execution at the village of Vaurain.*

Both parties take post at and around Laon.

On the following day, Blucher collected all his six corps around the splendid position of Laon. So exhausted were the French by their efforts during the battle, that they did not move from their ground till ten next day; and, as the Russians marched the whole night, they got the start of the enemy, and reached the neighbourhood of that town in safety. Napoleon also on his side collected his whole forces, which now amounted to about forty-eight thousand men. Marmont, who was ordered up from Soissons, crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, and, after sleeping at Corbeny, approached Laon by the road of Rheims; while the bulk of the army, consisting of the corps of Ney and Mortier, with the cuirassiers and reserve cavalry, after having joined the great road from Soissons to Laon at Chavignon and Vaurain, approached on the *chaussée* from Paris. Notwithstanding all his losses, Blucher had still above ninety thousand men grouped around the hill of Laon; and the approach to the position was by a defile two miles in length, where the road crosses a marsh that runs up to the foot of the hill. Chernicheff was posted at Etouville, which lay at the entrance of this defile, with four regiments of infantry and twenty-four guns; and he defended himself so vigorously against the impetuous attacks of Marshal Ney, who commanded the French advanced guard, that at nightfall he was still unable to make any impression. After it was dark, however, the peasants conducted the Old Guard through bypaths across the marshes; so that at daybreak on the 9th he found his post at the entrance of the defile no longer tenable, and withdrew with all his forces to the position of Laon. There, soon after, Rudzewitch arrived with the garrison of Soissons, having by forced marches and extraordinary vigilance eluded all the efforts of the enemy to intercept him. The accession of these forces, and the general concentration of his troops, raised Blucher's army to one hundred and nine thousand men, including twenty-four thousand horse, all concentrated and supporting each other: while Napoleon, including Marmont, had only fifty-two thousand, of whom not more than fourteen thousand were cavalry.†

Description of the position of Laon, and of the allied army.

The town of LAON, of great antiquity, containing seven thousand souls, so well known to travellers in that part of France, like that of Cassel on the borders of Flanders, stands upon the flat summit of a conical hill about three quarters of a mile in breadth, and elevated nearly two hundred and fifty feet above the adjacent plain. It is surrounded with irregular ancient walls and towers, standing on the edge of the lofty plateau as it sinks into the declivity, and following its varied sinuosities. Gardens, orchards, and grass fields lie on the slopes of this huge truncated cone: the roads leading to the town ascend by a gentle slope up the long acclivity; the houses at the foot, fronting the highways and villages adjacent, were all loopholed, and filled with musketeers; a hundred pieces of cannon crowded the ramparts on the summit, while numerous other batteries crowned every commanding eminence in the adjoining slopes. On these slopes, and in the neighhouring villages, lay the immense host of the allied army, having the town for a vast redoubt in its centre, and extending with its wings far into the plain on either side. On the right lay Winzingerode's men, drawn up in two lines near Aven; in the centre, Bulow's corps occupied the hill of Laon, the villages of Sermilly and Ardon, with the Abbey of St. Vincent at its foot, and formed the numerous batteries disposed around its slopes. On the left, Kleist and D'York extended from Laon to Chambry, opposite to Athies, and stretched far into the plain on the road leading to Rheims. Sacken and Langeron's troops, which had suffered so severely in the preceding combats, were in reserve behind Laon. The positions of the French, being fewer in number, were much more concentrated: Marmont was expected on the right, being ordered to come up by the road from Rheims to a spot assigned between Chambry and Athies in the level plain; Mortier, with the Guards, and the whole reserve cavalry under Grouchy and Nansouty, were in the centre; opposite Laon, in front of them, half way to Sermilly and Ardon, was Ney with his indefatigable corps, yet reeking with the blood of Craon.*

Sublime spectacle from the ramparts of Laon. March 8.

It was a sublime and yet animating spectacle, when, on the evening of the 8th of March, the allied army withdrew on all sides into the vicinity of this ancient and celebrated city. To the anxious and trembling crowds of citizens, and peasants driven in from the adjacent country which had been the theatre of hostilities, the horizon to the south and west appeared covered by innumerable fires; loud discharges of cannon rolled on all sides, and sensibly approached the town; long lines of light, proceeding from the fire of the infantry of the allies as they retired, or the French as they advanced, were distinctly seen as the shades of evening set in. When night approached, and darkness overspread the plain, a still more extraordinary spectacle presented itself: the continued fire in the midst of the thickets and woods with which the country abounded produced a strange optical delusion, which converted the trees into so many electrical tubes, from the summits of which sparks and dazzling light, as from so many fireworks, appeared to rush upward into the heavens. In the midst of this lurid illumination, long lines of infantry, dark masses of cavalry, and endless files of artillery were seen covering the plain in all directions, till they were lost in the obscurity of the distance.†

The succeeding day, being the 9th, was passed without any serious action on either side. Approached to the villages of Classy, Sermilly,

* Fain, 159, 161. Koch, i., 401, 403. Dan., 235.
† Dan., 236, 238. Kausler, 402. Fain, 161, 162. Koch, i., 408, 411. Plotho, iii., 292, 293. Vaud., i., 43, 44.

* Personal observation. Kausler, 403, 404. Koch, i., 407, 408. Beauch., i., 404, 405.
† Témoin Oculaire, in Beauch., i., 405.

Combats on the first day until Marmont comes up. March 9.

and Ardon, at the foot of the hill of Laon, the centre and left, composed of the troops under Napoleon in person, were perfectly prepared for an attack; but he was justly unwilling to hazard a general engagement until his right wing, under Marmont, came up to its ground from the side of Rheims; and repeatedly in the course of the day he despatched messengers in that direction, to learn where the marshal was, and how soon he might be expected in the field. Meanwhile, in order to feel the strength of the enemy's position, Ney was ordered to advance right against Laon by the great road from Soissons. Favoured by a thick fog, which entirely enveloped the hill of Laon, and concealed his advance from the enemy, he succeeded, by a sudden attack, in making himself master of the villages of Sermilly and Ardon, at the foot of the hill, and was only prevented from pushing up its slopes by the concentric fire of the batteries, which commanded every approach to the town. At eleven the mist cleared away, and the whole field of battle became visible from the ramparts. Blucher, perceiving how inconsiderable were the forces opposed to him in the centre, resolved to resume the offensive, and drive the enemy from the villages he had won at the foot of the hill. With this view, while Woronzow's infantry were ordered to attack Sermilly in front, and Bulow's at Ardon, a division of infantry, supported by all Winzingerode's cavalry, were directed to make a sweep in the plain, and turn their left. This double attack entirely succeeded; and Ney's corps were driven back across the *chaussée* and marshes towards Etouville, in such disorder, that it was only by charging with the Imperial Guard and reserve cavalry that Ney and Beliard succeeded in arresting the pursuit of the allies, and driving them back to the bottom of the hill. At four in the afternoon, Napoleon having learned that Marmont had come up to his ground on the right, towards Athies on the road to Rheims, brought forward his Guards and cuirassiers, and, by a vigorous advance, again expelled the allies from Ardon, and carried, after a bloody struggle, the village of Classy and the Abbey of St. Vincent from the Russians on their right.*

Arrival of Marmont, and Blucher's measures to overwhelm him.

Neither party, however, were intent on these attacks; both fought only to gain time. Napoleon was counting the minutes, till the announcement of the approach of Marmont warned him that he might with safety commence a real attack upon the enemy at once in front and flank; while Blucher, having received intelligence of the French marshal being expected on the road to Rheims from Laon, when he was totally unsupported by the remainder of the army, was taking measures to fall upon and crush him. Meanwhile, Marmont, who had commenced his march early in the morning from Berry-au-Bac, issued at one in the afternoon from the defile of Fetieux, and, driving the Prussian videttes before him, commenced an attack at four o'clock on a division of D'York's infantry, which was stationed at Athies, and after a fierce combat the Prussians were driven out of the village, which became a prey to the flames. Blucher now clearly perceived, from the vivacity of this assault, that the principal effort of the enemy was to be made in that direction; and that Napoleon's design was to amuse him by false attacks in front on the Soissons road, and, meanwhile, turn his flank, cut him off from all communication with the Grand Army, and throw him back on a separate field of operations on the side of Flanders. He immediately took measures to defeat this project, and convert it to the enemy's ruin; and for this object his central position at Laon, midway, as it were, between the two wings of the French army, presented extraordinary advantages. Langeron and Sacken were moved up behind Laon to the left, so as to be in a condition to support D'York: Kleist was ordered up to the front, close in his rear: the horse artillery of the army of Silesia was moved to the extreme left, so as to be ready to commence the attack: the infantry were all arranged in close columns, the cavalry in dense array of squadrons, and the whole received orders, as soon as it was dark, to advance in double quick time, and without firing a shot or uttering a word, against the enemy.†

Nocturnal surprise and defeat of Marmont.

Meanwhile, Marmont's troops, worn out with fatigue, and wholly unconscious of their danger, had sunk to sleep in their frigid bivouacs. At the dead of night, and in perfect silence, the Prussians advanced to the attack; Prince William of Prussia led the infantry, which were headed by the brigades of Horn and Klux, and moved by the high road right on Athies; the fields on either side were filled with the remainder of Kleist's corps, all in close column, so as to occupy very little room; while Zeithen's turned the right flank of the enemy, and drove them back on the infantry. Both attacks proved entirely successful. So complete was the surprise, so universal the consternation, that the French merely fired one round of grape on the approach of Prince William, and then dispersed, every one flying, in the profound darkness, where chance or his fears directed. Zeithen's horse at the same instant falling on the right, increased the confusion: the fugitives from these two attacks, flying at right angles to each other, soon got intermingled, and poured headlong out in frightful disorder on the road to Berry-au-Bac; while the Prussian infantry, pressing on through the throng with loud shouts, soon arrived at the grand park and reserve caissons, all of which, with the exception of a few pieces, were taken. The Prussian hussars, highly elated with their success, continued the pursuit without intermission, and the darkness of the night alone prevented the whole corps being made prisoners. In wild confusion, horse, foot, and the few cannon hurried through the defile of Fetieux, six miles off, at the entrance of which Colonel Fabvier contrived to rally a few hundred men, who, from the smallness of their number, not being perceived in the darkness of the night, contrived to stop the pursuit. As it was, however, Marmont lost forty pieces of cannon, a hundred and thirty-one caissons, and two thousand five hundred prisoners: the number of killed and wounded, from the rapidity of the flight, was not considerable; but his corps was

* Kausler, 405, 406. Koch, i., 409, 411. Dan., 239, 240. Vaud., ii., 45, 46. Plotho, iii., 494, 495.

* Dan., 240, 241. Koch, i., 414. Vaud., ii., 48, 50. Plotho, iii., 294, 295.

totally dispersed, and disabled from taking any part, till reorganized, in any military operation, while the whole loss of the allies was not three hundred men.*

Napoleon prepares to retreat. March 10.

Napoleon, anticipating a general battle, was drawing on his boots at four o'clock in the morning of the 10th, with his horse already at the door, when two dragoons, who had just arrived on foot, in great consternation, were brought to him. They stated that they had escaped by a miracle from a nocturnal hourrah, which the enemy had made on the bivouacs of Marmont; that the marshal himself was killed or taken, and that all was lost on that side. He immediately gave orders to suspend the preparations for a general attack, which were already commencing; and soon after more authentic intelligence of the disaster arrived, to the effect that the marshal was neither killed nor taken, but that his corps was entirely dispersed, its artillery lost, and the fugitives, in disorder, only beginning to rally in the neighbourhood of Fismès. The emperor at once saw that to persist in his attack on Laon, defended by an enemy double in amount to his own force, and with his right wing, for the time at least, *hors de combat*, was a vain attempt. But how to retreat in the face of a victorious enemy was the question; for already Blucher, elated by his victory, had given orders to Langeron, Sacken, D'York, and Kleist, to pursue Marmont with the utmost vigour; and he himself was only waiting on the ramparts of Laon, from whence he saw every movement in the French army, for the commencement of the retreat of the main body, to pursue on the road to Soissons. In this dilemma, he adopted the wisest course he could have pursued, which was to remain where he was, and impose upon the Prussian general by the display of a formidable force in front, so as at once to prevent pursuit of his own corps, and relieve the pressure on that of Marmont. So completely did this plan succeed, that Blucher, who in the first instance had given orders to Bulow and Winzingerode to issue forth from Laon in pursuit of the French main body, not only countermanded the directions upon seeing they stood firm, and seemed rather preparing for an attack, but despatched orders to the generals in pursuit of Marmont to return with their infantry, and follow him up only with their cavalry. Chernicheff, in consequence, who at daybreak had made a successful attack with Winzingerode's advanced guard on the French division at Classy, on the allied right, finding himself unsupported, was obliged to return in haste to the foot of the hill of Laon; and shortly after nine o'clock Napoleon ordered a general advance against that formidable position. The action soon became extremely warm, and when the French approached the hill, they were received by such tremendous discharges of artillery from the heights around its foot, as well as musketry from the loopholed villages, that, after sustaining a severe loss, they were obliged to retire. At four o'clock the grand park and equipages began to defile on the road to Soissons, and the French troops withdrew at all points; but the cannonade continued till nightfall, and from the summit of the ramparts of Laon the march of the retiring columns could be traced by the sight of villages in flames, and the awful prospect of granaries, farmyards, and churches consuming under the reckless fury of the devastating bands, which, like a stream of lava, overspread even their own territory with conflagration and ruin.*

Reflections on this battle.

Thus terminated the combats around Laon, which, though scarcely worthy of being dignified by the name of a battle, from the desultory manner in which they were conducted, and the great space over which they extended, were inferior to no pitched battle fought during the whole war in interest and importance. For the first time during the campaign, the whole disposable forces of the Emperor Napoleon, under his own immediate orders, had been brought to a stand: their assault upon a position found to be impregnable had been defeated; the object of the expedition beyond the Marne had been frustrated, and the Grand Army left at liberty to pursue, during ten days' active operations on the side of Troyes and Fontainebleau, which, if vigorously followed up, might have led to the capture of Paris. The combats around Laon, including the losses sustained by Marmont, had cost the French emperor six thousand men and forty-six pieces of cannon, while the allies were not weakened by more than four thousand; his total loss since he left Troyes, on the 1st of March, amounted to sixteen thousand men.† His situation now appeared altogether desperate: obliged to retire towards his capital, followed by a victorious army double his own strength, only to fall there into the jaws of a still larger army, driving before it two beaten corps not mustering between them twenty-five thousand sabres and bayonets. In this expedition against Blucher, the emperor was far from having shown proofs of his wonted skill: his bloody attack on the plateau of Craon had savoured rather of the obstinacy of a victorious than the caution of a defensive commander; and his plan of attack at Laon, operating by his two wings, separated six miles from each other and incapable of mutual support, upon an enemy twice his strength, and occupying a central position of uncommon strength between them,‡

* Plotho, iii., 296, 297. Dan., 240, 241. Koch, i., 415, 417. Vaud., ii., 49, 51.

* Beauch., i., 412, 414. Dan., 242, 243. Kausler, 408, 409. Koch, i., 419, 423. Fain, 164, 165.

† Viz.—

At Craon	8000
Assault of Soissons	1500
Around Laon	6000
Lesser affairs	500
	16,000

Such were the chasms in the ranks during these sanguinary struggles, that an entire reorganization of great part of the army took place at Soissons, by the incorporation of the divisions which had principally suffered; and the divisions of the Young Guard of Ney and Victor, as well as the division of infantry of General Poret de Morvau, entirely disappeared.—See KOCH, i., 429.

‡ This is accordingly admitted by the ablest of the French military historians, and the most zealous partisans of Napoleon. "It does not appear that the emperor acted according to the rules of art, or the prudence which the disproportion of his means required, in engaging the Duke of Ragusa (Marmont) at the same time that he attacked himself. He was as yet uncertain of the line of the enemy's operations, and his army was not a quarter of theirs in number. That quarter might have conquered if they had been massed together; but it was impossible to separate one corps without exposing it to destruction from a force tenfold its own."—VAUDONCOURT, ii., 63.

was precisely such an error as he had turned to such admirable account when committed by his adversaries at Castiglione in 1796, and at Dresden in 1813.*

Napoleon rests at Soissons, and Blucher at Laon.

But it soon appeared that the genius of Napoleon had been obscured for a moment, though it was not extinguished; and when all thought his fortunes desperate, he struck such a blow, in a quarter where it was least expected, as had wellnigh re-established his affairs, by the renewed timidity which it infused into the Austrian counsels. On the night of the 10th the emperor slept at Chavignon, on the road to Soissons; and on the 11th the army continued its retreat to the defiles in front of that town. This fortress, which had again fallen into the hands of the French after Rudzewitch's retreat to Laon, ever of primary importance during the campaign in this quarter, now offered the same secure passage across the Aisne to the retreating French which it formerly had done to the retiring allied army. The whole of the 12th was spent there also; the emperor being busied with Mortier and the officers of engineers in providing for the defence of the place; and, while giving a brief repose to the wearied soldiers of his army, he himself rode out on horseback to survey the environs, and choose the positions which might appear most defensible. During all this time, and, in fact, for nine days after the battle of Laon, Blucher remained in a state of complete inactivity with his vast army in that impregnable position: a delay, after such an advantage as he had recently gained, which would appear altogether inexplicable, if we did not know that, at that period, the allied army was almost starving from the total exhaustion of the country in which it had so long carried on the war; that the troops, worn out with six weeks' incessant marching and fighting in the most inclement weather, stood urgently in need of repose; that the veteran field-marshal himself was so ill, from ague and inflammation in the eyes, that he was unable to sit on horseback during the remainder of the campaign; and that Gneisenau and the officers of his staff felt that, having amply performed the part allotted to them in it, the time had arrived when it behooved the Grand Army to do something worthy of its gigantic strength and long-continued repose.†‡

March 11.

Capture of Rheims by St. Preist.

On the night of the 12th, however, Napoleon received information which induced him to alter the line of his operations, by presenting him with a new enemy accessible to his strokes, and capable of being destroyed. General St. Preist, with his corps of Russians, forming part of the reserves of the army of Silesia, had been left at Chalons, in order to keep up the communication between Blucher and Schwartzenberg; and having learned, during the concentration of all the French troops around Laon, that the garrison left by them in Rheims was very weak, particularly in cavalry, he resolved to attempt to carry the place. Like all the towns in that quarter, it was fortified, though not strongly, and the walls were in disrepair in several places, and but imperfectly armed; and St. Preist, having been re-enforced by the Prussian brigade of General Jagon, who had marched on after the surrender of Erfurth, determined to hazard an attack. The garrison, about two thousand strong, with only twelve pieces of cannon, were little in a condition to defend a town containing thirty thousand inhabitants against a corps of fifteen thousand men. They met, accordingly, with very little resistance: the garrison, after discharging a few rounds, endeavoured to escape out of the place by a gate which had not been blockaded, and six hundred of them, with ten guns, were made prisoners in making the attempt. The town itself was taken, with hardly any of the outrages or disorders consequent on a place carried by assault; some property which had been plundered was immediately restored, and the marauders punished; St. Preist himself went to the Cathedral to return thanks for his victory, and the troops, for the sake of recreation, were in great part allowed to amuse themselves in the surrounding hamlets.*

March 12.

Advance of Napoleon to Rheims.

The capture of this important town at once re-established the communications of Blucher with the Grand Army, and threatened Napoleon's right flank. He had no sooner heard of it, accordingly, than he gave orders for the whole army, with the exception of Mortier's corps, which was left for the defence of Soissons, to defile to the right on the road for Rheims. With such expedition did they march, that on the evening of the same day on which they set out from Soissons, the advanced guards appeared before the walls of Rheims. The Prussian videttes could hardly believe their own eyes when the increasing numbers of the enemy showed that a serious attack was intended; and, notwithstanding repeated warnings sent to St. Preist, he persisted in declaring it was only a few light troops that were appearing, and could not be brought to credit that the army so recently defeated at Laon was already in a condition to resume offensive operations. At length, at four o'clock, the cries of the troops and well-known grenadier caps of the Old Guard announced that the emperor himself was on the field; and then, as well he might, the Russian general hastily began to take measures for his defence. The nearest regiments, without orders or any regular array, hurried off to the threatened point; the French, skilfully feigning to be outnumbered, ceased firing and fell back, and for a short time all was quiet. St. Preist was confirmed, by this circumstance, in the belief that it was only a partisan division which was before him, or, at most, the beaten corps of Marmont, for which he conceived himself fully a match; and even on being assured by a prisoner that Napoleon was with the troops, he said, "He will not step over fourteen thousand men; you need not ask which way to retire, there will be no retreat."

March 13.

Shortly after Napoleon arrived, and after look-

* *Ante*, i., 409; iv., 137.

† Dan., 243, 245. Fain, 165, 166. Koch, i., 420, 422. Plotho, iii., 299, 302.

‡ "The true object of our stay here is not a military one. The only object I have in view is to give repose to a harassed army, and, as far as possible, to provide it with bread." —BLUCHER *to* WINZINGERODE, 14*th March*, 1814, DAN., 244, 245.

* Dan., 248, 250. Burgh., 262. Koch, i., 429, 434. Fain, 166.

Recapture of Rheims by Napoleon.

ing on the town for a short time, dryly observed, "The ladies of Rheims will soon have a bad quarter of an hour," and gave orders for an immediate attack. The allies by this time had almost entirely assembled in front of the town, and occupied a position in two lines, guarding the approaches to it: the right resting on the River Vele, the left extending to the Basse-Muire; the reserves on the plateau of St. Genevieve in the suburbs, where twenty-four pieces of cannon were planted. These preparations seemed to prognosticate a vigorous defence; but the promptitude and force of Napoleon's attack rendered them of very little avail. Eight thousand horse, supported by thirty pieces of horse artillery, were directed at once against the Russian left, to which St. Preist had hardly any cavalry to oppose; in a few minutes three Prussian battalions were surrounded and made prisoners. At the same time, Marmont, supported by the guards of honour and cavalry of the Guard, advanced by the high road, direct upon the enemy's centre. The Russian general, upon this, perceiving that he was immensely overmatched, gave orders for the first line to fall back on the second; and, at the same time, the battery of twenty-four guns withdrew towards the rear. Hardly were these movements commenced, when he himself was wounded in the shoulder by a ball: this event discouraged the troops; and the retiring columns, aware of their danger from the great masses which were everywhere pressing after them, fell into disorder, and hastened, with more speed than was consistent with discipline, into the town. Owing to the narrowness of the bridge and streets, the columns got entangled at every step, and in less than a quarter of an hour became a mere mob, while the French infantry and cavalry, with loud shouts, were pressing on their rear. Such was the scene of horror and confusion which soon ensued, that it appeared impossible for any part of the corps to escape; and none, in all probability, would have done so but for the steadiness of the regiment of Riazan, which, under its heroic colonel, Count Scobelof, formed square on the field of battle, and not only repulsed the repeated attacks of an enormous mass of cavalry at the entrance of the town, and gave time for a large part of the corps to defile in the rear, but itself pierced through the forest of sabres with the bayonet, bearing their bleeding and dying general in their arms.*

Defeat of the allies, and entrance of Napoleon into the town.

General Emmanuel now took the command; and the most vigorous efforts were made at the entrance of the town, by disposing the troops in the houses which adjoined it; and so obstinate was the resistance which they presented, that for above three hours the French were kept at bay. Towards midnight, however, it was discovered that the enemy, by fording the Vele, had got round the town, and, therefore, the whole troops in it were withdrawn, some on the road to Chalons, others on that to Laon, while the defence of the gate was intrusted to a non-commissioned officer of the 33d light infantry, with two hundred men. This little band of heroes kept their ground to the last, and were found by the officer sent to withdraw them dividing their few remaining cartridges, and encouraging each other to hold out even till death. When they received orders to retire, they did so in perfect order, as the evacuation was completed; and they fortunately effected their retreat in the darkness, without being made prisoners. Napoleon then made his entry into the town at one o'clock in the morning by torchlight, amid the acclamations of his troops, and enthusiastic cheers of the inhabitants, who gave vent to the general transport in a spontaneous illumination. In this brilliant affair, the French took two thousand five hundred prisoners, eleven guns, and a hundred caissons, and the total loss of the allies was three thousand five hundred; while the Emperor Napoleon was only weakened by eight hundred men: a wonderful achievement to have been effected by a worn-out army, after nearly two months' incessant marching and fighting, and two days after a disastrous defeat; but more memorable still, by one circumstance which gives it a peculiar interest—it was the LAST TOWN NAPOLEON EVER TOOK.*

Residence of Napoleon at Rheims. March 14 to 18.

On the same day General Janson arrived at the French headquarters, from Flanders, bringing with him a re-enforcement of six thousand men, which he had brought up by the road of Rhelet from the garrisons in the neighbourhood of the Ardennes forest, in obedience to the orders despatched from Fismès twelve days before. This re-enforcement was of incalculable importance at that period, when the emperor was so severely weakened by the losses of the dreadful campaign in which he had been engaged; and it illustrates the extreme imprudence, of which he had now become himself sensible, of that obstinate tenacity of disposition which had prompted him so long to retain fifty thousand veterans in useless inactivity in the German fortresses, and as many more in the places on the Rhine, while he himself, with no greater force, was driven to his last shifts on the plains of Champagne. To repair, if possible, the error he had committed, he despatched Ney to Chalons, and General Vincent to Epernay, who expelled the enemy from these towns; while the great body of Napoleon's forces were cantoned in Rheims and the villages in its vicinity. During all this time Blucher remained inactive at Laon, and on the 17th a grand review of all his forces took place, when it was ascertained that, with the additions received since the battle there, from St. Preist's corps and other sources, they still numbered a hundred and nine thousand combatants, of whom twenty-nine thousand were horse, with two hundred and sixty-five guns. From Chalons Ney despatched, in profusion, officers and secret emissaries, with instructions to all the garrisons on the Rhine, and between that and the theatre of war, to hold themselves in readiness to break through the blockading forces with which they were environed, and join the emperor as soon as they should receive intimations that the proper moment was arrived; with similar directions to the peasantry in all the rural districts, the moment the allies began to retreat, to fall

* Dan., 252, 253. Koch, i., 439, 440. Burgh., 203. Vaud., ii., 112, 114. Plotho, iii., 353, 354.

* Koch, i, 439, 440. Plotho, iii., 355. Vaud., ii., 114, 115. Burgh., 203. Dan., 253, 254.

on their flanks and communications, and do them all the mischief in their power.*

Last review of Napoleon at Rheims. March 15.

Meanwhile, a review took place at Rheims of all the troops under the immediate command of the emperor; but how different from the splendid military spectacles of the Tuileries or Chamartin, which had so often dazzled his sight with the pomp of apparently irreversible power! Wasted away to half the numbers which they possessed when they crossed the Marne a fortnight before, the greater part of the regiments exhibited only the skeletons of military force: in several, more officers than privates were to be seen in the ranks; in all, the appearance of the troops, the haggard air of the men, their worn-out dresses, and the strange motley of which they were composed, bespoke the total exhaustion of the Empire. It was evident to all that Napoleon was spending his last resources. Beside the veterans of the Guard—the iron men whom nothing could daunt, but whose tattered garments and soiled accoutrements bespoke the dreadful fatigues to which they had been subjected—were to be seen young conscripts, but recently torn from the embraces of maternal love, and whose wan visages and faltering steps told but too clearly that they were unequal to the weight of the arms which they bore. The gaunt figures and woful aspect of the horses, the broken carriages and blackened mouths of the guns, the crazy and fractured artillery-wagons which defiled past, the general confusion of arms, battalions, and uniforms, even in the best-appointed corps, marked the melted down remains of the vast military array which had so long stood triumphant against the world in arms. The soldiers exhibited none of their ancient enthusiasm as they defiled past the emperor: silent and sad they took their way before him; the stern realities of war had chased away its enthusiastic ardour; all felt that in this dreadful contest they themselves would perish, happy if they had not previously witnessed the degradation of France.*

CHAPTER LXXV.

FALL OF NAPOLEON.

ARGUMENT.

Labours of Napoleon in the Cabinet at this Period.—Affairs of the Low Countries.—Combat of Merxhem, and French driven into Antwerp. — Investment of that Fortress, of which Carnot takes the Command.—Progress of the War in Flanders. — Description of Bergen-op-Zoom. — Plan of the Attack on that Fortress.—The French rally and defeat the Assault. — Reflections on this Event. — Concluding Movements of the Campaign in Flanders. — Affairs of Italy, and Retreat of Eugene to the Mincio.—Reasons which led him to give Battle.—Battle of the Mincio.—Evacuation of Tuscany by the French. — Operations of Lord William Bentinck on the Coast of Tuscany.—Successes of Eugene on the Po.—Affairs at Lyons.—Combats in Savoy. —Augereau resumes the Offensive in Savoy and on the Jura. — Displeasure of Napoleon at the Direction of these Attacks. — His Operations on the Jura.—Battle of Limonet, and Fall of Lyons.—Great Effects of this Victory.— Concluding Operations of Wellington in the South of France. — His Difficulties there. — Plan of the English Government of employing him and his Army in Flanders, and his Reasons against it. — Difficulties of Soult. — Reduction of his Army and Increase of Wellington's. — Rejection of the Treaty of Valençay by the Cortes, and Arrival of the Duke d'Angouleme at Wellington's Headquarters. — Wellington's Proclamation against the Insurrection in Baygorry. — Position of Soult around Bayonne. — Wellington forces the Passage of the Upper Adour. — Passage of the Gave de Mauleon, and of the Lower Adour. —Entrance of the Flotilla into that River, and Investment of Bayonne. — Description of the French Positions and Force at Orthes.—Wellington's Order of March, and Attack. — Battle of Orthes. — Preparatory Movements. — Beresford carries St. Boes, but is arrested on the Ridge beyond it.—Wellington regains the Battle.—Soult orders a general Retreat.—Great Effects of this Victory.—Soult retires towards Tarbes and Toulouse. — Proceedings of the Royalists at Bordeaux. — The English arrive there, and Louis XVIII. is proclaimed. — Arrival of the Duke d'Angouleme there, and his Proclamation.—Soult's counter Proclamation, and resumption of Hostilities. — He finally retreats to Toulouse. — Combat of Tarbes. — General Results of the Campaign. — Progress of Events in Catalonia. — Stratagem by which Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, are recovered by the Spaniards.—Arrival of Ferdinand, and Termination of the War in Catalonia. — Siege of Santona, and Close of the War in the Peninsula. —Description of Toulouse, and the French Position there. — Ineffectual Attempt to attack it by crossing above the River.—Beresford, with the Left Wing, is thrown across below Toulouse. — His Danger, and Supineness of Soult. —Advantages of the French Position.—Wellington's Plan of Attack. — Position of the French, and Forces on both Sides.—Battle of Toulouse.—Defeat of the Spaniards on the British Right.—Picton also is repulsed at the Bridge of Jumeau. — Soult attacks Beresford, who carries the Redoubts on the French Right. — Soult's Dispositions to restore the Battle. — Beresford storms the Redoubt in the Centre.—Retreat of Soult behind the Canal.—Soult evacuates Toulouse.—Wellington's triumphal Entry into that Town, and Proclamation of Louis XVIII. — Convention which terminated the War in the South of France. — Sally from Bayonne. — Sir John Hope is made Prisoner, but the Sally is repulsed.—Concluding Operations at Bordeaux.—Errors of Wellington.—Lord William Bentinck's Operations against Genoa.—Concluding Operations of the Allies in Italy. — State and final Surrender of the Fortresses in Germany still held by the French.—Operations of Benningsen against Davoust in Hamburg.—Napoleon's last Survey of his Empire.—Final Terms proposed to him at Chatillon by the Allies. — Counter Projects of Napoleon. — Answers of the Allies to the Ultimatum of France. —Reflections on the Dissolution of the Congress.—Alarming Situation of Paris. — Napoleon marches against Schwartzenberg, and towards the Aube, and falls unawares on the Grand Army.—Napoleon moves to the Side. — Schwartzenberg resumes the Offensive. — Both march at the same Time on Arcis-sur-Aube. — Effect of these Movements on both Sides. — First Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube. — Order of Battle for the following Day. — The French at length retreat.—Their Rear-guard is attacked. —Napoleon's Reasons for the March to St. Dizier. — He moves on that Town.—The Allies follow, and receive Information of his Designs. — Important Council of War held at their Headquarters. — Volkonsky's Advice to march on Paris, which is adopted by Alexander, and acquiesced in by Schwartzenberg and the King of Prussia. —Orders given for the March of the Troops.—Enthusiasm of the Allied Soldiers on receiving these Orders. — Judicious Measures of Ertel in the Rear of the Grand Army. —Movements of Marmont and Mortier.—Approach of both Armies to Fere-Champenoise. — Battle of Fere-Champenoise. — Second Combat there. — Heroic Resistance, and Destruction of the French.—Results of these Combats.— Retreat and narrow Escape of Marmont and Mortier to Paris. — Splendid Appearance of the Allied Army on the March to that Capital.—Attack on Winzingerode by Napoleon.—His Defeats.—Passage of the Marne by the Allies. — Alexander's Efforts to preserve Discipline in his Army.—First Sight of Paris by the Allied Troops.—Extreme Agitation in that Capital during this Period.—Deliberation in the Council of State as to whether the Empress and King of Rome should remain in Paris.—Mourn-

* Fain, 167, 168. Koch, i., 442, 444. Vaud., ii., 208, 209.

* Koch, i., 442, 444. Fain, 167, 168.

ful Scene at their Departure. — Description of Paris as a military Station. — Its historic Interest and splendid Edifices. — Force of the French on the Line of Defence. — Schwartzenberg's Proclamation to the Allied Army. — Commencement of the Action, and Allied Dispositions of Attack.—Repulse of the Russians in the Centre.—Alexander brings up his Guards, who restore the Battle there. — Appearance of the Army of Silesia on the Right, and of the Prince of Wirtemberg on the Left. — Storming of the Heights which command Paris. — A Suspension of Arms is agreed to on both Sides.—General Occupation of the Heights, and Storming of Montmartre. — Results of the Battle.—Rapid Return of Napoleon towards Paris.—His Arrival in its Neighbourhood, and remarkable Conversation on hearing of its Fall.—Preparations of the Allies for entering Paris.—Final Conclusion of the Capitulation. — Interview of Alexander with the Magistrates of Paris.—State of public Feeling there during this Period.—First Movements of the Royalists.—Entrance of the Allied Sovereigns into Paris.—Extraordinary Transports of the People in the Place Louis XV. — Important Meeting of the Allied Sovereigns at Talleyrand's.—Its Deliberations — Declaration of the Allies that they would no longer treat with Napoleon or any of his Family. — Establishment of a Provisional Government by the Senate.—Generous Conduct of the Emperor Alexander, who liberates all the French Prisoners in Russia. — The Senate dethrone Napoleon.—General Adhesion to the new Government. — Defection of Marmont.—Caulaincourt's fruitless Mission to Alexander. — Napoleon agrees to abdicate in favour of his Son. — His Proclamation against Marmont and the Senate. — Caulaincourt's Mission to establish a Regency fails. — The Cause of the Restoration had become irresistible at Paris.—Increasing Fervour in favour of the Bourbons. — Napoleon's final and unconditional Resignation. — General and base Defection of the Emperor by his Followers. — Treaty between Napoleon and the Allied Powers.—Abortive Attempt of Napoleon to destroy himself.—Universal Desertion of the Empress, and Dispersion of Napoleon's Family. — Honourable Fidelity of Macdonald and a few Generals at Fontainebleau.—The Emperor's last Speech to his Guard at Fontainebleau. — His Journey to Frejus.—Narrow Escape from being murdered at Orgon and St. Cannat. — Death of Josephine. — Character of the Emperor Alexander, and of Talleyrand.— His early History.—Great Abilities and profound Dissimulation.—Solemn Thanksgiving in the Place Louis XV.— Louis XVIII. is called to the Throne. — Entry of the Count d'Artois into Paris, and of Louis XVIII. into London. — His Landing in France, and Entry into Paris. — Convention of the 23d of April for the French Abandonment of all their Conquests. — Prodigious Extent of the Conquests thus ceded by France. — Treaty of the 30th of May, between the Allies and France, signed at Paris.— Its Secret Articles.—Reflections on this Treaty.—Return of the Pope to Rome. — Extraordinary Spectacle which Paris exhibited at this Period.—Universal religious Feelings of the Allied Troops.—Grand Review of their Forces in Paris. — Visit of the Allied Sovereigns to England.— Remarkable Circumstance which led to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg coming to London. — Reflections on the decisive Movement of Napoleon on St. Dizier.—Difference in the final Struggle of France and the other European Powers.—Causes of this Difference.—It is that individual Advancement was the Mainspring of the Revolution.— Wide Difference between the present Baseness of France and the Fidelity of the Monarchy. — Misfortunes alone rendered Napoleon and the System of the Revolution unpopular.—Any Restoration of the Revolutionary System was impossible at this Period.—A pacific Career was impracticable to Napoleon. — His View of the Compulsion under which he acted.—View of the progressive Phases of the Revolution.—Agency by which the Divine Government of Nations is carried on.—Universal and downward Progress of Sin in Nations as well as Individuals; and ascending Career of Virtue. — How alone can this downward Progress be arrested? — Is a free Government possible in France?—Concluding Reflections.

BUT though Napoleon allowed a few days' repose to his wearied troops, he gave none to his own indefatigable mind; though he witnessed around him the wreck of a world, he stood undaunted amid its ruins.

> "Si fractus illabatur orbis,
> Impavidum *ferient* ruinæ."

During these days of physical repose, he was indefatigable in the cabinet: the varied concerns of his still vast empire passed before his view; despatches from all quarters were received; and his final resolution to reject the terms offered by the allies at Chatillon was taken. This brief intermission in military operations, both at the headquarters of the Emperor Napoleon, of Marshal Blucher, and of the Grand Army, affords a favourable opportunity for reviewing with the now straitened conqueror the varied condition of the remoter parts of his empire, preparatory to the grand catastrophe which occasioned his fall.*

Affairs of the Low Countries.

From Antwerp and Flanders the accounts were, on the whole, satisfactory. After the expulsion of the French from Holland, in the middle of the preceding December, the tricolour flag waved only on Bergen-op-Zoom, Bois-le-Duc, Goreum, and one or two lesser forts, the main strength of the French forces in that quarter being concentrated in Antwerp, which Napoleon justly classed with Mayence and Alessandria in Piedmont, as the principal bulwarks of his empire. To impose upon the allies, by the sound at least of military preparations, the emperor, by a decree in the end of December, ordered the formation of an army of fifty-five battalions, the command of which was bestowed on Count Maison. This respectable force, however, like most of the others of which Napoleon had the direction at this period, existed in great part only on paper; and when Maison arrived at Antwerp in the end of December, he found that he could not reckon on twenty thousand men for the defence of the whole Low Countries; and that, so far from thinking of the reconquest at Holland, it would be all he could do to provide for the defence of Flanders, now threatened on its maritime quarter by the English, and on the side of the Meuse by the Russians and Prussians. He therefore strengthened the garrisons of Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, and made every possible provision for the victualling, arming, and providing of these fortresses. Meanwhile, an English division, six thousand strong, under the orders of Sir Thomas Graham, who had resigned his command in Spain the day after his victorious passage of the Bidassoa, on the 7th of October preceding,† landed in South Beveland, and having concerted measures with Bulow, who had crossed the canal and advanced towards Antwerp, a general forward movement commenced on the 10th of January, which, after a variety of minor actions, brought on a warm contest on the 13th, when a combined attack was made on the village of Merxhem, near Antwerp, by the British under General Mackenzie in front, and the Prussians under Thumen in flank. The 78th Highlanders headed the assault, led by their brave colonel, M'Leod, and the French were driven out and back into Antwerp in the most gallant style, with the loss of a thousand men killed and wounded. The allies, however, suffered nearly as much from the heavy fire which the French kept up at the entrance of the village; and as they were ignorant of the strength of the garrison, and not prepared at that period to commence the investment of the place,‡ they withdrew at night to their former positions, although they had approached so near to Ant-

Dec. 21, 1813.

Combat of Merxhem.

Jan. 13.

* Fain, 169.

† *Ante*, iv., 248.

‡ Graham's Official Despatch, Jan. 14, 1814, Ann. Reg., 153. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 39, 40. Koch, i., 115, 127.

werp that their bombs already fell in the suburbs and docks of the fortress.

Investment of Antwerp. January 31.

On the night of the 25th, aided by the inhabitants, Bulow made a successful attack on Bois-le-Duc, which was taken by escalade, with its garrison of six hundred men. This enabled the Prussian general to turn his whole forces against Maison; and the latter not feeling himself in sufficient strength to keep the field against the superior forces of the allies, left Antwerp to its own resources, threw a garrison of a thousand men into Malines, and took post himself at Louvain, as a central point from which he might be able to observe the numerous enemies who now inundated the Low Countries; for, in addition to Bulow and Graham on the side of Antwerp, Winzingerode, with his numerous corps of Russians, was exciting the utmost alarm, as already mentioned, by his unresisted march from the Rhine, by Liege, towards the old French frontier. No sooner was Antwerp left to its own resources, than Bulow approached its walls and completed their investment; and three thousand additional troops having arrived from England, and a small battering-train been obtained from Holland, operations of a vigorous character were commenced against the place. The great object was not to breach and carry its ramparts, for which the battering-train as yet at the disposal of the allies was wholly inadequate, but to bombard the town, and burn the great fleet constructed there by Napoleon; and with which he had so long flattered himself he would effect the subjugation of Great Britain. Extraordinary precautions had, however, been taken by Admiral Missiessy, who commanded the squadrons, to render nugatory the effects of a bombardment, by blinding the ships in the docks with turf, wet blankets, and a variety of other articles, which rendered them impervious to the heaviest shells, as had been done at Malta in the year 1799. On the 1st of February a general attack was made on the French advanced posts beyond the works, by the combined Prussian and British forces; and although the former experienced a bloody repulse near the village of Duerne, the British drove in the enemy from Braschart to Merxhem, and next day carried the latter village by assault, driving the French, with severe loss, entirely into the works of the place on that side. They immediately commenced the construction of mortar-batteries behind the dikes of St. Ferdinand; and with such vigour were the approaches pushed forward during the night, that next morning a heavy fire was commenced upon the shipping.*

Jan. 27. Feb. 1. Feb. 2.

Of which Carnot takes the command.

It was at this moment that Carnot took the command at Antwerp. This stern Republican—who had lived in retirement since the fall of Robespierre, resisted all the offers of Napoleon during the zenith of his power to lure him from his retreat, and almost singly voted against his being made First Consul and Emperor†—now came forward, with true patriotic devotion, to offer him, in his adversity, what remained of strength at sixty-four years of age, for the defence of the country.* Napoleon knew how to appreciate grandeur of character, even in the most decided political opponent. He immediately said, upon receiving the letter, "Since Carnot offers me his services, I know he will be faithful to the post which I assign to him: I appoint him Governor of Antwerp." The sturdy veteran arrived at the fortress, and entered by one of the southern gates the very day before the bombardment commenced. He found the garrison fifteen thousand strong; but nevertheless, anticipating a long siege, and deeming it necessary to husband his resources, he immediately withdrew all his outposts within the outworks, so that the Prussians approached, without resistance, so near the place as to be able to take a part in the bombardment. It produced, however, very little effect. By the admirable precautions of Carnot and Missiessy, the fire, which was repeatedly raised in different quarters of the city and harbour, was immediately extinguished; the vessels of war in the docks were so protected as to be, for the most part, impervious to shells: the mortars which the English made use of, brought from Holland, though admirably served, soon became, for the most part, unserviceable, from too frequent discharges; and, after the bombardment had been kept up three days, it was discontinued from failure of ammunition. At the same time, Bulow received orders to raise the siege of the place, and advance with his corps into France, to take part in the great operations in contemplation against Napoleon, in which, as already mentioned, he rendered the most essential service. The British, not now half the strength of the garrison of the place, were in no condition to maintain their ground before it; and, accordingly, Sir Thomas Graham retired to his former cantonments, between Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom; and Carnot, in conformity with his principles of reserving the strength of the garrison for ulterior operations, made no attempt to disquiet them in their retreat.†

Feb. 2. Feb. 6.

Though Bulow, however, had passed on into France, and the English had retired to the frontiers of Holland, yet there was no intermission in the deluge of allied troops which rolled over Flanders. Wave after wave succeeded, as in those days when the long-restrained might of the northern nations found vent in the decaying provinces of the Roman Empire. The Prince of Saxe-Weimar, re-enforced by Borstell's brigade of Prussians, at the head of fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse, kept the field: Brussels was soon evacuated; and Maison, who retired to Tournay, was watched by the allies, whose headquarters were at Ath. Gorcum, however, having surrendered, and the blockading force, under the Prussian

Progress of the war in Flanders.

Feb. 3. Feb. 4.

* Koch, ii., 132, 136. Graham's Despatch, Feb. 6, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, p. 156. App. to Chron.

† *Ante*, ii., 235.

* "The offer is little, without doubt, of an arm sixty years old; but I thought that the example of a soldier whose patriotic sentiments are known, might have the effect of rallying to your eagles a number of persons hesitating as to the part which they should take, and who might possibly think that the only way to serve their country was to abandon it."—CARNOT *to* NAPOLEON, 24*th Jan.*, 1814, *Mémoires sur* CARNOT, p. 135.

† Graham's Despatch, Feb. 6, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, p. 156. App. to Chron. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 42, 43. Mém. sur Carnot, 136, 139.

general Zielenski, having re-enforced the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, he advanced against the French general, who retired towards Quesnoy and Maubeuge. Nothing of moment occurred in this quarter till the 8th of March, when the prince made an attack on Maison's troops with twelve thousand men, and drove them from the positions they occupied in front of Courtray, under the cannon of Lille; so that, with the exception of Antwerp, Bergen-op-Zoom, Ypres, Condé, and Maubeuge, which were still in the hands of the French, the whole of Austrian Flanders was wrested from the arms of Napoleon.*

Feb. 17.

March 8.

But an important event occurred at this period in Holland, which deserves to be more particularly noticed, both from the admirable skill with which it was projected by the English general, and the combined gallantry on the part of the French, and remissness on the part of the British, which rendered a successful attack ultimately abortive. This was the assault of BERGEN-OP-ZOOM by Sir Thomas Graham.

This celebrated fortress, well known in the wars of the Low Countries, and strengthened by the successive labour of many centuries, was justly regarded by the Dutch as their principal bulwark on the side of the Netherlands, and as in every respect the worthy antagonist of Antwerp, to which it was directly opposed at the distance only of fifteen miles. On its works the famous Cohorn had exhausted all the resources of his art; and though the town is inconsiderable, containing not more than six thousand souls, the works were so extensive that they could only be adequately manned by a garrison of twelve thousand men, and an immense system of mines and subterraneous works rendered all approach by an enemy to the ramparts hazardous in the extreme. The place is divided into two parts: the town, properly so called, and the port, which are separated from each other by internal walls, but both included in the external ramparts. The town has three gates, that of Steenbergen, Breda, and Antwerp: the port but one, called the Water gate. The garrison, nominally four thousand five hundred strong, but of whom not more than two thousand seven hundred were effective, under General Bizanet, was inadequate to the manning of the extensive outworks, some of which were negligently guarded; some of the scarps were out of repair, and the hard frost which had so long prevailed had entirely frozen over the wet ditches to its mines and ramparts.†

Description of Bergen-op-Zoom.

Encouraged by these circumstances, which seemed to offer a favourable opportunity for surprising the place, Graham, who had secret intelligences with several of the inhabitants, who were almost all seafaring people, heartily desirous to be delivered from the French yoke, in covert made his preparations for a general attack, and fixed the execution of the attempt for the 8th of March, being the day before the Prince of Orange's birthday. The troops, three thousand three hundred strong, were divided into four columns; the first, under General Lord Proby, mustering about a thousand bayonets, was ordered to attempt to force an entrance by escalade between the Antwerp and Water gates; the second, under Colonel Morrice, twelve hundred strong, was to attack to the right of the Water gate; the third, led by Colonel Honey, six hundred men, to distract the enemy by a false attack at the Steenbergen gate; and the fourth, headed by Skerret and Gore, consisting of eleven hundred men, to attack the mouth of the harbour, which was fordable at low water, for which reason the attack was fixed for half past ten o'clock at night. General Cooke commanded the whole. The troops employed in the four columns amounted, in all, to three thousand three hundred men in the assault, and six hundred in the feint. The instructions to Generals Cooke and Gore, upon whom the weight of the assault would depend, were, as soon as they got to the top of the rampart, to incline towards each other, if possible unite, and immediately force open the Antwerp gate. Scaling-ladders of adequate height were provided for the men; the utmost secrecy was enjoined on the assaulting columns: no light was allowed among them; while that intrusted with the false attack on the Steenbergen gate was instructed to raise as much noise, and keep up as sharp a rattle of musketry, as possible.*

Plan of the attack.

Shortly before ten o'clock, a loud fire of musketry was heard at the Steenbergen gate. It proceeded from the third column, which, having surprised the advanced guard and outworks, were arrested at the drawbridge of the chief moat and gate of the rampart by a discharge of small arms; thither the garrison reserves were immediately directed, and the assailants repulsed with great loss. Meanwhile, the fourth column successfully made its way into the harbour mouth unobserved in the dark, and, after winding its painful course among the numerous iron crow's-feet scattered in the bottom of the channel, at a quarter before eleven reached the top of the rampart without the loss of a man, seized and forced open the Water gate, while detachments, under Colonel Carleton and General Skerret, were sent to the ramparts on the right and left, which were almost wholly undefended. As soon as the alarming progress of the assailants in this quarter was known, the remaining reserves of the garrison were directed to the bastions adjoining the Water gate; and, after a sharp conflict, Colonel Carleton, who commanded the detachment which moved to the right along the ramparts, was repulsed and driven back towards that entrance. At the same time, however, Colonel Morrice, with his column, made his way across the ice, and reached the counterscarp undiscovered, near the Breda gate; but the garrison there being well prepared, a severe fire of grape and musketry from the summit of the rampart prevented them from crossing the ditch or getting into the body of the place. Hardly was the danger arrested in this quarter, when a still more formidable attack was made between the Antwerp and Water gates. This was the guards under Lord Proby, which, after being diverted from their original

Commencement and early success of the assault.

* Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 44, 48. Koch, ii., 137, 154.

† Personal observation. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 49, 50. Koch, ii., 151, 152.

* Sir T. Graham's Desp., March 10, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, p. 170. App. to Chron. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 49, 50. Koch, 153, 154.

point of attack by the ice, which, weakened by the tide, gave way under their weight, had turned aside, and following the foot of the wall to a place where the passage was practicable, had at length reached the summit of the rampart on the left of the Antwerp gate. The guards were there formed under the immediate direction of General Cooke, and a detachment was sent on the one side to the Antwerp gate, and on the other to gain intelligence of Skerret and Gore at the Water gate and harbour. The strength of the Antwerp gate, however, was such as to defy all their efforts to force it open; and though Gore's detachment, in the first instance, defeated a column of the garrison which advanced against it, yet the French reserves came up, and, in the end, overpowered it. At this moment, however, Morrice's column, which had been repulsed at its own point of attack, came round by the foot of the glacis, and mounted the walls by Lord Proby's ladders, and formed on the ramparts to the left of the guards.*

The French rally, and defeat the assault.

To all appearance, Bergen-op-Zoom was now taken, and with an ordinary garrison and governor it would have been so. Seven hundred and fifty men were in battle array on the ramparts adjoining the Water gate, and had possession of that gate, and fifteen hundred on those between it and the Antwerp gate: in all, they occupied fourteen of the sixteen fronts of the place. The fortress was considered as so completely carried, that the detachment which had made the false attack on the Steenbergen gate retired to their cantonments, and a brigade of Germans, which had advanced from Tholen at the first firing, countermarched and returned home. The French troops, of no greater strength than the assailants, withdrew for the most part to the market-place, in the centre of the town, fully expecting to surrender at daybreak. But as the night wore on, matters essentially changed. The excessive cold benumbed the British troops, and chilled the first ardour of success; some of them broke into spirit shops adjoining their position, and became intoxicated; no re-enforcements were forwarded to them without, and the French, as day dawned, discovered the small number of their antagonists, and that one third of them at the Water gate were separated from the remaining two thirds on the bastions of the Antwerp gate. The governor, accordingly, directed his whole efforts, in the first instance, against Skerret's detachment on the bastions near the Water gate, and having driven them into a low situation, where they were exposed to a raking fire from two faces of the rampart, compelled them to lay down their arms, but not before Gore and Skerret had both fallen, bravely combating at the head of their troops. He then formed his whole force for an attack on the British, fifteen hundred strong, on the summit of the Antwerp bastions. The contest here was long and bloody; but at length General Cooke, having learned the destruction of Skerret and Gore's detachments, and finding his men wasting away without any chance of success, was compelled to surrender. In this brilliant, though disastrous affair, the British lost above nine hundred killed and wounded, and eighteen hundred men laid down their arms, though they were next day exchanged by convention with the French governor.*

Reflections on this assault.

Such was the termination of this extraordinary assault; doubly memorable, both from the circumstance that one of the strongest fortresses in the world had its ramparts carried by storm, when the governor was aware of the enemy's intention and prepared to repel it, without any approaches, or attempt to breach the walls, by an assaulting force of no greater strength than the garrison; and from the still more marvellous result, that this assaulting column, victorious on the ramparts, was in the end obliged to lay down its arms to an equal force of the enemy, but in possession of the guns of the place. It excited, accordingly, a vivid interest in the mind of Napoleon, who frequently recurred to it, both at Elba and St. Helena. He admitted that Graham's plan was both daring and well conceived; and imputed the failure of the enterprise to the energy of the French governor, the courage of his troops, and the want of due support to the attacking columns.† In truth, the slightest consideration must be sufficient to show that it is to the last circumstance that the failure of this nobly conceived and gallant enterprise is to be ascribed. The English general had at his command nine thousand British or German troops, of whom not more than four thousand, at the utmost, were engaged in the assault.‡ If a reserve of two thousand had been stationed near the walls, and advanced rapidly to the support of their comrades the moment the ramparts of the Antwerp gate were taken, not a doubt can exist that the town must have fallen. Nay, if the troops who retired from the feigned attack on the Steenbergen gate had been sent round to the support of Skerret and Gore by the Water gate, of which the latter had possession, it is probable the enterprise would have been crowned with success. Of the ease with which fresh troops from without might have effected an entrance, even without blowing open that gate, we have decisive evidence in the fact, that Morrice's whole division, at one in the morning, ascended by Lord Proby's ladders, and formed on the summit without the loss of a man. But why was not a petard or a fieldpiece brought up, when the British were in possession of that gate, to blow it open, as has so often been done with such success in India? These considerations show that the hero of Barossa, the gallant veteran who had first planted the British standards on the soil of France, inured to a long course of triumphs, was on this occasion inspired with an undue contempt for his enemies, and forgot the first rule of tactics, that of having a reserve at hand, and vigorously advancing it to support the columns which had gained decisive success. On the other hand, the highest praise is due to the resolution and skill of the French governor, and to the intrepidity of his troops, who, undismayed by reverses which in general crush a garrison, found in their own energy the means of obviating them, and converting incipient disaster into ultimate victory. The conduct of both to the prisoners taken, and the readiness

* Jones's Sieges, ii., 307, 317. Koch, ii., 153, 155. Burgh., 283, 284. Vaud., ii., 140.

* Jones's Sieges, ii., 317, 324. Graham's Official Account, March 10, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, 171. App. to Chron. Koch, ii., 155, 156. Le Grand, 32, 37.

† O'Meara.

‡ Jones's Sieges, ii., 305.

with which they agreed to and observed an armistice for burying the dead, proves that in this, as in all other cases, humanity is closely allied to the warlike virtues. From the whole events of this extraordinary assault, the young soldier may take a model of the highest daring and skill in designing an enterprise; of the most undaunted resolution and energy in repelling it; and impress the momentous truth on his mind, that the best-conceived attacks may often in the end miscarry, by want of prudence and foresight in executing them, or an undue contempt of the enemy against whom they are directed; and that, even in circumstances apparently hopeless, vigour and resolution will sometimes retrieve the most formidable disasters.

Concluding movements of the campaign in Flanders.

This bloody check paralyzed the operations of the British in the Low Countries, whose efforts were thenceforward limited, with the assistance of an inconsiderable body of Prussians, to the blockade of Bergen-op-Zoom and Antwerp. Carnot continued to exert his great talents in the preparation for the defence of Antwerp, and made more than one excursion with part of the garrison from its walls; but as the siege was not resumed, there was no opportunity of putting his system to the test. In the middle of March, however, General Thielman brought up a powerful re-enforcement of fifteen thousand Saxons to the support of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar. This raised the forces of the latter to thirty-seven thousand men, of whom twenty-seven thousand were disposable, with forty-one pieces of cannon. The opposing armies were now no longer equal; Maison was unable to keep the field, and retired under the cannon of Maubeuge and Lille, whither he was speedily followed by the Saxons under Thielman; upon which he threw a thousand men into the latter fortress, and retired into an intrenched camp under the cannon of the former. A *coup-de-main*, attempted by the Duke of Saxe-Weimar on the 21st on Maubeuge, was repulsed after three days' fighting by the combined efforts of the little garrison and the brave inhabitants; while an incursion of Thielman to push his parties up to the gates of Lille was repulsed by Maison himself, two days afterward. In fine, Flanders was lost to Napoleon; but the vigour and activity of the French general supplied the deficiencies of numbers, and promised a tedious succession of sieges before the iron frontier of old France was finally broken through.*

March 21.

March 23.

Affairs of Italy. Retreat of Eugene to the Mincio.

From Italy the accounts which Napoleon received at Rheims were less encouraging. It has already been mentioned that, in the end of December, Eugene Beauharnois had retired to the line of the Adige, which he occupied with thirty-six thousand combatants, of whom three thousand were horse; while the Austrian troops opposed to them under Bellegarde were above fifty thousand, besides the detached corps of Marshall, which observed Venice and Palma-Nuova in the rear.† This disproportion of force was the more alarming that the forces of the viceroy were for the most part new levies in the plain of Lombardy, on whom very little reliance could be placed to meet the shock of the Transalpine bayonets; while a considerable part of the Austrians were old troops, and they were all animated, from the recent successes in Germany, with the very highest spirit. Eugene, in consequence, was already taking measures for a retreat, when the proclamation of Murat against Napoleon, already mentioned, on the 19th of January, and his consequent occupation of the Roman States, by exposing his right flank and communications, rendered an immediate retrograde movement a matter of necessity. He commenced his retreat, accordingly, from the Adige, and fell back to the Mincio, where he took post behind that classic stream, with the right resting on Mantua, and left on Peschiera; while the Austrians, following him, took post in a corresponding line opposite, from Rivoli to the neighbourhood of Mantua.*

Feb. 3.

Reasons which led Eugene to give battle.

No position could be more advantageous than the defensive one thus assumed by the viceroy to resist the incursions of the Imperialists in his front; but it was by no means equally well protected against the army of Murat on his flank, which was now approaching so near as to give serious cause for uneasiness. This celebrated monarch, preferring the chance of a throne to duty and honour, had concerted his measures with the Austrian and English commanders, and after entering the ecclesiastical states, in the beginning of December, with twenty-three thousand men, was to operate on the Po, in conjunction with a British expedition under Lord William Bentinck, which, embarking from Sicily, received orders to make for Leghorn, and threaten Genoa and the maritime coasts of Napoleon's Italian dominions. Desirous of ridding himself of one enemy before he encountered another, Eugene took the bold, but yet, in his circumstances, prudent resolution of marching forward, with a view to give battle to Bellegarde, and, if possible, throw him across the Adige before Murat's troops could reach the theatre of action. His resolution was just taken in time; for at that very moment a convention had been signed with Murat, who had advanced to Bologna and declared war against France, fixing on combined operations on both banks of the Po. Thus both parties at the same time were preparing offensive movements against each other; and their mutual execution of their designs at the same time brought on one of the most singular actions that ever was fought.†

Feb. 8.

Battle of the Mincio. February 8.

The two armies, assuming the offensive at the same moment, mutually passed each other, and the advanced guard of the one, from the way in which they were marching, came first in contact with the rear-guard of the other. The Austrian right, early in the morning, crossed the Mincio at Borghetto, and drove back Grenier's division, which formed the French left, in the direction of Marengo. Eugene was advancing with his right to cross the same river at Valeggio, his right wing already over, when the cannonade on the left was heard. The moment that he

* Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 50, 53. Koch, ii., 157, 163. Plotho, iii., 472, 475.

† *Ante*, iv., 197.

* Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 191, 196. Koch, ii., 163, 179. Plotho, iii., 384.

† Koch, ii., 172, 181. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 193, 195. Botta, iv., 478.

received intelligence of what was there going forward, he conceived the bold idea of suddenly changing his front on both sides of the river, and assailing the enemy in flank when half across the same river, and in the course of their march little prepared for a battle. It was an exact repetition of Napoleon's perpendicular attack at Austerlitz, or Wellington's at Salamanca. An irregular action, in consequence, ensued, the French army advancing with great resolution in two lines, with their cavalry on the two flanks; the Austrians, surprised in their march, suddenly wheeling about and fronting the enemy wherever they came upon them. The hottest fighting was around Valeggio, where several desperate charges of cavalry and bloody combats of infantry took place, which occasioned severe loss on both sides; but at the close of the day both parties maintained nearly the ground on which they had commenced the action, though upon the whole the advantage was rather on the side of the French, who accumulated a preponderating force on the decisive point at Valeggio, and made fifteen hundred prisoners. Three thousand were killed or wounded on both sides. On the day following the viceroy retreated across the Mincio at Goito, and Bellegarde immediately pushed over some divisions in pursuit; but they were so rudely handled, after some success in the outset at Borghetto, Salo, and Gardone, that the Austrian general, after a few days' skirmishing, withdrew his troops entirely across the Mincio, alleging as an excuse, that the King of Naples was not as yet in a condition to take his part in the proposed operations.*

Feb. 9.

Feb. 10 and 14.

But although success was thus balanced on the Mincio, affairs were rapidly going to wreck in other quarters, and everything presaged the speedy expulsion of the French from the Italian Peninsula. The castle of Verona surrendered to the Austrians on the 14th; Ancona, after a siege of twenty-five days, and a bombardment of forty-eight hours, capitulated to Murat's troops on the 16th; and the Italian troops in Eugene's service, despairing of the cause of Napoleon, and unable to endure the fatigues and hardships of a winter campaign, deserted in such numbers that it was found indispensable to station the few that remained in the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua. The arrival of nearly all the French in the service of the King of Naples at Eugene's headquarters, after his declaration of war against Napoleon, was far from counterbalancing this great defalcation; and the viceroy, unable to maintain his extended position on the Mincio, drew nearer to the Po, and brought up his whole reserves from the Milanese States. Meanwhile, Pisa was threatened by Pignatelli's division, forming part of Murat's army, which, being now disengaged from Ancona, was able to invade in force the Tuscan provinces; its governor, Pouchain, upon that, summoned seven hundred of the garrison of Leghorn to his support; and as this entirely denuded the maritime districts, Fouché, who held a general commission from the emperor, in his quality of Governor of Rome, to arrange the affairs of Central Italy, concluded a convention with the Neapolitan general, in virtue of which the citadels of Pisa, Leghorn, and Lucca, in the Tuscan territories, were delivered up to the allies; and the garrisons of Volterra, Civita-Vecchia, Florence, and the castle of St. Angelo, were to be withdrawn, and transported by sea to the south of France. The old Revolutionist, the author of the *mitraillades* at Lyons, the arch-director of Napoleon's police, had his views in this convention; it led to a secret conference between him and Murat, a few days after, at Modena, in which he congratulated the Neapolitan monarch upon having extricated himself so adroitly, by joining the coalition, from the wreck of his imperial brother-in-law's fortune, and persuaded him to issue his celebrated proclamation against Napoleon. He also contrived to extract from him, before the meeting broke up, 170,000 of francs of arrears of pay due to him as Governor of Rome, and 300,000 of francs (£12,000) in bills of exchange, for the cession of his rights on the Duchy of Otranto. Having accomplished this object, the wary statesman next proceeded, with all possible expedition, across the Alps into the south of France; and thence cautiously drew near to Paris, anxious to have a hand in the convulsion in that capital which he foresaw was approaching; hastening, like the vulture, to the spot where Revolutionary cupidity was to feast on the carcass of imperial greatness.*†

Evacuation of Tuscany by the French.

Feb. 14.

Feb. 16.

Feb. 20.

Feb. 24.

Meanwhile, Lord William Bentinck, at the head of a considerable expedition from Sicily, amounting to seven thousand men, of whom, however, only one half were British soldiers, set sail for Palermo on the last day of February, and arrived off Leghorn on the 8th of March. The troops were immediately landed, the French garrison having been previously transported to the south of France in virtue of the convention concluded with Murat; and the English general immedi-

Operations of Lord W. Bentinck on the coast of Tuscany.

March 8.

* Botta, iv., 478, 479. Koch, ii., 181, 193. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 195, 199.

* Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 202, 263. Koch, ii., 194, 195. Fouché, ii., 262, 275.

† "I had a secret conference with Murat at Modena. There I made him sensible, since he had a decisive part to take, that he ought to declare himself. 'If you,' said I, 'had as much firmness in your character as you have noble sentiments in your heart, you would be more powerful in Italy than the coalition.' He still hesitated: I then communicated to him *my most recent news from Paris*. Determined by their import, he intrusted to me the proclamation which he soon afterward issued against Napoleon. . . . Soon after, I had a secret interview with Eugene, at the time when he received the intelligence of the emperor's recent success over Blucher at Champagne. 'Return to Eugene,' said the emperor to the aid-de-camp who brought the intelligence; 'tell him how I have settled with these gentlemen here; they are a set of rascals whom I will put to flight with strokes of the whip.' All the world at the viceroy's headquarters were in transports at this intelligence: I took Eugene aside, and told him such rodomontade could impose on none but enthusiastic fools; that all reasonable persons saw the imminent danger in which the imperial throne was placed; and that it was not the nation which was wanting to Napoleon, but Napoleon, by his despotism, who had destroyed the spirit of the nation. I gave some good counsel to Eugene, and set out for Lyons; and there, as I saw the spirit of resistance was alive only in the public functionaries, I announced that a million of men were pouring into France, the defection of the King of Naples, and that it was impossible to reinstate affairs but by a great political change. I soon saw that the authorities had secret instructions regarding me, and, in effect, I was soon after obliged to set out for Valence and Dauphiny instead of Paris, the only destination to which I was at that juncture inclined."—*Mémoires de* FOUCHE, ii., 263, 275.

ately issued a proclamation, in which he called on the Tuscans to rise and join his troops in liberating Italy from the oppressors. At the same time, the hereditary prince of Sicily, who accompanied the expedition, issued of his own authority a proclamation, in which he openly brought forward his claims to the throne of Naples, and announced to the Sicilian troops in the expedition that he was about to assert them by force of arms. This injudicious and ill-timed effusion immediately gave umbrage to Murat, who had declared for the allies only in order to preserve that throne; and it not only had the effect of making him suspend his operations on the Po against the viceroy, and concentrate his troops in order to be ready for any contingency, but produced such ill humour in his mind as had wellnigh thrown him again into the arms of Napoleon. Bentinck had an interview with him, and insisted upon the evacuation of Tuscany by the Neapolitan troops; but he failed in appeasing his wrath or gaining that object, and a rupture seemed inevitable, when it was fortunately prevented by the seasonable interposition of the British government, who disavowed the hereditary prince's proclamation, and relinquished the demand for the evacuation of Tuscany. Meanwhile, the English general, finding combined operations with the King of Naples in his present temper impossible, moved his troops from Pisa to Lucca, in order to co-operate with the second division of the expedition, which had landed in the Gulf of La Spezia, in a general attack on Genoa. It did not take place, however, till after the fall of Napoleon, and though entirely successful, as will afterward appear, was accompanied with declarations on the part of Lord William which proved in no small degree embarrassing in the final settlement of Europe at the Congress of Vienna.*

March 10.

March 25.

The concentration of troops which took place, however, in consequence of Murat's jealousy of the hereditary prince's proclamation, relieved Eugene from part of the weight which had hitherto oppressed him, and demonstrated again, for the hundredth time, the inability of the Neapolitan soldiers to withstand the shock of the Transalpine bayonets. Murat, having pushed forward a division under Colonel Metzko to Casal-Maggiore on the Po, commenced the construction of a bridge there; but Metzko was surprised three days afterward by Bonnernain, with a division of Eugene's men, driven from the place, and the whole boats which had been collected were taken. Murat, upon this, retired, and Eugene having pushed General Grenier with his division, entirely French, across the river at Borgoforte, chased the Neapolitans, with great loss, from Guastalla, and next day the victors appeared before Parma, and routed the allied troops which occupied it. In this affair Metzko's Neapolitan brigade was entirely dispersed; sixteen hundred men, chiefly Austrians, were taken in the town of Parma, and Grenier, following up his success before the enemy could recover from their consternation, made himself master of Reggio, and threw the Neapolitans back to the foot of the Apennines. Murat, however, discovering some days afterward that this town was only occupied by three thousand men, pushed forward his advanced guard, composed entirely of Austrians, and carried Rubiera, where a detachment was placed, by assault, driving the garrison back to Reggio. Encouraged by this success, he advanced to the attack of the latter town; and Severoli, who commanded the troops which occupied it, had the imprudence to deliver a pitched battle before its walls, against a German force nearly three times superior, in which, after a gallant resistance, he was worsted; and having been obliged to leave the field severely wounded, his successor in the command, Rambourg, withdrew into the town, and soon after entered into a convention with Murat for its evacuation. The King of Naples, in consequence, entered Reggio on the following day, and pushed his vanguard on to Parma; but there the advance of the Neapolitans was arrested by the proclamation of the hereditary prince of Sicily already mentioned. The concentration of the Neapolitan troops in Tuscany enabled Eugene again to assume a menacing aspect on the Mincio against Bellegarde, and the whole remainder of March passed away without any enterprise of note taking place on the part of any of the three armies which now contended for the empire of Italy.*

Successes of Eugene on the Po.

Feb. 24.

Feb. 27.

March 1.

March 2.

March 3.

March 6.

March 7.

March 8.

Events of no ordinary importance had also at this period occurred at Lyons and its vicinity, where Augereau had been left, as already mentioned, to make head against the Austrian corps of Count Bubna. It has been noticed also that Geneva was occupied by the Austrian commander, in the beginning of January, without resistance; and such was the state of destitution in which the military force and fortresses of France at that period were, that if they had pushed on they might, with ease, have made themselves masters of Lyons, and the whole course of the Upper Rhone, before the middle of that month. The progress of the Austrians, however, was so slow that it was not till the 14th of January that their advanced posts even appeared before Lyons, and on that very day Augereau arrived from Paris to take the command. At that period there were only seventeen hundred regular troops in the garrison, inadequately supported by some thousand National Guards. Despairing of arresting the attack of the enemy with such feeble means, Augereau proceeded on to the south, to Valence, in order to hasten the armaments and organize troops in that direction, leaving General Musnier in command of the slender garrison at Lyons, with instructions to retard the enemy as much as possible, but not expose the city to the horrors of an assault.†

Affairs at Lyons.

Jan. 1.

Jan. 14.

The imminent danger that Lyons, the second city in the Empire, would speedily fall before the Austrian general, who had twenty thousand men around its walls, joined to the urgent representations of Augereau, as to the total inadequacy of the means at his disposal for its defence, induced

Combats in Savoy.

* Botta, iv., 480, 481. Ann. Reg., 32, 33. Koch, ii., 208, 210.

* Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 205, 207. Koch, ii., 195, 206. Bott., ii., 479.

† Koch, ii., 211, 219. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 207, 210. Plotho, iii., 452.

Napoleon to take the most vigorous measures for its relief. Augereau sent a thousand men, in post carriages, from Valence, who arrived during the night of the 18th; and re-enforcements having come in from other quarters soon after, the Austrians, who were ignorant of the real weakness of the garrison, and had not heavy artillery to undertake a siege, retired to Montluel, on the road to Geneva, where they remained inactive till the end of January. This retrograde movement, coupled with the daily arrival of some hundred conscripts from the depôts in the south and west within their walls, revived the spirit of the Lyonese, who, in the first instance, had despaired altogether of the possibility of resistance; and the National Guard soon raised the effective force in the garrison to ten thousand men. The Austrians now gave over all thoughts of an immediate attack on Lyons; and extending themselves from Geneva towards the valleys of Savoy, entered Chamberri after some successful combats, and got possession of the well-known and romantic defile of Echelles, the only direct, though steep and rugged, entrance from the plain of the Rhone into the Alpine heights. At the same time, Bubna pushed a considerable body of troops towards Chalons, made himself master of that town, and the whole country between the Aisne and the Saone; and everywhere disarmed the inhabitants, and applied the resources of the country to the supply of the allied forces.*

Jan. 18. Jan. 20. Jan. 21. Jan. 20. Jan. 31.

Augereau resumes the offensive in the Jura and Savoy.

The efforts of Napoleon, however, to re-enforce the army at Lyons, at length produced the desired effect. A considerable body of troops was drawn from Suchet's army in Catalonia, transported by post to Nismes, and thence forwarded, with every sabre and bayonet which could be collected in Languedoc, to Lyons. These great re-enforcements raised the troops under Augereau, who had now re-established his headquarters at Lyons, to twenty-one thousand men, who were divided into two corps, one of which, twelve thousand strong, under the command of the marshal in person, acted on the right bank of the Rhone, while the other, of nine thousand, led by Marchand, operated on the left bank. This force was much greater than any which Bubna could bring against him; and as this accumulation on the side of Lyons occurred at the very time that Napoleon enjoined a vigorous offensive to Augereau, after his own defeat of Blucher and resumption of operations against the Grand Army at Montereau, in order to threaten its flanks and rear, he immediately commenced active hostilities on both sides of the Rhone. Gradually the Austrians were forced back on the road from Lyons to Geneva; Bourg and Nantua were recovered; Marchand forced the steep pass of Echelles after a bloody conflict, and drove the enemy in confusion to Chamberri, where, nearly surrounded, they were glad to escape to Aix on the Lake of Bourget, between that town and Geneva, where they took up a strong position with the lake on one flank, the precipitous mountains on the other, and a morass in front.

Feb. 14. Feb. 19. Feb. 20. Feb. 15. Feb. 19.

* Plotho, iii. 453, 457. Koch, ii., 211, 225. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 211, 215.

There, however, they were soon attacked by the French, now flushed with victory; the position was carried, Aix taken, and the Austrians, after several unsuccessful combats, thrown back to the heights in front of Geneva.*

Feb. 22, 23, and 26.

Considerable as these successes were, they were very far from either answering the expectations, or coming up to the views of the French emperor. It was on the banks of the Seine, and not either in Savoy or the banks of the Rhone, that the contest was to be decided: Napoleon intended Augereau to threaten the flanks and rear of the Grand Army at the very time that he assailed it in front; and every movement on that marshal's part was therefore eccentric, and to be deprecated, which did not bring him close upon Schwartzenberg's rear. He was no sooner informed, therefore, of the direction of the French forces from Lyons into Savoy, than he wrote to him that it was towards Geneva and the Pays de Vaud that his march should be turned, as they lay on the communications of the Grand Army; that it was by massing his troops together, and acting at one point, that great things were to be done; and that he should forget he was fifty-six years old, and think only of his brilliant days at Castiglione.†‡ Augereau, however, was fearful of engaging his troops, of whom not more than one half were thoroughly disciplined and experienced, in a distant warfare in the defiles of the Jura; and he remained almost inactive till the end of February, content with the successes he had already gained on the side of Savoy: a degree of torpor, considering the vital interests which were then at stake in the headquarters of Schwartzenberg's army, and the

Displeasure of Napoleon at the direction of these attacks.

* Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 214, 220. Koch, ii., 226, 232. Plotho, iii., 454, 455.

† *Ante*, i., p. 410.

‡ "Count Bubna has not ten thousand men under his command to oppose to you—miserable troops, who will disappear like a mist before the sun at the aspect of your old bands from Catalonia. France and Switzerland have their eyes upon you; the inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud and Argovia have sixteen battalions of militia ready to range themselves on your side; the cantons of St. Gall, Soleure, and a part of Zurich, only await your standards to declare themselves in favour of the French. Forget that you are fifty-six years old, and think only of your brilliant days at Castiglione." And a few days after he wrote, "The emperor is not satisfied with your dispositions, in pushing detachments in this manner wherever the enemy has forces, instead of striking at his heart. He directs me, in consequence, to reiterate the orders you have already three times received. You are to *unite all your forces into one column*, and march either into the Pays de Vaud or the Jura, according as the enemy is in most force in the one or the other. It is by concentrating forces in masses that great successes are obtained. I have the best reasons for assuring you that the enemy is seriously alarmed at the movements he supposes you are to make, and which he was bound to expect; he would be too happy if he could assure himself that you would merely send out detachments in different directions, all the while remaining yourself quiet at Lyons. It is by putting yourself at the head of your troops, as the emperor wishes, and acting vigorously, that you can alone effect a great and useful diversion. The emperor conceives it to be altogether immaterial that the battalions of reserve from Nismes are ill clothed and equipped, since they have muskets and bayonets. He desires me to tell you that the corps of Gerard, which has done such great things under his eyes, is composed of conscripts half naked. He has at this moment four thousand National Guards in his army, with round hats, with peasants' coats and waistcoats, and without knapsacks, armed with all sorts of muskets, on whom he puts the greatest value; he only wishes he had thirty thousand of them."—Duc de Feltre (Clarke) à M. le Duc de Castiglione, *Feb.* 22 *and* 23, 1814. *Victoires et Conquêtes*, xxiii., 219 220.

terror which his movement from Lyons had already excited among the Austrian generals, which the French military historians may well denominate fatal. Meanwhile, the allied sovereigns, as already mentioned,* directed the reserves of the Grand Army towards Chalons and Maçon, in the direction of Lyons, and the formation of an army, to be called the army of the South, forty thousand strong, on the banks of the Saone; and Napoleon, to counterbalance this great detachment, ordered Suchet to re-enforce Augereau with ten thousand additional veterans from the army of Catalonia, and Prince Borghese to send eight thousand, with all possible expedition, across Mont Cenis to Lyons, so that, by the beginning of April, the contending armies on the Rhone would each amount to nearly fifty thousand men.†

Roused, at length, from his ruinous inactivity at Lyons by the repeated exhortations of the emperor, Augereau, in the beginning of March, put himself in motion in the direction evidently pointed out by the strategetical operations going forward on the banks of the Seine. Dessaix and Marchand made a combined attack on the Austrian positions in front of Geneva; and, after a series of obstinate engagements, drove them back into that town, with the loss of a thousand men. Fort Ecluse was captured next day; and the victorious French, instead of following up their successes by the capture of Geneva, or extending themselves along the margin of the Leman Lake, were directed by Jourdan to attack the corps of Lichtenstein, which lay in the neighbourhood of Besançon. This diversion of force saved Geneva, and extricated Bubna from great difficulties. Meanwhile, the powerful reserves which the allies were directing towards the Saone, under Bianchi, from the rear of the Grand Army, compelled Augereau to concentrate his forces, and direct them to the right bank of the Rhone, in order to make head against them and cover Lyons. With this view, he collected the bulk of his forces from both banks of the river at Lons-le-Saulnier, and gradually fell back towards Lyons, which he re-entered on the 9th of March. The exposed situation of an Austrian detachment at Maçon induced him, two days afterward, to order an attack by Musnier on that town; but Bianchi, advancing in person to its support, opened a warm fire from thirty pieces of artillery on the attacking column, and they were defeated with the loss of seven hundred men and two cannon. Disconcerted by this check, the French forces fell back towards Lyons, closely followed by the allied troops, as well in the Jura as in the valley of the Saone; and on the 18th, the Austrians, under Prince Hesse-Homburg, thirty thousand strong, made a general attack on the French line. Bianchi and Wimpffen assailed their right, while the Prince of Wied-Runcket turned their left by the road of Beaugiu. The French combated with great bravery, and in some points, particularly Lage-Longsart, gained, in the first instance, considerable advantages; but Wimpffen restored the combat, and Wied-Runcket having threatened their left, Augereau retreated to Limonet, on the road to Lyons, with hardly any hope of preserving that city from the enemy.*

Augereau's operations in the Jura. Feb. 27 and 28. March 2. March 3. March 7. March 9. March 11. March 18.

Determined, however, to retard the allies as much as possible, in order to give time for the arrival of the great re-enforcements, eighteen thousand strong, ordered, in the beginning of March, from Catalonia and Turin, above two thousand of which had already come up, Augereau took post across the great road near Limonet, barring all access to Lyons on that side. Musnier's division was established near Limonet, on the heights between the Saone and the Lyons road, and from thence the line extended by the plateau to Dardilly. The Prince of Hesse-Homburg made the following dispositions: Bianchi, after passing the defile of Dorieux, was to form between Dommartin and Salvagny, and push on direct for Lyons; Wimpffen was to support Bianchi, as soon as sufficient room was made for him to deploy; while Mumb, at the head of a brigade, was to follow the crest of the ridge which extends towards Lyons from Chasselay, and threaten the rear of the enemy. All these attacks proved successful. At noon, Musnier, seeing Mumb's brigade rapidly gaining the ridge in his rear, conceived himself cut off, and fell back towards Lyons; while Bianchi, without much difficulty, made himself master of the plateau of Dardilly, and, extending his lines along its summit, soon gained room for Wimpffen to pass the defile in his rear, and form on his right. The battle seemed already gained, as the French right and centre had abandoned their position, and were falling back towards Lyons, when the aspect of affairs was unexpectedly changed by two thousand foot, and three hundred horse, who made so vigorous an attack on Wied-Runcket, near the road to Moulins, that they not only arrested his advance, but gave time for Augereau to rally his other divisions, in full retreat towards Lyons, and bring them back to the charge. A furious combat now took place along the whole line, and continued with various success till nightfall; but at the close of the action, the progress of the Austrians, though not decisive, was distinctly marked on all sides; and Augereau, despairing of being able any longer to defend Lyons, evacuated the city at midnight, taking the road to Valence, in order to gain the line of the Isère. Next day the Austrians entered, and the second city in the Empire saw the allied colours waving on its walls.†

Battle of Limonet, and fall of Lyons. March 20.

In these actions, from the 16th to the 20th inclusive, the allies lost two thousand nine hundred men, killed, wounded, and prisoners: the French loss, as they were defending positions, did not exceed two thousand; but they left behind them twenty-two pieces of cannon, and large military stores of all kinds, including twenty-four thousand rounds of cannon-ball, in Lyons. The effects of this conquest were immense. It immediately liberated Bubna, who had for three weeks been nearly besieged by the French in Geneva;

Great effects of this victory.

* *Ante*, iv., p. 317.

† Fain, 116. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 219, 221. Koch, ii., 237, 239. Vaud., ii., 143, 144; and i., 431, 438.

* Koch, ii., 240, 254. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 226, 229. Plotho, iii., 459, 460. Vaud., ii., 151, 157.

† Plotho, iii., 460, 461. Koch, ii., 256, 263. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 227, 232.

Marchand, so recently victorious, was obliged to retire in haste to Grenoble, closely followed by the Austrians, who retaliated upon him all that they had recently suffered in their own retreat; and, to complete their misfortunes, the united French force, now reduced to twenty thousand combatants, had hardly taken post behind the Isère, thus abandoning entirely the passes of the Simplon and Mont Cenis, the great gates from France into Italy, when the crushing intelligence reached Augereau of the capture of Bordeaux by the British, accompanied by a pressing order from Napoleon that six of the ten thousand men who had been promised him from Suchet's army should be directed to the re-enforcement of Soult. This last blow broke the spirit of the veteran marshal; and deeming the cause of Napoleon all but hopeless, he wrote to Eugene, informing him of the full extent of the emperor's disasters, and conjuring him, in the name of their common country, to hasten with his yet unbroken army across the Alps, and, if he could not avert its misfortunes, at least share its fate. Meanwhile, he stationed his troops in *echelon* down the line of the Rhone, from Valence to the Pont St. Esprit, in order to establish an interior line of communication with Marshal Soult, and be in a situation to join him before the Prince of Hesse-Homburg could stretch across the south of France to unite with the victorious standards of Wellington on the banks of the Garonne.*

Concluding operations of Wellington in the south of France.

While the empire of Napoleon was thus crumbling away in Flanders, Italy, and on the Rhone, disasters attended with still more serious consequences, as leading directly to his dethronement, had occurred in the south of France.

Wellington's difficulties in the south of France.

The concluding and bloody operations of Wellington and Soult on the Nive, already mentioned,† were succeeded by a considerable rest to both armies. This, however, was far from being a period of repose to Wellington himself; on the contrary, his difficulties seemed to multiply even in the midst of his triumphs; and he never had more obstacles to encounter than now, when they seemed to be all vanishing before him. The noble and heroic system of protection to others and self-denial to himself, by which, in the eloquent words of an eyewitness, "order and tranquillity profound, on the edge of the very battle-field, attended the march of the civilized army which passed the Bidassoa,"‡ necessarily, when a hundred thousand men were to be provided for, occasioned an extraordinary strain on the British finances. Such were the demands on the English treasury at this period, from having come under an engagement to give £11,000,000 sterling in subsidies to the allied powers during a single year, besides arming nearly the whole of their vast warlike arrays, maintaining the contest at once in the south of France, Flanders, and Italy, and supporting a most expensive war by sea and land against America, that it was with the utmost difficulty that government could find the means of answering them, even out of the boundless resources and now exalted spirit of England. Above all, the difficulty of furnishing *specie* in sufficient quantity for an army of such magnitude, which paid everything in ready money, and levied no contributions on the conquered territory, especially at a time when the prodigious armies on the Rhine had absorbed nearly the whole circulating medium of the Continent, had become excessive. The utmost that government could furnish was a hundred thousand pounds in specie a month; but though this steady drain was felt as so severe at home, that the under-secretary of state, Colonel Bunbury, was sent out to endeavour to reduce it, yet it was very far indeed from answering Wellington's necessities. Some of his muleteers were two years in arrear; the soldiers, in general, had been seven months without pay; the debt owing by the English authorities in every part of the country was immense, although in the last year £2,572,000 had passed in specie through the military chest; the creditors, long kept out of their money, were becoming importunate; sixteen thousand of the Peninsular troops could not be brought into France, because there was no money either to feed or pay them; extraordinary obstacles were opposed by the Democratic Spanish authorities to the establishment of hospitals in the rear, even when thirty thousand men, wounded during the campaign in their service, required attendance; and although great benefits had been experienced by declaring St. Jean de Luz a free port, yet the French, too, were constantly receiving supplies at Bayonne by sea, and, strange to say, the mistress of the ocean was unable to prevent the coasting trade of a contemptible naval force of the enemy.*

Plan of employing Wellington in Flanders, and his reasons against it.

So forcibly were the British government impressed at this period with the enormous expense at which the contest in the south of France was carried on, that, deeming the independence of the Peninsula now secured, and conceiving that the decisive point in the struggle which remained was to be found nearer Paris than the banks of the Adour or the Garonne, they seriously entertained, and transmitted to Wellington a proposal, first suggested by the Emperor of Russia, for transporting his army by sea to the Netherlands, and causing it to form the right wing of the vast army which, from the Alps to the ocean, was now invading France. It must be admitted that this project presented at first sight several advantages. The independence of the Peninsula appeared to be secured, and the black ingratitude of its Democratic rulers held out no inducement towards making any farther efforts in its behalf; the vicinity of Flanders to the British shores would enable government to augment at pleasure the army to almost any amount; an act of Parliament had recently passed authorizing three fourths of the militia to volunteer for foreign service, and there could be but little doubt that they would crowd round Wellington's standards on the Scheldt; while the defenceless condition of the French barrier towns, and total absence of any considerable military force on the frontiers of Picardy, seemed to promise to the Pen-

* Koch, ii., 263, 267. Plotho, iii., 461, 463. Vict et Conq., xxiii., 232, 234.

† *Ante*, iv., 258, 262.

‡ Napier, vi., 456.

* Wellington to Earl Bathurst, Jan. 8, 1814, Gurw., xi., 425, 427. Nap., vi., 470, 472; and Gurw., xi., 387.

insular hero, as the reward of his toils, a triumphant and almost unresisted march to Paris. But while Wellington, with his usual patriotic spirit, professed his willingness to serve his king and country wherever government might direct, he justly observed, in reply, that with a British force never exceeding thirty thousand men in the field, he had maintained his ground in the Peninsula against two hundred thousand French, and finally driven them over the Pyrenees; that the frontier now invaded by him was the most vulnerable, perhaps the only vulnerable quarter in which France could be assailed; that if he could put twenty thousand Spaniards into the field, he would take Bayonne; if forty thousand, he would have his posts on the Garonne: that the latter event would shake Napoleon incomparably more than if forty thousand British troops were besieging the Dutch fortresses; and that the consequence of withdrawing the British army would be, that a hundred thousand veteran troops, of a quality superior to any the allies had yet had to deal with, would be at once put at Napoleon's disposal to act against their armies on the Seine and the Rhone, besides an equal force of reserves now forming in the southern provinces, and who, possessing an interior line of communication, could be brought into action long before the British could be brought up, after their shipment and landing on the other side; and that their army, by such a changing of the scene of action, would, for the next four months, big with the fate of the world, be put entirely *hors-de-combat*. These considerations prevailed with the English government, and they resolved to follow their general's advice as to continuing the war in the south of France; though a considerable part of the re-enforcements destined for his army were turned aside into Holland, and formed the gallant though ill-fated corps which was wrecked on the ramparts of Bergen-op-Zoom.*

Still greater difficulties of Soult.

But if Wellington's difficulties were great, those of his antagonist were still greater: for he had to contend with a falling cause and a tottering empire; to restrain treachery, and yet avoid severity; to enforce requisitions, and not exasperate selfishness; to inspire military spirit, and avoid exciting civil indignation. To do these things had now become impossible. The hour of punishment and retribution had struck, and no human power could avert its bitterness. In vain he exerted himself to the utmost to collect resources, and assemble a respectable military force to resist the farther advance of the English general; all his efforts were like rolling the stone of Sysiphus to the summit. The urban cohorts, indeed, were readily formed, as the means of creating a police force, and the conscripts obeyed the imperial authorities, and repaired to the points assigned for their organization; but the people were sullen and apathetic: the whole class of proprietors were openly opposed to war, to which they saw no end, and from the continuance of which they could not derive any visible advantage; the Royalist committees were already active in the rear, and preparing to take advantage of the crisis, which all foresaw was approaching, to re-establish the exiled family; and, above all, the forced requisitions excited universal indignation, and inclined the peasantry, at all hazards, to desire the termination of so abominable a system. France now felt what it was to make war maintain war: her people experienced the practical working of that system, which, when applied to others, had so long been the object, to her inhabitants, of pride and exultation. The people of Bearn learned what it was, as so many provinces of Spain had so long done, to feed, clothe, lodge, and pay an army of eighty thousand of Napoleon's soldiers. Such was the magnitude of the requisitions, and so unbounded the exasperation produced by them, especially when placed in bright contrast to the strict discipline of the English army, and the invariable payment for every article taken by them, that numbers of the peasantry passed with their horses, carts, and implements of husbandry into the British lines, to obtain an enemy's protection from the rapine of their own government; and one of the commissioners at the moment wrote from Bayonne, "The English general's policy, and the good discipline he maintains, does us more harm than ten battles. *Every peasant wishes to be under his protection.*"*

Reduction of Soult's army, and increase of Wellington's.

Soult employed the two months of respite to warlike operations which was afforded by the excessive rigour of the season, after the battle of the Nive, in the middle of December, in diligently instructing his conscripts in the military art; and, under the shelter of the ramparts of Bayonne, he was able to effect it without molestation. But the necessities of the emperor, after the battle of La Rothiere, compelled him to make a large draught from the army of the South; and in the beginning of February the French general had the mortification to receive an order, which compelled him to send off two divisions of infantry, two thousand detached veterans, and six regiments of dragoons, to re-enforce the host which was combating on the banks of the Seine. About the same time, re-enforcements to the amount of five thousand men, including twelve hundred horse, arrived at Wellington's headquarters from England; and the whole cavalry of the army, which had been sent back, from want of forage, to the banks of the Ebro, was now, with the returning spring, brought up again to those of the Adour. By this means Soult's effective troops in the field, after deducting the garrison of Bayonne and other forts which he was obliged to defend, did not exceed forty thousand men; and a considerable part of this force was composed of conscripts, who, though disciplined, were not yet inured to war, and could not be relied upon either to withstand the fatigues or confront the dangers of serious warfare in the campaign. On the other hand, the Anglo-Portuguese force, by the *Morning State* on February 13th, when the advance commenced, amounted to seventy thousand men, of whom ten thousand were cavalry, and the Spaniards were thirty thousand more: in all, a hundred thousand, with a hundred and forty pieces of cannon: a prodigious force to be collected at one point, under the command of a single general; and, considering the discipline and spirit of the troops, and the tal-

Feb. 4.

* Wellington to Earl Bathurst, Dec. 21, 1813, Gurw., xi., 384, 385.

* Nap., vi., 505, 507. Pellot, Guerre des Pyrenees, 54.

ents and experience of their chief, the most formidable army which had ever been put forth by the power of England.*†

Rejection of the treaty of Valençay by the Cortes, and arrival of the Duc d'Angouleme at Wellington's headquarters.

The security which the English general felt in commencing his military operations was much augmented by the rejection at the same time, by the Cortes at Madrid, of the treaty of Valençay, insidiously extorted at this period from the weak and captive Ferdinand. This resolution gave, as well it might, the highest satisfaction to Wellington; demonstrating in the clearest manner, that with whatever Republican ambition the government of Spain, elected under the impulse of universal suffrage, might be infected, they had not yet forgotten their patriotic resistance to Gallic aggression, nor were prepared to accept a despot from the prisons of a desolating conqueror. He was not a little embarrassed, however, shortly after, by an event as unforeseen as it was perplexing, and which at once involved him in those difficult questions concerning the future government of France which the allied sovereigns even felt themselves unable to determine, and which, by common consent, they left to time and the course of events to resolve. The partisans of the Bourbons in La Vendée and the western provinces had for some time past been in secret communication with the English general; although he took the utmost pains to guard them against committing themselves prematurely, not merely from the total uncertainty in which he was as to the intentions of the allied sovereigns with respect to the future government of France, but from the advice which he had given the British cabinet to accede to any peace with Napoleon which might afford reasonable security against aggression to the rest of Europe.‡ Matters, however, were at length brought to a crisis, by the Duke d'Angouleme suddenly arriving at headquarters; but in the critical circumstances which ensued, Wellington acted with his wonted judgment and delicacy. While manifesting the most marked attention towards the illustrious prince, he insisted upon his remaining incognito till the intentions of the allied sovereigns were distinctly pronounced; advised him, for the interests of his royal house, "neither to anticipate public opinion nor precipitate matters;" and would not allow him to leave St. Jean de Luz to accompany the army in active operations. At the same time, when he perceived, after the advance of the British to Orthes, that the spirit of the country was more openly manifesting itself, he made no scruple in informing the British government of the change, and apprizing them that "any decided declaration from them against Napoleon would spread such a flame through the country as would infallibly overturn him."*

Wellington's proclamation against the insurrection in Baygorry.

Previous to commencing active operations, there was one festering wound in his rear which it was the peculiar care of Wellington to close, and which his mingled firmness and humanity succeeded in healing. The mountainous districts of Baygorry and Bidarry, at the foot of the Pyrenees, had suffered severely from the rapine of Mina's troops before they were sent back into Spain; and several able French generals, especially General Harispe, who was a native of that district, had, in consequence, succeeded in rousing a national war among the peasants of those valleys, which did very serious injury to the allied army. To crush this dangerous example, which it had been the grand object of the English general to prevent, he issued a proclamation to the people in the French and Basque languages, which happily, on this painful and delicate subject, steered the middle course between savage cruelty and ruinous lenity. Without forbidding the peasants to take up arms to defend their country—as Napoleon had so often done in Spain, Italy, and the Tyrol—and denouncing the penalty of death in case of disobedience, he contented himself with declaring that, if they wanted to be soldiers, they must leave their homes and join the regular armies; in which case they should, if taken, be treated as prisoners of war, and their dwellings and families protected; but that he would not permit them with impunity to play the part alternately of a peaceable inhabitant and of a soldier.† In this proclamation there was nothing in the slightest degree unjust; it trenched on none of the natural rights of man to defend his country; it merely denounced as pirates and robbers those who, claiming and enjoying the benefits of hostile discipline, insidiously turned their arms

* See Morning State, Feb. 13, 1814, Nap., v., 706; and v., 506, 507, 525. Koch, ii., 268, 275. Vaud., ii., 160, 162.

† See App. A, chap. lxxv.

‡ "The people here all agree in one opinion, viz., that the sentiment throughout France is the same as I have found it here—an earnest desire to get rid of Bonaparte and his government, from a conviction that, as long as he governs, they will have no peace. The language common to all is, that although the grievous hardships and oppression under which they suffer are intolerable, they dare not have the satisfaction even of complaining; that, on the contrary, they are obliged to pretend to rejoice, and that they are allowed only to lament in secret and in silence their hard fate. They say that the Bourbons are as unknown in France as the princes of any other sovereign house in Europe. I am convinced, more than ever, that Napoleon's power stands upon corruption, and that he has no adherents in France but the principal officers of his army, and the *employés civils* of his government, with some of the new proprietors. Notwithstanding this, I recommend your lordship to make peace with him, if you can acquire all the objects which you have a right to expect. All the powers require peace even more than France; and it would not do to found a new system of war upon the speculations of any individual, on what he sees and hears in a corner of France. If Bonaparte becomes moderate, he is probably as good a sovereign as we can desire in France; if he does not, we shall probably have another war in a few years."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, 21*st Nov.*, 1813, GURWOOD, xi., 304, 305.

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, March 4, 1814, and to Duc d'Angouleme, Feb. 25, 1814, Gurw., xi., 547, 549. Beauch., 40, 44.

† "The conduct of the people of Bidarry and Baygorry has given me the greatest pain: it has been different from that of all the other inhabitants of the country, and they have no right to act as they have done. If they wish to make war, let them join the ranks of the enemy; but I will not permit them to play the part alternately of peaceable inhabitants and soldiers. If they remain quietly at home, no one will molest them; they shall be, on the contrary, protected, like all the other inhabitants of this country which my armies occupy. They ought to know that I have done everything in my power to fulfil the engagements which I have undertaken towards the country; but I give them warning that, if they persist in making war, they must join the enemy's ranks and become soldiers; they must not remain in their villages."—*Proclamation by* WELLINGTON, 28*th January*, 1814, GURWOOD, xi. 485. What a contrast to the savage proclamation of Soult, Augereau, Bessières, and Napoleon, in similar circumstances!—See *Ante*, i., 405, *for* NAPOLEON *at Pavia*; iii., 438, *for* AUGEREAU *and* BESSIERES; and iii., 412, *for* SOULT; all combined and referred to in iv., 330.

against those to whom they owed these blessings, and neither yielded the submission which is the condition of protection to the citizen, nor assumed the profession which gives the privileges of the soldier. Perhaps it was impossible on this difficult subject, fraught with such dreadful consequences on either side, to steer the middle course more happily; and the effect corresponded to such intentions, for the insurrection was speedily appeased; and, though Wellington desired his officers to inform the people that if any farther outrages continued he would treat them as the French had done the villages in Spain and Portugal—that is, he would destroy the houses and hang the inhabitants—yet it was not necessary to carry any of these menaces into effect.*

Position of Soult around Bayonne.

Although Soult's regular force in the field was little more than half of what his adversary could bring to bear against him, yet his situation, with the advantage of the now powerful and fully-armed fortress of Bayonne, at the confluence of the Nive and Adour, to protect his right, was such as in a great degree to counterbalance the inequality of numbers. The fortress itself, which could be rendered in great part inaccessible by inundations of the Lower Adour, could only be besieged in form by crossing that river, and breaking ground on the right bank; and this was no easy matter to accomplish in the face of a powerful flotilla of gunboats collected to obstruct the passage, and the efforts of an army of forty thousand men, sheltered by the guns of the place. Deeming his right sufficiently secured by this strong *point d'appui*, Soult, during the course of January, draughted off the bulk of his forces to his left, in the mountains towards St. Jean Pied-de-Port, and strengthened his position there by field-works; but he had no confidence in his ability to maintain his ground under the cannon of the fortress when the Upper Adour should be gained, as he foresaw it speedily would, by the enemy; and therefore he wrote to Napoleon, strongly counselling him to abandon all lesser objects, and concentrate his whole disposable forces from all quarters in a great army on the Seine, to prevent Paris from falling into the hands of the allies. For this purpose, he proposed that Bayonne should be left to its own resources, with a garrison of fourteen thousand men; that Clauzel, with two divisions, should be left in the Pyrenees to act on the rear of the invading force; and that the whole remainder of the army should march under his own command to Paris. Perhaps this was the only plan which, in the desperate state of the emperor's fortunes, promised a chance of success; but such as it was, it was disapproved of by him, as contravening his favourite political system of giving nothing up; and he commanded Soult to maintain himself as long as he could, in any defensive position he could find, on the banks of the Adour.†

Wellington forces the passage of the Upper Adour.

Having completed his preparations, Wellington determined to force the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, and for this purpose he collected at the mouth of the river forty large sailing boats of thirty or forty tons' burden each, professedly for the commissariat, but in truth laden with planks and other materials for the purpose of building a bridge between that point and the fortress. The better to conceal his real designs from the enemy, he determined, at the same time, to threaten the French left with Hill's corps, and turn it by the sources of the rivers at the foot of the mountains, while Beresford, with the main body, menaced their centre. By this means, if his left, which was under the direction of Hope, succeeded in forcing the passage of the river, he hoped to cut Soult off entirely from Bordeaux, and drive him from under the cannon of Bayonne towards the Upper Garonne. A hard frost having at length rendered the deep clayey roads of Bearn practicable, the troops were all put in motion at daybreak on the 14th of February. Hill marched with twenty thousand men against Harispe, who lay at Hellette with five thousand men, while another column moved towards the Joyeuse streamlet. After a slight combat, the French general, wholly unable to resist such a superiority of force, fell back, and the fortress of St. Jean Pied-de-Port was immediately invested by Mina's battalions. Meanwhile, the allied centre, under Beresford, advanced against the French centre, under Clauzel, who, in obedience to his orders, fell back successively across the Joyeuse, the Bidouse, and the Gave de Mauleon, behind which he at length took up a position. Meanwhile, Jaca, commanding the pass from that quarter into Arragon, being left to its own resources by this retreat of the French left, capitulated. At the same time, Harispe having taken post in a strong position on the Garris Mountain, Wellington, who had rode up late in the evening to the spot, struck with the necessity of driving the enemy from such a post before Soult had time to re-enforce the troops who occupied it from his centre, gave orders to attack, observing to the 28th and 30th regiments, which headed the assaulting column, "You must take the hill before dark." With loud shouts these gallant regiments rushed forward into the dark and woody ravine at its foot, and, clambering up the opposite side, carried the height almost immediately; but the enemy, seeing they were unsupported, returned twice to the charge, striving to regain the hill with the bayonet; but they were beat off with the loss of three hundred killed and wounded, and two hundred prisoners, while the British were only weakened by a hundred and sixty.*

Feb. 17.

Soult, upon this, drew back his troops across the Bidouse River by the bridge of St. Palais, which he destroyed; but Hill immediately repaired it; and on the 17th the French on the left were driven across the Gave de Mauleon, without having time to destroy the bridge of Arrivereta, from the 92d—ever foremost where glory was to be won—having discovered a ford above the bridge, and dislodged two battalions of French infantry posted to guard it. In the night of the 17th, the French retired across the Gave d'Oleron, and took up a strong position near Sauveterre, and Hill pushed forward his advanced post, and was next morn-

Passage of the Gave de Mauleon.

* Wellington to Sir W. Beresford, Jan. 28, 1814, Gurw., xi., 483, 484.

† Soult to Napoleon, Feb. 5, 1814, Nap., vi., 511, 514.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Feb. 26, 1814, Gurw., xi., 522. Nap., ii., 527, 533. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 237, 239. Koch, ii., 276, 279.

ing on that river; but as the bridges were all broken down, it could not be passed till the pontoon-train arrived, which occasioned, as the roads had become impassable from snow, a delay of several days. These decided movements on the right, however, had the desired effect of withdrawing Soult's attention from the Lower Adour, and inducing him to concentrate the bulk of his forces on the ridge of Sauveterre on his left, to defend the passage of the Gave d'Oleron. The time, therefore, having arrived for the attempt to force the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, Hope, on the night of the 22d, cautiously moved the first division, rocket brigade, and six heavy guns, to the sandhills near the mouth of the river; and at daybreak on the following morning, although the stormy, contrary winds and violent surf on the coast prevented the arrival of the gunboats and *chasse-marées*, which were intended to have co-operated in the passage, he gallantly resolved to force the passage alone.*

Feb. 22.

The French, however, were aware of what was going forward. No sooner were the scarlet uniforms seen emerging from the shelter of the sandhills, than the French flotilla, which, from the British gunboats not having got up, had the undisputed command of the river, opened a tremendous fire upon them. The British heavy guns and rocket brigade, which, on this occasion, was for the first time introduced in the Peninsular war,† replied with so quick and sustained a discharge, that a sloop and three gunboats were speedily sunk, and the rest of the flotilla, in consternation at the awful aspect and rush of the rockets, drew off, out of reach of fire, farther up the river. Upon this, sixty of the Guards were rowed across in a pontoon, in face of a French detachment, which was so terrified by the rockets whizzing through their ranks, that they also took to flight. A raft was then formed with the remainder of the pontoons, and a hawser having been stretched across, six hundred of the Guards and the 66th regiment, with part of the rocket brigade, were passed over. They were immediately attacked by a French brigade under Macomble; but the assailants were struck with such consternation at the unwonted sight and sound of the rockets, that they too fled at the first discharge. The British continued to pass troops and artillery over the whole night; and by noon next day they were solidly established on the right bank, in such force as to render any attack hopeless.‡

And of the Lower Adour.

Feb. 23.

To complete their security, the British flotilla, under Admiral Penrose, at this time appeared off the mouth of the river; and the boats of the men-of-war, with characteristic gallantry, instantly dashed into the raging surf to join in the dangers of their comrades ashore. O'Reilly, who led the whole, was thrown by the waves on the beach, with his whole crew, and only saved by the soldiers picking them up, when stretched senseless on the sand. The whole flotilla, when the tide rose, advanced in close order; but the long swell of the Bay of Biscay, impelled by a furious west wind, broke with such terrific violence on the shore, that several of the boats were swallowed up, with their gallant crews. Another and another, however, came on, rowing bravely forward to what seemed certain destruction; and at length Lieutenant Cheyne, of the Woodlark, caught the right line, and safely passed the bar. Captain Elliot of the Martial, who came next, with his launch and crew, were wrecked and all lost, and three other vessels stranded and lost part of their men, notwithstanding the utmost efforts on the part of the troops to save them. At length, however, the greater part of the flotilla was safely anchored inside the bar. Next morning a bridge was constructed by the indefatigable efforts of Major Todd, the troops and artillery were safely passed over, and Hope, two days afterward, commenced the investment of Bayonne, which, after some sharp fighting, which cost the allies five hundred killed and wounded, was effected chiefly by the admirable steadiness of the King's German Legion, upon whom the weight of the contest fell.*†

Entrance of the flotilla into the Adour, and investment of Bayonne.

March 26.

While the left wing of the army was thus establishing the investment of Bayonne, the centre and right, under the command of Wellington in person, were pursuing the career of victory on the Gave d'Oleron. The pontoons having arrived on the evening of the 23d, preparations were immediately made for the passage of that river, behind which a formidable French force, thirty-five thousand strong, was now assembled on the bridge of Sauveterre. Early on the 24th, Hill effected his passage at the head of three divisions at Villenave, while Beresford passed near Monfort with the whole centre. Soult, not deeming the position of Sauveterre tenable against the superior forces which by these movements threatened it in front, drew back his whole force, leaving Bayonne, garrisoned by six thousand men, to its own resources, and took post a little way farther back, at ORTHES, behind the Gave-de-Pau, and upon the last cluster of heights which presented a defensible position before the hills shooting off to the northward from the Pyrenees sank altogether into the plain of the Garonne. The army was here assembled on the summit of a ridge of a concave form facing the southwest, stretching from the neighbourhood of Orthes, on the left, to the summit of the heights of St. Boes, between it and Dax, on the right. D'Erlon, with the divisions of Foy and D'Armagnac, and the division Villatte in reserve, formed the centre: Clauzel, with the divisions Taupin and Maransin, occupied St. Boes and its neighbouring

Description of the French position and force at Orthes.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814, Gurw., xi., 538. Nap., vi., 534, 538. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 240. Koch, ii., 296, 297.

† Rockets had been used, for the first time in war, by the British brigade at Leipsic, on October 18, 1813.—*Vide Ante*, iv., 178.

‡ Nap., vi., 536, 541. Beamish, ii., 276, 281. Koch, ii., 296, 297.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 26, 1814, Gurw., xi., 538. Nap., vi., 539, 545. Koch, ii., 297. Beamish, ii., 278, 287.

† A curious circumstance occurred at the construction of this bridge, characteristic of the extraordinary intelligence and quickness which the long habit of campaigning had given to the British soldiers. Major Todd, who constructed the bridge, assured Colonel Napier, the Peninsular historian, that in the labours connected with it, though great part of the work was of a nautical kind, he found the soldiers, whose minds were quickened by extended experience, more ready of resource and of greater service than the seamen. —See NAPIER, vi., 542.

summits on the extreme right; while Clauzel, with the divisions Daricau, Harispe, and Paris, stretched out on the left to the town of Orthes, guarding the noble bridge over the Gave-de-Pau at that place, the strength of which had defied all attempts, even by the able French engineers, for its destruction. The whole cavalry, with the exception of some small detachments, was collected in the low grounds in front of Orthes, where alone it could act with advantage, under the orders of General Pierce Soult. Thus the French marshal had now assembled in one battle-field eight divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, which, according to their former strength in the palmy days of the Empire, would have presented at least sixty thousand combatants; but in the present wasted condition of the emperor's forces, they hardly mustered forty thousand sabres and bayonets, with forty guns.*†

Wellington's order of march, and attack.

Wellington approached this formidable position in three columns. He had thirty-seven thousand men of all arms, of whom four thousand were horse, all Anglo-Portuguese, and veteran troops, and forty-eight guns; the Spaniards being in the rear under Mina and Murillo, investing St. Jean Pied-de-Port and Navarreins, and two divisions under Hope before Bayonne. Clinton and Hill, with the right wing and right centre, advanced by the great road from Sauveterre to Orthes; Sir Stapleton Cotton, with the cavalry, crossed the Gave-de-Pau by the fords of Caunelle and La Honton; Picton, with the left centre, was near Bereux; Beresford, with the left in the field, though forming the centre of the whole arm, crossed the same river on the road from Peyrehorade, by means partly of fords and partly of pontoons. This approach to an enterprising and powerful enemy, laying in a strong and concentrated position, in three columns, extending in a mountainous country over an extent of twenty miles, presented no ordinary dangers; but the admirable quality of the troops he commanded, as well as the enfeebled spirit of the French army, made the English general hazard it without reluctance. He was in great anxiety, however, lest, against his army thus dispersed, an insurrectionary movement should spring up in the rear; and, therefore, not content with reiterating his former orders against plundering or disorders of any kind, he issued a proclamation, authorizing the people of the country, under their respective mayors, to arm themselves for the preservation of order, and arrest all stragglers or marauders. Nor did his proclamation remain a dead letter; for, on the night of the 25th, the inhabitants of a village on the high-road leading from Sauveterre, having shot one British soldier who had been plundering, and wounded another, he caused the wounded man to be hung, and sent home an English colonel who had permitted his men to destroy the municipal archives of a small town on the line of march. "Maintain the strictest discipline; without that we are lost," said he to General Freyre. By these means tranquillity was preserved in his rear during this critical movement; and the English general now reaped the fruits of the admirable discipline and forbearance he had maintained in the enemy's country, by being enabled to bring up all his reserves, and hurl his undivided force upon the hostile army. Having collected his troops in front of the enemy on the evening of the 26th, he gave orders for an attack on the line along its whole extent on the following morning, from the heights of St. Boes to the bridge of Orthes.*

Battle of Orthes. Preparatory movements.

At daybreak on the 27th, Beresford, with the left wing, consisting of the fourth and seventh divisions and Vivian's cavalry, commenced the action by turning the enemy's extreme right near St. Boes, and gaining the road to Dax beyond it; while, at the same time, Picton, moving along the great road from Peyrehorade to Orthes, with the third and sixth divisions under Clinton, supported by Cotton and Somerset's cavalry, assaulted the enemy's centre. Hill, with the second British and Le Cor's Portuguese brigade, was to endeavour to force the passage at Orthes, and attack the enemy's left. There was an alarming interval of a mile and a half between Beresford's and Picton's men; but in it was a conical hill, nearly as high as the summit of Soult's position opposite, upon the top of which, on the mouldering ramparts of an old Roman camp, Wellington, with his staff, took his station, having the whole battle spread out like a map before him. Soon the fire of musketry was heard, and volumes of smoke were seen issuing from the ravines below, as Beresford and Picton's columns, driving the enemy's pickets before them, wound their devious and intricate way through hollows, which a few men only could pass abreast, up towards the enemy's position. The moment was critical; and Picton, who was unsupported on either flank, felt for a time not a little anxious. They got through, however, without being seriously disquieted; and Wellington, who had eagerly watched their movements, as soon as they emerged into the open country, re-enforced Picton by the sixth division, and drew the light division into the rear of the Roman camp, so as to form a connecting link between Beresford and Picton's columns, and a reserve to either in case of need.†

Beresford carries St. Boes, but is arrested on the ridge beyond it.

Beresford having gained and overlapped the extreme French right, commenced a vigorous attack in front and flank on the village of St. Boes. The combat at this point was very violent: Reille's men, all tried veterans, stood firm; St. Boes was strongly occupied, and the musketry rang loud and long on the summit of the ridge without any sensible ground being won by the assailants. At length, when he got all his troops up, the English general made so vehement an onset with Cole's division in flank and Walker's in front, that the village was carried; and the victors, pursuing the

* Nap., vi., 545, 546. Koch, ii., 283, 284. Vaud., ii., 160. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 240, 241.

† See Napier, vi., 569, who quotes the numbers given above from Soult's official correspondence with the war office at Paris. The French writers, VAUDONCOURT, ii., 160, and *Vict. et Conq.*, xxiii., 236, make the numbers which fought on their side 30,500 infantry and 2900 horse. But Soult's correspondence shows that this was independent of 7000 conscripts who took part in the action; and five thousand of them were good troops.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814, Gurw., xi., 535. Nap., vi., 545, 555, 570. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 239, 240. Koch, ii., 285, 286.

† Nap., vi., 559, 560. Picton's Mem., ii., 272, 273. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814, Gurw., xi., 534. Koch, ii., 287, 288.

beaten columns of the enemy, began to move along the narrow elevated ridge, which extended from that point to the centre of their position. Here, however, all their efforts failed. The French troops, slowly retiring along the narrow neck of land, kept up an incessant rolling fire upon the pursuers; while Reille's batteries, skilfully disposed so as to rake on either flank the pursuing column, occasioned so dreadful a carnage that its advance was unavoidably checked. It was the counterpart of the terrific slaughter on the plateau of Craon. The fourth division, however, long inured to victory, and accustomed to see almost insuperable obstacles yield to their enthusiastic valour, returned to the charge, and pressed on with stern resolution; and the long train of killed and wounded which marked their advance proved the heroic valour with which they were animated. But a Portuguese brigade, torn in pieces by the terrible discharges of the cannon, every shot of which ploughed with terrible effect through their flank, at length gave way, and commenced a disorderly retreat along the narrow summit. The French, with loud shouts, and all the triumph of returning victory, pressed upon their rear; the fourth division, overwhelmed by the mass of fugitives which rushed into its ranks, reeled beneath the storm, and nothing but the subsequent timely charge of part of the light division on Reille's flank prevented a serious disaster on that part of the line. At the same time, a detachment which Picton sent forward to endeavour to gain a footing on a tongue of land, jutting out from the lofty ridge on which the enemy's centre was posted, was repulsed with loss; and Soult, seeing his troops victorious at both extremities of his line that was engaged, smote his thigh in exultation, exclaiming, "At last I have him."*

Wellington regains the battle.

But the eagle eye of Wellington was fixed on the decisive point. No sooner did he perceive, from the pause in the advance of the British along the ridge, and the continued and stationary fire which was going on, that a desperate conflict had taken place on the summit, than he made the requisite dispositions to facilitate the progress of that part of the line. The third and sixth divisions were instantly ordered to advance with all possible expedition up the hill, to attack the right of the centre; while Barnard's brigade of the light division was moved up to assail the left of their right wing, and interpose between it and the centre. The 52d, under Colonel Colborne,† led the way, and quickly reached the marsh which separated the enemy's ridge from the hill on which Wellington stood. Soon that gallant corps crossed the swamp, with the water up to the soldiers' knees, and mounting the hill unobserved amid the smoke and din on the summit, with a loud shout and crushing fire rushed forward into the opening between Taupin and Foy's divisions, at the very moment that the former, following up their success against Beresford, were driving violently through St. Boes, pushing the fourth division before them. At the same moment, Picton, at the head of his two divisions, mounted the ridge where the enemy's right centre was placed, and resolutely assailed Foy and D'Armagnac on their almost impregnable position. The effect of these simultaneous attacks, skilfully directed and gallantly executed, against two thirds of the enemy's line, was decisive. It was a repetition of the fatal flank attacks of Austerlitz and Salamanca. Foy and D'Armagnac, hard pressed themselves, were unable to send any succours to Reille's wing, which, thus cut off by Colborne's happy irruption, and assailed on one flank by his victorious troops, and on the other by Beresford's men, who, hearing the turmoil in the enemy's rear, returned with the discipline of veterans to the charge, fell into confusion, and were driven headlong down the hill, with the loss of part of their cannon. Cole's men now rushed with loud shouts along the narrow strait, strewed with so many of their dead, and joined with Barnard's brigade, so as completely to make themselves masters of that important part of the enemy's position. At the same time Foy fell, badly wounded, in the centre, and his division, falling into confusion, retreated down the hill on the opposite side, and, of necessity, drew after it D'Armagnac and Maransin's. Wellington immediately pushed forward the seventh division, hitherto held in reserve, and two batteries of artillery, which ascended to the narrow ridge now occupied by the fourth division and Barnard's brigade. At the same time, Picton, with the third and sixth divisions, reached the summit of the ridge in the middle, driving D'Armagnac before them down the other side; and his guns, established on a commanding knoll in the centre, ploughed through the enemy's masses from one end of his position to the other.*

Soult orders a general retreat.

The victory was now secure; and it was rendered more decisive by the simultaneous success of Hill on the extreme right, who had forced the passage of the Gave by the ford of Souars near Orthes, seized the heights above, won the great road from thence to Pau, and thus not only cut off his best and only direct line of retreat, but prevented Harispe, on the extreme French left, from sending any succours to their hard-pressed right and centre. Soult, seeing this, ordered a general retreat, and the wild, heathy hills which stretched out in their rear both afforded abundant room for his retiring columns, and presented several strong positions, of which he skilfully availed himself, for retarding the advance of the pursuing army. With admirable discipline, the French, having regained their order at the foot of the ridge on which they had been posted during the battle, retired in the finest array, the rear-guard constantly facing about and obstinately resisting, whenever the intervention of a ridge afforded a favourable opportunity for making a stand. But the wild and rocky hills, as they retired, gradually melted into the plain; and five miles from the field of battle they required to cross the stream of the Luy de Bearn, only to be reached by a single road, and traversed by a single arch at the bridge of Sault de Navailles; the English infantry was pressing on in close pursuit, with a

* Picton, ii., 279, 280. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814, Gurw., xi., 536. Nap., vi., 556, 559. Koch, ii., 287, 288.

† Now Lord Seaton.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814, Gurw., xi., 536, 537. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 241, 243. Picton, ii., 280, 281. Nap., vi., 559, 561. Koch, ii., 288.

deafening roll of musketry and cannon; Hill, on their left, was rapidly making for the only bridge in their rear; and Sir Stapleton Cotton and Lord Edward Somerset's dragoons, closely following in the low grounds on their flank, were preparing to charge the moment they descended into the plain. In these circumstances, although Paris with his division at first with heroic constancy sustained the onset of the pursuers, and gained time for the army to retire, yet, after some miles were passed, the soldiers became sensible of their danger, and, at first quickening their pace as they saw Hill moving parallel and threatening to anticipate them at the bridge, at length began to run violently. Hill's men set off at full speed also, each party striving which should first reach the bridge; and although the French gained the race, and so secured the passage of their army, yet great part of their troops fell into irretrievable confusion in the disorderly rush, and the fields were covered with scattered bands. Cotton charged, on the only occasion which presented itself, at the head of Somerset's dragoons and the 7th hussars, three battalions of the enemy, which he broke, and made three hundred prisoners; but although two thousand more threw down their arms in an enclosed field, the greater part contrived to escape across the river, which was not far distant. At length the scattered bands, after wading the stream, reassembled on the opposite bank, with that readiness for which the French troops have ever been distinguished; and the wearied British soldiers formed their bivouacs on the southern shore of its limpid waters.*

Great effects of this victory.

Though the battle of Orthes was not graced by the same military trophies taken on the field as those of Salamanca or Vittoria, it was inferior to none of Wellington's great victories in the moral consequences with which it was attended. The enemy lost three thousand nine hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners on the field, and six guns; the allies two thousand three hundred; but the discouragement and demoralization introduced into the French army by its consequences were extreme. The conscripts, in great part ill affected, and all desponding in the cause, threw away their arms and deserted by thousands: disorganization and confusion prevailed in their retreat, insomuch that, a month afterward, the stragglers and missing were found, by an official statement, to be still three thousand. Thus Soult was weakened by this victory, and its effects, to the extent of fully seven thousand men: a grievous and irreparable loss, when he was already painfully contending against superior numbers and growing despondency. But its moral effects upon the south of France were still more important, and, in the critical state of the emperor's fortunes, proved decisive. By the line of Soult's retreat, which was in the direction of Toulouse, the great road to BORDEAUX was left open; Bayonne and St. Jean Pied-de-Port were already closely invested; † no force, capable either of withstanding the invaders or controlling public opinion, existed from the Pyrenees to the Garonne; and the Royalists in the southern provinces, relieved from the fetters which for twenty years had restrained them, were left at liberty to give expression to their inclination, which soon found vent in a general revolt.

Soult retires towards Tarbes and Toulouse.

Soult, after refreshing his army with a few hours' sleep at Sault de Navailles, on the right bank of the Luy de Bearn, continued his retreat towards Agen, by Condom, breaking down the whole bridges over the numerous mountain torrents which he crossed, as soon as he had passed them. Their great number sensibly retarded the pursuit of the victors. although Wellington, regardless of a slight wound he had received on the preceding day, was on horseback at daylight on the 28th, and continued to follow the enemy with the utmost vigour. The French marshal retired towards Tarbes by both banks of the Adour: a bold, but yet judicious movement, which, albeit abandoning Bordeaux to the enemy, yet secured for his beaten and dejected army, on one flank at least, the support of the mountains, and preserved for him, in case of need, a secure junction with the forces of Suchet from Catalonia. There was not the slightest reason to fear that Wellington would advance far into the interior of France while such a force remained on his flank to menace his rear and communications: Frederic the Great saved his own states from invasion after the raising of the siege of Olmutz, by marching into Bohemia. The British army, accordingly, instead of moving in a body upon Bordeaux, wisely followed the retiring footsteps of their antagonists; and after taking possession of the magazines at Mont Marsan, which were abandoned by the enemy, and crossing over the bulk of his forces to the right bank of the Adour, by the bridge of St. Sever, which he repaired, he detached Hill to the left bank to make himself master of the great magazines at Aire. Villatte and Harispe's divisions were drawn up on a strong ridge in front of that town, and made so vigorous a resistance to General Stewart's attack, that the Portuguese were driven back, and the action was wellnigh lost; but Stewart, with the British left, having, meanwhile, won the heights on the French right, immediately detached Barnes, with the 50th and 92d, to the aid of the Portuguese. Their vigorous charge soon altered the state of affairs; the French reeled in their turn; Byng's brigade gradually came up, and ultimately, after a severe combat, in which great bravery was displayed on both sides, the French were driven entirely out of Aire, the whole magazines of which fell into the hands of the British.* March 1.

The pursuit was not continued at this time farther in this direction, for great events had occurred in another; and an opportunity presented itself for striking a decisive blow against the power of Napoleon in the third city of the Empire, which was not neglected by the English general.

Bordeaux, which, through the whole Revolution, had been distinguished by its moderate or

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814, Gurw., xi., 537. Vict. et Conq., xi., 242. 243. Koch, ii., 289, 290. Nap., vi., 563, 564. Picton, ii., 281, 282.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814, Gurw., xi., 540. Koch, ii., 290. Belm., i., 277. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 242. Nap., vi., 564, 565.

* Nap., vi., 564, 568. Hill's Report, March 3, 1814, Gurw., xi., 548. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 243, 244. Koch, ii., 293.

Proceedings of the Royalists at Bordeaux.

Royalist feelings, had been in the greatest state of excitement since the advance of the English army into the south of France promised to relieve its inhabitants, at no distant period, from the iron yoke of the Revolution; and those feelings rose to a perfect climax when the battle of Orthes opened the road to Bordeaux to the victorious British arms, and threw Soult back to an eccentric retreat in the direction of Toulouse. The Royalist committee, which, since March, 1813, had secretly existed in that city, and comprised a large portion of the most respectable and influential citizens, were indefatigable in their endeavours to take advantage of this favourable state of things, and bring about a public declaration from its inhabitants in favour of the Bourbon dynasty. Cautiously they revealed their designs to M. Lynch, the mayor of the city, who instantly and warmly entered into their views, and declared his earnest desire to be the first to proclaim Louis XVIII. By their united efforts, matters were so far arranged that, immediately after the battle of Orthes, the Marquis de Larochejaquelein was despatched to Wellington's headquarters to request the assistance of three thousand men to support their cause. Wisely judging that a small British force was not to be lightly hazarded on so momentous and distant an enterprise, and appreciating the importance of the movement which was now ready to take place, Wellington, instead of three thousand, sent them twelve thousand men, under the command of Lord Beresford. But as he was aware that the allied powers were still negotiating with Napoleon at Chatillon, and that peace might be any day concluded, he was careful to inform the deputation of the chances of such an event occurring, distinctly warning them, at the same time, that in the event of a declaration in favour of Louis XVIII. taking place, and peace following with Napoleon, it would be beyond his power to afford them any protection. Beresford's instructions were to take no part in any political movement which might occur, and neither to support nor repress it; to say the British wished well to Louis XVIII., but were negotiating with Napoleon; and if a revolt occurred, to supply the people with arms and ammunition from the magazines at Dax.*

The English arrive at Bordeaux, and Louis XVIII. is proclaimed.

Beresford, with the fourth and seventh divisions, set out from the main army on the 8th, and after crossing the wild and heathy *landes* without opposition, arrived on the 12th before Bordeaux. He had been preceded, two days before, by the Marquis de Larochejaquelein, who had announced the speedy arrival of the English divisions, and urged the Royalist committee to declare at once in favour of the descendant of Henry IV. Great hesitation, as is usual in such a decisive moment, prevailed among the leaders; and many were anxious to recede from their professions, now that the time for action had arrived. But equal apprehensions were felt by the imperial military authorities, who, unable to make head against the coming storm, secretly withdrew, one by one, to the opposite side of the Garonne, leaving the slender garrison without any leaders. Part of the troops in this emergency followed the example, and crossed over to the other side, after burning a few ships of war on the stocks; and a battalion of conscripts which remained voluntarily laid down their arms. At half past twelve the English standards approached the town, long the capital of the Plantagenet sovereigns in France, and the favourite residence of the Black Prince, but where they had not been seen for five hundred years. The mayor and civic authorities, in the costume of their respective offices, came out to meet them at a short distance from the suburbs; and the former delivered an address, in which he professed the joy which the people felt at being delivered from their slavery, and at the arrival of their liberators. His speech was frequently interrupted with cries of "A bas les Aigles!" "Vivent les Bourbons!" and at its close he took off his tricoloured scarf, as well as the order of the legion of honour and the imperial eagles, and mounted the white cockade. His whole attendants immediately did the same; enthusiastic cheers rent the sky; and the British troops, surrounded by an ever-increasing multitude of the people, entered the ancient capital of their Plantagenet ancestors, hailed as deliverers and friends, to re-establish the throne of the royal race, with whom they had for so many centuries been engaged in almost ceaseless hostility. Thus had England the glory of, first of all the allied powers, obtaining an open declaration from a great city in France in favour of their ancient but exiled monarch—just twenty years and one month after the contest had begun, from the murder of the best and most blameless of their line.*

March 12.

Arrival of the Duke de Angouleme at Bordeaux, and his proclamation.

The Duke d'Angouleme soon after arrived, and was received with unbounded enthusiasm; a prodigious crowd assembled to greet his entrance; white handkerchiefs waved from every window; the white flag was to be seen on every steeple; all classes felicitated each other on the change; the day was passed as a brilliant fête; and a revolution, the most important in its consequences which had occurred in Europe since the breaking out of the bloody drama of 1789, passed over without one tear falling in sorrow or one drop of blood being shed. But, amid all these transports, arising rather from the prospect of cessation to immediate and pressing evils, than any distinct hopes or anticipations for the future, there were not wanting many far-seeing men, even among those unconnected with the imperial government, who, without denying the intolerable evils to which it had given rise, felt profoundly mortified at this fresh proof of the instability of their countrymen, and who anticipated little eventual benefit to France from a restoration which was ushered in by the victorious bayonets of foreign powers. Meanwhile, however, the Duke d'Angouleme and Beresford remained in peaceable possession of Bordeaux; the threatening incursions of the imperial troops, on the other side of the river, were repressed by three thousand British soldiers who crossed over; and although

* Nap., vi., 592, 593. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 246, 247. Beauch., ii., 52, 57. Koch, ii., 300, 301. Wellington to Beresford, March 7, 1814, Gurw., xi., 557.

* Beresford to Lord Wellington, March 12, 1814, Gurw., xi., 577. Beauch., ii., 92, 96. Koch, ii., 301, 303.

Wellington was at first not a little annoyed by a proclamation issued by the Mayor of Bordeaux, in which he declared that "the English, Spaniards, and Portuguese were united in the south, as the allied sovereigns were in the north, to destroy the scourge of nations and replace him by a monarch, the father of his people,"* yet events succeeded each other with such rapidity that this source of disquietude was soon removed, and the words of M. Lynch seemed to have been prophetic of the approaching fall of Napoleon.†

Soult's counter proclamation, and resumption of hostilities.

Soult and Wellington during this period remained in a state of inactivity, each supposing that the other was stronger than himself; for the detachment of twelve thousand men to Bayonne, as many to Bordeaux, besides the blockade of St. Jean Pied-de-Port and Navarreins, had now reduced the opposite armies as nearly as possible to an equality. The forces at the command of the French general were reduced, by the desertion and disorganization consequent on the battle of Orthes, to twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty-eight guns. On the side of the English, twenty-seven thousand combatants were in line, with forty-two guns; but the quality and spirit of the troops were decidedly superior to that of the French army. The astounding intelligence of the defection of Bordeaux, however, and proclamation of Louis XVIII. there, made Soult sensible that some great effort was necessary to counteract the growing disaffection of the southern provinces, and prevent his army from melting away, as it had recently done, from the despondency and discontent of the newly-imbodied conscripts. This was the more necessary, as the admirable discipline and prompt payment for supplies of all sorts which obtained in the British camp, contrasted so fearfully with the forced requisitions to which he was obliged to have recourse from the capture of all his magazines, and the general license in which his troops indulged after the retreat from Orthes, that he wrote to the minister of war at Paris, that "he wanted officers who knew how to respect property; and that the people seemed more disposed to favour the invaders than to second the French army." Influenced by these considerations, the French marshal no sooner learned the events at Bordeaux, and the proclamation of the Duke d'Angouleme, than he issued a counter address, couched in energetic language, and strains of no measured invective against the English policy and government. While a calm retrospect of the past has now demonstrated, even to the French themselves, that great part of his reproaches were unfounded, and may make us smile at the vehemence of some of his expressions; yet candour must recollect the critical and unparalleled circumstances in which Soult was placed when this proclamation was issued, and do justice to the firmness which, amid the general wreck of the imperial fortunes, remained unshaken, and the fidelity which, surrounded by defection, nailed its colours to the mast.*†

Soult resumes the offensive, and finally retreats to Toulouse.

This proclamation produced a considerable impression, at least upon the old soldiers in his army; and Soult, anxious to take advantage of the excitement, and of the absence of so large a portion of the English troops at Bordeaux, determined to resume offensive operations. Accordingly, on the 12th of March, he put his troops in motion; and as Wellington's main body was concentrated round Aire and Barcelone, yet divided in two by the Adour, he concentrated his forces on the side of Maubourguet, on the high table-land between Pau and Aire, designing to

March 12.

* "It is not to subject our country to the yoke of strangers that the English, Spaniards, and Portuguese have approached our walls. They have united in the south, as the other people have in the north, to destroy the scourge of nations, and replace him by a monarch, the father of his people; it is by him alone that we can appease the wrath of a neighbouring nation, whom we have oppressed with the most perfidious despotism. The hands of the Bourbons are unstained by French blood: with the testament of Louis XVI. in their hand, they forget all resentment: everywhere they proclaim and prove that tolerance is the first principle by which they are actuated. It is in deploring the terrible ravages of the tyranny which license induced, that they forget errors occasioned by the illusions of liberty. The short and consoling expressions addressed to you by the husband of the daughter of Louis XVI., 'No more tyrants; no more war; no more conscription; no vexatious imposts,' have already proved a balm to every heart. Possibly it is reserved for the great captain who has already merited the glorious title of the *liberator of nations*, to give his name to the glorious epoch of such a happy prodigy."—*Proclamation, 12th of March*, 1814, *by* M. LYNCH, *Mayor of Bordeaux*. BEAUCHAMPS, ii., 101, 102.

† Beauch., ii., 96, 102. Wellington to Duc d'Angouleme, March 16, 1814, Gurw., xi., 584, 585. Nap., vi., 595, 602.

* Nap., vi., 580, 581, 587. Beauch., ii., 430, 431. Soult to War Minister, March 14, 1814, Nap., vi., 580.

† "Soldiers! At the battle of Orthes you did your duty; the enemy's losses surpassed yours, and his blood moistened the ground he gained. He has had the indecency since to provoke you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition. He speaks of peace, but firebrands of sedition follow him. Thanks to him for making known his intentions: our forces are thereby multiplied a hundred-fold; he has rallied round our standard all those who, deceived by appearances, believed our enemies would make an honourable war. No peace with that disloyal and perfidious nation! No peace with the English and their auxiliaries until they quit the French territory! They have dared to insult the national honour; they have had the infamy to incite Frenchmen to become perjured towards the emperor. Revenge the offence in blood! To arms! Let this cry resound through the south of France; the Frenchman that now hesitates abjures his country, and belongs to its enemies. Yet a few days, and those who believe in English honour and sincerity will learn to their cost that cunning promises are made to abate their preparations, and subjugate them. They will learn to their cost, that if the English pay and are generous to-day, to-morrow they will retake, and with interest, in contributions, what they disburse. Let the pusillanimous beings who calculate the cost of saving their country recollect that the English have in view to reduce the French to the same servitude as the Spaniards, Portuguese, and Sicilians. History shows the English at the head of all conspiracies, all odious plots and assassinations; arming to overthrow all principles, to destroy all great commercial establishments, to satisfy their insatiable cupidity. Does there exist upon the face of the globe a point known to the English where they have not destroyed, by seditions and violence, all manufactures which could rival their own! Thus will they do to the French if they prevail. Be obedient and yield to discipline, and reserve your implacable hatred for the traitors and enemies to the French peace. War to the death against those who would divide to destroy us, and to those cowards who desert the imperial eagles to range themselves under another banner."—See GURWOOD, xi., 594; NAPIER, vi., 587, 589. This proclamation is one of the most curious and instructive monuments of the Revolution. The magnanimous policy of Wellington, which, aiming at moving the moral affections, coerced so effectually the disorders of his troops; the generous forbearance of England, which, an enemy only to the Revolution and its spoliations, proposed to leave France untouched, could not be conceived by the French general. He thought it was the homage which vice in hypocrisy pays to virtue. It is interesting to contrast this furious tirade with Soult's unbounded praises of England at the London dinner, on occasion of the coronation of Queen Victoria in 1839; yet both were probably sincere at the time.

strike a blow at the English divisions on the left bank of that river. On the 13th March 13. he made a stroke at Pau, intending to arrest the nobles who had assembled to wel- March 14. come the Duke d'Angouleme, but was stopped by Fane, who anticipated him, and the blow failed. Some lesser actions of cavalry took place in front of Aire, in which the Portuguese horse sustained a trifling loss; but Wellington, as soon as he heard of this incursion, brought over the third and sixth divisions across the Adour to support Hill, and at the same time gave orders to Freyre's Galicians and Giron's Andalusians to issue from the valley of the Bastan, where they had been hitherto kept to prevent plundering, and come up to his support. By this means he collected thirty-six thousand men, including the troops on the other side of the Adour, to withstand the irruption; and Soult, fearing to attack such a force, and hearing of the fall of Bordeaux, determined to retire. He sent forward, accordingly, his conscripts at once to Toulouse, being resolved to try once more the fortune of arms in the strong position which was presented in the environs of that city, and commenced a rapid retreat. The British army as swiftly followed in pursuit, on both banks of the Adour, but the great bulk of their force was always on the left bank. A sharp combat took place at Vic-Bigorre on the March 19. 19th, when D'Armagnac and Paris were only compelled at length to fall back, after each side had sustained a loss of two hundred and fifty men. Unhappily, that on the side of the British included the able and accomplished Colonel Sturgeon of the engineers, whose efforts and genius had been so signally evinced through the whole course of the Peninsular war.*

A more serious action took place when the Combat of army approached Tarbes. The light Tarbes. division and hussars were still on the March 20. right bank of the Adour; but when they approached that town, which stands on the upper part of that stream, a simultaneous movement was made by Hill with the right wing, and Clinton on the left, to envelop and cut off Harispe and Villatte's divisions, which formed the French rear-guard in occupation of it. The combat began at twelve o'clock, by a violent fire from Hill's artillery on the right, which was immediately re-echoed in still louder tones by Clinton on the left; while Alten, with the light division, assailed the centre. The French fought stoutly, and, mistaking the British rifle battalions from their dark uniform for Portuguese, let them come up to the very muzzles of their guns. But the rifles were hardy veterans, inured to victory; and at length Harispe's men, unable to stand their deadly, point-blank fire, broke and fled. If Clinton's men on the left had been up at this moment, the French would have been totally destroyed; for Hill had, at the same moment, driven back Villatte on the right, and the plain beyond Tarbes was covered with a confused mass of fugitives, closely followed by the shouting and victorious British. But Clinton's troops, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, had not been able to get up: the numerous ditches and hedges which intersected the plain rendered all pursuit by the cavalry impossible; and thus the French, though utterly broken, succeeded, with very little loss, in reaching a ridge three miles distant, where Clauzel, who, with four divisions, was drawn up to receive them, immediately opened a heavy fire from all his batteries upon the allies. This at once checked the pursuit; and in the night Soult retired in two columns, one on the high road, the other on the right, guided by watch-fires on the hills. Such was the rapidity of his retreat—as he was now making by rapid strides for Toulouse, where his great depôts were placed, and on which all his future combinations were based—that he reached that town in four days, and arranged his army in position before it on the 25th. Wellington, encumbered with a great artillery and pontoon train, and obliged to keep his men well in hand, from the uncertainty when Suchet's great re-enforcement from Catalonia, which was known to be approaching, might join the enemy, did not arrive on the Touch, facing the French in front of Toulouse, till the 27th.*

Thus, within six weeks after the campaign opened, Wellington had driven the General re- French from the neighbourhood of sult of the Bayonne to Toulouse, a distance of campaign. two hundred miles; had conquered the whole country between the Pyrenees and the Garonne; had passed six large and several smaller rivers; driven the enemy's forces from two fortified *têtes-du-pont*, and several minor fieldworks; defeated them in one pitched battle, and several lesser combats; crossed the raging flood of the Adour in the face of the garrison of Bayonne, below that fortress, and laid siege to it as well as St. Jean Pied-de-Port and Navarreins; and, finally, brought about a revolution at Bordeaux, and a declaration in favour of the Bourbon dynasty from the third city in the Empire. These great successes, too, had been gained by an army composed of so many and such discordant nations, that the French themselves were astonished how it was held together; nearly a third of which, from the fierce passions with which it was animated, and the marauding habits which it had acquired, had not yet been brought across the frontier; which, though considerably superior when the campaign commenced, was so wasted down by the necessity of investing so many fortresses, and occupying such an extensive tract of country, that the active force in the field was from the very first little, if at all, superior to that of the enemy; and against an army in great part composed of the iron Peninsular veterans, the best troops now in the French service, and a general second only to Napoleon in the vigour and ability with which he maintained a defensive warfare. It must be confessed that there are few periods in the military annals of the British Empire fraught with brighter glory to its army or its chief. But the brows of Wellington and his followers, loaded with military laurels, are yet encircled with a purer wreath, when it is recollected that these advantages had been gained without the slightest deviation from the strict principles of justice on which they had

* Nap., vi., 606, 617. Koch, ii., 304, 307. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 250, 251.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 20, 1814, Gurw., xi., 596. Nap., vi., 616, 619. Koch, ii., 307, 309. Vict et Conq., xxiii., 251, 252.

throughout maintained the contest; that no wasting contributions, scarce any individual plunder, had disgraced their footsteps; that, to avoid the pillage of their own troops, the requisitions of their own generals, the peasants of France sought refuge within the sanctuary of the British lines; and that this admirable discipline was enforced by the commander and obeyed by his soldiers, when heading a vast military array of the Peninsular forces, hastily levied, imperfectly disciplined, burning with resentment for the six years' wasting and desolation of their own country, and whose services it was frequently necessary to forego, to avoid the retaliation which they so naturally endeavoured to inflict on their oppressors.*

Progress of events in Catalonia.

While these decisive blows were paralyzing the imperial strength in the south of France, the progress of events in Catalonia, though of far inferior importance, was also tending to the same general result. Since the junction of the armies of Catalonia and Arragon, and the retreat of the allied force under Lord William Bentinck to Taragona, in September, 1813, already noticed,† the opposite hosts had remained in a state of total inactivity; Clinton, who had succeeded Lord William in the command, with the British and German division from Sicily, ten thousand strong, with nine thousand of Sarsfield's Spaniards, lay on the right bank of the Llobregat, from its mouth to the mountains; Elio, with sixteen thousand ill-disciplined Spanish troops, observed Gerona from Vecqui; while Copons's men, about twelve thousand more, besieged Peniscola, and blockaded Lerida, Mequinenza, and the lesser forts still occupied by the enemy in the rear. On the other hand, Suchet had still sixty-five thousand admirable troops, the best in Spain, under his command, and, without drawing a man from the fortresses, he could bring thirty thousand sabres and bayonets into the field. Offensive operations upon an extended scale, with ten thousand British troops, and such a disjointed rabble of Spaniards, without discipline or magazines, and generally starving, under generals acting almost independent of each other, were of course out of the question; and the English general found that, even for lesser enterprises which offered a fair prospect of success, no reliance whatever could be placed on their co-operation. From a failure on Copons's part to take the share assigned him, a well-conceived attack of Clinton, with six thousand men, on the French posts at Molino del Rey, failed of obtaining complete success. Jan. 16. At this very time, however, Napoleon, alarmed by the formidable invasion of the allies, recalled ten thousand men and eighty guns from the army of Catalonia: upon which Suchet increased the garrison of Barcelona to eight thousand men; prepared to retire himself to the line of the Fluvia, near the foot of the Pyrenees; sent secret instructions to the garrisons in his rear to make their escape the best way they could, and join him near Figueras; and strongly recommended to Napoleon to send Ferdinand VII., under the treaty of Valençay, as speedily as possible into Catalonia, in order to give him a decent pretext for evacuating all the fortresses, except Figueras, in that province, and thereby enable him to march with twenty-five thousand additional veterans to the succour of the emperor.*

Stratagem by which Lerida, Mequinenza, and Mouzon are recovered by the Spaniards.

The return of some of these garrisons, however, was accelerated by a fraudulent stratagem, unworthy of the military honour, by which the Spaniards now recovered some of the fortresses, in much the same way as the French had, six years before, got possession of them. There was, at this time, in the French service, a Spaniard of Flemish descent, Van Halen, who, during his employment in the staff of Suchet, had contrived to make himself master, not only of the power of exactly imitating his writing, but of his private seal and the cipher which he made use of in his most confidential despatches. He had even dived so deep into his mysteries as to have discovered the private mark by which Suchet had desired all his chief officers to distinguish his genuine from forged despatches, viz., the inserting a slender light-coloured hair in the ciphered paper. Having possessed himself of this secret information, he entered into communication with the Baron d'Erolles, and they concocted orders addressed to the governors of the whole towns held by the French in the rear of the allied army, directing them to evacuate the fortresses and march to join him, with a view to joining the emperor in the heart of France. History has little interest in recording the means by which fraud and artifice overreach valour and sincerity. Suffice it to say, that the orders fabricated by Van Halen were so precise and articulate, the forgeries so well executed, and the preventions taken against discovery so complete, that they deceived the governors of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Mouzon, which thus fell into the hands of the Spaniards; though their garrisons rejoined Suchet in safety, in consequence of Clinton, from an honourable dislike to or distrust in the attempt, having done nothing to intercept their return. The stratagem, however, failed at Tortosa, in consequence of the Spanish general Sans, to whom the French governor Robert, feigning to fall into the snare, had written to come with two battalions to take possession of the place, not having courage to do so. Suchet thus was rather benefited than injured by Van Halen's treachery, for he thereby got back the garrisons of the towns thus fraudulently won, which were otherwise beyond his reach; but having received orders from Napoleon to send off a second draught of ten thousand men to Lyons, he surrendered Gerona to the Spaniards, and drew back all his troops in the field to the neighbourhood of Figueras, there to await the issue of the crisis which was approaching.† March 3.

Arrival of Ferdinand, and termination of the war in Catalonia. March 20.

Meanwhile, Barcelona continued closely blockaded; and a sally, which Habert made on the 23d of February, was repulsed with great loss by Sarsfield, who commanded the blockading force. The place continued closely invested till the 20th of March, when Ferdinand VII. arrived on the frontier from Perpig-

* Nap., vi., 568, 569. † *Ante*, iii., 489.

* Suchet, ii., 361, 368. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 252, 253. Nap., vi., 475, 487. Koch, ii., 309, 312.

† Suchet, ii., 370, 376. Nap., vi., 487, 493. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 254, 255. Koch, ii., 314, 315.

nan, accompanied by his brother, Don Carlos, and Don Antonio, his uncle. He was received on the banks of the Fluvia with great pomp, and in presence of both the French and Spanish armies, who made a convention for a suspension of arms on this interesting occasion. Indeed, hostilities everywhere ceased in Catalonia; both parties regarding, with reason, the war as terminated by the treaty of Valençay. Ferdinand continued his journey in perfect tranquillity towards Madrid, the honours of war being rendered to him equally by the French as the Spanish garrisons; and Clinton, in obedience to orders received from Wellington, broke up his army; part being embarked at Taragona to join Lord William Bentinck, who was engaged in operations against Genoa, and part marched across Arragon, to join Wellington on the Garonne. The treaty of Valençay, however, not having been ratified by the Cortes, the blockade of the fortresses still held by the French continued; and, so late as the 18th of April, long after peace had been concluded at Paris, Habert, in ignorance of that event, made a vigorous effort to cut his way out of Barcelona; and, though repulsed and driven in again, the encounter was very bloody, and cost the Spaniards eight hundred men. Intelligence of the pacification at Paris arrived four days afterward, and terminated the contest in that quarter; and then appeared, in the clearest colours, both the strength of the hold which the emperor had taken of Spain, and the disastrous effect of the grasping system which made him, even in the last extremity, persist in retaining what he had once acquired. When the French soldiers in Spain hoisted the white flag, the symbol of universal peace, they still held Barcelona, Figueras, Tortosa, Morellas, Peniscola, Saguntum, and Denia; and in these fortresses were shut up no less than sixteen thousand veteran soldiers, which, with the like force under Suchet's immediate command on the Fluvia, would have given Napoleon, when the scales hung all but even on the banks of the Seine, a decisive superiority over the whole force of the allied sovereigns.*

April 20.

The war terminated somewhat sooner on the western coast of Spain. The only stronghold still held by the French there, after the storming of St. Sebastian, was Santona, which, situated on the rocky extremity of a long sandy promontory on the coast of Biscay, had long been an object of violent contest between the contending parties; and still, on the edge of a recovered monarchy, hoisted the tricolour flag. After the battle of Vittoria, it was invested by the Galicians by land and the British cruisers by sea; but the latter blockade was maintained so negligently, and the Spanish land troops were so inefficient, that Wellington at first gave orders to Lord Aylmer's brigade to proceed thither; and though this intention was not carried into effect, yet Captain Wells, with some British sappers and miners, was sent to accelerate their operations. As usual, however, the Spaniards were so dilatory and ill prepared, that nothing effectual was done till the middle of February, when the fort of Puertal, outside the place, was carried. On the night of the 21st, the outworks were stormed; and the direction of the approaches being now intrusted to Captain Wells, he pushed his operations so vigorously, that the Fort Laredo, which commanded the harbour, was taken. Lameth, the French governor, upon this, offered to capitulate in April, on condition of being sent back to France. Wellington refused to agree to these terms; but hardly had his declinature arrived, when intelligence was received of the pacification at Paris, which closed hostilities, and the place, with the tricolour flag still waving on it, was, in terms of the treaty, given over to the Spaniards.*

Siege of Santona, and close of the war in the Peninsula.

Feb. 13.

Feb. 21.

To conclude the whole operations of the Peninsular war, it only remains to notice the last and bloody struggles on the Garonne and Adour, which, though not occurring in chronological order till after the capitulation of Paris, shall be here detailed, in order not to break the narrative of the decisive events which led to that catastrophe.

Toulouse, in which the French army, under Soult, was now concentrated, and before which the British army lay, on the left bank of the Garonne, fronting the Touch, was well known to Marshal Soult, as he had been born and bred in its vicinity, and he had long fixed upon it as the post where his final stand for the south of France was to be made. That ancient capital of the southern provinces of the monarchy, so celebrated in poetry and romance, though much declined from its former greatness, still numbered fifty thousand inhabitants within its walls; and being situated on both banks of the Garonne, of which it commanded the principal passage, and the centre of all the roads in that part of the country, it was a strategetical point of the very highest importance, both with a view to obtaining facilities for his own, and keeping them from the enemy's army. Posted there, the French general was master either of his retreat upon Suchet by Carcassone, or on Augereau by Alby; while the ample stream of the Garonne wafted supplies of all sorts to his army, and the walls of the city itself afforded a protection of no ordinary importance to his soldiers. The Garonne, flowing on the west of the city, properly so called, presented to the allies a deep curve, at the bottom of which the town is placed, connected, by a massy stone bridge of ancient architecture, with the suburb of St. Cyprien, situated on the westernmost of its banks. This suburb, which first presented itself to the attack of an enemy coming from the side of Bayonne, was defended by an old brick wall, flanked by massy towers; and beyond this rampart Soult had erected outer field-works. The city itself, on the other bank, was also surrounded by a thick brick wall, strengthened with towers of such dimensions as to bear four-and-twenty pounders. The great canal of Languedoc, which unites the Garonne to the Mediterranean Sea, wound round the town to the east and north, and joined the river a few miles below it; forming in this manner, with the Garonne itself, a vast wet ditch, which, on every side except a small opening to the south-east, encircled its walls at the distance of three

Description of Toulouse, and the position there.

* Suchet, ii., 376, 387. Koch, ii., 317, 319. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 255, 256. Nap., vi., 495, 498.

* Nap., vi., 499, 504. Belm., iv., 290.

quarters of a mile. The suburbs of St. Etienne and Guillemeri, which stretched out across the canal to the eastward from the walls, were strengthened with field-works at the points where they crossed the canal; and beyond them, on the other side of the canal, rose the steep ridge of Mont Rave, the outer face of which, whereby alone it could be assailed by the enemy, being exceedingly rugged and difficult of access.*

Ineffectual attempt to attack Toulouse by passing above the town.

From this description of Soult's position, it was clear that an attack on the town from the west, and through the suburb of St. Cyprien, was out of the question. The suburb itself, flanked on either side by a deep and impassable river, defended by a wall and external redoubt, could only be forced at an enormous loss of blood; and even if taken, the town could only be reached by a long bridge, easily susceptible of defence. The passage above the town presented difficulties apparently formidable; for it would bring the allies into the deep and heavy country around the Arriege, the cross-roads of which, from the recent rains, had become all but impassable; but, nevertheless, Wellington resolved to attempt it, because, if successful, it would detach Soult from the succours he expected from Suchet, throw back the latter general into the Pyrenees, by enabling the British to cut off his retreat by Narbonne, open up the communication with Bubna at Lyons, and compel Soult to abandon the line of the Garonne. He commenced the formation of a bridge at Poitet, six miles above Toulouse, which appeared the most advantageous site that could be selected; but the stream was found to be too broad for the pontoons, and no means of obviating the defect existed. This delayed the passage for some days; but at length Hill discovered a more favourable point near Pensaguel, about seven miles above Toulouse, where a bridge was speedily laid; and he immediately crossed over with two British divisions and Morillo's Spaniards, in all thirteen thousand men and eighteen guns. This detachment advanced towards Toulouse on the right bank of the Garonne, while Wellington, with the main body, threatened the faubourg St. Cyprien on the left; and Soult, not knowing on which side he at first was to be assailed, kept the bulk of his forces in hand within the walls of the town, only observing Hill with light troops. But the roads on either side of the Arriege were found to be altogether impassable; and as everything depended on rapidity of movement, Hill wisely renounced the project of an attack on that side, and recrossing the Garonne on the night of the 1st of April, took up his pontoon bridge, and returned to the headquarters on the left bank of the river.†

March 28.

Wellington now determined to make the attempt below the town; but this change in the line of attack, though unavoidable in the circumstances, proved of the most essential service to the French general; for, foreseeing that the passage would be made on that side, he set his whole army, and all the male population of Toulouse, to work at fortifications on the Mont Rave, by which alone the town could be approached in that quarter; and with such diligence did they work during the nine days' respite afforded them before the allied army could finally effect their passage, that a most formidable series of field-works was erected on the summit of that rugged ridge, as well as at all the bridges over the canal and entrances of the suburbs of the town. Though, however, every hour was precious, yet such was the flooded state of the Garonne, from the torrents of rain which fell, and the melting of the snows in the Pyrenees, that the English general was compelled, much against his will, to remain inactive in front of St. Cyprien till the evening of the 3d. Then, as the river had somewhat fallen, the pontoons were carried in the night to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse; and the bridge having been quickly thrown over, a battery of thirty guns was established to protect it, and three divisions of infantry and three of cavalry immediately passed over, which captured a large herd of oxen intended for the French army. But, meanwhile, a catastrophe, threatening the most terrible consequences, ensued. The river rose again in raging torrents; the light division and Spaniards, intended to follow the leading divisions, could not be got across; the grappling irons and supports were swept away; and, to avoid total destruction, it became necessary to take up the pontoons and dismantle the bridge, leaving Beresford, with fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, alone exposed to the whole weight of the French army of at least double their strength.*

Beresford with the left wing is thrown across below Toulouse.

April 4.

Soult was immediately made acquainted with this passage, but he was not at first aware of the small amount of force which was got across; and when he did learn it, he deemed it more advisable to await the enemy in the position he had fortified with such care at Toulouse, than to incur the chance of a combat, even with such superior forces, on the banks of the Garonne. He remained, accordingly, from the 4th to the 8th without moving from his intrenched position, and thereby lost the fairest opportunity of striking a serious, if not decisive, blow against the British army, which had occurred since the beginning of the war. Wellington, during this terrible interval, remained calm on the other side, ready to cross over in person by boat the moment Beresford was attacked: he was confident in his troops, even against twofold odds; and having done his utmost to avert danger, calmly awaited the result; and he has since been heard to say that he felt no disquietude, and never slept sounder in his life than on those three nights. At length, on the morning of the 8th, the river having subsided, the bridge was again laid down; Freyre's Spaniards, the Portuguese artillery, were crossed over; and Wellington, taking the command in person, advanced to Fenoulhiet, within five miles of Toulouse. Hill, with two divisions, was left to men-

His danger, and supineness of Soult.

* Choumara, Bat. de Toulouse, 176, 177. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 348. Nap., vi., 624, 626.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 1, 1814, Gurw., xi., 620. Nap., vi., 627, 631. Vaud., iii., 100, 103. Belm., i., 280.

* Belm., i., 281. Nap., vi., 631, 632. Vaud., iii., 104, 105. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 350. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814, Gurw., xi., 632.

ace the suburb of St. Cyprien on the left bank of the river, and the pontoon bridge brought higher up, so as to facilitate the communication between him and the main body of the army. In the course of the advance towards the town, a sharp cavalry action took place at the bridge of Croix de Orade, over the Ers, where Vial's dragoons were overthrown by the 18th hussars, led by Major Hughes, the bridge carried, and a hundred prisoners taken, with hardly any loss to the British troops.*

Advantages of the French position.

From the heights to which Wellington had now advanced, he had a distinct view of the French position, which he carefully studied, and the whole of the next day was spent in bringing up the troops, which was not completely effected till the evening of the 9th, and preparing for the battle. It must be admitted that Soult's measures had been conducted with great ability, and that his judicious selection of Toulouse as his battle-field had almost restored the chances of success in his favour. He had gained seventeen days of perfect rest for his troops, during which they had been sheltered from the weather, and both their physical strength and spirit essentially improved. He had brought the enemy to fight with an equality of force; for one third of the British army was on the opposite bank before St. Cyprien, a fortress so strong in front and secure in flank, that a small body of conscripts might be there securely left to combat them. The main body, under Soult's immediate command, was posted on the rugged summit of Mont Rave, called the Calvinet platform, in an elevated position about two miles long, and strengthened on either flank by strong fieldworks. This formidable position could be reached only by crossing first a marshy plain, in some places impassable from the artificial inundations of the Ers, and then a long and steep hill, exposed to the fire of the artillery and redoubts on the summit. All the bridges of the Ers, except the Croix d'Orade, were mined; and it was therefore necessary for the British army to make a flank-march under fire, so as to gain the southeastern slope of the Mont Rave, and ascend the hill from that side. If the summit of the ridge should be carried, there remained the interior line, formed by the canal, with its fortified bridge, houses, and suburbs, and within it again a third line, formed of the walls of the ancient city, planted with cannon, which it was scarcely possible to carry without regular approaches or an enormous slaughter.†

Wellington's plan of attack.

Wellington, having carefully examined the enemy's ground, adopted the following plan of attack. Hill, on the left bank, was to menace St. Cyprien, so as to distract the enemy's attention in that quarter, and prevent their sending any succours to the right bank of the river; Picton and Alten, with the third and light divisions, Freyre's Spaniards, and Bock's heavy dragoons, were to advance against the northern extremity of the enemy's line, and, if possible, carry the hill of Pugade, so as to restrain the enemy in that quarter; but they were not to endeavour to carry the summit. Meanwhile, Beresford, with the fourth and sixth divisions, with Ponsonby's dragoons and three batteries of cannon, after crossing the Ers at the Croix d'Orade, and skirting the base of the Mont Rave, was to defile along the low ground between it and the marshy banks of the Ers, and having gained the extreme French right, wheel into line and ascend the hill there, and assault the redoubts of St. Cyprien on the summit. This plan of operations was, perhaps, unavoidable, and it certainly promised to distract the enemy by three attacks: at St. Cyprien, the hill of Pugade, and St. Sypierre at once; but it was open to the serious disadvantage of dividing the main body of the army into two different bodies, separated by above two miles from each other; while the enemy, in concentrated masses, lay on the hill above them, and might crush either separately before the other could come to its assistance. It was exactly a repetition of the allied cross march, on the flank of which Soult had fallen with such decisive effect at Austerlitz,* or of Marmont's undue extension to his left, towards Ciudad Rodrigo, of which Wellington himself had so promptly availed himself, to the ruin of the French, at Salamanca.† Singular coincidence! that, in the very last battle of the war, the one commander should have repeated the hazardous movements which, when committed by his adversary, had proved fatal to the French cause in the Peninsula; and the other failed to take that advantage of it, by which he himself had formerly, under Napoleon's direction, decided the contest in Germany.‡

Position of the French, and forces on both sides.

Secure under cover of his numerous intrenchments on the long summit of the Mont Rave, and in the suburb of St. Cyprien, Soult calmly awaited the attack. Reille, with the division Maransin, was in St. Cyprien, opposed to Hill in the external defences of that suburb on the other side of the river; D'Erlon occupied the line on the right bank, from the mouth of the canal to the plateau of Calvinet, Daricau being at the bridge of Matabiau, and D'Armagnac thence to the northern extremity of the Mont Rave; Villatte was on the summit of the hill of Pugade, at the northern corner of the plateau; Harispe's men occupied the works in the centre; from thence to the extreme right Taupin's division was placed, a little in advance, with the summit of St. Sypierre strongly occupied. Berton's cavalry were in the low grounds near the Ers, to observe the movements of the enemy; Travot's division, composed chiefly of conscripts, occupied the fortified suburb of St. Michel to the bridge of Matabiau; and the National Guard of Toulouse lined the ramparts, and performed the service of the interior of the town. The forces on the opposite sides were unequal in point of numerical strength, but nearly matched in military strength: the Anglo-Portuguese around Toulouse being fifty-two thousand, including seven thousand horse and sixty-four pieces of cannon; but of these twelve thousand were Spaniards, who could not be re-

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814, Gurw., xi., 633. Nap., vi., 632, 633. Vaud., iii., 104, 105.

† Nap., vi., 636, 637. Vaud., ii., 107, 109. Koch, iii., 641, 643. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814, Gurw., xi., 633.

* *Ante*, ii., 368. † *Ante*, iii., 480.

‡ Soult's Official Despatch, April 11, 1814, Belm., 714. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814, Gurw., xi., 633.

lied on for a serious shock. The French had nearly forty thousand, of whom thirty-eight thousand were brought into the field, including Travot's reserve, but exclusive of the National Guard of Toulouse; and they had eighty pieces of cannon, some of them of very heavy calibre. The superiority in respect of numbers was clearly on the side of the allies; but this might be considered as compensated in point of effective force by the great strength of the French position, their local advantage, as lying in the centre of a vast circle of which the allies formed the circumference, the triple line of intrenchments on which they had to fall back in case of disaster, the heavy artillery which crowned their fieldworks, and the homogeneous quality of their troops, all French, and containing that intermixture of young and veteran soldiers which forms, perhaps, the best foundation for military prowess.* Both sides were animated with the most heroic resolution; for they were alike aware that their long struggle was drawing to a termination, and that victory or defeat now would crown the glories of the one, or obliterate the humiliation of the other.†

Battle of Toulouse. April 10.

Wellington gave the signal for the commencement of the battle at seven o'clock in the morning. Picton and Alten, on the right of the main battle on the right bank of the Garonne, drove the French advanced posts between the river and the hill of Pugade back to their fortified posts on the canal; Hill drove them in to their exterior line at St Cyprien; while Clinton and Cole, at the head of the 4th and 5th divisions, rapidly defiled over the bridge of Croix d'Orade, and, after driving the enemy out of the village of Mont Blanc, continued their march along the margin of the Ers, sheltered by Freyre's Spaniards, who established themselves on the summit of the Pugade, from whence the Portuguese guns opened a heavy fire on the more elevated fortified heights of the Calvinet. The way having been thus cleared on the right, Beresford, with Cole and Clinton's divisions, preceded by the hussars, continued their march, at as swift a pace as they could, along the level ground between the foot of the ridge and the Ers. But the plain was found to be extremely marshy, and in many places intersected by water-courses, which retarded the troops not a little; while Berton's cavalry vigorously skirmished with the British horse in front, and a thundering fire from the summit of Mont Rave in flank incessantly tore their ranks at every discharge. Nothing could be more critical than this flank march, with less than thirteen thousand men, in such a hollow way, with a superior force strongly posted on the ridge on their right, and an impassable morass and river on their left. Fortune seemed to have thrown her choicest favours in the way of the French marshal; and, to complete the danger of Beresford's situation, a disaster, wellnigh attended with fatal consequences, soon occurred on the left, which seemed to render nearly the whole force on the summit of the Calvinet disposable to crush the column painfully toiling beneath its guns at its foot.*

Defeat of the Spaniards on the right of the British.

While Arenschelt's guns were replying by a distant cannonade from the lower summit of the Pugade to the elevated works on the Calvinet, Freyre's Spaniards advanced in good order to assault the northern angle of the redoubts on the latter heights. They were about nine thousand strong, and mounted the hill at first with great resolution, driving before them a French brigade, which retired skirmishing up to the works in their rear; but when the Spaniards came within range of grapeshot, the heavy artillery on the summit, sweeping down a level sloping glacis, which enabled every shot to take effect, produced such a frightful carnage in front, while the great guns from the redoubt at Matabiau tore their flank, that the front rank, instead of recoiling, rushed wildly forward, with the instinct of brave men, to gain the shelter of a hollow road which ran like a dry ditch in front of the works. In great confusion they reached this covered way; but the second line, seeing the disorder in front, turned about and fled; upon which the French, leaping with loud shouts out of their works, ran down to the upper edge of the hollow, and plied the unhappy men who had sought refuge there with such a deadly fire of musketry, that it was soon little more than a quivering mass of wounded or dying. Freyre and the superior officers, with extraordinary gallantry, strove to rally the fugi-

* The battle of Toulouse being the last in the Peninsular contest, and a pitched battle of no ordinary interest and importance, has given rise to much discussion between the military historians of France and England: the former have laboured hard to diminish the effective French force in the field, while they magnified the British; and one of them, Choumara, has even gone so far as to claim for Marshal Soult and his countrymen the merit of a victory on the occasion. The British numbers in the field are exactly known, as the Morning State of the whole army on April 10 is extant, and has been published by Colonel Napier, vol. vi., 710. The French numbers cannot be so accurately ascertained, as no imperial muster-rolls are extant subsequent to December, 1813. The statement given in the text is founded on the detail of their army, as given by their able and impartial military historian, Koch, with the amount of Travot's reserve from Vaudoncourt, iii., 107.

I. ALLIED FORCE.

Present, Effective.

4th Division, Cole	4,613
6th Division, Clinton	4,877
3d Division, Picton	3,924
Light Division, Alten	3,709
2d Division, Stewart	5,990
Le Cor's Portuguese	3,307
Rank and File, bayonets	26,420
Officers, Sergeants, &c	2,872
Infantry	29,292
Artillery	6,832
Cavalry	3,600
British and Portuguese	39,724
Spaniards	12,000
	51,724

II. FRENCH FORCE.

Present, Effective.

Infantry	30,000
Cavalry	3,000
Trevot's reserve	4,000
	37,000
Artillery and drivers	1,480
Total	38,480

—*Morning State*, 10th April, 1814; NAPIER, vi., 670; KOCH, iii., 639; and Tableau xiv. for the details.

† Nap., vi., 670. Koch, iii. Vaud., ii., 107. Jones, ii., 372.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814, Gurw., xi., 634. Soult to Duc de Feltre, April 11, 1814, Belm., i., 714. Nap., vi., 940, 942. Vaud., iii., 114, 116.

tives, and actually brought back the second line in tolerable order to the edge of the fatal hollow; but there they suddenly found themselves torn in flank by the discharge of a French brigade, which they had not hitherto seen: the fire from above was so violent, and the spectacle beneath them so horrid, that, after hesitating a moment, they broke and fled in wild confusion down the slope towards the bridge of Croix d'Orade, closely followed by the French, plying them with an incessant fire of musketry.* Such was the panic, that the fugitives poured in wild disorder to the bridge, and the French would have made themselves masters of it, thus entirely isolating Beresford from the rest of the army, had not Wellington, who was there, checked the pursuit by the reserve artillery and Ponsonby's horse; while a brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, threw in its fire so opportunely on the flank of the pursuers, that they were constrained to return to their intrenchments on the summit of the hill.†

Picton also is repulsed at the bridge of Jumeaux.

This bloody repulse, which cost the Spaniards fully fifteen hundred men, was not the only disaster on the right. Picton, with the third division, had been instructed merely to engage the enemy's attention by a false attack; but when he beheld the rout on the hill to his left, and the rush of the French troops down the slope after the Spaniards, he conceived the design of converting his feigned into a real attack, supposing that that was the only way of drawing back the enemy, and avoiding total ruin in that quarter of the field. Accordingly, he advanced vigorously, converting his false attack into a real one, and pushed on to the edge of the counterscarp of the redoubt which defended the bridge of Jumeaux over the canal. There, however, all farther progress was found to be impracticable, by reason of the extraordinary height of the opposite scarp; but, nevertheless, Picton's men ran forward, descended into the fosse, and tried, by mounting on each other's shoulders, to reach the top of the opposite wall. All their efforts, however, were fruitless: the troops, being below the range of the guns on the rampart, were overwhelmed with a shower of large stones, arranged for that express purpose along the parapet, and at last driven entirely back, with the loss of five hundred killed and wounded. Thus, all along its northern front, the French position had been found, by dear-bought experience, to be impregnable; and although Hill had, by a vigorous attack, made himself master of the exterior line of fortifications of St. Cyprien, and though the Portuguese guns on the hill of Pugade, and Beresford's pieces, which it had been found impossible to drag through the miry ground on the edge of the Ers, with the guns of the light division near Matabiau, kept up a prodigious concentric fire on the redoubts of Calvinet, yet the French cannon on the works above, of heavier calibre, and firing down, replied with superior effect, and the strength of the position on the two sides yet assailed was unshaken.*

Soult attacks Beresford.

Everything now depended on the success of Beresford on the extreme British left; yet he was so situated, that it was hard to say whether his divisions were not in greater danger than any other part of the army. Separated now by more than two miles from the remainder of their allies, with their artillery, of necessity, left behind at Mont Blanc, out of cannon-shot, from the impossibility of dragging it forward, with their rear to an impassable morass and river, and a line of formidable intrenchments in their front, they had to ascend a sloping hill, above a mile in length, exposed all the way to the raking fire of a powerful army and an array of artillery on the summit. But the danger soon became still more pressing, and these two divisions were brought into such straits, that they must either conquer or die. Soult, relieved by the repulse of the Spaniards from the pressure on his left, and seeing distinctly his advantage, concentrated his troops in hand for a desperate attack on Beresford, whom he hoped, by a sudden irruption down the hill, to cut in two, and sever altogether from the remainder of the army.† It was precisely a repetition of Napoleon's perpendicular attack on the flank of the allies in march at Austerlitz, or Wellington on Thomière's division at Salamanca. He had fifteen thousand infantry and twelve hundred horse to make the attack, which promised decisive success. The orders were speedily given. Taupin's division on the summit of the Mont Rave, and one of Maransin's brigades from St. Cyprien, were brought forward, supported by Vial's and Berton's dragoons on either flank of the enemy, and directed to fall with the utmost fury on Beresford's men, now entirely destitute of artillery, while D'Armagnac's division supported them as a reserve, and the guns on the summit thundered on the devoted mass below.‡

Beresford carries the redoubts on the French right.

Taupin's division speedily appeared pouring down from the summit of the hill, flanked by clouds of cavalry, and half concealed by the volumes of smoke which issued from the redoubts above, which now redoubled their fire. Their generals and field-officers were seen in

* One Spanish regiment, the Tiradors de Cantabria, in the midst of this terrific carnage retained their post in the hollow way, under the redoubts, when their comrades were routed, till Wellington ordered them to retire.—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *12th April*, 1814; GURWOOD, xi., 635; and TORENO, v., 463.

† Nap., vi., 640, 641. Jones, ii., 270, 271. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814, Gurw., xi., 634. Vaud., iii., 116, 117.

* Picton's Mem., ii., 310, 311. Vaud., iii., 115, 118. Nap., vi., 641, 642. Jones, ii., 271. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 353, 354. Koch, iii., 641, 643.

† "Beresford's divisions marched in three lines, with their flank to us; they presented, in consequence, an extended body. The moment appeared favourable to destroy them; with that view, I ordered Taupin, whose division was formed on the plateau, to advance at the *pas de charge* against the enemy, to pierce through his line, and cut off all who were thus imprudently advanced. His division was supported by the division D'Armagnac; it was aided by the fire of the works on the right of the line, in which General Danton was posted with the 9th light infantry; while General Soult* received orders to move down with a regiment of cavalry, to cut off the communication on his right between the enemy's column and the remainder of his army, and two other regiments of horse assailed his left flank. These dispositions promised the happiest result; seven or eight thousand English and Portuguese could hardly fail to be taken or destroyed."—SOULT *to* Duc DE FELTRE, *11th April*, 1814, BELMAS, i., 715.

‡ Soult to Duc de Feltre, April 11, 1814, Belm., i., 715. Nap., vi., 642, 643. Vaud., iii., 118, 120. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 353, 354.

* The son of the marshal.

front of the line on horseback, waving their hats, amid shouts of the multitude, which, mingled with the thunder of the cannon above, resembled the roar of the ocean breaking on an iron-bound shore. Impressed, but not panic-struck, with the sight, the British troops halted in their advance, and deployed; the 79th and 42d Highlanders, who were directly in front, waved their bonnets in the air, and returned the shouts with three cheers; their light company, by a well-directed fire, brought down several of the gallant officers in front, and the French column halted. They immediately fired a volley into the British lines, and advanced amid a deafening roar of musketry and cannon. The French, in column, as usual, found themselves unable to withstand the British in line, being unable, from a few companies alone in front, to make any adequate resistance to the deadly fire of musketry by which they were assailed. The British returned the fire, and advanced to the charge. Lambert's brigade of the sixth division, with Anson's of the fourth, dashed forward with a terrible shout, and the opposite lines seemed madly rushing at each other in the midst of smoke, which on both sides obscured the view. But in that dreadful moment the native superiority of the British courage was apparent: the French quailed before the shock, the lines never met, and when the clouds of smoke cleared away, they were seen wildly flying over the summit of the ridge, closely followed by the British, the 42d and 79th in front, who, with loud shouts, carried, in the confusion, the redoubts of St. Sypierre. Taupin was killed while bravely endeavouring to rally his men; Berton's horsemen, after being repulsed by the 79th, whom they furiously charged, were swept away in the general rout; while Cole's division, stoutly ascending the hill on Clinton's left, completed the defeat of the enemy in that quarter, and not only solidly established the two divisions on the summit of the ridge at its extreme right, but threatened the enemy's communication by the bridge of Demoiselles with the town of Toulouse.*

Soult's dispositions to restore the battle.

Thus, by the undaunted resolution of Beresford, seconded by the heroic valour of his troops, not only had he extricated himself from a situation of uncommon embarrassment and danger, but established his divisions in force on the right of the enemy's position, and threatened to take all their defences in flank. It was now Soult's turn to feel alarmed, and he instantly made fresh dispositions to guard against the danger. His whole defeated right wing was re-formed; D'Armagnac's brigade brought up with Harispe's division, and a new line of defence taken up, facing outward, stretching from the heights of Calvinet on the left to the intrenchments at the bridge of Demoiselles on the right; while the remaining portion of the line still retained its old ground, facing the Spaniards and light division, on the northern extremity of the position. It was the same sort of line forming the two sides of a square, both facing outward, which the Russians at Eylau, after having repulsed Augereau's attack on their right, found themselves compelled to adopt when suddenly turned by Davoust's successful irruption on their left.* Some hours, however, elapsed before the combat could be renewed: for Beresford, being now firmly planted on the heights, waited till he got up his guns from Mont Blanc before he again commenced his attack, which he at length effected. Meanwhile, Wellington made all the dispositions in his power to take advantage of his success; but he had no reserve in hand but the light division and Ponsonby's dragoons, as the Spaniards could not be relied on for fresh operations, so that the weight of the remaining contest still fell on Beresford's wing.†

Beresford storms the redoubts in the centre.

About three o'clock, the artillery having joined Clinton and Cole's division, Beresford gave orders to advance along the level summit, towards the redoubts in the centre of the Calvinet. Cole was on the top of the ridge, Clinton on the slope down towards Toulouse; while, at the same time, the Spaniards under Freyre, now reformed, advanced again to assault the northern end of the Calvinet, and Picton resumed his attack on the bridge of Jumeaux. Pack had obtained from Clinton, for the 42d, the perilous honour of heading the assault, and soon the whole advanced in column to the charge. No sooner, however, were the Highland feathers seen rising above the brow of the hill, than so terrible a fire of grape and musketry opened from the works above, that the men involuntarily wheeled by the right into line, and rushed impetuously forward towards the redoubts. They were defended by bastions fronted with ditches full of water; but so vehement was the rush of the Highland brigade, that the enemy abandoned them before the British got up, and the 42d entered the redoubt by its gorge. The French, however, rallied bravely; Harispe's men, led by their gallant commander, headed the attack, and soon the taken redoubt was surrounded by a surging multitude, which broke into the work, put a large part of the 42d to the sword, and again got possession of that stronghold. The remains driven out, however, rallied on the 71st, 79th, and 92d; and these four Highland regiments, charging to the brow of the hill, fought, shoulder to shoulder, with such desperate resolution, though sorely reduced in number, that Harispe's men were never able to push them down the slope. Meanwhile, the other brigades of Cole and Clinton came up to their assistance; the French, still furiously fighting, were forced back; Harispe and Baurot both fell, badly wounded; the bloody redoubt was retaken by the 79th, and the whole French right, like a vast mass of burning lava, amid volumes of smoke and fire, hurled down the hill towards Toulouse.‡

Retreat of Soult behind the canal.

The battle was now gained; for although the Spaniards were repulsed in their fresh attack on the northern angle of the Calvinet, and Picton also failed in his renewed assault on the bridge of Jumeaux, yet three fourths of the Mont Rave was won; its central and southern works were in

* Reminiscences of Camp. in Pyrenees, 293, in Mem. of late War, vol. ii. Nap., vi., 643, 644. Jones, ii., 272. Vaud., iii., 120, 121. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 254, 255. Belm., i. 284. Koch, iii., 640, 642.

* *Ante*, ii., 484.

† Jones, ii., 273. Nap., vi., 646. Beamish, ii., 295, 296. Soult to Duc de Feltre, April 11, 1814, i., 716.

‡ Journal of 42d, Mem. of late War, ii., 297, 298. Nap., vi., 646, 648. Jones, ii., 273, 274. Vaud., iii., 123, 124. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 355.

the hands of the enemy, and his guns commanded the whole suburb of St. Etienne, as far as the old walls of the city. In these circumstances, at four o'clock Soult abandoned the whole remaining works of the Calvinet, and withdrew his troops at all points within the second line of defence, formed by the canal of Languedoc, with its fortified bridge and intrenched suburbs. The Spaniards, seeing the heights abandoned, pressed up the slope which had been the theatre of such sanguinary contention in the earlier part of the day, and the whole allied forces, crossing the ridge, fell on the retiring columns of the enemy; but they were arrested by the fire of the *têtes-du-pont*, and at seven o'clock the whole French army were ranged behind the canal, which formed the line of demarcation between the two armies. At the same time, Hill drove the enemy from their second line of intrenchments, within the old city wall, on the other side of the Garonne; and Picton pushed the third division up close to the bridge head of the canal next the Garonne; while Wellington, having thus cooped the enemy up within the city, and established his army in proud array on the bloodstained summits of the Mont Rave, despatched his cavalry along the banks of the Ers, so as to occupy the Montpelier road, the only remaining issue which was still in the hands of the enemy.*

Results of the battle.

Such was the bloody battle of Toulouse, in which, although the victory unquestionably was on the side of the British,† it is hard to say to which of the two gallant armies the prize of valour and devotion is to be awarded. Situated as the French army was, assailed by superior force, and depressed by a long course of defeats, the heroic stand they made on the Calvinet was among the most honourable of their long and glorious career. It is with a feeling of pride, not for England alone, but the human race, that the historian has now to take leave of the renowned antagonists of his country in the Peninsula. Nor was the conduct of the British and their allies less worthy of the highest admiration, assailing a force inferior in number, but in a concentrated intrenched position, and strengthened with the greatest possible advantages of nature and art. The loss on both sides was very severe, and heavier on that of the allies than the French, as might naturally be expected in the attack of intrenchments of such strength and so defended. The former lost four thousand five hundred and fifty-eight men, of whom one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight were Spaniards, six hundred and seven Portuguese, and two thousand one hundred and fourteen British; the French loss was three thousand two hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners, on the field, and one thousand five hundred men were taken prisoners on the 12th, in Toulouse, including Generals Harispe, Baurot, and St. Hilaire, who were severely wounded.*

Soult evacuates Toulouse.

Soult, four days before the battle, was aware of the taking of Paris on the 29th of March preceding;† but, like a good soldier and faithful servant, he was only confirmed by that disaster in his resolution to defend Toulouse to the last extremity, hoping thus to preserve for the emperor the capital of the South; and, at the same time, he wrote to Suchet, urging him to combine measures for ulterior operations in Languedoc. On the day after the battle he expected to be attacked, and his troops were posted at all points along the canal to resist an assault. But Wellington wisely determined not to trust to chance what was certain by combination. The strength of the enemy's defensive fortifications at the bridge heads of the canal had been fatally proved on the preceding day: ammunition for the cannon was wanting for a protracted struggle, till supplies were got up from the other side of the river; and the whole of the 11th was occupied in bringing it across. The attack was fixed for daylight on the 12th; and, meanwhile, the troops and guns were brought up to the front, and the cavalry pushed on to the heights of St. Martyn, menacing Soult's line of retreat to Carcassonne. How unwilling soever to relinquish the great and important city of Toulouse, containing his hospitals, magazines, and depôts of all sorts, Soult felt that it was no longer tenable, and that, by persisting to retain it, he would run the hazard of ruining his whole army.‡ Wherefore, making his arrangements with great ability, he left sixteen hundred wounded, including the gallant Harispe and two other generals, to the humanity of the British general, besides eight heavy guns; and defiling silently out at nightfall, managed his retreat so expeditiously that before daybreak he was at Ville Franche, two-and-twenty miles off, on the road to Carcassonne.◊

Wellington's triumphant entry into Toulouse, and proclamation of Louis XVIII.

Wellington entered Toulouse in triumph at noon on the 12th, and met with a most brilliant reception. A large proportion of the inhabitants, including the whole better classes, had already mounted the white cockade, though intelligence of the capitulation of Paris, and dethronement of Napoleon, had not yet been received; and the people, who the day before had been under mortal apprehensions at being subjected to the terrors of an assault, suddenly found themselves delivered at once from their alarm and their oppression, and the reign of a pacific monarch

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814, Gurw., xi., 638. Vaud., iii., 128. Kausler, 666.

† "M. Ricard was with me when I received the distressing intelligence of the entry of the allies into Paris. That great disaster confirms me in my resolution to defend Toulouse, happen what may. The maintenance of that place, which contains establishments of all kinds, is of the last importance. But if, unfortunately, I should be obliged to quit it, I will naturally draw towards you."—SOULT *to* SUCHET, *7th April*, 1814. BELMAS, i., 712, 713.

‡ "I am under the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear I shall be obliged to fight at Baziége, whither the enemy has directed a column to cut off my communication. To-morrow I shall take position at Ville Franche, for I hope nothing will prevent me from getting through the day after to-morrow at Castelnaudary."—SOULT *to* SUCHET, *11th April*, 1814, BELMAS, i., 721.

◊ Nap., vi., 650, 651. Vaud., iii., 127, 128. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814, Gurw., xi., 638, 639.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814, Gurw., xi., 636, 637. Jones, ii., 275, 276. Nap., vi., 648, 649. Vaud., iii., 125, 127. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 355, 356. Kausler, 665, 666.

† "The battle of Toulouse, in which the Duke of Dalmatia and the Duke of Wellington both claim the honour, was, beyond all question, lost by the former. But it was so dearly bought, that the English general was in no condition to follow up his success, and might have been brought into a critical situation if the French general had known how to avail himself of the advantages he still possessed."—VAUDONCOURT, iii, 128, 129.

proclaimed amid the combined shouts of their enemies and their defenders. Wellington, however, who had hitherto only heard of the capture of Paris, but not of the dethronement of Napoleon and restoration of the Bourbons, expressed no small uneasiness at the declaration thus made in favour of the exiled prince, when, so far as he knew, the allied powers were still negotiating with Napoleon. "The royal cockade," replied Count Hargicourt, "is in my hat: it shall not fall from it but with my head." Loud applause followed this intrepid declaration—white scarfs immediately waved from every hand—tears glistened in many eyes—and the tricolour flag was supplanted on the city hall by the fleur-de-lis and the white flag. Wellington still trembled for the devoted zeal of the people; but at five o'clock despatches arrived from Paris, announcing the dethronement of Napoleon by the Conservative Senate, and the proclamation of Louis XVIII. All restraint was now at an end, and the English general could scarcely give open vent to the feelings which he had long privately entertained: he assumed the white cockade amid thunders of applause; all his officers did the same; the news circulated in a few moments through the town; the British soldiers were everywhere decorated with the Royalist colours by fair hands trembling with agitation; and in the close of one of the longest and bloodiest wars recorded in history, was exhibited the marvellous spectacle of the white flag, the emblem at once of loyalty and peace, uniting in common transports the victors and the vanquished.*

Convention which terminates the war in the south of France.

These astonishing events, which in effect terminated the war in the south of France, were immediately followed by a formal convention for the termination of hostilities between the rival commanders. Wellington lost no time in making Soult acquainted with the changes at Paris; but the French marshal, faithful to his trust, declined to come to an accommodation till he received official intelligence that the emperor had really abdicated the throne. Having at length obtained that information, in a way which left no doubt of its authority, he concluded, on the 18th, a convention with Wellington, by which hostilities were immediately to cease, and the limits of the department of the Haute Garonne, with the departments of the Arriege, Aude, and Tarn, were to separate the two armies. The convention stipulated, also, the cessation of hostilities both at Bayonne, Navarreins, and Bordeaux, as well as on the Catalonian frontier, in which last quarter the boundaries of France and Spain were to be the separating line between the two armies, and the immediate evacuation of all the fortresses yet held by the French in Spain. Suchet, who had entirely withdrawn from Spain immediately before the battle of Toulouse, had already hoisted the white flag, before he received intelligence of the convention concluded by Soult on his behalf. Twenty thousand veterans, in the best possible state, and of the utmost experience, were drawn from the fortresses held by the French in Catalonia and Valencia alone, after the conclusion of the convention: a surprising proof of the tenacity with which Napoleon, even in his last extremity, clung to those distant, and to him pernicious strongholds. But, before the intelligence could be communicated to Bayonne, a deplorable event had taken place, which threw a gloom over the glorious termination of the Peninsular war.*

April 18.

After the departure of Wellington and the main army for the Upper Garonne, and the successful passage of the Adour, which has already been mentioned, Hope exerted himself with the utmost zeal and diligence to forward the siege of Bayonne, the works before which were in such forwardness, that he was ready to attack the citadel when rumours of the events at Paris reached him on the 7th of April; but, as he had not yet received any official communication on the subject, he, of course, continued his operations. Official accounts from Paris, however, had reached the British camp, and were by Hope forwarded to Thouvenot, the governor of the fortress, who returned for answer, "that we should hear from him on the subject before long." It would appear he had resolved on finishing the war with a brilliant exploit, which was the more likely to succeed, as the British, considering the contest as virtually at an end, might be supposed to be somewhat off their guard. Accordingly, at three o'clock in the morning of the 14th, the French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, suddenly poured out of the citadel to the number of three thousand men, broke through the line of pickets, and with a violent rush and loud shouts carried the whole village of St. Etienne, with the exception of a house occupied by a picket of the 38th under Captain Forster, which with heroic valour maintained its ground till General Hinuber came up with some of the German Legion; and a battalion of Portuguese arrived, who retook the village, after a tremendous struggle at the point of the bayonet, and drove the enemy back towards the works. Meanwhile, the guns of the citadel, guided by the flashes of musketry, fired incessantly on the scene of combat; the gunboats, which had dropped down the stream, opened upon the flanks of the fighting columns, without being able to distinguish friend from foe; and amid the incessant clang of small arms, and alternate cheers of the combatants, the deep booming of a hundred guns added to the horrors of this awful nocturnal combat.†

Sally from Bayonne. April 14.

On the right the conflict was still more terrible: the pickets and reserves were broken through by the vehement fury of the onset; the troops on both sides, broken into small bodies by the enclosures, and unable to recover their companions, or even their regiments, during the darkness, fought bayonet to bayonet, sword to sword, man to man, with the most determined resolution. Never had such fury been exhibited on both sides during the

Sir J. Hope is made prisoner, but the sally is repulsed.

* Beauch., ii., 460, 471. Lab., ii. 431, 434. Gurw., xi., 630. Wellington to Sir J. Hope, April 16, 1814, Gurw., xi., 648.

* Convention, April 18, 1814, Gurw., xi., 653, 654. Nap., vi., 651, 652. Suchet, ii., 395, 396; and Report to Minister of War, June 11th, 1814, ib., ii., 517.

† Howard's Official Accounts, April 15, 1814, Gurw., xi., 667. Note, Nap., vi., 653, 655. Subaltern, chap. 24. Beamish, ii., 301, 303. Vaud., iii., 132, 133.

whole course of the war; never were wounds of so desperate a character inflicted on the warriors engaged. In the midst of this scene of horror, Sir John Hope, ever foremost where danger was to be met or heroism displayed, was hurrying to the front in a hollow way, when he met a British picket retiring before a large body of French. "Why do you retreat?" cried he. "The enemy are yonder," was the answer. "Well, then, we must drive them back," he replied, and, spurring his noble charger, himself led them again to the attack. The French immediately gave a pointblank discharge, the general fell, wounded in two, his horse in eight places, and he was made prisoner. But now the day was beginning to dawn; the troops rallied in all directions; and the reserve brigade of the Guards, being led by General Howard, rushed forward in the finest order with the bayonet, and drove the broken and almost frantic mass, with terrible slaughter, back into the works. In this melancholy combat, fought after the peace had been concluded, the British lost eight hundred and thirty men, including the gallant General Hay, who fell early in the fight; but the French loss was nine hundred and ten: a catastrophe which, if the war had continued, must speedily have led to the fall of the place.*

Concluding operations at Bordeaux.

The convention prevented serious hostilities being renewed on the Lower Garonne. Napoleon had collected a considerable force on the other side of that river; and Lord Dalhousie, who had succeeded to the command of the British force at Bordeaux, crossed it on the 4th of April to attack them. The combat was soon decided: the enemy, about two thousand strong, fled on the first onset, and the British cavalry, charging, made three hundred prisoners; at the same time, Admiral Penrose, ascending the river in spite of the batteries at its mouth, burned the whole flotilla at Castillon; so that the whole line of the Garonne, from Toulouse to the sea, with the intermediate country from thence to the Pyrenees, had before the war ceased, with the exception of the fortress of Bayonne, been wrested from the French. Decaen, who had collected eight thousand men in La Vendée and the western provinces, could not have made head against Dalhousie, who commanded above twelve thousand. The whole infantry of the British army embarked at Bordeaux, some to America, some for Great Britain, loaded with honours, immortal in fame. Wellington and his staff soon after proceeded to Paris, to take part in the momentous negotiations there going forward; and the British cavalry, in number above seven thousand, marched in triumph by Orleans across France, and embarked for their own country from the harbour of Calais.†

Reflections on this campaign.

Though both the rival commanders displayed the most consummate ability in the short, but active campaign which preceded the battle of Toulouse, it may yet be doubted whether the conduct of either, at or shortly before the battle, is not open to serious criticism. On occasion of the three divisions of the British army, not more than sixteen thousand strong, even including cavalry and artillery, being left for three days close to Soult, who had thirty thousand disposable troops wherewith to assail them, on the opposite side of the Garonne from the remainder of the army, without the possibility of sending over succours to them from the flooded state of the river, the French marshal lost an opportunity of striking a decisive blow, such as is rarely presented to the most fortunate commander. Picton, who commanded one of the divisions which had crossed, always said that the French general evinced, on that occasion, a degree of vacillation which he could not have expected from his well-known abilities.* On the field of battle itself, he acted with neither the vigour nor decision which was requisite to obtain the proper advantage, from the extraordinary facilities of his situation. When Beresford moved with his two divisions so far to the left, and separated by two miles from the rest of the army, if Soult had thrown his whole disposable forces at once upon him he must have achieved as decisive a success as Wellington did when, in a similar situation, by a flank attack, he cut off Thomière's division at Salamanca;† and when he did make the attack, he sent forward only Taupin's division, and one of D'Armagnac's brigades, a force inadequate to the encounter in the open field of twelve thousand British troops, and by their defeat he lost the battle. Half measures here, as well as everywhere else, ruined everything: by sending this limited force, hardly half of what at the moment he had at his disposal, out of his redoubts, he paralyzed the fire of their guns, lest they should destroy their own men, while he brought no sufficient body to crush the enemy in the open field.

Errors of Wellington.

Wellington's measures appear, on the field at least, to have been not less inconsiderate. To push Beresford forward with 13,000 men, by a long flank march, immediately under the eye of Soult, posted on the heights above, with double that amount of disposable troops, seems at least a very questionable proceeding, and of which the English general's own success at Salamanca must have taught him the danger. If Soult in person, with the iron gauntlet of Napoleon, had struck at this detached corps when two miles off, at the head of twenty thousand men, where would the British army have been? The policy is not very apparent of intrusting the attack of the redoubts of Mount Calvinet, the key of the whole position, to the brave but unsteady Spanish troops; while Picton, with his heroic third division, and Hill, with another British division, were engaged, the one in a false attack on the bridge of Jumeaux, the other in a distant and immaterial operation on the suburb of St. Cyprien. The truth appears to have been, that Soult, by a long train of disasters, had become timorous and distrustful of his troops, in all but the defence of fortified positions; and Wellington, from an uninterrupted career of victory, had almost forgot that his men could ever be put to the hazard of defeat; and perhaps this circumstance affords the best vindication of both; for experience had too sorely impressed upon the one his apprehensions, and success

* Vaud., iii., 133. Nap., vi., 655, 656. Beamish, ii., 302, 303. Subaltern, chap. 24, p. 350, 353. Gurw., xi.
† Nap., vi., 656. Jones, ii., 279.

* Picton's Memoirs, ii., 299. † *Ante*, iii., 480

almost justified any anticipations of triumphant extrication from difficulties to the other.*

All that remains to narrate, before describing the final catastrophe at Paris, is the concluding operations of Lord William Bentinck and the Anglo-Sicilian army on the coast of Italy. The second detachment of the expedition having arrived from Catalonia, Bentinck, being now at the head of twelve thousand men, moved forward by the coast of the Mediterranean to La Spezia, which was occupied on the 29th of March. Thence he advanced by the coast road, through the romantic defiles of the Apennines, so well known to travellers, to Sestri, where the enemy's forces, about six thousand strong, were posted. From this strong position, however, the French were driven, with great loss, on the 8th; and from thence the allies advanced, fighting at every step, and gradually forcing their way through the ravines in the mountains till the 13th, when General Montresor established himself in an advanced position near the town; and on the 16th the whole army was concentrated in front of Genoa. The enemy were there very strongly posted on the almost inaccessible ridges, supported by forts and external works, which surround that noble city; their left resting on the castles of Richelieu and Tecla; their centre in the village of San Martino, and their right on the sea; the whole line passing through a country thickly studded with gardens, villas, enclosures, and all the impediments of suburban scenery. Such, however, was the vigour of the attack on the day following, being the 17th, that the whole position was speedily carried; the second battalion of the third Italian regiment stormed Fort Tecla; another battalion of the same regiment, with a body of Calabrese, surmounted the rocky heights above Fort Richelieu, and compelled the garrison to capitulate. The French, upon this, retired within the town, and the allies took up a positian within six hundred yards of the ramparts, where preparations were immediately made for establishing breaching batteries, and carrying the place by assault. To prevent such a catastrophe, the governor proposed to capitulate; and after some difficulties about the terms, a convention was concluded, in virtue of which the French garrison was to march out, with the honours of war and six pieces of cannon, and retire to Nice. The same day the British took possession; and thus was this noble fortress, which, under Massena in 1800, had held out so long against the Austrians, at once carried by the English forces, with immense stores of every kind, and two ships of the line and four brigs; all with the loss only of forty killed and a hundred and sixty wounded.*

Lord William Bentinck's operations against Genoa.

March 29.

April 8.

April 13.

April 17.

April 18.

In the proceedings which immediately followed this important acquisition, Bentinck, without any authority from his government, but not unnaturally in his situation, gave the inhabitants reason to believe that it was the intention of the allies to restore them to their former state of independence and Republican government, as they had existed before the French Revolution; declarations which excited unbounded joy and gratitude at the time, and gave rise to proportional dissatisfaction, when considerations of general policy, and, in fact, absolute necessity, rendered it unavoidable to incorporate them, even against their will, with the Sardinian monarchy. Meanwhile, the Austrian general, Bellegarde, signed a convention with Murat, providing for the more vigorous prosecution of the war on the Po, and the final expulsion of the French from Italy. The King of Naples, however, anxious to gain time, and to see the course of events on the Seine before he adopted a decisive course on the Po, adjourned, on various pretexts, the performance of his part of the contract, and it was not till the 13th that Bellegarde succeeded in prevailing upon him to put his troops in motion. On that day, however, he forced the Taro, after a vigorous resistance on the part of the French general, Maucune; and on the day following the passage of the Stura was also effected, after a sharp conflict. These actions, in which the French lost fifteen hundred men, were of sinister augury to the cause of the viceroy in Italy; but the farther prosecution of hostilities was prevented by the intelligence, which arrived next day, of the capitulation of Paris and dethronement of Napoleon. A convention was immediately concluded with the Austrian generals; in virtue of which Palma-Nuova, Osopo, Venice, and Legnago were immediately surrendered to their troops. Eugene's armaments were soon after dissolved; everything was placed on a new footing; the whole of Lombardy was occupied by the Germans; and in the first week of May the French

Concluding operations of the allies in Italy.

April 7.

April 13.

April 14.

April 17.

* The attempt, however, which is made by an ingenious French writer, to convert the battle of Toulouse into a victory for the arms of his country, is altogether hopeless. It is amusing to see such an attempt made in the face of Soult's written admission the day before the battle, already quoted, that the preservation of Toulouse was of such incalculable importance to him, as containing his magazines and establishments of all sorts; and of his admission in his letter to Suchet, the day after the battle, that he could no longer maintain it, followed by his evacuation of the town, and forced march of twenty-two miles, that very night. The ridge of the Mont Rave was the elevated ground for which both parties fought; when it was carried by the British, Toulouse was as indefensible as Paris was when Montmartre and Belville had fallen. The case of Wellington retiring from the ridge of Busaco, the day after the battle at that place,* to which Choumara (p. 202, *Cons. Mil. sur la Bataille de Toulouse*) wishes to parallel it, is not an analogous, but an opposite instance, and brings out the true distinction on the subject. The whole ridge of Busaco was maintained by the British, despite Massena's attack, and the turning their position by the pass of Sardao, and forcing them to fall back to Coimbra, was in no shape whatever the consequence of the battle. At Toulouse, the carrying of the ridge of the Mont Rave and the redoubts of Calvinet rendered Soult's position in that town wholly untenable; for the British guns commanded the city, and their cavalry cut off the only French communications left to them with Carcassonne and Suchet's forces. It was the possession of the heights of the Mont Rave, won by Beresford, that alone gave Wellington this advantage. If Massena had won the ridge of Busaco, and driven the British to a position half way down the mountain on the other side, and thus menaced the pass of Sardao, and forced them to retreat, no British writer would have thought of claiming the victory; nor would they do so at Toulouse if Beresford had been repulsed as Picton and the Spaniards were, and the works of Calvinet had remained in the hands of the French, and they had evacuated them two days afterward, only in consequence of a flank movement of Wellington threatening the French general's communication with Suchet.

* *Ante*, iii., 350.

* Bentinck's Official Account, April 20, 1814, Ann. Reg., p. 191. App. to Chron. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 345, 347. Botta, iv., 481, 482.

troops FINALLY REPASSED THE ALPS, not without casting from the summit of Mont Cenis a "longing, lingering look behind" at that classic land, which they had won by their valour and lost by their oppression.*

State and final surrender of the fortresses in Germany still held by the French.

To complete the picture of the French Empire, as it was submitted to the consideration of Napoleon at Rheims in the middle of March, when he took his final determination as to the Congress of Chatillon, it only remains to cast a last glance over the vast fortresses, once the bulwarks of his mighty dominions, which still remained in the hands of his generals on the other side of the Rhine. Glogau, blockaded since the 17th of August, 1813, capitulated from want of provisions on the 10th of April, and the garrison, still three thousand three hundred strong, became prisoners of war. Custrin fell on the 30th of March, with its garrison of three thousand. Wittenburg had been more actively besieged: trenches were opened against it in the beginning of January; and it was carried by assault on the 15th, fifteen hundred men having been made prisoners. The citadel of Wurzburg fell, as did those of Erfurth, long closely blockaded: the former on the 21st of March, with fifteen hundred men; the two latter, with two thousand, in the beginning of May. Magdebourg, with its garrison, now swelled by stragglers from the French army, who had sought refuge within its walls after the retreat from the Elbe, to eighteen thousand men, presented a more important object. The blockade was loosely maintained by successive bodies of allied troops as they advanced from Russia, or were equpped in the adjoining provinces of Prussia, from the 26th of October till the final capitulation took place in the middle of May. Several sorties were made to collect provisions, particularly in the beginning of January and on the 1st of April; on which last occasion, eight thousand men were engaged in the attack, and were not repulsed without considerable difficulty. An armistice was concluded on the 14th of April, as soon as the events at Paris were known; but it was not till the 19th of May that the place was finally evacuated, when General Lemarrois led back to France the divisions Lanusse and Lemoine, still fourteen thousand strong, besides four thousand Italians, Spaniards, and Croatians, who were dismissed to their respective homes.†

April 10.

March 30.

Jan. 15.

Operations under Benningsen against Davoust in Hamburg.

Davoust, in Hamburg, as already noticed, had been blockaded by Benningsen with a large part of the Russian army of reserve, immediately after the battle of Leipsic. General Strogonoff at first had the command, but he was replaced, in the end of January, by Benningsen in person, who thenceforward took the direction of that important operation. On the 20th of January, a serious attack took place on the fort of Haarbourg and the island of Willemsbourg: the first proved successful, but in the latter the Russians were repulsed, with the loss of seven hundred men. The hard frost which now succeeded, so well known and severely felt over all Europe, having completely frozen the Elbe, the Russian general resolved to take advantage of it to effect the reduction of the island of Willemsbourg, without the command of which he had become sensible that no operations, with any degree of certainty, could be carried on against the body of the fortress. Repeated attacks took place on the 9th, and 17th, and 24th of February, and the 5th and 11th of March; but such was the tenacity of Marshal Davoust, and the vigour of his resistance, that, although the Russians repeatedly got footing in the island, they were always, in the end, repulsed with very severe loss. Upward of four thousand men were lost to both sides in these bloody combats, which led to no decisive results; and at length Benningsen, despairing of dispossessing the enemy by main force, strengthened the blockade, and trusted to the slower and more certain effects of disease and scarcity. The city, already pillaged and wo-struck to an unparalleled degree by the merciless exactions of the French marshal, was now threatened with the combined horrors of plague, pestilence, and famine, when a period was fortunately put to their sufferings by the fall of Napoleon, which was followed by a suspension of arms on the 18th of April; and in the end of May, the garrison, still thirteen thousand strong, besides three thousand sick and wounded in the hospitals, set out on their return to France. Wesel, with its garrison of ten thousand men, long blockaded by Borstel's Prussians, was finally evacuated on the 10th of May.*

Feb. 9, 17, 24, and 28.

April 18.

Thus, while Napoleon at Rheims, with his heroic band of followers, not forty thousand strong, was maintaining a doubtful struggle with the vast masses of the allied forces, above seventy thousand of his veteran troops were blockaded in the fortresses still held by his lieutenants beyond the Rhine and the Pyrenees:† an extraordinary fact, and speaking volumes as to the disastrous effect which the obstinate retention of these distant strongholds had upon the fortunes of the Empire. Nor is there any foundation for the obvious remark, that if the emperor had withdrawn these garrisons to augment his forces in the interior, the blockading troops would have formed an equal or greater addition to the armies of the allies; for these blockading corps, though very numerous, were, for the most part, composed of landwehr and new levies, wholly unfit for operations in the field, while the garrisons they held in check were the best troops at that period in the French service. The armies, too, with which the allies invaded France were so numerous, that it was with the utmost difficulty they could find subsistence, and an additional host of mouths would have been an encumbrance rather than an advan-

* Koch, ii., 278. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 346, 348. Botta, v., 479.

† Plotho, iii., 502, 513. Vaud., 136, 139. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 349, 350.

* Plotho, iii., 515, 521. Vaud., iii., 139, 141.

† Viz.:

In Catalonia and Santona (*Ante*, iv., 360)	21,500
" Hamburg	16,000
" Wesel	10,000
" Custrin	3,000
" Wittenburg	1,500
" Magdebourg	18,000
" Wurzburg	1,500
" Erfurth	2,000
	73,500

—VAUDONCOURT, iii., 136, 141; SUCHET, ii., 517.

tage; whereas seventy thousand veterans added to Napoleon's armies in the plains of Champagne would have hurled back the allies with disgrace to the Rhine. It was want of men—the utter exhaustion of his military resources—which in the end proved his ruin; and yet, at that very time, he had veteran soldiers in abundance, voluntarily exiled by him from their country. Perplexed and wearisome as the details of the breaking up, in all its extent, of so immense a dominion necessarily are, the pains of investigating will not be deemed lost when it leads to such a result as this; and demonstrates the decisive influence which the necessity of nowhere receding, and maintaining to the last the principle "*tout ou rien*" had upon the ultimate fate of the Revolution. Dark and mournful as was the intelligence which on every side pressed on the emperor at Rheims, it had no effect in shaking his determination. The disasters which have been enumerated, which accumulated "round a sinking throne and falling empire," were all, with the exception of the taking of Lyons and Genoa, and the battle of Toulouse, known to him when he took his final resolution to refuse the terms proposed to him at Chatillon; but still he would not consent to abandon Antwerp and the frontier of the Rhine.*

Napoleon's last survey of his empire.

The terms which the allied sovereigns proposed to Napoleon in the close of the conferences at Chatillon, were the cession, by Napoleon, of the whole conquests made by France since 1792: the abandonment of the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of Switzerland, and King of Italy: the reconstruction of all the countries adjoining France in an independent form: in particular, the organization of Germany in a federal union; of Italy in independent states, between the Austrian possessions and the French frontier; the independence of Switzerland as a separate republic; the formation of a kingdom in Holland for the house of Orange; in fine, the restoration of the Peninsular thrones to the houses of Braganza and Bourbon. In return for these exactions, the British government consented to restore the whole French colonies conquered by them during the war, with the exception of the islands of Saintes and Tobago in the West, and the isles of Mauritius and Bourbon in the East Indies. Malta was to remain in the hands of the English; but Sweden and Portugal were to restore Guadaloupe and Cayenne. So noble and disinterested was the use which Great Britain made of the immense sacrifices and unbounded ultimate triumphs of the war, that all the exactions she required of France were for the security of her Continental allies; and peace was to bring to Napoleon only a restitution of four fifths of the conquests which Great Britain had made of her transmarine possessions. On these terms the allies offered to recognise Napoleon as Emperor of France, and immediately conclude peace, leaving him as great an empire as had been enjoyed by Louis XIV.;† and to possess which, Frederic the Great said, was "the brightest dream which a sovereign could form."*

Final terms proposed to Napoleon at Chatillon.

Napoleon having declined to accede to these conditions, Caulaincourt, after a great many delays thrown in the way, to gain time for the military successes of the emperor to influence in the manner he desired the progress of the negotiations, at length, on the 10th of March, gave in what he termed a counter-project, but which, in effect, was nothing but an able argument on the part of the French government against the terms proposed by the allies.† The allied plenipotentiaries, upon this, declared that this memoir was no answer to their ultimatum, and were on the point of breaking up the conferences; when Caulaincourt, overwhelmed with apprehension at the immediate and probable result of such a rupture, proposed verbally, on the part of the emperor, that he should renounce all supremacy or constitutional influence in countries beyond the limits of France; to recognise the independence of Spain in its old limits, under the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII.; to admit the independence of Switzerland, un-

Counter-project of Napoleon.

March 10.

* Fain, 170, 171.

† Project of Allies, Feb. 9, Koch, ii., 336, 343. Cap., x., 377. Fain, 327.

* "I will always hold to you the same language; it should be appreciated by men of sense who really desire the good of their country. We have but one wish, that of peace; but that peace is impossible, if you will not make the sacrifices necessary to regain your possessions beyond the seas. To arrive at that peace, it is necessary to be equally prepared for the means by which it is to be obtained, and not to forget that England disposes *alone* of all the compensations possible; and that, in agreeing to denude herself in favour of France *of almost the whole of her conquests*, she is entitled to insist that France shall be replaced on a level with the other great powers on the Continent."—METTERNICH *to* CAULAINCOURT, *March 8th*, 1814, FAIN, 305, 306. *Pièces Just.*

† "The allied powers declared, only three months ago, at Frankfort, that they wished to establish a just equilibrium in Europe. They profess the same desire now. To maintain the same *relative* position which she always enjoyed, is the only real wish of France. But Europe does not at this time resemble what she was twenty years ago. At that period the kingdom of Poland, already partitioned, disappeared entirely; the immense Empire of Russia received vast and rich provinces; six millions of men were added to dominions already more extensive than any sovereign in Europe enjoyed; while nine millions fell to the lot of Austria and Prussia. Soon the face of Germany was changed. The ecclesiastical states and the greater number of the free cities were divided among the secular princes! Prussia and Austria received the greater part of them. The ancient Republic of Venice became a province of Austria: two millions of subjects, with new territories and new resources, were given to Russia by the treaty of Tilsit, by that of Vienna, by that of Yassi, by that of Abo. On her own side, and during the same period, England has not only acquired the Dutch possessions of Ceylon and Trinidad, but she has doubled her territories in India, and contracted an empire there which two of the greatest monarchies in Europe would hardly equal. If the population of that empire cannot be considered as an addition to the inhabitants of Great Britain; on the other hand, she has acquired by their sovereignty and commerce an immense increase of riches, the other great element of power. Russia and England have preserved all that they have acquired; Austria and Prussia have, it is true, sustained losses; but do they abandon all thoughts of repaying them? or will they be now contented with the possessions which they enjoyed before the war? When all has thus changed around France, can it maintain the same relative power if it is reduced to its original limits? Replaced in its original state, it would be far from enjoying the same influence or security, when the power of its neighbours has so immensely increased. England can only be attacked by sea: Russia, backed by the pole and flanked on either side by inaccessible and boundless solitudes, can be attacked, since the acquisition of Finland, only on one side. France, half commercial and half territorial, is open to attack on all sides both by sea and land, on both which elements she is brought immediately in contact with valiant nations."—*Contre-projet of* CAULAINCOURT, *10th March*, 1814, FAIN, 835; *Supplement au Manuscrit de* 1814.

der the guarantee of the allied powers; the independence of Germany and of Holland, under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange. This was followed three days afterward by a more detailed *contre-projet* on the part of Napoleon, of the same general tenour, but in which he still eluded any answer to the requisition of the allies, that France should be restored to its limits as in 1792, and held out for the possession of Antwerp, Flanders, and the frontier of the Rhine. He insisted, also, that the Ionian Islands should be annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and that both should be settled on Prince Eugene and his descendants, with the Adige as a boundary on the side of Austria; that Saxony should be restored entire; that the sovereignty of Lucca and Piombino should be secured to his sister, the Princess Eliza; the principality of Neufchatel to Berthier; and that the whole colonies taken during the war, except Saintes, should be restored by Great Britain.*

March 13.

This counter-project of Napoleon was met by the following answer on the part of the allied powers: "Europe, allied against the French government, wishes only the re-establishment of a general peace, Continental and maritime. Such a peace can alone give the world repose, of which it has so long been deprived; but that peace cannot subsist without a due partition of force among the different powers. No view of ambition has dictated the proposals made on the part of the allies in the sitting of the 17th of February last. France, even when restored to her limits of 1792, is still, from the central nature of her situation, her population, the riches of her soil, the strength of her frontiers, the number and distribution of her fortified places, on a level with the greatest powers on the Continent: the other powers, in consenting to their own reconstruction on a proportional scale, and to the establishment of intermediate independent secondary states, prove at once what are the principles which animate them. England restores to France her colonies, and with them her commerce and her marine; England does more: in denuding herself of nearly the whole of the conquests which she has made during so many years, she is far from advancing any pretensions to the exclusive dominion of the seas, or any right inconsistent with the free enjoyment of commerce by others. Inspired with a spirit of justice and liberality worthy of a great people, England throws into the balance of the Continent acquisitions beyond seas, of which the possession would secure her for long the exclusive dominion. In restoring to France her colonies, in making great sacrifices for the restoration of Holland, which the spirit of the Dutch people renders worthy to resume its place in the European commonwealth, the British government are entitled to expect that such sacrifices on their part shall purchase a real and effectual, not a merely nominal equilibrium in Europe; that the political state of Europe shall be such as to afford her a guarantee that these concessions have not been a pure loss on her part, that they will not be turned against Europe and herself.

Answer of the allies to the ultimatum of France.

"The counter-project of the French plenipotentiary proceeds on entirely different principles. According to them, France will retain a territory more extensive than experience has shown to be consistent with the peace of Europe. She will retain those salient points and offensive positions, by the aid of which she has already overturned so many of the adjoining states; the cessions which she proposes to make are only apparent. The principles still announced by the actual sovereign of France, and the dear-bought experience of many years, have proved that adjoining secondary states possessed by members of his family can be independent only in name. Were they to deviate from the principles on which their project of the 17th of February rests, the allied sovereigns would have done nothing for the peace or safety of Europe. The efforts of so many sovereigns leagued together for one end, would be lost; the weakness of their cabinets would turn at once against themselves and their subjects; Europe, and France itself, would soon become the victims of new convulsions; Europe would not conclude peace, she would only disarm. The allied courts, therefore, considering the counter-project of France as essentially at variance, not merely with the details, but the spirit of the basis proposed by them, regard any farther prolongation of the Congress at Chatillon as useless and dangerous. Useless, because the proposals of France are opposed to the conditions which the allies consider as necessary to the equilibrium of Europe, and to the reconstruction of the social edifice, to which they are determined to consecrate all the forces with which Providence has intrusted them; dangerous, because the prolongation of steril negotiations would only inspire the people of Europe with vain expectations of peace. The allied powers, therefore, with regret regard the negotiations at Chatillon as dissolved; and they cannot separate without declaring that *they make no war upon France;* that they regard the proper dimensions of that empire as one of the first conditions of a proper balance of power; but that they will not lay down their arms until their principles have been recognised and admitted by its government."*†

* *Contre-projet* of Caulaincourt, March 10 and 13, 1814, Fain, 335, 359.

* Protocole, March 18, 1814, Fain, 357, 361. Koch, ii., 360, 363.

† So anxious was Metternich to induce Caulaincourt to make peace on the terms proposed, that, on the very morning of the day on which the last meeting of the Congress took place, he wrote to him as follows: "The day when peace may be finally concluded under the necessary sacrifices, has at length arrived: come to conclude it, but without attempting inadmissible projects. Matters have now come to such a pass, that you can no longer write romances without the greatest risks to the Emperor Napoleon. What risks, on the other hand, do the allies run? None but being obliged to evacuate the territory of old France; and what would that avail the Emperor Napoleon? The whole left bank of the Rhine will speedily be raised against him: Savoy is in arms: attacks entirely personal will soon be made on the emperor, without the possibility of arresting them. I speak to you with sincerity: I am ever on the same path. You know my views, my principles, my wishes. The first are entirely European, and, therefore, not alien to France; the second point to retaining Austria interested in the well-being of France; the third are in favour of a dynasty so intimately united to its own. I speak to you, my dear duke, in the most entire confidence. To put an end to the dangers which menace France, it depends only on your master to make peace. Matters, if he does not do so, will, ere long, be beyond his reach. The throne of Louis XIV., with the additions of Louis XV., is too high a stake to put upon a single throw. I will do my utmost to retain Lord Castlereagh a few days: the moment he is gone, all hope of peace has vanished." Caulaincourt re-

Reflections on the dissolution of the Congress.

Thus was finally dissolved the famous Congress of Chatillon; thus departed the last chance which Napoleon had of preserving his Revolutionary dynasty on the throne of France. Caulaincourt next day delivered an answer to the note of the allied sovereigns; it contained nothing but a repetition of the arguments he had formerly urged, but without abating in any degree of the pretensions which France had advanced; and the Congress was declared terminated. It broke off from no verbal distinctions or diplomatic casuistry: real substantial interests were involved in the matters at issue; it was the life or death of the French supremacy in Europe which was at stake. With Flanders and the Rhenish provinces remaining part of the French Empire; with the kingdom of Italy and the Elector of Saxony for external dependants; with one hand resting on Antwerp and another on Mantua, and a ready ingress at all times prepared into the heart of Germany through Mayence, the Revolutionary dynasty, impelled alike by internal discontent and external ambition, would have never ceased to disturb the peace of Europe. But, of all these great keys to European dominion, it was Antwerp to which the emperor most strongly held; it was the dread of losing it which made him, with fifty thousand men, renew a contest with two hundred thousand almost at the gates of Paris. "Antwerp," says Napoleon, "was to me a province in itself: it was the principal cause of my exile to St. Helena; for it was the required cession of that fortress which made me refuse the terms offered at Chatillon. If they would have left it to me, peace would have been concluded."* Strange, that within thirty years of the time when this great man had preferred risking the crown of France to the surrender of that outwork against England, and in the full knowledge of his opinion as to its importance for their overthrow, the British government, in a paroxysm of political madness, should have lent the aid of their fleet to the French army to wrest this noble fortress from their natural allies the Dutch, and restore it to a Revolutionary dynasty and the rule of the tricolour flag!‡‡

Alarming situation of Paris.

In the midst of the general wreck of his empire, it was on Paris, the seat of his power, and the centre of all his political ramifications, that the attention of the emperor was fixed. The accounts from that capital were sufficiently alarming. Slowly, indeed, but perceptibly, and at last in an alarming manner, the vast hosts of the Grand Army were approaching; the long diversion produced by Blucher's irruption towards Meaux had in a manner left the road to Paris open to Schwartzenberg. Macdonald and Oudinot, since their defeat at Bar-sur-Aube, were hardly a match for a single corps of the allied army; Troyes had been reoccupied; the passage of the Seine had been forced at Nogent; their light cavalry again appeared at Fontainebleau and Nemours; and the whole body of their forces might be at Paris on the 20th. The near approach of such formidable masses, the absence of Napoleon, the doubtful issue of the battles of Craon and Laon, the fall of Lyons, the occupation of Bordeaux, and proclamation of Louis XVIII. there, had both excited unbounded consternation among the imperial functionaries, and awakened enthusiastic hopes among the Royalist party. Their committees were in motion in all the provinces; Paris itself was no stranger to the movements; many of the strongest heads there considered the restoration of the Bourbons as the only means of extricating France from the abyss into which it had fallen; many more of the basest hearts looked to it as the securest means of preserving, amid the ruin of their country, their individual fortunes. Talleyrand, the Abbé de Pradt, the Duke of Dalberg, M. de Jaucourt, were in secret correspondence with the allied headquarters; and M. de Vitrolles had conveyed to the Emperor Alexander the feeling entertained at Paris on the necessity of a restoration. Alarmed at the dangers which were accumulating on all sides, Prince Joseph urged the empress to write secretly to her father, but she refused to do so without the knowledge of the emperor. Consternation or hope were painted in every visage; a restless disquietude kept the people in the streets; and that general quiver in thought was perceptible, which is the invariable precursor of revolution.*

March 12. March 14. March 15.

Napoleon marches against Schwartzenberg, and towards the Aube.

Amid so many dangers which pressed on all sides, it was against the army of Schwartzenberg that the emperor deemed it first expedient to march; for its columns, if not arrested, might be in Paris in three days. To guard against the danger of a surprise by the light troops of Blucher, while he himself was engaged in combating the Grand Army, he despatched, on the 16th, secret orders to Joseph, to send off the empress and King of Rome to the other side of the Loire, in the event of Paris being threatened. Having taken this precaution, he on the day following left Marmont and Mortier with twenty thousand men, of whom five thousand were cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, to make head against Blucher on the Aisne, with instructions to retard his advance as much as possible, and fall back, always drawing nearer to him, towards Paris; and himself set out with the remainder of his army, about twenty-six thousand strong (including seven thousand on their road from Paris, under Lefebvre Desnouettes), of which seven

March 17.

plied, on the 20th, "If it depended on me, your hopes would speedily be realized: I should have no doubt they would, if I was sure that yourself and Lord Castlereagh were the instruments of that work, as glorious as it is desirable."—METTERNICH *to* CAULAINCOURT, *18th March*, 1814; and CAULAINCOURT *to* METTERNICH, *20th March*, 1814, FAIN, 311, 313. * Las Casas, vii., 43, 44, 56, 57.

† Protocole, March 19, 1814, Fain, 361, 368.

‡ So intent was Napoleon on the preservation of Antwerp, that on the 17th of March, the very day before the ultimatum of the allies was delivered, declining the proposals of France, Maret, by his orders, wrote from Rheims: "The abandonment of all their conquests by the English is a real concession which his majesty approves, *especially if it can be combined with leaving us Antwerp*. If the negotiation is to be broken off, it is expedient that it should be on the cession of our strongholds, and the evacuation of our territory. If you are obliged to abandon Antwerp, the emperor requires that you shall insist on the restitution of all our colonies, including the Isle of France, and the adherence of the basis of Frankfort so far as regards Italy."—MARET *to* CAULAINCOURT, *Rheims*, *17th March*, 1814, FAIN, 307, 308. This letter did not reach Caulaincourt till the Congress was dissolved.

* Fain, 170, 172. Cap., x., 436, 437. Beauch., ii., 106, 107. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 267, 269.

thousand were cavalry, to join Macdonald and Oudinot, and drive back the Grand Army on the banks of the Seine. These marshals had thirty-five thousand under their orders, of whom ten thousand were cavalry; so that to attack Schwartzenberg, who had above a hundred thousand combatants under his orders, Napoleon had only sixty thousand men, of whom seventeen thousand were horse; while on the Aisne, the disproportion was still greater, for there Blucher, with above a hundred thousand, was opposed only by Marmont and Mortier with twenty thousand—in all, eighty thousand against two hundred thousand: a fearful disproportion, especially when the long course of previous victories, and admirable quality of the allied troops was considered; but yet not so decisive as to relieve the generals from serious anxiety, when the central position of Napoleon was taken into account, the devoted valour of his followers, the force and secrecy of the blows which he dealt out in all directions, the resources which he could command in his own dominions, and their own distance both from their reserves, their parks of ammunition, and supplies of provisions.*

The French troops rested the first night at Epernay: the worthy inhabitants emptied their cellars to refresh their defenders, and for a few hours the delicious wines of Champagne made the soldiers forget their fatigues, the officers their anxieties. On the 18th the march continued towards the Aube, and the army slept at Fere-Champenoise. Napoleon there received intelligence of the state of the negotiations at Chatillon, and the great probability that on that very day Caulaincourt's counter-project had been rejected, and the Congress broken up. Nothing disconcerted by this intelligence, which cut off his last hope of an accommodation, the emperor held on in his route, hoping to fall on the communications and rear of Schwartzenberg's army, which, loosely extended over a vast front nearly eighty miles in breadth, from Fere-Champenoise to Sens, promised to present some of its corps, isolated from the rest, to his strokes. Intelligence of the approach of the French emperor was soon conveyed to the allied generals by the admirable horsemen who formed the eyes of their army; but it was long before they would give any credit to the intelligence, deeming him fully occupied, or closely followed, by Blucher. At length, on the evening of the 18th, the accounts of the approach of large bodies, having the ensigns of the Imperial Guard among them, were so alarming, that the Emperor Alexander, accompanied by Prince Volkonsky, came up with all imaginable haste from Troyes to Arcis, where Schwartzenberg lay confined to bed by the gout. Meeting General Toll, the quarter-master-general, in the antechamber, Alexander said, with warmth, "What are you about here? we may lose the whole army!" "It is a great blessing," replied Toll, "your majesty has come: we could not persuade the generals of that; but now you will set all to rights." By Alexander's command, orders were instantly despatched in all directions for the army to concentrate between Troyes and Pongy; Wrede's corps being left in the night to keep possession of Arcis, and the bridge over the Aube, with all his troops.*

And falls unawares on the Grand Army.

Had Napoleon been at the head of a large force, or even been aware, with the troops he actually had, of the disjointed state of the allied army, and the panic which prevailed at headquarters, he might possibly, by pursuing his march direct on Arcis, have routed Wrede, and fallen headlong, by the great road to Troyes, into the very centre of the allied army. In the critical state of the negotiations at Chatillon, and the known timidity of the Austrian councils, the effect of such a success might have been incalculable. Ignorant, however, of the prize almost within his grasp, or deeming himself not strong enough to snatch it, Napoleon, instead of descending the course of the Aube, and moving direct on Arcis, turned aside to his right to Plancy, in order to effect a junction with Macdonald and Oudinot, who had received orders to meet him near that place, having marched that morning from Provins. They met accordingly, and their united forces crossed the Seine at Mery, traversed the yet smouldering ruins of that town, and at Chatres regained the great road from Troyes to Paris. Napoleon was now at the head of fifty-five thousand men, and prepared, when Lefebvre Desnouettes came up, with six thousand more, to give battle. But the surprise was over; his plan of attack was seen, the allied corps were rapidly concentrating, and Schwartzenberg, ably repairing his former error of undue extension, had stopped the retreat, and given orders to the troops to unite in advance, between Arcis and Plancy, and attack the enemy during his passage of the Aube. By this vigorous and well-timed change of operations, the initiative was taken from Napoleon and given to the allied generals; the concentration of their army was effected in advance, instead of retreat; and they were put in a condition at once to bring the enemy to a general battle, with every advantage on their side arising from their decisive superiority of numbers.†

Napoleon moves aside, and Schwartzenberg resumes the offensive.

Napoleon was not prepared for this sudden resumption of the offensive by the Austrian general. He had expected, from the information communicated by Macdonald and Oudinot, to have found the enemy at the gates of Paris; and, well knowing the Austrian nervousness about being turned, he had calculated, not without reason, on arresting them by falling on their communications. Now, however, the stroke had failed: the turn to the right at Plancy had given them time to concentrate their army, and all hope of reaching their rear was postponed, if not destroyed. Persuaded, however, that it was by such a manœuvre only that their enormous masses could be forced back, the emperor still clung to the idea of turning their right; and, therefore, he resolved to push forward his left, remount the course of the Aube by Arcis, as far, if necessary, as Bar-sur-Aube, and thus threaten Chaumont and their communications with the Rhine. On the 20th, accordingly, the whole army marched

Napoleon and Schwartzenberg both march on Arcis.

March 20.

* Fain, 171, 174. Koch, ii., 57, 59. Vaud., ii., 208, 211. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 174, 175. Dan., 260, 261.

* Dan., 261, 263. Fain, 177, 178. Vaud., ii., 211, 213. Koch, ii., 60, 61. Plotho, iii., 316, 317. Burgh., 208, 210.

† Dan., 263, 264. Fain, 176, 177. Koch, ii., 62, 63. Burgh., 210, 213.

by the right bank of the Aube, up the stream, till they came opposite to Arcis at ten o'clock. That town was immediately occupied; and Napoleon, coming up at one o'clock in the afternoon, held a council of war with his principal marshals and generals as to the course which should be pursued. The report of the inhabitants was unanimous that the retrograde movement of the allies had been arrested; that Schwartzenberg, with the greater part of his forces, was within a few miles, screened only by the intervening hills; and that before two hours had elapsed Arcis would be attacked on all sides by their columns. Napoleon, conceiving it impossible that the Austrian generalissimo could have adopted so able and vigorous a resolution as that of suddenly stopping his retreat and converging with all his force to the decisive point, persisted in maintaining that they were in full retreat, and that the troops before him were only a rear-guard; he summoned up, accordingly, all his troops, crossed them over the Aube at Arcis, and gave orders to continue the pursuit with the utmost vigour on the road to Troyes, and he was only convinced of his mistake when, on the firing of three guns from a short distance in the rear of the enemy's cavalry, the head of his columns, converging on all sides towards Arcis, suddenly appeared on the summit of the swelling hills lying on the westward of the town!*

Effect of these movements on both sides.

In effect, Schwartzenberg's dispositions had now brought the whole Grand Army upon Napoleon's forces; and the movement of the latter upon Arcis, instead of bringing him upon the flanks and rear of a retreating and disjointed host, as he expected, had brought him full tilt against the front of a superior and concentrated advancing one. The Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, Raieffsky, and Giulay, had marched at daybreak from Troyes upon Plancy, while Wrede again occupied Arcis, and the Guards and reserve came up to Onjou. At ten o'clock, Wrede's advanced guard, agreeably to orders, evacuated Arcis, and retired towards the south by the town of Troyes; and this retrograde movement it was which made Napoleon conceive that he had only a slender rear-guard before him. Meanwhile, Alexander and the King of Prussia arrived on the heights of Menil-la-Comtesse, where the Russian Guards were posted, and the former, immediately dismounting, walked backward and forward with Barclay de Tolly. "These gentlemen," said the emperor, looking to the Austrian generals, "have made the half of my head gray. Napoleon will amuse us here with insignificant movements, and, meanwhile, march the main body of his forces on Brienne, and fall on our communications." His anxiety the preceding two nights had been excessive, and he had rightly divined the French emperor's intentions; but his digression to Plancy had given Schwartzenberg time to concentrate, and a vigorous offensive was about to terminate the long irresolution of the Austrian councils.†

The battle commenced by a skirmish on the outposts, between the cavalry of the allies, under Kaisaroff, and that of the French led by Sebastiani. Gradually several batteries of horse artillery were brought up on both sides, fresh squadrons advanced to the support of either party, and, in the end, a serious cavalry action took place. The French horsemen, though inferior to none in the world in audacity and prowess, were overmatched by their opponents, and driven back in great confusion to the bridge of Arcis. Napoleon, who was on the other side, instantly rode forward to the entrance of the bridge, already all but choked up with fugitives, and, drawing his sword, exclaimed, "Let me see which of you will pass before me." These words arrested the flight; and, at the same time, the division Friant traversing the streets of Arcis in double-quick time, passed the bridge, formed on either side of its other extremity, and by their heavy fire drove back the allied horse. Meanwhile, a bloody combat had commenced on the French left, between Wrede and Ney, the former endeavouring to storm, the latter to defend the village of Torcy. An Austrian battalion, in the first instance, made itself master of that important post, which would have opened to the allied right, under Wrede, the direct road to Arcis; but Ney's men speedily drove them out. Wrede again retook it with three battalions; but Napoleon immediately brought up a body of his Guards, which a second time retook it, and maintained their post until nightfall, despite the utmost efforts of the Bavarians and Austrians.*

Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube.

The position of the French was now extremely strong, and well calculated to counterbalance the superiority of numbers which the allies enjoyed. Their army occupied a semicircular position facing outward, with each flank resting on the river Aube, so as to be secure against being turned; while in their rear was the town of Arcis, which would form a secure place of defence in case of disaster. The allies formed a much larger concave semicircle facing inward; Wrede being on the right, the Russian reserves and guards under Barclay in the centre, Raieffsky, who had now joined, and Giulay on the left. If the whole left had been able to get up in time to take a part in the action around Arcis, the battle would have been as general, and possibly as decisive, as that of Leipsic, to which, from the respective positions of the French and allies, it bore a very close resemblance. But the corps of the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg was absent on the side of Plancy, opposed to Mortier, where it was engaged only in an inconsiderable skirmish, which terminated in the capture on his part of a few pontoons. Thus nearly a third of the allied army was absent till the very close of the day; Napoleon took advantage of that circumstance to maintain his position before Arcis till nightfall, and seventy guns, placed in front of his right, ploughed with fearful effect through the squadrons of the allies. As soon, however, as the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg approached, Schwartzenberg ordered the Guards and reserve to advance: the cannon were all hurried to the front, and a general attack commenced. As the Russian batteries of the Guard passed the emperor at full speed, he

First battle of Arcis-sur-Aube.

* Fain. 180, 181. Dan., 265, 266. Vaud., ii., 215, 217. Burgh., 213, 214. Plotho, iii., 321, 323.

† Dan., 265, 266. Beauch., ii., 110, 111. Koch, ii., 67, 68. Burgh., 212, 214. Jom., iv., 566.

* Dan., 267, 268. Jom., iv., 567. Fain, 180, 181. Koch, ii., 68, 69. Burgh., 214.

bade them remember Leipsic; and soon the thunder of their guns was heard above the loudest roar of the combat. The sun was now setting, darkness was stealing over the heavens, Arcis and Torcy were wrapped in flames, the Russian horse artillery on the allied left reduced the French artillery to silence, and their long array of guns, advancing to the front of the semicircle of heights which surround the town, played with terrible effect on the dense columns of the French which encircled its walls. The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia now descended from the heights of Menil-la-Comtesse, and followed the reserves into action; behind them came a brigade of the Prussian, and the red Cossacks of the Russian guards, making the air resound with their trumpets and the war-songs of the desert. On the side of the French the scene was as mournful as on the allied it was animating. Motionless, but undaunted, the troops stood under the terrible cannonade; with the instinct of discipline, the ranks closed to the centre as fast as chasms were made; the officers exposed themselves like the privates, the generals as the officers. Napoleon was repeatedly in imminent danger, both from the charges of cavalry and fire of artillery; nearly all his staff were killed or wounded: a bomb fell at his side; he calmly waited its explosion, which covered him with smoke and dust, and wounded his horse; he mounted another and continued his position. "Fear nothing," said he to the generals, who urged him to retire; "the bullet is not yet cast which is to kill me." He seemed to court rather than fear death; his air was resolute, but sombre; and as long as the battle raged, by the light of the burning houses behind, and the flash of the enemy's guns in front, he continued with undaunted resolution to face the hostile batteries.*

Order of battle for the following day.

This dreadful cannonade continued till ten at night, when it died away by mutual exhaustion, and a nocturnal irruption by Sebastiani on Kaisaroff, which was repulsed, terminated the day. Both parties slept on the field of battle, and neither could claim any decided advantage; for if, on the one hand, the French had been stopped in their advance, and thrown back on the defensive around the walls of Arcis, on the other, the allies, though decidedly superior in number, had not been able to force their position there, or drive them over the Aube. On the side of the allies great efforts were made to bring up all their remote detachments, and concentrate their army; and a general and decisive battle, on the succeeding day, was universally anticipated. At daybreak the whole army was in line, and stood in the following order: Count Wrede was at Chaudre, in front of the blood-stained ruins of Torcy; the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg at the hamlet of Menil, Giulay on his left, and then Raieffsky with his Russians. The grenadiers and cuirassiers were in second line, behind the centre, at Menil-la-Comtesse. On the side of Napoleon, the troops stood on the same ground, in a semicircle around Arcis, which they had occupied on the preceding day, without any addition; for, though Macdonald and Oudinot had come up during the night, yet their forces, now raised to nearly thirty thousand strong, were still stationed on the opposite side of the river.*

The French at length retreat.

It was an awful, and yet animating sight, when the rising sun glittered on the low, swelling hills which surrounded the town of Arcis. A hundred and fifty thousand men on the two sides, trained to the most perfect discipline, but animated by burning passions, were drawn up, gazing at each other, at a very short distance, without moving from the spot on which they were placed. The soldiers stood at ease, but with their muskets at their shoulders; the cavalry were for the most part dismounted, but every bridle was over the horseman's arm; the slow matches were burning at the guns in front of the lines; a word from either commander would at once have let slip the dogs of war, and lighted up a dreadful combat, yet not a sound was to be heard, scarcely a movement seen in either army. Motionless, yet ever in perfect array, the vast masses stood fronting each other; not a gun was fired, not a voice was raised; it seemed as if both hosts, impressed with the solemnity of the moment which was to decide the conflict of twenty years, were too deeply affected to disturb the stillness of the scene. But hour after hour passed away, without any movement being attempted on either side, until the long suspense had made the very eyes of the soldiers to ache, and their hearts to sink within them at danger long fronted, hope long deferred.† At one time a large part of Macdonald's corps was brought across, and there seemed every appearance of the action commencing; but that was only a feint; a second bridge had, meanwhile, been thrown over the Aube; and at one in the afternoon the equipages were seen defiling to the rear, and decided symptoms of a retreat were manifested. No movement could be conceived more hazardous, in presence of nearly a hundred thousand men, ready to fall on and crush the rear-guard after half the army had passed. Such was the respect, however, inspired by the very name of Napoleon, and the imposing array which his forces made around Arcis, that it was not till three o'clock that Schwartzenberg gave the signal for attack.‡

The French rear-guard is attacked.

The troops on all sides immediately advanced, preceded by a hundred pieces of cannon, which opened their fire at the same instant. Pahlen attacked on the right, Raieffsky in the centre; and soon the advancing batteries approached so near, that their balls crossed each other in all directions over the town; bombs fell in all the streets and on both the bridges, and many houses took fire. If the Austrian general had advanced two hours

* Dan., 269, 270. Fain, 181, 182. Beauch., ii., 121, 124. Vaud., ii., 221, 223. Koch, ii., 69, 72. Plotho, iii., 327, 329.

* Dan., 270, 271. Fain, 181, 182. Vaud., ii., 223, 224. Plotho, iii., 330, 332.

† The great road from Arcis-sur-Aube to Chaumont passes through the centre of the allied position, in the winding sweeps which it makes to surmount the heights which bound the valley of the Aube to the southwest of the town. Of the innumerable travellers who pass over the field, how many think of the memorable scene decisive of the fate of Napoleon, and the Revolution of which it was the theatre!—*Personal observation.*

‡ Dan., 272, 273. Fain, 181, 183. Koch, ii., 75, 77. Vaud. ii., 229, 230. Burgh., 216, 217.

earlier to the attack, it must have been a repetition of the triumph which, in a similar situation at Friedland,* Napoleon had gained over an army of Russians of much the same strength as that he now commanded.† But the attack had been deferred too late for decisive success: a large part of the French army had passed over before the combat became serious; and the rear-guard under Macdonald maintained so gallant a resistance, that it was dark before the allied troops approached Arcis. Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg's men, however, at length drove back Oudinot, and broke into the town close after the French rear-guard, which rushed towards the bridges; their cavalry crossed at a ford; the bridge was blown up; a desperate conflict took place in the streets; and numbers were drowned in trying to swim across after the arch was cut away. During the whole night, however, the French kept up so heavy a cannonade from the opposite bank, that all attempts to restore it proved ineffectual; and before morning dawned, Napoleon was far advanced on the road to Vitry, leaving only a powerful rear-guard in front of Arcis to retard the passage of the river.‡◊

Though the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube was not attended with any brilliant trophies taken in the field, yet it was followed by decisive effects on the fortunes of Napoleon. The loss of the French was about four thousand men, of whom eight hundred were prisoners, and six pieces of cannon; that of the allies was as great; but its immediate result was to throw Napoleon upon the eccentric line of operations which immediately led to his fall. His meditated project of falling upon the rear and communications of the Grand Army had wholly failed: his cross-march to Plancy had given them time to concentrate, and he had been repulsed in the attempt to penetrate by main force into the allied lines; and it had been completely proved that his strength was unequal to hurtling against the immense masses when drawn together. Nothing remained but still to threaten their communications; to draw near to the garrisons of the frontier, from which those supplies of veteran troops could be obtained which were no longer to be found in the heart of France; and to lend a hand to the insurgent bodies of peasantry, who, inflamed by a patriotic spirit, and irritated by the pillage of the allied troops, were waiting only the signal of his advance to commence a murderous guerilla warfare on their flanks and rear. To do this, however, required an immense sacrifice: it was necessary to march direct towards the Rhine, and abandon the defence of Paris; for the emperor's army was so sorely reduced in numbers, that to divide was to destroy it; and the success of the measure depended entirely on the formation, by the aid of the disengaged garrisons, of such an imposing force on the enemy's communications as would command attention, and entirely withdraw them from any movement on the capital. Impressed with these ideas, on which he had long meditated, and which, situated as he was, were unquestionably well founded, Napoleon, on leaving Arcis, instead of taking the road either to Chalons, from whence he had come, or Paris, by which it was expected he would retire, moved on the *chaussée* of Vitry direct towards the Rhine.*†

Napoleon's reasons for the march to St. Dizier.

The emperor's first day's march was to the environs of Vitry. Ney was sent up to the walls of the town to summon it to surrender; but after some hesitation, the governor, who was at the head of a garrison of four thousand men and forty pieces of cannon, resolved to stand the hazard of an assault, and manfully held out. This check, which Napoleon had not anticipated, disarranged his plans, for he was in no condition either to batter its walls or attempt an escalade. Turning aside, therefore, from this unprofitable attempt, he next day continued his march, and reached St. Dizier, where headquarters were established for the night. He was there joined by Caulaincourt, with intelligence of the dissolution of the Congress of Chatillon. This portentous event, accompanied by the hopelessness of the war, and seeming extravagance of the march towards the Rhine, completed the discouragement of the generals and officers. They saw no end to the campaign, no fruit for their toils or their blood. Instead of defending Paris, they were marching towards Germany: the capital of their country, their homes, their hearths, would become the prey of the enemy; while all that was dear to them was lost, they were plunging anew into an endless warfare, to which they could neither see an issue nor an object. A revolution was openly spoken of, even at headquarters, as a possible, perhaps a probable contingency; the obstinacy which had refused the terms offered by the allies was universally condemned; many doubted the emperor's sanity of mind. "Where is this to end? Whither are we marching? If he falls, shall we fall with him?" was universally asked. Disregarding these murmurs and discontents, with the existence of which he was only partially acquainted, Napoleon spread out his wings on either side from St. Dizier to Bar-sur-Aube, headquarters being established at Doulevant; and the light cavalry having got on the great road to Langres, in the rear of the allies, and on their principal line of communication, entered Chaumont, captured a pontoon-train and a considerable quantity of baggage and ammunition, and spread terror from Troyes to Vesoul.‡

Napoleon's march to St. Dizier. March 22. March 23. March 24. March 25.

Great was the astonishment in the allied ar-

* *Ante*, ii., 535.

† The relative strength of the French and Russians at Friedland was almost exactly the same as that of the allies and French at Arcis; the French had eighty thousand, and the Russians fifty thousand.—See *Ante*, ii., 535, 536.

‡ Fain, 182, 183. Dan., 273, 274. Koch, ii., 76, 81. Burgh., 217. Vaud., ii., 229. 233. Plotho, iii., 329, 334.

◊ On leaving Arcis, Napoleon sent two thousand francs from his private purse to the Sœurs de la Charité, by the Count de Turenne, to assuage the sufferings of the wounded.—FAIN, 182, *note*.

* Fain, 184, 185. Dan., 275. Jom., iv., 570, 571. Koch, ii., 81, 84. Vaud., ii., 234, 240.

† "I marched on St. Dizier," said Napoleon afterward at Elba, to General Kohler, the Austrian commissioner, "because twenty experiments had convinced me that I had only to send a few hussars on your line of communication, in order to spread dismay among you. On this occasion I stood on it with my whole army, but you never troubled your heads about me; 'twas because the devil had possession of you."—DANILEFSKY, 279.

‡ Fain, 185, 187. Vaud., ii., 247, 249. Jom., iv., 573. Koch, ii., 84, 90.

The allies follow the enemy, and receive information of this design.

my when they beheld the French columns retreating, not towards the capital, but the Rhine. A Cossack, who first brought in the intelligence, was so confounded, that he said, "The enemy is retreating, not on Paris, *but on Moscow.*" It soon, however, became evident that the French line of march was decidedly taken; and Schwartzenberg, suspecting it was a feint, and desirous, at all events, to be near the enemy and keep his own troops together, crossed the greater part of his army over at Arcis and the adjacent fords, leaving Giulay alone, with the rear-guard, to retain possession of the bridge. On the day following, his troops continued to pursue the enemy's rear-guard, and some squadrons of cavalry having succeeded in routing a detachment of French horse at Sommepuy, which guarded a park of guns, the pieces, in number three-and-twenty, were taken, and four hundred prisoners; but, what was of far more importance, despatches from Napoleon's headquarters were intercepted, which left no doubt of his design of moving on St. Dizier, and falling on the communications of the Grand Army. On these letters being taken, they were straightway forwarded to Prince Schwartzenberg, who deemed them of such importance, that he immediately had them forwarded to the Emperor Alexanedr at Pongy. They proved to be a secret despatch from Savary, giving the most deplorable account, both of the total exhaustion of resources and shaken state of the public mind at Paris, and a private letter from Napoleon to Marie Louise, announcing his intended movement on St. Dizier, and design to draw near to the strong places on the frontier.*†

March 22.

Important council of war at the allied headquarters.

These important letters reached Alexander at Dampierre at one o'clock in the morning. They had hardly been read over, when despatches arrived from Count Pahlen, with intelligence of his having, on the road from Arcis to Chalons, fallen in with Chernicheff at the head of Blucher's advanced guard; and that the army of Silesia had advanced from Laon to Rheims and Epernay, and occupied Chalons. Thus, at the very moment that Napoleon had withdrawn from the protection of Paris, and marched towards the Rhine, the heads of Schwartzenberg's and Blucher's armies had effected a junction in his rear, and a hundred and eighty thousand men stood between him and the capital! Accounts, at the same time, arrived of the occupation of Bordeaux by the British troops, and the proclamation of Louis XVIII., with the general concurrence of the inhabitants. This extraordinary combination of important events led the Emperor Alexander, who had come on to Sommepuy, musing on them all the way, to call in Prince Volkonsky, Count Barclay, and Generals Diebitch and Toll, who all took part in the memorable council which followed. Alexander, adhering to the opinion which he had all along maintained, that the real object of the war was to destroy the military power of Napoleon, at first stated that he thought the most advisable course would be to unite with Blucher at Vitry, pursue the French emperor, and attack him wherever they should find him. "We have to choose, however, between that," he added, "and, concealing our movements from him, to march straight to Paris. What is your opinion, gentlemen?" turning to Barclay de Tolly. "We had better," said the field-marshal, after looking at the map, "follow Napoleon and attack him." All agreed in this opinion, flowing as it did from the first in rank and the first in reputation, except Diebitch and Volkonsky. The former said that it would be more advisable, in his opinion, while the united armies were following Napoleon, for Bulow, who was lying at Soissons, to make a dash at Paris. To this Volkonsky replied in these memorable words:* "It is well known that there are at Paris forty thousand National Guards and fragments of regiments; and, in addition to these, at a short distance from the capital are the two corps of Marmont and Mortier. Their united force will be at least seventy thousand strong; consequently, we cannot expect that Bulow, with his thirty thousand, could effect anything of importance; on the contrary, he would expose himself to danger by attacking an enemy so greatly superior to him in numbers. On the other hand, if we follow Napoleon, we must leave a considerable rear-guard to ward off the attack of these two marshals. In these circumstances, I am of opinion that it would be advisable, first to unite with the Silesian army, and then to detach against Napoleon a numerous body of cavalry and some regiments of infantry, with instructions everywhere to prepare accommodation for the emperor, that it may be believed we are following with the whole army. We ought then to march straight to Paris, through Fere-Champenoise, and Blucher through Etoges, keeping up an uninterrupted communication between the two armies. Following this route, we must attack Marshals Marmont and Mortier wherever we meet them. But we shall beat them, because we are stronger than they; and each day will place two marches between us and Napoleon." Alexander warmly approved this advice, which coincided entirely with the spirit of the vigorous councils he had always supported. "If it is your majesty's intention," said Diebitch, "to re-establish the Bourbons, it would certainly be better to march with both armies to Paris." "We are not now talking of the Bourbons, but of pulling down Napoleon." It was then calculated how long it would take to reach Paris; and it was found it could be possible to take possession of the capital, destroy Napoleon's power there, and assemble both armies, if Napoleon should attempt to regain it, before he could get back to its relief. The plan was then unanimously agreed to by all present; but the emperor, before finally

Volkonsky's advice to march to Paris, which is adopted by Alexander.

* Dan., 275, 278. Burgh., 220, 221. Plotho, iii., 329, 342.

† Napoleon's letter to the Empress Marie Louise was in these terms: "My love! I have been for some days constantly on horseback; on the 20th I took Arcis-sur-Aube. The enemy attacked me there at eight o'clock in the evening; I beat him the same evening; I took two guns, and retook two. The next day the enemy's army put itself in battle array to protect the march of its columns on Brienne and Bar-sur-Aube; and I resolved to approach the Marne and its environs, in order to drive them farther from Paris, by approaching my own fortified places. This evening I shall be at St. Dizier. Farewell, my love! Embrace my son!"—See BURGHERSH'S *Operations of the Allied Army in France*, 339, *No.* 14; and DANILEFSKY, 285.

* Dan., 286, 287. Jom., iv., 577. Burgh., 224.

adopting it, expressed a wish to communicate it to the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzenberg, and for that purpose mounted his horse and rode off towards Vitry, accompanied by General Toll.*

It is adopted by Schwartzenberg and the King of Prussia.

It was on the high road from Sommepuy to Vitry, five miles from the former place, that the emperor met the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzenberg, who were on their way to meet them. They all immediately dismounted, and ascending a knoll on the roadside, from whence Vitry and the whole adjacent plain were in view, the emperor desired General Toll to unroll the map on the grass, and, leaning over it, explained Volkonsky's views, which he had now adopted as his own. The king and the prince at once assented to it: the former observing that it entirely coincided with his own wishes; the latter, that he would indeed in this way lose his magazines at Chaumont, and would suffer for some time from the interruption of his communications; but that this evil, such as it was, had been already incurred, and that the proposed change of operations should meet with his cordial support. This was at eleven o'clock in the morning on the 24th of March, on a height within sight of Vitry, whither the troops were seen marching on all sides, over fields just beginning to put forth the first colours of restored nature. The sun shone with unclouded brilliancy; a balmy freshness succeeding to the long and dreary frost which had preceded it, softened the air; all nature seemed to be reviving under the breath of spring. Alexander, pointing in the direction of the capital, said aloud, "Let us all march TO PARIS." These words were the DEATH-WARRANT OF THE REVOLUTION; twenty-five years after it had first begun by the convocation of the States-General, in March, 1789; and exactly that day one year and nine months since, on the 24th of June, 1812, Napoleon, at the head of five hundred thousand men, had beheld, in the pride of apparently irresistible strength, his superb army cross the Niemen to invade the Russian territories.*†

Orders given for the march of the troops.

Although the resolution to march on Paris was thus formally adopted, it required some time before the necessary orders could be prepared, and a change of direction communicated to a hundred and eighty thousand men, who, over an extent of above seventy miles in breadth, overspread the plains of Champagne. Alexander and Schwartzenberg, with the King of Prussia, rode on to Vitry, where headquarters were established for the remainder of the day, and couriers were sent off in all directions with the requisite instructions to the commanders of corps. Shortly after the emperor had taken up his quarters at Vitry, Chernicheff arrived with Blucher's advanced guard, and, being immediately admitted to the emperor, earnestly enforced the propriety of an immediate advance to Paris. "Ask Volkonsky," replied Alexander, smiling, "what resolution we came to only half an hour ago." Meanwhile, the whole corps of the Grand Army were grouped around Vitry, with the exception of Giulay, who still remained in guard of the bridge of Arcis. The following orders were then issued. At daybreak on the next morning, the Grand Army was to march direct by the high road through Fere-Champenoise to Meaux, while the Silesian army was to advance to the same place from Chalons. The united armies were to advance direct from Meaux upon the capital, which it was expected they would reach by the 29th. Meanwhile, a column of eight thousand horse, with forty-six pieces of horse artillery, under Winzingerode, was detached in the direction of St. Dizier after Napoleon. His instructions were to detach Chernicheff with a large body of Cossacks to the right, towards Montierender, to observe the country between the Marne and the Aube; and Tettenborn to the left towards Metz, to observe whether Napoleon was making any movement in the direction of that fortress. His grand object was to be to conceal the movements of the allies from the French, and to give his own headquarters accurate information of the direction of Napoleon. The better to conceal what was going forward, Winzingerode received instructions everywhere to give orders for the reception of the Emperor of Russia. Flying detachments were at the same time sent out: Kaisaroff and Sislavin to scour the country, the former to the southward, in the direction of Brienne and Montierender, the latter of Montmirail and Montereau, in order, if possible, to prevent any communication passing between Paris and the French emperor. All the troops were directed to march in fighting order, all the battalions being in columns of attack. At three in the afternoon, Winzingerode, with his numerous corps of cavalry, marched out of Vitry towards St. Dizier; soon all became quiet in the former town, where the Emperor Alexander's headquarters alone remained, and soon the sky was illuminated by the blaze of innumerable bivouacs along the banks of the Marne, where the rude warriors of the East reposed around their humble watch-fires.*

Enthusiasm of the troops on advancing to Paris.

No words can convey an idea of the enthusiasm which prevailed throughout the whole allied army, when, at daybreak on the 25th, it became evident, from the routes assigned to the different corps, that a general march on Paris had been resolved on. The joyful news spread from rank to rank, the transports of the soldiers rose to the highest pitch; by a natural transition, their minds reverted to the days of their own humiliation; to the disastrous days when, at the close of their long-continued retreat, they had, with bursting hearts, abandoned Moscow to the invader. The staff-officers who now wrote the march routes for the troops were the same as those who, in 1812, when Moscow was abandoned, had framed the same instructions for the army when it marched out by the Riazan road. The same hands which had then written Bogorodsk, Kassimoff, Serpukoff, and Podolsk, now put down Etoges, Epernay, Fere-Champenoise, and Vertus. An age seemed to have separated the two periods, yet were they only distant eighteen months! The Russian

* Dan., 287, 289. † Dan., 288, 289. Burgh., 222, 225.
‡ The spot where these words were spoken may be seen on a little knoll, on the right of the road from Sommepuy to Vitry.—*Personal observation.*

* Dan., 291, 293. Burgh., 224, 225. Plotho, iii., 346, 349.

veterans, with the medal of 1812 on their bosoms, reverted to the dreadful war of 1812; they remembered the ghastly horrors of the field of Borodino, the circular night march round Moscow by the light of the burning capital; and mingled with the exultation, shared with them by their younger comrades, a deeper spirit of thankfulness for the marvellous protection afforded by Providence to their country.*

Judicious measures of Ertel in the rear of the Grand Army.

Although serious disasters might have been expected from the irruption of Napoleon with his whole force on the communications of the Grand Army, yet the mischief done was by no means considerable. Such was the activity displayed by General Ertel, the head of the military police in the rear, that on the approach of the French he collected the wounded, regimental wagons, parks, and wagons of treasure, and retired to Chaumont, where the emperor's baggage joined him. He then retreated towards Langres and Vesoul, with such regularity and expedition, that, with the exception of a pontoon-train, some couriers, and twenty carts, hardly anything was taken; while with the least hurt among the wounded he formed a corps at Altkirch, of six thousand men, which, daily augmented by the re-enforcements coming up through Germany, soon became so considerable as not only to secure the depôts from insult, but repressed every attempt at insurrection in the adjacent country. Nay, by the able dispositions of General Koller, the adjutant-general of the Austrian army, the capture of the magazines at Chaumont was prevented. Meanwhile, Winzingerode came up with Napoleon's rear-guard at Tieblemont, with whom he had a skirmish, which confirmed Napoleon in the belief that the Grand Army was pursuing him; and, conceiving now that all danger to Paris was averted, he sent orders to Marmont and Mortier, who were retiring towards the capital before the army of Silesia, to march through Vitry and join him there.†

Movements of Marmont and Mortier.

These two marshals had occupied the position assigned to them at Soissons and Rheims till the 18th of March, when Blucher, having at length obtained from the Low Countries in his rear those supplies of provisions, from the want of which, ever since the battle of Laon, he had so grievously suffered,‡ and having received intelligence of the departure of Napoleon to operate against Schwartzenberg on the Aube, made a forward movement, and crossed the Aisne, after some resistance, at Berry-au-Bac and the ford of Asfeld. Having thus accomplished the passage of the Aisne, the Prussian marshal detached his left wing, under Winzingerode, against Mortier at Rheims, who, in no condition to contend with so formidable a force, evacuated it at his approach. Marmont, however, having joined him before he had got far from the town, it was resolved to reoccupy a post of such importance before it was taken possession of in strength by the enemy, and endeavour to make it good. It was held, accordingly, that day, and Winzingerode was making preparations for an escalade; but in the night Mortier again evacuated it, and the two marshals, retiring together, took a position, intending to accept battle at Fismès. Blucher, however, desirous of re-establishing his communications with the Grand Army, and of operating to the relief of Schwartzenberg, rather than the threatening of Paris, instead of advancing in pursuit of the two marshals, extended himself from Rheims towards Epernay and Vitry; while Marmont and Mortier, abandoning Soissons to its own resources, with a garrison of three thousand men, resolved to keep the field as long as possible in front of Compeigne. On the 21st, however, they received Napoleon's orders to join him in the environs of Vitry. Regretting then that they had so easily abandoned Rheims, they had no alternative but to make the prescribed march by cross roads to regain Chateau-Thierry, and endeavour to thrid their devious way through the allied columns, to join the emperor on the banks of the Marne. They set out, accordingly; but, meanwhile, General Vincent, who lay at Epernay with seven hundred men, was attacked by Tettenborn, with two regiments of Cossacks, and, after a stout resistance, driven out of the town with the loss of half his forces. Deeming, from this check, the great road by Epernay strongly occupied, the marshals resolved to seek their way through by the other road, which passes by Etoges and Fere-Champenoise, little dreaming that in so doing they would fall at once into the jaws of the Grand Army, which was advancing by that very road to the capital. Meanwhile, Blucher, despairing of being able, on his side, to prevent the junction of the two marshals with the emperor, took the resolution of marching across from Rheims, by Chalons to Vitry, to join the Grand Army; so that, by a singular combination of circumstances, the whole hostile armies were, by the separate resolutions of their chiefs, unknown to each other, concentrating into two masses in close proximity, and mutually crossing to effect that object: the allies uniting from Vitry to Chalons, and marching towards Paris; the other striving for a point of rendezvous at Vitry, to carry the war towards the Rhine, but requiring, to effect that object, to pierce, with part of their force, through the heart of the allied army.*

March 18.

March 19.

March 20.

March 21.

Approach of both armies to Fere-Champenoise.

The march of the two marshals met at first with no interruption; on the 22d they reached Montmirail, on the 23d Etoges, and on the 24th Vitry and Soude, where they rested for the night. Intelligence of the occupation of Chalons by the enemy, and of their converging towards Paris, here reached them: and Count Bordesoulle, with Marmont's advanced guard, even reported that at Coste he had fallen in with the advanced guard of the Bavarians belonging to Wrede's corps. The marshals gave no credit, however, to the information, being fully persuaded that the Grand Army was following on the trace of Napoleon; and they were not even wakened from their delusion by the vast illumination of the sky to the east-

March 24

* Dan., 293. † Dan., 293, 294. Burgh., 222.

‡ "I am struggling with the greatest want of provisions: the soldiers have been for some days without bread; and I am cut off from Nancy, so that I have no means of procuring it."—BLUCHER *to* SCHWARTZENBERG, *17th March*, 1814, DANILEFSKY, 258.

* Koch, ii., 95, 112. Vaud., ii., 270, 278. Burgh., 227, 228. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 187, 189.

ward, produced by the countless bivouacs of the now united allied army, which was not eight miles distant. At daybreak on the 25th both armies were in motion, the allies marching towards Paris, the French from Paris towards Vitry, both on the same road. The common rendezvous of both Blucher and Schwartzenberg's troops was Fere-Champenoise. The two advanced guards came in sight of each other, near Soude St. Croix, at eight o'clock in the morning. Marmont's videttes hastily retired on seeing the masses which were approaching; and the marshal himself, now seriously alarmed, drew back to Sommesous, where he took up a position, and sent an urgent request to Mortier to come to his support. The latter marshal had encountered the cavalry of Doctoroff, forming the advanced guard of Blucher at Dommartin-l'Estree; and, finding every avenue by which he could proceed blocked up by the enemy, he hastened to obey the summons, and, by a cross march, joined Marmont near Lenhare. Both corps then retreated, combating vigorously all the way; but the rapidly-increasing numbers of the enemy, and the repeated charges of the Russian horse, threw them into a certain degree of confusion, and several guns had been lost before they reached Conantray, painfully toiling to gain the heights of FERE-CHAMPENOISE.*

Battle of Fere-Champenoise.

The force of the two marshals was twenty-two thousand men, of whom nearly five thousand were horse, with eighty-four guns; of the allied troops none but cavalry and artillery had yet got up; but they were very numerous, and embraced the flower of the Russian and Austrian army. Twenty thousand horse, including the cuirassiers and chevaliers of the Guards, with a hundred and twenty-eight guns, thundered in close pursuit; and though the French cavalry gallantly struggled against the overwhelming odds by which they were assailed, and their infantry formed square and retreated at first with great regularity, yet, from the long continuance of the fight, and the necessity of constantly retiring when surrounded by the enemy's squadrons, they at last fell into confusion. Several squares were broken by the Russian chevalier guards and cuirassiers; the gallant French horse, who had just arrived from Spain, strove to disengage their comrades on foot; but they, too, were overthrown by a charge of the Russian and Austrian cuirassiers, headed by the Grand-duke Constantine and General Nostitz, who took twenty-four guns; Pahlen's horse, under Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, captured twenty more; while another large body of cavalry appeared suddenly on their extreme left, and threatened to cut off their retreat. At the same time a violent storm of wind and rain arose, which, blowing right in the face of the French infantry, as it had done in that of the Austrians at Dresden,† prevented great part of the muskets from going off. A sudden panic now seized the French army: horse, foot, and artillery, breaking their ranks, rushed in a tumultuous torrent towards Fere-Champenoise; vast numbers of guns and caissons were taken; and it was only the gallant countenance of a regiment of heavy cavalry, under the brave Le Clerc, which opportunely came up at the moment, and, charging out of the town, right through the fugitives, stopped the horse under Nostitz, which gave the two marshals time to reform their troops on the other side of its buildings, and with the approach of night saved them from total ruin.*

Second combat at Fere-Champenoise.

While these glorious and important successes were gained by the advanced guard, the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia had left Vitry with Schwartzenberg at nine in the morning, following the same great road by Soude St. Croix, Sommesous, and Conantray. They heard the distant firing as they approached Fere-Champenoise; and, hurrying forward to the front, at length reached that town just as the sun was about to set. Instead of halting there, the emperor, accompanied by Schwartzenberg and a slender suite, set out for the advanced posts, whence a dropping and receding fire was still to be heard. They had not proceeded far when they descried on the right a considerable body of troops, having in convoy a large train of artillery, who were moving for Fere-Champenoise. From the direction they were taking, and the circumstance of their advancing without hesitation towards that town when in the hands of the allies, it was first thought to be part of Blucher's army; but they soon proved to be French, and were in effect General Pacthod's division, in guard of a great convoy of guns and bread, which had been driven to this apparently unaccountable cross-march to avoid Blucher's advanced guard, with which, to their infinite astonishment, they had fallen in near Bierges, on the road to Vitry. Immediately forming his troops in squares, with the convoy in the centre, Pacthod had long and bravely resisted the impetuous charges of Generals Korff and Wassilchikoff, at the head of the best Russian horse of the army of Silesia. At length, perceiving the enemy's squadrons and artillery every moment thickening around him, he abandoned the convoy, harnessing its horses to the guns so as to double their complement, and was making his way by a flank movement across the fields to Fere-Champenoise, when he fell into the middle of the cavalry of the Russian and Prussian guards.†

Heroic resistance, and destruction of the French.

As soon as Alexander was aware that this corps consisted of enemies, he took the most prompt measures to encompass them and accomplish their destruction. The Russian and the Prussian cuirassiers of the guard were formed on their right: Korff's hussars, who had moved parallel to them in their cross march, in front, and Wassilchikoff's dragoons on their left and rear. Thus nine thousand chosen horse, supported by seventy guns, were ready to assail above six thousand infantry, without cavalry, and with only sixteen pieces of cannon. Having thus environed the enemy, Alexander, to prevent a useless effusion of blood, summoned the French general to surrender. Pac-

* Dan., 307, 309. Burgh., 228, 229. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 270, 271. Vaud., ii., 277, 279.
† *Ante*, iv., p. 137

* Dan., 307, 309. Koch, iii. Burgh., 229, 231. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 271, 272. Vaud., ii., 276, 281.
† Vaud., ii., 282, 284. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 273, 274. Lond., 287, 288. Dan., 313. Koch, iii., 388, 392.

thod, albeit sensible that escape was hopeless, nobly refused, and briefly haranguing his soldiers, exhorted them to die like brave men in defence of their country. Loud cheers followed the generous appeal, and immediately the firing began. Formed into squares, with the ammunition and carriages in the centre, they bravely began a rolling fire, still continuing to retreat towards Fere-Champenoise, and for some time repelled all the charges of the Russian horse. At length, however, the guns, one battery of which was under the immediate command of Lord Cathcart, to whom the emperor, who was on the spot, had given its direction, were brought to bear upon them. Such was the deadly precision of their fire, that lanes were soon made in one of the squares, and the cavalry breaking in at the apertures, the whole were cut down or made prisoners. Meanwhile, the intelligence spread like wildfire through the Russian columns coming up, that the emperor was in danger: with inconceivable ardour, the troops rushed forward; hussars, light dragoons, hulans, and cuirassiers came up at speed or full trot, and dark clouds of dust darkened the air, and at last thirteen thousand were on the field. Still the other squares of the French refused to surrender; they even fired on the emperor's aid-de-camp, Rapatel, whom he had adopted as a legacy from Moreau, who fell dead on the spot; and Alexander, seeing there was nothing else to be done, gave the signal for a general charge. At the head of his chevalier guards, that brave prince threw himself upon the squares, and dashed in at one of the openings made by the cannon; the guards, roused to the highest pitch by the presence and danger of their beloved Czar, followed with irresistible fury, and the square was penetrated on all sides. Still the French, with heroic resolution, refused to submit; some in tears, others almost frantic with indignation, kept firing till their last cartridge was exhausted; and Pacthod, in the centre of the square, only surrendered his sword to the emperor in person. Three thousand of the French, many of them National Guards, fell nobly resisting on this fatal occasion: their historians justly lament that no monument is erected to their memory by their ungrateful country; let the first stone in the mausoleum of Fame be laid by their enemies.*†

Results of these combats.

The trophies of the battle of Fere-Champenoise were immense: seven thousand prisoners, two generals of division, four of brigade, eighty guns, two hundred ammunition-wagons, with the whole of their convoy and baggage, fell into the hands of the allies, whose loss did not exceed two thousand five hundred men. Mortier and Marmont were weakened in all by nearly eleven thousand men, and half their artillery: a dreadful loss to two weak corps, upon whom, in the absence of the Emperor Napoleon, the defence of Paris had devolved. The captured generals were received with the most marked distinction and courtesy by the Emperor of Russia, who invited them immediately to his own table, and paid them the most deserved compliments on their valour. The action itself was remarkable from one circumstance—that it took place on a line of march, and that cavalry alone, with artillery, utterly broke and nearly annihilated two corps, consisting of as great numerical force as their assailants, and four fifths of whom were infantry, with an adequate proportion of guns. The number of troops successively engaged on each side was about twenty-two thousand; and not a musket was fired on the part of the allies, who, by the force of their cavalry and horse artillery alone, broke all the squares to which they were opposed, though formed in great part of veteran troops, and took or destroyed half their number. This remarkable fact is calculated to shake the confidence which military men by general consent, since the invention of fire-arms, have placed in the ability of infantry to resit the utmost efforts of cavalry in at all equal numbers, and may lead to a doubt whether the opinion of Napoleon is not the better founded—that cavalry still retains the superiority which it enjoyed in the days when the Numidian horse first gave Hannibal victory over the Romans at the Ticino and Cannæ, and afterward, at Zama, gave Scipio the victory over Hannibal; that in equal numbers, and equally bravely led, it is still the most important force in war; and that the spread of the opposite opinion, since the decline of chivalry, has arisen from the circumstance of modern generals having never, from the cost with which it is attended, had the means of employing this formidable arm in adequate strength, or to an extent commensurate to the revolutions which in all other ages it has produced in the world.*†

Retreat and narrow escape of Marmont and Mortier to Paris.

These brilliant successes laid open to the allied armies the road to Paris, now not more than sixty-five miles distant; and they lost no time in pressing forward to the goal. The reduced strength of Marmont and Mortier left these marshals no means of arresting the enemy; all that they could hope for was to retard his advance, to give the emperor time to come up to their succour. Such, however, was the rapidity with which the allied advanced guard followed upon their traces, that they had no time to take up a position or to stop their march. The Grand Army marched at four in the morning, on the 26th, from Fere-Champenoise, on the direct road through Sezanne, to Paris, while Blucher advanced on two roads, from Vertus on Montmirail, and from Etoges on

* Dan., 314, 316. Vaud., ii., 283, 285, 287. Lond., 287, 292. Burgh., 230, 231. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 273, 275. Plotho, iii., 375, 379. Koch, iii., 390, 392.

† A romantic but melancholy incident occurred on this occasion, which deserves to be recorded. When Lord Londonderry, who was among the foremost in the charge, was in the midst of the *mêlée*, he perceived a young and beautiful French lady, the wife of a colonel, in a *calèche*, seized by three Bashkirs, who were proceeding to carry her off. The gallant Englishman immediately rushed forward and rescued her from her lawless oppressors, and, delivering her in charge to his own orderly, directed her to be taken to his own quarters till a place of safety could be procured for her. The orderly, accordingly, put her *en croupe*, and rode off towards Fere-Champenoise, which was in sight; but on the road he was attacked by a ferocious band of Cossacks, pierced through, and left for dead on the field; while the ruffians seized their victim, who was never more heard of, though the Emperor of Russia, who was greatly moved by the incident, made the utmost efforts to discover what had become of her.—Marquis Londonderry's *War in Germany and France*, 288, 289.

* Lond., 292. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 275. Dan., 316, 317 Koch, iii., 390, 392.

† "My decided opinion," said Napoleon, "is, that cavalry, supposing the men on both sides to be equal in number, equally brave, and equally well led, must always break infantry."—Las Casas.

La Ferté-Gaucher. An attempt was made to arrive before the French at the latter point, so as to cut off their retreat; and it very nearly succeeded. The Prussians, under Kleist, had received orders to anticipate them at that important point, and their advanced guard had accomplished the task, and established themselves in so solid a manner that all Mortier's efforts to force a passage proved ineffectual. Meanwhile, the indefatigable Pahlen, who, with the advanced guard of the Grand Army, never lost sight of the enemy, was closely pursuing their rear-guard; and no sooner did he hear the firing at La Ferté-Gaucher, than, foreseeing that they would endeavour to save themselves by a detour to the left, he quitted the high road, and, crossing the fields rapidly, reached Maisonelles, where the head of Mortier's columns had already began to appear, who had sought this very outlet from otherwise inevitable destruction. Like Napoleon on the Berezina, the French marshals were on the eve of total destruction; and if Pahlen had been let alone, they would have met it; for their troops, worn out and dejected, were in no condition to withstand the charge of the victorious Russian squadrons; and such had been their losses in artillery the day before, that they had only seven pieces with them. March 27. From this hopeless state they were relieved by the ill-timed prudence of the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg, Pahlen's commander, who was seized with such apprehensions about his artillery being lost in the fields or cross-roads, that he ordered Pahlen to return to the highway, which the latter officer, burning with indignation at seeing the enemy thus permitted to escape, reluctantly obeyed. Overjoyed to see him retire, the French immediately drew off their troops from the attack on La Ferté-Gaucher, and, defiling rapidly across fields to the left, reached Provins through Courtaçon. They were followed, however, by the advanced guard of Pahlen's Cossacks, and no sooner were the first spears discerned, than, rushing tumultuously out of Provins, they retired in haste to Nangis, from whence, without farther loss, they reached the capital; Mortier through Guignes, and Marmont through Melun.*

Splendid appearance of the allied army on the march to Paris.

Meanwhile, the innumerable host of the Grand Army, and the corps of Blucher, continued their march, without interruption, towards Paris. The Russians of Raieffsky's corps and the Wirtembergers led the van: then came the Austrians and Bavarians: behind them the guards and grenadiers, all marching along, or on either side of the high road to Meaux. The columns of the army of Silesia were seen like a waving dark line to the right. Indescribable was the enthusiasm of the troops; magnificent the spectacle which the military pageant exhibited. The weather, which for some months before had been so severe and dreary, had now become beautiful, and the rays of the ascending sun were reflected from the glittering arms of the host. Every step was lightsome, joy beamed in every countenance, ardour glanced from every eye, and rendered this triumphant march truly magnificent. A flourish of martial music, the loud roll of the drums, and the louder cheers of the soldiers, announced the presence of the emperor, as he rode successively up to every regiment. Several times he passed through the guards, and conversed with the generals and officers of corps, most of whom had been trained under his own eye; often he ascended an eminence on the roadside, to gaze on the interminable columns, as far as the eye could reach, which were all pressing forward to the completion of their mighty enterprise. "My children," said the Czar, "it is now but a step to Paris." "We will take it, father," they answered, with loud cheers; "we remember Moscow."*†

Attack on Winzingerode by Napoleon.

Foreseeing that Napoleon would, in all probability, as soon as he received intelligence of the advance on Paris, endeavour to regain the capital by the circuitous route of Troyes, Sens, and Fontainebleau, the greater part of the next night was employed by the emperor in despatching orders in all directions, as well to Winzingerode as Chernicheff and the other partisans who were to preserve the communications to the southward, to keep a vigilant look-out, and forward the earliest intelligence to headquarters of any movement on Napoleon's part of which they could receive advices. Meanwhile, however, Winzingerode himself, having borne the shock of the French emperor's greatly superior forces, had suffered a severe defeat. Napoleon, as already mentioned, had rested on the 25th at Doulevant, extending his wings in all directions in order to spread alarm in the enemy's rear; and although Winzingerode was in sight of the rear-guard, under Macdonald, yet with such diligence had the directions of Alexander been obeyed, that the reports constantly were, that they were followed by the whole allied army, under the emperor and Schwarztenberg in person. Meanwhile, the march of a body of French troops towards Chaumont March 25. spread such terror in the rear, that the Emperor of Austria, Lord Aberdeen, Counts Razumoffsky and Stadion, and the whole *corps diplomatique* who lay there, were obliged to mount on horseback and ride thirteen leagues, without drawing bridle, by cross-roads, to Dijon. The alarm, swelling as it receded March 26. from the real point of danger, spread to the Rhine, where it was universally believed that the whole victorious French army was immediately to be upon them. But on the day following, Napoleon, uneasy at the account transmitted by Macdonald, that he saw only horse in the enemy's outposts, began to suspect that he was not in reality followed by the Grand Army, and gave orders for the troops to retrace their steps towards St. Dizier. The refluent tide soon brought an overwhelming force on Winzinge-

* Dan., 320, 322. Burgh., 234, 236. Plotho, iii., 284, 285. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 277, 279. Vaud., ii., 289, 297.

* Dan., 322, 323.

† "An incident occurred on this day which was strikingly characteristic of the true magnanimity which warmed the bosom of this great man. On occasion of a deliberation the day before, he had said to Prince Volkonsky, in allusion to some apprehensions he had expressed of the amount of Napoleon's force, 'You always see the enemy double.' Musing on the displeasure of his sovereign, the prince was riding on, pensive and alone. No sooner did the emperor see him approach, than he called him to come near, and said publicly, in presence of the King of Prussia and a numerous suite, 'Je vous ai fait tort, hier, et je vous publiquement demande pardon.' Napoleon, though greatly Alexander's superior in genius, could not have done this: he could conquer the world, but not subdue himself."—DANILEFSKY, 323.

rode, who had, meanwhile, occupied St. Dizier with five thousand horse, the remaining three thousand being detached to the front, under Tettenborn, to gain information.*

His defeat.

Tettenborn, seeing that he was about to have the whole of Napoleon's army upon his hands, sent word to Winzingerode to send him no re-enforcements, as none he could send could enable him to keep his ground, and the troops coming up would only obstruct his retreat. Winzingerode, accordingly, drew up his troops in two lines, extending from St. Dizier to the neighbourhood of Perthe, on the right bank of the Marne, hoping by this imposing array to gain time for Tettenborn's advanced guard to retire. The attack of the French, however, was so rapid, and with such overwhelming force, that there were no means whatever of either stopping or retarding it. Their troops deployed with incredible rapidity; column after column descended from the neighbouring plateau into the valley of the Marne; powerful batteries were erected on all the eminences, which sent a storm of round-shot and bombs through the allied ranks; and, under cover of this fire, the French infantry, cavalry, and artillery crossed the Marne at the ford of Hallignicourt, and forthwith fell on Tettenborn, who was speedily routed, and driven with great loss towards Vitry. Winzingerode's main body was next assailed by ten thousand French cavalry, supported by a large body of infantry; while the succeeding columns of the army, stretching as far as the eye could reach, presented the appearance of an interminable host. The Russian horse were unable to resist the shock: they had time only to fire a few rounds; in a few minutes cavalry and artillery were fairly routed. In utter confusion, the Russian horse now made for the road to Bar-le-Duc, where Benkendorff, with a regiment of dragoons and three of Cossacks, with some guns, had taken up a good position flanked by an impassable morass. By the firm countenance of the brave rearguard the pursuit was checked, and Winzingerode gained time to reform his men and continue his retreat to Bar-le-Duc without farther molestation, from whence, next day, he retired to Chalons. The French loss in this brilliant affair did not exceed seven hundred men, while the allies were weakened by two thousand, of whom five hundred were made prisoners, and nine pieces of cannon.†

Napoleon learns of the allied advance to Paris, and sets out after them.

This was the last gleam of sunshine which fortune bestowed upon the conqueror who had so long basked in her smiles; henceforth he was involved in one disaster after another till he was precipitated from the throne. In the first moment of triumph, after his success at St. Dizier, he ordered a strong body of troops to approach Vitry; and, as the commandant refused to surrender, he marched there next day himself and ordered a hundred and twenty guns to be planted against it, and threatened in a few hours to reduce the town to ashes. He soon, however, received intelligence which gave him more serious subject of meditation. From the prisoners taken on the field, he learned that Winzingerode's corps consisted only of cavalry and horse artillery, with a few battalions of light infantry drawn from the garrison of Vitry; and immediately after some peasants came up from Fere-Champenoise with full details of the march of the allied armies towards Paris, and the disastrous combat which had taken place there two days before between the retreating marshals and their cavalry. The veil now dropped from before his eyes; all doubt was at an end: it was all but certain that the allies, full three days' march ahead, would be in Paris before him. "Nothing but a thunderbolt," said he, "can save us;" and immediately drawing off his whole troops and guns from before Vitry, he retired with his staff to St. Dizier, where he shut himself up in his cabinet, and spent the whole night in intently studying the maps. He resolved, after much consideration, instead of pursuing his movement on the Rhenish and frontier fortresses, to return forthwith to Paris; and, to avoid the allied army, which lay between, he chose the road by Doulevant, Vassy, Troyes, Sens, and Fontainebleau. Orders to that effect were immediately given, and by daybreak on the morning of the 28th all the army was in motion by Doulevant for Troyes.*

March 27.

March 28.

Meanwhile the allies were not idle. No force capable of even retarding their advance to the capital existed in the field, and they met with little interruption except at the passage of the Marne. The Grand Army of Silesia approached this river, which lay directly across their advance to Paris. Count Compans and General Vincent, with five thousand men, were retiring before them, and, like good soldiers, they broke down the bridges over the river, and took post on the opposite bank, at Trilpost and Meaux, to dispute the passage. General Emmanuel, with the advanced guard of the army of Silesia, soon came up and established a bridge of pontoons under the fire of artillery; the Cossacks crossed over, for the most part, by swimming their horses, and soon the bridge groaned under the weight of five Prussian regiments, which, with the Russian horse, instantly attacked the enemy, drove them back into Meaux, and, following close on their heels, expelled them from that town. Two bridges were immediately established at Trilpost, and one at Meaux; and the whole of the 28th was employed in transporting the immense masses and convoys of both armies, which, according to the plan concerted, here united, to the right bank of the river. The emperor then reviewed Sacken's corps, and publicly thanked them for the extraordinary energy and valour they had displayed since the commencement of the campaign. Their diminished numbers, for they were now only six thousand out of twenty thousand who had crossed the Rhine, as well as the bronzed countenances and tattered garments of the men, told the desperate nature of the service which they had gone through. But, though their clothes and equipments were worn out, their arms were clean and in good condition, and the artillery-train in perfect working order, though the frac-

Passage of the Marne by the allies.

March 27.

March 28.

* Fain, 187, 188. Vaud., ii., 314, 316. Dan., 326, 327. Burgh., 262, 263. Koch, iii., 548, 550.

† Dan., 328, 330. Burgh., 263, 264. Vaud., ii., 316, 318. Koch, iii., 553.

* Fain, 193, 196. Dan., 330, 332. Burgh., 265, 266. Vaud., ii., 319, 321.

ture of an enemy's ball was often supplied by the wheel of a farmer's cart.*

Alexander's efforts to preserve discipline in the army.

The allies had now entered a rich champaign country, adorned with woods, villas, orchards, smiling fields, and all the charming indications of long-established prosperity. It therefore not only abounded with resources of all kinds for the use of the troops, but offered almost irresistible temptations to the violence and marauding of conquest. This was more especially to be dreaded in a host such as that which now approached Paris, consisting of the soldiers of six different nations, extending from the Rhine to the wall of China, many of them of lawless and half-savage habits, all smarting under the recollection of recent wrongs and unbearable oppression. True to the noble principles on which he had throughout maintained the contest, Alexander immediately issued a proclamation to his soldiers, enjoining the strictest discipline, and forbidding any supplies to be obtained for the troops but through the intervention of the mayors and local authorities.† Not satisfied with this, he addressed with his own hand a circular to the commanders of corps belonging to the other nations, earnestly entreating them to take every possible means to preserve the strictest discipline among their troops.‡ The effect of these measures, not less politic than humane, was immense. A vast crowd of peasantry, indeed, inspired with terror, with their horses and cattle, at first fled into Paris, before the columns of the allied army; but it was soon discovered that order was preserved by the invaders; and, ere long, they remained at home, gazing with amazement at the endless columns of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, which, for days together, defiled past them towards the capital. After the repeated accounts which had been published of the defeat and ruin of the allied armies, it was with unbounded astonishment that they beheld the interminable extent of their hosts; they admired the superb array of the Guards, the dazzling cuirasses of the horsemen, the formidable trains of artillery; and shuddered when they gazed on the long and desultory array of Cossacks and Bashkirs sweeping by, speaking uncouth tongues, singing Oriental songs, giving fearful token of that vast moral revolution which had thus brought the children of the desert into the heart of European civilization.*

First sight of Paris by the allied army.

As the allied troops approached Paris, the resistance of Marmont and Mortier's retiring corps, which had now completed their roundabout march by Nangis and Melun, and again interposed between the invaders and the capital, was again felt. Compans's did not evacuate the forest of Bondy till it had been turned on all sides, and after some sharp firing. Thence the sovereigns inclined to the left, and ascended an eminence on the roadside, by a path through brushwood. The sun had just set; a cool breeze refreshed the air; there was not a cloud in the sky. All at once, on the right, the buildings of Montmartre appeared, and the stately edifices of PARIS burst upon the view. Indescribable was the sensation which this sight produced. From rank to rank, from mouth to mouth, the thrilling words passed; in a few seconds the electric shock was felt as far as the eye could reach in the columns; and all, breaking their order, hurried forward to the front and crowded up the ascent. The last rays of the sun were still illuminating the dome of the Invalids, the summit of the Pantheon yet reflected his beams; while they gazed the light ceased, and darkness began to overspread the massy structures of the capital. Forgotten in an instant were the fatigues of the campaign: wounds, fallen brothers, lost friends, were as nothing; one only feeling, that of exultation, filled every bosom; one only emotion, that of gratitude, swelled every heart. After inhaling, during several minutes, the entrancing spectacle, the allied sovereigns, slow and pensive at the very magnitude of their triumph, descended from the height, and proceeded to Bondy, the last post station before Paris, where they passed the night.†

Extreme agitation in Paris during this period.

And what was the state of Paris—of the great Revolutionary capital—when the danger could no longer be concealed; when crowds of peasants, flying before the foe, beset the barriers in trembling agitation; when the rattle of musketry was already heard in the plain of St. Denis, and the resplendent illumination of the eastern sky told the affrighted inhabitants that the forces of banded Europe slept around watchfires at their gates? Fearful indeed, for eight-and-forty hours, had been the note of preparation within its walls. In vain the agents of the police spread proclamations, assuring the people that the allies would never venture to attack the immortal city; that its means of defence were invincible; that five hundred guns were ready to spread death among the foe; and that it would be sufficient simply to close the barriers to exterminate them to the last man.‡

* Dan., 335, 336. Burgh., 334, 336. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 280, 281. Vaud., ii., 296, 299.

† "It is the immutable will of his majesty the emperor that the troops under your command should observe the strictest discipline, and on no account whatever leave their bivouacs to go into the villages; and that their wants, such as fire, wood, straw, should not be supplied otherwise than through the intervention of the mayor. You cannot but be aware how much the good conduct of our troops in the present circumstances may influence the common success; and, therefore, his majesty will hold you personally responsible for the execution of this order."—ALEXANDER'S *Circular Order, 26th March*, 1814, DANILEFSKY, 334.

‡ "At the moment we are approaching Paris, it is only by the strictest subordination among the troops that we can hope to obtain the important results we have in view. You were one of the first to be convinced of the necessity of gaining over the affections of the inhabitants of Paris to the cause we are defending; but shall we be acting on this conviction if the villages around Paris be left a prey to plunderers, instead of finding protection in our armies? I earnestly entreat of you to use every possible means to prevent acts of violence. Every commander of a corps or detachment should be made personally responsible for whatever disorder may be committed. Your active exertions on this occasion will secure you the general gratitude, and double the high respect I entertain for you."—ALEXANDER *to* MARSHAL COUNT WREDE, *March* 26, 1814, DANILEFSKY, 334, 335.

* Dan., 334, 335. Lab., ii., 349. Cap., x., 440.

† Dan., 338, 339.

‡ "The allies regard the pillage and destruction of the capital as the recompense and end of their invasion; they already make a boast of having entered it without resistance—of having sacked it; and they propose to send off the *élite* of its workmen, of its artisans, of its artists, to the depths of Russia, to people their deserts, and then they will set fire to all the quarters of the town. But with what hope of success can they enter Paris? What would become of them in the midst of an immense population, armed, inflamed, and resolute to defend itself? Paris contains

These high-sounding expressions could not conceal the real facts which were before their eyes; they could not make the citizens blind to the endless crowds of peasants in consternation, which defiled in confusion along the Boulevards, conveying with them their wives, their children, their horses and cattle, into the last asylum of the capital. The extreme orders which the more violent of the Jacobin emissaries promulgated in the name of the emperor, that they should arm the populace, burn the suburbs, destroy the bridges, barricade the streets, and, if necessary, retire to the south of the Seine, there to defend themselves to the last extremity till the arrival of the heads of his columns, augmented the general consternation. Universal spoliation, conflagration, and massacre were anticipated from such letting loose of the long-pent-up passions of the Revolution. The banks were closed, the shops shut up; every one hid his most valuable movables; vast quantities of plate and treasure were buried; the gaming-houses were stopped; and, what had been unknown in the bloodiest days of the Revolution, *the theatres were empty*. Preparations were at length making by the government, but they were of a kind to increase rather than diminish the terrors of the people: six thousand troops of the line and twenty thousand National Guards were reviewed in the Place Carrousel, and marched along the quays; but the gloomy aspect of the soldiers, the long trains of artillery which traversed the streets, the distant thunder of the enemy's cannon, the ceaseless torrent of disorderly peasants flying before the invaders, which streamed over the Boulevards, and the wounded and dying who were brought in from the advanced posts, told but too plainly that war in all its horrors was fast approaching the mighty capital.†

Deliberation in the Council of State as to whether the empress and King of Rome should remain in Paris.

In the midst of the general consternation, the Council of State was summoned to deliberate on the grave question whether or not the empress and the King of Rome should remain in Paris to await the fate of arms, or be withdrawn to a place of safety beyond the Loire. The minister of war, Clarke, briefly unfolded the military situation of the capital, its troops of the line, artillery, and National Guards, who could be assembled for its defence. The forces of the allies were estimated at a hundred and fifty thousand men; and in these circumstances the minister declared he could not answer for the safety of the empress and her son. Various opinions as to what should be done followed this exposition. Boulay de la Meurthe, an old Republican, proposed that they should convey the empress to the Hôtel de Ville, and show her to the people in the faubourgs, holding her infant in her arms; that now was the time to display the heroism of Maria Theresa. Savary expounded the means which he could put in motion for rousing the masses; and Molé combated this opinion by observing, "that the greatest of all errors, if resistance was determined on, would be to leave Paris without a government — that, left to themselves, they would speedily abandon the emperor." To this opinion Talleyrand assented. Clarke insisted "that it was a mistake to consider Paris as the centre of the imperial power: that the power of the sovereign would follow him everywhere; and, as long as a village remained in France unoccupied by the enemy, that was his capital." On the vote being taken, nineteen out of twenty-three voted for making the contest a popular one, and transporting the empress and the seat of the government, as in the days of the League, to the Hôtel de Ville. When this division was made known, Joseph produced an express order from the emperor, dated from Rheims not a fortnight before, to the effect, that in no event should they permit the empress and the King of Rome to fall into the hands of the enemy; that, if the allies approached Paris with forces plainly irresistible, the empress, with the King of Rome and the great dignitaries of the Empire, should be removed to the other side of the Loire: in fine, that he would rather see his son in the Seine than in the hands of the enemy.* This precise and definitive order, which provided for the very case which had occurred, put an end to all deliberation; and it was arranged that Joseph should remain to direct the defence of the capital, but that the principal officers of state should accompany the empress and the King of Rome beyond the Loire.†

Mournful scene at the departure of the empress. March 29.

The departure of the empress took place next day, and completed the discouragement of the inhabitants of Paris. A great crowd assembled at the Place Carrousel when the carriages came to the door at daybreak; and, though none ventured openly to arraign the orders of government, yet many were the condemnations uttered in private at the timid policy which virtually abandoned the capital to the enemy, by withdrawing those whose presence was most calculated to have preserved authority, and stimulated resistance among its inhabitants. The King of Rome, though only three years of age, cried violently when they came to take him away: he exclaimed that they were betraying his papa, and clung to the curtains of his apartment with such tenacity, that it required all the influence of his governess, Madame de Montesquieu, to induce him to quit his hold. He was still in tears when he was carried down to the carriage of the empress. Marie Louise was calm and resigned,

twenty thousand horses, which might convey to the heights five hundred pieces of cannon. It would be easy to barricade the streets, and to offer at every point an invincible resistance. It would be enough even to close the barriers to exterminate them to the last man! No! the allies will never approach Paris!"—*Affiche, Paris, 29th March*, 1814, BEAUCHAMPS, ii., 191, 192.

* Beauch., ii., 191, 194. Lab., ii., 349, 350. Cap., x., 440.

* "You are in no event to permit the empress and the King of Rome to fall into the hands of the enemy; I am about to manœuvre in such a manner, that you may possibly be several days without hearing from me. Should the enemy advance upon Paris with such forces as to render all resistance impossible, send off in the direction of the Loire the empress, the King of Rome, the great dignitaries, the ministers, the officers of the Senate, the president of the Council of State, the great officers of the crown, and the treasure. Never quit my son; and keep in mind, that I would rather see him in the Seine than in the hands of the enemies of France. The fate of Astyanax, a prisoner in the hands of the Greeks, has always appeared to me the most deplorable in history."—NAPOLEON *to* JOSEPH, *Rheims, 16th March*, 1814, CAPEFIGUE, x., 443, 444.

† Thib., ix., 617, 618. Cap., x., 442, 444. Savary, vi., 344, 345.

but deadly pale. At eleven o'clock in the morning the mournful procession set out, and, defiling by the quay of the river, took the road for Rambouillet. The long train of carriages passed slowly along, amid the tears of a large body of people, while the thunder of the cannon was already heard from the direction of St. Denis. Terror now froze every heart; all felt that resistance was hopeless, and that nothing remained but to make the best terms that could be obtained from the victors.*

Description of Paris as a military station.

Paris, now almost as well known as London to every person in England, whether male or female, who has received a liberal education, may not be equally familiar in future times or in other countries; and even to those who know it best, it is never irksome to read a description of a city in which some of the happiest days of their life have been spent. Situated on both banks of the Seine, the French metropolis is as favourably adapted for external defence as for internal ornament and salubrity. From Mount Valerius on the west, to the fortress of Vincennes on the east, it is protected by a line of hills running on the northern bank of the Seine, and presenting a natural fortification against an enemy approaching from the north or east, the quarter from which danger is principally to be apprehended. Clichy, Romainville, Belleville, the plateau of Chaumont, Montmartre, are the names which have been affixed to this ridge; and although not strengthened by fieldworks, yet these natural advantages constituted a very formidable line of defence. The ridge is about three miles and a half in length, and the woods, orchards, gardens, villas, and enclosures with which it is covered, rendered it in a peculiar manner susceptible of defence by a body of militia or National Guards, who might be unequal to a combat with regular forces in the open field. The plain of St. Denis, between Montmartre and Romainville, extends up to the gates of the capital; but it is enfiladed on either side by the guns from those elevated heights, the fire of batteries on which, intersecting each other, rendered all access by the great road from St. Denis impossible till the summits were carried. Montmartre, a conical hill which rises to a considerable height, and is nearly covered with buildings, presented, if adequately furnished with cannon, a most formidable object of attack; but the positions of Chaumont, Belleville, and Menilmontant were less compact, and more open to a flank attack. The whole defence of the capital, however, depended on the possession of these heights: if they were taken, Paris was at the mercy of the conqueror. Bombs from Montmartre and Chaumont would carry as far as the Rue Montblanc, and into the very heart of the city; the old ramparts had long since been converted into shady walks, well known as the principal scene of enjoyment in the capital; and the barriers on the principal roads, connected together by a brick wall, presented the means only of preventing smuggling or aiding the efforts of the police, but could oppose no resistance whatever to the attack of regular soldiers.†

What chiefly strikes a stranger on his first arrival in Paris is the extraordinary variety and beauty of the public edifices. The long-established greatness of the French sovereigns, the taste for architecture which several of them possessed, and the durable materials of which the capital is built, have conspired, in a long succession of ages, to store it with a series of public and private edifices, which are not only for the most part exceedingly imposing in themselves, but in the highest degree interesting, from the picture they present of the successive changes of manners, habits, and taste during the long lifetime of the monarchy. From the stately remains of the baths of Julian, now devoted to the humble purpose of a cooper's warehouse in the Faubourg St. Germain, to the recent magnificent structures projected by Napoleon, and executed by the Bourbons, it exhibits an unbroken series of buildings, still entire, erected during fifteen centuries, connecting together the ancient and modern world, and forming, like Gibbon's History of Rome, a bridge which spans over the dark gulf of the Middle Ages. The towers of Nôtre Dame, which rise amid the austerity of Gothic taste, and are loaded with the riches of Catholic superstition; the Hôtel de Ville, the florid architecture of which recalls the civil wars of the Fronde and the League; the Marais, with its stately edifices, carrying us back to the rising splendour of the Bourbon princes; the Louvre, which witnessed the frightful massacre of Charles IX.; the Pont Neuf, which bears the image of Henry IV.; the Tuileries, breathing at once the splendour of Louis XIV. and the sufferings of his martyred descendant; the Place Louis XV., which beheld in succession the orgies of royalty and the horrors of the Revolution; the column of the Place Vendôme, which perpetuates the glories of Napoleon—present a series of monuments unequalled in interest by any other city of modern Europe, and which may possibly to future ages exceed even the attractions of the Eternal City itself. Every step in Paris is historical; the shadows of the dead arise on every side; the very stones breathe. The streets in the old part of the town are narrow, and consequently, perhaps, unhealthy; but their straitness only renders them the more imposing, their buildings being always seen in rapid perspective; and the old stone piles, often five stories in height, some of them contemporary with the Crusades, seem to frown with contempt on the modern passenger. It was in these narrow streets, the focus of the Revolution, that the great bulk of the inhabitants, estimated in all at that period at six hundred thousand souls, dwelt. On the banks of the river a wider space is seen—light arches span the limpid stream, and long lines of pillared scenery attest the riches and taste of a more refined age. Nor is the beauty of architectural monuments inferior to the interest of ancient associations: the colossal proportions, and yet delicate finishing, of the Arch of Neuilly; the exquisite peristyle of the Church of the Madeleine; the matchless façade of the Louvre; the noble portico of the Pantheon; the lofty column of Austerlitz, will ever attract the cultivated in taste from every quarter of Europe,* even after the political greatness of France has declined, and

Description of the buildings of Paris.

* Sav., vii., 1, 3. Thib., ix., 618, 619. Cap., x., 442, 443.
† Personal observation. Koch, iii., 415, 429. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 283, 284.

* Personal observation.

its glories exist only in the records of historic fame.*

Forces of the French on the line of defence.

The troops which remained at the disposal of Joseph for the defence of the heights of Paris were very inconsiderable, and altogether inadequate to the defence of so extensive a position. The National Guard, indeed, was thirty thousand strong, but not more than half of this number were armed; and they were, for the most part, absorbed in the guarding of the twelve barriers of the city, or the service of the interior; so that not more than five thousand were available for service on the external defences. Marmont commanded the right, which rested on Belleville and Chaumont, with detachments on all the points susceptible of defence, as far as Vincennes; and Mortier the left, which extended between the canal of Ourcq and Montmartre, across the great road from St. Denis, with posts as far as Neuilly. It was easy to foresee that the weight of the contest would be around the hill of Montmartre and the *buttes* of Chaumont, and it was there, accordingly, that the main strength of the enemy was placed. The wreck of fifteen divisions stood on the line of defence, which, in former days, would have contained at least ninety thousand combatants; but so wasted had they been under the dreadful campaigns of the last two years, that they could not now muster more than twenty thousand infantry and six thousand horse. In Marmont's wing, the skeletons of seventy battalions were required to make up eight thousand men. Their air was firm, but sad: they were resolved to lay down their lives for their country; but they knew the enemy they had to combat, and were aware it would be in vain. Including the National Guards who were without the barriers, and all the depôts which had been brought forward, not more than thirty-five thousand men took part in the defence; but they were supported by a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, fifty-three of which were of position, some on the extreme right being manned by the young men of the Polytechnic school. Of the allies, a hundred thousand men were in line, and ready to take part in the attack; the remainder of the force being left behind on the Marne, at Trilpost and Meaux, to guard the communications and keep an eye on the movements of Napoleon. That great commander, as already mentioned, had projected the erection of powerful fortifications on the heights now threatened by the allies, after his return from Austerlitz in 1806,† and had been only prevented by the dread of awakening the Parisians from their slumber of security under the shadow of the glory of the Great Nation. Memorable warning! How often is national security endangered, or national existence shortened, by heedless pride or short-sighted economy obstructing the sagacious foresight, requiring present sacrifice in money or vanity, of prophetic wisdom!‡

Schwartzenberg's proclamation to the allied army.

Joseph, on the 29th, issued a spirited proclamation to his troops and the inhabitants of Paris, in which he exhorted them to combat bravely to maintain their ground until the arrival of the emperor, who might be hourly expected.* Schwartzenberg, on his part, with the approbation of the allied sovereigns, issued a remarkable proclamation to the inhabitants of Paris, in which the precise language was used which Louis XVI., two-and-twenty years before, had recommended to the allied sovereigns as the only tone which was likely to vanquish the Revolution, by declaring war on it, but not on France; but which had been then and since unaccountably forgotten amid the ambition and separate interests of the potentates who composed the alliance.†‡ The allusions in this proclamation to the insatiable spirit of conquest with which all the governments of France for twenty years had been animated, and to the facility with which peace might be obtained, on honourable terms, by France, and to the example of Bordeaux, where Louis XVIII. had already been proclaimed, pointed, not obscurely, to a restoration of the exiled princes as the sole condition on which, since the rupture of the negotiations at Chatillon, the allies considered it possible that a pacification could be effected. They had already erected the conquered districts into a sort of province, with the direction of which the Count D'Artois, who was at Vesoul, was intrusted. The proclamation, with a proposal for the capitulation of Paris, was sent to the French advanced posts; but the French marshals, like brave men, rejected it, and resolved to maintain their posts to the last extremity.§

At two in the morning of the 30th of March

* They may well put the architects of England to the blush, for the painful inferiority which the modern structures of London exhibit. The *modern* structures, observe—nothing worthy of the nation has been built in public edifices in London in our time. Compare St. Paul's or Westminster Abbey with the National Gallery, and say whether we have not fallen from a race of giants to a brood of pigmies. † *Ante*, iii., 215.

‡ Vaud., ii., 310, 313, 328. Koch, iii. Burgh., 238. Dan., 347, 348. Plotho, iii., 403, 404.

* "Citizens of Paris! A column of the enemy has advanced to Meaux. It approaches by the road of Germany; but the emperor follows it closely at the head of a victorious army. The Council of the Regency has provided for the safety of the empress and the King of Rome. I remain with you. Let us arm to defend our capital—its monuments, its riches, our wives, our children, all that is dear to us. Let this great city become a camp for a few instants, and let the enemy find his shame under those walls which he hopes to pass in triumph. The emperor marches to our succour: second him by a brief and vigorous resistance, and we shall preserve the honour of France."—THIBAUDEAU, ix., 619, 620. † *Ante*, i., 122.

‡ "Inhabitants of Paris! The allied armies are under your walls. The object of their march to the capital of France is founded on the hope of a sincere and durable pacification with her. For twenty years Europe has been deluged with blood and tears. Every attempt to put an end to these calamities has proved vain; for this reason, that, in the very government which oppresses you, there has been found an insurmountable obstacle to peace. Who among you is not convinced of this truth? The allied sovereigns desire to find in France a beneficent government, which shall strengthen her alliance with all nations; and, therefore, in the present circumstances, it is the duty of Paris to hasten the general pacification. We await the expression of your opinion with a degree of impatience proportioned to the mighty consequences which must result from your determination. Declare it, and you shall at once find defenders in the armies standing before your walls. Parisians! the state of France, the proceedings of the inhabitants of Bordeaux, the peaceable occupation of Lyons, and the real sentiments of your countrymen, are known to you. In these examples you will find the end of war and domestic discord: it is to be found nowhere else. The preservation of your city and of your tranquillity shall be the object of the prudent measures which the allies will not fail to take, in concert with such of your authorities as enjoy the general confidence. Troops shall not be quartered upon you. Such are the sentiments with which Europe, arrayed before your walls, now addresses you. Hasten to justify her confidence in your patriotism and prudence."—See DANILEFSKY, 345, 346, and CAPEFIGUE, x., 458.

§ Dan., 345, 346. Cap., x., 438, 439. Burgh., 234.

Commencement of the action, and allied disposition of attack. March 30.

the *générale* beat in all the quarters of Paris, to summon the National Guard to assemble at their different points of rendezvous. One-and-twenty years had elapsed since, at the same hour, it had called them, amid the clang of the tocsin, to muster for the defence of the throne on the 10th of August, 1793; they had then failed at the decisive moment—they had basely surrendered their sovereign to an infuriated rabble, and abandoned the nation to the government of the multitude.* They now had their reward: they were to witness the degradation and punishment of their country; the iron was to enter into the soul of France. Bravely, however, they repaired to their posts, amid the tears of their wives and children, who never expected to see them more. Hardly had the clock in the Church of St. Denis struck five in the morning, when the anxious eyes from the summit of the heights of Romainville discovered several dark masses appearing beyond Pantin, on the road to Meaux. Still, not a gun was fired on either side; the level glance of the sun illuminated the peaceful slopes of Romainville, and the gilded dome of the Invalides was only beginning to lighten before his rays. Suddenly the discharge of artillery was heard on the right; the dark mass quickly became edged with fire; and soon the roar of several hundred pieces of cannon announced to the trembling inhabitants of the capital that the last day of the Revolution had arrived. Raieffsky, supported by the reserves of Barclay, was charged with the attack of the French centre, between Pantin and Vincennes, and especially the heights of Belleville; the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg, supported by Giulay's Austrians on the left, was to assail the bridges of the Marne at St. Maur and Charenton, to clear the wood of Vincennes, blockade the castle, and threaten the Barriere du Trone. On the right, the army of Silesia was to advance on Montmartre on two sides: Count Langeron, from Clichy and St. Denis; Kleist, D'York, and Woronzoff, on the allied left, from the villages of La Villette and La Chapelle. Above a hundred thousand men were destined to co-operate in the attack, but they did not all arrive in action at the same time; the weight of the contest long fell on Raieffsky and Barclay alone in the centre, and thence the unlooked-for continuance and bloody nature of the strife.†

Repulse of the Russians in the centre.

At six in the morning the firing of musketry began in the centre, by Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, with his division, issuing from the village of Pantin; while Raieffsky himself, with Gortchakoff's infantry and Pahlen's cavalry, advanced direct on Romainville. Marmont, however, convinced of the error which had been committed in not occupying these villages the evening before, was advancing to occupy them with Boyer's division of the Young Guard, when he met Prince Eugene's Russians on an eminence a little beyond Pantin. A furious conflict immediately commenced, which soon extended to Romainville: the numbers were equal, the resolution and skill on the opposite sides well matched; and so bloody was the combat, that in a short time fifteen hundred of the Russians had fallen. Mortier, finding he was not attacked, sent two divisions to aid Marmont, and with their aid the Russian cuirassiers were routed, and Prince Eugene driven back, still bravely fighting, into the villages. Feeling himself unequal to such a conflict for any considerable time, he wrote to Barclay, urgently requesting assistance;* and, shortly afterward, Raieffsky, having completed his circular march, commenced operations on the left: his infantry carried Montreuil, and his cavalry pushed on to Charron, nearly in the rear of the Young Guard at Romainville, which checked the advance of Marmont's victorious division, but still decided nothing. It was now eight o'clock, and the Emperor of Russia had just arrived on the field of battle, uncertain of the force of the enemy, or of the probable time of Napoleon's approach; he learned, with dismay, that Blucher's forces had not yet reached the neighbourhood of Montmartre; that the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg and Giulay were still far behind, on the left; and that Raieffsky was overmatched, and his men fast falling in the centre. Instantly perceiving the danger, the emperor immediately ordered Barclay to bring up the grenadiers, and Russian and Prussian Guards, to the support of Raieffsky; and soon these noble troops were seen marching in double-quick time on the road to Pantin.†

The emperor brings up the Guards, which restores the battle there.

Their arrival at the scene of danger speedily changed the state of affairs. Prince Eugene, long oppressed by superior numbers, now in his turn had the advantage. General Mesenzoff advancing at the head of three Russian divisions of the Guards, supported Raieffsky; and their united force, finding that it was impossible to advance in the plain till the heights were carried, from the summit of which the French guns vomited forth death on all sides, made a general attack on the wooded hills of Romainville, which were carried after a most desperate conflict, the French who occupied them being driven back to the heights in the rear of Menilmontant and Belleville. At the same time, as the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg had not yet come up, Count Pahlen pushed forward a body of his dragoons towards Vincennes, who, meeting with no opposition, approached the Barriere du Trone, where twenty guns, manned by the scholars of the Polytechnic school, received them with a pointblank discharge. Hardly, however, was the first round over, when the Russian hulans made a dash in flank at the guns, which were taken, with the gallant youths who served them; and the seizure of the gate itself was only prevented by the National Guard, who checked the pursuit.‡ Meanwhile, Barclay having, by the aid of the Guards and grenadiers, at length dislodged the enemy from the heights of Pantin and Romain-

* *Ante*, i., 127.

† Dan., 348, 349. Vaud., ii., 330, 331. Burgh., 237, 238. Koch, iii., 451, 452. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 293, 294.

* His words were: "The second corps is ready and willing to be sacrificed: think of us, and help us." Barclay answered, "Many thanks for your resolution: the grenadiers are prepared to re-enforce you."—DANILEFSKY, 352.

† Dan., 353, 354. Vaud., ii., 332, 334. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 296, 297. Burgh., 240. Koch, iii., 453, 460, 471.

‡ One of these boys was overthrown into a ditch, where a Cossack had his spear uplifted to pierce him, when a Russian lancer, touched with his youth and valour, staid his arm, saying "Pas tuer jeune Français."—KOCH, iii., 472.

ville, gave orders to suspend the attack in the centre, until the arrival of the army of Silesia on the right, and the corps of Giulay and the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg on the left, enabled the whole army to take the parts assigned them in the battle.*

Appearance of the army of Silesia on the right.

At eleven o'clock, standards and armed bodies of men were seen by the anxious crowds who thronged the heights of Montmartre around St. Denis, which soon, widening and extending, moved steadily forward, till, like a huge black wave, they overspread the whole plain which stretches from thence to the capital. It was the first host of the army of Silesia, which, dividing into two columns as it approached Montmartre, streamed in endless files, the one half towards La Villette, on the great road to the barrier of St. Denis, the other in the direction of Neuilly, as if to turn that important post by the extreme French left. D'York and Kleist were on the great road, moving direct on Paris, Langeron on the allied right, moving to turn the enemy's flank. The defence of La Villette and La Chapelle was most obstinate. For four long hours Mortier's troops, with heroic resolution, made good their post against the constantly-increasing masses and reiterated attacks of the Prussians; and it was not till Woronzoff brought up his iron bands of Russian veterans, with the 13th and 14th light infantry at their head, that the batteries which commanded the village were carried, and the French driven out. Meanwhile, Marmont, being re-enforced, again made dispositions for an attack on Pantin. Barclay, upon that, ordered the Prussian and Baden guards to march out and attack the enemy; and these splendid troops, led by their gallant colonel, Alvensleben, rushed on the enemy with such impetuosity, that they were speedily broken, and driven back almost to the barriers of Pré St. Gervais. Such was the admiration which this charge excited in the breast of Alexander, who witnessed it, that with his own hands he took the cross of St. George off the neck of the Archduke Constantine, who stood near him, and sent it to the Prussian commander while he and his troops were in the thick of a running fire; and the flattering badge being put on his breast on the spot, the men set up a shout which was heard above all the roar of the battle.†

And of the Prince of Wirtemberg on the left.

At length, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the heads of the columns of the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg arrived at the extreme allied left; and although Giulay's Austrians had not yet made their appearance, he immediately commenced operations. The wood of Vincennes was occupied almost without opposition; the castle blockaded; the bridge of St. Maur, with eight guns, carried by storm, and the French driven back with severe loss to Charenton. Both wings having thus come up at last, the emperor ordered a general attack along the whole line. The allies formed, as at Leipsic and Arcis-sur-Aube, a vast semicircle, stretching from Charenton on the extreme left, to the neighbourhood of Neuilly on the right; the French a concave circle, facing outward, and which was gradually falling back to the barriers. Langeron was ordered to carry Montmartre, cost what it might; while Raieffsky and Prince Eugene, supported by Barclay's reserves and the grenadiers, again renewed the attack on the centre. This grand assault, now made with greatly superior forces, and at all points at the same time, proved entirely successful. The conquerors rushed forward in the order followed in the desperate assault of Ismael, and with as rapid success. In vain the French generals and officers did all in their power, by standing in front of their columns, and exposing themselves to the uttermost, to animate their men and lead them back into action. Heroism and patriotism did their best to resist, but they did it in vain; an invincible spirit was roused among mankind; the Almighty fiat had gone forth: its instrument was the indignation of oppressed humanity, and France was to undergo the punishment of the Revolution.*

Storming of the heights which command Paris.

Flashing in the rays of a brilliant sun, the Russian and Prussian colours were carried forward from one summit to another, till every obstacle was surmounted, and Paris lay at their feet. The Prussians, under the gallant Prince William, after a desperate struggle, carried the bridge over the canal of Ourcq, and expelled Mortier's men, at the point of the bayonet, out of La Villette. Charpentier's veterans of the Guards retired, furious with indignation, and still, even in retreat, keeping up a deadly and unquenchable fire on their pursuers. Pitchnitsky's division of the Russians carried the barriers of Pré St. Gervais, and made themselves masters of seventeen guns which had been planted there; ten more yielded to the impetuous assault of the Prussian and Baden guards; Prince Gortchakoff forced Charron; the burying-ground at Mont Louis with eight, the battery of Menilmontant with seven guns, were successively stormed; the inmost recesses of the wood of Romainville were the theatre of mortal conflict; the village of Bagnolet was forced, at the same time, by Mesenzoff; and the external defences of the French centre being thus all carried about the same time, the whole allied centre, amid deafening shouts, converging together, rushed simultaneously into Belleville. Following up their successes, the advanced guards, with breathless haste, toiled to the summit of the Butte de Chaumont; the level plateau was speedily covered with troops; the splendid capital of France burst on their view; the cry, "Fire on Paris, fire on Paris!" arose on all sides, and amid cheers which were heard over the whole battle-field; twenty guns were brought forward, which speedily sent their bombs as far as the Chaussée d'Antin. The first shot was fired from the Russian battery of light artillery, which was the last that evacuated Moscow, and on both occasions was under the direction of General Milaradowitch.† All of

* Dan., 355, 356. Burgh., 241. Koch, iii., 461, 464. Vaud., ii., 334, 336. Plotho, iii., 404, 406.

† Dan., 357, 358. Burgh., 241, 242. Plotho, iii., 406, 407. Vaud., ii., 336, 338. Koch, iii., 465, 476.

* Dan., 360. Burgh., 242, 243. Vaud., ii., 342, 352. Koch, iii., 639, 646. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 342, 343.

† Dan., 360, 361. Burgh., 342, 343. Koch, iii., 474, 477. Vaud., ii., 362, 365. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 303, 307. Plotho, iii., 407, 411.

a sudden the troops received orders to halt at all points, and it was soon known that a capitulation had been concluded.

A suspension of arms is agreed to on both sides.

Joseph no sooner perceived that the allied armies were about to throw the French troops back upon Paris, than he authorized the marshals to enter into a capitulation. This authority was given by Joseph at a quarter past twelve; but it was not till the plateau of Chaumont was stormed, and the Russian bombs began to fall in the city, that the French marshals rightly judged that the defence could no longer be prolonged. In fact, in half an hour more, the French troops, driven headlong down the steep descent which leads from the plateau to the town, would have been irrecoverably routed, and the conquerors would have entered the gates with them. They, in concert, accordingly despatched an officer to the Emperor Alexander, who was on the summit of the hill of Romainville, to request an armistice. The emperor answered, with dignity, that he acceded to the proposition, but on condition only that Paris was immediately surrendered. As the officer had no power to accede to such a condition, Colonel Orloff returned with him to Marshal Marmont, whom he found in the first line, with his sword drawn, encouraging his worn-out battalions. The terms were at once agreed to, and the French were immediately to evacuate all the positions without the gates, including Montmartre. Orders were soon after despatched in all directions to stop the firing. So warm, however, was the conflict, so exasperated were the soldiers on the opposite sides, that it was with great difficulty that they could be separated; the enthusiastic cheers of the allies made the very earth to shake over the adjacent parts of Paris; and, when the firing ceased, the last sounds that were heard were from Curial's veterans of the Old Guard, who still shouted, "Vive l'empereur!"*

General occupation of the heights, and storming of Montmartre.

To the loud roar of the artillery, the incessant clang of the musketry, the cries and cheers of the combatants, now succeeded a silence yet more awful, during which the terms of capitulation were under discussion, and the fate of six hundred thousand human beings depended on a few words from the Emperor of Russia. Meanwhile, the French troops, in the deepest dejection, many of them with tears mingling with the blood on their cheeks, withdrew within the barriers. The allied columns, who had now all come up in great strength, and exulting in their triumphs, were immediately everywhere brought forward to the front, and formed a sublime spectacle. From the banks of the Marne to those of the Seine, on a vast semicircle of six miles, the troops rested on their arms. The different lines were placed near each other, so as to form a continued close column; artillery bristled on all the heights, cavalry filled all the plains; a hundred thousand men, leaning on their arms, and three hundred pieces of cannon, with the matches burning, were ready to pour the vials of wrath on the devoted city. Alexander, with all his suite, rode on to the plateau of Chaumont; Paris lay spread like a map at his feet; the descending sun, which cast its rays over its vast assemblage of domes and palaces, seemed to supplicate him to imitate its beneficence, and shine alike upon the just and the unjust. He was not wanting to his glorious destiny. But ere the terms could be agreed to, loud cheers, followed by a tremendous fire, were heard on the right; Montmartre was speedily enveloped in smoke, and for some time all were in suspense watching the dreadful struggle—the last of the campaign—which was there going forward. In a quarter of an hour, however, the thunder ceased; the well-known Russian hurrah resounded through the air; Russian standards were descried on the summit of the hill; and soon the arrival of messengers announced that, before intelligence of the suspension had reached them, Count Langeron, ascending from the extreme right of the allied line, on the side of Clichy, had carried this stronghold by assault. Such was the vigour of the storm, that, of thirty guns planted on the hill, twenty-nine were taken; and, in ten minutes from the time when the attack commenced, the Russian colours waved on its summit, although the preparations for defence appeared so formidable, that the brave Rudzewitch, who led the assault, took leave of his brother officers, as advancing to certain death, before he entered the fire. No sooner was the hill carried, than Langeron chased the French back into Paris, and immediately brought up eighty-four guns, which were planted on its summit, pointed towards the capital. "So, Father Paris! you must now pay for Mother Moscow!" exclaimed a Russian artilleryman, with the medal of 1812 on his bosom, as he approached his match to the touch-hole of his cannon. As soon as the suspension of arms, however, was agreed to, a white flag was displayed from the telegraph on the top of Montmartre, the soldiers piled their arms, and the bands of all the regiments, advancing to the most elevated points around, made the air resound with martial and triumphant strains.*

Results of the battle.

The battle of Paris, the last scene in this mighty drama, was also on the side of the allies, and, considering the number opposed to them, one of the most bloody. They lost not less than 9093 men, of whom 153 were Wirtembergers, 1840 Prussians, and 7100 Russians: a clear proof upon whom the weight of the contest had fallen, and with whom its principal glory should rest. They took eighty-six pieces of cannon on the field, two standards, and a thousand prisoners; and the guns of the National Guard, seventy-two in number, were given up by capitulation. The French loss was much less severe, and did not exceed 4500 men. The reason of this great disproportion between the loss of the victorious and vanquished army was not so much the strength of the French position, or the effect of their formidable heavy batteries on the allied columns, as the circumstance that Blucher did not receive his orders in time to make his attack on the right simultaneously with Raieffsky's in the centre, and that the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg did not come up till the very last attack, at two o'clock in the afternoon, af-

* Dan., 363, 365. Cap., x., 464, 465. Sav., vii., 11, 13. Burgh., 247. Lond., 299, 300.

* Dan., 366, 368. Plotho, iii., 414. Koch, iii., 647, 658. Vaud., ii., 369, 371.

ter the battle had lasted eight hours. Thus, during the greater part of the day, the opposite sides were nearly equally matched in respect of number at the points engaged, though, when all their troops came up, the allies were three to one. Nevertheless, the resistance of the French army from first to last was most heroic; they yielded their capital, in the end, only to the forces of banded Europe; and this day may justly be considered as adding another to the immortal wreath of laurels which encircles their brows.*

Rapid return of Napoleon towards Paris.

"If the allies were encamped," said Napoleon in the Senate, on the 30th of March, 1813, "on the heights of Montmartre, I would not surrender one village in the thirty-second military division" (the Hanse Towns). On that day year—on the 30th of March, 1814—the allies were encamped on the heights of Montmartre; but he was obliged to surrender, not a village in the north of Germany, but his crown and his empire. No sooner was the emperor made aware, on his return to Paris, that the allies were approaching its walls, than he despatched on the 29th his aide-de-camp, General Dejean, from Doulencourt, to announce his immediate return to the capital; and to intimate that negotiations were renewed, through the medium of Austria and Prince Metternich, with the allied powers. Dejean had reached Mortier, after incredible exertions, about three o'clock, as he was bravely combating the Prussians in front of La Villette. The marshal immediately despatched a flag of truce to Schwartzenberg, with a letter written on a drum-head, intimating the resumption of the negotiations, and proposing an armistice. The allied generals, however, were too well informed to fall into the snare; and a polite answer was returned by the generalissimo, stating "that the intimate and indissoluble union which subsists between the sovereign powers affords a sure guarantee that the negotiations which you suppose are on foot separately between Austria and France, have no foundation; and that the reports which you have received on that head are entirely groundless." The attempt to avert the evil hour thus entirely failed, and it was shortly after that Marmont and Mortier jointly concluded the armistice for the evacuation of Paris.*

Return of Napoleon to the neighbourhood of Paris.

Meanwhile, Napoleon, every hour more alarmed, was straining every nerve to reach the capital. On the 29th, the Imperial Guard and equipages arrived at Troyes late at night, having marched above forty miles in that single day. After a few hours' rest he threw himself into his travelling carriage, and, as the wearied cuirassiers could no longer keep pace with him, set out alone for Paris. Courier after courier was despatched before him to announce his immediate return to the authorities of the capital; but as he approached it, the most disastrous intelligence reached him every time he changed horses. He learned successively that the empress and his son had quitted Paris; that the enemy were at its gates; that they were fighting on the heights. His impatience was now redoubled; he got into a little post *calèche* to accelerate his speed, and although the horses were going at the gallop, he incessantly urged the postillions to get on faster. The steeds flew like the winds; the wheels took fire in rolling over the pavement: yet nothing could satisfy the emperor. At length, by great exertions, he reached Fromenteau, near the fountains of Juvisy, only five leagues from Paris, at ten at night. As his horses were there changing at the post-house called Cour de France, some straggling soldiers who were passing, announced, without knowing the emperor, that Paris had capitulated. "These men are mad!" cried Napoleon: "the thing is impossible: bring me an officer!" At the very moment General Belliard came up and gave the whole details of the catastrophe. Large drops of sweat stood on the emperor's forehead; he turned to Caulaincourt and said, "Do you hear that?" with a fixed gaze that made him shudder. At this moment the Seine only separated the emperor from the enemy's advanced posts on the extreme allied left, in the plain of Villeneuve St. George's; their innumerable watch-fires illuminated the whole north and east of the heavens; while the mighty conqueror, in the darkness, followed only by two post-carriages and a few attendants, received the stroke of fate.*

Napoleon's remarkable conversation on hearing of the fall of Paris.

Berthier now came up, and Napoleon immediately said he must set out to Paris. "Caulaincourt, order the carriage!" Unable to restrain his anxiety to get forward, he set out on foot, accompanied by Berthier and Caulaincourt, speaking incessantly as he hurried on, without waiting for an answer, or seeming to be conscious of their presence. "I burned the pavement," said he; "my horses were as swift as the wind; but still I felt oppressed with an intolerable weight; something extraordinary was passing within me. I asked them only to hold out four-and-twenty hours. Miserable wretches that they are! Marmont, too, who had sworn that he would be hewn in pieces rather than surrender! And Joseph ran off too—my very brother! To surrender the capital to the enemy—what poltroons! They had my orders; they knew that, on the 2d of April, I would be here at the head of seventy thousand men. My brave scholars, my National Guard, who had promised to defend my son; all men with a heart in their bosoms would have joined to combat at my side. And so they have capitulated; betrayed their brother, their country, their sovereign, degraded France in the eyes of Europe! Entered into a capital of eight hundred thousand souls without firing a shot! It is too dreadful. That comes of intrusting cowards and fools. When I am not there, they do nothing but heap up blunder on blunder. What has been done with the artillery? They should have had two hundred pieces, and ammunition for a month. Every one has lost his head; and yet Joseph imagines he can lead an army, and Clarke is vain enough to think himself a minister; but I begin to think Savary is right, and that he is a traitor. Set off, Caulaincourt; fly to the allied lines; pene-

* Dan., 371. Plotho, iii., 416, 417. Vaud., ii., 372, 373. Koch, iii., 488, 506.

† Mortier to Schwartzenberg, March 30, 1814, and Reply, Sav., vii., 10, 11. Fain, 198, 199.

* Fain, 198, 199, 203. Caul., ii., 356, 358. Koch, iii., 561, 562.

trate to headquarters; you have full powers; fly, fly!" He still insisted upon following with Belliard and the cavalry, who had already evacuated Paris; but, upon the repeated assurances of that officer that the capitulation was concluded, and the capital in the hands of an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men, he at length agreed to return, rejoined his carriages, which he had preceded by above a mile, and, after ordering the retiring corps to take a position at Essonne, set out for Fontainebleau, which he reached at six in the morning.*

Preparations of the allies for entering Paris.

While these mournful scenes were passing at the solitary headquarters of the French emperor, very different was the spectacle which the victorious camp of the allies exhibited. It was there universally known that the troops were to enter Paris on the following morning, and orders had been issued that all those who were to accompany the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia should appear in their gala dresses, and with their arms and accoutrements in the best possible order. In great part of the troops, especially the corps of Blucher's army, the clothing was almost worn out; hardly an entire uniform was to be seen; many of the men were arrayed in a motley garb, stripped from the dead bodies of their enemies and allies. But the case was otherwise with the household troops of the emperor, the Guards, grenadiers, and reserve cavalry. These superb corps had been kept by the emperor throughout the whole three preceding campaigns in the highest state of discipline and equipment, and for this glorious *entrée* they decked themselves out with the utmost possible care. Incredible efforts were made by the men through the night, even after the fatigues of the preceding day, to gratify alike their sovereign's and their own wishes on this memorable occasion. From having almost invariably, during the preceding campaign, fought in their greatcoats, their uniforms were in their knapsacks, quite clean and dry, and their arms were burnished up with a vigour which soon rendered them as bright as when they left the esplanade of St. Petersburg or Berlin.†

Final conclusion of the capitulation.

Meanwhile, the terms of the capitulation were the subject of anxious discussion in the emperor's cabinet. It was conducted on the part of the French by Colonels Fabvier and Dennis, on that of the allies by Nesselrode and Orloff. To all the demands of the French marshals that Paris should be protected, its monuments intrusted to the care of the National Guard, and private property preserved sacred, the allies gave a ready consent; but a very serious difficulty arose when it was proposed that the marshals, with their followers, should capitulate. To this they positively refused to accede, declaring that they would perish first in the streets; and as the Russian officers had no power to dispense with this material article, they were obliged to refer the matter to the emperor, who agreed to abandon it. A discussion next arose as to the route by which the marshals should retire, the allies insisting for that of Britanny, the French for any they might choose. This, too, was referred to the emperor, who also agreed to forego this condition. The terms of the capitulation were at length finally adjusted at three in the morning; it being stipulated that the marshals should evacuate Paris at seven on the same day; that the whole public arsenals and magazines should be surrendered in the same state in which they were when the capitulation was concluded; that the National Guard, according to the pleasure of the allies, should be either disbanded or employed under their direction in the service of the city; that the wounded and stragglers found after ten in the morning should be considered prisoners of war; and that Paris should be recommended to the generosity of the allied sovereigns.*

Interview of Alexander with the magistrates of Paris.

The municipal magistrates of Paris, consisting of the two prefects of the department of the Seine, the mayor of the city, the chiefs of the National Guard, and a few of its superior officers, thus abandoned to themselves, without any superior government to direct their movements, now deemed it high time to take steps for the preservation of the city. Accordingly, a deputation, consisting of those elevated functionaries, set off at two in the morning for the headquarters of the allied sovereigns. They had no need of lamps to their carriages; the immense semicircle of watch-fires through which they passed on the road to Bondy threw a steady light on the road, and first revealed to them the vast force by which the capital had been assailed. Proceeding rapidly on, they soon reached the headquarters, and at four they were introduced to the Emperor Alexander. They were received by him in the most gracious manner: "Gentlemen," said the Czar, "I am not the enemy of the French nation; I am so only of a single man, whom I once admired and *long loved*; but who, devoured by ambition and filled with bad faith, came into the heart of my dominions, and left me no alternative but to seek security for my future safety in the liberation of Europe. The allied sovereigns have come here neither to conquer nor to rule France, but to learn and support what France itself deems most suitable for its own welfare; and they only wait, before undertaking the task, to ascertain, in the declared wish of Paris, the probable wish of France." He then promised to take under his especial protection the museums, monuments, public institutions, and establishments of all sorts in the capital. Upon the request of the magistrates that the National Guard should be kept up, Alexander, turning to the chief of the staff, asked if he could rely upon that civic force. The reply was, that he might entirely rely upon their discharging every duty like men of honour. The emperor immediately replied that he could expect nothing more, and desired no other guarantee; and that he referred the details to General Sacken, whom he had appointed governor of Paris, and whom they would find in every respect a man of delicacy and honour.†

State of public feeling at Paris during this period.

Paris, meanwhile, was in that state of combined excitement and stupor which prepares the way for great political revolutions. The terrors of the people had been extreme during the

* Caul., ii., 358, 361. Koch, iii., 562, 564.
† Dan., 381. Lond., 300, 254.

* Dan., 375, 377. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 317, 318.
† Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 319, 320. Burgh., 249, 250. Koch, iii., 517, 521.

battle; they trembled for the pillage, massacre, and conflagration, which they were told, by the placards posted by the police, awaited them if the allies were successful; and they dreaded at least as much the unchaining the cupidity of the faubourgs and passions of the Revolution, by the proposal to arm the working classes, and prepare a national defence. While the battle lasted, an immense crowd filled the Boulevards, and all the streets leading into them from the north and east, composed of at least as many women as men, who manifested the utmost anxiety for the event, and evinced the warmest sympathy with the long files of wounded who were brought in from the heights. On the approach of evening, when the passage of artillery and ammunition-wagons through the streets to the southward told but too plainly that the defence could no longer be maintained, the sentiment that Napoleon was overthrown, and that a change of government would take place, became universal: the partisans of a regency, under the direction of Marie Louise, who otherwise might have been numerous, were paralyzed by her departure from the capital; and the Jacobins and Republicans, long restrained under the Empire, did not venture to declare themselves, from terror of the allied arms. Thus the Royalists, who had received some slight countenance at least from the allied headquarters, were the only party which ventured to act openly; and already some symptoms of their taking a decided part had appeared.*

First movements of the Royalists.

At the barrier of Mousseaux, where a battalion of National Guards was ordered by the general to issue forth and combat with the troops of the line, the Duke of Fitzjames, a known Royalist leader, stepped forward from the ranks, harangued the regiment, and persuaded them to disobey the order, upon the ground that it was contrary to the fundamental conditions of their institution to be sent beyond the barriers. After it was known that a capitulation had been agreed to, the activity of the Royalist committee was redoubled: all night they were in deliberation; in vain several of their members were arrested by the police; the general conviction that the authority of that hated body, and their host of ten thousand spies, by whom Paris and France had so long been governed, would soon be at an end, counterbalanced all their efforts; and it was determined to raise the Royalist standard openly in the capital on the following morning at nine o'clock. Accordingly, M. Charles de Vauvineux, on the Place Louis XV., read aloud, to a small assembly of Royalists, Schwartzenberg's proclamation, issued the day before, and at its close, mounting the white cockade, exclaimed, "VIVE LE ROI!" The number of his followers was only four, but they immediately rode through the neighbouring streets and boulevards, repeating the ancient rallying cry of France, and distributing white cockades to the people. A few gentlemen of the old families and the better classes joined them; but their numbers were still very inconsiderable, and towards the Porte San Martin and Rue St. Antoine the Royalist emissaries were insulted by the people and seized by the police. The great body of the inhabitants were congregated in the streets, and highly excited, but dubious and uncertain: anxious, but yet apprehensive: ready to receive an impulse, but incapable of originating it. Such is the end of revolutions.*

Entrance of the allied sovereigns into Paris.

In this state of agitation and uncertainty, noonday arrived, and the *cortège* of the allied sovereigns began to make its appearance in the Faubourg San Martin, on their way to the capital. The Prussian cavalry of the Guard, preceded by some squadrons of Cossacks, came first; then the Prussian light horse of the Guards; next the Austrian grenadiers; then the Russian and Prussian foot-guards; the Russian cuirassiers and artillery closed the procession. Indescribable was the enthusiasm which the matchless spectacle excited in the minds of the soldiers and officers who witnessed the march. Precisely at eight o'clock the emperor mounted his horse, and traversing the countless array of soldiers, who were drawn up to salute him in passing, arrived at nine at the commencement of the Faubourg St. Martin. Already, various pickets of Cossacks had traversed the boulevards; the principal military points in the capital had been occupied by the Russians; the red Cossacks of the Guard were to be seen at the corners of the principal streets; their bizarre costume, and Asiatic physiognomy, excited general alarm. But when the superb array of the household troops commenced, when the infantry, thirty, and the cavalry, fifteen abreast, began to defile through the faubourg, and the forces whom they had so often been told were cut to pieces or destroyed, appeared in endless succession, in the finest order and the most brilliant array, one universal feeling of enthusiasm seized upon the multitude. Every window was crowded; the roofs were covered with anxious spectators; the throng in the streets was so excessive, that it was with difficulty the troops could make their way through them. Passing from the extreme of terror to that of gratitude, the Parisians gave vent in the loudest applause to their astonishment and admiration. The proclamation of the allied sovereigns to the inhabitants of Paris, already given,† had been placarded in every part of the capital that morning; its conciliatory expressions were universally known, and had diffused a unanimous entrancement. The grand object of anxiety to all was to get a glimpse of the Emperor Alexander, to whom, it was generally felt, their deliverance had been owing. When that noble prince, with the King of Prussia on his right, and Prince Schwartzenberg and Lord Cathcart on his left, made his appearance, amid a brilliant suite of varied uniforms, at the Porte St. Martin, the enthusiasm of the multitude knew no bounds. Cries of "Vive l'Empereur Alexandre!" "Vive le Roi de Prusse!" "Vivent les Alliés!" "Vivent notres Liberateurs!" burst from all sides; and the universal transports resembled rather the incense of a grateful people to a beneficent and victorious sovereign, than the reception by the vanquished of their conqueror, after a bloody and desperate war.‡

* Beauch., ii., 225, 259. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 320, 321. Lab., ii., 369. Koch, iii., 521, 523.

* Lab., ii., 378, 381. Beauch., ii., 257, 283. Montag., vii., 400. Vict. et Conq., xxiii., 321. Koch, iii., 525, 527.

† *Ante*, iv., 389.

‡ Cap., x., 467, 468. Dan., 384, 386. Lond., 301, 302. Burgh., 251, 252. Thib., ix., 640. Beauch., ii., 281, 284.

Turning to the right at the Porte St. Martin, the allied sovereigns passed along the boulevard of the same name, and admired at the gate of St. Denis the noble triumphal arch, inscribed "Ludovico Magno." As they approached the Boulevard Italienne, the aspect of the multitude, if possible still greater, was of a more elevated description: the magnificent hotels of that opulent quarter were crowded with elegantly-dressed females, waving white handkerchiefs, and cries of "Vivent les Bourbons!" were heard in every direction. Such was the enthusiasm with which the sovereigns were received as they defiled through the Boulevard de la Madeleine, that the people kissed their boots, their sabres, and the trappings of their horses; and many young women of graceful exterior and polished manners entreated the gentlemen in attendance to take them up before them on their horses, that they might obtain a nearer sight of their deliverers.* Alexander's manner was so gracious, his figure so noble, his answers so felicitous, his pronunciation of the French so pure, as to excite universal admiration. "We have been long expecting you," said one. "We should have been here sooner but for the bravery of your troops," was the happy answer of the Czar. "I come not," he repeatedly said, "as your enemy; regard me as your friend." The sovereigns defiled past the then unfinished pillars of the Temple of Glory, now converted into the graceful peristyle of the Chruch of the Madeleine; their triumphant hoofs rung, in the Place Louis XV., on the spot where Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the Princess Elizabeth had been executed, and halting in the entrance of the Champs-Elysées, they beheld fifty thousand of their chosen troops defile before them, amid the applause of the multitude, and through the space formed by the bayonets of the National Guard of Paris, which kept the ground for the procession. "God!" said Monort, in the Church of St. Roch during the fervour of the Revolution, "if you exist, avenge your injured name: I bid you defiance: you dare not launch your thunders; who will, after this, believe in your existence?"† The thunders of Heaven had now been launched; the Revolution had been destroyed by the effect of its own principles, and the answer of God delivered by the mouths of the revolutionists themselves.‡

Extraordinary transports in the Place Louis XV.

When the review was concluded, and the troops were dividing into small parties to reach the quarters assigned them in the barracks and suburbs of the city, Alexander alighted at the hotel of M. Talleyrand, where the leading members of the Senate, and the most distinguished characters of the capital, were assembled. The meeting was of a very various character, and exhibited a strange example of the manner in which the most opposite parties are thrown together in the latter stages of a revolution. On the side of the Royalists there were the Baron Louis and M. de Pradt, the well-known and acute Archbishop of Maline, the Duc de Dalberg, Bourrienne, and the senator Beurnonville; and these, with the King of Prussia, Prince Schwartzenberg, Prince Lichtenstein, Count Nesselrode, and Count Pozzo di Borgo, constituted this memorable assemblage. Their proceedings are well worth recounting; the fate of the world depended upon their deliberations.*

Important meeting of the sovereigns at Talleyrand's hotel.

Alexander opened the discussion by stating that there were three courses to adopt: either to make peace with Napoleon, taking the necessary securities against him; to establish a regency; or to recall the house of Bourbon. Upon these momentous questions he requested the opinion of the meeting, protesting that the only wish of the allied sovereigns was to consult the wishes of France, and secure the peace of the world. Talleyrand immediately rose, and strongly urged that the two former projects were altogether inadmissible; and that there could be no peace in Europe while Napoleon or any of his dynasty were on the throne. He concluded that the only course was to adopt the third, which would be generally acceptable, and which offered the only way of escaping out of the evils by which they were surrounded; and that, under the mild rule of a race of princes who had learned wisdom in misfortune, all the guarantees which could be desired would be obtained for durable freedom. To this proposition it was replied by Schwartzenberg, that no indications of indifference to the emperor had been witnessed by the army in its passage through France; that the declarations in favour of the Bourbons had been few and far between; and that the heroic resistance of the National Guards at Fere-Champenoise, many of whom had been only a few days before at the plough, gave no indications of such a disposition. Alexander then turned to Talleyrand, and asked him how he proposed to arrive at his object. Talleyrand replied, by means of the constituted authorities; that he would answer for the Senate, and that their example would be speedily followed by all France. Alexander then asked the Abbé de Pradt and Baron Louis their opinion; and prefaced it by declaring, in the most energetic terms, "that he was not the author of the war; that Napoleon had, without a cause, invaded his dominions; that it was neither a thirst for conquest nor the lust of dominion which had brought him to Paris, but the necessity of self-preservation; that he had done all in his power to spare that capital, and would have been inconsolable if he had failed in that object; finally, that he was not the enemy of France, but of Napoleon, and all who were hostile to its liberties." In

Account of the deliberation.

* I have been assured of this fact by both Lord Cathcart and Lord Burghersh, now the Earl of Westmoreland, who took a part in the procession, and themselves had a fair Parisian, sometimes *en croupe*, at others on the pommel of their saddles, at the Place Louis XV. The English who entered Paris with the allies were the Earl of Cathcart, Lord Stewart, Lord Burghersh, Sir Hudson Lowe, Colonel H. Cooke, the Hon. Major Frederic Cathcart, Captain Wood, Lieutenant Aubin, Lieutenant the Hon. George Cathcart, Lieutenant Harris, who brought the despatches to England, Thomas Sydenham, Esq., John Bidwell, Esq., and Dr. Frank. —BURGHERSH, 254, *note*. Savary gives the same account of the Parisian ladies on this occasion. "There were to be seen ladies, and even ladies of rank, who so far forgot the respect due to themselves as to give themselves up to the most shameful delirium. They threw themselves over the circle of horses which surrounded the Emperor of Russia, and testified an *empressement* more fitted to excite contempt than conciliate kindly feeling."—SAVARY, vii., 52.

† *Ante*, i., 224.

‡ Montg., vii., 400. Beauch., ii., 283, 285. Cap., x., 467, 468. Lond., 302. Dan., 384, 386. Burgh., 252.

* Thib., ix., 640, 641. Cap., x., 469, 476. De Pradt, Hist. de la Restauration, 13, 14.

these sentiments the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzenberg expressed their entire concurrence; and then the Abbé de Pradt and Baron Louis declared that they were Royalists: "that the great majority of the French nation were of the same opinion; that it was the knowledge of negotiations going on at Chatillon with Napoleon that alone had hitherto prevented this opinion from manifesting itself; but that, now that they were concluded, Paris would readily declare itself, and the whole of France would immediately follow its example." "Sire!" resumed Talleyrand, "there are but two courses open to us: Bonaparte or Louis XVIII. Bonaparte if you can; but you cannot, for you are not alone. What would they give you in his place? A soldier? We want no more of them. If we wanted one, we would keep the one we already have: he is the first in the world. After him, any one that could be offered us would not have ten votes in his favour. I repeat it, sire! any attempt but for Bonaparte or Louis XVIII. is but an intrigue." "Well, then," said Alexander, "I declare that I will no longer treat with the Emperor Napoleon;" and added, on the suggestion of the Abbé de Pradt, "nor with any member of his family."*

Declaration of the allies that they would no longer treat with Napoleon nor his family. March 30.

The die being thus cast, the next step to be taken was the announcement of the resolution of the allied sovereigns to the inhabitants of Paris. An address to the French nation was immediately drawn up and published, in which they declared that they would grant more favourable terms to a wise government than when it was necessary to provide against the devouring ambition of Napoleon; that they would not treat with Napoleon nor any member of his family; that they would respect the integrity of France, such as it had been under its legitimate monarchs; that they wished that France should be great and powerful, and would respect and guaranty any constitution which it might adopt; and that they invited the Senate to appoint a provisional government, and prepare a suitable constitution for the French people.† Orders were, at the same time, sent to the police to liberate all persons detained in prison for state offences, or "for having prevented the inhabitants in their communes from firing on the allied troops, and so saved their persons and effects, or who were in detention on account of their attachment to their ancient and legitimate sovereign." Some difficulty was anticipated in getting a printer who would have courage enough to throw off such a proclamation; but Talleyrand had, early in the morning, provided against this difficulty, and was ready with a printer, who threw it off with such expedition, that, before nine at night, five hundred copies were placarded over every part of Paris; while Bourrienne, by means of the postoffice, of which he got possession by authority of Alexander, circulated it next morning over the whole of France.*

This declaration produced a prodigious impression. It cut short at once all intrigues for a regency, and, in fact, left the nation no alternative but to revert to the Bourbons. The Senate, thus specially called upon by the allied sovereigns to act, was not long in being put in motion: it had been secretly prepared in part for such a step by Talleyrand, and the declaration of the allies at once brought matters to a crisis. Already the municipal council of Paris had, from the Hôtel de Ville, issued a vehement invective against Napoleon, and in favour of Louis XVIII.; but the senators were in great part uninitiated in the secret of the approaching change, and it was with pale visages and trembling steps that they obeyed the summons which, early in the morning of the 1st of April, Talleyrand, in his capacity of Arch-chancellor of the Empire, sent them, to assemble to deliberate in their usual hall of assembly. Only sixty-four out of one hundred and forty attended; but they composed several men of distinction, whose names had been known on almost every extreme side through all the phases of the Revolution; many who had voted for the death of the king; and others who, by a kind of miracle only, had kept their heads on their shoulders during the Reign of Terror. To the proceedings of that day are affixed the signatures of Destult, Tracy, Fontanes, the eloquent orator of the Empire, Garat, the Abbé Gregoire, Lambrecht, Lanjuinais, the Abbé de Montesquieu, Roger Ducos, Serrurier, Soules, and the Marshal Duc de Valmy! Strange assemblage of men, of the most opposite political sentiments, now met together to pull down the last government of the Revolution! Talleyrand opened the proceedings, and, after a short discussion, a provisional government was unanimously established, consisting of Talleyrand, who was president, Count de Beurnonville, Count de Jaucourt, the Duc de Dalberg, and M. de Montesquieu. The latter had been a distinguished member of the Constituent Assembly in 1789. Nothing was said of Napoleon, though the very establishment of a provisional government was the most decided act of high treason to his authority; nor of the Bourbons, though every step they took was a nearer approach to their recognition. The principal care of the Senate appeared to be the formation of a constitution, and in that view it was provided that the Senate and Legislative Body should be a constituent part of the new government; their ranks and pensions should be preserved to the army, the public debts maintained, the sale of the national domains ratified, an amnesty declared for the past, liberty of

Establishment of a provisional government by the Senate.

April 1.

* De Pradt, Hist. de la Rest., 18, 24. Sav., vii., 53, 55. Thib., ix., 640, 641. Cap., x., 476, 477.

† "The allied powers having occupied Paris, they are ready to receive the declaration of the French nation. They declare that, if it was indispensable that the conditions of peace should contain stronger guarantees when it was necessary to enchain the ambition of Napoleon, they should become more favourable when, by a return to a wiser government, France itself offers the assurance of repose. The allied sovereigns declare, in consequence, that they will no longer treat with Napoleon, nor with any of his family; that they respect the integrity of old France, such as it existed among its legitimate kings; they may even go farther, for they always profess the principle, that for the happiness of Europe, it is necessary that France should be great and powerful. That they recognise and will guaranty such a constitution as the French nation may give itself. They invite, consequently, the Senate to appoint a provisional government, which may provide for the necessities of administration, and establish such a constitution as may be fitting for the French people. The intentions which I have just expressed are common to me, with all the allied powers.—ALEXANDER, *Paris, 31st March*, 1814, *three P.M.*"—See CAPEFIGUE, x., 477; and THIBAUDEAU, ix., 642.

* Hard., xii., 394, 395. Cap., x., 476, 477. Thib., ix., 642, 643. Bour., x., 43, 45.

worship and of the press established, and a constitution on these bases formed. The last act in the popular drama in France was worthy of all which had preceded it: no provision was made, excepting a word for the press, for public freedom, or individual liberty; all that was thought of was the preservation of the *interests* created by the Revolution. Doubtless their preservation was an essential element in any restoration which was likely to be durable; but what a picture does the *absence* of any other stipulations give of the principles on which the struggle had been maintained!*

Generous conduct of the Emperor Alexander, who liberates all the French prisoners.

The meeting of the Senate broke up at half past nine, and they proceeded to wait upon the Emperor Alexander. He received them in the most gracious manner. "Gentlemen," said he, "I am charmed to find myself in the middle of you. It is neither ambition nor the love of conquest which has led me hither; my armies have only entered France to repel an unjust aggression. Your emperor carried war into the heart of my dominions when I wished only for peace. I am the friend of the French people; I impute their faults to their chief alone; I am here with the most friendly intentions; I wish only to protect your deliberations. You are charged with one of the most honourable missions which generous men can discharge, that of securing the happiness of a great people, in giving France institutions at once strong and liberal, with which she cannot dispense in the state of civilization which she has attained. I set out to-morrow to resume the command of the armies, and sustain the cause which you have embraced: it is time that blood should cease to flow; too much has been shed already; my heart grieves for it. I will not lay down my arms till I have secured the peace which has been the object of all my efforts; and I shall be content if, in quitting your country, I bear with me the satisfaction of having had it in my power to be useful to you, and to contribute to the peace of the world. The provisional government has asked me this morning for the liberation of the French prisoners of war confined in Russia: I give it to the Senate. Since they fell into my hands, I have done all in my power to soften their lot. I will immediately give orders for their return; may they rejoin their families in peace, and enjoy the tranquillity which the new order of things is fitted to induce!" A hundred and fifty thousand men by these words recovered their liberty, and were to be restored to their families and their country! Such was the vengeance which Alexander took for the desolation of his dominions and the flames of Moscow! When Napoleon left Vienna in 1809, he blew up the time-honoured bastions of the capital;† when he became master of Berlin in 1806, he said, "I will make the Prussian nobility so poor that they shall beg their bread;"‡ when he evacuated Moscow, he gave orders for blowing up the Kremlin, the last relic of that capital which had escaped the flames.§‖ If ever the spirit of Heaven actuated the human breast, it was Alexanders' on that occasion.

The Senate dethrones Napoleon. April 2.

On the day following, being April 2d, the Senate by a solemn decree dethroned the emperor, and absolved the army* and people from their oaths of allegiance.† This decisive step was moved in an impassioned speech by Lambrecht; the act of accusation having been prepared by Barbe-Marbois, Lanjuinais, and Fontanes. It abounded in the most severe and cutting invectives against the imperial government; in the justice of which, posterity, from the evidence of facts, must almost entirely participate, and which contains the valuable commentary which history has preserved on the inevitable tendency and final issue of revolutions. Nor is the lesson less important, if we recollect that the body which now burst forth into this vehement strain of indignation against the emperor, was the very Senate which had so long been the passive instrument of his will; that the orators, whose eloquence was now so powerfully exerted to demonstrate the ruinous tendency of his administration, were the very men who had hitherto exalted it to the skies as the height of wisdom and magnanimity; and that the Empire, whose exhaustion and miseries they now so graphically portrayed, was the powerful monarchy which had been regenerated by revolution, and conducted by the most splendid abilities to the summit of military glory. Either the statement they now made, and the picture they now drew, was true or false. If it was true, what a lesson does it read on the effect of that unrestrained indulgence of the social passions which constitutes a revolution: if it was false, what a mirror does it present of the baseness of character which such a convulsion produces, and the destiny of a state which it throws into the guidance of such hands!‡◊

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* Séances, April 1, 1814. Moniteur, April 2, 1814; and Cap., x., 471; and Thib., ix., 647.

† *Ante*, iii., 274. ‡ *Ib.*, ii., 458. § *Ib.*, iii., 579.

‖ Moniteur, April 3, 1814. Cap., x., 478. Beauch., ii., 326, 327.

* "Soldiers! France has broken the yoke beneath which she has groaned for so many years! You have never fought but for your country: you can now no longer combat but against her, under the standards of the man who has hitherto conducted you. See what you have suffered from his tyranny: you were once a million of soldiers; almost all have perished under the sword of the enemy, or, without subsistence, without hospitals, they have been doomed to perish of misery and famine. You are no longer the soldiers of Napoleon: the Senate and people of entire France absolve you from your oaths."—*Moniteur, April 5th*, 1814.

† "Frenchmen! on issuing from civil dissension, you chose for chief a man who appeared on the theatre of the world with an air of grandeur. You reposed in him all your hopes; those hopes have been deceived: on the ruins of anarchy he has founded only despotism. He was bound at least in gratitude to have become a Frenchman with you: he has not done so. He has never ceased to undertake, without end or motive, unjust wars, like an adventurer who is impelled by the thirst for glory. In a few years he has devoured at once your riches and your population. Every family is in mourning: all France groans: he is deaf to our calamities. Possibly he still dreams of his gigantic designs, even after unheard-of reverses have punished in so signal a manner the pride and the abuse of victory. He has shown himself not even capable of reigning for the interests of his despotism. He has destroyed all that he wished to create. He believed in no other power but that of force: force now overwhelms him: just retribution of insensate ambition!"—CAPEFIGUE, x., 483; and *Moniteur, April 5*, 1814.

‡ Moniteur, April 4, 1814; and Cap., x., 481. Thib., ix., 650, 651.

◊ "The conservative Senate, considering that, in a constitutional monarchy, the monarch exists only in virtue of a social compact; that Napoleon Bonaporte's administration for some time was firm and prudent, but that latterly he has violated his fundamental compact with the French people, especially by raising and levying taxes without the sanction of the law, in direct opposition to the oath which he made on ascending the throne; that he committed that infraction of the liberties of the people when he had, without cause,

The Legislative Body, in a meeting consisting of seventy-seven members, adhered to the act of the Senate dethroning Napoleon, and absolving the army and nation from their oaths to his government. Adhesions speedily came in on all sides: a falling cause rarely finds faithful defenders; in a revolutionary state, where success is the god of idolatry, never. All the public bodies of Paris forthwith prepared addresses vying with one another in invectives against Napoleon, as they had formerly exhausted all the flowers of rhetoric in extolling the unparalleled blessings of his government. It was a realization of the views, and even the language, of Malet, which had so nearly proved successful when the emperor was in Russia; but with the additional invectives drawn from boundless calamities since incurred, and irresistible military support since obtained. As fast as the intelligence reached the provinces and provincial towns, they lost not an instant in proclaiming the downfall of the tyrant, and their cordial adhesion to the new order of things. Still, not a word was said, at least by any of the constituted authorities, on the subject of a return to the Bourbon dynasty. On the contrary, the persons appointed by the provincial government to the principal offices of state were almost all drawn from the Republican party. Dessolles, an austere Democrat, was nominated to the command of the National Guard; M. Angles to the police; Henriot de Pansey was the minister of public justice; M. Beugnot, of the interior; Malouet, of the marine; M. Louis, of the finances; M. de Laforest, of foreign affairs; Dupont de Nemours was made secretary to the government; and the general, Dupont, minister of war. This last appointment, though made because they thought they were sure of the man, was unfortunate; it recalled to the army the disaster of Baylen, the darkest blot on their scutcheon. All these persons belonged, more or less, to the Republican or imperial parties: not a Royalist appeared among them. Therein Talleyrand showed his knowledge of human nature: the former could be gained only by their interests; of the latter he was sure from their affections.*

General adherence to the new government.

Nothing, however, had yet been heard from the army; and although its force, reduced now to fifty thousand men, could not pretend to cope with the colossal mass of a hundred and sixty thousand allies, who, having been brought up from all the detachments in the rear, were now grouped around Paris; yet it had Napoleon at its head, and it was of the highest importance, both to the domestic settlement of France and the general peace of Europe, that its sentiments should as soon as possible be expressed. The world was not long kept in suspense. In the *Moniteur* of April 7, appeared an official correspondence between Prince Schwartzenberg and Marshal Marmont, commencing on the 3d, and which terminated in the adhesion of the marshal to the provisional government on the 4th, on condition that the life and personal freedom of Napoleon should be secured, and a fitting asylum provided for him in some situation designed by the allied powers; and that the French troops, which, in virtue of the present convention, might pass over to the allies, should be provided with secure quarters in Normandy, where they were to retire with their arms, cannon, and baggage. In consequence of this important step, the whole corps of Marmont, twelve thousand strong, immediately entered the allied lines, where they were received with respect mingled with acclamations, and, passing through their files, took up their quarters at Versailles on their route for Normandy.† At the same time, Barclay de Tolly issued a proclamation to the Russian troops, in which he declared that, peace being now restored between France and Russia, all enmity between them and the French inhabitants should forthwith cease, and they should reserve their hostility for the small body of unhappy warriors who still adhered to the fortunes of Napoleon.‡◊

Defection of Marmont.

April 5.

April 4.

prorogued the legislative, and suppressed as criminal a report of that body, thereby contesting its title and share in the national representation; that he has undertaken a series of wars, of his own authority, in violation of the law, which declared that they should be proposed, discussed, and promulgated as laws; that he has illegally issued several decrees declaring the penalty of death, especially those of 3d of March last,* tending to establish as national a war which sprung only from his immediate ambition; that he has violated the laws of the Constitution by his decrees on state prisons; that he has annihilated the responsibility of monarchs, confounded all powers, and destroyed the independence of the judiciary bodies; that he has trampled under foot the liberty of the press by means of a corrupt and enslaved censorship, and made use of that powerful instrument only to deluge France with false maxims, doctrines favourable to despotism, and outrages on foreign governments; that acts and reports of the Senate itself have undergone alteration previous to publication; that, instead of reigning conformably to the interest, happiness, and glory of the French nation, in terms of his oath, Napoleon has put the finishing stroke to the miseries of the country, by refusing to treat with the allies on terms which the national interest required him to accept, and which did not compromise the honour of France; that, by the abuse which he has made of the resources in men and money intrusted to him, he has effected the ruin of the towns, the depopulation of the country, everywhere induced famine and contagious pestilence: considering, in fine, that by all these causes the imperial government *has ceased to exist*, and that the wishes of the French call for a state of things, of which the first result may be the re-establishment of a general peace, and the reunion of France with all the states of the great European family, the Senate declares and decrees as follows: 1. Napoleon Bonaparte is cast down from the throne, and the right of succession in his family is abolished. 2. The French people and army are absolved from their oath of fidelity to him. 3. The present decrees shall be transmitted to the departments and armies, and proclaimed immediately in all the quarters of the capital."—*Moniteur, 5th April*, 1814; and CAPEFIGUE, x., 479, 481.

* *Ante*, x., 329.

* Moniteur, April 4, 1814, and Cap., x., 482.

† "Soldiers! for three months the most glorious successes had crowned your efforts; neither perils, nor fatigues, nor privations, have been able to diminish your zeal or cool your ardour for your country. Your country esteems and thanks you by my mouth, and will never forget what you have done. But the moment has now arrived when the war which you waged has become without end or object; it is the moment when you should repose. You are the soldiers of your country; it is public opinion, therefore, which you are bound to follow, and it desires you to tear yourselves from dangers which are now without an object; to preserve the noble blood which you will know how again to shed should your country again call for your exertions. Good cantonments and my paternal cares will soon, I trust, make you forget the fatigues you have experienced."—MARMONT *to his Corps d'Armeé, 5th April*, 1814, *Moniteur, 7th April*, 1814; and CAPEFIGUE, x., 500.

‡ Moniteur, April 4 and 7, 1814, and Cap., x., 497, 501.

◊ "Soldiers! your perseverance and your valour have delivered the French nation from the yoke of a tyrant, who acted for himself alone, and forgot what he owed to an estimable and generous people. The French nation has declared for us; our cause has become theirs; and our magnanimous monarchs have promised them protection and support. From that moment the French became our friends.

That body, however, was daily becoming more inconsiderable: the fidelity of the Revolution was towards the god of its idolatry—success, and it could not withstand the storms of adverse fortune. Caulaincourt, despatched by Napoleon from the Trois Fontaines of Juvisy to endeavour to reopen a negotiation with the allied powers, had great difficulty in making his way into Paris, as the barriers were in the hands of the allied soldiers, when, by accident, the carriage of the Grand-duke Constantine drove up, who, after much entreaty, agreed to put him in the way of seeing the emperor, though without giving him the slightest reason to hope that any alteration of the determinations already taken would be expected. This was on the evening of the 31st of March. He was introduced into the palace of the Elysée Bourbon at ten at night, but the emperor could not leave the conference of the allied sovereigns at which he assisted. The brilliant lights with which the palace was resplendent; the rapid entry and departure of carriages; the cheers of the Russian guards round the hotel; the prancing and neighing of steeds which drove up to the door; the busy concourse to and fro—reminded him of the days when, in that same palace, Napoleon had with him matured his gigantic plans for the conquest of Russia. What a contrast for the imperial plenipotentiary! Here, worn out with care, devoured with misery, steeped in grief, he awaited, with breathless anxiety, the approach of the Czar, who was to announce the decision of the allied powers on his master's fate. At length, at one in the morning, the emperor appeared, and received him in the kindest manner; but gave him no hopes of any modification of the resolution of the sovereigns. The utmost that he could get him to promise was, that on the day following, at the council, he would revert to the question of a regency; intimating, at the same time, that any farther hope was inadmissible. At four the emperor retired to rest; he reposed in the bed in which Napoleon formerly slept: Caulaincourt threw himself, in the antechamber, on a sofa on which that great man had in old times worked with his secretaries during the day. Unable to sleep, from the recollections with which he was distracted, he arose, and slept for some hours in an arm-chair: when daylight dawned in the morning, he found that it was the very chair on which Napoleon had usually sat, and bore in all parts the deep indentations of his penknife.* The decision of the sovereigns was then announced by Alexander in these words: "Return unto the Emperor Napoleon; tell him faithfully all that has passed here, and as soon as possible come back with an abdication in favour of his son. The Emperor Napoleon shall be suitably treated, I give you my word of honour."†

Caulaincourt's fruitless missions to Alexander.

Caulaincourt arrived with this intelligence at Fontainebleau late on the night of the 2d of April. Napoleon at once refused, in the most peremptory terms, to abdicate in favour of his son, and treated as altogether chimerical the idea of restoring the Bourbons in France; alleging that they were obnoxious to nine tenths of the nation.* Full of the project of resuming hostilities, he mounted on horseback early on the morning of the 3d, and traversed the advanced posts along the whole line. The soldiers, despite their disasters, were full of enthusiasm, and demanded, with loud cries, to be led back to Paris;† and the *young* generals who had their fortunes to make shared the general ardour. But it was not thus with the old generals, or those whose fortunes were made. They surrounded Caulaincourt, eagerly demanding what had been done at Paris; listened with undisguised complacency to the proceedings of the Senate; and it was evident, from their doubts and hesitations, either that they regarded the cause of the Revolution as hopeless, or that they had profited so much by its excesses, that they were disposed to risk nothing more in its defence. The marshals were nearly unanimous on the subject; Ney, in particular, was peculiarly vehement upon the impossibility of farther maintaining the contest, and the absurdity of their sacrificing everything for one man.‡ Orders were, nevertheless, given over night for the troops to prepare for a forward movement; and measures were adopted for transferring the headquarters next day to Essonne, on the road to Paris. But during the night news arrived of the dethronement of

Napoleon agrees to abdicate in favour of his son. April 4.

Let your arms destroy the inconsiderable band of unfortunate men who still adhere to the ambitious Napoleon; but let the cultivators and the peaceable inhabitants of towns be treated with consideration and friendship, like allies united by the same interests." — *Ordre du Jour, par le* COMTE BARCLAY DE TOLLY, *Paris, 4th April*, 1814, *Moniteur of 5th.*

* *Ante*, iv., 100.

† Caul., i., 363, 380; and ii., 1, 19. Cap., x., 491, 493. Fain, 218, 219.

* "Re-establish the Bourbons in France! The madmen! They would not be there a year; they are an object of antipathy to nine tenths of the nation. And how would the army, whose chiefs have combated the emigrants—how would they bear the change? No, no; my soldiers will never be theirs: it is the height of folly to think of founding an empire of such heterogeneous materials as theirs of necessity would be composed of. Can it ever be forgotten that they have lived twenty years on the charity of the stranger, in open war with the principles and interests of France? The Bourbons in France! It is absolute madness, and will bring down on the country a host of calamities. I was a new man, free of the blood which had stained the Revolution: I had nothing to avenge, everything to reconstruct; but even I would never have ventured to seat myself on the vacant throne, had not my forehead been crowned with laurels. The French nation had not raised me on their bucklers, but because I have executed great and glorious deeds for it. But the Bourbons, what have they done for France? What part can they claim in its conquests, its glory, its prosperity? Re-established by the stranger, they must yield everything to their masters; they must bend the knee to them at every turn. They may take advantage of the stupor occasioned by the occupation of the capital to proscribe me and my family; but to make the Bourbons reign in France!—never!"—CAULAINCOURT, ii., 48, 50.

† "Soldiers!" said he, "the enemy has gained some marches upon us, and outstripped us at Paris. Some factious men, the emigrants whom I have pardoned, have mounted the white cockade, and surrounded the Emperor Alexander, and they would compel us to wear it. Since the Revolution, France has always been mistress of herself. I offered peace to the allies, leaving France in its ancient limits, but they would not accept it. In a few days I will attack the enemy; I will force him to quit our capital. I rely on you—am I right? (Yes, yes.) Our cockade is tricolour; before abandoning it, we will all perish on the soil of France. (Hurrah! yes, yes.)"—CAPEFIGUE, x., 496.

‡ "Ney, in an especial manner, made himself remarkable by the vehemence of his expressions, as he had always done since Moscow. 'Are we,' said he, 'to sacrifice everything to one man? Fortune, rank, honours, life itself? It is time to think a little of ourselves, our families, and our interests.' Caulaincourt warmly supported the plan of a regency, thinking it was all that could be done for Napoleon." —CAPEFIGUE, x., 492.

the emperor by the Senate; it spread immediately through the army, and produced a great impression, especially on the marshals and older generals; the orders to advance to Paris were not recalled, but it was evident that they were not to be obeyed; and at noon a conference of the emperor with Berthier, Ney, Lefebvre, Oudinot, Macdonald, Maret, Caulaincourt, and Bertrand, took place, at the close of which Napoleon signed his abdication in favour of his son, and of the empress as regent. Macdonald and Ney were forthwith despatched with Caulaincourt to present this conditional abdication to the allied sovereigns.*†

Napoleon's proclamation against Marmont and the Senate.

While the three plenipotentiaries of Napoleon were on their way to Paris, the march of events at Fontainebleau was so rapid as almost to outstrip imagination. During the night of the 4th, intelligence arrived of the adhesion of Marmont to the provisional government, and the entrance of his *corps d'armée* within the allied lines. At this news the indignation of the emperor knew no bounds, and its vehemence found vent in an order of the day next morning. "The emperor," said he, "thanks the army for the attachment which it has manifested towards him, and chiefly because it has recognised the great principle that France is to be found in him, and not in the people of the capital. The soldier follows the fortune and the misfortune of his general; his honour is his religion. The Duke of Ragusa has not inspired his companions in arms with that sentiment: he has passed over to the allies. The emperor cannot approve the condition on which he has taken that step; he cannot accept life and liberty at the mercy of a subject. The Senate has allowed itself to dispose of the government of France; it forgets that it owes to the emperor the power which it has now abused; that it was he who saved a part of its members from the storms of the Revolution, drew it from obscurity, and protected it against the hatred of the nation. The Senate founds on the articles of the Constitution to overturn it, without adverting to the fact that, as the first branch of the state, it took part in those very acts. A sign from me was an order for the Senate, which always did more than was desired of it. The Senate does not blush to speak of the libels the emperor has published against foreign nations; it forgets that they were drawn up by itself. As long as fortune was faithful to their sovereign, these men were faithful, and not a whisper was heard against the abuses of power. If the emperor despised them, as they now reproach him with having done, the world will see whether or not he had reasons for his opinion. He held his dignity from God and the nation; they alone could deprive him of it. He always considered it as a burden; and when he accepted it, it was in the conviction that he alone was able to bear its weight. The happiness of France appeared to be indissolubly wound up with the fortunes of the emperor: now that fortune has decided against him, the will of the nation alone can persuade him to remain on the throne. If he is really the only obstacle to peace, he willingly gives himself up the last sacrifice to France."*

When Caulaincourt and Macdonald arrived at Paris, however, they found that matters had proceeded too far to render the proposition of a regency admissible. In fact, though the Emperor Alexander secretly inclined to that course, and Austria, as might have been expected, was ready to support it; yet the declaration against Napoleon, and the manifestations in favour of the Bourbons, had been so vehement and unanimous from all incorporated bodies and all classes of society, that to establish the family of Napoleon now on the throne would appear to be doing a violence to the national will. Nor did it escape observation, that the recognition of Marie Louise as regent, and the young Napoleon as heir, would, in fact, be a continuation of the Revolutionary régime, attended with all its passions, its ambitions, and its dangers; and that the exclusion of Napoleon personally would be but a name, as long as his family sat upon the throne, and the imperial authorities continued the government.† Influenced by these considerations, the allied powers unanimously agreed that the sentence of dethronement pronounced by the Senate could not be disturbed, and that they must adhere faithfully to their declaration that they would not negotiate with Napoleon or any of his family. Caulaincourt and Macdonald exerted themselves to the utmost in the emperor's behalf; but it was in vain, and Alexander announced the final decision, in the mournful words, "It is too late." Ney was more flexible: feeble and irresolute in political life, as much as he was bold and undaunted in the field of battle, he was easily gained over to the party of Talleyrand; and next morning his formal adhesion to the provisional government appeared in the columns of the *Moniteur*.‡§

The mission of Caulaincourt to establish a regency fails.

In truth, during the four days which had

* Fain, 218, 221. Caul., ii., 28, 37. Cap., x., 492, 493.

† "The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to quit France, and even life itself, for the good of the country, insoparable from the rights of his son, of the regency of the empress, and of the maintenance of the laws of the Empire.—*Fontainebleau, April* 4, 1814."—FAIN, 221.

* Fain, 225, 227. Cap., x., 505.

† "A regency with the empress and her son," said the Emperor Alexander, "sounds well, I admit; but Napoleon remains: there is the difficulty. In vain will he promise to remain quiet in the retreat which will be assigned to him. You know even better than I his devouring activity, his ambition. Some fine morning he will put himself at the head of the regency, or in its place: then the war will recommence, and all Europe will be on fire. The very dread of such an occurrence will oblige the allies to keep their armies on foot, and thus frustrate all their intentions in making peace."—THIBAUDEAU, x., 15.

‡ Thib., x., 21. Fain, ii., 228, 230. Cap., x., 508, 509. Caul., ii., 51, 57. Lond., 311.

§ "Yesterday I came to Paris with the Duke of Vicenza and the Duke of Tarentum, furnished with full powers from the Emperor Napoleon to defend the interests of his dynasty on the throne. An unforeseen event having broken off the negotiations when they promised the happiest results, I saw that, to avoid a civil war to our beloved country, no course remained but to embrace the cause of our ancient kings; and, penetrated with that sentiment, I repaired that evening to the Emperor Napoleon to declare to him the wish of the French nation. The emperor, aware of the critical situation to which he has reduced France, and of the impossibility of his saving it himself, appeared to resign himself to his fate, and has consented to an absolute resignation, without any restriction.—LE MARECHAL NEY. *Fontainebleau, 5th April*, 1814, *half past eleven at night.*"—*Moniteur, April* 7.

The cause of the restoration had become irresistible at Paris.

elapsed since the first declaration of the allies that they would not treat with Napoleon or any of his family, the cause of the Bourbons had been gained. The voice in their favour, which at first had emanated merely from the enthusiastic lips of a few devoted adherents, whose fidelity had survived all the storms of the Revolution, had now swelled into a mighty shout, so as to include not only the whole influential bodies, but nearly all the population of the capital. It was neither any chivalrous feeling of loyalty, nor any abstract repentance for the crimes of the Revolution: *deliverance from evil* was the prevailing feeling of the multitude—preservation of their fortunes the ruling passion with the great. Even on the first day of the allies' arrival, a crowd of persons, flying with characteristic vehemence from one extreme to another, had grossly insulted the busts and monuments of the emperor, and a rope was slung up to the very top of the pillar in the Place Vendôme, with which they strove to pull it down; but the solidity of the fabric resisted all their efforts. When they could not succeed in throwing it down, the mob next covered the statue with a white sheet, so as to withdraw it from the view. "They did well," said Napoleon, "to conceal from me the sight of their baseness." By a decree

April 5. of the Senate, on April 5, all the emblems and initials belonging to the imperial dynasty were ordered to be effaced from all the public edifices and monuments in Paris; workmen were immediately engaged to carry this decree into execution, and their ingenuity generally contrived to turn the N into an H, for Henri IV., as quickly as the nation turned from the imperial to the royal dynasty. So great was the violence of public feeling against the monuments of the late emperor, that Alexan-

April 7. der, to prevent their total destruction, was obliged to issue a decree, taking them, and in an especial manner the pillar in the Place Vendôme, under his peculiar protection.*†

Such was the rise in the public funds on the prospect of a termination of the war, that the five *per cents.*, which, on the 30th of March, were at 45, had risen, in the next five days, 25 *per cent.*, so as to be quoted on the 5th of April at 70. Universal transports, similar to those which prevailed in England at the restoration, seized upon the public mind; it was like the joy of a shipwrecked mariner when he first beholds a friendly sail in the desolate main. In the midst of the general rapture, Chateaubriand's celebrated pamphlet, "*De Buonaparte et des Bourbons*," appeared, and contributed, in the most powerful manner, to give a practical direction to general feeling, by pointing out with fervent, though exaggerated eloquence, the origin of the public evils, and the only mode of escape which yet remained open to them. Whatever might be said of the violence of this production, of which thirty thousand copies were sold in a few days, no reproach could be cast upon the consistency of the author; for he had refused office under Napoleon on the death of the Duke d'Enghien, and braved his resentment in the plenitude of his power.* When Alexander and the King of Prussia appeared at the opera on the 3d of April, thunders of applause shook that splendid edifice. Every allusion to passing events was seized with avidity and encored with rapture: the splendid melodrame, the Triumph of Trajan, was brought forth with unequalled magnificence, and had a run of unprecedented success; and a couplet, the production of a very liberal writer, was sung and rapturously encored, which savoured rather of the servility of an Oriental despotism than of a nation which had so strenuously contested for liberty and equality.††

Increasing favour in favour of the Bourbons.

When the plenipotentiaries of Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau with this decided refusal, he burst out into a violent explosion of passion: declared that it was too much; that he would put himself at the head of his armies, and rather run the hazard of any calamities than submit to a humiliation worse than them all. He called for his generals and maps; talked of retiring to the Loire, and spoke of the resources which still remained to him in the armies of Soult and Suchet. But during the night he received the most decisive proof of the universal defection of his generals. All, with the exception of a few young, generous, and ardent men, represented the continuance of the war as impossible; and, in fact, during the five days which had elapsed since the battle of Paris, the allied forces had so accumulated both on his front and flanks, that retreat even had become out of the question. Still the iron soul of Napoleon refused to yield, and it was only after several painful altercations between him and his marshals that, with an agitated hand, and in almost illegible characters, he wrote and signed the absolute and unqualified resignation of the throne. "Observe," said he, when he affixed his signature, "it is with a conquering enemy that I treat, and not with the provisional government, in whom I see nothing but a set of factious traitors."◊‖

Napoleon's final and unconditional resignation.

* Moniteur, April 5 and 7, 1814. Cap., x., 492.

† "The monument on the Place Vendôme is under the especial safeguard of the magnanimity of the Emperor Alexander and his allies. The statue on its summit will not remain there; it will immediately be taken down, and give place to one of Peace."—*Proclamation, 7th April, 1814, Moniteur.*

* *Ante*, ii., 229.

† Cap., x., 508, 509. Personal observation. Thib., ix., 653, 655. Montg., vii., 418, 419.

‡ The following couplets were added to the air of Henry IV., and sung at all the theatres amid unbounded applause:

"Vive Alexandre,
Vie à Roi des Rois;
Sans nous donner des lois,
Ce prince auguste,
A le triple renom
De heros, de juste;
Et nous rendre un Bourbon.

Vive Guillaume,
Et ces guerriers vaillans;
De ce royaume,
Il sauve les enfans,
Par sa victoire,
Et nous donne la paix;
Et compte la gloire,
Par ses nombreux bienfaits."

◊ Moniteur, April 12, 1814. Cap., x., 515. Fain, 231, 232. Caul., ii., 62, 68, 95.

‖ "The allied powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of a general peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he renounces, for himself and his

Universal and base defection from Napoleon.

And now commenced at Fontainebleau a scene of baseness never exceeded in any age of the world, and which forms an instructive commentary on the principles and practice of the Revolution. Let an eyewitness of these hideous tergiversations record them; they would pass for incredible if drawn from any less exceptionable source. "Every hour,"* says Caulaincourt, "was after this marked by fresh voids in the emperor's household. The universal object was how to get first to Paris. All the persons in office quitted their post without leave or asking permission; one after another they all slipped away, totally forgetting him to whom they owed everything, but who had no longer anything to give. The universal complaint was, that his formal abdication was so long of appearing. 'It was high time,' it was said by every one, 'for all this to come to an end; it is absolute childishness to remain any longer in the antechambers of Fontainebleau, when favours are showering down at Paris;' and with that they all set off for the capital. Such was their anxiety to hear of his abdication, that they pursued misfortune even into its last asylum; and every time the door of the emperor's cabinet opened, a crowd of heads was seen peeping in to gain the first hint of the much-longed-for news." No sooner was the abdication and the treaty with the allies signed than the desertion was universal; every person of note around the emperor, with the single and honourable exceptions of Maret and Caulaincourt, abandoned him: the antechambers of the palace were literally deserted. Berthier even left his benefactor without bidding him adieu! "He was born a courtier," said Napoleon, when he learned his departure: "you will see my vice-constable mendicating employment from the Bourbons. I feel mortified that men whom I have raised so high in the eyes of Europe should sink so low. What have they made of that halo of glory through which they have hitherto been seen by the stranger? What must the sovereigns think of such a termination to all the illustrations of my reign!"†

Treaty between Napoleon and the allied powers.

Nothing remained now but to conclude the formal treaty between Napoleon and the allied powers, and it was signed on the 11th of April. By it, Napoleon renounced the empire of France and the kingdom of Italy for himself and his descendants; but he was to retain the title of emperor, and his mother, brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces, those of princes and princesses of his family. The island of Elba having been selected by him as his place of residence, it was erected into a principality in his favour: the duchy of Parma and Placentia was secured to the Empress Marie Louise and the prince her son in full sovereignty; two millions five hundred thousand francs (£100,000) a year was provided for the annual income of the Emperor Napoleon, to be reserved from the revenue of the countries he ceded, and two millions more inscribed on the great book of France, and to descend after his decease to his heirs, the first being a provision for himself, the second for his family; the Empress Josephine was to receive a million of francs yearly (£40,000) from the great book of France. All the movable estate of the princes and princesses of the emperor's family was to remain with themselves; but the furniture of the palace and diamonds of the crown were to remain to France. Fifteen hundred of the Old Guard were to escort the emperor to his place of embarcation; and he was to be at liberty to take with him four hundred soldiers to form his bodyguard. Finally, the Poles in the service of France were to be at liberty to return to their own country, with their arms and baggage. The treaty bore the signatures of Caulaincourt, Macdonald, Ney, Metternich, Nesselrode, and Hardenberg. To this treaty Lord Castlereagh, on the part of England, acceded, "but only to be binding upon his Britannic majesty with respect to his own acts, but not with respect to the acts of third parties."*†

Abortive attempt of Napoleon to poison himself.

A terrible catastrophe had wellnigh terminated at this period the life and the sufferings of Napoleon. His departure for Elba had been fixed for the 20th of April; and in the interim, while he was totally deserted by all but a few domestics and his faithful Guards, it became evident to those around him that some absorbing idea had taken possession of his mind. He recurred constantly to the last moments of departed greatness; his conversation to his intimate friends was entirely upon the illustrious men of antiquity, who, in circumstances similar to his own, had fallen by their own hand; in the close of his career, as in its outset, he dwelt on the heroes of Plutarch, and their resolution not to survive misfortune. The apprehensions of his attendants were increased when they learned that on the 12th, the day after the signature of the treaty, he had directed the Empress Marie Louise, who was on her way from Blois to join him, to delay the execution of her design. On taking leave of Caulaincourt that night, after a mournful revery, he said, "My resolution is taken: we must end: I feel it." Caulaincourt had not been many hours in bed when he was suddenly roused by Constant, the emperor's valet, who entreated him to come instantly, for Napoleon was in convulsions, and

heirs, the throne of France and Italy; and that there is no personal sacrifice, not even that of life itself, which he is not willing to make for the interests of France.—*Fontainebleau, April* 6, 1814."—*Moniteur, April* 12, 1814; and CAPEFIGUE, x., 515.

* Caul., ii., 68, 69, 99, 111. Fain, 233, 235. Cap., x., 317, 318.

† In the general scramble, Constant, the emperor's private valet, who had served him faithfully for fourteen years, took the opportunity to secrete one hundred thousand francs with which he had been intrusted, and which he buried in the forest of Fontainebleau. The fraud was detected the night before the emperor set out for Elba, and the money given up by Constant from the place where he had secreted it. He set off immediately for Paris, accompanied by Rustan the Mameluke, who had been the emperor's constant companion ever since he returned from Egypt. What is very remarkable, Constant details all these facts himself, giving them, of course, the best colouring he could.—See CONSTANT'S *Memoirs*, vi., 101, 112, and FAIN, ii., 150.

* See the Treaty in Martens, Sup., i., 696, 700; and Cap., x., 518, 519.

† Lord Castlereagh's objections to the treaty were twofold. 1st. That it recognised the title of Napoleon as Emperor of France, which England had never yet done, directly or indirectly. 2d. That it assigned him a residence, in independent sovereignty, close to the Italian coast, and within a few days' sail of France, while the fires of the revolutionary volcano were yet unextinguished in both countries. The result proved that he had judged rightly.—See BEAUCHAMP, ii., 364.

fast dying. He instantly ran in: Bertrand and Maret were already there; but nothing was to be heard but stifled groans from the bed of Napoleon. Soon, however, his domestic surgeon, Ivan, who had so long attended him in his campaigns, appeared in the utmost consternation, and stated that he had been seen, shortly after going to bed, to rise quietly, pour a liquid into a glass, and lie down again; and Ivan had recognised in the vial, which was left on the table, a subtle poison, a preparation of opium and other deadly substances, which he had given him during the Moscow retreat, at his desire, and which, as long as the danger lasted, he had constantly worn round his neck. When Caulaincourt seized his hand, it was already cold. "Caulaincourt," said he, opening his eyes, "I am about to die. I recommend to you my wife and my son—defend my memory. I could no longer endure life. The desertion of my old companions in arms had broken my heart." The poison, however, either from having been so long kept, or some other cause, had lost its original efficacy; violent vomiting gave him relief; he was with great difficulty prevailed on to drink warm water; and, after a mortal agony of two hours, the spasms gradually subsided, and he fell asleep. "Ivan," said he, on awaking, "the dose was not strong enough—God did not will it;" and he rose, pale and haggard, but composed, and seemed now to resign himself with equanimity to his future fate.*

Universal desertion of the empress, and dispersion of Napoleon's family.

Meanwhile, the imperial court at Blois, where the Empress Marie Louise and the King of Rome had been since the taking of Paris, was the scene of selfishness more marked, desertions more shameless, than even the saloons of Fontainebleau. Unrestrained by the awful presence of the emperor, the egotism and cupidity of the courtiers there appeared in hideous nakedness, and the fumes of the Revolution expired amid the universal baseness of its followers. No sooner was the abdication of the emperor known, than all her court deserted the empress; it was a general race who should get first to Paris to share in the favours of the new dynasty. Such was the desertion, that, in getting into her carriage, on the 9th of April, at Blois, to take the road to Orleans, no one remained to hand the empress in but her chamberlain. The empress, the King of Rome, were forgotten; the grand object of all was to get away, and to carry with them as much as possible of the public treasure, which had been brought from Paris with the government. In a few days it had all disappeared. At Orleans, the remaining members of Napoleon's family also departed: Madame Mere and her brother, the Cardinal Fesch, set out for Rome; Prince Louis, the ex-king of Holland, for Switzerland; Joseph and Jerome soon after followed in the same direction. The empress at first declared her resolution to join Napoleon, maintaining that there was her post, and that she would share his fortunes in adversity, as she had done in prosperity. The wretched sycophants, however, who were still about her person, spared no pains to alienate her from the emperor; they represented that he had espoused her only from policy; that she had never possessed his affections; that during the short period they had been married he had had a dozen mistresses,* and that she could now expect nothing but reproaches and bad usage from him. Overcome partly by these insinuations, and partly by her own facility of character and habits of submission, she, too, followed the general example; her French guards were dismissed, and replaced by Cossacks; she took the road from Orleans to Rambouilhet, where she was visited successively by the emperor her father and the Emperor Alexander; and at length she yielded to their united entreaties, and agreed to abandon Napoleon. A few days after she set out for Vienna, taking the King of Rome with her, and neither ever saw Napoleon more.† April 18 and 23.

Amidst the general and humiliating scene of baseness which disgraced the French functionaries at the fall of Napoleon, it is consolatory for the honour of human nature to have some instances of a contrary character to recount. Carnot remained faithful at his post at Antwerp, till the abdication of Napoleon was officially intimated; and then he announced his adhesion to the new government in an order of the day to the garrison, in which he concluded with the memorable words, which comprise so much of a soldier's duty, "The armed force is essentially obedient; it acts, but never deliberates." Soult was one of the last to give in; his adhesion is dated Castelnaudary, April 19, nine days after the battle of Toulouse,‡ and when, in reality, there was no alternative, as the whole nation had unequivocally declared itself. Of the few who remained faithful to the emperor at Fontainebleau, it is impossible to speak in terms of too high admiration. Caulaincourt, after having nobly discharged to the very last his duties to his old master, at his earnest request returned to Paris, a few days before he departed for Elba, and bore with him an autograph letter from Napoleon to Louis XVIII., in which he strongly recommended him to his service. The emperor obviously thought, and justly, that his presence there was indispensable to watch over the performance of the treaty of Fontainebleau. General Bertrand, Generals Drouot and Cambronne, Maret, General Belliard, Baron Fain, General Gorgaud, Colonel Anatole, Montesquieu, Baron de la Place, Generals Kosakowski and Vonsowitch, remained with him to the last at Fontainebleau; and Bertrand shared his exile as well at Elba as at St. Helena. Macdonald, though the last of his marshals to be taken into favour, was faithful

Honourable fidelity of a few at Fontainebleau. April 15.

* Caul., ii., 85, 89. Fain, 241, 243. Constant, vi., 85, 90.

* There was too much foundation for this scandal. Though women had no lasting power over Napoleon, and never in the slightest degree influenced his conduct, he was extremely amorous in his disposition so far as the senses were concerned; and his infidelities, though carefully conducted, to avoid observation, were very frequent, both before and after his marriage with Marie Louise. Two instances, in particular, are mentioned by Constant, which occurred at St. Cloud recently before this period; and, what was very remarkable, both the ladies, one of whom was of rank, came to visit him at Fontainebleau during the mournful scenes which passed, though neither saw him on that occasion. Both afterward visited him at Elba.—CONSTANT'S *Mémoires de* NAPOLEON, vi., 92–97.

† Sav., vii., 115, 119, 156, 157. Thib., x., 33, 34.

‡ "Essentially obedient, the army has nothing now to do but to conform to the will of the nation."—SOULT'S *Proclamation, Castelnaudary, 19th of April*, 1814, *Moniteur of 24th April*; and BEAUCHAMP, ii., 501.

to his duty; he did not forget his word, pledged on the field of Wagram.* Napoleon was so sensible of his fidelity, that, on the morning when he brought him the ratification of the treaty of Fontainebleau to sign, he publicly thanked him for his affectionate zeal, and lamented the coldness which had at one period estranged them from each other. "At least," said the emperor, "you will not refuse one souvenir—it is the sabre of Mourad-Bey, which I have often worn in battle; keep it for my sake. Return to Paris, and serve the Bourbons as faithfully as you have served me." Amid the general and hideous defection of the other marshals,† it is refreshing to find one man who preserved unscathed, amid the revolutionary furnace, the honour and fidelity of his Scottish ancestors, which had so long bound the Highlanders, more steadily even in adverse than prosperous fortune, to the house of Stuart.‡

The last scene of this mighty drama was not unworthy the dignity of those which had preceded it. When the day for setting out drew nigh, Napoleon in the first instance refused to move, and even threatened to renew the war, alleging that the allied powers had broken the compact with him, by not permitting the Empress Marie Louise and his son to accompany him. Upon the solemn assurance of General Koller, the Austrian commissioner, that the absence of the empress was of her own free-will, he agreed to take his leave. The preparations for the emperor's departure having been completed, and the four commissioners, on the part of the allied sovereigns, who were to accompany him, been appointed, viz., General Koller on the part of Austria, General Schouvaloff on that of Russia, Colonel Campbell on that of England, and Count Waldbourg-Truches on behalf of Prussia, the emperor at noonday descended the great stair of the palace of Fontainebleau, and, after passing the array of carriages which awaited him at the door, advanced into the middle of the Old Guard, which stood drawn up to receive him. Amid breathless silence and tearful eyes, he thus addressed them: "Soldiers of my Old Guard, I bid you adieu! During twenty years I have ever found you in the path of honour and of glory. In the last days, as in those of our prosperity, you have never ceased to be models of bravery and fidelity. With such men as you, our cause could never be lost; but the war was interminable: it would have become a civil war, and France must daily have become more unhappy. I have, therefore, sacrificed all our interests to those of our country: I depart; but you remain to serve France. Its happiness was my only thought; it will always be the object of my wishes. Lament not my lot: if I have consented to survive myself, it was because I might contribute to your glory. I am about to write the great deeds we have done together. Adieu, my children! I would I could press you all to my heart; but I will, at least, press your eagle." At these words, General Petit advanced with the eagle; Napoleon received the general in his arms, and kissed the standard. His emotion now almost overcame him; but making a great effort, he regained his firmness, and said, "Adieu, once again, my old companions! May this last embrace penetrate your hearts!" With these words he tore himself from the embraces of those around him, and threw himself into his carriage, which immediately drove off amid the sobs and tears of his faithful Guard, all of whom had petitioned to be allowed to accompany him. Certainly never was a great career more nobly terminated.*

The emperor's last speech at Fontainebleau. April 20.

Napoleon ere long, however, received convincing evidence that, how ardent soever might be the attachment of his soldiers, the population of all France was far from sharing the same sentiments. On the road to Lyons, indeed, he was received always with respect, generally with acclamations; but after passing that city, which he traversed on the night of the 23d, he began to experience the fickleness of mankind, and received bitter proofs of the baseness of human nature, as well as the general indignation which his oppressive government had produced. At noon on the following day, he accidentally met Augereau on the road near Valence: both alighted from their carriages, and ignorant of the atrocious proclamation, in which that marshal had so recently announced his conversion to the cause of the Bourbons, the emperor embraced him, and they walked together on the road for a quarter of an hour, in the most amicable manner. It was observed, however, that Augereau kept his helmet on his head as he walked along. A few minutes after, the emperor entered Valence, and beheld the proclamation placarded on the walls: he then saw what recollection his lieutenant had retained of the days of Castiglione. The troops were drawn out to receive him, and they saluted the emperor as he passed; but they all bore the white cockade. At Orange loud cries of "Vive le Roi!" were heard, and at Avignon he found his statues overturned, and the public effervescence against his government assuming the most menacing character.‡

Napoleon's journey to Frejus, and dangers which he ran.

As Napoleon continued his journey to the south, the tumult became so excessive that his life was more than once in imminent danger from the fury of the populace. At Orgon he was with difficulty extricated, and chiefly by the firmness and intrepidity of Colonel Campbell and the other allied commissioners, who acted with equal courage and judgment, from a violent death; and at the inn of La Calade, near Saint Cannat, a furious mob surrounded the house for some hours, demanding his head, and it was only by getting out by a back window, and riding the next post in disguise, with the

His narrow escape at Orgon and Saint Cannat.

* *Ante*, iii., 255.

† Augereau, at Valence, on the Rhone, thus addressed his soldiers: "Soldiers! The Senate, the just interpreter of the national will, worn out with the despotism of Bonaparte, has pronounced, on the 2d of April, the dethronement of him and his family. A new dynasty, strong and liberal, descended from our ancient kings, will replace Bonaparte and his despotism. Soldiers! you are absolved from your oaths; you are so by the nation, in which the sovereignty resides: you are still more so, were it necessary, by the abdication of a man who, after having sacrificed millions to his cruel ambition, has not known how to die as a soldier.—AUGEREAU, 16*th April*."—*Moniteur*, 23*d April*, 1814.

‡ Mém. sur Carnot, 280. Thib., x., 27, 29. Moniteur, April 21. Caul., ii., 114, 165.

* Fain, 250, 252. Thib., x., 46, 47.

† Thib., x., 45, 47. Sir Neil Campbell's MS. Cap., i., 31, 32. Bour., x., 227, 230.

white cockade on his breast, as a courier, that he escaped. Such was the mortification which Napoleon felt at this cruel reception from the people whom he had so long governed, that when the allied commissioners came up to the posthouse they found him in a back room, with his elbows on his knees and his hands on his forehead, in profound affliction. Relays were provided outside the walls at Aix, to avoid the dangers of entering the city; he was clothed in the Austrian uniform, which he wore during the remainder of his journey; and the under-prefect, Dupeloux, a man of courage and honour, escorted him in person on horseback as far as the limits of his department. At Luc Napoleon met and had an affecting interview with Pauline, who, amid all her vanities, had some elevated points of character; on the 27th he reached Frejus; and on the 28th, at eight at night, set sail for Elba, on board the English frigate, *The Undaunted*, sent there to receive him. Thus, in its last stage, a British vessel bore Cæsar and his fortunes. He was received by Captain Usher, who commanded that vessel, agreeably to the orders of government, with the honours due to a crowned head; a royal salute was fired as he stepped on board, the yards were manned, and every possible respect was shown to him, from the captain to the humblest cabin-boy. Such was the impression produced by this reception from his enemies, so different from that of his own subjects which he had recently experienced, that he burst into tears. During the voyage he was cheerful and affable; conversed much with Captain Usher and the other officers on board, and was particularly inquisitive concerning the details of the English naval discipline, the object, he said, of his long admiration. A slight shade of melancholy was observed to pass over his countenance while the vessel was in sight of the maritime Alps, the scene of his early triumphs; but he soon regained his usual serenity, and had, with his wonderful ascendency over mankind, made great progress in the affections of the crew, when the vessel cast anchor in Porto Ferrajo, the capital of Elba.*

Death of Josephine.

Josephine did not long survive the fall of the hero, with whose marvellous fortunes her own seemed in a mysterious manner to be linked. In her retreat at Navarre, she had wept in secret the declining fortune and tarnished glory of the husband who had elevated her to the pinnacle of worldly grandeur, and whose star had visibly become obscured from the moment that he divorced her from his side. Alexander was desirous to see and console her amid her misfortunes, and promise his powerful protection to her children. At his request she came to Malmaison, the much-loved scene of the early and romantic attachment of Napoleon, and there the emperor saw her frequently, and gave her those assurances in the most unreserved manner. In the midst of these cares, however, she was suddenly taken ill of a putrid sore throat, which proved fatal at the end of a few days. The Emperor Alexander was with her almost to the last, and soothed her deathbed by reiterated assurances of protection to her children.

May 28.

And well and faithfully did he keep his promise. When some delay took place in making out the letters-patent, erecting the forests around Saint Leu into an appanage in favour of the second son of Queen Hortense, her grandson, as had been stipulated in the treaty of Paris, he declared that his guards should not leave Paris till it was signed, which was accordingly done; and in the following year he took Prince Eugene's interests under his especial protection at the Congress of Vienna, and was mainly instrumental in there putting them on a proper footing. The friendship thus contracted between the viceroy and the Czar led to a prolongation of the intimacy in the next generation; and by a remarkable revolution in the wheel of fortune, Eugene Beauharnois's son, the Duke of Leuchtenberg, espoused in subsequent times one of the grand-duchesses, a daughter of the Emperor Nicholas; so that it is not altogether beyond the bounds of possibility that a lineal descendant of Josephine, and a descendant by marriage of Napoleon, may one day mount the throne of Russia.*

Character of the Emperor Alexander.

ALEXANDER, emperor of Russia, who took so prominent a part in these memorable events, is one of the sovereigns of modern times who has left the greatest name in history, and who has impressed his signet deepest on the records of European fame. The vast extension which the Russian Empire has received under his rule, the burning of Moscow, and dreadful overthrow of the French army in 1812; the deliverance of Germany, and fall of Napoleon, have conspired to give a character of awful and yet entrancing interest to his reign, to which there is perhaps nothing comparable in the whole annals of mankind. He was born in 1777, and ascended the throne on the murder of the Emperor Paul in 1800, so that he was at this period only thirty-seven years of age. His character, naturally amiable and benevolent, had been moulded by the precepts of his enlightened, though speculative and visionary, Swiss preceptor, La Harpe; but the ideas of that distinguished philanthropist were formed upon the dreams of the closet rather than a practical acquaintance with men, and this defect strongly appeared when Alexander was first called to act in the great theatre of public life. His early measures were all beneficent in their tendency, and bespoke a warm and susceptible heart; but he was not at first a match for the talent and the wickedness of the Revolution; and he yielded at Tilsit, less to the force of the French arms, than the irresistible ascendant and magic sway of the great Enchanter who wielded these powers.

He became great in misfortune.

But if he was born good, he became great. He learned wisdom and gathered strength in the school of misfortune. If he had yielded at first, perhaps, too easily to the fascination of Napoleon's genius, no one ever surpassed him in the firmness with which, when again driven to arms, he resisted his aggression, or the tenacity with which he followed up the contest, till he had hurled his enemy from the throne. His early friendship for Napoleon was an affair of the heart; and he who has surrendered his heart,

* Thib., x., 47, 48. Sir Neil Campbell's MS. Cap., Cent Jours, i., 32, 33. Lab., ii., 452, 453. Journal du Comte Valdbourg, 27. Bour., x., 227, 235.

* Thib., x., 115, 117. Beauch., iii., 37, 42. Bour., x., 212, 216.

and been deceived, will be deceived no more. But for his firmness and resolution, the coalition would repeatedly have fallen to pieces; from the day Napoleon crossed the Niemen, he clearly saw that peace with him was impossible; with Roman magnanimity, he held the same language when his empire was reeking with the slaughter of Borodino, and his star seemed to pale before the conflagration of Moscow, as when, on the heights of Chaumont, he gave law to a conquered world. And if few conquerors have surpassed him in the lustre of his victories or the magnitude of his conquests, none have equalled him in the magnanimous use which he made of his power, and the surpassing clemency with which in the moment of triumph he restrained the uplifted arm of justice.

His private character and disposition.

In private life his conduct was less irreproachable. Unhappy circumstances had early produced an estrangement between him and the empress, who spent the latter years of his reign at Rome; and this at once deprived the Empire of the hope of a direct succession to the throne, and threw the emperor into the usual temptations of female fascination. He had frequent *liaisons*, accordingly, but they partook of the benevolent and tender character of his mind, and were wholly unattended by open licentiousness or indecorum. He was fond of praise, and often led into extremes by that weakness; but it was the praise only of generous or noble deeds which he coveted. His figure was majestic, his countenance serene, his air mild, but such as at once bespoke the sovereign. No one possessed personal courage in a higher degree, or more passionately desired the honours of war; but still a sense of duty to Europe led him to forego the command, which he might have obtained, of the allied armies in Germany in 1813. His manners were polished and fascinating in the highest degree, his tastes refined and elegant, and his information surprising, considering the incessant avocations which the management of such weighty concerns required. Though passionately fond of accomplished female society, he was deeply impressed with the responsibility of his situation at the head of such an empire, and ever ready to forego its charms, and abandon all the luxuries of his court, to execute justice or stimulate improvement in the remotest parts of his dominions. A profound master, like most of his nation, of dissimulation, he was yet jealous of his personal honour; and whatever he promised on his word might with confidence be relied on, how much soever he thought himself entitled to elude the wiles of inferior diplomatists.

His ambition and character as a sovereign.

He was ambitious; but his thirst for acquisition of territory was so blended with a desire for, and generally followed by an increase of, the happiness of mankind, that it could hardly be called a fault. Deeply impressed with religious feelings, those noble sentiments breathed forth in all his addresses to his people and army throughout the whole course of the war, and influenced his conduct to the latest hour of his life. He regarded himself as an instrument in the hand of the Almighty for the destruction of the Revolution and the improvement of mankind, and acted through life sometimes with imprudent haste under that impression. His character cannot be better illustrated in this respect than by the fact that he refused to permit his statue to be placed on the summit of the column which the gratitude of his country decreed to him at St. Petersburg, but, instead, he caused it to be surmounted by one of Religion extending her arms to bless mankind. Serenity and benevolence formed the leading features of his mind: no one more readily overlooked a fault, or forgave an injury; none was so uniformly devoted to the happiness of his people. But his empire was not ripe for the mighty projects of amelioration which he contemplated: mankind were too selfish and corrupt to follow out his wishes. He was perpetually grieved by discovering how all his philanthropic intentions had been marred by the cupidity or neglect of inferior agents, and how uniformly human wickedness had fastened on the best-conceived plans of social improvement. His very generosity at Paris, the liberal sentiments he there uttered, which entranced the world, were in advance of his people, and brought on a dark conspiracy in his own dominions, which imbittered his future days, and in the end shortened his life. Inferior to Napoleon in genius, he was his superior in magnanimity: both conquered the world; but Alexander only could conquer himself. Posterity will certainly award the first place to the matchless genius of the French emperor; but it will confirm the saying of that great man, extorted from him even in the moment of his fall, "If I were not Napoleon, I would be Alexander."*

Character of Talleyrand. His early history.

Never was character more opposite to that of the Russian autocrat than that of his great coadjutor in the pacification and settlement of Europe, PRINCE TALLEYRAND. This most remarkable man was born at Paris in 1754, so that in 1814 he was already sixty years of age. He was descended of an old family, and had for his maternal aunt the celebrated Princess of Ursins, who played so important a part in the war of the succession at the court of Philippe V. Being destined for the Church, he early entered the seminary of St. Sulpice; and even there was remarkable for the delicate vein of sarcasm, nice discrimination, and keen penetration, for which he afterward became so distinguished in life. At the age of twenty-six, he was appointed agent-general for the clergy, and in that capacity his administrative talents were so remarkable that they procured for him the situation of Bishop of Autun, which he held in 1789, when the Revolution broke out. So remarkable had his talents become at this period, that Mirabeau, in his secret correspondence with Berlin, pointed him out as one of the most eminent men of the age. He was elected representative of the clergy of his diocese for the Constituent Assembly, and was one of the first of that rank in the Church who voted on the 29th of May for the junction of the ecclesiastical body with the *tiers état*. He also took the lead in all the measures, then so popular, which had for their object to spoliate the Church, and apply its possessions to the service of the state: accordingly, he himself proposed the suppression of tithes, and the application of the prop-

* Caul., ii., 237.

erty of the Church to the public treasury. In all these measures he was deaf to the remonstrances of the clergy whom he represented, and already he had severed all the cords which bound him to the Church.

His ruling principle was not any peculiar enmity to religion, but a fixed determination to adhere to the dominant party, whatever it was, whether in Church or State; to watch closely the signs of the times, and throw in his lot with that section of the community which appeared likely to gain the superiority. In February, 1790, he was appointed president of the Assembly; and from that time forward, down to its dissolution, he took a leading part in all its measures. He was not, however, an orator: knowledge of men and prophetic sagacity were his great qualifications. Generally silent in the hall of debate, he soon gained the lead in the council of deliberation or committee of management. He officiated as constitutional bishop, to the great scandal of the more orthodox clergy, in the great *fête* on the 14th of July, 1790, in the Champ de Mars, of which an account has already been given;* but he had already become fearful of the excesses of the popular party, and was, perhaps, the only person to whom Mirabeau, on his deathbed, communicated his secret views and designs for the restoration of the French monarchy. Early in 1792 he set out on a secret mission to London, where he remained till the breaking out of the war in February, 1793, and enjoyed much of the confidence of Mr. Pitt. He, naturally enough, became an object of jealousy to both parties; being denounced by the Jacobins as an emissary of the court, and by the Royalists as an agent of the Jacobins; and, in consequence, he was accused and condemned in his absence, and only escaped by withdrawing to America, where he remained till 1795 engaged in commercial pursuits. It was not the least proof of his address and sagacity, that he thus avoided equally the crimes and the dangers of the Reign of Terror; and returned to Paris at the close of that year with his head on his shoulders, and without deadly hostility to any party in his heart.

His influence and abilities soon caused themselves to be felt; the sentence of death, which had been recorded against him in absence, was soon recalled; he became a leading member of the Club of Salm, which, in 1797, was established to counterbalance the efforts of the Royalists in the Club of Clichy; and on the triumph of the Revolutionists by the violence of Augereau in July, 1797, he was appointed minister of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, aware of the imbecility of the Directorial Government, he entered warmly into the views of Napoleon, upon his return from Egypt, for its overthrow. He was again made minister of foreign affairs by that youthful conqueror after the 18th Brumaire, and continued, with some few interruptions, to be the soul of all foreign negotiations, and the chief director of foreign policy, down to the measures directed against Spain in 1807. On that occasion, however, his wonted sagacity did not desert him: he openly disapproved of the attack on the Peninsula, and was, in consequence, dismissed from office, which he did not again hold till he was appointed chief of the provisional government on the 1st of April, 1814. He had thus the singular address, though a leading character under both *régimes*, to extricate himself both from the crimes of the Revolution and the misfortunes of the Empire.

His great abilities.

He was no ordinary man who could accomplish so great a prodigy, and yet retain such influence as to step, as it were by common consent, into the principal direction of affairs on the overthrow of Napoleon. His power of doing so depended not merely on his great talents; they alone, if unaccompanied by other qualifications, would inevitably have brought him to the guillotine under the first government, or the prisons of state under the last. It was his extraordinary versatility and flexibility of disposition, and the readiness with which he accommodated himself to every change of government and dynasty which he thought likely to be permanent, that mainly contributed to this extraordinary result. Such was his address, that, though the most changeable character in the whole Revolution, he contrived never to lose either influence or reputation by all his tergiversations; but, on the contrary, went on constantly rising, to the close of his career, when above eighty years of age, in weight, fortune, and consideration. The very fact of his having survived, both in person and influence, so many changes of government, which had proved fatal to almost all his contemporaries, of itself constituted a colossal reputation; and when he said, with a sarcastic smile, on taking the oath of fidelity to Louis-Philippe in 1830, "C'est le treisième," the expression, repeated from one end of Europe to the other, produced a greater admiration for his address than indignation at his perfidy.

And profound dissimulation.

He has been well described as the person in existence who had the least hand in producing, and the greatest power of profiting, by revolutions. He was not destitute of original thought, but wholly without the generous feeling, the self-forgetfulness, which prompt the great in character as well as talent to bring forth their conceptions in word or action, at whatever hazard to themselves or their fortunes. His object always was, not to direct, but to observe and guide the current; he never opposed it when he saw it was irresistible, nor braved its dangers where it threatened to be perilous, but quietly withdrew till an opportunity occurred, by the destruction alike of its supporters and its opponents, to obtain its direction. In this respect his talents very closely resembled those of Metternich, of whom a character has already been drawn;* but he was less consistent than the wary Austrian diplomatist; and, though equalled by him in dissimulation, he was far his superior in perfidy. It cost him nothing to contradict his words and violate his oaths, whenever it suited his interest to do so; and the extraordinary and almost unbroken success of his career affords, as well as that of Napoleon, the most striking confirmation of the profound saying of Johnson—that no man ever raised himself from private life to the supreme direction of affairs, in whom great abilities were not combined with certain meannesses, which would have proved altogether fatal to him in ordinary life. Yet

* *Ante*, i., 99.

* *Ante*, iv., 122.

was he without any of the great vices of the Revolution; his selfishness was constant, his cupidity unbounded, his hands often sullied by gold; but he was not cruel or unforgiving in his disposition, and few, if any, deeds of blood stain his memory. His witticisms and bonmots were admirable, and repeated from one end of Europe to the other; yet was his reputation in this respect, perhaps, greater than the reality; for, by common consent, every good saying at Paris during his lifetime was ascribed to the ex-Bishop of Autun. But none, perhaps, more clearly reveals his character, and explains his success in life, than the celebrated one, "That the principal object of language was to conceal the thought."

Solemn thanksgiving in the Place Louis XV.

On Easter Day, being April 10, a grand and imposing ceremony was performed in the Place Louis XV. On the spot where Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, the Princess Elizabeth, and so many of the noble victims of the Revolution had perished, a great altar was erected, by command of the Emperor Alexander, in order to a general thanksgiving, by the sovereigns and armies, for the signal and complete success with which it had pleased the Almighty to bless the allied arms. There was something to the thoughtful mind inexpressibly impressive in this august ceremony. Bareheaded, around the altar, the sovereigns, with their princes, marshals, and generals, partook in the service, which was celebrated with extraordinary pomp, according to the forms of the Greek Church, by the bishops and priests of that establishment who had accompanied the Russian army. But it was, in the most emphatic sense, a *catholic* service: all Christendom was there represented; the uniforms of twenty victorious nations were to be seen around the altar; it was a thanksgiving for the triumph of Christianity over the most inveterate, the most depraved, and the most powerful of its enemies. On their knees, around the altar, the monarchs kissed the sacred emblem of the cross; when it was elevated, all assembled bowed their heads with reverent devotion; and a hundred guns, from the banks of the Seine, announced the triumph of the Gospel by the devotion which it had inspired into the breasts of its supporters. Such was the impression produced by the scene, that not an arm was moved, nor a sound to be heard, in the vast concourse of thirty thousand soldiers, who stood in close column in the square. The whole marshals of France, in full uniform, attended the ceremony. The world never beheld such an example of moral retribution, such a convincing proof of the reality of the Divine administration. The rudest Cossack who witnessed it felt the sacred influence. But no feelings of that sort were experienced, save in a few breasts, by the immense numbers of French who witnessed the ceremony: they were dead to its moral import; they felt not its awful warning; and consoled themselves for the presence of so many foreign uniforms in the heart of their capital by the observation, that the dresses were not so well made as those of their own army.*

Nothing remained but to give effect to the declared will, alike of the sovereigns and the French people, by recalling the Bourbons. Hitherto, although all believed that the old family would be restored, yet no act clearly expressive of that intention had emanated from the provisional government, and they had, on the contrary, carefully disclaimed several acts of individuals tending to the restoration of the royal authority. Doubts, in consequence, began to be entertained as to what was to be done, and the Royalists were in general and undisguised uneasiness. But the resolution of the allies having been finally taken in the sitting, which continued till seven in the morning, of the night between the 5th and 6th, not to treat with a regency, Talleyrand threw off the mask, and the conservative Senate, by a solemn decree, called Louis XVIII. to the throne, and his heirs, according to the established order of succession previous to the Revolution. Various provisions were, at the same time, made for the establishment of the Senate and Legislative Body, and the due limitations of the royal authority, which were afterward engrossed in the charter, and formed the basis of the government of the restoration. Suffice it to say at present, that they received a constitution which gave them a hundred times more real freedom than the French had ever enjoyed since the revolt of the 10th of August had overturned the throne, and incomparably more than, as the event proved, they were capable of bearing. And so completely had the people repented of their dreams of self-government, and so wofully had they suffered from its effects, that this important decree, which thus re-established, after a lapse of twenty-one years, the royal family upon the throne, attracted very little attention, and was received by the whole multitude as a matter of course. Even the Abbé Siéyes voted for the king's return: he had now got an answer to his celebrated question, which twenty-five years before had convulsed France, "What is the Tiers Etat?"*

Louis XVIII. is called to the throne.

The royal authority being thus re-established, the different branches of government rapidly fell into the new system. On the 9th the National Guard assumed the white cockade, and on the 12th, the Count d'Artois, who, during these great events, had been drawing near to the capital, made his public entry into Paris. He was on horseback, surrounded by a brilliant *cortège* of gentlemen who had gone out to meet him, and near the barrier of Pantin was met by the marshals of France, in full costume, with Ney at their head. "Mon Seigneur," said Marshal Ney, speaking for himself and his brethren in arms, "we have served with zeal a government which commanded us in the name of France: your highness and his majesty will see with what fidelity we will serve our legitimate king." "Messieurs," replied the Count d'Artois, "you have illustrated the French arms; you have carried, even into countries the most remote, the glory of the French name; the king claims your exploits: what has ennobled France can never be strange to him." The procession, which swelled immensely as it advanced, proceeded to Nôtre Dame, where the

Entry of the Count d'Artois into Paris.

* Dan., 403, 404. Bour., x., 180, 181. Lab., ii., 435, 436. Moniteur, April 12, 1814. Thib., x., 24, 25.

* Moniteur, April 7, 1814. Beauch., ii., 390, 394. Thib., x., 19, 21. Lond., 309. Burgh., 306.

prince returned thanks for his restoration to his country. "There is nothing changed," said he; "only a Frenchman the more in Paris: this is the first day of happiness I have experienced for twenty-five years."*

Entry of Louis XVIII. into London and Paris. April 20.

Louis XVIII. was not long of responding to the call made upon him by the Senate. On the 20th of April the fugitive monarch left his peaceable retreat of Hartwell, to be again tossed on the stormy sea of public affairs, and made his entry amid an extraordinary concourse of spectators into London, where he was received in state by the prince regent. No words can convey an adequate idea of the enthusiasm which prevailed on this occasion. It was a great national triumph, unmixed by one circumstance of alloy; it gave demonstration strong of the total overthrow of the Revolutionary system; sympathy with an illustrious race, long weighed down with misfortune, was mingled with exultation at the glorious reward now obtained for a quarter of a century of toils and dangers. White cockades were universal; the general rapture was shared alike by the rich and the poor; the fierce divisions, the rancorous faction, with which the war commenced, had disappeared in one tumultuous swell of universal exultation. "Sire," said the monarch, with emotion, to the prince regent, when he first addressed him, "I shall always consider that, under God, I owe my restoration to your royal highness." The prince regent received his illustrious guest with that dignified courtesy for which he was so celebrated, accompanied the royal family to Dover, and bade them farewell at the extremity of the pier at that place. In a beautiful day, and with the utmost splendour, the royal squadron, under the command of the Duke of Clarence, accompanied the illustrious exiles to their own country; and hardly had the thunder of artillery from the castle of Dover ceased to ring in the ears, when the chalk cliffs of France exhibited a continued blaze, and the roar of cannon on every projecting point, from Calais to Boulogne, announced the arrival of the monarch in the kingdom of his forefathers.†

April 27.

Hitherto the progress of the sovereign had been a continued triumph; but as he advanced through France, although the crowds which were everywhere assembled on the wayside to see him pass received him always with respect, sometimes with enthusiasm, yet it was apparent that there was a mixed feeling on the part of the people. The unanimous transports which had greeted his entry into London, and passage through England, were no longer to be discerned. The feeling of loyalty, one of the noblest passions which can fill the breast, because one of the least selfish, was nearly extinct in the great mass of the people; the return of the royal family was accompanied with circumstances of deep national humiliation; their principal feeling was curiosity to see the strangers. The king arrived at Compeigne on the 29th, and the preparations for his reception at Paris having been completed, he made his public entry by the gate of St. Denis on the 3d of May, in the midst of a prodigious concourse of spectators. The Duchess d'Angouleme was seated by his side: the Old Guard of Napoleon formed his escort: the National Guard of Paris kept the streets for the procession; and innumerable officers and privates of the allied armies added, by their gay and varied uniforms, to the splendour of the scene. The procession proceeded first to Nôtre Dame, where the king and the royal family returned thanks for their restoration, and then proceeded by the quays and the Pont Neuf to the Tuileries. When the Duchess d'Angouleme reached the foot of the principal stair of that palace, which she had not seen since the 10th of August, 1792, when, in company with Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, she left it to take refuge from the insurgents in the National Assembly,* her emotions were so overpowering, that she fell down insensible at the king's feet. But these awful recollections produced little or no effect on the Parisians; and the principal observation was, that the king's and princess's dresses were cut in the London fashion, and that the Duchess d'Angouleme was a perfect fright with her low English bonnet.‡‡

King's entry into Paris. May 3.

But a more serious duty awaited this restored monarch; and having now resumed the reins of government, the first care which awaited him was the difficult task of concluding a treaty of peace with the allied powers, which should at once satisfy their just and inevitable demands, and not prove an insuperable stumbling-block in the first days of his restoration to the French people. The generous, perhaps in some degree imprudent, expressions of the Emperor Alexander, at the first taking of Paris, had produced a prodigious impression; his popularity was at the highest point, and his influence at the capital altogether irresistible. It was the idea that they would escape by his magnanimity from the consequences of defeat, and retain, even after the occupation of the capital, no inconsiderable portion of their conquests, which had reconciled them to the Restoration, and produced the general burst in favour of the Bourbon dynasty. But when the diplomatists began coolly to sit down to reduce the conditions of the treaty to writing, it was no easy matter to reconcile these expectations with the obvious necessity of curtailing France so much that it should not again prove dangerous to the liberties of Europe; and it required all the address of Talleyrand and the other ministers who had been appointed by the king to overcome the difficulty.§

Convention of April 23d for the French abandonment of all their conquests.

By a convention concluded on the 23d of April, it was provided that the French troops in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries, should evacuate all the fortresses and countries

* Beauch., ii., 407, 415. Burgh., 307. Lab., ii., 437, 438.

† Cap., Cent Jours, i., 7, 10. Ann. Reg., 1814. Chronicle, 34, 36. Beauch., ii., 509, 515. Lab., ii., 473, 474.

* *Ante*, i., 129.

† Cap., Hist. de la Restauration, 1. Beauch., ii., 517, 533. Bour., x., 239, 242. Lab., ii., 479, 480. Moniteur, May 4, 1814. Thib., x., 92.

‡ At this period the English fashion for bonnets was exceedingly low, and the French proportionally high: so that the contrast between the Duchess d'Angouleme's haymaker's bonnet and the splendid *coiffures* and feathers with which the ladies were adorned at Paris, was sufficiently striking. When Louis crossed the Pont Neuf, the veil was taken off the statue of Henry IV., which had been placed there a week before, and which bore the inscription, "Ludovico reduce, Henricus redivivus," which was the felicitous thought of M. Lally Tollendal.—*Personal observation.*

§ Hard., xii., 422, 423. Lab., ii., 483, 484. Sav., vi., 174, 175

Prodigious extent of the possessions thus ceded by France.

beyond the frontiers of Old France, as they stood on the 1st of January, 1792, which was at one blow to sweep away the whole conquests of the Revolution. The allied troops were with as little delay as possible to evacuate the whole of the territory so defined, and all military exactions on both sides were by a secret article to cease forthwith. The principal object of this clause was to put a stop to the unbounded and scourging requisitions of Marshal Davoust, who still retained possession of Hamburg. The number of strong places, and the quantity of artillery, warlike stores, and muniments of war which by this convention fell into the hands of the allies, was prodigious, and altogether unexampled in the annals of military trophies. They convey alone a stupendous idea of the vast extent of the military resources which at one period were at the disposal of the French emperor, and of the strange and ruinous policy which prompted him to disperse his troops over so many distant strongholds, when he was contending against greatly superior forces of the enemy for life and death on the plains of Champagne. Hamburg, Magdebourg, and Wesel, in Germany; Maestricht, Mayence, Luxemburg, and Kehl, on the Rhine and the Meuse; Flushing, Bergen-op-Zoom, Antwerp, Ostend, Nieuport, and many others, in the Low Countries; Mantua, Alexandria, Peschiera, Gavi, Turin, in Italy; Barcelona, Figueras, Rosas, Tortosa, in Spain; besides a vast number of others of lesser note, were abandoned. Fifty-three fortresses of note, twelve thousand pieces of cannon, ammunition and military stores in incalculable quantities, and garrisons to the amount of nearly a hundred thousand men,* all beyond the frontiers of Old France, were thus at one blow surrendered! What a picture does this present of the astonishing strength and tenacity of the grasp which Napoleon had thus laid on Europe; of the magnitude of the military giant whose weight had so long oppressed the world, when even in his last extremity, and after such unheard-of reverses, he yet had such magnificent spoils to yield up to the victor! But what is physical strength where moral virtue is wanting? and what the external resources of an empire, when its heart is paralyzed by the selfishness of a revolution?†

Treaty of May 30th at Paris.

The treaty of the 30th of May was signed at Paris by the plenipotentiaries of France on the one side, and Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia on the other; but after the convention of the 23d of April, it contained little which was not foreseen by the French. It provided that France should be reduced to its original limits, as they stood on the 1st of January, 1792, with the exception of various cessions of small territories, some to France by the neighbouring powers, others by France to them, for the sake of defining more clearly, and for mutual advantage, its frontiers, but which, upon a balance of gains and losses, gave it an increase of four hundred and fifty thousand souls. Avignon, however, and the country of Venaisin, the first conquests of the Revolution, were secured to it. France, on the other hand, consented to abandon all pretensions to any territories beyond these limits, and to throw no obstacle in the way of fortifications being erected on any points which the new governments of those countries might deem expedient. Holland was to be an independent state, under the sovereignty of the house of Orange, but with an accession of territory; Germany was to be independent, but under the guarantee of a federal union; Switzerland independent, governed by itself; Italy divided into sovereign states. The free navigation of the Rhine was expressly stipulated. Malta, the ostensible cause of the renewal of the war after the treaty of Amiens, was ceded in perpetuity, with its dependances, to Great Britain; and she, on her part, agreed to restore all the colonies taken from France or her allies during the war, with the exception of the islands of Tobago, St. Lucie, and the portion of St. Domingo formerly belonging to Spain, which was to be restored to that power, in the West, and the Isle of France in the East Indies. Guadaloupe, Martinique, and Le Guyane were restored to France. France was to be permitted to form commercial establishments in the East Indies, but under the condition that no more troops were to be sent there than were necessary for the purpose of police; and she regained the right of fishing on the coast of Newfoundland and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The fleet of Antwerp, which consisted of thirty-eight ships of the line and fifteen frigates, was to be divided into three parts, of which two were to be restored to France, and one to the King of Holland. The ships, however, of France which had fallen into the hands of the allies before the armistice of the 23d of April, and especially the fleet at the Texel, were to remain with the allies; and they were immediately made over to the King of Holland. All subordinate points and matters of detail were, by common consent, referred to a congress of all the great powers, which it was agreed should assemble at Vienna in the succeeding autumn.*

Secret articles of the treaty.

Such were the public articles of the treaty; but, in addition to these, there was a secret treaty also signed, which contained articles of considerable importance, and which pointed in no obscure manner to the policy which was to be pursued for the reconstruction of the balance of power in Europe. They related chiefly to the disposal of the immense territories, containing no less than 15,360,000 souls, which had been severed from Napoleon's empire, besides 16,000,000

* The magnitude of these garrisons, even in the last moments of the Empire, and when Napoleon was literally crushed at Paris for want of men, was such as almost to exceed belief. The following was the amount of a few of the principal, as they finally evacuated the fortresses they held on the conclusion of hostilities:

	Garrisons.	Surrendered.
Hamburg	12,300	25th May.
Magdebourg	16,000	25th May.
Wesel	10,000	10th May.
Mayence	15,000	4th May.
Barcelona	6,000	12th May.
Antwerp	17,500	6th May.
Mantua	6,000	28th April.
Alexandria	5,500	30th April.
Bergen-op-Zoom	4,000	24th April.
	92,300	

—See SCHOELL, *Histoire des Traités de Paix*, x., 442, 443; and *Ante*, iv., 371.

† Koch, iii., 667, 669. Schoell, x., 442, 445. Martens, N. Recueil, i., 706.

* Martens, Sup., or N. R., ii., 1; and Schoell, x., 486, 496.

more from its external dependances, which were now in great part at the disposal of the allied powers. The leading principle which regulated these distributions was to strengthen the second-rate states which bordered upon France, and from the weakness of which she had hitherto always been able to make successful irruptions from her own territories, before the more distant sovereigns could come to their support. To guard against this danger, it was provided that Piedmont should receive an accession of territory by the incorporation of Genoa with her dominions, the latter town being declared a free port; that the reconstruction of Switzerland, as agreed on by the allied powers, should be ratified by France; that Flanders, between the Scheldt and the Meuse, should be annexed to Holland; and the German States on the left bank of the Rhine, which had been conquered from France, divided between Holland and Prussia.*

Reflections on the treaty of Paris.

Such was the treaty of Paris, the most glorious that England had ever concluded—glorious, even more from what she abandoned than what she retained of her conquests. With her enemy absolutely at her feet—with half of France overrun by four hundred thousand victorious troops—with her capital taken, and her emperor virtually a prisoner in exile, she gave to her no inconsiderable accession of territory in Europe, and restored three fourths of her colonial possessions. Not a village was reft from Old France; not a military contribution was levied; not a palace or a museum was rifled; not an indignity to the national honour was offered. All that was done was to restore the provinces which, since her career of conquest began in 1794, she had wrested from the adjoining powers. The French museums, loaded with the spoils of Italy, Germany, Spain, Flanders, and Holland, were left untouched; even the sacred relics of Sans-Souci, and of the great King of Prussia, were unreclaimed; so far from following Napoleon's bad example, in seizing every article of value wherever he went, the allies, when they had them in their power, did not even reclaim their own.† What did Napoleon do to Prussia, in similar circumstances, in 1807? Why, he imposed on that limited state, with only seven millions of inhabitants, a war contribution of £26,000,000, and severed from it the half of its dominions.‡ What did he do to Austria by the treaty of Vienna, in 1809? Why, he imposed on it a contribution of £9,500,000, and wrested from it a fourth of the monarchy.§ If the allies had acted in a similar spirit in 1814, how much of the territories of Old France would they have left to its inhabitants? What crushing contributions would they have levied for many a long and weary year on the vanquished; what havoc would they have made in all the museums and royal palaces of France! Doubtless, their forbearance was not entirely owing to disinterestedness; doubtless, they had jealousies of their own to consider, political objects of their own to gain in reconciling France to the new dynasty; but still their policy was founded on a noble spirit—it rested on the principle of eradicating hostility by generosity, and avenging injury by forgiveness. The result proved that, in doing so, they proceeded on too exalted an estimate of human nature.

Return of the pope to Rome.

In the general settlement of Europe after the Revolutionary deluge had subsided, the fate of one of the most persevering, and not the least illustrious, of Napoleon's opponents must not be overlooked. Pious the VII., after having been taken away, he knew not whither, by orders of Napoleon, from Fontainebleau on the 23d of January, in virtue of the convention already mentioned,* had been still, under one pretext or another, detained in the French territory, and was still in Provence when Paris was taken. One of the first cares of the provisional government was, by a decree, to direct him to be instantly set at liberty, and conducted to the Italian frontiers with all the honours due to his rank. He entered Italy, accordingly, and at Cesina, near Parma, had an interview with Murat, who exhibited to him the original of a memorial, a copy of which a number of the nobles and chief inhabitants of Rome had presented to the allied powers, praying to have the Roman States incorporated with one of the secular powers of Italy. Without looking at the memoir, so as to know what signatures were attached to it, the generous pontiff at once threw it into the fire. Continuing his route by slow journeys, which the feeble state of his health rendered necessary, he reached the neighbourhood of Rome on the 23d, and entered that city on the 24th of May, nearly five years after he had been violently carried off at dead of night by the troops of Napoleon. Opinions had been divided, previously, as to the expedience of his return, and those who had signed the memorial to the allies justly dreaded the effects of his resentment; but the generous proceeding at Cesina overcame all hearts, and he was received with unanimous and heartfelt expressions of satisfaction. Stricken by conscience, some of the nobles who had signed the memorial came next day to request forgiveness. "Have we not some faults, too, to reproach ourselves with?" replied the generous pontiff: "let us bury our injuries in oblivion."†

April 2.

Extraordinary spectacle which Paris exhibited at this period.

The world has never seen, probably the world will never again see, so marvellous a spectacle as the streets of Paris exhibited from the 31st of April, when the entry of the allies took place, till the 16th of June, when, upon their finally retiring, the service of the posts was restored to the National Guard of the capital. In a state of the most profound tranquillity, with the most absolute protection of life and property, even the most obnoxious of their former enemies, the capital of Napoleon was to be seen occupied by the troops of twenty different nations, whom the oppression of his government had roused to arms from the walls of China to the pillars of Hercules. As if by the wand of a mighty enchanter, all the angry passions,

* Cap., Cent Jours, i., 18, 19.

† Napoleon had some of these with him, in the room in which he died at St. Helena. "Vous examinez," said he, "cette grande horloge; elle servait de reveil-matin au Grand Frederic. Je l'ai prise à Potsdam: c'était tout ce que valait la Prusse."—ANTOMARCHI. *Derniers Jours de Napoleon*, i., 97.

‡ *Ante*, ii., 546.

§ *Ante*, iii., 258.

* *Ante*, iv., 276.

† Artaud, ii., 367, 381. Pacca, ii., 257, 261.

the fierce contentions, which had so long deluged the world with blood, seemed to be stilled, and victors and vanquished sank down side by side into the enjoyment of repose. Beside the veterans of Napoleon's Old Guard, who still retained, even in the moment of defeat, and when surrounded by the might of foreign powers, their martial and undaunted aspect, were to be seen the superb household troops of Russia and Prussia; the splendid cuirassiers of Austria shone in glittering steel; the iron veterans of Blucher still eyed the troops of France with jealousy, as if their enmity was unappeased even by the conquest of their enemies. The nomade tribes of Asia and the Ukraine were to be seen in every street; groups of Cossack bivouacs lay in the Champs-Elysées; the Bashkirs and Tartars gazed with undisguised avidity, but restrained hands, on the gorgeous display of jewelry and dress which were displayed in the shop windows to attract the notice of the numerous princes and potentates who thronged the metropolis. Every morning the noble columns of the Preobazinsky and Simonefsky Guards marched out of the barracks of the Ecole Militaire, to exercise on the Champ de Mars; at noon, reviews of cavalry succeeded, and the earth shook under the thundering charge of the Russian cuirassiers. Often in the evening the allied monarchs were to be seen at the opera, or some of the theatres; and the applause with which they were received resembled what might have been expected if Napoleon had returned in triumph from the capture of their capitals. Early in June, Wellington, who had been appointed ambassador of England at the court of the Tuileries, appeared among them; he was received with enthusiasm, and the opera-house never shook with louder applause than when he first made his appearance there after the battle of Toulouse.*

Universal religious feelings of the allied troops.

One peculiarity in the Russian and Prussian armies, which most excited the attention of the Parisians, was the universal and simple feeling of piety with which they were animated. To an infidel generation, who had known Christianity only in its corruption, and judged of its spirit only from the misrepresentation of its enemies, this circumstance was the subject of general astonishment and partial admiration. "We listened," says a contemporary French journalist, "to young Russian officers, on the very day of their triumphant entrance into Paris, who spoke of their exploits from Moscow to the Seine as of deeds which had been accomplished under the immediate guidance of Divine Providence, and ascribing to themselves only the glory of having been chosen as the instruments for the fulfilment of the Divine decree. They spoke of their victories without exultation, and in language so simple, that it seemed to us as if they did so, by common consent, out of politeness. They showed us a silver medal, worn equally by their generals and private soldiers as a badge of distinction.† On the one side is represented the eye of Providence, and on the other these words from Scripture, 'Not unto us, not unto us, but to thy name.' We must allow it is religion which has formed the sacred bond of their union for the benefit of mankind, the emblems of which their troops wear on their garments. No human motive could have induced them to make sacrifices unparalleled in history."* Such was the spirit which conquered the French Revolution; such, on the testimony of the vanquished, the principles which gave final victory to the arms of the desert in the centre of civilized infidelity. The opposite characters of the two contending powers were perfectly represented by one circumstance: Napoleon placed on his triumphant column in the Place Vendôme a statue of *himself*; Alexander, as has been already mentioned, caused the column, which the gratitude of the Senate decreed for him at St. Petersburg, to be surmounted by a statue of *Religion*, extending her arms to bless mankind.†

Grand review of the allied troops at Paris. May 20.

Before the allied armies broke up from Paris, a grand review took place of the whole troops in and around that city, comprising the *élite* of the allied forces then in France. Seventy thousand men, with eighty-two guns, were drawn up three deep on the road, from the barrier of Neuilly to the bridge of St. Cloud: they occupied the whole space, and certainly a more magnificent military spectacle never was witnessed. When the Emperor Alexander, with the Emperor of Austria and King of Prussia, and all the marshals and generals of their respective armies, rode along the line, the acclamations of the troops, at first loud and overpowering, then getting fainter and fainter as they died away in the distance, were inexpressibly sublime. Breaking then into open column, the whole defiled past the sovereigns, and such was the splendour of their array, that it seemed scarcely conceivable that they had so recently been engaged in a campaign of unexampled duration and hardship. The Russian Guard, in particular, twenty, and the Prussian, eight thousand strong, attracted, by the brilliancy of their equipments and the precision of their movements, universal admiration. The eye could scarcely bear the dazzling lines of light which, under a bright sun and a cloudless sky, were reflected from the cuirasses and sabres of the cavalry. Proudly the celebrated regiments of the Russian Guards, Preobazinsky, Simonefsky, and Bonnet d'Or, marched past; every third or fourth man bore the mark, in a religiously-preserved chasm in his cap, made by the French grapeshot on the field of Culm. In noble array the vast host pressed on with an erect air; they passed through the unfinished arch of Neuilly, begun by Napoleon to the honour of the Grand Army, defiled in silence over the Place of the Revolution, treading on the spot where Louis XVI. had fallen, and scarce cast an eye on the unfinished columns of the Temple of Glory, commenced after the triumph of Jena. Among the countless multitude whom the extraordinary events of the period had drawn together from every part of Europe to the French capital, and the brilliancy of this spectacle had concentrated in one spot, was one young man, who had watched with intense interest the progress of the war from his earliest years, and who, having hurried from his paternal roof in Edinburgh on the first

* Personal observation. Dan., 408, 409.
† The Medal of 1812.

* Journal des Debats, April 3, 1814.
† Dan., 407, 408. *Ante*, iv., 21, 22.

cessation of hostilities, then conceived the first idea of narrating its events; and amid its wonders inhaled that ardent spirit, that deep enthusiasm, which, sustaining him through fourteen subsequent years of travelling and study, and fourteen more of composition, has at length realized itself in the present history.

Visit of the allied sovereigns to England.

Having finally arranged matters at Paris, the allied sovereigns, before retiring to their own dominions, paid a visit to London. It belongs to the historians of England to recount the festivities of that joyous period—that cloth of gold of modern times—when the greatest, and wisest, and bravest in Europe came to do voluntary homage to the free people whose energy and perseverance had saved themselves by their firmness, and Europe by their example. Suffice it to say, as a topic interesting to general history, that the allied monarchs left Paris on the 5th of July, and reached Deal on the 8th; that they were received with extraordinary enthusiasm by all classes in England, from the peasant to the throne; that they were feasted with more than the usual magnificence at Guildhall, and received with more than wonted splendour at the Palace; that the Emperor of Russia was invested with the Order of the Garter at Carlton House; and that at Oxford both he and the King of Prussia, as well as Marshal Blucher, were arrayed with all the academic honours which a grateful nation could bestow; that a splendid naval review at Portsmouth, where thirty ships of the line and frigates manœuvred together, conveyed an adequate idea of the naval power of England; and that, satiated with pomp and the cheers of admiration, they embarked for the Continent on their return to their own dominions. But two circumstances connected with this visit, at the close of the longest, most costly, and bloodiest war mentioned in history, deserve to be recorded, as characteristic of the British Empire at this period. When Alexander visited the arsenal at Woolwich, and saw the acres covered with cannon and shot in that stupendous emporium of military strength, he said, "Why, this resembles rather the preparation of a great nation for the commencement of a war, than the stores still remaining to it at its termination." And, as the same monarch surveyed the hundreds of thousands who assembled to see him in Hyde Park, he was so impressed with the universal well-being of the spectators, that he exclaimed, "This is, indeed, imposing; but where are the people?"*

Remarkable circumstance which led to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg coming to England.

One other circumstance, of domestic interest in its origin, but of vast importance in its ultimate results, deserves to be recorded of this eventful period. At Paris, during the stay of the allied monarchs, there was Lord ——, who had filled with acknowledged ability a high diplomatic situation at their headquarters during the latter period of the war. His lady, of high rank, had joined him to partake in the festivities of that brilliant period, and with her a young relative, equally distinguished by her beauty and talents, then appearing in all the freshness of opening youth. A frequent visiter at this period in Lord ——'s family was a young officer, then an aid-de-camp to the Grand-duke Constantine, a younger brother of an ancient and illustrious family in Germany, but who, like many other scions of nobility, had more blood in his veins than money in his pocket. The young aid-de-camp speedily was captivated by the graces of the English lady; and when the sovereigns were about to set out for England, whither Lord —— was to accompany them, he bitterly lamented the scantiness of his finances, which prevented him from following in the train of such attraction. Lord —— good-humouredly told him he should always find a place at his table when he was not otherwise engaged, and that he would put him in the way of seeing all the world in the British metropolis, which he would proba never see to such advantage again. Such an offer, especially when seconded by such influences, proved irresistible, and the young German gladly followed them to London. He was there speedily introduced to, and ere long distinguished by the Princess Charlotte, whose projected alliance with the Prince of Orange had recently before been broken off. Though the princess remarked him, however, it was nothing more, at that time, than a passing regard, for her thoughts were then more seriously occupied by another. Having received, at the same time, what he deemed some encouragement, the young soldier proposed to the princess and was refused, and subsequently went to Vienna, during the sitting of the Congress at that place, where his susceptible heart was speedily engrossed in another tender affair. Invincible obstacles, however, presented themselves to the realization of the Princess Charlotte's views, which had led to her first rejection of the gallant German; he received a friendly hint from London to make his attentions to the fair Austrian less remarkable: he returned to the English capital, again proposed to the English princess, and was accepted. It was Prince LEOPOLD OF SAXE-COBOURG; and his subsequent destiny, and that of his family, exceeds all that romance has figured of the marvellous. He married the heiress of England; after her lamented end he espoused a daughter of France: he was offered the throne of Greece, he accepted the crown of Belgium. In consequence of his elevation, one of his nephews has married the heiress of Portugal, another the Queen of England; and the accidental fancy of a young German officer for a beautiful English lady has, in its ultimate results, given three kingdoms to his family, placed on one of his relatives the crown of the greatest empire that has existed in the world since the fall of Rome, and restored to England in hazardous times the inestimable blessing of a direct line of succession to the throne.*

Reflections on the decisive movement on St. Dizier.

The march upon St. Dizier was unquestionably expedient as a measure of military policy, and as such it may be regarded as the last of those brilliant movements in that aston-

* Ann. Reg., 1814, 43, 55. Chronicle. Croly, Life of Geo. IV., ii., 67, 71.

* It would be indelicate, during the life of some of the persons mentioned in the preceding curious narration, to give their names to the public. Those acquainted with the elevated circles of English society at that period, will have no difficulty in filling them up; and the facts may be relied on, as the author had them from some of the parties immediately concerned.

ishing campaign, which alone would be sufficient to give immortality to the name of Napoleon. When his whole remaining resources had been fairly worn out in that marvellous struggle, he had a fair prospect by this felicitous conception of renewing the contest on fresh ground, hitherto comparatively unexhausted, and of tripling his force in the field by the addition of the garrisons drawn from the frontier fortresses. How nearly it succeeded is proved by the extreme difficulty which Alexander had to prevent the Austrian commander from commencing, in consequence, a ruinous retreat; and his own words, that his anxiety on that occasion made half his hair turn gray. Yet this movement, beyond all question, proved his ruin; for, by giving room for the manly counsels of Blucher and the Russian emperor, it exposed the capital to the assault of irresistible forces, and led to the overthrow of the French emperor's power in the very quarter where he had deemed it most securely founded. And that he fully appreciated the danger of an attack there, is decisively proved by the haste with which he at once abandoned all the military advantages of the march on St. Dizier to avert it, and the decisive results which followed the start which the allies had got of him at the capital by only eight-and-forty hours.

Difference in this respect of the other European monarchies.

It was not thus with the other European monarchies when they were involved in disaster: Vienna was taken by Napoleon in 1805; but the Austrians fought the battle of Austerlitz, and had wellnigh restored affairs after that event; it was again taken in 1809, but the monarchy stood firm, and reduced the invader to the verge of ruin at Aspern and Wagram. Berlin was captured by the Russians in 1760, and by Napoleon in 1806; but that did not prevent the Great Frederic, in the first instance, from bringing to a glorious close the Seven Years' War, nor Frederic William in the second, from gallantly struggling with his Russian allies for existence in the farthest corner of his dominions, amid the snows of Eylau. Madrid fell an easy prey, in 1808, to the mingled fraud and violence of the French emperor; but Spain, notwithstanding, continued to maintain a mortal struggle for six long years with the forces of Napoleon. Russia was pierced to the heart in 1812, and her ancient capital became the spoil of the invader; but Alexander continued the contest with unabated vigour, and from the flames of Moscow arose the fire which delivered the world. How, then, did it happen that the fall of the capital, which in all these other cases, so far from being the termination, was rather the commencement of the most desperate and protracted period of the war, should in France alone have had a totally opposite effect; and that the capture of Paris should not merely have been the conquest of a kingdom, but the overthrow of a system, the change of a dynasty, which still spread its ramifications over the half of Europe?

Causes of this difference.

The cause of this remarkable difference is to be found in the decisive distinction in the last crisis between a revolutionary and an established government, and the different motives to human action which the two bring to bear upon mankind. A revolution being founded on general on the triumph of violence, robbery, and treason, over fidelity, order, and loyalty, and almost always accompanied in its progress by a hideous effusion of blood and spoliation of property, its leaders, if successful, have no means of rousing or retaining the attachment of their followers but by constantly appealing to the passions of the world. Equality, patriotism, liberty, glory, constitute the successive and brilliant meteors which they launch forth to dazzle and inspire mankind. They have an instinctive dread of the influences of heaven; all allusion to a Supreme Being appears to them as fanaticism; they would willingly bury all thoughts of another world in oblivion. As long as success attends their efforts, the powerful bond of worldly interest or temporary passion binds together the unholy alliance, and its force proves for a long period irresistible. But the very principle which constitutes its strength in prosperity affords the measure of its weakness in adversity; its idol being worldly success, when that idol is pierced to the heart by the destroyer, "the ocean vault falls in, and all are crushed." The same motives of action, the same principles of conduct, which make them unanimously rally around the eagles of the conqueror, necessarily lead them to abandon the standards of the unfortunate. The enthusiasm of Austerlitz, however different in its aspect, sprang from the same source as the defections of Fontainebleau: in both cases they were true to one and the same principle—self-interest.

It is that individual advancement was the mainspring of the Revolution.

The existence of this motive, as the moving general principle, is quite consistent with the utmost generosity and heroism in *individual* cases, though these, unhappily, daily become less frequent in the late stages of the national malady. Nay, the absorbing passion for individual advancement, which, in the more advanced stages of revolution, comes to obliterate every other feeling, springs from the ill-regulated impulse given in the outset to the generous affections. For such is the deceitfulness of sin and the proneness to self-aggrandizement in human nature, that the passions cannot be set violently in motion, even by the disinterested feelings, without the selfish ere long obtaining the mastery of the current: as in a town carried by a storm, how sublime soever may be the heroism, how glorious the self-sacrifice with which the troops mount the breach, the strife, if successful, is sure to terminate in the worst atrocities of pillage, rape, and conflagration. It is Religion alone, which, by opening a scene of ambition beyond the grave, can provide a counterpoise to the overwhelming torrent of worldly ambition, which can render men nobly superior to all the storms of time, and give the same fidelity to a falling which revolution secures to a rising cause.

Wide difference from the fidelity of the monarchy.

That this, and not any peculiar fickleness or proneness to change, was the real cause of the universal and disgraceful desertion by France of its revolutionary chief when he became unfortunate, is decisively proved by the consideration that, in other times, even in France itself, in those parts of the country, or among those classes where the old influences still survived, the most glorious examples of constancy and

fidelity had been found. In the course of the wars with England, Paris was not only taken, but occupied eighteen years by the English armies; an English king was crowned King of France at Rheims; and so complete was the prostration of the country, that an English corps, not ten thousand strong, marched right through the heart of France, from Calais to Bayonne, without encountering any opposition; but that did not subjugate the French people, nor hinder them from gloriously rallying behind the Loire, and twice expelling the English from their territory. The League long held Paris; but that did not prevent Henry IV., at the head of the forces of the provinces, from laying siege to it, and placing himself, a Protestant chief, on the throne of France. Where, in the annals of the world, shall we find more touching examples of heroism in misfortune, constancy in adversity, than in La Vendée, under the Republican massacre, or in Lyons, under the *mitraillades* of Fouché and Collot d'Herbois? Even in Paris, stripped as it had been of almost the whole of the nobility by the previous emigration, five hundred devoted gentlemen hastened to the Tuileries, on the 10th of August, 1792, to meet death with the royal family; but not one went from thence to Fontainebleau to share exile with Napoleon on the eve of his overthrow.

It is in vain, therefore, to attempt to shelter the tergiversations of Fontainebleau under any peculiarity of national character, or to ascribe to human nature what is only true of its baseness under the vices of a revolution. It is equally vain to allege that necessity drove the French leaders to this measure; that they had no alternative; and that desertion of Napoleon, or national ruin, stared them in the face. If that were the case, what condemnation so severe could be passed on the revolutionary system as the admission that it had brought matters, under chiefs and leaders of the nation's own appointment, to such a pass, that nothing remained but to ruin their country or betray the hero whom they had placed upon the throne? But, in truth, it was misfortune, and the stoppage of the robbery of Europe, which alone rendered Napoleon unpopular, and undermined the colossal power which the Revolution had reared up. Not a whisper was heard against his system of government as long as it was victorious; it was at the zenith of its popularity when, after twelve years' continuance, he crossed the Niemen; it was when it became unfortunate alone that it was felt to be insupportable. If the French eagles had gone on from conquest to conquest, France would have yielded up the last drop of its blood to his ambition, and he would have lived and died surrounded by the adulation of its whole inhabitants, though it had deprived all its mothers of their sons, and all the civilized world of its possessions.

It was misfortune alone which rendered Napoleon unpopular.

No position is more frequently maintained by the French writers of the liberal school, than that Napoleon perished because he departed from the principles of the Revolution; that the monarch forgot the maxims of the citizen, the emperor the simplicity of the general; that he stifled the national voice till it had become extinct, and curbed the popular energies till they had been forgotten; that he fell at last, less under the bayonets of banded Europe, than in consequence of his despotic terror at putting arms into the hands of his own people; and that, if he had revived in 1814 the Revolutionary energy of 1793, he would have proved equally victorious. They might as well say, that if the old, worn-out debauchee of sixty would only resume the vigour and the passions of twenty-five, he would extricate himself from all his ailments. Doubtless he would succeed in so doing, by such a miracle, for a time; and he might, if so renovated, run again, for twenty years, the career of pleasure, licentiousness, suffering, and decay. But is such a restoration in the last stages of excitement, whether individual or national, possible? Is it desirable? Was there ever such a thing heard of as a nation, after twenty-five years' suffering and exhaustion from the indulgence of its social or convulsive passions, again commencing the career of delusion and ruin? Never. Men are hardly ever warned by the sufferings of preceding generations, but they are never insensible to the agonies of their own.

Any restoration of the Revolutionary system was impossible at this period.

Equally extravagant is the idea frequently started by a more amiable and philanthropic class of writers, that it was Napoleon's ambition which ruined the cause of the Revolution; and that if he had only turned his sword into a ploughshare and cultivated the arts of peace, after he had gained possession of supreme power, as he had done those of war to attain it, he might have successfully established in France the glorious fabric of constitutional freedom. They know little of human nature, of the deceitfulness of sin, and downward progress of the career of passion, who think such a transformation practicable. They know still less of the laws of the moral world, who deem such a result consistent with the administration of a just and beneficent Providence. Are the habits necessary for the building up constitutional freedom; the industry, self-denial, and frugality, which must constitute its bases in the great body of the people; the moderation, disinterestedness, and general sway of virtue, which must characterize the leaders of the state, to be acquired amid the total breaking up of society, the closing of all the channels of pacific industry, the excitement and animation of war? Is the general abandonment of religion, the universal worship of the idol of worldly success, the sacrifice of every principle at the shrine of self-interest, the school in which the domestic and social virtues are to be learned? Are robbery, devastation, and murder, the sweeping away of the property of ages, the pouring out like water the blood of the innocent, the steps by which, under a just Providence, the glorious fabric of durable freedom is to be erected? We might well despair of the fortunes of the human race, if the French Revolution could have given the people engaged in it such a blessing.

A pacific career was impracticable to Napoleon.

Napoleon knew well the fallacy of this idea. He constantly affirmed that he was not to be accused for the wars which he undertook; that they were imposed upon him by an invincible necessity; that glory and success—in oth-

Napoleon's views of the compulsion under which he acted.

er words, perpetual conquest—were the conditions of his tenure of power; that he was but the head of a military republic, which would admit of no pause in its career; that conquest was with him essential to existence; and that the first pause in the march of victory would prove the commencement of ruin. This history has, indeed, been written to little purpose if it is not manifest, even to the most inconsiderate, that he was right in these ideas, and that it was not himself, but the spirit of the age, which is chargeable with his fall. The ardent and yet disappointed passions of the Revolution, the millions thrown out of pacific employment, the insatiable desires awakened, the boundless anticipations formed, during the progress of that great convulsion, could by possibility find vent only in external conquest. The simple pursuits of industry, the unobtrusive path of duty, the heroic self-denial of virtue, the only sure basis of general freedom, were insupportable to men thus violently excited. If we would know where the career of conquest, once successfully commenced by a Democratic state, must of necessity lead, we have only to look to the empire of Rome in ancient, or of British India in modern times. Even now the fever still burns in the veins of France: her maniac punishment is not yet terminated. Not all the blood shed by Napoleon, not her millions* of citizens slaughtered, have been able to subdue the fierce ebullition: the double conquest of her capital has been unable to tame her pride; and nothing but the consummate talents and courage of Louis Philippe, joined to the philosophic wisdom of M. Guizot, have been able to prevent her from rushing again into the career of glory, of suffering, and of punishment.

View of the progressive phases of the Revolution.

The French Revolution, therefore, is to be regarded as a great whole, of which the enthusiasm of 1789 was the commencement; the rebellion against government and massacre of the king, the second stage; the Reign of Terror and charnel-house of La Vendée, the third; the conquests and glory of Napoleon, the fourth; the subjugation of France and treachery of Fontainebleau, the consummation. Its external degradation and internal infamy at the latter period were as necessary a part of its progress, as inevitable a result of its principles, as the harvest reaped in autumn is of the seed sown in spring. The connexion—the necessary connexion between the two, now stands revealed in colours of imperishable light; they are stamped in characters of fire on the adamantine tablets of history. Therefore it is that any narrative of the Revolution, which does not follow it out to its fall, must necessarily be imperfect, both in the fidelity of its picture and the truth of its moral. To stop at the accession of the Directory, or the seizure of supreme power by Napoleon, as many have done, is to halt in our account of a fever at the ninth or thirteenth day, when the crisis did not come on till the twenty-first. And he who, after reflecting on the events of this marvellous progress, in which the efforts of ages, and the punishment of generations, were all concentrated into one quarter of a century, does not believe in the Divine superintendence of human affairs, and the reward of virtuous and punishment of guilty nations in this world, would not be converted though one rose from the dead.

Agency by which the Divine government of nations is carried on.

An author, in whom simplicity or beauty of expression often conceals depth and justice of thought, has thus explained the mode of the Divine administration, and the manner in which it works out its decrees by the instrumentality of free agents: "The beauty and magnificence," says Blair, "of the universe are much heightened by its being an extensive and complicated system, in which a variety of springs are made to play, and a multitude of different movements are with admirable art regulated and kept in order. Interfering interests and jarring passions are in such manner balanced against one another; such proper checks are placed on the violence of human pursuits, and the wrath of man is made so to hold its course, that how opposite soever the several motions at first appear to be, yet they all concur at last in one result. While, among the multitudes that dwell on the face of the earth, some are submissive to the Divine authority, some rise up in rebellion against it; others, absorbed in their pleasures and pursuits, are totally inattentive to it; they are all so moved by an imperceptible influence from above, that the zeal of the dutiful, the wrath of the rebellious, and the indifference of the careless, contribute, finally, to the glory of God. All are governed in such a manner as suits their powers, and is consistent with their moral freedom: yet the various acts of these free agents all conspire to work out the eternal purposes of heaven. The system upon which the Divine government plainly proceeds is, that men's own wickedness should be appointed to correct them, that they should be snared in the work of their own hands. When the vices of men require punishment to be inflicted, the Almighty is at no loss for the ministers of justice. No special interpositions of power are requisite. He has no occasion to step from his throne and interrupt the majestic order of nature. With the solemnity which befits Omnipotence, he pronounces, 'Ephraim is joined to his idols: let him alone.' He leaves transgressors to their own guilt, and their punishment follows of course. *Their own sins do the work of justice.*

* Levies of men in France since the Revolution:

1793	300,000
1793	1,200,000
1798	200,000
1799	200,000
1801	30,000
17th Jan., 1805	60,000
24th Sept., 1805	80,000
4th Dec., 1806	80,000
7th April, 1807	80,000
21st Jan., 1808	80,000
10th Sept., 1808	160,000
18th April, 1809	30,000
18th April, 1809	10,000
5th Oct., 1809	36,000
13th Dec., 1810	120,000
13th Dec., 1810	40,000
20th Dec., 1811	120,000
13th March, 1812	100,000
1st Sept., 1812	137,000
11th Jan., 1813	250,000
3d April, 1813	180,000
24th Aug., 1813	30,000
9th Oct., 1813	280,000
15th Nov., 1813	300,000
Total	4,103,000

—Capefigue, x., 510; and *Moniteurs* of the above dates.

They lift the scourge; and with every stroke they inflict on the criminal, they mix the severe admonition that he is reaping only the fruit of his own deeds, and deserves all that he suffers."*

Universal downward progress of sin.

Without pretending to explain the various modes by which this awful and mysterious system of Divine administration, in which ourselves are at once the agents and the objects of reward and punishment, is carried on, it is impossible not to be struck with the powerful operation of two moral laws of our being, with the reality of which every one, from the experience of his own breast, as well as the observation of those around him, must be familiar. The first is, that every irregular passion or illicit desire acquires strength from every gratification which it receives, and becomes the more uncontrollable the more it is indulged. The second, that the power of self-denial and the energy of virtue increases with every occasion on which it is called forth, until at length it becomes a formed habit, and requires hardly any effort for its accomplishment. In the first instance, whether with nations or individuals, "c'est le dernier;" in the second, "c'est le premier pas qui coute." On the counteracting force of these two laws the whole moral administration of the universe hinges, as its physical equilibrium is dependant on the opposite influences of the centripetal and centrifugal forces.

Gradual and deceitful progress of vice.

It is by gradual and latent steps that the destruction of virtue, whether in the individual or in the community, begins. The first advances of sin are clothed in the garb of liberality and philanthropy; the colours it then assumes are the homage which vice pays to virtue. If the evil unveiled itself at the beginning—if the storm which is to uproot society discovered as it rose all its horrors, there are few who would not shrink from its contact. But its first appearance is so attractive that few are sensible of its real nature; and, strange to say, the most hardened egotism in the end derives its chief strength in the outset from the generous affections. By degrees, "habit gives the passions strength, while the absence of glaring guilt seemingly justifies them; and, unawakened by remorse, the sinner proceeds in his course till he waxes bold in guilt, and becomes ripe for ruin. We are imperceptibly betrayed; from one licentious attachment, one criminal passion led on to another, till all self-government is lost, and we are hurried to destruction. In this manner every criminal passion in its progress swells and blackens, till what was at first a small cloud, no bigger than a man's hand rising from the sea, is found to carry the tempest in its womb."† What is the career of the drunkard, the gamester, or the sensualist, but an exemplification of the truth of this picture? Reader! if you have any doubt of the reality of this moral law, search your own hearts, call to mind your own ways; exactly the same principle applies to nations. What is the history of the French Revolution, in all its stages, but an exemplification of this truth when applied to social passions? And how did the vast confederacy of earthly passion, which had so long bestrode the world, ultimately break up? Despite the bright and glowing colours with which its Aurora arose, despite the great and glorious deeds by which its noontide was emblazoned, it sunk in the end amid the basest and most degrading selfishness. It perished precisely as a gang of robbers does, in which, when the stroke of adversity is at last felt, each, true to the god of his idolatry, strives to save himself by betraying his leader. The same law which makes an apple fall to the ground regulates the planets in their courses.

And ascending career of virtue.

The second moral principle, not less universal alike in individuals and nations than the first, is open to the daily observation of every one, equally in his own breast and the conduct of others. Every one has felt, in his own experience, however little he may have practised it—every teacher of youth has ascertained by observation—every moralist from the beginning of time has enforced the remark, as the last conclusion of wisdom—that the path of virtue is rough and thorny at the outset; that habits of industry and self-denial are to be gained only by exertion; that the ascent is rugged, the path steep, but that the difficulty diminishes as the effort is continued; and that, when the "summit is reached, the heaven is above your head, and at your feet the kingdom of Cachemere." And such is the effect of effort strenuously made in the cause of virtue, that it purifies itself as it advances, and progressively casts off the intermixture of worldly passion, which often sullied the purity of its motives in the outset. Hence the constant elevation often observed in the character of good men as they advance in life, till at its close they almost seem to have lost every stain of human corruption, and to be translated rather than raised, by death to immortality. It is in this moral law that the antagonist principle of social as well as individual evil is to be found, and it was by its operation upon successive nations that the dreadful nightmare of the French Revolution was thrown off the world. Many selfish desires, much corrupt ambition, great moral weakness, numerous political sins, stained the first efforts of the coalition, and in them at that period England had her full share. For these sins they suffered, and are suffering; and the punishment of Great Britain will continue as long as the national debt endures;* of Russia and Prussia, as long as Poland festers, a thorn of weakness, in their sides. But how unworthy soever its champions at first may have been, the cause for which they contended was a noble one—it was that of religion, fidelity, and freedom; and as the contest rolled on, they were purified in the only school of real amelioration—the school of suffering. Gradually the baser elements were washed out of the confederacy; the nations, after long agony, came comparatively pure out of the furnace; and at last, instead of the selfishness and rapacity of 1794, were exhibited the constancy of Saragossa, the devotion of Aspern, the heroism of the Tyrol, the resurrection of Prussia; and the war, which had commenced with the partition of Poland and the attempted partition of

* Blair, iv., Serm. 14; and ii., Serm. 14.
† Blair, i., 177.

* If England had acted at the outset of the war as she did at the close, the contest would have been terminated in 1793, and £600,000,000 saved from the national debt.

France, terminated with the flames of Moscow and the pardon of Paris.

How alone can this downward progress be averted?

Is, then, the cause of freedom utterly hopeless; does agitation necessarily lead to rebellion, rebellion to revolution; and must the prophetic eye of wisdom ever anticipate in the infant struggles of liberty the blood of Robespierre, the carnage of Napoleon, the treachery of Fontainebleau? No. It is not the career of freedom: it is the career of sin which leads, and ever will lead, to such results. It is in the disregard of moral obligation when done with beneficent intentions; in the fatal maxim that the end will justify the means; in the oblivion of the Divine precept, that "evil is *not to be done* that good may come of it;" and not in any fatality connected with revolutions, that the real cause of this deplorable downward progress is to be found. And if the supporters of freedom would avoid this otherwise inevitable retribution—if they would escape being led on from desire to desire, from acquisition to acquisition, from passion to passion, from crime to crime, till a Moscow retreat drowns their hopes in blood, or a treachery of Fontainebleau forever disgraces them in the eyes of mankind—they must resolutely in the outset withstand the tempter, and avoid all measures, whatever their apparent expedience may be, which are not evidently based on immutable justice. If this, the only compass in the dark night of revolution, is not steadily observed; if property is ever taken without compensation being given; or blood shed without the commission of crimes to which that penalty is by law attached; or institutions uprooted, sanctioned by the experience of ages, when their modification was practicable: if, in short, the principle is acted on, that the end will justify the means, unbounded national calamities are at hand, and the very objects for which these sins are committed will be forever lost.

Is a free government possible in France?

What are the difficulties which now beset the philosophic statesman in the attempt to construct the fabric of constitutional freedom in France? They are, that the national morality has been destroyed in the citizens of towns, in whose hands alone political power is vested; that there is no moral strength or political energy in the country; that no great proprietors exist to steady or direct general opinion, or counterbalance either the encroachments of the executive or the madness of the people; that France has fallen under a subjection to Paris, to which there is nothing comparable in European history; that the Prætorian guards of the capital rule the state; that ten millions of separate proprietors, the great majority at the plough, can achieve no more in the cause of freedom than an army of privates without officers; that commercial opulence and habits of sober judgment have been destroyed, never to revive; that a thirst for excitement everywhere prevails, and general selfishness disgraces the nation; that religion has never resumed its sway over the influential classes; that rank has ceased to be hereditary, and, having become the appanage of office only, is a virtual addition to the power of the sovereign; and that the general depravity renders indispensable a powerful centralized and military government. In what respect does this state of things differ from the institutions of China or the Byzantine Empire? "The Romans," says Gibbon, "aspired to be equal: they were levelled by the equality of Asiatic servitude."

Reasons which must prevent it.

And yet, what are all these fatal peculiarities in the present political and social condition of France, but the effects of the very revolutionary measures which were the object of such unanimous support and enthusiasm at its commencement? This was the expedience for which the crimes of the Revolution were committed! For this it was that they massacred the king, guillotined the nobles, destroyed the Church, confiscated the estates, rendered bankrupt the nation, denied the Almighty! to exchange European for Asiatic civilization! to destroy the elements of freedom by crushing its strongest bulwarks, and, by weakening the restraints of virtue, render unavoidable the fetters of force! Truly their sin has recoiled upon them; they have indeed received the work of their own hands. Mr. Burke long ago said, "that without a complete and entire restitution of the confiscated property, liberty could never be re-established in France." And the justice of the observation is now apparent, for by it alone could the elements and bulwarks of freedom be restored. But restitution, it will be said, is now impossible; the interests of the new proprietors are too immense, their political power too great; the Restoration was based on their protection, and they cannot be interfered with. Very possibly it is so; but that will not alter the laws of Nature. If Reparation has become impossible, RETRIBUTION must be endured; and that retribution, in the necessary result of the crimes of which it is the punishment, is the doom of Oriental slavery.

CHAPTER LXXVI.

AMERICA—THE NEUTRAL QUESTION—AND WAR WITH THAT POWER.

ARGUMENT.

Vast Outlet provided for Mankind in the American Continent.—Enchanting Aspect of the West India Islands.—Character of North America.—Geographical Division of the United States.—The Prairies and Rocky Mountains.—Description of Mexico.—Its vast Agricultural Riches, and Capacity for Mankind.—Physical Description of Canada.—Its superficial Extent, probable Resources, and Vegetable Productions.—Immense Rivers of Central America.—The Delta of the Mississippi.—Primitive Forests of the Southern Provinces.—Character of the American Indians.—Their striking Peculiarities of Disposition.—Extraordinary Growth of the Anglo-Saxon Race in the New World.—Prospects of its future Growth.—Prodigious Increase in the Valley of the Mississippi.—Immense Stream of Emigration across the Alleghany Mountains.—First Settlers, or Squatters.—Their Habits and Modes of Life.—Striking Appearance of the Growth of Cultivation in the Forest.—Extraordinary Progress of the Stream of Emigration.—Effect of Steam Navigation and Paper Credit upon the United States.—Their vast Paper Circulation.—Dreadful Danger with which it has been attended.—General Well-being of the People.—Proportion of the Agriculturists and other Classes in Great Britain and America.—General Attachment of Mankind to their Native Seats.—Universal migratory Turn of the Americans.—Causes of this Peculiarity.—Effect of the prodigious Rise in the Value of Land in the newly-cleared Parts of the Country.—Extraordinary Activity of the Americans.—Their ardent and impetuous Character.—Universal Discontent which prevails among all Classes.—General Thirst for Wealth.—Commercial Cities of the Union.—Progress of American Commerce and Shipping.—Their present Military Establishments, and Naval Force.—Revenue and Expenditure of the Government.—Sketch of the American Constitution.—The Senate and House of Representatives.—Their Formation and Power.—Powers of the President.—Sovereignty of the People.—Religion in the United States.—Want of any Provision for a National Clergy.—Ruinous Effect of the Dependance of the Clergy on their Flocks.—How has this Democratic System worked?—Irresistible Power of the Majority.—Total Absence of Originality, or Independence of Thought.—Prodigious Effects of the Revolutionary Law of Succession.—Spoliation already effected of the Commercial Classes.—Insecurity of Life and Order in America.—Peculiarity of the American Cruelties in this respect.—External Weakness of the Americans.—General Banishment of the highest Class of Talent from the Public Service.—State of Dependance of the Bench.—Literature and the Press.—Great Extent of Slavery in the United States.—Vehement Resistance made to its Abolition.—Manners in America.—How has America escaped the political Dangers incident to its Situation?—Political State of Canada and its Population.—Loyalty of the Canadians.—The *Habitans* of Lower Canada.—Ruinous Effect of the Constitution of 1791.—Vast Importance of the North American Colonies to Great Britain.—Real Causes of the disastrous Issue of the late American War.—Effect of these Causes on the War.—Efforts of Washington to maintain Peace with Great Britain.—Progress of the Maritime Dispute with America.—The Berlin and Milan Decrees, and British Orders in Council.—Effect of these Decrees on the Neutral Trade.—Origin of the Differences with America.—Mr. Erskine's Negotiations with Mr. Madison; which the British Government refuses to ratify.—Storm of Indignation in the United States at their Disavowal.—Neither France nor England will repeal their obnoxious Decrees.—Affair of the Little Belt and President.—Threatening Aspect of the Negotiations.—Violent Measures of Congress in preparing for War.—Diminutive Scale of their Hostile Preparations.—Reflections on this Circumstance.—Invasion of Canada by General Hull, and his Surrender.—Armistice on the Frontier, which is disavowed by the American Government, and Dissatisfaction which it excites.—Total Defeat of the Americans at Queenstown.—A third Invasion of Canada is repulsed.—Success of the Americans at Sea.—Capture of the Guerriere by the Constitution.—Action between the Frolic and Wasp.—Capture of the Macedonian by the United States; and of the Java by the Constitution.—Desperate Defence of the Former.—Capture of the Peacock by the Hornet.—Prodigious moral Effect of these Victories of the Americans.—Reflections on the Causes to which they were owing.—Vigorous Efforts made in England to repair the Disasters.—Great Effect of these Efforts, and Supineness of the American Government in recruiting the Navy.—The Shannon and Chesapeake.—Approach of the two Vessels to each other.—The Chesapeake is carried by Boarding.—Desperate Conflict on her Quarterdeck.—Great moral Effect of this Victory.—Combats of lesser Vessels: The Boxer and Enterprise, and Pelican and Argus.—Actions in Chesapeake Bay.—Operations by Land, and Preparations by the Americans for carrying on the War.—Invasion and Defeat of General Winchester, and Capture of Fort Ogdenburg.—Capture of York, the Capital of Upper Canada, by the Americans.—Great Efforts of both Parties on the Lakes.—Defeat of the Americans on the Miami, by General Proctor.—The Americans effect a Landing on the Niagara Frontier, of which they become entire Masters.—Abortive Attack by Sir George Prevost on Sackett's Harbour.—Surprise of the Americans at Forty Mile Creek, and Defeat of Boestler.—Fresh Loan, and new Taxes imposed by Congress.—Surprise of Black Rock Harbour by the British.—Their Successes on Lake Champlain and at Plattsburg.—Repulse of the British at Fort Sandusky on Lake Erie.—The Americans acquire the Superiority on Lake Erie, and gallant Action of Captain Barclay there.—Defeat of General Proctor by the Americans on the Thames.—Indecisive Actions on Lake Ontario.—Operations in Lower Canada.—Defeat of General Wilkinson by Colonel Morrison.—General Retreat of the Americans, and Results of the Campaign.—Capture of Fort Niagara, Defeat of Hull, and Burning of Buffalo.—Maritime Operations of 1814.—Capture of the Essex by the Phœbe; of the Frolic by the British, and Reindeer by the Americans; of the President by the Endymion, and others.—Operations in Canada.—Symptoms of approaching Separation of the Northern States of the Union.—Repeal of the Embargo and Non-Importation Act.—President's Proclamation concerning Neutral Vessels.—Storming of Fort Oswego, and Failure at Sandy Creek.—Capture of Fort Erie by the Americans, and Battle of Chippewa.—Operations in the Chesapeake.—Battle of Bladensburg, and Capture of Washington.—Failure at Bellair; and of the Attack on Baltimore.—Lesser Actions in Canada.—Sir George Prevost's Expedition against Plattsburg.—Defeat of the Flotilla on Lake Champlain, and Retreat of the British Army.—Operations at Fort Erie.—Expedition against New-Orleans.—Bloody Battle before that Town, and Defeat of the British.—Proceedings of the Legislature of Massachusetts.—Negotiations at Ghent, and Treaty of Peace between America and Great Britain.—Reflections on this Contest.—Its disastrous Effects to the Americans.—On the Causes of the mutual Failures, and on future Hostilities between the two Countries.

Vast outlet for mankind in the American continent.

IF the friends of freedom are often led to despair of its fortunes amid the dense population, aged monarchies, and corrupted passions of the Old World, the Aurora appears to rise in a purer sky and with brighter colours in the other hemisphere. In those immense regions which the genius of Columbus first laid open to European enterprise, where vice had not yet spread its snares nor wealth its seductions, the free spirit and persevering industry of England have penetrated a yet untrodden continent, and laid in the wilderness the foundations of a vaster monument of civilization than was ever yet raised by the hands of man. Nor has the hand of Nature been wanting to prepare a fitting receptacle for the august structure. Far beyond the Atlantic wave, amid forests trod only by the casual passage of the savage, her creative powers have been for ages in activity: in the solitudes of the Far West, the garden of the human

race has been for ages in preparation; and amid the ceaseless and expanding energies of the Old World, her prophetic hand has silently prepared, in the solitude of the New, unbounded resources for the future increase of man.

Enchanting aspect of the West Indian islands.

There is a part of the New World where nature appears clothed with the brilliant colours, and decked out with the gorgeous array of the tropics. In the Gulf of Mexico the extraordinary clearness of the water reveals to the astonished mariner the magnitude of its abysses, and discloses, even at the depth of thirty fathoms, the gigantic vegetation which, even so far beneath the surface, is drawn forth by the attraction of a vertical sun. In the midst of these glassy waves, rarely disturbed by a ruder breath than the zephyrs of spring, an archipelago of perfumed islands is placed, which repose, like baskets of flowers, on the tranquil surface of the ocean. Everything in those enchanted abodes appears to have been prepared for the wants and enjoyments of man. Nature seems to have superseded the ordinary necessity for labour. The verdure of the groves, and the colours of the flowers and blossoms, derive additional vividness from the transparent purity of the air and the deep serenity of the azure heavens. Many of the trees are loaded with fruits, which descend by their own weight to invite the indolent hand of the gatherer, and are perpetually renewed under the influence of an ever-balmy air. Others, which yield no nourishment, fascinate the eye by the luxuriant variety of their form or the gorgeous brilliancy of their colours. Amid a forest of perfumed citron-trees, spreading bananas, graceful palms, of wild figs, of round-leaved myrtles, of fragrant acacias, and gigantic arbutus, are to be seen every variety of creepers, with scarlet or purple blossoms, which entwine themselves round every stem, and hang in festoons from tree to tree. The trees are of a magnitude unknown in northern climes; the luxuriant vines, as they clamber up the loftiest cedars, form graceful festoons; grapes are so plenty upon every shrub, that the surge of the ocean, as it lazily rolls in upon the shore with the quiet winds of summer, dashes its spray upon the clusters; and natural arbours form an impervious shade, that not a ray of the sun of July can penetrate. Cotton, planted by the hand of nature, grows in wild luxuriance; the potato and banana yield an overflowing supply of food; fruits of too tempting sweetness present themselves to the hand. Innumerable birds, with varied but ever splendid foliage, nestle in shady retreats, where they are sheltered from the scorching heats of summer. Painted varieties of parrots and woodpeckers create a glitter amid the verdure of the groves, and humming-birds rove from flower to flower, resembling "the animated particles of a rainbow." The scarlet flamingoes, seen through an opening of the forest in a distant savanna, seem the mimic array of fairy armies: the fragrance of the woods, the odour of the flowers, loads every breeze. These charms broke on Columbus and his followers like Elysium: "One could live here," said he, "forever." Is this the terrestrial paradise which nature seems at first sight to have designed; which it appeared to its heroic discoverer? It is the land of slavery and of pestilence; where indolence dissolves the manly character, and stripes can alone rouse the languid arm; where "death bestrides the evening gale," and the yielding breath inhales poison with its delight; where the iron race of Japhet itself melts away under the prodigality of the gifts of nature.*

Character of North America.

There is a land, in the same hemisphere, of another character. Washed by the waves of a dark and stormy ocean, granite rocks and sandy promontories constitute its sea-front, and a steril, inhospitable tract, from a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles broad, and eleven hundred long, presents itself to the labours of the colonist. It was there that the British exiles first set their feet, and sought amid hardship and suffering that freedom of which England had become unworthy.[a] Dark and mel-

* Malte Brun, xi., 727, 731. Tocq., i., 33. Descourtiz Descript. du Antilles, i., 265. Irving's Columbus, x., 269, 271. Bancroft, i., 92.

[a] To Mr. Alison's survey of North America, and to his narrative of the second contest between the United States and Britain, it has been adjudged proper to append some explanatory notes, to correct the inaccuracies which are found in the seventy-sixth chapter of his history. In the *North American Review* for April, 1843, Number cxix., a decision is announced which is so appropriate and convincing, that it is here introduced, to justify the attempt made in the ensuing additional illustrations, and the subsequent essay, to remove the false impressions which Mr. Alison's details and inferences unavoidably suggest. Mr. Alison maintains that a Democratic government is inherently mischievous, and therefore ought not to exist; and that a monarchy is necessarily beneficial, and should universally prevail. In the language of the critic, "He appears to maintain that a Democracy or a monarchy is a good or evil thing of itself, irrespective of the habits, condition, and general intelligence of the people among whom it is established. The most striking illustration of his argument, because it is the best known and the easiest to be studied, is found in the practical operation of the Republican institutions of this country."

"Mr. Alison's chapter on America is elaborate and interesting, though it is so slenderly connected—through the late war with Britain—with his main subject, the history of Europe during the French Revolution, that we suspect it would not have found a place in his work if it had not been for its intimate bearing on the political discussion into which he enters with so much earnestness. It is apparent that a strong bias existed in his mind when he first undertook a general summary of information respecting the condition, politics, and prospects of the United States. The lesson taught by American experience of a popular government was previously determined by his feelings and prejudices, and he investigated the subject in order to discover evidence only on one side."

The student of Mr. Alison's history is now advised of one fact, that the fidelity of the American edition may not unjustly be impeached. If the text in the reprint is compared with the London work, a difference appears in some paragraphs of the seventy-sixth chapter; but the alterations have been made by the request of the author himself, who transmitted to the publishers a manuscript entitled "Corrections and Addenda for the New Edition of Alison's History of Europe," volume iv., chapter lxxvi.

For the sake of distinctness, the following list is presented of the emendations which the author has made. The titles quoted are the topics specified in the marginal reference at the head of each paragraph.

Page 429. "Vast paper circulation of the United States."

Page 435. "Revenue and expenditure of the United States."

Page 438. "Want of provision for a national religion."

Page 440. "Total absence of originality or independence of thought." This whole paragraph has been remodelled and enlarged.

Page 444. "State of dependance of the bench."

Page 445. "Literature and the press."

Page 459. "Action between the Java and the Constitution."

These are the entire "*corrections and addenda*" which Mr. Alison deems it requisite to make to the original narrative. As the work already has been so extensively diffused, the very unimportant alterations which the author has proposed, and which, of course, are the only "*corrections*" that he adjudges essential, render the ensuing annotations, which are numbered from I. to XLII., indispensable. They will evince the truth of the sentiments already cited from the American critic. Only the more prominent misstatements will be noticed, although a few additional minor errors might have been rectified. As the author has solicited that this portion of his volume should be revised, "we have commented with perfect freedom on the mistakes which Mr. Alison has committed, and on the prejudices

ancholy woods cover the greater part of this expanse: the fir, the beech, the laurel, and the wild olive are chiefly to be found on the seacoast; but in such profusion do they grow, and so strongly characterize the country, that even now, after two hundred years of laborious industry have been employed in felling them, the spaces cleared by man appear but as spots amid the gloomy immensity of the primitive forest. Farther inland, the shapeless swell of the Alleghany Mountains rises to separate the seacoast from the vast plains in the interior; the forests become loftier, and are composed of noble trees, sown by the hand of Nature in every variety, from the stunted pine which strikes its roots into the ices of the Arctic Circle, to the majestic palm, the spreading planetree, the graceful poplar, and verdant evergreen oak, which overshadow the marshes of the Floridas and Carolina. The ceaseless activity of nature is seen, without intermission, throughout these pathless solitudes: the great work of creation is everywhere followed by destruction, that of destruction by creation; generations of trees are perpetually decaying, but fresh generations ever force their way up through the fallen stems; luxuriant creepers cover with their leaves alike the expiring and the reviving race; frequent rains, which almost everywhere stagnate amid the thickets, attracted by this prodigious expanse of shaded and humid surface, at once hasten decay and vivify vegetation; prolific animal life teems in the leafy coverts which are found amid these fallen patriarchs; and the incessant war of the stronger with the weaker strews the earth alike with animal and vegetable remains. The profound silence of these forests is occasionally interrupted only by the fall of a tree, the breaking of a branch, the bellowing of the buffalo, the roar of a cataract, or the whistling of the winds. It is the land of health, of industry, and of freedom; of ardent zeal, and dauntless energy, and great aspiration. In those forests a virgin mould is formed; in those wilds the foundations of human increase are laid; no gardener could mingle the elements of rural wealth like the contending life and death of the forest; and out of the decayed remnants of thousands of years are extracted the sustenance, the life, the power of civilized man.*

Geographical divisions of the United States.

The United States of North America extend from 70° to 127° west longitude, and from 25° to 52° north latitude. They embrace in the territories of the separate states 1,535,000 square miles, or about ten times the area of France, which contains 156,000; and seventeen times the British islands, which embrace 91,000; besides about 500,000 more in the unappropriated Western wilds not yet allotted to any separate state—in all, 2,076,000 square miles, or 1,328,896,000 acres, upward of two-and-twenty times the area of the British islands.† This immense territory is portioned out by nature into three great divisions, of which not a third has yet heard the hatchet of civilized man, by the two great chains of mountains, which, running from north to south, nearly parallel to the adjacent oceans, separate the Continent of North America, as it were, into a centre and two wings. These chains are the Alleghany and the Rocky Mountains. The former, gradually rising from the shores of the St. Lawrence and the frontiers of Canada, stretching southward to the Gulf of Florida, a distance of above fourteen hundred miles, dividing the seacoast, which first began to be cultivated by the European settlers, from the vast alluvial plains of Central America. The space between it and the sea is comparatively steril, and does not embrace above 200,000 square miles. It is beyond the Alleghanies, a comparatively low and shapeless range, seldom rising to five thousand feet in height, that the garden of the world is to be found. In the immense basins of the Missouri, the Ohio, and the Mississippi, to which the waters descend from the whole length of the Alleghanies on the east, and the vast piles of the Rocky Mountains on the west, are contained above 1,000,000 square miles, with hardly a hill or a rock to interrupt the expanse. Of this prodigious space, above six times the whole area of France, and fully eleven times that of the British islands, two thirds, being that which lies nearest to the Alleghany range, is composed of the richest soil, in great part alluvial, in others covered with the virgin spoils of decayed forest vegetation during several thousand years. The remaining third stretches by a gentle, and almost imperceptible slope, to the foot of the Rocky Mountains.*

The Prairies and Rocky Mountains.

Gradually, as it approaches that stupendous barrier, the character of nature changes: charming savannas, over which innumerable herds of buffaloes range at pleasure, at first break the dark uniformity of the forest; wider and more open prairies next succeed, over which the trees are loosely sprinkled, and sometimes attain a prodigious size: naked and dreary plains are then to be traversed, in which a thousand rills meander, with imperceptible flow, towards the great river in the east, almost concealed amid gigantic reeds and lofty grass, which fringe their banks; until, at length, the vast and snowy ridge of the Rocky Mountains, rising in unapproachable grandeur to the height of fourteen and fifteen thousand feet, presents, apparently, an impassable barrier to the adventurous steps of man. Yet even these, the Andes of Northern America, which traverse its whole extent from Icy Cape to the Isthmus of Darien, do not bound the natural capabilities of its territory; on their western slopes, another more broken plain, furrowed by innumerable ravines, is to be seen, descending rapidly towards the Pacific, which embraces 300,000 square miles; its numerous and rapid streams give it an inexhaustible command of water power; its rivers, stored with fish, and in great part navigable, present vast resources for the use of man: its boundless forests and rich veins of mineral wealth point it out as the future abode of manufacturing greatness.†

Description of Mexico.

These are the great geographical divisions of the territory of the United States; but they do not comprehend the whole of the immense Continent of North America. MEXICO on the south, and the British provinces on the north, contain within themselves the elements of mighty empires, and are destined to

which so evidently have warped his judgment in respect to the nature and effects" of American institutions, and the present condition, with the future prospects of this Republic.

* Tocq., i., 34, 35. Malte Brun, xi., 184, 211. Balbi, 879, 920.

† The total territory of the United States, including the Floridas, is, according to Malte Brun, 313,000 square marine leagues, or about 3,000,000 square geographical miles; but that includes the portion covered by water, which is a fifteenth of the whole, and the desert tracts of the Rocky Mountains.—MALTE BRUN, xi., 185.

* Balbi, 935, 937. Malte Brun, xi., 185, 200.

† Balbi, 935, 939, 1012. Tocq., ii., 387. Malte Brun, xi., 185, 215. American Atlas, No. 6.

open their capacious arms for ages to come to receive the overflowing population of the Old World. The former of these possesses a territory of above a million of geographical square miles, thinly populated at this time by nearly eight millions of inhabitants,* yielding just eight to the square mile; while in England the proportion to the same space is three hundred. The Rocky Mountains run like a huge backbone through its whole territory from north to south, rising here to stupendous volcanic peaks, which in some places attain the height of sixteen and seventeen thousand feet.† These mountains, which spread their ramifications through a great portion of the country, are stored with the richest veins of gold and silver; and these minerals are in great part found, not at the shivering elevation of ten or twelve thousand feet above the sea, as in South America, but at the comparatively moderate height of three or four thousand. Vast lakes, most of which are rapidly filling up, are to be found in many of the lofty valleys; and plateaus or table-lands of prodigious extent, like so many successive steps of stairs, from the seashore to the Cordilleras, give every variety of climate, from the warmth of the tropics to the borders of everlasting snow.‡

Vast agricultural riches, and capacity for mankind.

If great part of the country is rocky, parched, and steril, ample compensation is afforded in the surpassing fertility of the lower valleys of the other districts. Humboldt has told us that he was never wearied with astonishment at the smallness of the portion of soil which, in Mexico and the adjoining provinces, would yield sustenance to a family for a year, and that the same extent of ground, which in wheat would maintain only two persons, would yield sustenance under the banana to fifty; though, in that favoured region, the return of wheat is never under seventy, sometimes as much as a hundred-fold.§ The return, on an average, of Great Britain, is not more than nine to one. If due weight be given to these extraordinary facts, it will not appear extravagant to assert that Mexico, with a territory embracing seven times the whole area of France, may at some future, and possibly not remote period, contain two hundred millions of inhabitants. But notwithstanding all these advantages, it is more than doubtful whether the Spanish race is destined to perpetuate its descendants, or, at least, retain the sovereignty in this country. Compared with the adjoining provinces of America or Canada, it appears struck with a social and political palsy. The recent successful settlement of a small body of British and American colonists in Texas, a Mexican province, their easy victory over the Mexican troops, and the rapid growth of their republic, may well suggest a doubt whether priority of occupation and settlement will not in this instance, as it has done in many others, yield to the superiority of race, religion, and political character; and whether to the descendants of the Anglo-Saxon settlers is not ultimately destined the sceptre of the whole North American Continent.*

Physical description of Canada.

Canada, and the other British possessions in North America, though apparently blessed with fewer physical advantages, contain a nobler race, and are evidently reserved for a more lofty destination. Everything there is in proper keeping for the development of the combined physical and mental energies of man. There are to be found at once the hardihood of character which conquers difficulty, the severity of climate which stimulates exertion, the natural advantages which reward enterprise. Nature has marked out this country for exalted destinies; for if she has not given it the virgin mould of the basin of the Missouri, or the giant vegetation and prolific sun of the tropics, she has bestowed upon it a vast chain of inland lakes, which fit it one day to become the great channel of commerce between Europe and the interior of America and eastern parts of Asia. The River St. Lawrence, fed by the immense inland seas which separate Canada from the United States, is the great commercial artery of North America. Descending from the distant sources of the Kaministiquia and St. Louis, it traverses the solitary Lake Winnipeg and Lake of the Woods,♭ opens into the boundless expanse of Lake Superior, and after being swelled by the tributary volumes of the Michigan and Huron waves, again contracts into the River and Lake of St. Clair; a second time expands into the broad surface of Lake Erie, from whence it is precipitated by the sublime cataract of Niagara into "wide Ontario's boundless lake," and again contracting, finds its way to the sea by the magnificent estuary of the St. Lawrence, through the wooded intricacies of the Thousand Islands. Nor are the means of water navigation wanting on the other side of this marvellous series of inland seas. The Rocky Mountains, sunk there to five or six thousand feet in height, contain valleys capable of being opened to artificial navigation by human enterprise; no considerable elevation requires to be passed in making the passage from the distant sources of the St. Lawrence to the mountain feeders of the Columbia; the rapid declivity of the range on the western side soon renders the latter river navigable, and a deep channel and swelling stream soon conduct the navigator to the shores of the Pacific. As clearly as the Mediterranean Sea was let in by the Straits of Gibraltar to form the main channel of communication and the great artery of life to the Old World, so surely were the great lakes of Canada spread in the wilderness of the New, to penetrate the mighty continent, and carry into its remotest recesses the light and the blessings of Christian civilization.†

The superficial extent of the British posses-

* The numbers were 7,687,000 by the census of 1841.—*American Statistical Almanac for* 1841, 267.

† The following are the heights of some of the highest in the range:

	Feet.
Grand Volcano Popocatipell	16,584
Pic d'Orizaba	16,332
Sierra Nevada	14,166
Nevada de Taluca	14,184

—Humboldt, ii., 421; and Malte Brun, xi., 373.

‡ Malte Brun, xi., 363. Balbi, 1017, 1037.

§ Humboldt, iii., 29, 36; and ix., 150, 152.

* Malte Brun, xi., 363, 394. Balbi, 1017, 1037.

♭ I. In consequence of Mr. Alison's public request for information which might enable him to correct any errors in the seventy-sixth chapter of his History, Mr. Kent, the late Chancellor of the State of New-York, transmitted to the author a letter of remarks, which he has permitted to be transcribed for these notes. They not only contribute to amend the text, but corroborate, by his authoritative testimony, the corrections and decisions upon the multiplied topics which had previously been prepared for this American edition of Mr. Alison's work.

On the above delineation of the course of the River St. Lawrence, Judge Kent remarked, "This is not so. The waters of the Rainy Lake run west into the Lake of the Woods, and the waters of that lake are forced headlong, by rapids and cascades, into Lake Winnipeg, and from that lake issues Nelson River, which runs into Hudson's Bay."

† Malte Brun, xi., 139, 143. Balbi, 926.

Superficial extent, and probable resources of Canada.

sions in North America is prodigious, and greatly exceeds that which is subject to the sway of the United States; it amounts to above 4,000,000 of square geographical miles, or nearly a ninth part of the whole terrestrial surface of the globe.* Probably seven eighths of this immense surface are doomed to eternal sterility from the excessive severity of the climate, which yields only a scanty herbage to the reindeer, the elk, and the musk ox; but Upper and Lower Canada alone contain 300,000 square miles, of which 95,000 are in the upper and richer province; and, altogether, there are probably not less than 500,000 square miles in the British dominions in that part of the world capable of profitable cultivation, being more than six times the superficies of the whole British islands, if the wastes of Scotland, not less steril than the Polar snows, are deducted. Of this arable surface, about 130,000 square miles, or somewhat more than a fourth, have been surveyed, or are under cultivation. The climate is various, being much milder in the upper, or more southerly province of Canada, than in the lower; but in both it is extremely cold in winter, and surprisingly warm in summer. In the lower province, the thermometer has been known to stand in July and August at 93° of Fahrenheit, and it is usually from 80° to 90° in the shade; while in winter it is not unfrequently as low as —40°, so as to freeze mercury. But, notwithstanding this extraordinary variation of temperature, the climate is not only eminently favourable to the health of the European race, but brings to maturity, in many places, the choicest gifts of nature.†

Vegetable productions of the Canadas.

Vast pine forests, scantily intersected, in the vicinity only of the great rivers, by execrable roads, cover, indeed, nine tenths of the northern provinces, as of the corresponding districts of Russia and Sweden in the Old World; but they constitute no inconsiderable portion of the national wealth, for in them is found an inexhaustible store of timber, the exportation of which constitutes the great staple of the country, and employs four fifths of the eight hundred thousand tons of shipping which now carry on the trade between Great Britain and her magnificent transatlantic possessions. Even in Lower Canada, however, when you approach the basin of the St. Lawrence, the earth becomes fruitful, and yields ample supplies for the use of man: grain, herbage, potatoes, and vegetables grow in abundance; the almost miraculous rapidity of spring compensates the long and dreary months of winter; and the fervent heat of summer brings all the fruits of Northern Europe to maturity. In the upper province the winter is shorter and milder, and the ardent rays of the summer sun so temper the northern blasts, that the vine, the peach, and the apricot, as well as cherries and melons, ripen in the open air. In both, the same change took place which has been observed in Europe since the dark masses of the Hercynian Forest were felled,‡ and its morasses drained by the laborious arms of the Germans; and the climate, every season becoming more mild, has undergone a change of 8° or 10° on the average of the year, since the efforts of European industry were applied to the cultivation of their territory.

Immense rivers of Central America.

Although the rivers in the United States of America do not offer the same marvellous advantages for foreign commerce which the St. Lawrence and its chain of inland seas afford to the activity of British enterprise, they are inferior to none in the world in the immensity of their course and the volume of their waters, and present unbounded facilities both for the export of the produce of the soil and the marvellous power of steam-navigation. The greatest of these is the Missouri, the main branch of the vast system of rivers which drain the rich alluvial plain between the Alleghany and Rocky Mountains, and which, after a course of two thousand five hundred miles in length, empties itself into the Gulf of Mexico, below New-Orleans. Already a great river when it issues in the solitude of the Far West from the Rocky Mountains, its passage into the plain is worthy of the majestic character of the Great Father of waters. Between stupendous walls of rock, twelve hundred feet high, and three leagues in length, whose overhanging cliffs darken the awful passage, it issues forth in a deep and foaming current three hundred yards broad, and, soon swelled by other tributary streams, winds its long and solitary way through the prairies to the falls, sixty miles distant, which rival Niagara itself in sublimity and grandeur.* The Mississippi, the Ohio, the Tennessee, the Illinois, the Arkansas, the Kanses, the White River, the Red River, the St. Peter, the Ouisconsin, any one of which exceeds the Rhine or the Danube in magnitude, and which have given their names to the mighty states which already are settled on their shores, are but the tributaries of this prodigious artery. These various rivers, all of which are navigable, each with their own affiliated set of tributary streams, several thousand in number, form a vast chain of inland navigation, all connected together, and issuing into the sea by one channel, which, like the arteries and veins of the human body, is destined to maintain an immense interior circulation, and convey life and health to the farthest extremities of the million of square miles which constitute the magnificent garden of Central America.†

The Delta of the Mississippi.

If the majestic portals by which the Missouri issues from its icy cradle in the Rocky Mountains is one of the sublimest, the alluvial swamps through which it finds its way to the ocean in the Gulf of Mexico is one of the most interesting objects in nature. There one of the great formations of the earth is actually going forward: we are carried back to what occurred in our own continent before the creation of man. Like all other great rivers, the Missouri, or the Mississippi as it is there called, does not empty itself into the sea in one continuous channel, but in a great variety of arms or mouths, which intersect, in sluggish streams, the great alluvial Delta, which is formed by the perpetual deposite of the immense volume of waters which it rolls into the sea. Between these mouths of the river a vast surface, half land, half water, from fifty to a hundred miles in

* The exact amount is 4,109,630 square geographical miles. The terrestrial globe embraces about 37,000,000.—MALTE BRUN, xi., 179. Besides this land surface, British North America contains 1,340,000 square miles of water.—*Ibid.*

† Malte Brun, xi., 179, and 143, 145. Balbi, 1096, 1107.

‡ Malte Brun, xi., 143, 145. Annales des Voyages, xviii., 114, 126.

* They are, in all, 384 feet in height; the principal fall alone is 220 feet high, and about eight hundred broad. They are surmounted by lofty cliffs, and their roar is heard thirteen miles off. In a solitary tree on an island, in the middle of one of the falls, an eagle has built its nest.—LEWIS and CLARKE, ii., 347, 351.

† Malte Brun, xi., 296, 297, 192, 194. Lewis and Clarke, ii. and iii.

width, and three hundred in length, fringes the whole coast; and there the enormous mass of vegetable matter constantly brought down by the Mississippi is periodically deposited. A few feet are sufficient to bring it above the level of the water, except in great floods; and as soon as that is done, vegetation springs up with the utmost rapidity in that prolific slime. Nothing can be conceived so dreary, and yet so interesting, as the prospect of these immense alluvial swamps in the course of formation. As far as the eye can reach, over hundreds of square leagues, nothing is to be seen but marshes bristling with roots, trunks, and branches of trees. In winter and spring, when the floods come down, they bring with them an incalculable quantity of these broken fragments, technically called logs, which not only cover the whole of this immense semi-marine territory, but floating over it, strew the sea for several miles off to such an extent that ships have often no small difficulty in making their way through them. Thus the whole ground is formed of a vast network of logs, closely packed and rammed together to the depth of several fathoms, which are gradually cemented by fresh deposites till the whole acquires, by degrees, a firm consistency. Aquatic birds, innumerable cranes and storks, water serpents, and huge alligators, people this dreary solitude. In a short time a sort of rank cane or reed springs up, which, by retarding the flow of the river, collects the mud of the next season, and so lends its share in the formation of the delta. Fresh logs, fresh mud, and new crops of cane, go on for a series of years; in the course of which, the alligators in enormous multitudes fix in their new domain, and extensive animal remains come to mingle with the vegetable deposites. At length, as the soil accumulates and hardens, a dwarfish shrub begins to appear above the surface; larger and larger trees succeed with the decay of their more stunted predecessors; and at length, on the scene of former desolation, the magnificent riches of the Virginian forest are reared.*

Primitive forest of the Southern provinces.

Would we behold what this barren marsh, at first the abode only of serpents and alligators, is destined one day to become under the prolific hand of nature? Enter that perfumed and verdant forest, where, on the shores of the rivers of Florida and Virginia, the marvellous riches of nature are poured forth with a prodigality of which, in more northern climates, scarcely a conception can be formed. So rapidly does vegetation there grow out of the water, that, in navigating their rivers, thickets and woods seem to be floating on its surface. The magnificent scarlet blossoms of the *Lobelia cardinalis*, and the gigantic perfumed white petals of the *Pancratima* of Carolina, attract the eye, even in the midst of the endless luxuriance of marsh vegetation. High over head the white cedar towers, and furnishes in its dense foliage a secure asylum for the water eagle and the stork; while wild vines cluster up every stem, and hang in festoons from tree to tree, and every branch in the lower part of the forest teems with luxuriant creepers, often bearing the most splendid flowers. In the natural labyrinths formed in these watery forests spots of ravishing beauty are often to be found which might tempt the pilgrim to fix his abode, did not the pestilential air of autumn forbid for a long period the residence of civilized man. But these dangers diminish as the soil becomes higher and more consistent; human perseverance embanks the rivers and excludes the flood; and in no part of the world, when this is done, does such exuberant fertility reward the labour of the husbandman.

Character of the American Indians.

The immense regions of North America were not wholly uninhabited when Columbus first approached their shores. Sprung originally from the neighbouring tribes of Asiatics who inhabited the most eastern portion of the Old World, and whom accident or adventure had wafted across Behring Straits, its inhabitants have gradually spread over the whole extent of the American Continent in both hemispheres, from Icy Cape to Cape Horn. Tradition, universal and unvarying, assigns the first origin of the American race to a migration of their fathers from beyond the Western Ocean: a connected chain of words, which float unchanged through the otherwise forgotten floods of time, may be traced from the tribes of the Caucasian range to the Cordilleras of Mexico and Peru. But climate and circumstances, those great moulders of the human character, have exercised their wonted influence upon the descendants of Shem, and presented in the North American savage a different specimen of the race of man from what the world has elsewhere exhibited. He is neither the child of Japhet, daring, industrious, indefatigable, exploring the world by his enterprise, and subduing it by his exertions; nor the offspring of Ishmael, sober, ardent, enduring, traversing the desert on his steeds, and issuing forth at appointed intervals from his solitudes to punish and regenerate mankind. He is the hunter of the forest; skilled to perfection in the craft necessary for that primitive occupation, but incapable of advancing beyond it. Civilization in vain endeavours to throw its silken fetters over his limbs; he avoids the smiling plantation, and flies in horror before the advancing hatchet of the woodsman. He does well to shun the approach of the European race; he can neither endure its fatigues nor withstand its temptations; and, faster than before the sword and the bayonet, his race is melting away under the fire-water, the first gift and last curse of civilization.

Their striking peculiarities of disposition.

Like the Germans in the days of Tacitus, the life of the North American is divided between total inactivity and strenuous exertion: after sleeping away months in his wigwam, he will plunge into the forest, and walk from eighty to ninety miles a day on a stretch for weeks; he will lie for days together in ambush waiting for an opportunity to spring upon his foe; and in following, sometimes for hundreds of miles, the trail of his enemies through the forest, he exhibits a degree of sagacity which almost appears miraculous. Enduring of privation, patient in suffering, heroic in death, he is wavering in temptation, and without honour in the field; his principle is ever to shun danger if possible, and never attack except at an advantage; and the man who can bear, without flinching, the most exquisite tortures, will often perish beside a barrel of spirits, which he wanted the resolution to resist. The language of these tribes is poetry;

* Duvallon's Colonie de Mississipe, 13. Captain Hall's America, iii., 336, 341. Malte Brun, xi., 272, 274, 196.

* Malte Brun, xi., 200, 203. Payne's Geog., iv, 418, 424. Drayton's South Carolina, 20, 28.

their ideas are elevated; the imagery of nature, amid which they live, has imprinted a majestic character on their thoughts; but like their companions, the beaver and the elk, they cannot be converted to the habits of laborious life; they adopt of civilization only its vices; their remains are fast disappearing under the combined influence of European encroachment and savage indulgence; already they are as rarely to be seen in New-York as in London; and before many ages have elapsed, their race, like that of the mammoth, will be extinct; and their memory, enshrined by the genius of Cooper, will live only in the entrancing pages of American romance.*

Extraordinary growth of the Anglo-Saxon race in America.

Two hundred years have elapsed since the British exiles, flying the real or imaginary persecutions of Charles I., first approached the American shores; and their increase since that time has been unparalleled for so considerable a period in any other age or part of the world. Carrying with them into the wilderness the powers of art and the industry of civilization; with English perseverance in their character, English order in their habits, and English fearlessness in their hearts; with the axe in their hand, the Bible in their pocket, and the encyclopædia by their side; they have multiplied during that long period in exactly the same ratio, and the different states of the Union now contain above seventeen millions of souls, of whom fourteen millions are of the Anglo-Saxon race.† The duplication of the inhabitants during this whole time has regularly occurred every twenty-three years and a half; it was the same under the British colonial as under the Republican independent government; evidently demonstrating that it has been owing to general and permanent causes altogether independent of the forms of constitutions. The negro inhabitants at this time are 2,874,378, of whom 2,487,113 are in a state of slavery; but though the black inhabitants increased from 1790 to 1830 faster than the white, yet the balance since that time has been rather turned the other way,‡ and, except in the most Southern States, the European race is increasing faster than the African.*

Prospects of the growth of the American population.

If this rate of increase should continue for the next hundred as it has done without the slightest variation for the last two hundred years, America will, by the year 1940, contain two hundred and seventy millions of inhabitants, or thirty more than all Europe west of the Ural Mountains at this time, which now are peopled by two hundred and forty millions. Prodigious as this increase of human beings is, it is by no means beyond the bounds of probability that it will be realized; for if the usual causes which retard the advance of mankind will, long ere that time arrives, have come into powerful operation over a great part of the Union, as they already have done in the states on the seacoast which were first colonized, yet the immense tracts of unappropriated rich land in the basin of the Mississippi will still communicate an unwonted impulse to the principle of population, and perpetuate, on the frontier of the desert, the prolific augmentation of the human race. Gradually, however, as the seacoast becomes an old-established and densely-peopled country, the temptation to European emigration will diminish, while its difficulties must increase; the expense of transporting a family from the shores of the ocean to the Far West will exceed that of conveying it across the Atlantic; the stream of European settlement will take some other direction, and the hundred thousand emigrants who now annually land on the American shores from the states of the Old World will disappear. But, whatever may be the rapidity of their increase, nothing is more certain than that the prolific powers of nature will keep far ahead of them; and that, great as is the surplus produce of the American agriculturists at this time, it will, if their society is undecayed, be far greater, in proportion to their population, a thousand years hence.†

Prodigious increase in the valley of the Mississippi.

Prodigious as has been this increase of population during so long a period in the whole American States, it is incomparably less than the growth of mankind in particular parts of this favoured quarter of the globe. In the basin of the Mississippi, by far the richest part, as already mentioned, of the states of the Union, the population has multiplied in the last fifty years no less than fifty-fold, having increased in that time from 112,000 to 5,385,000! This is probably the most extraordinary instance of well-authenticated human increase on record in the world.‡ It is far beyond the powers of multiplication which mankind possess from their own unaided resources;

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* Chateaubriand, Voyages en Amérique.

† The following is the increase of the American population since the first regular census was taken in 1790:

1790.	1800.	1810.	1820.	1830.
3,929,326	5,306,035	7,239,903	9,638,226	12,853,838

1840.
17,068,666

This rate of increase is exactly thirty four *per cent.* every ten years, being just the growth of population in Lanarkshire during the last ten years.—MALTE BRUN, xi., 346; *American Atlas*, No. 6; and *Census for* 1840; *Stat. Almanac*, 265.

The increase in America in the last ten years has been 4,202,646 inhabitants, being a growth of 34½ per cent. for the last ten years—less than the increase during the same period in some parts of Great Britain. In the following counties, from 1831 to 1841, the augmentation was,

Monmouth . .	36.9 *per ct.*	Lancashire . .	24.7 *per ct.*
Lanark . . .	34.8 "	Forfar . . .	22.0 "
Dumbarton . .	33.3 "	Surrey	19.0 "
Durham . . .	27.7 "	York (W. Riding)	18.2 "
Stafford . . .	24.2 "	Chester . . .	18.5 "

—*Population Returns*, 1841, *Great Britain*, p. 2, 3.

But the increase over the whole Empire, during these ten years, has been only 14 per cent., not half of what has occurred in America during the same period. Yet when it is recollected that at least from 50,000 to 60,000 persons annually, on an average, during the same time, have emigrated from the British islands and settled in the United States, it is probable that the increase in *births* in the two countries was not materially different; an extraordinary and portentous circumstance, when it is recollected that in the British islands population is about three hundred to the square mile, whereas in America it is only eleven, the area of the states being about 1,500,000 square miles.

‡ Census, 1841; and Tocq., ii., 329, 370.

* The following is the relative growth of population in the blacks and whites, from 1780 to 1840, in the slave states:

From 1790 to 1830, whites increased 80 per cent.
" " " blacks " 112 "

But since 1830 the proportion stands thus:

From 1830 to 1840, whites increased 30 per cent.
" " " blacks " 25 "

What is very remarkable, it appears from all the returns, that the white race is now gaining rapidly on the black in all the Northern States where slavery is abolished, and the black race is increasing most rapidly in the most southerly states: a state of things which leads to the hope that, in process of time, the black slave population will be entirely confined to the states bordering on the Gulf of Mexico.—See CAREY'S *Letters on Colonization of Society*, 1833; TOCQUEVILLE, ii., 239; and *Population Returns*, 1840.

† Alison's Population, i., 60, 62.

‡ The following table exhibits the growth of population in the provinces in the basin of the Mississippi since 1790. It almost exceeds belief:

and is mainly to be ascribed to the vast influx of immigrants into those fertile regions, both from the states of the Union on the shores of the Atlantic, and the more distant British islands. The number of persons who annually settle in the United States of America from Great Britain and Ireland is, on an average, nearly fifty thousand.* At New-York, it is no unusual thing to see five thousand landed in a single week; and great numbers of those who land at Quebec or Montreal, attracted by the fertility of the backwoods of America, make their way across the border. And almost the whole of this vast multitude no sooner arrive on the shores of America than they crowd away to the back settlements, and seek the prodigious flood of civilization which is overspreading the banks of the Ohio. To these are to be added a still greater stream of immigration from America itself: for clearly marked as is the tendency of emigration from Europe, and especially from the British islands, to the American shores, it operates not less forcibly in directing mankind from the margin of the Atlantic, across the Alleghany Mountains, into the vast and untrodden solitudes of the West. Such has been the growth of the human species in that fertile territory, that the states in its great alluvial surface, though they only began to be seriously cultivated in 1790, contain now above five millions of inhabitants; and from the vast rapidity of their increase, compared with that of the other states in the Union, it is no longer matter of doubt that in less than twenty years their representatives will have a preponderating voice in the National Legislature.†

Immense stream of immigration across the Alleghany Mountains.

There is something solemn and almost awful in the incessant advance of the great stream of civilization, which in America is continually rolling down from the summits of the Alleghany Mountains, and overspreading the boundless forests of the Far West. Vast as were the savage multitudes which ambition or the lust of plunder attracted to the standards of Timour or Gengis Khan, to oppress and overwhelm the opulent regions of the earth; immense as were the swarms which for centuries issued from the cheerless plains of Scythia to insult or devastate the decaying provinces of the Roman Empire; they were as nothing compared to the ceaseless flood of human beings which is now, in its turn, sent forth from the abodes of civilized man into the desert parts of the world. No less than three hundred thousand persons, almost all in the prime of life, now yearly pass the Alleghany Mountains, and settle on the banks of the Ohio or the Arkansas, and their tributary streams. They do not pass through, as the Tartar hordes, like a desolating fire or a raging torrent: they settle where they take up their abode, never to return. Their war is with the forest and the marsh, not the corrupted cities of long-established man. Spreading themselves out over an extent of nearly twelve hundred miles in length, these advanced posts of civilization commence the incessant war with the hatchet and the plough; and at the sound of their strokes, resounding through the solitude of the forest, the wild animals and the Indians retire to more undisturbed retreats. Along a frontier tract, above twelve hundred miles in length, the average advance of cultivation is about seventeen miles a year. The ground is imperfectly cleared, indeed, by these pioneers of humanity, but still the forest has disappeared under their strokes; the green field, the wooden cottage, the signs of infant improvement, have arisen; and behind them, another wave of more wealthy and skilled settlers succeed, who complete the work of agricultural improvement. The wild animals of the forest retire before this incessant advance of civilization; by a mysterious instinct, or the information of other creatures of their race, they become aware of the approach of the great enemy of their tribe; and so far does the alarm penetrate before the approach of real danger, that they are frequently found to commence their retreat two hundred miles in advance of the actual sound of the European hatchet.‡

First settlers, or squatters. Their habits and mode of life.

The first settlers, or squatters, who precede the arrival of regular colonists, constitute a most important class, peculiar to America, of whom no type had previously existed in the world. Consumed by an incessant desire to explore new territories, and skim the surface of the as yet virgin soil, they penetrate with dauntless courage into the wilderness; and, often several hundred miles in advance of the regular clearers of the forest, first make the woods resound with the crack of the rifle and the strokes of the hatchet. The profound solitude with which they are surrounded, the dangers from wild beasts and savage tribes to which they are exposed, the independent roaming life which they lead, possess charms which more than compensate to them for the loss of all the comforts and intercourse of civilized society. The desert attracts them as powerfully as it does the red man or the elk. Under pretence of choosing a more healthy abode, richer soil, or more abundant game, they push incessantly forward; and, advancing into the very depths of the forest or the prairie, gradually drive the native inhabitants of the wilderness before them. Adventurers of this description have often been known to penetrate a thousand miles

	1790.	1800.	1810.	1820.	1830.	1840.
Ohio	3,000	45,365	230,760	581,434	935,884	1,519,467
Kentucky	73,677	220,959	406,511	564,317	687,917	779,898
Indiana	....	4,875	24,520	147,178	343,031	685,866
Arkansas	....	....	....	14,273	30,388	212,267
Illinois	....	215	12,282	55,211	157,455	476,183
Tennessee	35,691	105,602	261,727	422,813	684,904	829,210
Missouri	....	....	20,845	66,586	140,455	383,702
Mississippi	....	8,850	31,502	75,448	136,621	97,574
Louisiana	....	....	76,556	153,407	215,529	352,411
Total	112,368	385,866	1,064,703	2,080,667	3,372,184	5,335,578

—*American Census in* MALTE BRUN, xi., 346; *American Atlas*, No. 6; *and Stat. Almanac*, 1841, 264.

* Table showing the number of emigrants who have landed at New-York alone, in the years undermentioned, from the United Kingdom.

1830	21,433	1833	16,109
1831	22,607	1834	26,510
1832	28,283	1835	26,540
1836	16,749	1838	34,009
1837	59,975		

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, viii., 199.

† Tocq. ii., 376, 377. Census of America, 1840.

‡ Tocq. ii., 274. Report of Cass and Clarke to Congress, February 4, 1829.

alone into the woods: in a small canoe, capable of being borne on the shoulders, they descend immense rivers, with no other equipments but a carabine, a bag of powder and shot, a tomahawk, a couple of beaver snares, and a large knife. If the first stragglers of the crowd approach in their rear, they move steadily on, ever far in advance of civilized life; and leave to succeeding and more permanent settlers the labour of felling the trees, of erecting the log-houses, of sowing the maize, and reaping the first fruits of the virgin riches of nature.*

Striking appearances of the progress of cultivation in the forests.

Few objects are more striking than the first appearances of regular cultivation in the midst of the aged magnificence of nature. They have been thus described by the masterly hand of an eyewitness: "Beside," says Chateaubriand, "an ancient cyprus-tree of the desert, is to be seen the spring of infant cultivation; the golden ears of the wheat wave over the fallen trunk of an oak, and the harvest of a season replaces the growth of ten centuries. Everywhere are to be beheld forests delivered over to the flames, sending forth clouds of smoke into the air, and the plough slowly making its way through their roots: land-surveyors, with their long chains, are measuring the desert, and marking out the first divisions of property on its surface; arbiters settle the disputed limits: the bird abandons its nest; the resting-place of the wild beast is converted into a log-house; and the strokes of the hatchet are the last sounds which are repeated by the echoes, which are themselves perishing with the forests which produced them." Gradually the powers of man assert their destined superiority over those of nature: man not only "replenishes the earth, but subdues it." In a few years the patriarchs of the forest disappear; a few indurated stems, which have withstood alike the fire and the axe of the woodsman, alone rise up above the level expanse of cultivation. The astonishing riches of a virgin soil, impregnated with the ashes of the forest which overshadowed it, reward fifty-fold even the rudest labours of cultivation; the smiling village, the church spire, the infant school, succeed; but with them are mingled the spirit shop, the hotel, the attorney's office; and civilization spreads its roots, with its blessings, its passions, and its vices.†

Extraordinary progress of the stream of emigration.

The violence of the mysterious impulse which thus impels the European race into the Western solitudes, appears in the strongest manner in all the public carriages which transport passengers to these distant regions. Thousands and tens of thousands every week in summer descend from the heights of the Alleghany to the margin of the streams, which promise them the means of passing to the distant regions of the West, all eager for an immediate conveyance to the land of promise. Difficulties cannot retard, dangers cannot deter them. With ceaseless activity and persevering courage, they make their way to the first steamboats, which carry them down the tributaries of the Ohio to that mighty river, and, without regarding the perils of the passage, or the numerous dangers of steam navigation, demand only to be instantly conveyed to the land of their hopes. Such are the multitudes that flock to these means of transport, and the universal anxiety to get forward, that even the sight of a high-pressure steam-engine blown up before their eyes has no effect in deterring others from instantly embarking in the perilous navigation. They ask only a cheap passage and quick voyage. For weeks and months together in summer, they stream down every road which descends from the Alleghany, and crowd to the quays where the steamboats take their passengers, almost rolling over each other in their anxiety to get forward. No sooner does a boat touch the quay than it is instantly filled with passengers; and, with scarcely any money in their pockets, and but little provender in their scrips, the hardy adventurers rush forward into the wilderness before them, and gain from the chase a precarious subsistence, till the first returns of cultivation afford them the means of support.*

Effects of steam navigation and paper credit on the United States.

Steam navigation is the vital means of communication, by which this extraordinary activity is conveyed into distant regions. The Ohio, the Mississippi, the Arkansas, and all their numerous tributary streams, are constantly navigated by steamboats. Nearly three hundred ply on the Mississippi alone; upward of five hundred are employed in the different rivers which convey this prodigious flood of immigration to the Western provinces of the Union. Without the assistance of this mighty agent, which alike aids the descending, and conquers the adverse stream, the progress of cultivation and the clearing of the forest must have been comparatively slow; propelled by its marvellous powers, the human race has advanced with the steps of a giant through the vast wilderness prepared for its reception. Steam navigation is to the Continent of America what the circulation is to the human frame; and the commercial wealth and paper currency of the great commercial cities on the shores of the Atlantic are the moving power in the heart which sets the whole circulation in motion.†

Vast paper circulation of the United States.

Immense has been the extent to which this powerful but perilous engine of advancement has been carried in the American Continent. From an inquiry set on foot in 1834, it appears that there were in the United States, at that period, five hundred and six banking establishments, independent of the National Bank of the United States at Philadelphia, which last issued notes to the amount of £3,300,000. The private banks issued notes to the amount of £16,200,000 more, making in all a paper circulation of £19,500,000, besides £10,000,000 in specie. This makes the total circulation at that period nearly £30,000,000, or nearly £2 a head to the whole free population; a proportion considerably greater than obtains in the British Islands, if the vast extent of the commercial dealings of this empire are taken into consideration.‡ This vast circulation is pushed into the farthest extremities of the states of the Union by means of the branch banks, which, like so many forcing pumps, disseminate the bank-notes through every village and hamlet it contains. Such is the competition of these branch banks for employment, that they are everywhere established on the frontiers of civilization, almost before the surrounding trees are

* Michaux, Voyage à l'Ouest des Monts Alleghany, 89, 91. Malte Brun, xi., 253, 254.

† Chateaubriand, Voyage en Amérique, 312. Malte Brun, xi., 206. Hall's America, iii., 281, 283.

* Tocq., iv., 274. Chevalier, ii., 23, 24. Alison on Population, i., 547. † Chevalier, ii., 24, 25.

‡ The total paper circulation of the United Kingdom of Britain is £42,300,000, and in gold and silver £33,000,000; in all, about £75,000,000.—M'CULLOCH's *Commercial Dictionary*.

felled. The discounting of bills is carried to an unprecedented extent. The law, indeed, in all the states has fixed eight per cent. as the maximum rate of interest; and, in most cases, it is only six; but the cupidity of lenders, combining with the necessities or speculative tendency of borrowers, very frequently breaks through that restraint, and fixes a higher rate, which is often excessive. One per cent. a month is a usual, three per cent. a month not an uncommon occurrence; and those immense profits at once tempt bankers to advance money to needy adventurers, and indemnify them for the numerous losses to which such perilous issues are liable.c So powerful an agent is this system of paper credit in forcing and maintaining the industry of the United States, that its influence may be seen in the farthest parts of their possessions; and it is to the greater advantages they enjoy in this respect, more than any other cause, that the superior population, wealth, and cultivation of the southern side of the St. Lawrence and lakes, to that which appears on the British side of those noble estuaries, is to be attributed.*d

He was a wise man who said that paper currency is strength in the outset, but weakness in the end; and America has more than once bitterly felt the truth of this aphorism. The commercial and monetary crisis to which she has long been subject have been such, that they would have crushed, perhaps forever, the industry of any other nation. During the war with Great Britain in 1814, the commercial distress was such, that the whole Northern States, including New-York, the commercial capital of America, were on the very point of breaking off from the Union; and it was computed that at least two thirds of the whole traders in the states became insolvent. In the course of the great crisis of 1837, nearly all the cotton-growers in the Southern States became bankrupt together; in the still more disastrous convulsions of 1839, the whole banks of Philadelphia and the Southern States, including the National Bank of the United States, at once stopped payment; those of New-York only avoided a similar catastrophe by a contraction of credit, not less disastrous; and such was the effect of these repeated shocks upon the national fortunes, that the exports of Great Britain to the United States, which in 1836 had reached £12,425,604, in 1837 were only £4,695,225, and in 1838 £7,585,760. But these dreadful catastrophes, which would overwhelm any state in the Old World with a mass of pauperism from which it could scarcely recover, cast but a passing cloud over the fortunes of the New. The vast flood of British emigration; the constant increase of population, and consequent rise in the value of every species of property, even without any exertion on the part of its owners; the continual forward expansion of cultivation, in a very short time obliterate the effects of all these disasters. So boundless are the resources of the country, that no human catastrophes seem capable of arresting them: in a few months, a new race of traders succeed those in New-York or Philadelphia who have been swept away by the tempest: their bills, discounted at 12 *per cent.*, soon put them on the perilous road to affluence or ruin: their predecessors, who had sunk before the storm, are transported by the steamboats to the back settlements, where they speedily enter, with exemplary vigour, upon the labours of cultivation: the ladies of New-York and Pennsylvania, once delicate and languishing amid the frivolities of affluence, are seen, active and happy, amid the variety of rural or household employment; and the deserts of the Ohio are vivified by a fresh stream of intelligent emigrants, from the effect of those very commercial catastrophes, which, to distant spectators, appear to shake to its centre the whole fabric of industry in the New World.*

Dreadful disasters with which it has been attended.

This marvellous rapidity of increase has hitherto not only been unattended with any addition to human suffering, but it has taken its rise rather from the prodigious extent to which, owing to the combined bounty of nature and efforts of man, general prosperity has been diffused through all classes of the community. Among the many marvels which strike a European traveller on his first approach to the United States, one of the most extraordinary is the general well-being which pervades all classes of the community. Pauperism, indeed, exists to a most distressing

General well-being of the people.

c II. Mr. Alison has partly corrected the statement above, by omitting the words "the law allows any rate of interest agreed on by the parties to be taken." But the alteration does not render our note irrelevant, as the impression yet made by the statement is fallacious. Upon the inaccuracy of the text Judge Kent wrote, and the testimony of that eminent jurist is unquestionable: "In all the Atlantic States there are laws fixing the rate of interest, and making void, and generally penal, any conventional excess. The statutes against usury are strictly enforced by the courts, though in the commercial cities juries are much prejudiced against the plea. There was a statute in Alabama in 1818, allowing any conventional interest, but it operated very oppressively, and was repealed." Moreover, the narrative altogether is not sufficiently limited, for it is not applicable to the ordinary condition of mercantile affairs. In all cases of that irregular character, the present certain discount is considered to be no more than a fair equivalent for the great risk of prospective defalcation. Part of the narrative, respecting the premium rate of interest, is decidedly incorrect, as is evinced by the decision already presented; but the mistakes may have arisen from the entire publicity of all ordinary transactions in the United States, and the influence of party perversions of truth. The laws of each state determine the rate of interest within their own jurisdiction; and the forfeiture of the whole debt is the statute-penalty for exacting illegal interest.

* Chevalier, i., 392, 394.

d III. The cause assigned by Mr. Alison for the "superior population, wealth, and cultivation of the southern side of the River St. Lawrence and the lakes," when contrasted with "the British side of those noble estuaries," is altogether imaginary and delusive. Lower Canada originally was settled a few years prior to the first landing of the Puritan Pilgrims on Plymouth Rock. The Canadian colony, during one hundred and fifty years, was sustained by the authority and opulence of the French government, aided by the papal ecclesiastical power and revenues. Notwithstanding, until the vast flood of British emigration commenced its movement across the Atlantic, Lower Canada was the castle of superstition and ignorance, and the abode of social wretchedness. On the contrary, in spite of all the "hardship and sufferings," amid that "steril, inhospitable tract of granite rocks and sandy promontories," within twenty years from the arrival of the "MAY-FLOWER," so far as the Anglo-Saxon citizens extended, New-England developed the identical characteristics which it exhibits at this day. The land of the Puritan Pilgrims is distinguished from every other portion of our habitable globe as the *domicil of Christian freedom, intelligence, morality, and comfort!* "Paper credit," or, to use a more exact term, the banking system, was unknown on both sides of the St. Lawrence and the lakes until after the exclusion of the British sway from the United States. Therefore, other causes must be found for the fact that the *habitans* of Canada are just THREE centuries, at least, *behind* the descendants of those "British exiles," to use Mr. Alison's own diction, who sought in New-England, amid "hardship and suffering, that freedom of which England had become unworthy." That short sentence includes the solution of the entire mysterious contrast. Religious bondage crushed the French Canadians almost to extinction—religious freedom gave life and energy to the Puritans.

* Tocq., iv., 557. Chevalier, i., 117, 124.

extent in many of the first-peopled states along the seacoast, and nearly all the great commercial towns of the Union: poor's rates are in consequence generally established, and benevolence is taxed nearly as severely as in the old monarchies and dense population of the European nations.e But these are the exceptions, not the rule. In the rural districts, and especially in the states which lie in the basin of the Mississippi, there is scarcely a working man who does not eat butcher meat twice a day; and so great is the universal demand for labour, that common workmen everywhere receive from sixteen to twenty shillings a week: skilled labourers, such as masons and carpenters, from thirty to forty shillings for their ordinary wages. Such is the magnitude of these gains as compared with the cost of food, clothing, and other necessaries, that a common workman, with ordinary prudence, is able in two years to lay by enough to purchase and stock a little freehold of twenty or thirty acres; and at the end of two years more, the return of the few acres which he has cleared and sown is so considerable as to place him and his family, not only beyond the reach of want, but on the fair road to rustic opulence. The old observation of Adam Smith still holds good, that in America a widow with eight children is sought after and married as an heiress; and, as in the days of the patriarchs, the greater the number of arrows in the quiver of the American cultivator, the greater is his strength in the gate.*

Progress of agriculturist and other classes in Great Britain and America.

It is the universal diffusion and extraordinary facility of acquiring property over all the states of the Union, which is the great cause of the coincidence of this astonishing increase, with the continued well-being of all the individuals, at least in the rural districts, of whom the population consists. Over the whole of America there is not to be found a single *farmer*, in the European sense of the word—that is, a cultivator who pays rent to a landlord for the ground which he occupies.* Every man is the proprietor of the land which he cultivates. Nine tenths of the population in the rural districts are engaged in the cultivation of the soil; and even taking into view the whole inhabitants of the Union, the cultivators are to the whole other classes of society put together, in the proportion of nearly *four to one*.† This fact is very remarkable, and affords the most decisive refutation of Mr. Malthus's celebrated principle of the increasing pressure of population on subsistence in the later stages of society, for in Great Britain, by the late census, the proportion lies just the other way: *one fourth* of the whole population engaged in agriculture, furnishing subsistence for the remaining three fourths, engaged in commerce and manufactures.‡ Nay, in America itself, the same law of nature is distinctly demonstrated; for while over the whole Union the cultivators are to the other classes as four to one, in the agricultural states beyond the Alleghany they are as *eight* to one.§ And yet, in Great Britain, anterior to the last five extraordinary bad seasons, subsistence, derived almost entirely from domestic cultivation, was not only abundant, but overflowing; and wheat, for the first time for a hundred years, was, in 1835, below forty shillings a quarter; while the average amount of foreign grain imported had been steadily diminishing ever since the commencement of the present century.‖ Thus, while on the virgin soil, and amid the boundless profusion of America, four culti-

e IV. This paragraph must be received with deductions. "*Poor's Rates*," in the Anglican sense of the term, are not established. As a distinct form of taxation, they are generally unknown. "Benevolence, in the great commercial towns of the Union, is taxed," although not so "severely" as is above implied. But whence flows the "pauperism that exists to a most distressing extent?" Not from the native American citizens. Almost all the "*paupers*" of every class and condition in the United States are from the British islands. Among the paupers who thus so severely tax benevolence, native American citizens are seldom found, unless, from perfect isolation in society, or decrepitude and disease, or old age, they are obliged to seek an asylum for medical relief, and the supply of food when strength has failed, and all friends have departed. The pauperism "along the Atlantic seacoast" in the United States is confined almost exclusively to the English and Irish, who have been sent away from their native land, that by their absence the parishes might save the "Poor's Rates." American citizens, ordinarily, are not amalgamated with that mass of pauperism! *Suum cuique*.

* Hall's America. Martineau's, Buckingham's, *passim*. Chevalier, i., 158.

* Tocq., iii., 47.

† The following is the proportion of the agricultural to the other classes of society in the United States in 1840:

Agricultural	3,717,756
Other classes, viz.:	
Mining	15,203
Commerce	117,575
Manufactures	791,554
Sailors	56,025
On Lakes	33,067
Learned Professions.	65,236
All other classes	1,078,660

‡ By the census of 1831, out of 3,414,175 families in Great Britain, 961,134, or nearly a fourth, only (282 in 1000) are employed in the products of food. By the census of 1841, the agricultural population has in many places declined, and the manufacturing everywhere immensely increased, and it will probably appear that hardly a fourth are employed in rearing food for the remaining three fourths.—PORTER, i., 59; and *Census* of 1831.

§ The following table shows the proportion of the agriculturists to the other classes in the states beyond the Alleghany Mountains. *Videlicet:*

States and Territories.	Agriculture.	Mining.	Commerce	Manufactures and Trades.	Sailors on the Ocean.	Sailors on the Lakes.	Learned Professions.	Total, not Agricultural.
North Carolina	217,095	589	1734	14,322	327	379	1086	
South Carolina	198,363	51	1958	10,325	381	348	1481	
Georgia	209,383	574	2428	7,984	262	352	1250	
Alabama	177,439	96	2212	7,195	256	758	1514	
Mississippi	139,724	14	1303	4,151	33	100	1506	
Louisiana	79,289	..	8549	7,565	1322	662	1018	
Tennessee	227,739	103	2217	17,815	55	302	2042	
Kentucky	197,738	331	3448	23,217	44	968	2487	
Ohio	272,579	704	9201	66,265	212	3323	5663	
Indiana	148,806	233	3076	20,590	89	627	2257	
Illinois	105,337	782	2506	13,185	63	310	2021	
Missouri	92,408	742	2522	11,100	39	1885	1469	
Arkansas	26,355	41	215	1,173	3	39	301	
	2,092,255	4260	41,369	204,887	3087	10,053	24,095	287,751

—*American Census*, 1841.

‖ Average of corn imported into Great Britain from 1800 to 1810, 600,468 quarters; 1810 to 1820, 458,578 quarters; 1820 to 1830, 534,992 quarters; 1830 to 1835, 398,509 quarters; 1835 to 1840,* 1,992,548 quarters.—PORTER'S *Progress of Nations*, ii., 145; and *Parl. Tables*, ix., 164.

* Five bad seasons in succession.

vators only maintain one person engaged in pursuits unconnected with agriculture, amid the dense and long-established population of Great Britain, one cultivator maintains four manufacturers and artisans: a fact which demonstrates, that so far from population, in the later stages of society, pressing on subsistence, the powers of agriculture daily, in such circumstances, acquire a more decisive superiority over those of population.*

General attachment of men to their landed possessions.

But in America there is one circumstance connected with the race of cultivators which is very remarkable, and altogether unparalleled in any other age or country of the world. In every other nation, the enjoyment of property, and engrossing of mankind in the cares of agriculture, has been found to be attended with the strongest possible attachment by the owners of the soil to the little freeholds which they cultivate; and nothing short of the greatest disasters in life has been able to tear them away from the seats of their childhood, and the spots on which their own industry and that of their fathers has been exerted. Mungo Park has told us how strong this feeling is in the heart of Africa among the poor negroes: "To him no water is sweet but that which is drawn from his own well, and no shade refreshing but the tabba-tree of his native dwelling. When carried into captivity by a neighbouring tribe, he never ceases to languish during his exile, seizes the first moment to escape, rebuilds with haste his fallen walls, and exults to see the smoke ascend from his native village."† In Ceylon, Bishop Heber tells us, the attachment of the cultivators to their little properties is such that it is not unusual to see a man the proprietor of the hundred and fiftieth part of a single tree.‡ In France, the same principle has always been strongly felt; and Arthur Young long ago remarked that it continues with undiminished strength, though the freehold is reduced to the fraction of a tree; while in Canada local attachment operates among the *habitans* of French descent with such force, that instead of spreading out into the surrounding wilds, the cultivators divide and subdivide among their children the freeholds they have already acquired; population multiplies *inward*, not *outward*, and instead of spreading over and fertilizing the desert, it leads, as in Old France, to an infinite subdivision among the inhabitants of the land already cultivated.§

Universal migratory turn of the Americans.

In America, on the other hand, for the first time in the history of mankind, this strong and general feeling seems to be entirely obliterated. Though the labourers of that country have probably derived greater advantages from the cultivation of the soil than any other people that ever existed, yet they have no sort of attachment either to the land which they have acquired, or to that which they have inherited from their fathers. Not only is landed property almost always sold and divided at the death of the head of a family, but even during his lifetime, immigration from one spot to another is so frequent that it may be considered as the grand social characteristic of the American people. However long and happily a proprietor may have lived upon his little domain; though it may have been the sepulchre of his fathers, the playground of his infancy, the arbour of his wedded love, the nursery of his children; though it may be endeared to him by all the ties which can bind man to material nature, and the severance of which, in other countries, constitutes the last drop in the cup of the vanquished—an American is always ready to sell it, if he can do so for a profit; and putting himself and his family, with all his effects, on board the first steamboat, transport himself and his household to a distant part of the country, and commence again, perhaps at the distance of some hundred miles, the great and engrossing work of accumulating wealth. To turn money into land, and take root in the soil, and leave his descendants there, is the great object of ambition in the Old World; to turn land into money, and leave his children afloat, but affluent in society, is the universal desire in the New. This peculiarity is so remarkable, and so totally at variance with what had previously been ever observed in nations engaged in the cultivation of the soil, that it may be considered in a social point of view as the grand characteristic of society in the United States of America; and its present condition, at least beyond the Alleghany Mountains, cannot be so well characterized, in comparison with that of other countries, as by styling it the NOMADE AGRICULTURAL STATE.*

Causes of this peculiarity.

This extraordinary peculiarity appears to be mainly owing to three causes: 1. The universal passion for Democratic equality has led in practice to a universal division of landed estates among all the children equally, or with sometimes a double portion only to the eldest. The law allows a certain portion of the land to be otherwise disposed of by will; but primogeniture is so repugnant to general opinion that this power is hardly ever acted upon, and equal division is universal.*f* Hence a landed property is never looked to as a permanent family resting-place; it is merely a temporary lodging, to be used till the owner's death breaks it up into lots, or till he can get an opportunity of disposing of it to advantage. Hereditary feeling is unknown in America; even family portraits, pictures of beloved parents, are often not framed, as it is well understood that, at the death of the head of the family, they will be all sold and turned into dollars, to

* Alison on Population, chap. ii., 40, 53.
† Park's Travels, i., 247. ‡ Heber's Travels, ii., 247.
§ Young's Travels in France, i., 496. Tocq., ii., 204.

* Tocq., ii., 121. Chev., ii., 121, 123.

f V. The whole of this paragraph, commencing at "This extraordinary peculiarity," teems with errors both of assertion and of opinion; but they are so obvious that it is scarcely necessary to point them out. It is not the "passion for Democratic equality" that has led to the universal division of landed estates; the causes of this policy are, 1. Justice, which is violated by impoverishing all the younger children to enrich one; and, 2. Knowledge of the social and political evils occasioned by the law of primogeniture; evils of which England furnishes the proof, and which English writers have exposed and denounced. *Vide* Gibbon, Gillies, Hume, and especially Smith, in his "Wealth of Nations."

What is said of landed property as a permanent resting-place, and of family portraits, &c., must be taken as a mere figure of speech. There are instances of its truth, and many others of its utter inaccuracy.

Agriculture never was regarded in the United States as a *vulgar* occupation, except by the same class of ill-informed and ill-judging people that so consider it in England and in Europe. Among intelligent people here, as there, it is accounted the most honourable; and this sentiment is daily becoming more general.

The rest of the paragraph shows Mr. Alison to be ill-informed on the subject of which he is writing.

For better views as to the whole of this matter, may be consulted with advantage, "Democracy," by George S. Camp, and "Essays on Property and Labour," by Francis Lieber.

be divided among the children. 2. Agriculture being the general, and in many places almost only profession, it is regarded as a *vulgar* occupation; the aristocracy, except in Virginia and the Carolinas, where primogeniture has more strongly taken root, is never to be found among the landowners any more than among the merchants: the little freeholders on the Ohio and the Mississippi are the grand support of the extreme Democratic party; the Conservative cause is upheld only by the merchants of New-York, Philadelphia, and the other commercial towns on the coast; the Democratic cry there is not down with the landed, but down with the *paper* aristocracy. The whole clamour against paper currency, which has recently convulsed the Union, and in its effects brought insolvency upon three fourths of the whole trading classes throughout the country, was in reality a political movement; they wanted to destroy paper credit, and stop bank issues, because they knew perfectly that was the last citadel in which the influence of property was intrenched, and that when it was ruined the whole power of the state would be centred in numbers. The same instinct which roused such a fever in France against the noblesse, made the American Democrats run at the banks.*†

Effect of the continual rise in the value of land in the newly-cleared parts of America.

3. The prodigious rise in the value of property on the frontiers of civilization, in consequence of the felling of forests and spread of cultivation around it, offers a prospect of accumulating fortunes and amassing wealth, far beyond what can be obtained from the slow and regular returns of long-established agricultural industry. In the states in the basin of the Mississippi, if a man can only muster up a hundred dollars, and buy as many acres of land, he is certain that in ten years, by the mere lapse of time, and accumulation of population around him, it will be worth, with very little exertion on his part, five hundred or a thousand. Hence the universal fever to get on to the frontier, and by a cheap purchase of virgin land, at once reap the first fruits of the bounty of nature, and the first profits arising from the rapid multiplication of man. And truly, when we recollect that the population of the states to the westward of the Alleghany has augmented fifty-fold in the last half century, it may be conceived what prodigious profits must have been realized by all those who were fortunate enough first to get possession of the land; and we shall cease to wonder at the universal passion which, obliterating all recollections of home, infancy, and place of nativity, perpetually urges the American race towards the frontiers of civilization, the real El Dorado of the New World.

Extraordinary activity of the Americans.

Nothing is more remarkable in America than the universal activity and industry which prevail in all classes of society. That the Anglo-Saxon race, in Europe, is laborious, persevering, and energetic, need not be told to any one who witnesses the colossal fabric of British greatness, or the vast impression which England has made in every quarter of the globe. But, enterprising as it is in Great Britain, it is not influenced by such a restless spirit of activity, such a perpetual fever of exertion, as appears among its descendants in the New World. The vast facilities for the acquisition of fortune, which the prodigious increase of population, and boundless extent of fertile land, afford; the entire absence of all hereditary rank or property, which opens the career of power and distinction alike to every citizen; the engrossing thirst for gold, which springs from its being the only source of distinction, and the only durable basis of power, have combined, with the active and persevering habits which they have inherited from their Anglo-Saxon ancestors, to produce in the Americans a universal spirit of industry and enterprise to which nothing comparable has ever been witnessed among mankind. It is the fervour of Roman conquest, turned only to war with the desert; the fever of French democracy, yet "guiltless of its country's blood." In the British islands, if energy and perseverance distinguish the middle classes, labour and industry the lower, the higher ranks are often indolent or luxurious; and, with the graces of patrician manners, they have sometimes imbibed the selfishness and indolence of patrician wealth. But in America, all are in a state of activity. Every human being, except the pauper and the lunatic, is engaged in some profession.*

Ardent and impetuous character of the people.

The enterprise of the Americans, however, differs from that which, at least in former times, laid the deep and solid foundation of British greatness. It is far more vehement, ardent, and speculative. If it be true, as the Scripture says, that "he who hasteneth to be rich shall not be innocent," there are few blameless characters in the United States. The few idlers from Europe find themselves so useless and contemptible amid the general din of activity with which they are surrounded, that they are driven to exertion in their own defence. Wealth being universally felt to be the only passport either to influence, enjoyment, or consideration, it is everywhere sought after with an avidity unknown even in the most commercial states of the Old World. Speculations the most rash, enterprises the most dangerous, undertakings often the most absurd, are gone into with avidity, prosecuted with energy, and never abandoned in fickleness. If it turns out, as is not unfrequently the case, that the affair is of such a kind that it can by no possible effort be brought to a successful issue, it is abandoned in a state of bankruptcy: the speculators get on board steamboats, hurry away to the frontier, and commence anew, with undiminished energy, the great and all-important business of amassing wealth. Everything goes on at the gallop; neither society, nor the individuals who compose it, ever pause for an instant; new undertakings are incessantly commencing; new paths of life continually attempted by the unfortunate; successful industry ardently prosecuted by the prosperous. Projects of philanthropy, of commerce, of canals, of railways, of banking, of religious and social amelioration, succeed one another with breathless rapidity, and are all gone into with ardent zeal by the different classes of society, according to their inclinations and habits. A European, accustomed to the stillness of social life on the Continent, is almost stunned, when he lands at New-York, by the din with which he is surrounded; and even an Englishman, accustomed to the corresponding turmoil in which the com-

* Chev., i., 109, 201.

† We have felt the same in Great Britain. "To stop the Duke, go for gold."

* Chev., ii., 118, 123, 124. Tocq., i., 84.

mercial cities of his own country are involved, sees enough to convince him that an additional impulse has been communicated to his already active race, by the Democratic institutions and vast capabilities of the New World.*

Universal discontent in America.

At first sight, it would be supposed that a country such as this, possessing unbounded natural advantages, with unlimited power of elevation and means of advancement open to all, even the humblest of the community, and with no hereditary rank or arbitrary privileges to keep back or prefer any in the common race, must be not only one of the most rising, but one of the happiest in the world. Nevertheless, it is just the reverse; and this is the people of all others where at once general progress is the greatest, and private discontent the most universal. All classes and ranks are dissatisfied with their condition, and plod on in sullen discontent, which so strong as to be apparent in their [illegible] manners, even the expression of their countenances. The scholars are dissatisfied: they complain of the superficial character of their nature, and lament that its tone, instead of [illegible], is progressively sinking, with the extension of the power of reading to the working orders of society. The professional men are dissatisfied: they allege that their rank is lower than in Europe; that they are overshadowed by commercial wealth, and find no compensation in the esteem or respect in which their avocations are held, or the society, often imperfectly educated and ill-mannered, of which it is composed. The merchants are dissatisfied: they declare that they are worn to death by excessive toil; and are surrounded by such a multitude of competitors and slippery undertakings, that it is seldom that they can preserve their fortunes during their lives, and still more rarely that they can bequeath them in safety to their children. Even the mechanics and cultivators are dissatisfied; outwardly blessed beyond any other class that society has ever contained, they are ground down by the pressure of competition, and incessant thirst for riches and advancement—a thirst which not even the boundless capabilities of the basin of the Mississippi has been able to slake. In all this there is nothing surprising; individual dissatisfaction, and the desire to remove it by rising in the world, is at once the mainspring of the general progress, and the certain cause of private discontent in free communities. In despotic states all are contented, because none can get on; in democratic states none are contented, because all can get on; and thus it is that Nature, in mercy to her offspring, equalizes in all respects, save from inequality in virtue, the sum of human happiness.†

General thirst for wealth.

"Our present civilization," says Channing, "is characterized and tainted by a devouring greediness for wealth; the passion for gain is everywhere sapping pure and generous feeling, and raising up bitter foes against any reform which may threaten to turn aside the stream of wealth. I sometimes feel as if a great reform were necessary to break up our present mercenary civilization, in order that Christianity, now repelled by the universal worldliness, may come into near contact with the soul, and reconstruct society after its own pure and disinterested principles."* This is strictly true, and it is the necessary effect of those Democratic institutions which, by removing all other distinctions, concentrate the whole aspirations of the human mind upon this one object of ambition. But though beyond all precedent desirous of wealth, the American is far from being avaricious or tenacious in its disposal: like Catiline, he is "alieni appetens, sui profusus." In no country is wealth bestowed with a more lavish hand on all undertakings, public or private, promising a return for money, or [illegible] in a more generous spirit, to every [illegible] a religious or charitable description. [illegible] great towns can boast of noble establishments for education, public worship, and the relief of suffering almost entirely supported by private contributions which can vie with any in the world, both in the magnificence of their undertakings, and the benevolent ardour with which they are superintended and supported. It would seem as if the extraordinary facilities which they enjoy of getting wealth [illegible] them liberal and generous in its disposal: [illegible] most common cause of an avaricious disposition is the experience of difficulty in making [illegible].tg

Although [illegible]sion of America evidently is to people [illegible] been well termed "the Reserve of Nature," and her Democratic institutions and national character impel her people with such violence

Commercial cities of America.

* Channing's Letter to Birney, 1837.

† Chev., ii., 159. Buckingham's America, ii., 237, 248; and *passim*.

g VI. The descriptions of American character and life in the paragraphs entitled "*Activity of the Americans*," "*Character of the People*," and "*Thirst for Wealth*," are not correct. That the citizens of the United States are active and enterprising in the pursuit of pecuniary opulence, is indubitable; but the position thus announced is altogether inapplicable: "Wealth is the only passport to influence, enjoyment, or consideration, and is therefore sought after with an avidity unknown in the most commercial states of the Old World." That representation is totally disproved by ever-recurring facts in our national history. Wealth *alone* will not give any man influence or consideration in civil or religious society in this Republic, any farther than as schemes may be devised to obtain the use of his money for the purposes of gain or benevolence. The highest, as well as the subordinate offices in the Federal and state commonwealths, often are bestowed upon citizens so dependant, that the trifling salary paid for the fulfilment of the duties is an acceptable supply to procure the ordinary comforts of life. During the last half century, it is questionable whether an office was ever filled, through an election by the people, in which "wealth was the only passport" to it. In a large majority of cases, the possession of wealth constitutes a special barrier to civic official elevation. Mr. Alison's error in the whole of this paragraph is one most unbecoming in an historian; that of gross exaggeration. There is a foundation of truth in what he says of our eagerness for profitable employment and for the acquisition of wealth; but the manner in which he has *embellished* this truth, though pardonable in a novelist, a political orator, or even in a speaker before some promiscuous assemblage, whose object is rather to make an impression than to guide the reason or enlighten the mind, is altogether inconsistent with the gravity of history, and its earnest desire to describe the real.

Moreover, the sentences which so justly narrate the extent of education, public worship, and the institutions for the relief of penury and suffering, are so strictly true, that the eulogy nullifies the censure, so that his own discordant exhibitions demonstrate that one part of his description must be altogether incorrect.

On the nature of education in the United States, the reader is referred to the following works, from which the judgment of American citizens on that most important part of our social polity can correctly be ascertained: "History of Philosophy," from the French, by C. S. Henry, D.D.; "History of Education," by H. I. Smith; and "The Pleasures and Advantages of Science." Those works, which are scattered in every direction, expressly are adapted to elevate the minds of youth, and also of adults, above the withering pursuit of wealth, from the mere sordid impulse of avarice and worldliness.

* Chev., ii., 122, 124. Tocq., ii., 128, 130. Martineau, Society in America, iii., 40, 41.

† Martineau, iii., 40, 49. Chev., ii., 374.

towards that noble destiny, yet she is great, also, in her seaport towns and commercial activity. The very transit of such a multitude of emigrants, in their way to the land of promise in the West—the wants of such a vast and rapidly-increasing population—necessarily induce a very great foreign trade.* New-York, the commercial capital of America, already numbers three hundred and twelve thousand inhabitants, and, at its present rate of increase, will in twenty years have six hundred thousand; Philadelphia has two hundred thousand; Boston, Baltimore, New-Orleans [illegible] rapidly increasing, and will soon rival [illegible] commercial cities of the Old World. [illegible] dent spirit of enterprise, the insatiable [illegible] on for gambling adventures, by which the inhabitants of the United States are so peculiarly distinguished, occasion, indeed, periodical and rapidly-returning crises of commercial or monetary distress, and overwhelm the land with a flood of embarrassment exceeding anything ever experienced from [illegible] causes in the Old World. But these [illegible] catastrophes, though the cause of unbounded [illegible] suffering, produce apparently no sensible diminution in the general progress of their commercial activity. A new race of energetic adventurers [illegible] equally capable, equally daring, immediately succeeds that which had been swept away. The great [illegible] of private effort and public advancement continues with unabated vigour; the flame, apparently extinguished forever, burns up again with fresh brilliancy; wave after wave is broken on the shore, but the great flood-tide still streams forward, and rises higher and higher upon the beach.

Progress of American commerce and shipping.

The American seaman possesses all the hardihood and daring which have given to those of Great Britain the empire of the ocean, and is stimulated, in addition, by a spirit of adventure, a thirst for gain, exceeding that of his hardy progenitors on the wave. The progress of American foreign commerce has been more rapid for the last half century than that of England during the same or any former period. The same indomitable perseverance and inextinguishable passion for advancement which drives their race with such violence towards the Rocky Mountains, has sent them forth with equal vigour in the opposite direction, and impelled their sails into every creek and bay of the navigable seas. Their pendants are to be seen alongside those of England in every harbour of the world: in London and Liverpool, Petersburg and Constantinople; in the waters of Canton and the Gulf of New Zealand; amid the ices of the South Pole and on the frozen shores of Greenland. Individual adventure, private enterprise, have in so short a time achieved all these prodigies; the American commercial navy owes nothing to the encouragement or power of its government. The American shipmaster stretches across the Atlantic with a scanty crew and ill-equipped ship; indefatigable exertion, untiring watchfulness, supply the want of numbers; he takes in his cargo of tea at Canton, returns to New-York, sells it at a half-penny a pound cheaper than his British rival, and he is content.* It is in this minute attention to details and indefatigable vigour that the secret of the rapid progress of the American commercial navy is to be found. Yet is its value so considerable as to have now (1840) reached in exports the vast amount of 131,500,000 dollars, or £26,892,000, of which 113,000,000 dollars, or £20,220,000, is for the value of domestic produce. Their imports for the same year were 104,000,000 dollars, or £21,200,000 sterling. Both exports and imports have more than doubled in the last twenty years, a progress somewhat greater than [illegible] British foreign commerce has made during [illegible] me period.†

Their present naval establishment.

[illegible] merican navy at this time (1841) consists [illegible] ships of the line, and four [illegible] stocks, seventeen frigates, [illegible] one sloops, and twelve schooners [illegible] d brigs; no very formidable force for a [illegible] which boasts its ability to contend with Great Britain for the empire of the waves. The real strength of their marine is to be found in the [illegible]st and growing amount of their commercial vessels, and the vigour and courage which long training on the storms of the Atlantic have communicated to the already hardy and intrepid race of their seamen. The marine seamen of their whole states for the year 1841 was 56,000; a considerable commercial navy, from whence powerful supplies of sailors, already trained to the most material parts of their duty, may at all times be obtained. The pay they give to the seamen and *inferior* officers is very high; to the superior ones proportionally low; a peculiarity observable universally in the United States, where Democratic parsimony can only relax in favour of that class with which itself sympathizes, and from the comforts of which itself may benefit. Gunners receive £150 a year, boatswains £180, captains on duty only £625. The wages of common sailors, being four or five pounds a month, are so considerable as to attract a large portion of British seamen into their service, whom, from the identity of language and habits between the two states, it is impossible to distinguish; while the diminutive number of their ships, compared with those of Great Britain, renders it impossible for the latter power to attempt to vie with the United States in

* The following is the present population and past progress of the principal cities in America:

	1790.	1800.	1810.	1820.	1830.	1840.
New-York..	33,131	60,489	96,373	123,706	203,007	312,710
Philadelphia	42,520	70,287	96,664	108,116	167,118	228,691
Baltimore...	13,503	26,614	46,555	62,738	80,625	102,313
N. Orleans..	....	....	17,242	27,176	46,310	102,193
Boston	18,038	24,927	32,250	43,298	61,392	93,383
Cincinnati ..	....	750	2,540	9,644	24,831	46,338
Brooklyn ...	....	3,298	4,402	7,175	12,042	36,233
Albany.....	3,498	5,349	9,356	12,630	24,238	33,721
Charleston..	16,359	18,712	24,711	24,480	30,289	29,261
Washington.	..	3,210	8,208	13,247	18,827	23,364
Providence	....	7,614	10,071	11,767	16,832	23,171

—*American Statistical Almanac for* 1842, p. 261.

* Table showing the progress of exports and imports of the United States:

Years.	Total value of exports, foreign and domestic.	Total value of imports.
	£	£
1821	13,544,661	13,038,592
1825	20,736,539	20,070,849
1830	15,385,314	14,766,025
1831	16,939,703	21,498,140
1832	18,161,862	21,047,764
1833	18,779,255	22,524,648
1834	21,736,868	26,35[illegible],610
1835	25,352,822	31,228,279
1836	26,804,799	39,579,174
1837	24,702,355	29,292,544
1838	22,121,854	22,431,350
1839	25,557,104	32,523,120
1840	26,892,041	21,201,470

—PORTER'S *Prog. of Nations*, ii., 190; *American Statistical Almanac for* 1842, p. 120.

† Woodbury's Report to Congress, December 9, 1840.

the amount of the remuneration they can hold out to the naval service.*

Their military force.

If the navy of America, even in the present maturity of its power, is small, its military force is still more inconsiderable, and affords a striking proof of the entirely pacific direction which the national strength has hitherto taken. It consists of eight regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and three of artillery, numbering in all 12,537 combatants! This is just the strength of a Roman legion, or of one of Napoleon's divisions. It is not a fifth part of the military force of Bavaria, nor a half of that maintained by Baden or Wirtemberg. Such as it is, this Lilliputian force is scattered over fifty fortified posts on the frontier, and twelve arsenals in the interior, stretching over an extent two thousand miles in length, being not, on an average, two hundred and fifty men to each. Of all marvels, this amount of military force is the most marvellous when the magnitude and resources of the Republic are taken into view, the vast extent of territory they have to defend, and the arrogant tone which they assume in their diplomatic intercourse with foreign states. It is true, they have a militia every-where established, which, in periods of danger, may, it is said, enrol fifteen hundred thousand combatants around its banners;† but although such a force, composed of backwoodsmen combating behind trees in their forests, may be very formidable, and may sometimes make a stout resistance behind intrenchments in the neighbourhood of towns, yet the result of the war of 1812 demonstrated, what *a priori* might have been readily imagined, that it is incapable of carrying on war in the field, is wholly unfit for offensive operations, and cannot be relied on for the defence even of the strongest positions, if assailed with skill by much inferior forces. The proof of this is decisive: the Americans allowed their capital to be taken and pillaged by a British division that could not muster three thousand five hundred bayonets. De Tocqueville was never more correct than when he asserted, that if America were placed in the midst of the European powers, it would, at the end of a century, if still independent, have made a much more rapid progress than any of them; but that it would run the most imminent hazard of being three or four times conquered, in the interim, by monarchies not possessing a fourth part of its material resources.‡

Revenue and expenditure of the United States.

Incredibly small as the naval and military establishments of the United States appear to one accustomed to contemplate the colossal armaments of the European powers, they are fully as large as the scanty revenue at the disposal of the central government can afford to maintain. Such is the impatience of taxation in America, as in all countries where Democratic power is really, and not, as in Republican France, nominally established, that no consideration will induce them to submit to the burdens necessary to put the national independence on a secure foundation.[h] The ordinary national revenue at this time (1840) is only $17,197,000, or £3,861,000; and including all extraordinary aids, no more than $28,234,000, or £5,858,000. The expenditure is $26,643,636, or £5,660,134. There is no national debt properly so called, that is, attaching to the central government, excepting a floating balance of three or four millions of dollars in exchequer bills, issued during the dreadful commercial embarrassments, and consequent fall of revenue, during the last four years. Of this revenue, four fifths, or about $15,000,000 (£3,350,000), is derived from customs: there is no excise or direct taxes to the General Government of any kind; and the remainder is almost entirely drawn from the sale of the lands belonging to the state, which, in the year 1840, produced $2,620,000, or £556,000. This, however, is a small part of the revenue and debt of the United States. Each of the separate states in the Union has a separate exchequer, receipts, expenditures, and debt of its own, from which its local expenses for judges, courts of justice, militia, &c., are defrayed. The greater part of the debt of each separate state has been contracted by their local Legislature for the promotion of great public improvements, roads, canals, railways, and bridges, for the benefit of the community. Those debts are very considerable, amounting in all to $248,842,540, or £53,000,000; a fact of no small moment to Britain at this time, considering that at least two thirds of that sum are due to British capitalists, and that the Democratic masters of several of those states already have adopted the convenient device of "repudiating" the debt; in other words, refusing to pay either its principal or interest, after it has been expended for their behoof. The states which have adopted this disgraceful step owe $100,000,000, or £22,000,000, and include Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and some others beyond the Alleghany Mountains. Pennsylvania has failed in the regular payment of their interest. Even in the great commercial capital of New-York symptoms of an equivocal

* American Navy List, 1841, in Stat. Almanac, 1842, p. 79, 81.

† The militia of the whole states amounted, according to the Army List of 1841, to 1,503,952 men in arms.

That of New-York was	169,435
" Pennsylvania	257,178
" Virginia	105 122
" Ohio	146,428

—*Militia Abstract*, 1841; *State Almanac*, 85, *for* 1841.

‡ Army List, 1841. Stat. Almanac, 83. Tocq., ii., 274.

h VII. The third paragraph from the end of the seventy-sixth chapter, page 486, asserts a similar position to the above opinion. The reluctance of the citizens of the United States "to heavy direct taxation during peace, will hinder them from securing the contingent benefits of war." Assuredly, the North American republics never will submit to burdensome taxation during peace, expressly for the establishment of powerful military armaments. The citizens of the United States inherit from their Puritan ancestors an unconquerable aversion to standing armies, as destructive to religious and civil liberty and national prosperity. That truth is thus affirmed with all oracular authority by Washington, in his unparalleled Farewell Address: "Overgrown military establishments, under every form of government, are inauspicious to freedom, and are to be avoided as particularly hostile to Republican liberty."

Moreover, it is the conviction of all American citizens, that by means of the Federal compact, which makes them one people, and by reason of their distance from Europe, the necessity, during peace, of maintaining a large superfluous military and naval force is entirely superseded. The events of the last war, as detailed by Mr. Alison, fully confirm that judgment. In all the severest conflicts upon the northern frontier, the American troops were not inferior, either in science or bravery, to their European opponents. The sufficient answer to all the *disparaging* comments made by Mr. Alsion upon the slenderness of our military establishment is, that we find it ample for our need. If our situation called for a larger force, undoubtedly we should have a larger force, whether to be maintained by direct taxation or otherwise. The experience of all nations tells us that a standing army is an evil; we desire to have this evil as small as possible. And, certainly, there can be no more triumphant proof of the worth of Republican institutions, than the fact that we require an army of no more than 12,000 men. The British government needs more than three times that number in Ireland alone, besides other large bodies in Wales and the manufacturing districts of England itself.

kind have appeared of a disposition to relieve the people of the disagreeable burden of paying their debts.*i*

Sketch of the American Constitution.

The government of America, as all the world knows, is a pure and unmixed De-mocracy, established on a scale and over an extent to which there has never been a parallel in the annals of mankind. The central government, the local government, the officers of state, the President of the Republic, the judges, the civil officers of every description, in all the states are elected by the universal suffrage of the [illegible] either through the medium of the elec[illegible] r separate legislature, or the general e[illegible] the national office-bearers.*k* So great is the amount of the constituency which may be called on to vote on the election of a Pres[illegible] that it is not unusual to see nearly two [illegible] and a half of electors record their suff[illegible] on that interesting occasion; and nearly that number actually voted at the election of General Harrison on 4th of March, 1841.* This is somewhat less than the proportion capable of bearing arms, in a population of 14,500,000 free whites in round numbers, being abo[illegible] to six in the whole free inhabitants. In Great Britain and Ireland there are 830,000 electors out of 27,000,000 people, or one in thirty-two only; in France, less than 200,000 among 32,000,000, or one in 190! So widely different is the extent to which the electoral suffrage has been carried in the three countries in the world where the greatest efforts in favour of freedom have been made, and popular institutions have been established on the broadest basis. It will not appear surprising, when these figures are considered, that the Americans should be repudiating their debts, while those of England have always been, and those of France are now at least, religiously upheld. The mass of the people are, no doubt, deeply interested in the *final* result of keeping faith with the public creditor; but the immediate effect of its violation promises them a most alluring liberation in the [illegible] from disagreeable burdens. The majori[illegible] men in all ages are governed by the first effect of measures, which strike the senses only; ultimate consequences, overwhelming in their influence upon the thinking few, are wholly overlooked by the unthinking many. The majority of men will never discharge their obligations if they can possibly help it. If Great Britain wants to shake off its national debt, it has only to extend the suffrage in any considerable degree, and [illegible]n will not stand three months.

The Senate and House of Representatives: their constitution and power.

According to the theory of the American Constitution, a great variety of checks are established, intended to limit and restrain the inordinate power given to the popular voice in the formation of government. The principle of their union is, that whatever power is not expressly vested in the Federal Government, belongs of right to the assemblies of the separate states; and the central authority itself is restrained as much as appeased under such a system for its formation.*l* The General Government, which meets at Washington in Congress, consists of two chambers, the Senate and House of Representatives. Each state sends two members to the Senate, and a certain number, in proportion to the population, which is fixed every ten years, to that of the Representatives. This proportion was originally made one to every thirty thousand persons; but in 1792, this was changed to one in thirty-three thousand; and in 1832, to one in forty-eight thousand souls.* The House of Representatives is named by the direct and immediate vote of the people; the Senate by the choice of the State Legislature; thus the first is the result of a single, the second of a double election. In the first instance, the seat endures for two, in the second, for six years. The chamber of Representatives is endowed only with legislative powers; the Senate, in addition to these, with certain judicial and executive duties. No bill can become a law until it passes both houses; but, in addition to this, the Senate judges of impeachments preferred by the lower house for state offences, and its consent is requisite to rat-

i VIII. Notwithstanding Mr. Alison's "corrections and addenda" of the above paragraph, as it originally appeared, the allegations which it makes are grossly fallacious respecting the general "*repudiation*" of the public debts by the states of this Union. In New-York especially, it has never been even hinted at by any public officer who enjoys the respect and confidence of his fellow-citizens; and the system which in some instances was adopted in reference to the suspension of specie payments at the bank, both theoretically and practically, was rejected in the great commercial metropolis of North America. It is too true that large occasion for reproach has been given by some of the states, but already (August, 1843) a decided melioration of feeling and opinion on this subject is manifest, and there is every reason to hope that in five, or, at the utmost, ten years, the world will have assurance unequivocal that dishonesty is not a permanent characteristic of the American people, or any part of them.

k IX. To illustrate the narrative in the text, Judge Kent thus commented: "You say that 'judges and civil officers of every description in all the states are elected by universal suffrage, either through the medium of the elections of their separate legislature, or the general election for the national office-bearers.' And in the paragraph on the 'State of dependance of the bench,' page 444, it is also added, 'all the state judges, from the highest to the lowest, are virtually elected by the people, and are liable to be displaced by them, for they are appointed by the state legislatures, who are themselves nominated by the universal suffrage of the inhabitants. Their tenure of office is sometimes for four, sometimes for seven years, but more generally for life.' This is quite an erroneous view of the subject. There is but one state, Mississippi, in which the judges of the higher courts of law and equity are chosen by the people. In many of the states, they are chosen by the joint regulation of the two houses of the Legislature. This is the case in Rhode Island, Connecticut, New-Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, Ohio, and Illinois. In other states, New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, New-York, Maryland, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, and Missouri, the higher judicial officers are appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, as in the government of the United States. In Pennsylvania and Delaware, those judges are appointed by the governor alone.

"Nor can the judges be displaced by the people at will. In *eleven of the states*, the judges of the higher courts hold their offices during good behaviour, which is for life, unless removed by process of impeachment, or, in many of these states, on the address of two thirds of the Legislature. *Their tenure is not otherwise in Britain.* In other states, the good-behaviour tenure is limited to the age of seventy or sixty, or to twelve, or eight, or seven, or six, or three years. In Vermont and Rhode Island they are annually elected, or, at least, may annually be removed."

* On that occasion there voted for

Harrison	1,274,783
Van Buren	1,128,702
Total electors	2,403,485

—*Stat. Almanac*, 1841, 53.

l X. Upon the subject of the constitutional power of the Federal Government, Judge Kent thus corrected Mr. Alison's inadequate statement: "Such a check was in the old Articles of Confederation, but it was dropped, *ex industria*, in the Constitution of the United States. Whatever powers are not given to the United States remain with the states; but there is a vast mass of *implied* powers belonging to the United States, and they are such as are necessary and proper, under a sound construction, to the complete exercise of the express powers. The Bank of the United States was created under such an implied power."

* Story, Laws of the United States, i., 235.

ify treaties with foreign powers, and validate certain appointments made by the President.*

Powers of the President.

The executive power is vested in a great degree in the President, whose functions are intended to correspond with those of a sovereign in the European monarchies; but both in substantial authority and theoretical right, the two are essentially different. His tenure of office is not for life, but for four years; and a Vice-president is always elected with the President, who, in the event of his death while in office, succeeds without any farther election. The President can propose no laws to Congress, and his ministers are excluded in like manner as himself; so that it is only by indirect means that the views of government can be laid before the Legislature.*m* No inviolability is attached to the office of supreme magistrate, as to the constitutional monarchs of France and England. The President carries the laws into execution, but he has no share in their formation; he can refuse his sanction to them, but, by a singular anomaly, though this prevents their execution, it does not prevent them from being laws, and carried into effect when a more pliant chief of the Republic is elected.*n* The only real source of influence which the President enjoys is the nomination to employments under government; and their number is very considerable, for it already amounts to sixty thousand,† the greater part of whom are removed with every change of administration.‡

Sovereignty of the people.

It is not, however, either in the President or the Senate, in the ministers of state or the House of Representatives, that the true sovereignty of the United States resides. Government is really vested in THE PEOPLE; and that, too, not in the figurative and hyperbolic sense in which that expression is used in the declamations of modern Europe, but really, practically, and effectively. Each separate state is a democracy in itself, and in it the power of the people is exerted without any control. Every one has its governor, its senate, and house of representatives; the whole number of which are elected by the universal suffrage of the people. The senators, in these separate legislatures, vary from twelve to ninety-three in number, the representatives from twenty-six to three hundred and fifty-two. These legislative bodies are invested with what practically amounts to absolute powers in their separate states, and the governor carries into effect the declared will of the majority of both houses, in like manner as he does the declared will of Congress. They exclusively manage their debts, finances, improvements, judicial establishment, militia, harbours, roads, railways, canals, and whole local concerns. So extensive and undefined are their powers, that it may be doubted whether they do not amount to those of declaring peace and war, and acting in all respects as independent states. Certain it is, that on more than one occasion, particularly the dispute with the Southern States in 1834, on the question of nullifying the tariff of duties established by Congress; and the open hostilities which the Northern States carried on with the British inhabitants on the Canada frontier in 1837 and 1839; the separate states, the Carolinas in the first instance, and New-York and Maine in the second, took upon themselves to set the authority of the central government at defiance; and Congress and the executive were glad to veil their weakness under the disguise of moderation, while, in reality, they succumbed to the whole demands of the insurgent commonwealths.*o* It does not require the gift of proph-

* Story, 199, 314. Tocq., i., 200, and 197.

m XI. This statement conveys to persons who are not conversant with the Constitution of the United States a decidedly erroneous impression. It is true that neither the President of the United States, nor the Secretary of State, of the Treasury, of War, or of the Navy, directly or formally, in person, can propose any law for adoption by the Congress; but the President, as the Constitution directs, "shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge expedient and necessary." That duty is regularly performed, *seriatim*, at the commencement of each session of the Congress, both by the President and the secretaries, and at all other times, when the National Legislature are assembled, either of his own will, or by the request of the Senate or the House of Representatives.

n XII. The President can refuse his sanction to a bill; but in that case he is obliged to return it to the house in which it originated within *ten* days, with his reasons for withholding his assent; and if, after the consideration of his objections, two thirds of each house ratify the bill, it becomes a law, although the President has disapproved of its provisions. But in case two thirds of the members of each house do not ratify the bill, it is a nullity, and thus the statement in the following words is altogether unfounded, and directly denied by the very authorities whom Mr. Alison cites. The President "can refuse his sanction to them," the bills which have passed both houses of Congress; "but, by a singular anomaly, though that prevents their execution, it does not prevent them from being laws, and carried into effect when a more pliant chief of the Republic is elected." NOT AT ALL! The bills may be introduced and pass the Legislature a second time, and the same or another President may approve and sign them; but until that course is adopted, the rejected bill is a nonentity.

Judge Kent's corroborative testimony is subjoined: "If the President objects to a law, it destroys the bill, unless two thirds of each house of Congress pass it, despite of his objections. Another Congress may originate and pass a similar bill, and another President may let it pass without objections. This paragraph is exceedingly erroneous."

† Offices in America in the gift of the executive:

Collection of taxes and general administration	12,144
Military, and service against the Indians	9,643
Navy	6,499
Postoffice	31,917
	60,203

—CALHOUN'S *Report to the Senate*, 1836, given in CHEVALIER, ii., 461, note 46.

‡ Tocq., i., 207, 209. Kent's Commentaries, i., 289. Chev., i., 328.

o XIII. This announcement is singularly delusive. On the expressed dubitation concerning the power of the states independently of each other "of declaring peace and war," Judge Kent affirmed: "Such a doubt does not exist in any human being in this country, nor do the examples cited give colour to the position. Certainly neither of the states of New-York or Maine ever made any pretensions to set the authority of the Federal Government at defiance. It never entered into their conception, though they had to deal with turbulent individuals. South Carolina did act seditiously and menacingly in respect to the tariff, but the Federal authority was quietly and firmly sustained."

The following paragraph was written prior to the reception of the foregoing statement by Judge Kent, and confirms the impression made by his contradiction to Mr. Alison's averment; especially as in reference to the "hostilities on the Canada frontier," the writer was intimately acquainted with many of the principal actors in that mischievous commotion. "The North American States, individually and separately, have not any power over the question of 'declaring peace and war;' and the instances alluded to above were outrageous anomalies. The law of South Carolina in 1834 was a direct violation of the federative compact between the United States, and therefore was both illegal and unconstitutional. The doings of the lawless freebooters on the boundary line between the United States and the British provinces were the result of circumstances which could not have been foreseen, and for which no adequate legal enactments had been adopted. That defect, however, now has been supplied. Moreover, it is derogatory to standard history to represent the predatory acts of absconding insurgents, with their English and Irish accomplices, who were merely resident aliens in the United States, as part of our national established policy, the wicked character of which prognosticates the speedy dissolution of the American confederated Republic. If the British Tories survive that day, they will have a long life; during which they will behold the acceler-

ecy to foretel that a vast confederacy of separate states, each with its own legislature and armed force, and actuated, from difference of climate and situation, by opposite and conflicting interests, held together by so slender a tie, is not destined to hang long together.*

In one important respect America differs entirely from any state of Christendom, or, indeed, any state that ever before existed in the world.p It acknowledges no state religion, and no public funds whatever are provided for the clergy, or religious instructers of any denomination. All are on the footing of dissenters in England; that is, they are maintained solely by the seat rents, or the voluntary contributions of their flocks. Churches, especially in the great towns, are numerous, and embrace every possible variety of belief, from the austere Puritan, the genuine descendant of the patriarchs who two centuries ago found a refuge in Pennsylvania from the persecution of Charles I., to the lax Socinian whose creed scarcely differs from that of the Pagans of ancient times. Episcopacy is the prevailing religion of the higher classes in the principal cities of the Union, except Baltimore; but the Presbyterians are also very numerous; and in several districts the Roman Catholics are making great progress, insomuch that they now number above two millions of souls within the pale of their church, in the whole states of the Union. Religion in the United States being entirely separated from civil government, its ministers are relieved from that jealousy which in Great Britain is attached by the Democratic party to every person in any situation of trust, whether civil or ecclesiastical, whose nomination is not vested in themselves. The clergy of all denominations are elected by their congregations; they are maintained by them during their incumbency; they may be dismissed by them at pleasure.q A strong religious feeling pervades the United States, especially New-England and Pennsylvania, which has descended to them from their Puritan ancestors; the clergy have no political influence, and never intermeddle with temporal affairs; but in no country in the world have they a stronger influence in society, or are their opinions more attended to, especially by the female portion of their congregations. It is to this general influence of religion, and the unseen chain which it has thrown over the passions and vices of men, more perhaps than any other cause, that the existence of society for so considerable a period as sixty years without any considerable convulsions, notwithstanding the almost entire absence of external restraint or efficient government, is to be ascribed.*

Religion in the United States.

But the difficulties of the American Church are yet to come, and with the increase of its destitute population, and of the classes which subsist on wages alone, the impossibility of providing by voluntary contribution for the maintenance of religion will become very apparent. No want of religious instruction is felt in the great commercial towns, but in the rural districts the case is often directly the reverse;† and although the proportion of proprietors has hitherto been so great, no less than five millions of persons already exist in the United States for whom there is no provision in any place of endowed or provided public worship whatever.‡ If this is the

Want of a provision for a national religion.

ating development and widespread extension of our infallible Democratic principles, and, which is 'a consummation devoutly to be wished,' they will also abandon their political heresies, and rejoice in our Christian freedom."

* Tocq., i., 99, 130. Stat. Almanac, 1840, 126.

p XIV. This and the two succeeding paragraphs respecting "Religion in the United States," are replete with mistakes; but they comprise topics too momentous to be discussed in a concise note. The subject, in its existing reality, and by contrast with "times bygone," and with other nations at the present era, is illustrated in the general essay at the close of the work. One remarkable fact, however, must incidentally be mentioned, as placing all Mr. Alison's theory respecting the "want of a provision for a national religion," at least, among the matters of "doubtful disputation." This particular authentic example is cited, because it affords the most favourable aspect of the point in support of Mr. Alison's unsound and anti-evangelical principle—the necessity of so commingling religion with the state, that the churches of Christ shall be subordinate to the temporal jurisdiction.

Prior to the disruption of the established Kirk of Scotland, in May, 1843, the state religious community comprised 1210 congregations. During the year then terminated, they contributed for "Education, Home Missions, Foreign Missions, Jewish Conversion, and the Colonial Church," their "Five Schemes," according to the official account presented to the "Free Assembly," nearly one hundred and thirty thousand dollars. In the State of Massachusetts, there are four hundred Congregational churches; yet, exclusive of all the other Christian denominations, who may justly be credited for a sum at least equivalent, *the Congregational brethren appropriated about one fourth more for education and missionary purposes alone* than the whole national established Kirk of Scotland, with thrice the number of congregations, the aid of the Regium Donum, and all the aristocratical patronage north of the Tweed. This comment upon Mr. Alison's boasted superior value and efficacy of Church and State establishments does not evince the truth of his assertion, that "the impossibility of providing by voluntary contribution for the maintenance of religion is very apparent!"

A still stronger refutation of Mr. Alison's theory is the fact, that by far the largest proportion of what is done in England for benevolent, religious, and educational purposes, is done by voluntary contributions. True, these contributions are made by members of the Established Church—perhaps under the prompting of that Church—but still they are essentially and absolutely voluntary. For instance, after the defeat of the government measure for extending education, in June, 1843, a society was formed for increasing the means of religious education, and by the 20th of July the "voluntary" subscriptions already amounted to £33,000. The queen, Sir Robert Peel, and several others, gave £1000 each. Munificent donations, certainly, but they were *voluntary*. The establishment had nothing to do with them, except that the donors were members of the establishment.

q XV. Respecting the dismission of ministers by their congregations "at pleasure," Judge Kent thus explained: "This may be so, perhaps, when there is no written contract or settlement; but generally, and especially in the old states, clergymen are called and settled upon stipulated provisions, and the church property is bound in the hands of the trustees to fulfil the contract. The ministers of the Reformed Dutch churches in New-York and New-Jersey hold by a permanent tenure for life: so do many of the Episcopal and Presbyterian clergy in the old-settled parts of the country; and the trustees of the churches would be liable for their salaries if they should undertake to dismiss them without their consent."

The arbitrary, irregular, and unjust act to which Mr. Alison adverts, the informal or coerced dismission of a minister "at pleasure," is of very rare occurrence, and is contrary to the authoritative regulations of all our religious communities. That violation of the public covenant with the minister is never attempted, except by one or two influential and opulent malicious individuals, who, to avoid the discipline of the Church, which they are conscious their iniquitous "conversation" requires, and aware that, in ordinary cases, a conscientious minister will rather suffer than contend for his right, or even his subsistence, perpetrate their injustice from revenge, hoping with impunity thereby to conceal their fraud, and to justify their calumny and ungodliness!

* Tocq., ii., 224, 228. Chev., ii., 328. Mart., iii., 272, 283.

† "The Baptist sect alone proclaims a want of above three thousand ministers to supply the existing churches. Churches and funds are sufficient, but men are wanting."—MARTINEAU, iii., 272, 273. This is the precise point where the question hinges, and the difficulty *always* occurs: it is comparatively easy, under the influence of temporary excitement or philanthropic feeling, to *build* churches: to *maintain* their minister in decent competence from voluntary sources, is a very different matter.

‡ "According to a general summary of religious denomi-

case in their infancy, what will it be in their maturity and old age? And how are funds to be raised to provide for the deficiency in a Democratic worldly community, which starves down all its public establishments to the lowest point, and where no legislator ever yet has ventured to hint in Congress at a general direct tax?* If nothing else existed to subject America to the common lot of humanity, the seeds of its mortal distemper are to be found in the want of any provision for the *gratuitous* religious instruction of the poor: the very circumstance which, with the admirers of their institutions, is the most ceaseless subject of eulogy.†r

Ruinous effects of the dependance of the clergy on their flocks.

Already the ruinous effect of this dependance of the ministers of all denominations on the voluntary support of their flocks has become painfully conspicuous. Religion has descended from its function of denouncing and correcting the nation's vices, and become little more, with a few noble exceptions, of whom Channing is an illustrious example, than the re-echo of public opinion. Listen to the words of an able and candid eyewitness, herself the most strenuous advocate for the voluntary system. "The American clergy," says Miss Martineau, "are the most backward and timid class in the society in which they live. Themselves exiled from the great moral questions of the time; the least informed with true knowledge; the least conscious of that Christian and Republican freedom which, as the natural atmosphere of piety and holiness, it is their prime duty to cherish and diffuse. The proximate causes of this are obvious: it is not merely that the living of the clergy depends on the opinion of those whom they serve; to all but the far and clear-sighted it appears that the usefulness of their function does so. The most guilty class of the community on the slavery question at present, is not the slaveholding, nor even the mercantile, but the clerical. They shrink from the perils of the contest. It will not be for them to march in the noble army of martyrs. Yet if the clergy of America follow in the rear of society, they will be the first to glory in the reformations which they have done the utmost to retard. The fearful and disgraceful mistake which occasions this, is the supposition that the clerical office consists in adapting the truth to the minds of their hearers; and this is already producing its effect in thinning the churches, and compelling the people to find an administration of religion better suited to their need. My final impression is, that religion is best administered in America by the personal character of the most virtuous members of society, out of the theological; and next, by the acts and preachings of the members of that profession, who are the most secular in their habits of life. Thus exclusively clerical are the worst enemies of Christianity, except the vicious." Such is the fruit of the voluntary system, according to the testimony of its most ardent supporters.*

How has this Democracy worked?

Here, then, is a country in which, if they ever had on earth, Republican principles have enjoyed the fairest ground for trial, and the best opportunity for establishing their benefits. The land was boundless, and in the interior, at least, of unexampled fertility; the nation began its career with all the advantages and powers, and none of the evils or burdens of civilization. They had the inheritance of English laws, customs, and descent; of the Christian religion, of European arts, and all the stores of ancient knowledge: they had neither a territorial aristocracy, nor a sovereign on the throne, nor an hereditary nobility, nor a national debt, nor an established church, which are usually held out as the impediments to the blessings of freedom in the Old World. How, then, has the Republican system worked in this, the garden of the world, and the land of promise? The answer shall be given on no mean authority; in the words of one, himself an ardent, though candid, supporter of Democratic equality, and whose political writings alone, in this age, deserve a place beside the works of Bacon and Machiavel.

Irresistible power of the majority.

"The self-government and all-powerful sway of the majority," says M. de Tocqueville, "is the greatest and most formidable evil in the United States. The reproach to which I conceive a Democratic government, such as is there established, is open, is not, as many in Europe pretend, its weakness; it is, on the contrary, its irresistible strength. What I feel repugnance to in America, is not the extreme liberty which reigns in it, but the slender guarantee which is to be found against tyrrany. When a man or a party suffers from injustice springing from the majority in the United States, to whom can he apply for redress? To public opinion? It is formed by the majority. To the legislative body? It represents the majority, and blindly obeys its mandates. To the executive? It is named by the majority, and is the passive instrument in its hands. To the

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nations, made in 1835, the number of churches was 15,447, but there were only 12,130 ministers."—MARTINEAU, iii., 272. This is about one church to each thousand inhabitants, and one minister to each thirteen hundred, the population being at that period about 15,000,000 This, on an average, might seem to be a fair proportion; but the evil of the system lies in two points: 1. The churches are unequally distributed: abounding sometimes to profusion in the rich towns, and wholly wanting in the rural districts. 2. No provision exists for the *permanent maintenance* of the clergy, which is the real difficulty; and, accordingly, in the Baptist persuasion alone, 3000 churches are already without ministers.—See last note, and MARTINEAU, iii., 273.

* There are some small direct taxes in some of the separate states; and in New-York, $600,000, or £140,000, are yearly raised in this way. But there is no general direct tax whatever over the whole Union.

† Tocq., ii., 224, 236. Chev., ii., 284. Buckingham, ii., 231, 284.

r XVI. In reference to American direct taxes, Judge Kent sent Mr. Alison this exposition: "This is quite a mistake. The State of New-York, for instance, has a general tax on the whole real and personal property of the state assessed and levied. It was last year 600,000 dollars, and the same tax continues for the present year. There are regulations of the same kind in most of the states for the support of government. It is true that several of the states to the West refuse to levy a general tax to meet their heavy speculating state debts, because they feel themselves too poor and distressed at present to grasp the demand. Pennsylvania is the state most to be condemned, for she is rich and able; but the better part of the nation, and sensible men everywhere, reprobate repudiation, and great efforts are making to meet and redress the evil."

From the short additional note which, according to Mr. Alison's desire, is appended to this paragraph, it is evident that he had received Judge Kent's correction, and yet the general inaccuracy in the text is not satisfactorily altered. It must, therefore, be subjoined, that during the contest with Britain, from the years 1812 to 1815, "*direct taxes*" unavoidably were imposed by Congress to supply the deficit made by the interruption of commerce, and to provide for the increased expenditures demanded by the army and navy. Mr. Alison here contradicts himself; for in his subsequent notice of the "Financial measures of the American government" for the year 1814, he informs us truly, that "Congress were obliged to lay on a great variety of new taxes on excisable articles." He also correctly observes, that this proceeding originated in "sheer necessity."

* Martineau's America, iii., 278, 283, 293.

public force? It is nothing but the majority under arms. To a jury? It is the judicial committee of the majority. To the judges? They are elected by the majority, and hold their offices at their pleasure.s How unjust and unreasonable soever may be the measure which strikes you, no redress is practicable, and you must submit."* "Liberty of thought and opinion," says Miss Martineau, "is strenuously maintained in words in America; it has become almost a wearisome declamation, but it is a sad and deplorable fact, that in no country on earth is the mind more fettered than it is here; what is called public opinion has set up a despotism such as exists nowhere else—public opinion sitting in the dark, wrapped up in mystification and vague terrors of obscurity, deriving power no one knows from whom; like an Asiatic monarch, unapproachable, unimpeachable, undethronable, perhaps illegitimate; but irresistible in its power to quell thought, repress action, and silence conviction; bringing the timid perpetually under the unworthy fear of man, fear of some superior opinion which gets astride of the popular breath for a day, and controls, through imprudent folly, the speech and actions of the wise." "This country," says Jefferson, "which has given the world the example of physical liberty, owes it to moral emancipation also; for, as yet, it is nominal with us. The inquisition of public opinion overwhelms in practice the freedom asserted by the laws in theory."†

Total absence of originality or independence of thought.

Original thought, independence of character, intrepid assertion of opinion against the prepossessions of the majority, are unknown in America. So completely do their ideas flow in one channel, that you would say they are all cast in one mould, and stamped with one image and superscription. Party spirit, indeed, runs extremely high. The public press abounds with furious and often coarse invective, and the most vehement division of opinion often agitates the whole Union. But in neither of those vast arrays is there any originality or stubborn independence of thought in individuals. All follow implicitly, like the well-disciplined forces of a parliamentary leader in Britain, the opinions of their separate parties. It is a mere struggle of numbers for the superiority, and the moment the contest is decided by a vote, the minority give way, and public opinion ranges itself, to appearance, universally on the side of the greater number. It may well be believed that this unanimity is *seeming* only, and that the beaten party do not really become converted to the opinions of their antagonists. But they are compelled to feign acquiescence; they must crouch to numbers. That noblest of spectacles which is so often exhibited in Britain of a resolute minority, strong in the conviction and intrepid in the assertion of truth, firmly maintaining its opinions in the midst of the insurgent waves of an overwhelming majority, is scarcely ever seen on the other side of the Atlantic. They feel sufficiently often the "civium ardor prava jubentium," but the "justum et tenacem propositi virum" is unknown. The reason is obvious. Society in America is governed only by one element. Individual resolution is not wanting, but it has no ground to rest against the majority. It is as impossible to avoid being carried away by the tide, as for a dismasted ship in a bottomless ocean to avoid being swept on by the waves.

The Americans will exclaim that this statement is overcharged, and that independence of opinion is to be found as much in America as in Britain, or any European state. The matter may be brought to a very easy test, which will illustrate the fact, and the causes to which the difference in this respect between Britain and the United States is owing. Every one knows that the greatest possible diversity of opinion upon all political subjects exists in Britain; and it is a matter of every day's occurrence to see persons belonging to the aristocratic party, and boldly maintaining conservative opinions, appearing on the hustings, and soliciting the votes of the most democratic constituencies; and for members of the House of Lords and House of Commons to advocate extreme radical, and even Republican opinions, in presence of a vast majority of persons supporting the aristocratic side. Yea, examples have not been wanting of officers of high rank in the army and navy, who, of course, are entirely dependant on the crown for their promotion, or even remaining in the service, giving vent to the most violent Democratic opinions. A large part of the public press of Britain avowedly supports Republican principles; and not a few of its writers of the highest talent advocate the same principles, both at public meetings and in their literary productions. Is a similar state of things ever seen on the other side of the Atlantic? Is it as usual there to see candidates for popular favour at public meetings maintain monarchical and aristocratical opinions, as in Britain it is to see them support Republicanism? Does the hall of Congress resound with arguments in favour of a mixed monarchy in preference to a Republic, in like manner as the English House of Commons does with declarations in favour of Democratic and Republican institutions? Does a large part of the public press and periodical literature of America constantly advocate the substitution of a mixed monarchy for their institutions in the same manner as it does in Britain the conversion of the government into a pure democracy? We have never heard that any of those things take place. On the contrary, it is well known that the advocates for monarchical institutions, and they are both numerous and able in America, are as guarded in expressing their opinions in public as those who, impressed with Republican ideas, are in Russia. The reason is the same in both cases. Power resides in one class only, and therefore the other classes cannot enjoy any practical freedom in discussion, and independence of opinion cannot exist. Let the Americans, in their public debates, philosophical works, and periodical literature, evince the same variety and independence of opinion on political subjects which is every day put forth in Britain,* and they

s XVII. Judge Kent thus summarily adjudicates upon the sterling weight of Mr. Alison's two chief witnesses, and no decision in equity can be more irrefragable. "The charges of Miss Martineau, as to the total want of independence in the American clergy, are vastly exaggerated; and so are the unworthy sneers of De Tocqueville on the want of integrity in juries and judges. I have no respect for Miss Martineau's competency for correct and comprehensive observation." It is indisputable that Harriet Martineau, during her visit to this country, moved within a comparatively restricted circle, and enjoyed not sufficient opportunities accurately to comprehend our Republican institutions, and general American society.

* Tocq., ii., 145, 146.

† Sober Thoughts on the Times, Boston, 1833. Martineau, ii., 69, 70. Jefferson's Works, ii., 321.

* Tocq., ii., 156, 157. Chev., i., 306, 307. Mart., iii., 8. and ii., 26, 58, and 150.

will obtain credit in Europe for possessing real freedom in public deliberation and independence of thought, but not till then.†

All the restraints on the excessive power of the majority devised by the wisdom of Washington and the original framers of the American Constitution, have been shattered by two causes: the equal division of landed property by succession, and the growing Democratic ambition of the people. Under the equal law of succession established at the Revolution, the death of every proprietor brings about a splitting of his inheritance into little portions; and when their owners, in their turn, are carried to the great charnel-house of mortality, a similar division takes place; so that the partition goes on *ad infinitum*. Such has been the effect of this system, that it is extremely rare for any considerable fortune to survive the second generation, and the grandchildren of those who were first in wealth and station in the days of Washington, are now lost in the obscurity of the general crowd, nay, in great part labouring with their own hands. There are thus few rich persons in America, and no hereditary fortunes, but an immense number of little proprietors; and in the states beyond the Alleghany, in particular, their number is prodigious, and hourly increasing. These little landholders, as is invariably the case, are strongly attached to the Democratic party; they are the great supporters of the violent outcry which has been raised in every part of the Union, with such fatal effects, against the paper credit and the commercial aristocracy; and such is the ascendant they have now gained, both in the separate states and the General Legislature of the Union, from the continual multiplication of these small properties, under the law of equal succession, which is everywhere established, that all bulwarks have been swept away, the march of Democracy has become irresistible, and, for good or for evil, the whole Confederacy must go through with its consequences. But equality must have one of two results: all must have power, or none. Hitherto the first effect has taken place in America; let them beware of the last.*

Prodigious effects of the Revolutionary law of succession.

As a natural consequence of this state of things, there is, in opposition to the will or passions of the majority, no security whatever either for life or property in America.‡ Hitherto, indeed, no direct attack on property has been made,

† XVIII. On the original paragraph respecting independence of thought and character, Judge Kent remarked: "The whole section struck me with astonishment. To my certain knowledge, *the fact, as to the whole charge, is directly the reverse.*" That retort was ample confutation of all the non-existent absurdity which Mr. Alison had written. But the novel defence now appended to justify the primary statement, after the reception of Judge Kent's testimony, is still more marvellous. If Mr. Alison's questions are propounded ironically, the point of the jest is certainly hard to find; if in earnest, they testify more strongly of his simplicity than of his powers as a reasoner. Men, indeed, are not found arguing in favour of a monarchy in this country, either before public meetings or on the floor of Congress; but the sufficient reason is, that there are none who think monarchy preferable to a republic, notwithstanding Mr. Alison's assertion that such men are "both numerous and able." He might as well infer dependance of thought and opinion from the fact that no man argues in favour of the Mohammedan religion. Are English writers or speakers ever known to advocate despotic government?

As between monarchy and a republic there is no difference of opinion among us; but on numberless topics, admitting of different opinions, there is quité as much diversity of opinion—which Mr. Alison apparently considers synonymous with independence—as in England. For example, on the subject of slavery, protection, free trade, a national bank, paper money, internal improvements, &c., &c.

* Tocq., i., 82, 85, 87. Chev., ii., 345, 354. Mart., i., 151, 152.

‡ XIX. This sweeping assertion, with the subsequent averments and reasonings in its support, is most discreditable to the temper and judgment of Mr. Alison; showing that he writes under the influence of bitter and deeply-rooted prejudice, and that, where prejudice governs him, he casts reason and argument to the winds. Compare the recklessness of his assertion—"there the terrible spectacle has been *frequently* exhibited, of persons obnoxious to the majority being publicly burned alive by the people"—with the evidence by which he supports it; *two* cases cited by Miss Martineau, one of which is undoubtedly true, and the other rests solely on that lady's report from hearsay; for she herself admits that it occurred, if at all, before she visited the place of its occurrence. She does not give her authority; and there is little hazard in saying that it never did occur, because if it had, somebody would undoubtedly have known something of it besides the lady in question.

Again: "Murders and assassinations in open day are not unfrequent among the members of Congress themselves." No authority is cited in support of this assertion; and as it is wholly destitute of truth—as not a solitary murder or assassination ever took place, by day or night, among the members of Congress—it can only be met by a pointblank denial.

But without going into these details, let us examine the sweeping declaration of the text, "there is no security whatever for life or property in America." Literally this is true, but not of America only. Everywhere the life of every man is at the mercy of any other man who may choose to take it. Everywhere the property of every man is exposed to depredation and destruction. The question is, whether the restraints of law, morality, and religion are more or less effective in affording that security which mere caution and vigilance are inadequate to give.

Now it is not to be denied that there have been too many instances, in this country, where their restraint have proved ineffectual. There have been anti-slavery riots—individuals have been maltreated, scourged, and even slain, in the lawless exercise of mob vengeance—there has been a violent execution of gamblers at Vicksburg—there have been tumults of an aggravated character at New-York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. We do not deny, or excuse, or palliate these things; but we utterly deny that they have been or are peculiar to this country, that they have resulted in any degree from our political institutions, or that they bear out the declaration in the text. They are the inevitable consequences of human depravity; they are, in this as in other countries, the deplorable exceptions to the general peace and order of society; and in their origin they have no more to do with Democracy than they have with Russian or Austrian despotism.

There have been, time and again, fearful riots in London, Bristol, Birmingham, Manchester, Edinburgh, Paris, Lyons, and other European cities. For years past assassination has been a thing of almost daily occurrence in Ireland. Recently the private secretary of England's prime minister has been shot dead, in open day, in one of the most frequented streets of London, within a stone's throw of that minister's official residence. The queen herself has been shot at. Every London paper has its tale or tales of murder, robbery, housebreaking, and violence in a thousand forms. At this moment—August, 1843—several counties of Wales are literally overrun by organized bands of rioters, against whom the soldiery and the police can do nothing. In a word, the insecurity of life and property is ten times as great in compact, densely-peopled Great Britain, despite its admirable police and its vast military establishment, as in our immense territory, with its comparatively scanty population, and the consequent imperfections of police and executive power to suppress or prevent violence. But we do not charge this upon monarchical institutions. It is a state of things having its cause apart from theories or forms of government; and its cure is to be hoped for in education, the greater prevalence of Christian principles, and human progress in wisdom and virtue.

In like manner, the vices and evils of which Mr. Alison gives an account so exaggerated, as existing in our country, have their source, not in our Republican institutions or in our theory of government, but in the wickedness and ignorance of individuals. They are anti-republicans; incidental to defective education and morals; and as in Britain, their cure is to be hoped for in improved knowledge, more enlightened minds, and better progress in wisdom and virtue.

But we say, without fear of contradiction, that nowhere in the world are life and property more safe than in this country. We aver that, whether population or extent of territory be taken as the basis of comparison, nowhere is crime less prevalent or less aggravated; nowhere can a man or a woman travel so great a distance with less exposure to danger of personal harm or robbery; and, notwithstanding the horrors so fearfully paraded by Mr. Alison and

Spoliation of the commercial classes already effected.

at least where it is vested in land, for this simple reason, that the majority are themselves little landowners, and, therefore, any such system would be an attack upon their own interests. But the system of spoliating that species of property in which the majority do not participate, and for which they feel no sympathy, has already been carried to a most frightful extent. The run against paper credit, the fury against the commercial aristocracy, the cry, "Bank or no bank," which has convulsed all the states of the Union for the last ten years, and at last ruined the National Bank, rendered bankrupt nine tenths of the commercial classes, and reduced the national exports and imports one half,* are nothing but so many successful attacks of the Revolutionary majority on that species of property which was vested solely in the wealthy classes of society, of which they were jealous, and which they were desirous to destroy. The determination, now openly avowed in many of the states, particularly Arkansas, Illinois, and the Democratic communities in the Valley of the Mississippi, to repudiate their state debts, and shake off the burden of their public creditors, after they have experienced the full benefit of their capital by expending it on railroads, canals, and other public improvements, is another example of the incipient spoliation of the fundholders. The period when the attack on landed property, if the present system of government continues, will commence, may be predicted with certainty; it will be as soon as the majority of electors, in any of the states, have come, from the natural growth of other trades, to be persons without any interest in the soil, and when the back settlements have become so distant by the advance of civilization, that it is less trouble to take their neighbours' fields than to go to the Far West to seek possessions of their own.†

Insecurity of life and order in America.

Is life secure in the United States, when property is placed in such imminent peril? Experience, terrible experience, proves the reverse, and demonstrates that not only is existence endangered, but law is powerless against the once-excited passions or violence of the people. The atrocities of the French Revolution, cruel and heart-rending as they were, have been exceeded on the other side of the Atlantic; for there the terrible spectacle has been frequently exhibited, of late years, of persons obnoxious to the majority being publicly burned alive by the people, and, to render the torment more prolonged and excruciating, over a fire purposely kindled of green wood.‡ Combined and systematic attacks on property, or dreadful acts of terror and revenge, have taken place in several great towns; and such has been the prostration of law and paralysis of authority by the will of the sovereign multitude, that, on many of these occasions, not only the press did not venture to denounce the infamous proceedings, but the law authorities did not make any attempt to apprehend or punish the delinquents.* Murders and assassinations in open day are not unfrequent among the members of Congress themselves;ν and the guilty parties, if strong in the support of the majority, openly walk about, and set all attempts to prosecute them at defiance. So common have these summary acts of savage violence grown in America, that they have come to be designated by a peculiar and well-known expression, and the phrase "Lynch law" is understood, all over the world, to express the sudden assumption by the multitude of the

Miss Martineau, nowhere among seventeen millions of people is there a more general respect for private and personal rights, or a greater observance of the duties which man owes to his fellow-man. With a very imperfectly-organized police in the large cities; with scarcely a vestige of police in the villages and rural districts, and with no standing army to supply the want of a police in great emergencies, life and property are more secure in the United States than in any other part of the world; and this fact Mr. Alison cannot disprove, though he should gather together all the instances of violence to either that are to be found in our whole history.

* Exports from Great Britain to America in 1835, £10,568,455; in 1836, £12,425,604; in 1837, £4,695,225; in 1838, £7,585,760.—*Parl. Paper, 27th May*, 1840.

† Chev., i., 153. Tocq., ii., 284, 287.

‡ "Some months before I left the United States, a man of colour was *burned alive*, without trial, at St. Louis, in Missouri; a large assembly of the 'respectable' inhabitants of the city being present. The majority of newspaper editors made themselves parties to the act, by refusing, through fear, to reprobate it. The gentlemen of the press in that city dared not condemn the deed, for fear of the consequen-

[redacted]rderers. They merely announced the deed [redacted]e regretted, and recommended that a veil [redacted]n over the affair. The newspapers of the [redacted]y were afraid to comment on it, because they [redacted]uis editors were afraid."—MISS MARTINEAU,

[redacted]re I reached Mobile, two men were *burned* [redacted] *a slow fire* in the open air, in presence of the gentlemen of the city generally. No word was breathed of the transaction in the newspapers; and this is a special sign of the times. There is far too much subservience to opinion in the Northern States; but in the Southern, it is like the terrors of Tiberius Cæsar."—*Ibid.*, ii., 141, 144.

"Upon a mere vague report or bare suspicion, persons travelling in the South have been arrested, imprisoned, and in some cases *flogged or tortured*, on pretence that they came to cause insurrection among the slaves. More than one innocent person has been hanged. It was declared by some liberal-minded gentlemen of South Carolina, after the publication of Dr. Channing's work on slavery, that if he were to enter that province with a body-guard of twenty thousand men, he would not come out alive. Handbills are issued by the committees of vigilance offering enormous rewards for the heads or ears of prominent abolitionists. The Governor of South Carolina last year recommended the summary execution, without benefit of clergy, of all persons caught within the limits of the state holding prominent anti-slavery opinions; and every sentiment of his is endorsed by a select committee of the State Legislature."—*Ibid.*, ii., 348, 349.

"A young man at Nashville, in Tennessee, was lately seized by the Committee of Vigilance, and an abolition newspaper found in his bundle among a number of Bibles. He was immediately seized, publicly flogged, the mayor of the town presiding, and sent out of the town in that dreadful condition; his horse, gig, and Bibles, of which he was disposing, worth 300 dollars, being no more heard of."—*Ibid.*, ii., 139, 140.

* "Baltimore was lately, during four days, at the mercy of the genius of destruction. The security of the city was vainly bandied from the mayor to the sheriff, from the sheriff to the commander of the militia; the prisons were forced, the mayor and militia pillaged, but not a person could be found in that city, with 100,000 inhabitants, who would head any force against the rioters, till an old patriarch of 84, who had signed the Declaration of Independence, stepped forth, and requesting to be put at the head of thirty men, stopped the disorder, and put an end to the pillage. Well may the Americans say, with Mr. Clay, 'We are in the midst of a revolution.'"—CHEVALIER, ii., 347, 348.

ν XX. Respecting the "murders and assassinations" alleged in the text, Judge Kent thus instructed Mr. Alison: "This is altogether a mistake, or a gross exaggeration. Members of Congress sometimes have fought a duel, and so have members of the British Parliament. There has been, at times, great rudeness in the House of Representatives and on the floor of Congress, but no murders. There was a murder committed some time ago in the Assembly of the new State of Arkansas; but that state was just organized and in its infancy, and is far in the Southwest, bordering on savage Indians and barbarous Texans. The delegates from some of the Western States are rough, and have not yet attained the requisite refinements of civilization, as it is displayed by the other citizens; but no such violence is chargeable on the characters of the citizens in the old states. We also have had mobs in our cities, but no American mob ever produced any such devastation as the mob some years since in the city of Bristol."

office, on a sudden impulse, at once of accusers, judges, juries, and executioners. "Is this the freedom we were promised?" said the French Revolutionists: "we can no longer hang whom we please;" but the Americans have improved on this idea, for their principle is, they may either hang *or burn* whom they please.*

Peculiarity of the American cruelties in this respect.

The American writers plead, in extenuation of these atrocities, that they are only of occasional occurrence; that the states of their confederacy are in general peaceable and orderly; that the annals of every country exhibit too many examples of occasional outbreaks of popular violence; and that it is unjust to hold their institutions responsible for acts common to them with all mankind. There is some justice in these observations, although it affords but a melancholy proof of the depravity of human nature, if the spread of knowledge and march of intellect have no tendency to check these [illegible] dispositions, and the citizens of the great and well-educated model Republic are obliged to plead in extenuation of their cruelties, that the same things were done during the crusade against the Albigeois, or by the *auto-da-fés* of Castile. But the peculiar and damning blot on America, in this particular, is this, and it is one to which it is impossible to make any reply. In other countries, the frightful atrocities of the stake and the torture have characterized government during savage and ruthless periods, and it has been the well-founded boast of civilization, that they have disappeared before the milder spirit which its blessings have introduced. Ebullitions of popular violence have been frequent; horrors unutterable have been committed, and are committed, during their continuance; but these have always been the passing fury of the multitude merely, and the return of order has uniformly been signalized by increased vigour of the executive for the repression of such excesses, and increased horror of the public at their continuance. It was thus that the Reign of Terror, in France, was succeeded by the arms of Napoleon; the violence of the great rebellion by the despotism of Cromwell. But in America, not only is there no reaction against such popular atrocities, or attempt to coerce them, but the human mind is so debased by the tyranny of the majority, that they are not even complained of: the people pass them over in trembling silence, like the stroke of Providence, or the vengeance of an Eastern sultan, to which it is the only wisdom to submit without a murmur.†‡

External weakness of the Americans.

The system of government in the United States has been proved to be wholly unequal to the external security of the nation. America, it is true, is still independent, and is rapidly extending in every direction; but that is only because she has no civilized neighbours in contact with her territory except Great Britain, which has no interest to engage in the fruitless and enormous costs of transatlantic warfare. But so inefficient is her force both by sea and land, owing to the invincible repugnance to taxation among her people, and the total want of foresight among the ruling multitude, that she rushed headlong into a war with Great Britain in 1812, with an army of six thousand men and a navy of four frigates; and she could not prevent her capital being taken by an English division not mustering three thousand five hundred bayonets.*w* Baden or Wirtemberg would never have incurred a similar disgrace. If America were placed alongside of the European powers, she would be conquered in three months if she did not alter her system of government. In 1840 she was all but at open war with Great Britain, and yet her army was only twelve thousand men, and her navy seven ships of the line, with a population of seventeen millions, being just the population of the British isles at the close of the war with Napoleon. True, the four frigates in 1812 did great things, and their crews evinced a valour and skill worthy of combating their ancient parent on the waves; but that only confirms the general argument. In Democratic communities measures of foresight are impossible to government, because the masses of whom they are the organ are incapable of looking before them, and never will submit to present burdens from a regard to future and remote dangers. Hence, while Philip was preparing his armament against Greece, the Athenian Democracy diverted the funds set apart for the support of the navy to the maintenance of the theatres, and introduced and carried the punishment of *death* against any one who should propose even their reapplication to their original destination. But energy unbounded is awakened in individuals by such institutions, and hence the great achievements which they effect with inconsiderable means. In despotic states, greatness is sometimes forced upon the nation by the vigour and foresight of the government, notwithstanding the general lassi-

* Chev., ii., 345, 347. Mart., i., 162.

† Mart., ii., 177, 178. Chev., ii., 347, 348.

‡ "On occasion of the frightful riot at Faneuil Hall, Boston, in 1835, when the celebrated Mr. Garrison narrowly escaped being murdered, no prosecutions followed. I asked a lawyer, an abolitionist, Why? He said there would be difficulty in getting a verdict, and if it was obtained, the punishment would be merely a fine, which would be paid on the spot, and the triumph would remain with the aggressors. I asked an eminent judge the same question; he said he had given his advice against a prosecution. And why? Public feeling was so strong on the subject; the rioters were so respectable in the city: it was better to let the whole affair pass over without farther notice."—MARTINEAU i., 175, 176.

w XXI. The above contemptuous declaration respecting our national security, is attempted to be fortified by the sudden capture of Washington in 1814, where the only renown which the British officers attained was deathless disgrace. Vandal-like, they destroyed the national edifices and the invaluable public library, with similar domestic ravages, during their predatory course in the bay of the Chesapeake. Mr. Alison would have acted wisely had he merely recorded the dishonourable fact, without the implied boasting comment. Other British historians did not view the proceedings of the modern transatlantic Goths with the same gratulation. James Mackintosh thus depicted those piratical acts as a stigma on the British name: "The success of the British at Washington was far more disgraceful and disastrous than the worst defeat would be."

But Mr. Alison may retort, Mackintosh was a Whig philosopher, who valued not military glory. Let us, then, study the opinion of one of those British officers, who himself was an eyewitness of the scenes, and employed in that expedition. Captain Chamier thus graphically depicted and denounced "the frightful atrocities of those savage and ruthless marauders." In his "Life of a Sailor," he records his sense of the degradation that he felt as having been present at that inglorious expedition. "We arrived in the Chesapeake amid that general war of conflagration and destruction which half ruined the fertile shores of Maryland and Virginia. That the means by which this war was carried on were disgraceful to a civilized nation, no man now doubts. If the Americans who bound the shores of Virginia and Maryland do not entail upon their posterity the deepest hatred and the loudest curses upon England and her marauders, they must possess great Christian charity, for we left them to brood over ruin, desolation, and heartless misery. Let us hope that this disgraceful, savage mode of warfare never again will be countenanced by civilized nations. It will be a blot on our escutcheon as long as the arms of England exist."

tude or supineness of the community: in Democratic states, greatness is often forced upon the government, despite its own weakness, by the vigour and spirit of the people.

Banishment of higher talent or station from the public service.

Ability of the highest kind has been rarely, if ever, called to the direction of affairs in America, since the Democratic régime has been fully established by the general triumph of the popular over the Conservative party. Men either of great talents or elevated character are disgusted with the low arts and mob-flattery which are the indispensable passport to popular favour: they retire from all contest for office, as in Eastern dynasties similar characters do from the sycophancy of courts and the precincts of palaces. It is extremely rare to see persons of considerable property who will, for any consideration, engage at all in public life; they retire into the bosom of their families, and leave open to bustling indigence or pliant ambition the path leading to power, distinction, and political honours.x In public, these men profess the most unbounded admiration for popular institutions; they shake hands with every man they meet in the street; they are never to be seen on a platform that they do not utter sonorous periods on the virtue and intelligence of the people, and the incalculable blessings of Democratic institutions; in private they reveal, in confidence, to those whom they can trust, and especially to strangers on the eve of departure, their decided conviction that the present system cannot much longer continue, and that a frightful revolution will ere long bury the rising splendour of North, as it has already done that of South America, in its ruins. The wealthy classes, unable to overcome the jealousy with which they are surrounded, and obnoxious to the people merely because they are independent, and will not, in general, condescend to court them, have everywhere given up public life, and abandoned all contest for political power. They have taken refuge in exclusive society, and guard its avenues with a degree of jealousy unknown even in the aristocratic circles of London or Vienna. Externally, they are plain in their dress; few carriages are to be seen in the streets considering the fortunes enjoyed, and the exterior of their dwellings exhibits nothing to attract notice or awaken jealousy. It is in the interior of their mansions that they give a full rein to the luxury of wealth; all that riches can purchase of the elegant or costly is there displayed in profusion: like the Jews in the days of Ivanhoe, and from a similar cause, they are homely in external appearance, and gorgeous in interior display. Democracy and aristocracy have an equal aversion to the highest class of intellect, and neither will, in general, call in its assistance except in the last extremity, and when no other means of salvation remain; for the first is jealous of the power of mind, which it is unable to combat; the second, of independence of character, which it cannot control. Pliant ability is what both desire.†y

State of dependance of the bench.

Judicial independence, though in appearance generally established, is in reality almost unknown in America; but integrity of judicial character, to their honour be it said, is universal. All the state judges, from the highest to the lowest, are virtually elected by the people, and are liable to be displaced by them; for they are appointed by the state legislatures, who are themselves nominated by the universal suffrage of the inhabitants. Their tenure of office is sometimes for four, sometimes for seven years, but more generally for life.* In appearance, therefore, the independence of the bench is, in a majority of the states of the Union, established on the same footing as in Britain; but the difference, and it is a vital one, lies here: Power, in Britain, resides in three branches of the Legislature; in America, it is vested solely in ONE, the people. Judges in Britain can be displaced only by the crown, on the address of both houses of Parliament, a [illegible] which can never take place, except in the [illegible] case of judicial inquity, or the [illegible]tion of our liberties. In America, [illegible] the states, they are liable to be removed by a vot[illegible] the two branches of the Legislature, both of whom are selected by the people; that is, *on the simple declared will of one interest in society*, the majority in numbers. In several states, the tenure of office expires in six or seven years; in two states, in one. If their decisions are obnoxious to the feelings, however excited, of the multitude, they are sure not to be re-elected.z

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x XXII. The statement here made is in absolute contradiction to the principles which are refuted in Note VI.

* Tocq., ii., 12, 13.

y XXIII. Mr. Alison affirms that "Democracy has an aversion to the highest class of intellect. It desires pliant ability." But it is undeniable, that men who already have held, and who now fill the most exalted civic stations of dignity and power in the United States, are indebted for their official honours to their "intellectual ability" alone. On this point, it is proper to refer the reader to the volume entitled "The Congress of 1776," by N. Dwight, and to the "Library of American Biography," by Jared Sparks. Those works certify that Mr. Alison's statement in reference to the dead is without authority. Among the many living, constant proofs in this country that Mr. Alison's position is contrary to fact, it might be exceptionable to designate individuals. Nevertheless, one whole-souled genuine American Republican is so conspicuous, who moves with all the consistency of primitive Puritanism in an orbit so exclusively his own, that without indecorum he may be introduced as a visible, overpowering confutation of Mr. Alison's theoretic phantom; for he is the personification of "the highest class of intellect," without one impulse of "pliant ability." Has Mr. Alison ever heard of JOHN QUINCY ADAMS?

* "In thirteen states the judges hold office during good behaviour; in eight others, during periods of not less than seven years; in some instances those periods are from twelve to fifteen years. In two states they hold office but for one year. In but one instance they are appointed directly by the people; and they can never be removed by the direct action of the people. In thirteen states they are appointed by the Legislature. In twelve by the governor, with the advice of a senate or council. They are removable only by impeachment; or, in some instances, by an address of both branches of the Legislature, for which, usually, the votes of two thirds or three fourths of the House must concur."—*North American Review*, No. cxix., p. 394.

The author is happy, on this high authority, to correct an error into which he had fallen in regard to the appointment of the judges in America in his former editions. At the same time, he expresses his high sense of the liberal and impartial spirit, as well as eminent ability, with which his work has been reviewed, and his opinions often combated, in that distinguished periodical.

z XXIV. The above paragraph has been changed according to Mr. Alison's own "Addenda," and yet his original deceptive misstatement virtually remains. To sustain it, he announces an almost unexampled solecism; for he affirms that *the three co-ordinate branches of our American Legislatures are but one*, the people! In other words, that the Governor, the Senate, and the House of Representatives are one body, the people; and that the people are the Governor, the Senate, and the House of Representatives! From which sagacious discovery he infers, by a system of logic totally unknown at Edinburgh, that all the judges are elected by the people, and are liable to be displaced by them! This egregious fallacy is the more extraordinary, because he had the aid of Judge Kent's unimpeachably accurate testimony to guide his details, note IX., page 436. It is still more remarkable, that he quotes the North American Review as his authority, and thanks the critic for ena-

The highest talent at the bar rarely, from this cause condescends to accept judicial situations; and, consequently, the ability of the bench is generally unequal to that of the counsel, and their station in life inferior. This appears in the clearest manner from the amount of the salaries paid to these functionaries, which, even in the highest stations, never exceeds £1200, and in the local judicatures even of the greatest states, seldom reaches £500 a year.* But although these important functionaries hold their offices during pleasure, as they did in all the European monarchies before the dawn of freedom, or, as was the case in France after the first outbreak of the Revolution, yet no suspicion attaches to their judgments; and impartial justice is administered, except, perhaps, in a very few political cases, on the bench. Democratic jealousy, by the dependance which it exacts, and the scanty remuneration which it offers, may effectually seclude elevated character or shining abilities from public situations; but by fixing the attention of all on public functionaries, it provides the only effectual antidote to official corruption.*

Literature and intellectual ability of the highest class meet with little encouragement in America.*aa* The names of Cooper, Channing, and Washington Irving, indeed, amply demonstrate that the American soil is not wanting in genius of the most elevated and fascinating character; and Bancroft has given a history of the United States distinguished by profound thought, accurate research, and a manly eloquence; but their works, for the most part, are published in London; a decisive proof that it is in Europe that the chief encouragement for them is to be found. Such is the concentration of public interest on deeds of present, and often pressing concern, that neither the future nor the past excites general attention.*bb*

Literature and the press.

bling him to correct his errors; and while he selects that part of the passage in the North American [illegible] which is comparatively of less importance, because almost identical with the elucidation which Judge [illegible] had transmitted, he omits the critic's pungent exp[illegible] which evinces the total inaccuracy of the confus[illegible] scription that he has given of the dependant condition of the American judiciary. The reviewer expressly states, in the very same paragraph, cited by Mr. Alison in his note that immediately precedes, "The *independence of the judges* of the national courts is secured by an express provision of the Constitution, which requires that the offices shall be held '*during good behaviour*,' and the compensation attached '*shall not be diminished during* their continuance in office.'" The North American Review, adverting to Mr. Alison's "*extraordinary perversion* of De Tocqueville's language," thus combats the historian, and it is for the liberality and impartiality developed in *this sentence* that the author of the History of Europe has so highly eulogized the "distinguished ability" of his critic: "We are unwilling to accuse a writer, who shows so much apparent candour and fairness as Mr. Alison, of wilfully misstating facts, and deliberately falsifying the authority cited in support of them; but when we remember that this alleged fact respecting the want of an independent judiciary forms an important point in his reasoning, and is referred to again and again, in order to prove the general 'insecurity of life and property in the United States,' it must be admitted that his character as an historian is subject to a very serious imputation."—*North American Review*, No. cxix., page 393, 394.

* Salaries paid to judges, supreme and inferior, in America:

Chief-justice of Supreme Court	$5000 or	£1050
Ordinary Judges	4500 "	900
Chief Judge of New-York	3500 "	700
Second Judge of New-York	2000 "	400
Chief Judge of Pennsylvania	2500 "	500
" " North Carolina	2000 "	400
" " South Carolina	2500 "	600
" " Ohio	1000 "	200
" " Missouri	2000 "	400

And the others in proportion.—*Stat. Am.*, 1841, p. 64.

Connected with this subject there is a very curious fact indicative of the opposite effect, yet springing from the same motive at bottom in society, of aristocracy in Europe, and Democracy in America. It is mentioned by Tocqueville, and the same fact is also attested by Chevalier, that while the higher appointments in America are not paid at so high a rate as a tenth, or sometimes a twentieth part of what the same class of officers in Europe receive, the inferior class of officers draw at an average three, sometimes five times as much as their brethren on this side of the Atlantic. The President of the United States has six thousand a year, and the highest judge in the Republic twelve hundred; but a common sailor has five pounds a month, and a sheriff-officer or macer from fifty to a hundred pounds a year. In Great Britain, the sovereign has £200,000 a year, and the highest judges ten or fifteen thousand. But the common sailor has one pound fifteen a month, besides his allowances and rations, which may amount to as much more, and the doorkeeper or macer would think himself well paid with half of what his brother in America enjoys. Human nature is the same on both sides of the water. Aristocracy in Europe liberally provides for the functionaries who are drawn from its own class, or of the splendour with which it sympathizes; Democracy in America rewards in the most niggardly manner the elevated class of public servants, with whom it feels no identity of interest, and reserves all its liberality for the inferior class of offices, from which it itself expects to derive benefit.—See TOCQUEVILLE, ii., 73, 75; CHEVALIER, ii., 151.

* Tocq., ii., 44, 176, 177. Chev., ii., 151. Mart., i., 116

aa XXV. Probably, among all the extraordinary demonstrations of ignorance of American affairs, and the social condition of the United States, or of unwillingness faithfully to delineate the mental and moral character of our citizens, not one paragraph can be cited from Mr. Alison's History which is more objectionable in every application of it, than the above section entitled "Literature and the Press." It should also be remembered, that the text, as presented above, is according to the author's "Corrections and Addenda," after having received Judge Kent's amended exposition, and after having studied the literary arithmetical memoranda published in the "American Book Circular" for April, 1843. The direct contradiction in Mr. Alison's own paragraph, which is both exemplary and edifying, demonstrates that he is now accurately informed upon the general topic; for the author thus describes the grade of our Republican knowledge: "Literature and intellectual ability of the highest class meet with little encouragement in America." "The taste for a higher class of literature is diffused to a surprising degree through the community." "Utrum horum mavis accipe."

If no other fact existed, the republication of this American edition of his own voluminous history confutes all Mr. Alison's invidious statements. Notwithstanding the repugnance which is felt among us to his misrepresentations of the United States, and the still stronger antipathy to his anti-Republican heresies, such are the craving for historical literature, and the avidity with which it is read, that *fifteen* thousand copies of his own work already are disseminated. How, therefore, can the above assertion be reconciled with truth? Exclusive of the self-evident fact that in the six Eastern States probably *not one native citizen* or child, capable of tuition, can be found who is ignorant of the elementary parts of learning, many individual booksellers in Boston, New-York, and Philadelphia not only publish, but sell more books annually than are dispersed by all the tradesmen in Lower Canada. To that circumstance alone, if no other cause was discoverable, without "paper credit," may be traced "the superior population, wealth, and cultivation of the southern side of the River St. Lawrence and the lakes."

In this connexion one memorable donation shall be recorded: JOHN JACOB ASTOR has recently appropriated two hundred thousand dollars to purchase a free public library for the citizens of New-York!

bb XXVI. In reference to the total inattention to "the future and the past," as connected with the mental acquisitions and habits of American citizens, it is only requisite to mention the rapidly-increasing number of academic and collegiate institutions in the United States.

According to the last census of the United States, in 1840 there were *one hundred and seventy-three* colleges, with ten thousand two hundred and forty students, and three thousand two hundred and forty-two academies and grammar-schools, with one hundred and sixty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-nine students. The *alumni* of *seven* only of the colleges amount to nineteen thousand and eight hundred. There are in this Republic twenty-eight *medical schools*, with three thousand two hundred and sixty-five students. One essential department of literature, so common in the United States, is almost unknown in England, except among the Nonconformists; that is, the biblical and theological lore which is pursued in the seminaries expressly consecrated to the preparation of students for the ministry of the Gospel. The proposition for such a course at Cambridge and Oxford, within our own recollection, was

The classics are in little esteem.[cc] Works in the higher branches of philosophy or speculation are unknown.[dd] We have the authority of Tocqueville for the assertion, that so wholly are they regardless of historical records or monuments,

denounced with nearly universal scorn and ridicule; and the efforts of the few noble individuals to supply that withering destitution of ecclesiastical knowledge in those universities have been counteracted almost as sternly as if those *evangelicals*, as they are contemptuously denominated, had endeavoured to introduce the plague from Turkey, and rattlesnakes from the Rocky Mountains. Now in this Republic we have *thirty-nine* theological institutions, with thirteen hundred students, expressly devoted to the acquisition of that knowledge which shall qualify them, *quo ad hoc*, to become "able ministers of the New Testament." To which must be added, that the libraries of our various collegiate institutions comprise about one million volumes of the noblest standard works in every department of literature.

Now, although some of these institutions in the Western States as yet are in an incipient state only, the Greek and Latin languages, with the mathematics, constitute the prominent themes of the academical course.

The national statistics of "*Elementary Education*," by the census of 1840, are still more extraordinary, when contrasted with the general impression which would be derived from Mr. Alison's statement. Of "*Primary and Common Schools*" there are 47,209, with 1,845,000 pupils, of which 468,000 are instructed at the public charge.

cc XXVII. On this paragraph, Judge Kent thus commented in his letter of elucidation to Mr. Alison: "This passage is utterly unfounded. Very many men reside in this city, in Philadelphia, New-Haven, Boston, in our colleges, and throughout the country, who are perfectly skilled in Greek and Roman original literature, and in all the higher branches of science and philosophy. It is truly painful to see our country so exceedingly misunderstood, and our accomplished scholars and scientific men so little known. The historical societies in Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New-York, Pennsylvania, Georgia, &c., are very enterprising. The State of New-York at this moment has an agent in Europe, sent on purpose to collect colonial documents. The very expensive geological survey of the state also is completed; and the first volume, in elegant style, both of engraving and type, has been published, at the expense of the state."

dd XXVIII. This assertion, that "works in the higher branches of philosophy or speculation are unknown," is peculiarly incorrect. The following paragraph from the "American Book Circular" for April, 1843, which Mr. Alison has seen, for it was issued in London some time prior to the transmission of his final "*Corrections and Addenda*" to New-York, refutes his text so completely, that it is transcribed as an illustrative comment. "We have good English authority for the opinion that the System of Theology by Dwight; the text-book editions of the Classics by Anthon; Medical Jurisprudence by Beck; Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity by Ray; and Webster's English Dictionary, are the best works, in their several departments, existing in the language. Jonathan Edwards is held in *some* repute as a metaphysician." Besides multiplied copies of separate disquisitions, we think four editions of the whole works of Edwards, at least, have been issued in this country during the present generation. The recent treatises of Day, Rauch, Schmucker, Tappan, Upham, and Wayland indicate that this "speculation" is not yet extinct in this country. Besides those original works, and translations of the volumes of Cousin, De Watte, Jouffroy, Gall, and Spurzheim, the first complete collections ever made of the works of Bolingbroke, Burke, Cudworth, Paley, and Dugald Stewart, to which may be added the Essays of Carlyle, Jeffrey, Macaulay, Talfourd, and Professor Wilson, in a corrected form, all were first printed in the United States. Mr. Alison also can decide whether the "higher branches of philosophy or speculation" are unknown in this Republic, by the fact that large editions have been issued of the works of Abercrombie, *Alison* on Taste, Bacon, Bentham, Thomas Brown, Chalmers, Coleridge, Dymond, Reid, Adam Smith, Isaac Taylor, and others. Thus, from a very imperfect survey of the "Lists of American Publications," it appears that during the last fifteen years, there were issued in the United States nineteen original and thirty-one reprints of works on metaphysics; thirty-six Greek and Latin Classics with original notes; and thirty-five Hebrew, Greek, and Latin original Text-books, and not one reprint of a foreign work. On Jurisprudence, which also largely partakes of abstract "speculation," in the year 1834 alone, twenty volumes were published. Mr. Alison's statement, therefore, is altogether defective and inaccurate.

Three voluminous Encyclopædias have been reprinted, the Britannica, Brewster's, and that of Rees; and the "Encyclopædia Americana" supplies the deficiencies of all others on American topics.

"As proof that the American Republicans are not utterly absorbed in the present, exclusive of other editions, three sets of stereotype plates have produced sixty thousand copies of Scott's Commentary on the Bible. Of Henry's Commentary the sale has been equal. From Brattleborough, a small village in the State of Vermont, one hundred thousand large octavo volumes on Biblical Literature have been sent forth, and the whole process of book-making, from the manufactory of the paper to the binder's elegant finish, has been executed in the same edifice, and under one roof. In Cincinnati, which half a century ago was a wilderness, quarto volumes on American Antiquities have been issued, not inferior to any of the London publications. Lowell, a town of cotton and woollen factories, not thirty years old, has produced an elegant edition of Goëthe's Faust; and a Literary Miscellany is now published there, which comprises only original articles *written exclusively by females employed in the mills*, and which, in genius, style, intelligence, and morals, is superior to the Lady's Magazine, as it was published in London at the commencement of the present century; and it is far more refined and intellectual than nine tenths of the similar British existing periodicals." "Our elementary works of education are written at home, and their number is incalculable, of which one fact is proof. A single publisher in Cincinnati has printed nearly seven hundred thousand copies of school-books during the last six years," and of one geographical text-book with maps, one hundred thousand copies were sold within two years. Of the character and value of those school-books, one example may be mentioned: *Burritt's Geography of the Heavens, Atlas of the Heavens*, which is now very generally used in the American *Common Schools*, and which *Thomas Dick*, a most competent British judge, has authoritatively pronounced to be of far superior character, and more useful than any similar compendium known in Britain.

"That science and scientific records are not neglected is evident from these four facts: the Legislature of New-York appropriated two hundred thousand dollars for expenditures to develop the Natural History of that state; the Legislature of Massachusetts directed the survey of that state, and the publication of the researches for that purpose; Geological and other Literary Societies constantly publish their discoveries and transactions; and costly scientific works of the highest character frequently are issued." Mr. Alison can comprehend the extent of scientific acquirements and research among us from the example of a young man, brought up in the daily exercise of the typographical art, who has, by his own unaided energies, attained such maturity in geological science, that he ranks among his correspondents and the contributors to his museum one of the most eminent natural philosophers in Europe, the Professor of Geology at Berlin.

The ensuing extract, transcribed from the "American Book Circular," as it is sanctioned by the approbation of the "London Athenæum," includes correlate information too important to be omitted, especially as Mr. Alison has not adjudged it requisite to exemplify the literary piracy which it announces in his "*Corrections and Addenda*."

"*Englishmen read more American books than is generally supposed.* The oldest London Review appropriated the articles of the *North American* entire, *as original*, but *accidentally* omitted to mention their origin. American periodicals have contributed 'considerably' to some of those in England, in mutually innocent unconsciousness. Some American writers would scarcely recognise their own offspring under their new names and foreign dress. Harris's Natural History of the Bible, Bancroft's translation of Heeren's Politics of Greece, and Everett's translation of Buttman's Greek Grammar, all were reprinted and sold as English books. 'Montacute' was only the English title for a 'New Home.' Judge Story's 'Law of Bailments' was appended by Mr. Theobald in his Notes on Sir William Jones. Mr. Neal published a volume, entitled 'Charcoal Sketches;' that volume appeared in London entire, with the plates, in the middle of 'Pic Nic Papers.'" One other fact is very extraordinary. The Westminster Review favourably noticed Peter Parley's works, quoting, however, a series of Americanisms which disfigured them. But every one of those interpolations proved to be the work of the London publishers. Not one of them was written by Peter himself, or can be found in the American editions. It is also worthy of notice, that within ten years, in the "London Catalogue" alone, which does not include the minor different editions of the popular religious volumes, there are enumerated sixty-eight works on Theology; Fiction, sixty-six; Juvenile, fifty-six; Travels, fifty-two; Education, forty-one; Biography, twenty-six; History, twenty-two; Poetry, twelve; Metaphysics, eleven; Philosophy, ten; Science, nine; and Law, nine. This catalogue does not include the American books sent to London for sale. Therefore we may appropriate, with a trifling alteration, the language of the writer already quoted. "This rapid glance will not be deemed impertinent, as there is a great deficiency of available information about the actual progress and condition of

that half a century hence the national annals even of these times could only be written from the archives of other states.*ee* Literary talent, in a great degree, is directed to the wants or amusements of the day. It is vehement, and impassioned often in the highest degree upon them, but in general regardless of other and more durable concerns. The taste, however, for English literature is not only general, but almost universal. The leading authors of Britain are all published in America, and read with avidity. So numerous are the editions of the more popular writers, as to exceed those published in Britain itself; and to afford a decisive evidence, that if their own writers are chiefly occupied with objects of local or party contention, the taste for a higher class of literature is diffused to a surprising degree through the community.*ff* Legislation, stamped with the same character, is almost entirely engrossed with objects of material, and often only of temporary importance. The struggles of interest between contending provinces or classes in society; the formation of railroads, canals, or harbours, for the advantage of particular districts; the establishment of joint-stock companies as a source of individual profit, engross nine tenths both of the general and local legislation of the United States. The press, which everywhere abounds, and is diffused to a degree unexampled in any other country, though by no means deficient in ability, is uniformly distinguished by violence, personalities, and rancour;*gg* its influence is so considerable in guiding the irresistible impulse of public opinion, that it may truly be said to be the ruler of the state, though itself is swayed by the interests and passions of those to whom its productions are addressed; and it is well known in the United States, that public services the most important, private character the most immaculate, furnish no protection whatever against its calumnies; and that, by a combination among the editors of newspapers, should so unlikely an event occur,

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the United States; at least, if we may judge from the many mistakes and erroneous inferences which disfigure the work of Mr. Alison." These Notes, in the form of Corrections and Addenda," will suggest sources of information, and will also promote the cause of historical truth.

ee XXIX. That there may be no cavil on the part of the historian to the additional "*Corrections and Addenda*" included in these notes respecting the delinquencies and errors in his text, the ensuing paragraph is extracted from the London Athenæum for May, 1843. "Another charge preferred against the Americans by Mr. Alison is this, indifference to their historical records and monuments. *This appears to us singularly unjust. Our own library shelves would almost enable us to refute it.* The historical commemorations alone, *a custom peculiar to America*, must tend to collect and preserve such a mass of historical information that no other country ever possessed, or can ever hope to possess. Every town has its history and its historical records, and the labour of selection will be the great difficulty in the way of the future historian. However, let the Americans adduce their proofs of its injustice. The publication of more than *fifty octavo volumes* of the historical memoirs and correspondence of Washington, Franklin, Jay, Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, Morris, Adams, and many other statesmen; of *twenty volumes* of diplomatic correspondence; of *four* biographical collections; of as many historical, statistical, and commercial journals continued for several years; the publication for twenty-four years of a Scientific Quarterly Journal, and of a Quarterly Literary Review, both of the highest class; the three folio volumes commencing a series of *American Archives*, under Congressional authority; the collection of American State Papers in about forty volumes; *two thousand volumes* of documents, published in successive years, by the two houses of Congress and the various state legislatures; the systematic collection and arrangement of the original public archives, commenced in Massachusetts, under the direction of the state government, and continued by other states; the Collections of the Historical Societies of Massachusetts, in *twenty-six volumes*, of New-York, of Pennsylvania, of Connecticut, of Rhode Island, of New-Hampshire, of Georgia, and of Ohio! the sale of *nine* editions of Bancroft's extensive History of the United States; and the Natural History of the State of New-York, in *ten* quarto volumes, published at an expense of two hundred thousand dollars; with many other instances that can be quoted in evidence, disprove Mr. Alison's allegation that the Americans are 'wholly regardless of historical records or monuments;' and verify that this charge against them is not 'more just or true than many other' unfounded assertions respecting 'the citizens, the political affairs, and the civic institutions of the United States, which are incorporated in his History.'"

ff XXX. The State of Connecticut contains about three hundred thousand persons. The school fund, as a permanent capital, amounts to two millions and a quarter of million of dollars, more than half a million of British sovereigns, and since the primary establishment of that fund for the sole use of general education, a much larger sum has been appropriated from the interest, &c., than the whole present amount of that public property. Look at the result! Out of the whole three hundred and one thousand persons enumerated by the census of 1840, only *five hundred and twenty-six persons could be found, over twenty years of age, unable to read and write.*

In the State of New-York alone, there are eleven thousand School District Libraries, each containing about two hundred volumes of choice and select publications, historical, scientific, and moral, expressly adapted for youth, of all which every child in the district has the perusal and use gratis, amounting to more than two millions of standard books diffused in every corner and nook of the state, while the funds permanently invested for the support of education in the republic of New-York alone amount to nearly eleven millions of dollars, more than two millions and a quarter of British sovereigns. We are convinced, unless an almost incredible change has taken place within a few years, that there are more children enjoying the benefits of an adequate elementary education adapted to the purposes of ordinary life, in the city of New-York and its vicinity, than in the city of London, with its ten miles of circumference; and that there are more students receiving the advantages of competent instruction in the seven states of Maine, New-Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New-York, with one fourth of the numerical population, than in the whole insular circuit from Berwick upon Tweed to Dover and Land's End.

Whether "the classics are in little esteem," Mr. Alison could easily ascertain, if he would examine the boxes of Greek and Latin books which are constantly floating in our steamboats, and flying on our railroads to villages and hamlets, the names of which have scarcely yet found their record in the last and most minute gazetteer; combined with the mass of stereotype plates and volumes which he could discover without a moment's delay among the book publishers of Boston, New-York, Philadelphia, and even of Cincinnati, where, about fifty years since, the Indians held their wigwams.

On Biblical and Oriental Philology, there are Robinson's Hebrew Lexicon and Greek Lexicon to the New Testament; Nordheimer's Hebrew Grammar; and "the only translations in English of many of the German classical and critical works which have been republished in Britain, are by American scholars."

Moreover, a judiciously-selected library of standard works, more extensive and valuable than very recently could have been found in the ornamental bookcases of the countless majority of the middle ranks in Britain and Ireland, now adorns the plain shelves of many log-cabins and similar unpretending domicils amid the American forests. If Mr. Alison, in propria persona, would explore some of the deep dells of our loftiest mountains, he might encounter a rough-looking Republican in semi-Indian habiliments, who would astonish him by the amplitude of his "literature and his intellectual ability."

gg XXXI. Among all the mistakes of Mr. Alison—among all the misrepresentations of foreign writers concerning this country—there is none more gross than this imputation of *distinguishing* "violence, personalities, and rancour," to the American newspaper press. In general—looking at the whole body of newspapers—there is room enough for censure, but these are not the faults. Want of talent, want of earnestness, want of knowledge, want of elevated and noble purpose, are too often characteristic of our editors; but in violence and rancour they fall infinitely short of the English journalists. With very few exceptions, their tone is moral, their respect for the proprieties of life commendable; and it is notorious, not only that the most prominent of these exceptions is a paper owned and conducted by foreigners, but that it has been more than once compelled, by the strong and united condemnation of the American press, properly so called, to pause in its career of profligacy and rascality, and assume, for a time at least, a virtue which was foreign to its nature.

the noblest and best citizens of America may at any time be driven into exile.*

Great extent of slavery in the United States.

Slavery, as all the world knows, exists to a great extent in a large part of the United States. It is in the Southern States that this dreadful evil almost exclusively prevails; for although the negro race extends into the State of New-York, and some of the adjoining ones to the North and West, yet their number is declining in these districts, while it is rapidly increasing in those to the South; and the present comparative rate of increase of the two races justifies the hope that ere long slavery will be entirely confined to those parts of America which border on the tropics. There, however, it prevails to a prodigious extent, and nearly the whole labour, both field and domestic, is performed by the African race. In the six states alone of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, there were in 1840 no less than 1,751,529 slaves—a prodigious number, considering that the total free white population of the same states is only 2,406,876. History has not yet solved the questions, whether the negro race can ever be induced to labour continuously and effectively without the coercion of a master, and whether the whites are capable of bearing the effect of rural work in hot climates. But the experience, alike of Africa in every age, of St. Domingo in the last, and the British West India colonies in the present, seems to lead to the belief that both questions must be resolved in the negative; that the negro constitution possesses an aptitude for bearing the effect of tropical heat to which the European is a stranger; and that the utmost which philanthropy can do for the descendants of Canaan in the New World—of whom it was prophesied at the flood, that they should be the servants of those of Japhet*—is to mitigate their sufferings, and restrain the severity of their oppression.

Vehement resistance made against its abolition.

The most energetic efforts have been made for a number of years back, by a humane and philanthropic party in the United States, headed by not a few leaders of genius and ability, to produce a general feeling against the farther continuance of slavery in any part of the Union; but although they have succeeded in procuring its abolition in a few states where the negroes were inconsiderable in number, they have made no sort of impression in those where they are numerous. All the efforts of philanthropy, all the force of eloquence, have been shattered against the obvious interests of a body of proprietors dependant for their existence on slave labour. It is perfectly understood in every part of the Union, that the first serious attempt to force emancipation upon the country by a general measure, will be the signal for an immediate separation of the Southern States from the Union. Superficial observers are never weary of throwing their tenacious retention of slavery in America in the face of the Republicans of that country, and proclaiming it as the greatest of all inconsistencies, for those who are so ambitious of maintaining and extending their own privileges, to deny even common freedom to others who happen to be subject to their power. More profound thinkers have observed, that this Democratic principle is itself the main cause of the obstinate retention of the servient race in slavery; that in every country and age of the world, those who are loudest in the assertion of their own privileges are the least inclined to share them with others; that they are extremely willing to level *down* to a certain point, but extremely unwilling to level *up* from below to the same point; and that that point is always to be found in that stratum of society where the majority of the electors is placed. There cannot be a doubt that the observations of Mr. Burke on this subject are well founded. The English Reformed House of Commons would never have emancipated the West India negroes, if they had been in the employment of even a part of the electors. Witness the obstinate resistance the Democratic members of the Legislature make to any restriction on the practical slavery of the factory children.

Manners of America.

Volumes without number have been written on the manners of the Americans; their exclusive system in society; their national vanity, and iritability at censure; and many of these productions, lively and amusing, are penned in no friendly, and often in no just spirit. The whole subject may be dismissed in a single paragraph. The manners of the Americans are the manners of Great Britain, *minus* the aristocracy, the landowners, the army, and the Established Church. In New-York and Philadelphia the society of the great merchants is indistinguishable from that of the same rank in the greatest towns of the British islands: the habits of the American middle class, if a few revolting customs are excepted, will find a parallel in our steamboats and stage-coaches. Exclusive society is practised to an extent, and pervades all ranks to a depth, altogether unknown in most European communities, where the distinctions of rank have been long established, are well understood, and not liable to be infringed upon, except by peculiar merit or good fortune;* but that is the necessary result of the total absence of all hereditary rank, and may be witnessed to nearly the same extent, and from the same causes, in the commercial and manufacturing cities of Great Britain. The admiration for rank which is generally felt in America, especially by the fair sex, is excessive; but that is common to them with Republicans all the world over. The abolition of titles of honour in Democratic communities is the result, not of a contempt for, but an inordinate desire for such distinctions; they injure, when enjoyed by a few, the self-love of those who do not possess them;

* Tocq., ii., 63, 64.

† "God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant."—*Gen.*, ix., 27.

	Free Whites.		Slaves.	
	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.
Virginia	371,223	369,745	228,661	220,326
North Carolina	240,047	244,823	123,546	122,271
South Carolina	130,496	128,588	158,678	168,360
Georgia	210,534	197,161	139,335	141,609
Alabama	176,692	158,493	127,360	126,172
Mississippi	97,256	81,818	98,003	97,208
	1,226,248	1,180,628	875,583	875,946

—*Census*, 1841.

* "'You can't imagine,' said an American girl, the daughter of a milliner, to Miss Martineau, 'what a nice set we have at school; we never let any of the *haberdashery daughters associate with us.*' My informant went on to mention how anxious she and her set of about sixty young people were to visit '*exclusively*' among themselves: 'how delightful it would be to have no *grocers' daughters among them*;' but 'that was found to be impossible.'"—MARTINEAU, iii., 33. *Cælum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt.*

and since the majority cannot enjoy that advantage, for if so it would cease to be one, they are resolved that none shall. They are vain on all national subjects, and excessively sensitive to censure, however slight, and, most of all, to ridicule; but that obtains invariably with those classes or individuals who have not historic descent or great personal achievements or qualities to rest upon, and who, desirous of general applause, have a secret sense that in some particular they may be undeserving of it. The Americans have already done great things: when they have continued a century longer in the same career, they will, like the English, be a proud, and cease to be a vain people. Vanity, as Bulwer has well remarked, is a passion which feeds on little gratifications, but requires them constantly: pride rests on great things, and is indifferent to momentary applause. The English not only noway resent, but positively enjoy, the ludicrous exhibitions made of their manners on the French stage; such burlesques would flay the Americans alive. The English recollect that the French learned these peculiarities when the British troops occupied Paris.

How has America escaped its political dangers?

How, then, has it happened that a country possessing none of the securities against external danger or internal convulsion, which have been elsewhere found to be indispensable, has still gone on increasing and flourishing; extending alike in internal strength and external consideration, and still exhibiting, though with several ominous heaves, an unruffled surface in general society? The solution of this peculiarity is to be found in the circumstance that the United States have no neighbouring powers either capable of endangering their security, or having an interest in provoking their hostility; that the majority of the electors, as yet, are owners of land, and therefore have an interest to resist or prevent spoliation of real property; and that the back settlements furnish a perpetual and ready issue for all their restless activity and discontented energy to exhaust and enrich itself in pacific warfare with the forest. When these peculiarities have ceased to distinguish them, as cease they must in the progress of things; when the growth of population, and completed appropriation of land, have rendered the class of workmen who live by wages more numerous than those who have property of their own, and the filling up or distance of the frontier settlements has closed that vast outlet to the selfish desires and ill-humours of the state, the political power, now vested in numbers, will inevitably produce a general disruption and chaos of society, attended with consequences as disastrous as those which in our times have desolated the provinces of South America; unless, as is more probable, a sense of the approaching danger, or events that cannot now be foreseen, restore in the United States those safeguards against human wickedness which have in all other ages and countries been found to be essential to the existence of society.*hh*

Political state of Canada, and its population.

In many of the fundamental particulars which distinguish the United States of America from all other countries of the world, the British provinces in CANADA entirely participate. They have the same boundless extent of unappropriated territory, in some places rich and fertile, in others steril and unproductive; the same active and persevering race to subdue it; the same restless spirit of adventure, perpetually urging men into the recesses of the forest in quest of independence; the same spirit of freedom and enterprise; the same advantages arising from the powers of knowledge, the habits of civilization, the force of credit, the capacities of industry. Their progress in respect of wealth and population, accordingly, has been nearly at the same rate, at least since, in the middle of the last century, they fell under the British dominion, as that of the neighbouring provinces in the United States; and both have regularly gone on, doubling in somewhat less than a quarter of a century: a rate of advance which may be considered as the maximum of colonial increase in the most favourable circumstances, and when largely aided by emigration from the parent state. The total inhabitants of the British possessions in America are now about one million seven hundred thousand; but when it is recollected that the natural increase of this number is aided by an immigration, annually, of from thirty to fifty thousand persons in the prime of life from the British islands, which number is rapidly increasing, it may well be imagined that it is destined to become, ere long, one of the most powerful states of the New World.*†

It is not the points of resemblance between Canada and the United States of America, it is the points of their difference, which require to be pointed out; and they are so remarkable as to indicate, not obscurely, a different ultimate destiny in the two nations.

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hh XXXII. This fearful prediction of Mr. Alison's will excite merely a transient emotion of slightly contemptuous amusement in the breast of every intelligent reader. It is not worth while to furnish an elaborate refutation of the erroneous notions on which it is founded; but it may be observed, that as "God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb," there is every reason to hope that Providence will continue, even when Mr. Alison's causes of our safety have ceased to operate, to guide us in the path of welfare, peace, and improvement. We have little confidence in Mr. Alison's "safeguards"—to wit, an aristocracy, a hierarchy, primogeniture, and a standing army; but considerable in books and schoolmasters. There is virtue enough in education and Republican principles to save us from the "general disruption and chaos of society" which Mr. Alison predicts for us with so much complacency.

* Malte Brun, xi., 179. Martin's Col. Hist., iii., p. 1 and 89.

† The population of the British possessions in North America, according to the last census taken in 1834, was as follows:

Lower Canada	549,005
Upper Canada	336,461
New-Brunswick	152,156
Nova Scotia and Cape Breton	142,548
Prince Edward's Island	32,292
Newfoundland	75,000
Total	1,287,462

Increase of Population in Lower Canada.

Years.	Population.
1764	76,275
1783	113,012
1825	425,080
1831	540,628
1841 (estimated)	610,000

—MALTE BRUN, ix., 179. In the last eighty years, the population has multiplied eightfold.

But the population of Upper Canada alone is now above 450,000, and the total inhabitants are not under 1,700,000. —See MALTE BRUN, xi., 179; *American Stat. Alm.*, 267; and MARTIN'S *Colonial History*, iii., p. 1, Table. The number of emigrants who have landed at Quebec and Montreal in the subjoined years, have been as follows. The marked diminution in the year 1838, being the year of the Canadian revolt, is a striking commentary upon the tendency of the criminal ambition of its unprincipled leaders:

1831	49,783	1836	35,226
1832	66,339	1837	29,884
1833	28,808	1838 (Rebellion)	2,993
1834	40,060	1839	26,472
1835	15,573	1840	29,549

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, vi., 166; and vii., 199; and viii., 199.

Loyalty of the Canadians.

The character of the Canadians bears the same relation to that of the Americans that the Tyrolese does to that of the Swiss. Both are sprung from the same race, are subjected to the same necessities, are animated by the same ambition, and enjoy, in a great measure at least, the same advantages. But there is this difference between them, and in its ultimate effects it may prove a vital one: the American has no sovereign; in him the aspirations of loyalty are lost, the glow of patriotic devotion is diffused over so immense a surface as to be wellnigh evaporated; and from having no visible or tangible object to rest upon, the generous affections are too often obliterated, and individual ambition, private advancement, the thirst for gold, absorb every faculty of the mind. In the Canadian, on the other hand, patriotic ardour is in general mingled with chivalrous devotion; the lustre of British descent, the glories of British renown, animate every bosom, at least in the British race; and with the well-founded pride arising from the contemplation of their own vast natural advantages and honourable martial exploits, is mingled a strong and personal attachment to the throne. In Upper Canada, in particular, which now numbers four hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, these sentiments are peculiarly strong; the large bodies of Scottish Highlanders who have settled in its secluded wilds have borne with them from their native mountains the loyal ardour by which their race has been distinguished in every period of English history; on every occasion of hazard they have been foremost at the post of honour, and to the patriotic attachment of the inhabitants of that noble province, the preservation of those magnificent possessions to the British crown is mainly to be ascribed. The effect of this spirit upon national character is incalculable; it produces that first and greatest step in social elevation—a forgetfulness of self, a devotion to others, a surrender of the heart to generous affections; and from its tendency to concentrate the energies of men upon patriotic objects, it may at some future period, combined with the incalculable advantages of the water communication by the great chain of lakes, come to counterbalance all the riches of the basin of the Mississippi, and reassert in America the wonted superiority of Northern valour over Southern opulence.

The *habitans* of Lower Canada.

A peculiar and highly-interesting feature of society in Lower Canada is to be found in the *habitans*, or natives of French descent. These simple people, for the most part entirely uneducated, and under the guidance of their Catholic priests, comprise eight ninths of the whole population of that province, and their number now is not short of five hundred thousand. In every respect they are the antipodes of the Anglo-Saxon race, which elsewhere in the New World has acquired so decided a preponderance. While the colonists of British descent are incessantly penetrating the forests in search of new abodes, and clearing them by their industry, those of French origin have in no instance migrated beyond the seats of their fathers, and remain immovably rooted in their original settlements. Local attachment, unknown in America, is felt in the strongest degree among the *habitans* of Canada; and rather than emigrate from their native habitations, or penetrate the woods in search of more extended or richer settlements, they divide and subdivide those which they already enjoy, till they have in many cases become partitioned into as diminutive portions as in the wine provinces of Old France. The effects of this disposition have been in the highest degree important. While the British race has been continually spreading around them, with the same vigour as in the American States, and the forests in every direction have been falling beneath their strokes, the French inhabitants have been fixed immovably in the seats of their fathers, and their descendants, though immensely increased in numbers, are to be found tilling their native fields. Hence, even in the infancy of the nation, they are already a prey to the evils of long-established civilization; population has become extremely dense in districts where the European race has been little more than a century established, and in the midst of a country which possesses three hundred square miles of fertile territory, land is often partitioned into heritages of an acre and half an acre each. The ultimate results of this most striking peculiarity may already be distinctly foreseen. The British race, impelled into the wilderness by the wandering spirit which belongs to their blood, and the ardent passions which have been nursed by their institutions, will overspread the land, and, like a surging flood, surround and overwhelm those isolated spots where the French family, adhering to the customs, the attachments, and the simplicity of their fathers, are still marrying and giving in marriage in their paternal seats. Democracy is the great moving spring in the social world; it is the steam power of society, the centrifugal force which impels civilization into the abodes of savage man.*

Ruinous effect of the constitution of 1791.

A rebellion, or possibly a separation from the parent state, was inevitably bequeathed to Canada by the constitution of 1791. That constitution, struck out at a heat during the first fervour of the French Revolution, and founded apparently on an equitable basis, the result of inexperience and an over-estimate of human nature, involved two fatal errors. 1st. The country was divided into different provinces, having separate assemblies, over each of which the representatives of the sovereign presided, without any common or paramount Legislature in the colonies. Nothing could be more convenient at first sight, or just in theory, than this arrangement, under which the representatives of each province assembled within their own bounds to discuss their matters of local interest; but what was its effect when the representatives of Lower Canada, nine tenths of the inhabitants of which were of French descent, were in one house, and those of the Upper Province, seventeen twentieths of whom are of British origin, in another; and the former were animated by the combined passions of roused Democracy and national animosity, and the latter by British spirit and steady loyalty to the throne? 2d. One uniform rate of qualification, viz., the possession of a forty-shilling freehold in the country, or a ten-pound subject held in *tenancy*, as in the British Reform Bill, in towns, was established as the test of the elective franchise in all the British provinces;† a principle in appearance the most equitable, but in practice the most perilous and unequal, where the popu-

* Malte Brun, xi., 155, 156. Tocq., ii., 204.

† By the act of 1791, 31 Geo. III., c. xxxi., the freehold is vested in forty-shilling freeholders in the country; property to the amount of £5 sterling, or tenancy of a subject paying £10 rent, in towns.

lation is composed of different races of men, in different degrees of civilization, knowledge, and advancement. It is exactly the same thing as cutting clothes according to one measure for a stripling of fifteen, a man of thirty, and a veteran of sixty, merely because they happen to live under the same roof. The English have felt the evils of this system, in its application to the British islands, since the Reform Bill established one uniform qualification for the sober English, inured to centuries of freedom; the ambitious Scotch, teeming with visions of Democratic equality; and the fiery Irish, steeped in hatred of the religion and institutions of the Saxon. But these evils have been still more sorely felt in Canada, where that unhappy constitution, in its ultimate effects, gave the same powers to the French *habitans*, not one in fifty of whom could read, and who, speaking their native language, were but ill reconciled to a foreign dominion, as the hardy English and Scotch emigrants, who had brought with them across the Atlantic the habits and loyalty of their fathers. But the evils consequent on this arrangement as yet lay buried in the womb of time; they were brought to life only by the passions and weaknesses of a future age; and in 1812, when the war began, one only feeling of loyalty animated the whole inhabitants of the British North American possessions. Above forty thousand effective militia in arms were ready to defend their territory from invasion, and the King of England had not, in his wide-spread dominions, more loyal subjects than the French inhabitants on the shores of the St. Lawrence.*

Vast importance of the North American colonies to Great Britain.

Incalculable is the importance of its North American colonies to the British Empire. Its population, doubling every quarter of a century, promises in fifty years to amount to between seven and eight millions of souls; while the opulence of its inhabitants, and the taste for British comforts which they have brought with them from their native country, promises to render it a boundless vent for our manufactures; and the peculiarity of its trade, consisting chiefly of those bulky articles, emigrants taken out, and wood brought home, has already rendered it the nursery of the British navy. Already the exports of British produce and manufactures to our North American colonies have reached, on an average of years, nearly three millions sterling; an amount, great as it is, by no means unprecedented, when it is recollected that in 1812, when the war began, the United States of America, with a population somewhat under eight millions, took off thirteen millions annually of British goods. But the marvels of the shipping employed in the North American trade exceed all other marvels. From the Parliamentary returns, it appears that the tonnage, wholly British, employed at this time (1841) in the trade with the North American provinces, has reached the enormous amount of 800,000 tons, being fully a fourth of that carried on in British bottoms with the whole world put together; and that it has steadily advanced at the rate of doubling every ten years.† At this rate of increase, in ten years more it will give employment to 1,600,000 tons of shipping, or fully *a half* of the whole British tonnage at this time. And observe, while this is the astonishing value of our colonial trade, both upon our manufactures and shipping, the encouraging effect of our emancipated colonies is widely different; for the Parliamentary papers demonstrate that at this moment, while seventeen hundred thousand of our own fellow-citizens in Canada consume nearly two millions and a half worth annually of our manufactures, seventeen millions in the United States take off on an average only eight millions worth, or considerably less than what half their number did thirty years ago, before rivalry of British manufactures had commenced; and that while the trade with the Canadas gives employment to eight hundred thousand tons of British shipping, that with the independent States of America, with just *ten times* their population, only employs from eighty to ninety thousand, or a *tenth part* of its amount, the remainder having passed into the hands of the Americans themselves.*

Real causes of the disastrous issue of the first American war.

Various have been the causes assigned by statesmen and historians for the disastrous issue of the first American war. Two may be specified, of such paramount importance, that they eclipse all the others, and are of themselves perfectly adequate to explain the phenomenon, without recurring to any other. Great Britain was at that period in an especial manner, as she is at all times in a certain degree, the victim at once of Democratic parsimony and aristocratic corruption. She undertook the conquest of colonies possessing then three millions of inhabitants, situated three thousand miles from the parent state, with an army which could not bring ten thousand combatants into the field; for the whole military force of the empire of every description did not amount to twenty thousand men.† The furious patriots and country party

Years.	Exports. Declared value.	Imports. Declared value.	British Tonnage.
	£	£	£
1827	950,490	468,766	359,793
1828	1,248,288	466,065	400,841
1829	1,117,422	569,452	431,901
1830	1,570,020	682,202	452,397
1831	1,922,089	902,915	480,236
1832	2,078,949	795,652	504,211
1833	2,100,211	756,466	512,820
1834	1,339,629	618,598	524,606
1835	2,127,531	629,051	631,345
1836	2,739,507	633,575	620,722
1837	2,141,035	684,791	631,427
1838*	1,992,459	553,827	665,354
1839	2,467,319	721,679	709,846
1840	2,884,231		796,410

—*Parl. Return, May* 27, 1840.

* Table showing the comparative exports and tonnage to the United States of America, and British possessions therein, in 1836, 1837, 1838, and 1839:

Years.	Exports to United States. Declared value.	Exports to British Possessions. Declared value.	Tonnage to United States.		Tonnage to British Possessions.
			American.	British.	
1836	12,425,605	2,739,507	226,483	86,383	620,722
1837	4,695,225	2,141,035	275,813	81,023	631,427
1838	7,585,760	1,992,459	357,467	83,203	665,354
1839	8,341,672	2,467,619	282,005	92,482	709,846

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, vi., 43, and vii., 43.

† Supplies for the year 1773:

Dec. 3, 1772. That 20,000 men be employed for the sea service for the year 1773, including 4354 marines.

Dec. 10. That a number of land forces, including 1522 invalids, amounting to 17,070 effective men, commissioned and non-commissioned officers included, be employed for the year 1773.

Feb. 13, 1775. That 2000 men be now added to the navy, in prospect of the war with the plantations in America.

* Martin's Col. Hist., iii., 127, 128. 31 Geo. III., c. xxxi.

† Table showing the progress of the export and import trade and tonnage with our North American possessions, from 1827 to 1840:

* Rebellion.

were perpetually declaiming against the enormous military and naval forces of an empire which even then embraced both hemispheres, when in fact it was considerably less than what Baden and Wirtemberg, or other sixth-rate powers, now maintain, to defend dominions of not a hundredth part of the extent, nor possessing a thousandth part of the resources of the British Empire at that period. This Lilliputian army, such as it was, was still farther paralyzed by the corruption, that inherent vice of aristocratic as well as Democratic governments, which pervaded all its branches. Commissions in the army, bestowed almost entirely as a reward for, or an inducement to secure parliamentary support, were seldom the reward of the most deserving: military education was unknown; it was no unusual thing to see boys in the nursery, captains and even majors in the army; and such was the corruption of commissaries and superior officers, sharing in their gains in the field, that the expense of the troops was nearly doubled, while their efficiency was reduced to less than a half. From the combined operation of these causes, the war, which, by a vigorous and efficient army worthy of the real strength of England, might have been concluded with ease at latest in the second campaign, was protracted till France and Spain, as may always be expected in such a case, joined in the contest; and then England, after a long and costly struggle, was obliged in the end to succumb to a formidable coalition. Even as it was, more than one opportunity of crushing the forces of the insurgents* was lost, by the incapacity or selfish desire to protract the war on the part of the military commanders. If Great Britain had put her naval and military forces on a proper footing *during peace*, and been ready, on the first breaking out of hostilities, to act with an energy worthy of her real strength; if she had possessed fifty thousand disposable troops in 1775, and a hundred thousand in 1792, the American war might have been brought to a victorious termination in 1776; the French contest in 1793; six years of subsequent disastrous warfare in the first case, and twenty of glorious, but costly hostilities, in the second, would have been avoided, and the national debt, instead of eight hundred, would now have been under two hundred millions sterling.†

Operation of these causes on the war.

It was not surprising that the American people, after the glorious termination of the war of independence, retained a warm feeling of gratitude towards their allies, the French, and a strong degree of animosity towards their enemies, the English. The enlightened and truly patriotic leaders of this revolution, however, had discernment enough to perceive, that though the passions of the people were in favour of France, their interests were indissolubly wound up with those of England, and greatness of mind sufficient to risk their popularity for the good of their country. The whole efforts of Washington and his friends in the government, from the conclusion of the American war in 1783, to the retirement of that great man from public life in 1796, were devoted to tempering the Democratic ardour which had broken out with such vehemence in their country after the declaration of their independence, and laying the foundation of a lasting pacific intercourse with Great Britain. Yet so strong were the sympathies of the people enlisted on the side of France and revolution, that it required all his immense popularity to counteract, in 1793, the declared wish of the decided majority of the American citizens to declare war against Great Britain. So vehement was the clamour, that, on more than one occasion at that period, it was apparent that the Federalist party, to which he belonged, had lost the majority in the Chamber of Representatives; and such was the fury of the journals out of doors, that he was openly accused of aspiring to the monarchy, and of being, "like the traitor Arnold, a spy sold to the English." But Washington, unmoved, pursued steadily his pacific policy. The horrors of the French Revolution cooled the ardour of many of its ardent supporters on the other side of the Atlantic; and one of the last acts of that great man was to carry, by his casting vote in Congress, a commercial treaty with Great Britain.‡‡*†

Efforts of Washington to maintain peace with Great Britain.

But various causes contributed, in the course of the contest between England and France, at once to increase the partiality of the Americans to the latter country, and to bring such important interests of its citizens into jeopardy, as could hardly fail to involve them in the dispute. Under the influence of the equal law of succession, landed property was undergoing a continual division, while the increasing energy of the Democratic multitude was gradually destroying the majority of the Conservative party in Congress, and augmenting the violence of the popular press in the country. Already it had become painfully evident, from the conduct of the American government on various occasions after Washington's retirement from public life, but especially in the dispute which occurred with France in 1797,‡ in consequence of the sanguinary decree of the Directory, and the readiness with which they accommodated all their differences with that power in 1800, and subscribed the treaty of Mortefontaine, which recognised Napoleon's new maritime code, and, in particular, stipulated that the flag should cover the merchandise, and that no articles should be deemed contraband of war but arms and warlike stores; that their inclinations now ran violently in favour of the French side of the question, and that, right or wrong, for their interest or against it, they might be expected on the first crisis to take part with that power.§ And with the usual tendency of mankind to attach themselves to names and not to things, this strong partiality for the French alliance, which originated in the common Democratic feelings by which they both were animated, and the Republican institutions which they both had established, continued after France had passed over

Progress of the maritime dispute with America.

Feb. 15. That an augmentation of 4383 men be made to the land-forces.—*Ann. Reg.*, 1773, 226; *App. to Chron.; and for* 1775, p. 93, 94.

* Particularly when the main American army, under Washington, was driven by Lord Howe into Long Island, and might have been made prisoners by a vigorous advance of the British troops on the 29th August, 1776.—See *Ann. Reg.*, vol. xix., 173.

† See *Ante*, i., 247, 248.

ii XXXIII. This strange blunder is only worth noticing as an instance of Mr. Alison's habitual inaccuracy in all that relates to this country. Washington was President in 1794, and, of course, had no "casting vote" in Congress.

* Marshall's Life of Washington, v., 314, 355, 265. Tocq., ii., 105. *Ante*, i., 445, 446.

† See the treaty, 19th November, 1794, between Great Britain and America, in MARTIN, v., 641; and *Ann. Reg.*, 1795, *State Papers*, 294.

‡ *Ante*, i., 559, 560; 18th January and 29th October, 1798; *Ante*, ii., 142, 143; 30th September, 1800.

§ *Ante*, ii., 143.

to the other side; and the citizens of the United States clamoured as loudly for a junction of their arms with those of the Great Empire, as they had done for an alliance offensive and defensive with the rising Republic.

The Berlin and Milan decrees, and British orders in council, however, brought the American commerce immediately into collision with both the belligerant states, and rendered it hardly possible that so considerable a maritime power could avoid taking an active part in the strife. It has been already mentioned how that terrible contest, distinguished by a degree of rancour and violence on both sides unparalleled in modern warfare, commenced with Mr. Fox's declaring the coasts of France and Holland, from Brest to the Elbe inclusive, in a state of blockade: which was immediately followed by Napoleon's famous Berlin and Milan decrees, which retaliated upon the English by declaring the British islands in a state of blockade, and authorizing the seizure and condemnation of any vessel on the high seas bound from any British harbour, and the seizure of all British goods wherever they could be found.* To this the English government replied by the not less famous orders in council, which, on the preamble of the blockade of the British dominions established by the Berlin decree, declared "all the posts and places of France, and her allies, from which, though not at war with his majesty, the British flag is excluded, shall be subject to the same restrictions, in respect of trade and navigation, as if the same were actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner; and that all trade in articles, the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be deemed unlawful, and all such articles declared good prize."†

The Berlin and Milan decrees, and British orders in council.

May 16, 1806.

November 21, 1806; and November 17, 1807.

November 11, 1807.

It is difficult to say which of these violent decrees bore hardest upon neutral powers, or was most subversive of Napoleon's own favourite position, that the flag should cover the merchandise; for, on the one hand, the French emperor declared that all vessels coming from England or its colonies, or having English goods on board, should be instantly seized and confiscated; and, on the other, the English government at once declared the whole dominions of France and its allies, thus comprehending, after the treaty of Tilsit, nearly the whole of Europe, in a state of blockade, and all vessels bound for any of their harbours, or having any of their produce on board, good and lawful prize. Between these opposite and conflicting denunciations, it was hardly possible for a neutral vessel, engaged in the carrying trade of any part of Europe, to avoid confiscation from one or other of the belligerant parties. In such circumstances, the Americans, whose adventurous spirit had enabled them to engross, during this long war, nearly the whole carrying trade of the globe, had unquestionably the strongest ground of complaint; but against whom was it properly to be directed? Against the British, who, by Mr. Fox's order, declared only the coast from the Elbe to Brest in blockade, and supported that declaration by a fleet of a thousand vessels of war, which had long since swept every hostile flag from the ocean? or the French, who, without a single ship of the line, and only a few frigates at sea, had declared the whole British Empire in blockade, and all its produce and manufactures, wherever found, lawful prize? If Mr. Fox's blockade of the Elbe and the Weser, besides the harbours of the French channel, was an unwarranted stretch, even when supported by the whole navy of England, what was Napoleon's blockade of the whole British Empire, enforced only by a few frigates and sloops at sea? If, therefore, the Americans suffered, as suffer they did, in this unparalleled strife, the party which was to blame was that which first commenced this extraordinary system of declaring blockades to extend beyond the places actually invested by sea or land; and of that unheard-of extension Napoleon was unquestionably the author. If the Americans had been really animated with a desire in good faith to vindicate the rights of neutrals, and restrain the oppression of belligerants, what they should have done was to have joined their arms to those of Great Britain, in order to compel the return of the French emperor to a more civilized method of warfare.

Effect of these decrees upon the neutral trade.

But these were very far from being the views which animated the ruling party now in possession of power in the United States. Mr. Jefferson was now President, and he was the organ of the Democratic majority, which, forgetting the wise maxims of Washington and the authors of American independence, without being inclined to submit, if it could possibly be avoided, to actual injustice or loss of profit from either of the belligerant powers, desired, if possible, to accommodate their differences with France, and wreak their spite on aristocracy, by uniting with that country against Great Britain. This disposition soon appeared in two decisive proceedings. The British government, in December, 1806, had concluded and ratified a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with the American plenipotentiary in London; but Mr. Jefferson refused to ratify it, and it fell to the ground. Not long after, propositions were submitted by the American government to Napoleon on the subject of the Floridas, which they were desirous of acquiring from the Spaniards, and regarding which they wished a guarantee from the emperor that, in the event of their being attacked by the English, he would use his influence with the spaniards to obtain their cession. This Napoleon, in the first instance, positively refused, as he had an eye to those possessions for Joseph as an appanage to the crown of Spain; and afterward an ambiguous answer was returned; but this repulse had no effect in weakening Mr. Jefferson's partiality for a French alliance. Meanwhile, the American government took the most decisive measures for withdrawing their merchant vessels from aggression on the part of either of the belligerant powers. In the first instance, an angry message was communicated to Congress by Mr. Jefferson, inveighing bitterly against the British orders in council of January, 1807, but not breathing the slightest complaint against the French Berlin decree of November, 1806, to which they were merely a reply; and, on receipt of intelligence of the more extended British orders in council of the 11th of November, 1807, he laid a general embargo on all vessels whatever in the

Origin of the dispute with America.

Dec., 1807.

July, 1808.

Oct. 27, 1807.

* *Ante*, ii., 553–556, where the subject is fully discussed, and the orders on both sides given.

† Parliamentary Debates, x., 134, 138.

March 1, 1808. American harbours. And this was followed, on the 1st of March, 1808, by the substitution of a Non-intercourse Act for the embargo, whereby all commercial transactions with either of the belligerant powers was absolutely prohibited; but the embargo was taken off as to the rest of the world. This act, however, contained a clause (§ 11) authorizing the President, by proclamation, to renew the intercourse between America and either of the belligerant powers which should first repeal their obnoxious orders in council or decrees. This Non-intercourse Act had the effect of totally suspending the trade between America and Great Britain, and inflicting upon both these countries a loss tenfold greater than that suffered by France, with which the commercial intercourse of the United States was altogether inconsiderable.*

In addition to the other causes of difference, unhappily already too numerous, which existed between Great Britain and the United States, an unfortunate collision, attended with fatal consequences, ensued at sea. The Chesapeake, American frigate, was cruising off Virginia, and was known to have some English deserters on board, when she was hailed by the Leopard, of 74 guns, Captain Humphries, who made a formal requisition for the men. The American captain denied he had them, and refused to admit the right of search; upon which Captain Humphries fired a broadside, which killed and wounded several on board the Chesapeake, whereupon she struck, and the deserters were found on board, taken to Halifax, and one executed. The President, upon this, issued a proclamation, ordering all British ships of war to leave the harbours of the United States; but the English government disavowed the act, recalled Captain Humphries, and offered to make reparation, as the right of search, when applied to vessels of *war*, extended only to a *requisition*, but could not be carried into effect by actual force.†

Affair of the Chesapeake.

June 23, 1807.

July 14.

This state of matters promised little hopes of an amicable adjustment; but as Mr. Jefferson soon after retired from power, and was succeeded in the office of President by Mr. Madison, who professed an anxious desire to adjust the differences which, to the enormous loss of both, had arisen between Great Britain and the United States, Mr. Erskine, envoy and minister plenipotentiary at Washington, deemed the opportunity favourable for renewing the negotiations, and, if possible, restoring that amicable intercourse between the two countries, on which their mutual welfare was so materially dependant. A correspondence accordingly ensued between Mr. Erskine and Mr. Smith, the American foreign secretary, in which it was expressly stated that the Non-intercourse Act had produced a state of equality between the United States and the belligerant powers, and that he accordingly offered public reparation for the forcible taking of the men out of the American frigate Chesapeake, which had highly inflamed the national passions on both sides of the water. To this Mr. Smith made a reply in a similar amicable spirit; and, in consequence, Mr. Erskine, on the 19th, wrote to Mr. Smith, that "his majesty's orders in council of January and November, 1807, will have been withdrawn, as respects the United States, on the 10th of June next." To which Mr. Smith rejoined, that the Non-intercourse Act would be withdrawn, in virtue of the powers conferred on the President by the act establishing it, from and after the 10th of June; and a proclamation to that effect, from him, appeared the same day.*

Mr. Erskine's negotiation with Mr. Madison.

April 17, 1809.

April 18.

April 19.

This important change of tone and concession had been obtained from the American government by a distinct and serious threat, held out by New-England and the five Northern States of the Union, to break off from the confederacy if the Non-intercourse Act were any longer continued in force. To all appearance, therefore, the disputes with America were now brought to a close; and on the faith that they were so, American vessels, in great numbers, poured into the British harbours, and the commercial intercourse between the two countries became more active than ever. This auspicious state of matters, however, was not destined to be of long continuance. In concluding this arrangement with the United States, Mr. Erskine had not only exceeded, but acted in contradiction to his instructions;† and although nothing could be more advantageous for Great Britain than the renewal of a commercial intercourse with that power, yet it was not by government deemed worth purchasing by an abandonment, so far as the greatest carrying power in existence was concerned, of the whole retaliatory policy of the orders in council. The English ministry, accordingly, refused to ratify this arrangement; a resolution which, although justified in point of right by Napoleon's violence, and by Mr. Erskine's deviation from his instructions, may now well be characterized as one of the most unfortunate, in point of expediency, ever adopted by the British government; for it at once led to the renewal of the Non-intercourse Act of the United States; put an entire stop, for the next two years, to all commerce with that country; reduced the exports of Great Britain fully a third during the most critical and important years of the war; and, in its ultimate results, contributed to produce that unhappy irritation between the two countries, which has never yet, notwithstanding the strong bonds of mutual interest by which they are connected, been allayed.‡§

Which the British government refuses to ratify.

May 24.

It may well be imagined what a storm of indignation was raised in the United States when the intelligence of the refusal of the British government to ratify Mr. Erskine's convention was received; and how prodigiously it strengthened the hands of the party already in power, and supported by a decided majority

Storm of indignation in the United States at this disavowal.

* President's Message, Oct. 27, 1807. Ann. Reg., 1807, 663. State Papers, &c., for 1808, p. 228. Bign., viii., 399. Parl. Deb., xiv., 882, 887.

† Hughes, v., 209. Ann. Reg., 1807. App. to Chron., 646.

* See the Correspondence and Proclamation, Ann. Reg., 1809, 694, 697.

† This was at first denied, both in the House of Lords and Commons; but on February 5, 1810, Mr. Canning seconded a motion of Mr. Whitbread's for production of the instructions, which were accordingly produced and printed, and completely proved Mr. Canning's assertion that they had been violated by Mr. Erskine. No farther notice, accordingly, was taken of the subject in Parliament.—See *Parl. Deb.*, xv., 314; and *Ann. Reg.*, 1810, 255, 256.

‡ Ann. Reg., 1809, 255, 256. Parl. Deb., xv., 314.

§ Exports from Great Britain, declared value.

1806	£40,874,983	1810	£48,438,680
1807	37,245,877	1811	32,890,712
1808	37,275,102	1812	41,716,964
1809	47,371,393	1813 Records destroy'd by fire.	

—PORTER'S *Progress of Nations*, ii., 98.

in the nation, which was resolved at all hazards, and against their most obvious interests, to involve the country in a war with Great Britain. Mr. Erskine, as a matter of course, was recalled, and Mr. Jackson succeeded him as British envoy at Washington; but his reception was such, from the very outset, as left little hope of an amicable termination of the differences. From the President's table, where the English minister was treated with marked indifference, if not studied insult, to the lowest alehouse in the United States, there was nothing but one storm of indignation against the monstrous arrogance of the British maritime pretensions, and the duplicity and bad faith of their government. Unhappily, the elections for Congress took place during this whirlwind of passion; and such was the ascendency which the Democratic party acquired in the Legislature from this circumstance, that it was plain that all hopes of an accommodation were at an end. Mr. Jackson continued, however, at the American capital, striving to allay the prevailing indignation, and renew the negotiation where Mr. Erskine had left it off; but it was all in vain; and after a stormy discussion of twenty-five days in the House of Representatives, it was determined, by a great majority, to break off all communication with the British envoy; and Mr. Pinkney, the American envoy in London, was directed to request the recall of Mr. Jackson, whose firmness the American government found themselves unable to overcome; and this was at once acceded to by the British administration.*kk* And on the 10th of August, Mr. Madison formally announced, by proclamation, that as "England had disavowed the acts of its minister, the commerce which had been renewed with that country, on the supposition that the orders in council were repealed, must be again subjected to the whole operation of the Non-intercourse Act, which had been suspended."

Neither France nor England will repeal their obnoxious decrees.

Meanwhile, the maritime dispute, so far as the orders in council and decrees of Napoleon were concerned, seemed to be reduced, as between America and both these powers, to a mere point of etiquette who should give in first. England had constantly declared, both in diplomatic notes and speeches by her ministers in Parliament, that the orders in council were retaliatory measures only; and that as soon as the French emperor would recall the Berlin and Milan Decrees, they should be repealed.

Aug. 22, 1809.

On the other hand, Napoleon formally declared, through M. Champagny, that "if England recalls her blockade of France, the emperor will recall his blockade of England; if England withdraws her orders in council of 11th of November, 1807, the Milan decree will fall of itself." And, to complete the whole, America had already solemnly stated in the Non-intercourse Act, and Mr. Madison had acted in terms of it by his declaration of 19th of April, 1809, that, if either France or England would repeal their obnoxious decrees, the non-intercourse would immediately cease with respect to the country making such concession. And this assurance was again renewed by the American Legislature, in a bill brought forward in January, 1810, which passed by a large majority.

Jan. 22, 1810.

It seems difficult to account, therefore, for the continued adherence to the rigorous system of maritime warfare on the part of either of the belligerant powers, and especially of Great Britain, which had such vital commercial interests at stake in adjusting matters with America, and so little to gain either in honour or profit from a contest with that power. But notwithstanding all this, the misunderstanding seemed to increase rather than diminish; and on March 1st, Mr. Pinkney, in a formal audience, took leave of the prince regent, not without, on his own admission, the most emphatic expressions on the part of his royal highness, of a wish to restore amicable relations with the United States.*

March 1, 1811.

Affair of the Little Belt and President.

After this it was generally thought a rupture with America was inevitable; and so entirely were the Americans of this opinion, that the intercourse with France was openly renewed, and the American harbours filled with French vessels, which were, for the most part, fitted out as privateers, and did considerable mischief to British shipping. Matters seemed to be brought to a point by a collision which soon after took place between a British and American ship of war. On the 16th of May, a most gallant officer, Captain Bingham, in the Little Belt, of eighteen guns, fell in with the American frigate President, of forty-four. The latter gave chase to the former, without either apparently being well aware to what nation the other belonged; and when they were within hail, each party asked the other to what nation they belonged; but before an answer could be received, or at least heard, the American frigate fired a broadside, which was immediately returned. The action now went on with great vigour on both sides, and was maintained with the most heroic valour by the British against such fearful odds for half an hour, when, in a suspension of a few seconds, the hailing was renewed, and as soon as it was understood what they were, both ships drew off, and the action ceased. Captain Rodgers, of the President, next morning sent polite message to Captain Bingham, regretting what had occurred, and offering all assistance in his power, which was declined, and each ship returned to their respective harbours; the Little Belt had thirty-two men killed and wounded. The official accounts of the two commanders, as is usual in such cases, differed as to which began the action, each alleging that the other fired the first shot; but in this matter there is an article of real evidence, which seems decisive; it is hardly credible that a sloop with eighteen guns and one hundred and twenty-two men would provoke a contest with a frigate of forty-four, manned by four hundred.†*ll*

Notwithstanding this collision, the gallantry

kk XXXIV. The circumstances mentioned respecting the President of the United States are totally unfounded. Mr. Jackson was honoured with all the affable intercourse and dignified courtesy which were habitual to Mr. Madison and the American secretaries, until the haughty representative of the then arrogant British ministry, without their personal humiliation, could not any longer be tolerated by our government. In truth, an impartial observer *then*, and an unprejudiced reader of the historical narrative *now*, might plausibly conclude that Mr. Jackson was sent to this country expressly to insult and exasperate the citizens, thereby to embroil the Republic in a war with Britain, that Lords Liverpool and Castlereagh might have a plausible excuse for their piratical plunder of our merchants.

* Ann. Reg., 1810, 258, 261. Bign., viii., 399, 400, 408.

* Champagny to Mr. Armstrong, August 22, 1809. Bign., vi., 414, 416. Ann. Reg., 180.

† James, vi., 8, 11. Cooper's Naval Hist., i., 142, 144. Ann. Reg., 1811, 152, 153.

ll XXXV. The description of the contest between the ship President and the Little Belt is altogether contrary to the admitted authenticated facts respecting the infatuation

Threatening aspect of the negotiation.

displayed in which by Captain Bingham and his crew excited a strong national feeling in Great Britain, and proportionally exasperated the Americans, the English government made one more attempt to adjust the differences between the two countries, by sending out Mr. Foster as envoy plenipotentiary to the United States. The affairs of the Chesapeake and the Little Belt were easily adjusted, and, in fact, constituted complete sets-off against each other, as both had originated in the larger vessel attacking the smaller to enforce the right of search; and both were satisfactorily arranged, by each government disclaiming that right when exercised by the armed vessel of one nation against an armed vessel of another. The seizure of the Floridas by America, which had recently before taken place during the distracted state of Spain, to which it belonged, was justified by the Americans on the ground that it was an appendage of Louisiana, which they had acquired by purchase; and it was proposed to discuss the title with the Spanish government, as soon as it should be re-established. More serious subjects of difference arose in the right of search, strenuously insisted for by the British government, and as stoutly resisted by the American; and the orders in council, which the British government still declined to recall, and the revocation of which the Americans, with reason, maintained was an indispensable preliminary to any accommodation. So little favourable, in the close of the year, was the aspect of the negotiation, that the President's speech, in December, to Congress, contained a recommendation to raise ten thousand regular troops and fifty thousand militia; and the vehement temper of the Legislature so far outstripped the more measured march of the executive, that the numbers voted were, by a majority of one hundred and nine to twenty-two, increased to twenty-five thousand regular troops, and it was agreed to raise an immediate loan of ten millions of dollars.*

Jan. 12, 1812.

Violent measures of Congress preparatory to a war.

The object of the Americans in thus precipitating hostilities was to secure the capture of the homeward-bound West India fleet, which was expected to cross the Atlantic in May or June, before the British government was so far aware of their designs as to have prepared convoy; and they made no doubt, that on the first appearance of an American force, the whole of Canada would, as a matter of course, fall into their hands. With this view, in the beginning of April, a general embargo was laid by Congress upon all the vessels in the harbours of the United States for ninety days; a measure which they hoped would at once prevent intelligence of their preparations from reaching Great Britain, and furnish themselves with the means, from their extensive commercial navy, of manning their vessels of war. The better to work the representatives up to the desired point of fermentation, the President soon after laid before them copies of certain documents found on a Captain Henry, who had been despatched by Sir James Craig, governor of Canada, into Massachusetts, without the knowledge of the government at home; and to such a pitch were they transported, that a bill was brought into Congress, and seriously entertained, the object of which was to declare every person *a pirate*, and punishable with death, who, under pretence of a commission from any foreign power, should impress upon the high seas any native of the United States; and gave every such impressed seaman a right to attach, in the hands of *any* British subject, or of *any debtor* to *any* British subject, a sum equal to thirty dollars a month during the whole period of his detention. This violent bill, worthy of the worst days of the French Revolution, actually passed a third reading of the House of Representatives, and was only lost in the Senate.*

April 3.

May 9

When such was the temper of the ruling party in the United States, it is unnecessary to follow out ulterior measures, or discusst he objects of complaint ostensibly put forth as the cause of the war. On the 18th of June an act passed both houses, by a majority of 79 to 49, declaring the actual existence of war between Great Britain and America, and hostilities were immediately ordered to be commenced. Nor did the American government make any attempt to recede from these hostile acts, when intelligence arrived a few weeks after this resolution, and before war had commenced, that, by an order in council, the British government had actually *repealed the previous orders*, so that the ostensible ground of complaint against this country was removed.† Great events were about to take place when the Americans thus thrust themselves into the contest: three days after, Wellington crossed the Agueda to commence the Salamanca campaign: six days after, Napoleon passed the Niemen on his march to Moscow. No cause of complaint or hostility now remained; for although the right of search exercised by the British, in conformity with the common maritime law of nations, may have afforded a fit subject for remonstrance and adjustment, it was no ground for immediate hostilities. But on war they were determined, and to war they went. And thus had America, the greatest Republic in existence, and which had ever proclaimed its attachment to the cause of freedom in all nations, the disgrace of going to war with Great Britain, then the last refuge of liberty in the civilized world, when their only ground of complaint against it had been removed; and of allying their arms with those of France, at that very moment commencing its unjust crusade against Russia, and straining every nerve to crush in the Old World the last vestige of Continental independence.‡

June 18. War declared by America, though the orders in council are repealed.

June 23.

When the ruling party in America was thus resolved, *per fas aut nefas*, to plunge into a war with England, it may naturally be asked, What preparations had they made for sustaining a contest with that formidable power? They knew that Great Britain was the greatest maritime power in existence; that she had a hundred ships of the line in commission, and that a thousand ships of war bore the royal flag; they were aware that her armies had conquered a vast dominion in India, and long measured swords on equal terms in the Peninsula with the conqueror of Continental Europe. They had been preparing for the war for four years; since 1807, such had been the difference

Diminutive scale of the American preparations for war.

of Captain Bingham, who vainly imagined that he could capture the President.

* See the Correspondence in Ann. Reg., 1811, 153, 157; and for 1812, 193.

* Ann. Reg., 1812, 195, 197. † *Ante*, iii., 388.
‡ Ann. Reg., 1812, 196, 197. Cooper, 172.

between them and the English government, that their intercourse with Great Britain had been almost entirely suspended. Almost all their trading vessels, seven thousand in number, were at sea, and lay exposed in every quarter of the globe to the innumerable cruisers and privateers of the enemy whom they were thus anxious to provoke. What preparations, then, had a republic, numbering eight millions of souls within its territory, so vehemently bent on war, and having had so many years to muster its forces, actually made for a contest of the most impassioned character with such a naval and military power? Why, they had four frigates and eight sloops in commission, and their whole naval force afloat in ordinary, and building for the ocean and the Canadian lakes, was eight frigates and twelve sloops; while their military force amounted to the stupendous number of twenty-four thousand soldiers, not one half of whom were yet disciplined, or in a condition to take the field.*

Reflections on this circumstance.

It is hard to say whether this extraordinary want of foresight, and sway of passion, in the American people and government, or the great things which, with such inconsiderable means, they actually did during the war, are the most worthy of meditation. It demonstrates, on the one hand, how marvellous is the *insouciance* and want of consideration in Democratic communities; how blindly they rush into war, without any preparation either to ensure its success or avert its danger; how obstinately they resist all propositions in time of peace to incur even the most inconsiderable immediate burdens to guard against future calamity; how vehemently, at the same time, they can be actuated by the warlike passions; and with what force, when so excited, they impel their government into the perilous chances of arms without the slightest preparation, and when calamity, wide-spread and unbounded, is certain to follow the adoption of a measure thus wholly unprovided for. On the other hand, the gallant and extraordinary achievements, both of the American navy and army, during the contest which followed, are no less worthy of consideration, as demonstrating how far individual energy and valour can overcome the most serious difficulties, and the tendency of Democratic institutions to compensate, by the vigour they communicate to the people, the consequences of the debility and want of foresight which they imprint upon the government.

Invasion of Canada by General Hull, and his surrender.

The first exploits of the American army, though such as might naturally have been expected from the total want of preparation on the part of their government or people for a war, were, nevertheless, very different from what the noisy Democrats, who had driven the nation into it, had anticipated. Early in July 1. July, General Hull invaded Upper Canada with a force of two thousand eight hundred men, having crossed the St. Lawrence at Detroit, and marched to Sandwich, in that province. He there issued a proclamation, in which he expressed entire confidence of success, and threatened a war of extermination if the savages were employed in resisting the invasion. His next operations were directed against Fort Amherstburg, but he was repulsed in three different attempts to cross the River Canard, on which it stands; and General Brock, having collected a force of seven hundred British regulars and militia, and six hundred auxiliary Indians, not only relieved that fort, but compelled Hull to retire to Fort Detroit, on the American side of the St. Lawrence, where he was soon after invested by General Brock. Batteries having been constructed, and a fire opened, preparations were made for an assault; Aug. 16. to prevent which General Hull capitulated with two thousand five hundred men, and thirty-three pieces of cannon—a proud trophy to have been taken, with the Fort of Detroit, by a British force of no more than seven hundred men, including militia, and six hundred auxiliary Indians.*†

Armistice on the frontiers, which is disavowed by the American government, and dissatisfaction it excites.

This early and glorious success had the most powerful effect in increasing the spirit and energy of the militia of Upper Canada, the inhabitants of which, of British origin, and strongly animated with patriotic and national feelings, had taken up arms universally to repel the hated invasion of their republican neighbours. An armistice was soon after agreed to between Sir George Prevost, the British governor of Canada, and General Dearborn, the American commander-in-chief on the northern frontier, in the hope that the repeal of the orders in council, of which intelligence had now been received, would, by removing the only real ground of quarrel between the two countries, have led to a termination of hostilities. But in this hope, how reasonable soever, they were disappointed; the American government, impelled by the Democratic constituencies, had not yet abandoned their visions of Canadian conquest, and they not only disavowed the armistice, but determined upon a vigorous prosecution of the contest. As this determination, however, unveiled the real motives which had led to the war, and demonstrated that the orders in council had been a mere pretext, it gave rise to the most violent dissatisfaction in the northern provinces of the Union, who were likely, from their dependance upon British commerce, to be the greatest sufferers by the contest. So far did this proceed, that many memorials were addressed to the President from these states, in which they set forth, that they contemplated with abhorrence an alliance with the present Emperor of France, every action of whose life had been an attempt to effect the extinction of all vestiges of freedom; that the repeal of the orders in council had removed the only legitimate object of complaint against the British government; and that, if any attempts were made to introduce French troops into the United States, they would regard them as enemies.‡ Nor were these declarations confined to

* Cooper, History of American Navy, ii., 167, 140.

* Ann. Reg., 1812, 199. General Brock's Despatch, August 16, 1812. Ibid. App. to Chron., 243.

† The operations of the war in Canada may be traced by the reader's consulting any of the maps of that province; particularly those in Wyld's General Atlas, by far the best, both for that contest and the war in France in 1814, which have fallen under the author's observation.

‡ "On the subject of any French connexion we have made up our minds. We will in no event assist in uniting the Republic of America with the military despotism of France. We will have no connexion with her principles or her power. If her armed troops, under whatever name or character, should come here, we will regard them as enemies."—*Memorial from Rockingham in New-Hampshire, 15th September*, 1812.

"We are constrained to consider the determination to persist in the war, after official notice of the revocation of the British order in council had been received, as a proof that it was undertaken on motives entirely distinct from those

mere verbal menaces, for two of the states, Connecticut and Massachusetts, openly refused to send their contingents, or to impose the taxes which had been voted by Congress; and symptoms of a decided intention to break off from the confederacy were already evinced in the four Northern States, comprising New-York and the most opulent and powerful portions of the Union.*

Total defeat of the Americans at Queenstown.

The American government, however, were noways intimidated either by the bad success of their arms in Canada, or by the menaces of the northern provinces of the Union. Later in the season they assembled a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Niagara; and on the 13th of October, General Wadsworth crossed over with thirteen hundred men, and made an attack on the British position of Queenstown. General Brock immediately hastened to the spot with the first troops he could collect; and, while gallantly cheering on the grenadiers of the 49th, he fell mortally wounded, and soon after died. Discouraged by this loss, the troops fell back, and the position was lost; but this success of the enemy was of short duration. Reenforcements, consisting partly of regular troops, partly of militia, came up to the British, of whom General Sheaffe had now assumed the command; and a combined attack was made on the American force by the English troops and artillery in front and on flank, in all about eight hundred men, while Norton, with a considerable body of Indians, menaced their other extremity. This well-laid attack proved entirely successful; and, after a short conflict, the Americans were totally defeated, their commander, General Wadsworth, with nine hundred men, being made prisoners, with one gun and two colours taken, and four hundred killed and wounded; while the total loss of the British and their gallant Canadian comrades did not exceed seventy men. At the same time, General Evans, from Fort George, on the Canadian side of the river, opened so heavy a fire on Fort Niagara on the opposite side, that the enemy were compelled to evacuate the fort. This victory, important and decisive as it proved, was dearly purchased by the loss of General Brock, an officer of equal suavity and firmness in civil administration, and energy and valour in war; and to whose worth, well known on both sides of the frontier, the honourable testimony was borne of minute guns being discharged during his funeral, alike by the American and the British batteries.†

Oct. 13.

A third invasion of Canada is repulsed.

Irritated, rather than discouraged, by those repeated and disgraceful failures, the Americans now strained every nerve to augment their naval forces on Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, and re-enforced General Dearborn, who commanded their troops on the frontier of Lower Canada, so considerably, that by the middle of November he was at the head of ten thousand men; while General Smyth had five thousand men, chiefly militia, on the Niagara frontier; and they had augmented their fleet on Lake Ontario to such a degree, that the British flotilla was unable to face it, which gave them the entire command of the lake. Encouraged by this favourable state of affairs, which they were aware might be turned the other way before spring, they resolved, notwithstanding the lateness and inclemency of the season, to make a combined attack on the British possessions both in the upper and lower provinces. Early on the morning of the 28th of November, accordingly, General Smyth commenced the inroad into Upper Canada, by crossing the St. Lawrence, between Chippewa and Fort Erie, with about five hundred men; but they were received in so vigorous a manner by a small British detachment under Colonel Bishop, that they were repulsed with severe loss. About the same time, General Dearborn commenced a systematic invasion of Lower Canada; but the militia and regular forces of that province, under General Prevost, turned out with such alacrity, and in such formidable numbers, that he withdrew, without making any serious progress, and put his army into winter-quarters in the neighbourhood of Plattsburg. Thus the invasion of the Canadas, from which the Americans expected so much, and from the hopes of which they had mainly engaged in the war, terminated this year in nothing but discomfiture and disgrace.*

Nov. 28.

Nov. 22.

But if the Americans were unsuccessful on one element, they met with extraordinary and unlooked-for triumphs on another; which excited the greater sensation, that they shook the general belief that at that time prevailed of British invincibility at sea, and opened up, to the jealousy of other nations at our commercial greatness, hopes of its overthrow at no distant period.

Success of the Americans at sea.

The first action which took place after war was declared was between the British frigate Belvidera and the American frigate President. The British vessel, commanded by Captain Byrn, was in charge of a large fleet of West India merchantmen on their way home, and Captain Rodgers came up with her on the 18th of June, with a squadron of three frigates and two sloops, which immediately gave chase, and a running fight ensued which lasted for a whole day, each party losing two-and-twenty men; but the result was favourable to the British, whose guns were pointed with great skill, and produced a surprising effect, as the American squadron failed in taking the single English frigate, and the whole merchantmen escaped untouched. After a cruise of seventy days, the American squadron returned to port, having only captured seven merchantmen in that time, although they fell upon the British commerce when wholly unaware of impending hostilities. Shortly after, the Constitution was chased by a squadron of British frigates, headed by the Africa of sixty-four guns, and escaped after a most interesting chase, in which great skill and ability were displayed on both sides. But in the next action the result was very different. The Constitution fell in, on the 19th of August, with the Guerrière, Captain Decres, and a most obstinate action took place. The American frigate was decidedly superior, both in the number and weight of its

Actions at sea. Capture of the Guerrière by the Constitution. June 21.

July 17 and 18.

Aug. 19.

hitherto avowed; and we contemplate with abhorrence the possibility even of an alliance with the present Emperor of France, every action of whose life has demonstrated that the attainment, by any means, of universal empire, and the consequent extinction of every vestige of freedom, are the sole objects of his incessant, unbounded, and remorseless ambition."—*Resolutions of Thirty-four Cities and Counties of the State of New-York, adopted at a meeting held at Albany, 17th and 18th September*, 1812. *Ann. Reg.*, 1812, p. 201. * Ann. Reg., 1812, 200, 201. Tocq., i., 289.

† Christie's Memoirs of the War in Canada, 67, 68. Sheaffe's Desp., Oct. 13, 1812. Ann. Reg., 1812, p. 253, App. to Chron.

* Christie, 65, 68. Ann. Reg., 1813, 177, 178.

guns, and the number of its crew;* but notwithstanding that disadvantage, Captain Decres maintained a close fight, yard-arm to yard-arm, for upward of an hour, with his formidable antagonist. At the end of that time, however, his vessel was a perfect wreck, wholly dismasted, rolling about in the trough of a tempestuous sea, incapable of making any farther resistance, with seventy-nine men killed and wounded, and thirty shots in the hull below water-mark; while the Constitution had only seven killed and as many wounded. In these circumstances farther resistance was evidently hopeless, and the English colours were mournfully lowered to the broad pendant of their emancipated offspring.†

Frolic and Wasp. October 16.

Hardly had the English recovered from the shock of this unwonted naval disaster, when other blows of the same description succeeded each other with stunning rapidity. On the night of the 16th of October, the Frolic, British sloop of eighteen guns, fell in with the American brig Wasp, of the same number of guns, but considerably superior both in weight of metal, tonnage, and crew.‡ The crew of the Frolic were labouring to repair their rigging, which had been severely damaged the day before in a gale, when the action commenced, and was kept up with equal skill and spirit on both sides; but the rigging of the Frolic was in so shattered a condition from the effect of the previous storm, that in ten minutes she lay an unmanageable log in the water, which gave her opponent such an advantage, that in twenty minutes more she was compelled to strike. This disaster, however, except in so far as the moral influence of the triumph to the American arms was concerned, was speedily repaired; for a few hours after the action, the Poictiers of seventy-four guns hove in sight, and at once captured the Wasp and recaptured the Frolic, the captain of which, in just testimony of his valour, was continued in the command.§

Capture of the Macedonian by the United States. October 25.

But a more serious disaster soon occurred. On the 25th of October, the American frigate United States hove in sight of the British frigate Macedonian. As usual on all these occasions, the American vessel was superior by about a half in tonnage, crew, and weight of guns.‖ From the very commencement of the combat, which for some time was at long shot only, it was evident that the Americans were cutting the British to pieces with comparatively little loss on their side; and when, at length, the English commander succeeded in engaging the enemy in close fight, which Commodore Decatur of the United States willingly joined in, the superiority of the enemy's fire was such, that the Macedonian was soon dismasted—she had received nearly a hundred shots in her hull, and her lower tier of guns, owing to the rolling of the vessel in a tempestuous sea, were under water, while a third of her crew were killed or wounded. On the other hand, the American vessel, having no sail which she could not set except her mizen topsail, remained perfectly steady. Even in these desperate circumstances, however, the native spirit of British seamen did not desert them: as a last resource, an attempt was made to carry the enemy by boarding, and the moment this intention was announced, every man was on deck, several of whom had lost an arm but a few minutes before in the cockpit; and the universal cry was, "Let us conquer or die." At this moment, however, the fore brace was shot away, and the yard swinging round, threw the vessel upon the wind, so that boarding was impossible. The United States then stood athwart the bows of the Macedonian without firing a gun, and passed on out of shot; and it was at first supposed she was making off by the British sailors, who loudly cheered; but this was only to refill her cartridges, which had been expended, and soon tacking, she took up a raking position across the stern of her now defenceless antagonist, and soon compelled her to strike her colours. The superiority of the American force, as well as her weight of metal, was then very apparent; for while the Macedonian had thirty-six killed and sixty-eight wounded, the United States had only five killed and seven badly wounded.*

Action between the Java and Constitution. Dec. 28.

Nor was this the last of the discomfitures which at this period befell the British navy. The Java, forty-six guns, had sailed from Spithead on the 12th of November, with a motley crew of 397 persons, nearly one half of whom were wholly inexperienced; and on the 28th they discharged six broadsides of blank cartridges, being the first that the majority of the crew had ever assisted in firing. Captain Lambert, who commanded her, had warmly remonstrated against this wretched crew, declaring that with such people he was not only no match for an American of superior, but hardly for a Frenchman of equal size; but all the answer he got from the Admiralty was, that "a voyage to the East Indies and back would make a good crew." Obliged to submit, the English captain set sail, and on the 28th of December fell in with the American frigate Constitution; and, notwithstanding the superior bulk and weight of his antagonist,† and the

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* The relative force on the two sides was as follows:

	Guerriere.	Constitution.
Broadside guns	24	28
Weight in lbs.	517	768
Crew	244	460
Tons	1092	1533

—James, vi., 104, and Cooper, ii., 199, 200.

"Captain Decres," says the American annalist, "lost no professional reputation by his defeat: he had handled his ship in a manner to win the applause of his enemies, fought her gallantly, and only submitted when farther resistance would have been as culpable as in fact it was impossible. That the Constitution was a larger and heavier ship than the Guerrière will be disputed by no nautical man, though less, it is believed, than might be inferred from their respective rates; but the great inferiority of the Guerrière was in her men."—Cooper, ii., 199, 201.

† Captain Decres's Account, Ann. Reg., 1812, 249. App. to Chron. James, vi., 105. Cooper, ii., 172, 201.

‡

	Frolic.	Wasp.
Guns, broadside	9	9
Crew	92	135
Tons	384	434

—James, vi., 112.

§ James, vi., 109, 112. Cooper, ii., 208, 211.

‖

	Macedonian.	United States.
Broadside guns	24	28
Weight of broadside, lbs.	528	864
Crew, men only	254 (35 boys)	474
Tons	1081	1533

—James, vi., 119, and Cooper, ii., 206.

* Captain Cadin's Desp., Oct. 28, 1812, Ann. Reg., 255. App. to Chron. James, vi., 113, 117. Cooper, ii., 205, 207.

† Comparative force of the two vessels:

	Java.	Constitution.
Broadside guns	24	28
Weight, lbs.	517	768
Crew, men only	344	460
Tons	1092	1533

—James, vi., 104 and 134; and Cooper, ii., 225.

"The same peculiarity," says Cooper, "attended this combat as had distinguished the two other cases of frigate actions. In all three the American vessels were superior to their antagonists; but in all three the difference in execu-

wretched condition of his crew, Captain Lambert immediately made up to the enemy, although nineteen of his men were away with a prize he had shortly before made. The Constitution at first stood away under all sail before the wind, to gain the distance at which the American gunnery was so destructive; but finding the British frigate gained upon her, she shortened sail, and, placing herself under the lee bow of the Java, a close action immediately commenced. The first broadside of the English frigate told with such effect on the American hull, that the latter wore to get away; but the skilful Englishman wore also, and a running fight ensued for a considerable time, during which Captain Lambert's superiority of seamanship was very apparent.*

Desperate defence of the former.

After a desultory engagement of this sort for forty minutes, during which the Java, notwithstanding the superior weight of the enemy's metal, had suffered very little, the two vessels came within pistol-shot, and a most determined action ensued. Captain Lambert now resolved on boarding; but just as he was making preparations for doing so, the foremast of the Java fell with a tremendous crash, breaking in the forecastle and covering the deck; and soon after the main-topmast came down also; and, to complete their misfortunes, Captain Lambert fell, mortally wounded. The command now devolved on Lieutenant Chads; but he found the vessel perfectly unmanageable, and the wreck of the masts falling over on one side, almost every discharge set the vessel on fire. Still the action continued with the most determined resolution; but at length, after it had lasted three hours and a half, the Java was found to be rapidly sinking, while the Constitution had assumed a raking position, where every shot told, and not a gun could be brought to bear on her. In these desperate circumstances, Lieutenant Chads at length struck; and the vessel was so disabled, that, as soon as the crew were taken out, the American captain blew her up. In this desperate and most unequal engagement, the Java had twenty-two killed and one hundred and two wounded; the Constitution ten killed and forty wounded. Captain Bainbridge treated the officers most generously: a conduct similar to that of Captain Hull, of the Constitution, and Captain Decatur, of the United States, who treated their prisoners of all ranks with the courtesy which is ever the accompaniment of heroic minds.†‡*mm*

The Peacock taken by the Hornet.

Another action between smaller vessels, but terminating in the same results, took place on the 14th of February, 1813, between the British sloop Peacock and the American brig Hornet. In this, as in all the previous instances where the Americans had proved successful, the superiority on their side was very decided;* but the action which ensued was, nevertheless, of the most bloody and destructive kind. It lasted an hour and a half; but at the end of which time, the effect of the American's fire was so tremendous, that the Peacock was found to be in a sinking state. A signal of distress was immediately hoisted, which was answered with praiseworthy humanity by the brave Americans, and every effort was made by the crews of both vessels to save the sinking ship; but, notwithstanding all their efforts, she went down in a few minutes, with thirteen of her own crew and three of the Hornet's, who were engaged in the noble act of striving to save their enemies.†*nn*

Prodigious moral effect of these victories.

No words can convey an adequate idea of the impression which the successive capture of these three frigates and two sloops made, not only in Great Britain and America, but over the whole civilized world. The triumphs of the British navy, for above a century, had been so uninterrupted, and the moral influence they had in consequence acquired had become so prodigious, that it was generally believed both at home and abroad that they were invincible, and that no other nation had any chance of success in combating them on the ocean but by the most de-

tion was greatly disproportioned to the disparity in force."—ii., 225.

* Brenton, ii., 461. Ann. Reg., 132, for 1812. James, vi., 128, 129. Cooper, ii., 219, 220.

† Brenton, ii., 460, 462. James, vi., 127, 137. Cooper, ii., 220, 224. Lieutenent Chads's Account, December 31, 1812, Ann. Reg., 1813, 132. App. to Chron.

‡ The heroism displayed on both sides in this action never was surpassed. A midshipman, Mr. Keele, a boy thirteen years of age, had his leg shot away, and suffered amputation. He anxiously inquired, after the action was over, whether the vessel had struck, and seeing a ship's colour spread over him, the little hero grew uneasy till he saw it was an English flag. He died next day. The boatswain, Mr. Humble, had had his hand shot away, and he was wounded above the elbow; but no sooner was the tourniquet put on than he hastened on deck to cheer his comrades with his pipe in boarding.

mm XXXVI. Mr. Alison has erased the calumnious misrepresentation in his original edition respecting the cruelty and robbery which he charged upon Commodore Bainbridge. Nevertheless, it is indispensable, in justice to that noble citizen, to present an authentic detail of the naval combat which Mr. Alison describes.

The only commissioned and warrant officers still living who were attached to the Constitution in her action with the Java, are Commodore Morgan, Commander Long, and Dr. Evans, who thus testifies: "The crew of the Java were treated with great humanity and kindness. They were not handcuffed, at least, not generally. One or two may have been confined for disorderly conduct, though I have no recollection of anything of the kind. They were suffered to mix with our men, and fared in every particular as they did. They were permitted to retain every article of private property which they claimed as their own, and were landed at St. Salvador, on parole, a few days after the action. I was in both the actions of the Constitution with the Guerrière and the Java, and, therefore, had opportunities of knowing that the prisoners were treated alike under both commodores."

Captain Lambert, the commander of the Java, being dangerously wounded, the duty of making a report of the battle to the Admiralty devolved on the first lieutenant, H. D. Chads. In his official communication, he states: "I cannot conclude this letter without expressing my grateful acknowledgments thus publicly for the generous treatment Captain Lambert and his officers have experienced from his gallant enemy, Commodore Bainbridge and his officers."

A quotation from the "Life of Bainbridge" by Dr. Harris shall close this testimony.

"A New-York gentleman, being in London at the time when the news of the capture of the Java arrived, happened on the next day to be in company with Admiral Jarvis. The veteran remarked that he had 'passed a sleepless night. It was not occasioned by the loss of the frigate Java, but by the dignified manner in which the American commander had treated his vanquished enemy.' He observed, that 'the deportment of Bainbridge more resembled the proud bearing of a Spanish grandee to his prisoners, during the days of ancient chivalry, than of a young man of a young nation, scarcely yet in the gristle of manhood.' He added, that 'this trait of national character, which indicated so much of future greatness, had given to him, as an Englishman, much uneasiness and apprehension.'"

* Comparative force of the combatants:

	Peacock.	Hornet.
Broadside guns	9	10
Weight, lbs	192	297
Crew, men only	110	162
Tons	386	460

—JAMES, vi., 193.

† James, vi., 193. Cooper, ii., 227, 228.

nn XXXVII. The important circumstances of the battle between the Hornet and the Peacock are strangely perverted in Mr. Alison's narrative. The authorities cited by him contradict the above description of the conflict.

cided superiority of force. When, therefore, it was seen that, in repeated instances of combats of single vessels of the same class against each other, the ships of the United States had proved victorious, the English were stunned as by the shock of an earthquake, the Americans were immeasurably, and with good reason, elated, and the other nations in Europe thought they discerned at last the small black cloud arising over the ocean which was to involve the British maritime power in destruction. The majority of men in the Continental States, ever governed by the event, and incapable of just discrimination, took no trouble to inquire whether or not the vessels opposed to each other had been equally matched, but joined in one universal chorus of exultation at the defeat of a nation which had so long been the object of their avowed dread and secret jealousy. And it was generally said, apparently not without reason, that a naval power which, with the command only of four frigates and eight sloops, had in so short a time achieved such successes, might look forward at no distant period, when its navy was enlarged, to wresting from Great Britain the sceptre of the ocean.*

Reflections on the causes which gave rise to them.

In truth, this succession of disasters, like all calamities which occur in such numbers together as to be obviously beyond the effect of chance, gave much subject for serious reflection, not merely to the heedless multitude, but to the reflecting statesman. It was now painfully evident that the English were not invincible on their favourite element; that foresight in preparation, as well as energy in action, were necessary to sustain their fortunes; and that, if these were neglected, they had no exemption from the common lot of humanity. All the world saw, indeed, to what cause the disasters had been owing. The British government, maintaining a hundred ships of the line, and five hundred smaller vessels actually in commission, and carrying on war at once in every quarter of the globe, could not by possibility man their vessels with the same picked and skilled crews as the Americans, who had merely a few frigates and sloops to fit out from the resources of a great commercial navy. The frigates and brigs of the United States, built with extraordinary skill and in a peculiar manner, to which there was no parallel in the British navy, were at once too swift sailers to be overtaken by ships of the line, and of too heavy metal to be a fair match for frigates nominally of the same class. This peculiarity in the constitution of their vessels had been wholly overlooked by the Admiralty, who anticipated no danger from so diminutive a marine as that of the United States, though it was well known, and had been the subject of anxious solicitude to better-informed individuals in the community.† But admitting the full weight of these circumstances, it was plain that a new era in naval warfare had arisen, since the English came to contend with their Anglo-Saxon brethren on the other side of the Atlantic. The very fact of the comparison which they so anxiously instituted with their American antagonists, and the superiority on the part of the latter, in weight of metal and strength of crews, in the encounters which had taken place, which they justly pointed out, afforded decisive proof of this: with the French and Spaniards, they had been accustomed to look only to the class of vessels, and never to count guns. In seamanship, the British sailors, inured to the storms of every quarter of the globe, might justly claim an equality with the Americans similarly instructed, and a superiority to the mariners of any other country in the globe; but in the practice of gunnery, especially at a distance, it was very evident that they were, at that moment, their inferiors; and experience had now proved that long-continued and unexampled success had produced its wonted effect in relaxing the bands of British naval preparation; and that they had much need to recollect that, in the language of the ancient conquerors of the world, the word for an *army* was derived from the verb to *exercise*.*

Vigorous efforts made in England to repair the disasters.

In this, as in other cases, however, it soon appeared that, as much as unbroken prosperity is pernicious, so occasional disaster is beneficial to nations, provided only that the patriotic spirit is not extinct in their members, or the generous feelings buried under the weight of selfish indulgences. The officers who had commanded in the vessels which had been taken were all tried by court-martial, honourably acquitted, and immediately after employed anew. This was going to work in the right spirit; there was no attempt to select a second Byng to be the expiatory victim for popular clamour or ministerial neglect. The most vigorous efforts were made by the Admiralty, at once to strengthen the squadrons on the coast of America, and fit out single ships, which might, from their size, crews, and weight of metal, really be a match for the gigantic frigates which the United States had sent forth to prowl through the deep. Several vessels were commenced on the model of the American frigates and sloops, which had been found by experience so swift-sailing and formidable in action; and secret instructions were given to the commanders of vessels on the North American station not to hazard an encounter with an opponent nominally of the same class, unless there was something like a *real* as well as an apparent equality between them. Greater care was, at the same time, taken in the selection of crews; a larger proportion of men was given to the cannon on board; and orders were issued for the frequent exercise of the men in ball practice, both with small arms and great guns; a point of vital importance in naval warfare, but which had hitherto been in an unaccountable manner neglected, with a very few exceptions, in all the departments in the British navy.†

Good effects of these efforts, and supineness of the American government.

The good effects of these improvements speedily appeared in the next naval actions which ensued. Sir John Borlase Warren, who commanded on the North American station, established a vigilant blockade of the harbours of the United States; their commerce was soon entirely ruined, the immense carrying trade they had so long conducted slipped from their hands; and such was the con-

* Cooper, ii., 197. Ann. Reg., 1812, 108, 109.

† In 1808, four years before the American war broke out, the author well recollects hearing his uncle, the late Dr. Gregory, of Edinburgh, say, "The Americans are building long forty-six gun frigates, which really carry fifty-six or sixty guns; when our forty-fours come to meet them, you will hear something new some of these days." In England, as in every other constitutional monarchy, the intelligence and information of enlightened individuals often precede those of government or public functionaries. If the direction of affairs could be confined to *such* men, or those whom they can influence, no wise man would object to the widest extension of the elective franchise.

* *Exercitus*, from *exerceo*, to exercise.

† James, vi., 144, 151, 196. Ann. Reg., 1813, 108, 109.

sequence of this upon their national finances, which depended almost entirely on custom-house duties, that the public revenue had sunk, since the war had commenced, from twenty-four millions of dollars annually to eight millions.* Paralyzed in this manner, in the sinews of war, by the first results of the contest, the American government were in no condition to augment their expenditure; and, notwithstanding the enthusiasm which their glorious successes had excited in the country, no attempt was made by Congress during the year 1812 to increase their naval force. In the beginning of the next year, however, they passed two acts, the one authorizing the building of four 74 gun ships, and four of 44; and in March six additional sloops were ordered to be built for the ocean; and for the lakes as many as the public service might require. But a very considerable period might be expected to elapse before these vessels could be ready for sea, and meantime their trade was destroyed, and the danger imminent. On the other hand, a close blockade was maintained by the British of all their harbours: the bays of the Chesapeake and the Delaware were scoured by Admiral Cockburn at the head of a light squadron, appointed for that purpose, and various landings, by bodies of marines, effected along their shores, which, besides doing considerable damage to the enemy's naval stores and arsenals, kept the towns on the coast in a constant state of alarm.†

April 29.

Among the many officers in the British navy who ardently desired to meet even on inferior terms, but with an adequate crew, with the American forty-four-gun frigates, was CAPTAIN BROKE of the Shannon. This admirable officer commanded a frigate pierced for 38 guns, but really mounting 52; and he had for many years trained the crew, whom by admirable management he had brought to the highest state of discipline and subordination, to the practice of ball firing. Being stationed off Boston, where the Chesapeake, under Captain Lawrence, of 49 guns, had passed the winter, Captain Broke, to render the combat equal, sent away the Tenedos, of equal strength, his consort, with instructions not to return for three weeks; and when she was fairly out of sight, he stood in to the mouth of the harbour, and sent a challenge, couched in the most courteous terms, to the captain of the Chesapeake, stating the exact amount of his forces, and inviting him to single combat for the honour of their respective flags.‡ Having despatched this letter, Captain Broke, with colours flying, lay close in to Boston lighthouse; and soon the Chesapeake was under weigh, surrounded by numerous barges and pleasure-boats, which, amid loud cheers, accompanied her some way out to what they deemed a certain victory. Captain Lawrence of the Chesapeake had not received Captain Broke's challenge when he stood out; but he was too brave a man to shun an offered combat on equal terms, and such was the confidence which the inhabitants of Boston entertained in his success, that they had prepared a public supper to greet the victors on their return, with their prisoners, to the harbour.*

The Shannon and Chesapeake.

Meanwhile, Captain Broke at the mast-head was anxiously watching the movements of the American frigate, and beheld with a thrill of delight, such as the brave only can know, first her fore-topsail, then her other topsails loosed and sheeted home, and soon after a signal gun fired, the topgallant sails loosed and set, and at length the vessel under weigh, and standing out with a light air for the bay. The order to clear for action was immediately given on board the Shannon, and as promptly obeyed; and soon the two vessels neared, the Shannon clewing up her foresail, and with her main-topsail braced flat, under a light breeze from the shore, that the Chesapeake might overtake her. The American came gallantly down with three flags flying, on one of which was inscribed, "Sailors' rights and free trade." The Shannon had a unicorn jack at the fore-mast, and an old rusty blue ensign at the mizen peak, and two other ensigns rolled up and ready to be hoisted, if either of these should be shot away. Her heavy guns were loaded alternately with two round shot and a hundred and fifty musket-balls, and with one round and one double-headed shot in each gun. At a quarter to six the enemy hauled up within two hundred yards of the Shannon's weather beam, and her crew gave three cheers; Captain Broke upon that harangued his men, telling them that that day would decide the superiority of British seamen, when properly trained, over those of all other nations; and that the Shannon would show how short a time the Americans had to boast when opposed to an equal force. Loud cheers followed this gallant appeal, and the two ships being not now more than a stone-throw asunder, the order was given to the crew of the Shannon to commence firing.†

Approach of the Shannon and Chesapeake. June 1.

Slowly, and with deliberate aim, the British guns were pointed, and discharged successively at the American frigate as she passed, receiving, at the same time, her broadside, which was delivered at once, and with great effect. But the Shannon's guns, admirably directed, soon injured the Chesapeake's rigging, as well as made dreadful havoc among her men; and after two or three broadsides had in this manner been exchanged, the Chesapeake, attempting to haul her foresail up, fell on board the Shannon, whose starboard bower-anchor locked with her mizen channels. In this situation the great guns ceased firing, except the Shannon's two aftermost guns, thirty-two pound carronades, loaded with grape and round shot, which soon beat in the sternports of the Chesapeake, and, sweeping the deck, drove

The Chesapeake is boarded.

* Home produce, and of foreign countries, exported from America.

Years.	Foreign.	Home.	Total.
1805	£11,078,964	£8,830,625	£19,909,589
1806	12,559,006	8,594,526	21,153,552
1807	12,425,741	10,145,747	22,571,488
1812	1,769,817	6,256,689	8,026,506
1813	593,301	5,220,031	5,813,322
1814	30,243	1,412,973	1,443,216

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii., 191.

† Cooper, ii., 204, 205. Ann. Reg., 1813, 109.

‡ "As the Chesapeake appears to be now ready for sea, I request you will do me the favour to meet the Shannon with her, ship to ship, to try the fortunes of our respective flags. All interruption shall be provided against. I entreat you, sir, not to imagine that I am urged by mere personal vanity to the wish of meeting the Chesapeake; we have both nobler motives. You will feel it as a compliment, if I say that the result of our meeting may be the most grateful service I can render to my country; and I doubt not that you, equally confident of success, will feel convinced that it is only by repeated triumphs in *even combat*, that you can console your country for the loss of that trade it can no longer protect. Favour me with a speedy reply: we are short of provisions and water, and cannot remain long here."—JAMES, vi., 199.

* James, vi., 198, 199. Cooper, ii., 284, 285.

† James, ii., 202. Cooper, ii., 287.

the men from their quarters. For a few minutes a sharp fire of musketry was kept up by the marines on both sides; but ere long, Captain Broke, observing that the Americans were not standing to their guns, ordered the two ships to be lashed together, and the boarders to be called up from below. Mr. Stevens, the Shannon's boatswain, a veteran who had fought in Rodney's action, immediately set about making the ships fast, outside the Shannon's bulwark, and while so employed, he had his left arm, which held on to the enemy's rigging, hacked off by repeated sabre cuts from their marines, and his body mortally wounded with musketry from the tops; but, in spite of all, he had fastened the ships together with the right arm ere his hold relaxed in death! a deed of heroism worthy of ancient Rome.*

Desperate conflict by which she was carried.

Meanwhile, however, the brave Captain Lawrence, and several other officers in the Chesapeake, were wounded, and Captain Broke, at the head of the boarders, leaped upon the Chesapeake's quarter-deck, on which scarce an American was to be seen; and the men quickly following, the seamen on the gangways, twenty-five in number, were, after a desperate struggle, overpowered, or driven below; and the second party of boarders having now come forward amid loud cheers, the hatchways were closed down, and a sharp fire opened upon the marines in the tops, who kept up a destructive discharge of musketry. The sailors from the Shannon's fore-yard, headed by Mr. Smith, at the same time forced their way up to the Chesapeake's main yard, and thence to her tops, which in a few minutes were cleared. Captain Broke at this moment was furiously assailed by three American sailors who had previously submitted; he succeeded in parrying a thrust at his breast, but was immediately after knocked down by the butt-end of a musket. As he rose, he had the satisfaction of seeing, in his own words, "the American flag hauled down, and the proud old British Union floating triumphantly over it." So rapid was the action, that fifteen minutes only elapsed from the time the first gun was fired till the Chesapeake was entirely in the hands of the British. Unhappily, Lieutenant Watt, who hauled down the enemy's colours, not having immediately succeeded in hoisting the British above it, was killed, with two of his men, by a discharge of musketry from the Shannon's marines, in the belief that the conflict still continued. Yet, in this short period, the Chesapeake had sustained a loss of forty-seven killed and ninety-eight wounded; a dreadful proof of the admirable training in the use of their arms, both small and great, which the Shannon's people had received. Her own loss had also been severe: it amounted to twenty-four killed and fifty-nine wounded.††

Perhaps no single combat between vessels of war ever produced so great a moral impression as this did, both in the United States and the British islands. The Americans had fallen into the fault of the British, and began to think themselves, from their extraordinary success, invincible in naval warfare: the English, unaccustomed to disasters at sea, had almost begun to fear that their long career of glory on the ocean was drawing to a close, when they sustained such repeated shocks from a maritime force so diminutive as that of the United States. Proportionally great was the despondency on one side and joy on the other, when the result of this action, where an equality for the first time obtained between the combatants, and due attention had been paid in both cases to their training, explained at once to what causes the former disasters had been owing.oo The effect in restoring public confidence in Great Britain in the efficiency of the navy was immense, and the feelings of every right-thinking man in the country went along with government when they made Captain Broke a baronet. The brave victor brought his prize, amid the loud cheers of the inhabitants and sailors in the harbour, who manned every spar of their vessels, into Halifax, where the lamented Captain Lawrence soon after breathed his last, and was buried with military honours in presence of all the British officers on the station, who uncovered as their noble antagonist was lowered into the grave.*

Great moral effect of this victory.

No long period elapsed before it appeared from other detached combats, of which alone this naval warfare admitted, that the old superiority of the British navy remained unimpaired. The British brig Boxer, of fourteen guns and sixty-six men, was indeed taken by the American brig Enterprise, of sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men; the former defect of inadequate manning having paralyzed all the efforts of devoted valour, which proved fatal to the commanders of both vessels, who were killed during its continuance; but on the next occasion, when anything like equality of force existed, the result was in favour of the British. On the 14th of August, the Pelican, British brig of eighteen guns, met the American brig Argus, of twenty; and as the crew of the latter was somewhat superior, and the broadside weight of metal a little in favour of the former, the combatants were very nearly matched.† The action soon became extremely warm, and before it had lasted many minutes Captain Allen of the Argus was severely wounded, and the rigging of his vessel so much cut up that the command of it was lost. At length, after a gallant resistance, the Pelican succeeded in raking the Argus, and shortly after carried her by boarding. The Argus had six killed and eighteen wound-

Combats of lesser vessels. The Boxer and Enterprise, the Pelican and Argus.

Sept. 5.

Aug. 14.

* James, ii., 202, 203. Brent., ii., 491. Cooper, ii., 287. Captain Broke's Despatch, Ann. Reg., 1812, 185. App. to Chron.

† Cooper, ii., 289, 290. Brenton, ii., 492, 493. James, vi., 202, 205. Captain Broke's Despatch, Ann. Reg., 1812, 185.

‡ Comparative force of the combatants.

	Shannon.	Chesapeake.
Broadside guns	25	25
Weight in lbs.	538	590
Crew, men only	306	376

—James, vi., 209.

oo XXXVIII. Captain Marryatt, in his "Diary in America," decides altogether adversely to the unfounded boast of Mr. Alison. The judgment and authority of a sailor in a maritime case ordinarily are preferable to those of a landsman. The naval officer thus announced his opinion: "*Lawrence fought under disadvantages*—many of his ship's company, hastily collected together, were not sober; and there was a want of organization, from just coming out of harbour, which is quite sufficient to account for his defeat." These are the contrasted decisions of a regular professional mariner and of an inexperienced student.

* Cooper, ii., 291, 293. James, vi., 209.

†

	Pelican.	Argus.
Broadside guns	9	10
Weight in lbs.	262	228
Crew, men only	101	122
Tons	285	316

—James, vi., 223; and Cooper, ii., 308.

ed, the Pelican two killed and five wounded. This action was the more remarkable, that it took place off St. David's, in the mouth of the Irish Channel.*

Various operations were undertaken this summer in the Bay of Chesapeake by the British squadron under the command of Sir John Borlase Warren, but they were not attended with any remarkable success. An attack on Craney Island, which the Americans had fortified, failed from the water being found too shallow, when the boats approached the shore, to admit of the troops being landed; but some gallant boat enterprises against schooners of the enemy had previously proved successful. The British were consoled for this check by the victorious issue of an attack made by Sir Sidney Beckwith, with a strong body of marines, on an American post and battery at Hampton, which was quickly stormed two days after, and all its guns taken; some acts of violence were committed on the inhabitants during the heat of the assault, which gave rise to much acrimonious feeling in the United States. Shortly after, two fine brigs, the Anaconda and Atlas, the former of ten, the latter of eighteen guns, were taken in Ocracoke harbour by the boats and marines of the squadron under Lieutenant Westphal; and Captain Fleury in the Martin, who had grounded in the Delaware, most gallantly beat off an attack by a cloud of American gunboats, and at length, when the tide rose, made off with one as his prize, to the great mortification of the crowd on shore, who had hastened to witness what they deemed a certain victory. The American squadron of frigates put to sea from New-York, but was speedily pursued by the British squadron of superior strength, and blockaded in New-London. Upon the whole; although the operations in the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays were not attended with any great results, yet they had the effect of completely destroying the trade of the most flourishing harbours in the United States; and sensibly demonstrated to the people the folly of the war in which they had engaged, in which, without the slightest hope of territorial aggrandizement, they were undergoing the realities of naval blockade, national insult, and commercial ruin.†

Naval operations in Chesapeake Bay. June 24.

June 26.

July 13.

July 24.

The operations by land during the year 1813 were conducted on a greater scale than in the preceding campaign, and though they terminated, upon the whole, gloriously for the British arms, yet the contest was more bloody, and success more various. The absorbing interest of the contest, yet doubtful and undecided, in the Peninsula, and the urgent necessity of sending off every sabre and bayonet that could be spared to feed the army of Wellington, rendered it a matter of impossibility to despatch an adequate force to the Canadian frontier, and compelled government, how reluctantly soever, to intrust the defence of those provinces mainly to the bravery and patriotism of their inhabitants. Nor was the confidence reposed in vain; although, as the Americans had now accumulated a considerable force on the frontier, the struggle was more violent, and victory alternated with disaster. The American government, as is the case with all Democratic states, had rushed into the contest wholly unprepared, alike by land and sea, to maintain it, and they had, in consequence, sustained nothing but disaster on the former element; and if, on the latter, they met with extraordinary success, it was entirely owing to the hardihood and skill of their seamen, coupled with the dispersion of the British force, and the accidental ignorance of the English government of the structure and size of the American frigates. But the national passion was now roused in the United States, and great efforts were made to prosecute the war with vigour. It has been already noticed, that four additional ships of the line and four sloops were ordered to be built, and a loan of 16,000,000 dollars was contracted for at 7½ per cent.; and in order to excite the ardour of their own, and, if possible, shake the fidelity of British seamen, the war was justified, in an elaborate report presented by the Committee of Foreign Relations to Congress, and approved by them, entirely on the ground of the right claimed by the English government to search for and reclaim British subjects on board of American vessels. This they were determined at all hazards to resist, should they stand alone in the contest: "for to appeal to arms in defence of a right, and to lay them down without securing it, would be considered in no other light than a relinquishment of it."*

Operations by land, and American preparations for the war.

Jan. 3.

March 6.

The first operations of the campaign in Canada proved singularly unfortunate to the Americans. In the end of January, General Winchester, with a thousand men, crossed over to attack Fort Detroit in the upper province, and, before any force could be assembled to resist him, made himself master of Frenchtown, twenty-six miles from that place. General Proctor, however, who commanded the British forces in that quarter, no sooner heard of this irruption, than he hastily assembled a body of five hundred regulars and militia, being the Glengarry fencibles, and six hundred Indians, and commenced an attack upon the invaders, two days afterward, in the fort of Ogdensburg. The assault was made under circumstances of the utmost difficulty; deep snow impeded the assailants at every step, and the American marksmen, from behind their defences, kept up a very heavy fire; but the gallantry of the British overcame every obstacle, and the fort was carried, with eleven guns, all its stores, and two armed schooners in the harbour.†

Invasion and defeat of General Winchester, and capture of Ogdensburg.

Jan. 22.

But a far more material success soon consoled the Americans for their reverses. By indefatigable exertions during the winter, they had augmented their naval force in Sackett's Harbour so considerably, that the British squadron on Lake Ontario was no longer a match for them. Nor is this surprising; for the Americans built their ships at their own doors, with all their materials at hand, while the British, from the long export of timber to England, had not even wood in abundance, and were obliged to bring all their naval stores from Great Britain; and it was computed that each gun, before it was launched on the lakes, had cost a thou-

Capture of York, the capital of Upper Canada.

* James, vi., 221, 223. Brenton, ii., 495. Cooper, ii., 308, 309. Ann. Reg., 1831, 112.

† James, vi., 224, 239. Ann. Reg., 1813, 184. Cooper, ii., 312, 326.

* Report to Congress, Jan. 29, 1813. Ann. Reg., 1813, 178, 181. Cooper, ii., 204, 205.

† Ann. Reg., 1813, 179, 180. Armstrong's War of 1812, i., 67, 86. Christie's War in Canada, 71, 73.

sand pounds. Encouraged by this circumstance, the Americans fitted out an expedition of seventeen hundred men, who sailed from Sackett's Harbour on board fourteen armed vessels, and two days afterward effected a landing, after a sharp conflict, at the old fort of Toronto, three miles from York, the capital of Upper Canada. General Sheaffe commanded the British forces in that quarter; but he could only collect seven hundred regulars and militia, and a hundred Indians; with these, however, he made a stout resistance in the woods and thickets, in the course of which the grenadiers of the 8th regiment fell to a man. He was at last overpowered, and compelled to fall back to the town, which was weakly fortified; and in its bastion was a large magazine of powder, which exploded as the assailants were advancing to the attack. Two hundred of them, with General Pike, their commander, were blown into the air by this catastrophe, and half that number of the British; but the walls were thrown down by the shock, and the defences were no longer maintainable, while, at the same time, Chauncey, with his flotilla, had worked his way into the harbour. Sheaffe, therefore, wisely availed himself of the consternation produced among the Americans by the explosion to effect his retreat in the direction of Kingston, with the whole regulars who remained unhurt, about four hundred in number; and, though the enemy seized all the public stores that were left in the place, they re-embarked with such haste that they were all abandoned; and, by their own admission, the only trophies they brought away were "a stand of colours and a human scalp." The Americans, however, carried off three hundred prisoners, and an equal number were killed and wounded on either side in the action; and the British sustained a severe loss in a large ship on the stocks, and extensive naval stores, which they were obliged to burn to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands.*

April 27.

The American squadron, after this success, sailed away to Sackett's Harbour for re-enforcements, in order to prosecute their ulterior operations; and meanwhile, Colonel Proctor, crossing Lake Erie, made a dash, with nine hundred regulars and militia, and twelve hundred Indians, at General Harrison, who lay with his division near the rapids of the Miami, on the American side, in a position strengthened by blockhouses and batteries, which defied every attack made upon them. Meanwhile, two American regiments, eight hundred strong, under General Clay, approached to aid Harrison, and at first, by a sudden attack, carried part of the British batteries. Having incautiously followed up their success too far, however, these regiments were surrounded by the British and Indians, and, after a desperate struggle, totally defeated, with the loss of two hundred killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners, while the English lost only fifteen killed and forty-five wounded. Meantime, a considerable re-enforcement of sailors having reached the British side of Lake Ontario, the squadron on that lake, under their able and gallant officer, Sir James Yeo, was enabled to put to sea from Kingston, and a combined attack by land and water was attempted on Sackett's Harbour, the principal naval establishment of the enemy on that inland sea. The expedition excited great interest on both sides of the water, and the most sanguine hopes were entertained by the British that it would lead to the destruction of this growing and formidable naval establishment of the enemy. These hopes, however, were miserably disappointed. The troops landed, indeed, and, after some sharp skirmishing, advanced over a narrow isthmus, connecting the island on which they had landed with the mainland. Though the British were only seven hundred strong, and the Americans, in the absence of their main force, about a thousand, yet the whole American militia took to flight on the first discharge, leaving the regulars, not more than four hundred strong, to sustain the combat. In the first moment of alarm, their officers actually set fire to their naval storehouses, arsenal, and barracks, which were speedily consumed. Unhappily, this was deemed a sufficient achievement by Sir George Prevost, who, conceiving his force not adequate to any farther operation, re-embarked his troops, at a time when a vigorous assault would probably have led to the entire capture of this important depôt, and the immediate settlement of the naval contest on the lakes.*

April 26. Success at the fords of Miami, and failure at Sackett's Harbour.

May 5.

May 28.

The principal American force on Lake Ontario, about six thousand strong, were at this juncture engaged in an attack on Fort George at the western extremity of the lake. Early in the morning of the 27th of May, a combined attack was made, both by the naval and military forces, on that stronghold; the former under the command of Commodore Chauncey, the latter led by General Dearborn. General Vincent, who commanded the British in that quarter, could not muster above nine hundred soldiers; but with this handful of men he made a most gallant resistance, until at length the works, especially on the lake-front, being torn in pieces by the heavy cannonade, the British commander blew up the fort, and withdrew, with the loss of three hundred and fifty men, to a strong position on Burlington heights, near the head of the lake, where he collected detachments from Chippewa, Fort Erie, and other points, and assembled about sixteen hundred troops, of which one half were regular soldiers. After this success the Americans advanced to Queenstown, and being strongly re-enforced, established themselves in a solid manner on the Niagara frontier, with nearly six thousand men.†

Reduction of Fort George by the Americans. May 27.

This was by far the most formidable lodgment which the Americans had effected in the Canadian territory, and it excited, in consequence, equal attention and alarm through the whole British possessions. General Dearborn now confidently anticipated their entire conquest at no distant period; and to dislodge Vincent from his position, he pushed forward a body of three thousand infantry, two hundred and fifty horse, and nine guns. No sooner was the English general apprized of their approach, than he despatched eight hundred men, under Colonel Harvey, to retard their advance; and this gallant officer finding, when he arrived near the enemy, that they kept

The Americans are defeated at Stony Creek, Beavers' Dams, and Black Rock.

June 8.

* Ann. Reg., 1813, 180. Christie, 74, 75. Armstrong, i., 129, 132.

† Ann. Reg., 1813, 182, 183. Armstrong, i., 133, 135. Christie, 75, 76.

* Christie, 77, 79. Ann. Reg., 1812, 182, 183. Armstrong, i., 123, 147.

a bad look-out, resolved on a nocturnal surprise. This was accordingly executed, in the most brilliant style, as soon as it was dark, and with such success that two generals and a hundred and fifty men were made prisoners, and four guns captured. After this check, the enemy retreated to Fort George in great confusion. Having recovered from this disaster, Dearborn, a fortnight after, sent out an expedition of six hundred men to dislodge a British picket, which was posted at a place called Beavers' Dams, a few miles from Queenstown. They were soon beset on their road through the woods by Captain Kerr, with a small body of Indians, and Lieutenant Fitz Gibbon, at the head of forty-six of the 49th regiment, not two hundred strong in all; but this little force was so skilfully disposed as to make the Americans believe they were the light troops of a very superior army, which in fact was approaching, though it had not come up. They surrendered in consequence, five hundred in number, with two guns and two standards. Shortly after, a successful expedition was undertaken against the American fortified harbour of Black Rock on Lake Ontario, which was burned, with all its naval stores and vessels, by a British detachment under Colonel Bishopp, who, unfortunately, fell in the moment of victory; while the British flotilla on Lake Champlain captured two armed schooners, of eleven guns each: a success of no small importance, in a warfare where so much depended on the command of those inland waters.*

June 24.

July 11.

These repeated disasters so disconcerted the Americans, that though their force at Fort George was still more than double that of the British who advanced against it, yet they kept cautiously within their lines, and submitted to be insulted by the English troops, who not only cooped them up within their walls, but actually advanced to within a few hundred yards of their guns. Prevost, however, wisely judged that it would be the height of imprudence to assault the Americans, driven to desperation, with half their number, in works bristling with cannon, and supported by the fire of Fort Niagara on the other side of the river; and as no provocation could induce them to quit their lines, he left a force to maintain the blockade, and returned to Kingston. Meanwhile the war was vigorously prosecuted on Lake Erie by General Proctor, who invested the fort of Lower Sandusky on the Sandusky River, with five hundred regulars and militia, and above three thousand Indians. The works having been battered, Proctor led his troops to the assault. They crossed the glacis with great gallantry, though entirely deserted by their Indian allies, whom no consideration could induce to face the great guns, and were actually in the ditch, when the head of the column was smote with such a fire of grape and musketry, that they were driven back, and obliged to re-embark with the loss of a hundred killed and wounded, and he soon after raised the siege.†

Blockade of Fort George, and repulse of Proctor at Sandusky.

Aug. 2.

These mutual injuries, though, upon the whole, highly favourable to the British arms, yet in truth decided nothing; it was on the lakes that the real blows were to be struck, and a decisive superiority acquired by the one party over the other. Events in the outset of this inland naval warfare were highly favourable to the British arms. Strengthened by the two armed schooners which had been taken on Lake Champlain, and which had been christened the Broke and Shannon, the English flotilla, with nine hundred men on board, stretched across the lake, took Plattsburg, which was evacuated by twelve hundred Americans without firing a shot, burned part of the naval stores, and brought away the rest, and also destroyed their naval establishments at Burlington and Champlain. By these successes, a decisive superiority was acquired on Lake Champlain for the remainder of the campaign. Sir James Yeo also gained considerable successes on Lake Ontario, particularly on the 10th of August, when he captured two schooners, and destroyed two others; but no decisive engagement took place on that inland sea, as neither party was sufficiently confident in his strength to risk the fate of the campaign by a general battle on its surface.*

Success of the British on Lake Champlain.

Aug. 10 and 11.

Aug. 28.

But while the campaign, both by land and water, was thus prosperous in the upper provinces, a dreadful disaster occurred on Lake Erie, which more than compensated all these disadvantages, and immediately exposed the British provinces in North America to imminent danger, which was the more alarming, that the force at the command of Sir George Prevost was so small as to be wholly inadequate to the defence of a frontier everywhere vulnerable, and above twelve hundred miles in length. Both parties had made the greatest efforts to augment their naval force on Lake Erie; but owing to the superior facilities of the Americans for ship-building at their own doors, while the whole British naval stores had to come from England, the weight, as well as the number of their vessels, became soon superior to that of the British, while the total stoppage of their mercantile navy gave them ample means for manning them with numerous crews of picked seamen. Captain Barclay, an officer inferior to none in the service of Great Britain for skill and gallantry, was appointed in May to the command of the squadron on the lake, and immediately entered on his unenviable duty, when the whole force was not equal to a British twenty-gun brig. The Detroit, however, was soon after launched, and fifty English seamen having been received and distributed through his ships, Barclay set out, early in September, with his little fleet, consisting of two ships, two schooners, a brig, and a sloop, carrying in all 63 guns. Thus there was not one British sailor to each gun, the rest of his crews being made up of 240 soldiers and eighty Canadians. On the other hand, the American squadron, of two more vessels and an equal number of guns, was nearly double the weight of metal and number of hands; and still more superior, from their crews being all experienced seamen, to meet the wretched mixture of five landsmen to one sailor, who manned the British fleet.‡‡

Defective state of the British flotilla on Lake Erie.

* Christie, 81, 82, 85. Armstrong, i., 137, 151. Ann. Reg., 1813, 182, 183.

† Christie, 83, 84. Ann. Reg., 1813, 186, 187. Armstrong, i., 164, 168.

* Ann. Reg., 1813, 186, 187. Christie, 87, 91. Armstrong, i., 165, 166. James, vi., 246.

† James, vi., 247, 249. Armstrong, i., 167, 168.

‡ Force of American and British squadrons:

	British.	American.
Ships, brigs, and schooners	6	8
Broadsides guns	34	34
Weight of metal in lbs.	459	928
Crews	345	580
Tons	1250	960

—JAMES, vi., 248, 249.

Barclay, in the first instance, with his feeble force, blockaded the American flotilla in the harbour of Presqu' Isle, now Erie, which he could do with safety, notwithstanding his inferiority, as the Americans could not get their squadron over the bar in its front, but with the guns out, which, of course, prevented their attempting it in the face of an armed force. At length, however, their commodore, Captain Perry, adroitly seized the moment when Barclay was absent, and got outside the bar. The British commander, upon this, returned to Amherstburg, where he was soon blockaded by the American squadron; the former being busily engaged, meantime, in exercising the soldiers at the guns, and accustoming the Canadians to handle their ropes. Soon, however, provisions on that desolate shore fell short; and Barclay, deeming his crews a little more efficient, put to sea. An action ensued between the opposite squadrons, which for valour and resolution displayed on both sides never was surpassed. In the first instance, the Lawrence, which bore Commodore Perry's flag, was cut to pieces by the British guns: she became unmanageable; Perry shifted his flag on board the Niagara, and soon after the colours of the Lawrence were hauled down amid loud cheers from the British squadron. After this, the firing ceased on both sides for a few minutes, and a breeze having sprung up behind the Americans, Perry skilfully gained the weather-gage, while the British vessels, in endeavouring to wear round to present a fresh broadside to their antagonists, fell, from the inexperience of the crews, into confusion, and for the most part got jammed together, with their bows facing the enemy's broadsides. So defective, too, was Barclay's equipment, that he had only one boat on board of his own vessel, the Detroit, and it was pierced with shot; he could not, in consequence, take possession of his prize; the Lawrence drifted out of fire, and her crew immediately rehoisted their colours; and Perry took advantage of the weather-gage, which he had gained, to take a position with his remaining vessels, which raked the principal British ships; while they, from the unskilfulness of their men, were unable to handle their ropes so as to extricate themselves from the danger. The result was, that, after a dreadful carnage and desperate engagement of three hours, the whole British vessels were taken; but not until they had become wholly unmanageable, all the officers, including Barclay, being killed or desperately wounded, and they had lost forty-one killed and ninety-four wounded, or above a third of the whole men on board the flotilla.*

Desperate action on Lake Erie, and defeat of the British.

Sept. 10.

The effects of this dreadful defeat speedily were felt in the military operations. The Americans being now entirely masters of Lake Erie, had it in their power at once to intercept the whole coasting trade by which Proctor's force and auxiliary Indians were supplied with provisions, and to land any force they chose in his rear, and entirely cut him off from Kingston and York, and the lower part of the upper province. He was constrained, therefore, immediately to commence a retreat, abandoning and destroying all his fortified posts beyond the Grand River; Amherstburg and Detroit, accordingly, were immediately dismantled, and with the Indians under Tecumseh, who preserved an honourable fidelity in misfortune, the British commenced a retreat towards the River Thames. In this retrograde movement, however, they were immediately followed by Harrison, who was attended by Perry's squadron on the lake, while the British, almost starving, toiled through wretched roads and interminable forests. On the 4th of October, Harrison came up with the British rear, and succeeded in capturing all their stores and ammunition. Unable to retreat farther in anything like military array, Proctor had now no alternative but to endeavour to check the enemy by a general battle, and for this purpose he took up a position at the Moravian village on the Thames. Here he was attacked next day by the Americans with greatly superior forces; the Indians, little inured to regular battles, gave way after a gallant resistance, and their brave chief, Tecumseh, was slain; the first line of the British was overthrown by a sudden charge of the Kentucky horse; and, after a short combat, they were totally defeated, with the loss of six hundred men, almost all made prisoners. The remainder dispersed in the woods, and, after undergoing incredible hardships, reassembled at Ancaster, at the head of Lake Ontario, to the number of only two hundred and forty.*

Retreat and disaster of General Proctor.

Oct. 4.

Oct. 5.

On the same day on which this defeat was sustained on the shores of Lake Erie, six schooners, having on board two hundred and fifty soldiers, proceeding from York to Kingston without convoy, were captured on Lake Ontario. These repeated losses, coupled with the alarming intelligence received at the same time of great preparations for a general invasion of Lower Canada, made Sir George Prevost wisely determine it to be impossible to continue any longer the investment of Fort George, and the siege was accordingly raised a few days after. Though the British force at this point was so much weakened by sickness that not a thousand firelocks, out of three thousand, could be brought into action, yet the retreat was conducted with perfect order, and the troops concentrated in a strong position on Burlington heights, where they were soon after joined by the fugitives from Proctor's detachment, and succeeded in mustering fifteen hundred bayonets. They showed so strong a front that the Americans did not venture to attack them, and this stemmed the torrent of disaster in that quarter. But by driving the British from the territory to the westward of the River Thames, the Americans had in a great degree cut them off from their Indian allies, with whom they now could maintain no communication but by the distant and now isolated Fort of Michilimackinac; an advantage of no small moment for the future progress of the war.†

Disaster on Lake Ontario, and raising of the siege of Fort George.

Oct. 9.

The Americans were so elated with these successes, that they openly announced their intention of forthwith conquering Lower Canada, and taking up their winter-quarters at Montreal. Nor were their preparations and forces,

Preparations for a grand invasion of Canada.

Sept. 26.

* Cooper, ii., 447, 467. James, vi., 247, 253. Christie, 93, 94. Ann. Reg., 1813, 187. Captain Barclay's Account.

* Christie, 96, 97. Ann. Reg., 1813, 188. Prevost's Official Account, Oct. 30, 1813. App. to Chron., 221. Armstrong, i., 170, 174.

† Christie, 97, 98. Armstrong, i., 170, 175. Ann. Reg., 1813, 189.

if the numerical amount of their troops is alone considered, at all inadequate to such an undertaking. Their generals, abandonnig for the time their operations in Upper Canada, transported all their forces by water on Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, so as to take part in the grand combined attack on the lower province. With this view, they concentrated the great bulk of their forces at Sackett's Harbour; and their troops were much more formidable than on any former occasion, for they amounted, in all, to eighteen thousand regular soldiers and ten thousand militia, divided into three armies; that on Lake Erie amounting to eight thousand, under Harrison; Wilkinson having ten thousand at Sackett's Harbour, and Hampton four thousand, and as many militia, on the Chateaugay River, near Lake Champlain. Threatened by so many enemies, Sir George Prevost issued an animated proclamation to the Canadians, and put the militia of the lower province on permanent duty. It will immediately appear how nobly they answered the appeal.*

Defeat of the invasion of Lower Canada, Oct. 21.

Hampton, with the right wing of the army of invasion, was the first to take the field. Early on the 21st of October he crossed the frontier at the junction of the Chateaugay and Outard Rivers; but though he had four thousand effective infantry, two thousand militia, and ten guns, he was so vigorously and gallantly resisted by the frontier light infantry of the Canadians, not six hundred in number, under Colonel De Salabery, who fought with the steadiness of veteran soldiers in their woods, that, after three days' desultory fighting, he was driven with disgrace back into the American territory, pursued and harassed by the Canadian militia, and his troops were so discouraged by their reverses, that they became incapable of taking any farther part in the campaign. Meanwhile, Wilkinson, with the centre of the invading force, about ten thousand strong, left Sackett's Harbour, and crossing Lake Ontario, mustered his troops, in the end of October, in Grenadier Island, opposite Kingston, where General De Rottenburgh lay awaiting his attack. Having delayed till the principal forces of the upper province were concentrated around that great depôt, the American general skilfully shifted his line of attack, and embarking his troops on board three hundred boats, escorted by Chauncey, reached the lower end of the lake, and dropping down the St. Lawrence, landed, on the 18th of October, near Point Iroquois. No sooner was the British general apprized of this circumstance than he detached Colonel Morrison, with eight hundred regulars and militia, to follow the motions of the fleet, and oppose them wherever they attempted a landing. Morrison came up with the enemy near Chrystler's Point, twenty miles above Cornwall, in number about three thousand, who had landed from their boats, and a violent encounter ensued. The Americans were unable, however, to bear the attack of the British bayonet; they broke and fled in disorder before the detachments of the 48th, 49th, and 89th, supported by the militia, and lost one gun and two hundred and fifty killed and wounded. Disconcerted by this defeat, Wilkinson re-embarked his troops; and having received, at the same time, accounts of Hampton's failure, he deemed the attack on Lower Canada hopeless, and landed them on the American shore, and put the men into winter-quarters.*

Oct. 25. Oct. 26. Nov. 3. Nov. 11. Nov. 17.

This glorious defeat of an invasion so confidently announced and strongly supported diffused the most heartfelt joy in Lower Canada, and terminated the campaign there in the most triumphant manner; but it was immediately followed by successes equally decisive in the upper province. All cause of apprehension for Montreal and the lower province being now removed, a strong body of troops was despatched, under Colonel Murray, from Kingston, to repel the invasion of Upper Canada, and, if possible, clear that province of the enemy. They set out from Kingston accordingly, and advanced towards Fort George, with a view to resume the investment, even amid all the severities of a Canadian winter. The American general, however, did not await his approach, but precipitately evacuated that fort, and retreated across the Niagara, but not without having, by express orders, reduced the flourishing village of Newark to ashes.† Such was the indignation excited in the breasts, equally of the British soldiers and the Canadian militia, by this inhuman act, which at once reduced above four hundred human beings to total destitution, amid the horrors of a Canadian winter, that Colonel Murray resolved to take advantage of it to carry Fort Niagara, on the frontier of the United States. A detachment of five hundred men, accordingly, under the command of Murray, crossed the River Niagara in boats, and succeeded in surprising the fort, with the loss only of five killed and three wounded. The garrison, nearly four hundred strong, with three thousand stand of arms and vast military stores, fell into the hands of the victors. Immediately after this success, the troops attacked a body of Americans, who had erected a battery opposite Queenstown, from which they were discharging redhot shot at that town, defeated them, and carried the fort.‡

Total defeat of the enemy in Upper Canada, and evacuation of Fort George.

Dec. 12. Dec. 18.

Still following up these successes, General Drummond, with eight hundred men, crossed the Niagara to Black Rock, which was stormed, and the fugitives pursued to Buffalo, a few miles distant, where they rallied on a body of two thousand men who had assembled, under Hull, to defend that rising town. Such, however, was the vigour of the British attack, that the Americans were speedily routed with the loss of four hundred, while the victors were not weakened by more than one hundred. Buffalo was immediately taken and burned: all the naval establishments there and at Black Rock were de-

Defeat of Hull, and burning of Buffalo. December 28.

* Ann. Reg., 189; and General Prevost's Desp., Oct., 1813. App. to Chron., 217. Christie, 99, 100.

* Morrison's Official Account, Nov. 12, 1813. Ann. Reg., 1813, 235. App. to Chron. Christie, 105, 108. Armstrong, ii., 8, 18.

† "'The post of Fort George, not being tenable against the enemy, must be abandoned, the garrison removed to Fort Niagara, and the exposed part of the frontier protected, by destroying such of the Canadian villages in its front as would best shelter the enemy during winter.' Such were the orders of government. This new and degrading system of defence, which, by substituting the torch for the bayonet, furnished the enemy with both motive and justification for a war of retaliation, was carried into full execution on the 10th of December. Newark was reduced to ashes, and orders were given to fire hot shot on Queenstown."—ARMSTRONG, i., 20.

‡ Christie, 110, 111. Armstrong, ii., 19, 20. Ann. Reg., 1814, 176, 177.

stroyed; while the Indians, let loose on the surrounding country, took ample vengeance for the conflagration of Newark, which had commenced this savage species of warfare. Though it had the desired effect, however, by making the Americans feel the consequences of their actions, of putting a stop to this barbarous system of hostilities, yet it was so much at variance with the British method of carrying on war, and so shocking to the feelings, both of the officers and men engaged in it, that Sir George Prevost, shortly after, issued a noble proclamation, lamenting the stern necessity under which he had acted in permitting these reprisals, and earnestly deprecating any farther continuance of so inhuman a species of warfare.*

Jan. 12, 1814.

This terminated the campaign of 1813 in Canada, and though not uncheckered by disaster, yet was it, upon the whole, eminently glorious, both to the arms of Britain, and to the inhabitants of her noble American colonies. The superiority of the enemy, both in troops and all the muniments of war, was very great: twenty thousand regular soldiers, besides as many militia, were at their disposal; the vessels built on the lakes were at their own door, armed from their own arsenals, and manned by the picked men of their commercial marine, now thrown almost utterly idle. On the other hand, the whole British force did not exceed *three thousand* regular soldiers,† who were charged with the defence of a frontier nearly a thousand miles in length; and although they were supported by thirty thousand gallant militia, yet these troops could not be moved far from home, or kept imbodied for any considerable length of time, and they could not be relied on except in small bodies for offensive operations. The British naval force on the lakes required to bring every gun, and great part of its naval stores, from Great Britain, a distance of three thousand five hundred miles; and the government could with difficulty spare from the wants of a navy which was spread over the globe, even a handful of sailors for this remote inland service. To have repelled all the efforts of the Americans in such circumstances, and with such forces, is of itself distinction; but it becomes doubly glorious when it is recollected that this distant warfare took place during the crisis of the contest in Europe, at the close of a twenty years' war, when every sabre and bayonet which could be spared was required for the devouring Peninsular campaigns, and when eleven millions were sent in subsidies in that one year from Great Britain to the German and other Continental powers. If these circumstances be duly weighed, it must appear evident, especially when the vast subsequent increase in the British population of Upper Canada is taken into consideration, that if the affections of our North American possessions are secured by a just system of colonial administration, Great Britain has now no reason to apprehend danger from the utmost efforts of the United States.

General result of the campaign.

The naval operations of the year 1814 commenced with a successful attack on the American frigate Essex by the British frigate Phœbe, supported by the Cherub brig. The Essex, under Captain Porter, had set out in the autumn preceding, on a cruise to the South Seas; and after having made some valuable captures, was at length overtaken, with two of her prizes, one of which she had armed with twenty guns, and manned with ninety-five men, in the roads of Valparaiso, on the 9th of February. After a close blockade of three weeks, during which various attempts to escape were made, the British commander, Captain Hillyar, succeeded in bringing the Essex to action in the roads of Valparaiso before she could get back, and without the aid of her lesser consort. This unequal combat, however, was maintained for forty minutes by Captain Porter with the utmost gallantry; the crews on both sides were strongly excited; the Americans having the motto flying, "Free trade and sailors' rights;" the British, "God and our country; traitors offend both." Early in the action the Phœbe received a shot in her rigging, which for a short time deprived her crew of the management of the vessel, so that she dropped almost out of shot; but the mischief being shortly repaired, the action was renewed, and as the Cherub raked the Essex while the Phœbe exchanged broadsides with her, both firing with great precision, the carnage on board the American vessel was soon frightful. Twice she took fire; and at length Captain Porter, having exhausted every means of defence, and sustained a loss of one hundred and fifty-two men, of whom fifty-eight were killed, was compelled to lower his colours. The loss on the side of the British was very trifling, being five killed and two wounded: a fact which sufficiently proves the inequality of the combat, though it had been managed with the greatest skill by the British commander. Nearly a hundred British sailors were on board the American vessel when the engagement commenced, who jumped overboard when it appeared likely she would be taken; forty of these reached the shore, thirty-one were drowned, and sixteen were picked up when at the point of perishing.*

Capture of the Essex by the Phœbe.

Feb. 28.

Early in February the American sloop Frolic, pierced nominally for eighteen guns, but really carrying twenty-two, was captured, after two shots only had been fired, by the British frigate Orpheus, of thirty-six guns. The Epervier British sloop of eighteen guns, however, was soon after taken by the American sloop Peacock of twenty-two; and on the 28th of June, a most desperate combat took place between the British sloop Reindeer of eighteen guns, and the American sloop Wasp. The preponderance of force was here in a most extraordinary degree in favour of the Americans;† but, notwithstanding this advantage, Captain Manners, of the Reindeer, one of the bravest officers who ever trod a quarter-deck, the moment he got sight of the American vessel, gave chase, and as soon as it was evident to the American captain that he was pursued by the Reindeer alone, he hove to, and the action commenced. Never were vessels more gallantly commanded and

The Frolic taken by the Orpheus, and Reindeer by the Wasp.

* Christie, 111, 112. Armstrong, ii., 19, 23. Ann. Reg., 1814, 176, 177.

† "Throughout the campaign, Prevost's regular force, covering a frontier of nine hundred miles from the Sorel to Fort St. Joseph, did not exceed three thousand men."—ARMSTRONG (*the American Secretary at War*), i., 131.

* James, vi., 285, 286. Captain Hillyar's Account, March 30, 1814. Ann. Reg., 1814, 179. App. to Chron. Cooper, ii., 262, 269.

† Broadside guns . . . . Reindeer. 9 Wasp. 11
Weight of metal, lbs. . . . 189 338
Crew, men only . . . 98 173
Tons 385 539
—JAMES, vi., 296.

fought on both sides. The engagement lasted, yardarm to yardarm, for half an hour, at the end of which time the Reindeer was so disabled, that she fell with her bow against the larboard quarter of the Wasp. The latter instantly raked her with dreadful effect; and the American rifles, from their tops, picked off almost all the officers and men on the British deck. But Captain Manners then showed himself indeed a hero. Early in the action the calves of his legs had been shot away, but he still kept the deck; at this time a grapeshot passed through both his thighs, but, though brought for a moment on his knees, he instantly sprang up, and though bleeding profusely, not only refused to quit the deck, but exclaiming, "Follow me, my boys; we must board!" sprang into the rigging of the Reindeer, intending to leap into that of the Wasp. At this moment, two balls from the American tops pierced his scull, and came out below his chin. With dying hand he waved his sword above his head, and exclaiming, "O God!" fell lifeless on the deck. The Americans immediately after carried the British vessel by boarding, where hardly an unwounded man remained, and so shattered was she in her hull, that she was immediately after burned by the victors. Never will the British Empire be endangered while the spirit of Captain Manners survives in its defenders.*†

An action more prosperous, but not more glorious for the British arms, than that between the Reindeer and Wasp, took place next spring, which terminated in the capture of the noble American frigate President, one of the largest vessels of that class in the world, by the Endymion, Captain Hope, slightly aided by the Pomona. On the 14th of January, 1815, the President and Macedonian brig set sail from New-York on a cruise, and were shortly after chased by the British blockading squadron, consisting of the Majestic, 56 guns, the Endymion, 40, and Pomona, 38. Being evidently no match for so great a superiority of force, Commodore Decatur, who commanded the American vessels, endeavoured to get back, but he was intercepted, and chased for fifty miles along the coast of Long Island, in the course of which the Tenedos, British frigate, also joined in the pursuit. Towards evening the Endymion gained rapidly on the American frigate—while the Majestic and Pomona fell behind out of gunshot—and opened a fire with her bow-chasers, which was vigorously returned by the President from her stern guns. At length the Endymion gained so much on the American as to permit her first broadside guns to begin to bear, and a close running fight ensued, the two vessels sailing under easy way, within half-musket-shot distance. Commodore Decatur suffered so severely, especially in his rigging, under their fire, that he took the gallant resolution of lying alongside the Endymion, with the view of carrying her by boarding, and going off with his prize,‡ leaving his own crippled vessel to the enemy, before the other British ships could get up.

Action between the President and the Endymion.

Jan. 14.

But the Endymion skilfully avoided this risk, which, with the enemy's great superiority of men, might have been serious, by keeping at a short distance, and preserving the advantage she had gained by a fire at half-gunshot range. Thus the fight continued for two hours longer, both vessels being most gallantly fought and skilfully handled; at the end of that time the Endymion's sails were so much cut away by the American bar-shot, that she fell astern, and the Pomona coming up, gave the President two broadsides with little or no effect, owing to the darkness of the night, but this circumstance saved the American's honour, as two vessels had now opened their fire upon him; and he accordingly hauled down his colours, and was taken possession of by the boats of the Pomona. In this long and close cannonade, the President lost thirty-five men killed and seventy-six wounded; the Endymion ten killed and twelve wounded; but her upper rigging, at which the enemy chiefly aimed, was very much cut away. This action was one of the most honourable ever fought by the British navy, and in none was more skilful seamanship displayed; for although at the close of the action the Pomona came up, yet during its continuance the superiority was strongly on the side of the President.* When she struck, there were no less than one hundred and eighty British seamen found in her crew, the greater part of whom had fought under English colours in the Macedonian, and been since enticed, in moments of intoxication, into the service of their enemies.†

Capture of the former by the British.

This was the last action between frigates that occurred during the war; but several lesser combats ensued, honourable alike to the sailors and officers of both nations. Let it not be said these combats were trivial occurrences: nothing is trivial which touches the national honour. Napoleon felt this at the battle of Maida, albeit not more momentous to his colossal power than the capture of a sloop to Great Britain. The superiority of her navy is an affair of life or death to England; when her people cease to think so, the last hour of her national existence has struck. On the 23d of March, long after peace had been signed, the Hornet met the Penguin, and a furious conflict ensued, both commanders being ignorant of the termination of hostilities. Both vessels were of equal size and weight of metal, but the American had the advantage in the number and composition of her crew;‡ and after a desperate conflict, in the course of which the brave Captain Dickin-

Lesser actions, which closed the war.

March 23.

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* James, vi., 294, 295. Cooper, ii., 232, 235.

† The Wasp itself, with its gallant captain (Blakely) and crew, was, in the same year, lost during a cruise, and no trace of them was ever obtained. They had previously compelled the Avon, of 18 guns, to surrender, but not till the latter vessel was so cut to pieces that she sank immediately after. The Americans must allow the British Empire to share with them the honours of the brave and skilful Captain Blakely, for he was born in Dublin.—COOPER, ii., 341; and JAMES, vi., 297, 299.

‡ Captain Hayes's Official Account, Ann. Reg., 1815. App. to Chron., 139. Cooper, ii., 538, 545. James, vi., 364, 367. Brenton, ii., 538.

	Endymion.	President.
* Broadside guns	24	28
Weight of metal in lbs.	664	852
Crew, men only	319	465
Tons	1277	1533

—JAMES, vi., 367.

In justice to the Americans, however, it must be observed, that as they were chased by other vessels besides the Endymion, though they had not yet come up, they could not venture to range up alongside, when their great superiority in guns and metal might have been most effectually brought into play.

† James, v., 366, 367. Captain Hayes's Official Account, Jan. 17. Ann. Reg., 1815, 139. App. to Chron. Cooper, ii., 542, 544.

	Men.	Boys.	Total.
‡ Hornet	163	2	165
Penguin	105	17	122

—JAMES, vi., 385, 386.

son of the Penguin was slain in the very act of attempting to board, the British vessel surrendered, having lost a third of her crew killed and wounded. The Hornet was shortly after chased by the Cornwallis, of seventy-four guns, and only escaped into New-York by throwing all her guns overboard. Lastly, the American brig Peacock, of twenty-four guns, fell in with the British East India Company's cruiser, the Nautilus, of fourteen guns, which was, of course, captured after a few broadsides, although the British commander assured the American that peace had been signed. Thus terminated at sea this memorable contest, in which the English, for the first time for a century and a half, met with equal antagonists on their own element; and in recounting which, the British historian, at a loss whether to admire most the devoted heroism of his own countrymen, or the gallant bearing of their antagonists, feels almost equally warmed in narrating either side of the strife, and is inclined, like the English sailors who were prisoners in the hold of the French vessel that combated in the Bay of Algesiras,* to cheer with every broadside which came in, for it was delivered, in descent at least, from English hands.†

June 30.

Financial measures of the American government.

At the beginning of 1814, the long continuance of the war, the total destruction of the American trade, and blockade of their harbours, and the evident hopelessness of the contest at land, after the pacification of the European Continent had enabled Great Britain to send its victorious troops to the fields of transatlantic warfare, increased, to a very great degree, the discontent of that large party in the United States who had throughout opposed the contest, and actually, in two of the Northern States, had influence sufficient to prevent their sending their contingents of armed men to carry it on. The blockade of their harbours, and stoppage of their trade, had almost entirely ruined the American customs, the only source of revenue, except the sale of waste lands, on which their government had hitherto relied; and, from sheer necessity, Congress was driven to lay on a great variety of new taxes on exciseable articles, to supply the alarming deficiency of the public revenue. These taxes were laid on wine licenses, licenses to distil spirituous liquors, on sales by auction of merchandise, ships and vessels, on sugars refined in the United States, bank-notes, and stamps for bills of exchange, and on imported salt. These taxes were to continue during the whole period of the war, and for a year after its termination. A farther loan of 7,500,000 was concluded in August, 1813, for the service of that year and the first quarter of the next. Thus the Americans, under the pressure of warlike necessity, were fast gliding into the long-established system of taxation in the European States, and losing the peculiar advantage they had hitherto enjoyed, of being placed beyond the hostility of the Old World, and, consequently, relieved from its burdens.‡

Aug. 24, 1813.

Repeal of the Non-importation Act.

It may readily be imagined that these direct or excise taxes, to which they had hitherto been wholly unaccustomed, did not increase the popularity of the war in the United States; the more especially after the evident approach of a termination to the European contest left the war equally without an object as without hope. To such a height did these discontents rise, even among the Democratic party, who had hitherto been the most violent supporters of the war, that government was obliged to do something indicating a disposition to recede from the inveterate system of hostility which they had hitherto pursued. In the end of March, a message from the President to Congress recommended the repeal of the Non-importation Act; and, in pursuance of the recommendation, a bill soon after passed both houses, by a large majority, repealing both the Embargo and Non-importation Act. This decisive approach to pacific measures awakened sanguine hopes throughout the Union of reviving trade and a speedy termination of hostilities; but they were soon undeceived by a proclamation by the British government, which declared the ports north of New-York, as well as those to the southward, in a state of blockade; in answer to which the American government issued a counter proclamation, in which, after setting forth that a blockade of a coast two thousand miles in length was an unwarrantable stretch, and could not be enforced, ordered all vessels, whether national or privateers, bearing the flag of the United States, to pay no regard to such blockade, and not to molest any vessels belonging to neutral powers bound for any harbour in the United States.*

March 31.

April 16.

April 25.

June 20.

Symptoms of a breaking up of the Union.

But the discontents of the Northern States had now risen to such a height as seriously threatened the dissolution of the Union. The two States of Massachusetts and Connecticut continued to refuse to send their contingents to the army; and the governor of the former state thus addressed the State Legislature in the beginning of the year: "If our conduct to both belligerants had been really impartial, all the calamities of war might have been avoided. We had assumed the character of a neutral nation; but had we not violated the duties imposed by that character? Had not every subject of complaint against one belligerant been amply displayed, and those against the other palliated or concealed? When France and England were engaged in an arduous struggle, and we interfered and assaulted one of them, will any man doubt our intention to assist the other?" At a subsequent period of the same year, the State of Massachusetts took still more decisive measures. Openly asserting their inherent rights to frame a new constitution, they resolved to "appoint delegates to confer with delegates from New-England on the subject of their grievances and common concerns, and to take measures, if they think proper, for procuring a convention of delegates from all the United States to revise the Constitution." These propositions were the more alarming, that the general discontent was much increased by the vast augmentation of the taxes, which were progressively swelled to the end of the year, and had already arisen to the most alarming amount. The direct taxes were advanced fifty *per cent.*; that on auctions was doubled, and many new imposts added, expected to produce eleven or twelve millions of dollars, or about £2,500,000. And with all these aids, so low had the credit and resources of the treasury fallen, that the government could not nego-

January 12.

Dec. 13.

* *Ante*, ii., 177.
† James, vi., 385, 387. Cooper, iv., 551, 554.
‡ Ann. Reg., 1813, 185. Armstrong, i., 271.

* Ann. Reg., 1814, 179, 181.

tiate a loan, and were driven to the necessity of issuing treasury notes to a large extent, which were to bear interest like English Exchequer bills, and supply the want of a circulating medium in the States.*

Preparations in Canada, and among the Indians.

The greatest exertions were made during the winter in Canada to augment the efficient military force of the provinces, and prepare, in the most vigorous manner, for the ensuing campaign. The Houses of Assembly warmly seconded the efforts of the British; thanks were unanimously voted Colonel de Salaberry and the other officers who had distinguished themselves during the preceding campaign; the imbodied or regular militia was augmented to four thousand men, besides the voltigeur and frontier corps, which numbered as many more; and considerable sums were voted by the chief towns to expedite the transmission of the troops.

March 15. In March, a solemn embassy from the Indians waited on the governor at Quebec, to supplicate the powerful protection of Great Britain in shielding them from the continual encroachments of the American States. "The Americans," said they, "are taking lands from us every day; they have no hearts, father; they have no pity for us; they want to drive us beyond the setting sun; but we hope, although we are few, and are here, as it were, upon a little island, our great and mighty father, who lives beyond the great lake, will not forsake us in our distress, but will continue to remember his faithful red children." They received the strongest assurance of protection and support, and were sent back to their wilds loaded with presents, determined to avenge their beloved chief Tecumseh, and prosecute the war with redoubled vigour.†

Storming of Fort Oswego, and failure at Sandy Creek. March 30.

No material movement occurred on either side on the Canadian frontier till the end of March, when the American general, Wilkinson, on the extreme right on Lake Champlain, collecting a large force from Plattsburg and Burlington, attacked the Canadian outposts at La Cole Mill; but he was repulsed with considerable loss, with very little injury to the British detachments. A more serious attempt was made, in Upper Canada, by Sir James Yeo and General Drummond, on Fort Oswego, situated on Lake Ontario. This fort was an important station, as it served as a resting-place and depôt in the transit of military stores from Sackett's Harbour, the grand arsenal on the lake, to its upper extremity in the neighbourhood of Niagara, where it was known the principal effort was to be made in the ensuing campaign. Three hundred seamen and marines were landed from

May 4. the flotilla, who carried the place in gallant style, destroyed the barracks, carried off the stores, and brought away the guns. At this time the British had a superiority on Lake Ontario, though the Americans were assiduously labouring to augment their force; and, accordingly, Sackett's Harbour was closely blockaded, and an attempt was made by Captain Popham,

May 31. who commanded the blockading squadron, to destroy the enemy's flotilla in Sandy Creek, which was conveying a considerable quantity of naval and military stores. This attempt, however, which was gallantly made with two hundred seamen and marines, was repulsed with the loss of seventy men, in consequence of the assailants being suddenly attacked by forces three times more numerous, consisting of riflemen, militia, and Indians, from the bloody tomahawks of the latter of whom the English prisoners were with difficulty rescued by their humane American enemies.*

Capture of Fort Erie, and battle of Chippewa, June 3.

The American forces destined for the invasion of Upper Canada were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Buffalo, Black Rock, and other places on the Niagara frontier; and two strong brigades crossed over, under General Ripley, containing about five thousand men, and not only effected a landing without opposition, but succeeded in making themselves masters of Fort Erie, with its garrison of a hundred and seventy men, without firing a shot. Having thus gained one stronghold on the British side, Ripley advanced confidently to the neighbourhood of Chippewa, and was making preparations to carry that place, when General Riall, June 5. who had collected about fifteen hundred regular troops, and a thousand militia and Indians, adopted the bold resolution, notwithstanding the enemy's great superiority of force, of hazarding an immediate attack. The action commenced at five o'clock in the afternoon, by the militia and Indians attacking the light infantry of the enemy: but the Kentucky Rifles fought stoutly; their marskmen dealt out death with no sparing hand among the trees; and it was only by the light companies of the Royal Scots and 100th that they were finally driven in. The main body, consisting of these regiments, the King's, and the militia, now advanced to the attack in column, the Americans receiving them in line, thus reversing the usual order of the British and French in the Peninsular campaigns. The result was the same as what had there so often occurred: the head of the British column was crushed by the discharges of the American line, which stood bravely, and fired with great precision; and though they succeeded in deploying with much steadiness, the loss sustained in doing so was so serious that General Riall was obliged to retreat, with the loss of 151 killed and 320 wounded. The American loss was 251. After this repulse, the British retired to their intrenched camp; but the Americans, now commanded by General Brown, having discovered a cross-road, which enabled them to threaten his communications, Riall fell back to Twenty-mile Creek, abandoning Queenstown, which was occupied by the enemy.†

Defeat of the Americans at Chippewa.

This well-fought action was the most considerable which had yet occurred during the war, and as it terminated unfavourably for the British, though with a great superiority of force on the part of the enemy, it demonstrated that increased experience and protracted hostilities were beginning to produce their ordinary effects in teaching a people naturally brave the art of war. Their triumph, however, was not of long duration. Brown advanced to the vicinity of Fort George, where, according to the plan of the campaign, he was to have met the flotilla: but as the June 15. British still had the superiority on Lake Ontario, he not only met there with none of the

* Ann. Reg., 1814, 178, 193. † Christie, 117, 122.

* Christie, 122, 129. Ann. Reg., 1814, 149, 150. Armstrong, ii., 63, 74.

† General Riall's Account, July 6, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, 200. App. to Chron. Christie, 128, 130. Armstrong, ii., 86, 89.

naval succour which he had expected, but found the English flotilla lying in the harbour, and their land-forces considerably augmented. The forts also, both of George and Niagara, were so strengthened as to leave no hope of a successful siege of them with the means at his disposal. Brown accordingly, after remaining a week in the neighbourhood of Fort George, commenced his retreat to Chippewa, which he reached on the evening of the 24th. General Riall immediately moved out of his intrenched camp in pursuit; and General Drummond having come up at the same time with re-enforcements from Kingston, an attack with the united body —in all about three thousand, of whom eighteen hundred were regulars—was made upon the enemy, whose force was about five thousand strong. The British guns, nine in number, happily seized a commanding eminence, which swept the whole field of battle. With great resolution, however, and highly elated with their recent success, the Americans advanced to the charge. The action began about six in the evening, and the whole line was soon warmly engaged, but the weight of the conflict fell upon the British centre and left. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts, the latter was forced back, and General Riall was severely wounded and made prisoner. In the centre, however, the 89th, Royals, and King's regiments, opposed a determined resistance; and the guns on the hill, which were worked with prodigious rapidity, occasioned so great loss to the attacking columns, that Brown soon saw that there was no chance of success till that battery was carried, and a desperate effort was resolved on to obtain the mastery of it.*

July 25.

Awful circumstances of the action.

The Americans, under General Miller, advanced with the utmost resolution, and with such vigour, that five of the British cannon at first fell into their hands. So desperate was the onset, so strenuous the resistance, that the British artillerymen were bayoneted by the enemy in the act of loading, and the muzzles of their guns were advanced to within a few yards of the English battery. This dreadful conflict, when, literally speaking, "Greek met Greek," continued till after dark, with alternate success, in the course of which the combatants fought hand to hand, by the light of the discharges of the guns, and the artillery on both sides was repeatedly taken and retaken. At length, after an hour's vehement struggle, the combatants sank to rest from pure mutual exhaustion, within a few yards of each other, and so intermingled that two of the American guns were finally mastered by the British, and one of the British by the Americans; so that, on the whole, one gun was gained for England in this unparalleled struggle with her worthy offspring. During this period of repose, the loud roar of the battle was succeeded by silence so profound that the dull roar of the Falls of Niagara, interrupted at intervals by the groans of the wounded, was distinctly heard. Over the scene of this desperate strife the moon threw an uncertain light, which yielded occasionally to the bright flashes of musketry or cannon, when the combat was partially renewed. Drummond skilfully took advantage of this respite to bring up the left wing, which had been repulsed, so as to form a support to the centre, while the line was prolonged to the right, where there was some danger of being outflanked; so that the bloodstained hill now formed the pivot of the British right. Upon this, the American general, being in no condition to continue the contest, gave orders for a retreat, which was carried into effect about midnight, the whole army retiring into their camp near Chippewa; and the next day the retreat was continued to Fort Erie with such precipitation that the whole baggage, provisions, and camp equipage were thrown into the rapids, and precipitated over the awful cataract of Niagara.*

Results of the battle.

In this desperate battle, the loss on both sides was very severe, but more so to the Americans than to the British. The former lost nine hundred and thirty killed and wounded, including in the latter Generals Brown and Scott; besides three hundred prisoners and one gun. The latter were only weakened by eight hundred and seventy men, of whom forty-two were made prisoners; among the latter were General Riall and his staff. But the result of the action was of the highest importance, as it entirely stopped the invasion of Upper Canada, and threw the Americans, late so confident of success, back into Fort Erie, where they were immediately besieged by a force little more than half their amount. The operations were pushed with great activity; three armed schooners, anchored off the fort, were captured by a body of marines who pushed off in boats during the night; and the defences were so much injured that Drummond determined to hazard an assault early on the morning of the 15th of August.†

Aug. 8.

Unsuccessful assault on Fort Erie.

This daring attempt to storm an intrenched camp resting on a fort, and garrisoned by three thousand five hundred men, with two thousand, had very nearly succeeded. The assailants were divided into three columns, and the first, under Colonel Fischer, had actually gained possession of the enemy's batteries, at the point assigned for its attack, two hours before daylight. If the other columns had reached their destined points of attack at the same time, the fort and intrenched camp would have been won, and the whole invading force made prisoners; but the supporting columns got entangled, by marching two near the lake, between the rocks and the water, and came up later, when the enemy were on the alert, who opened a tremendous fire upon the head of the column, which threw it into confusion. Meanwhile the other column succeeded, after a desperate resistance, in effecting a lodgment in the fort, by creeping in through the embrasures of a bastion, and had actually turned its guns for above an hour upon the enemy, when the stone building in the interior, which they still held, took fire, and a quantity of powder placed in it having caught the flames, the whole blew up, with an explosion so tremendous, that the troops, thinking a mine had been sprung, were seized with a sudden panic, and in spite of all the efforts of their officers, rushed in disorder out of the fort. The enemy now turned their whole forces upon Fischer's column, which was driven out of the works it had won, and the assault was repulsed at all points. In this gallant but abortive attempt, the

Aug. 15.

* General Drummond's Official Account, July 27, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, 204. App. to Chron Christie, 133, 134. Armstrong, ii., 93, 95.

† Christie, 134, 135. Armstrong, ii., 94, 95.

* General Drummond's Official Account, July 27, 1814, Ann. Reg. App. to Chron., 203. Christie, 132, 133. Armstrong, ii., 89, 91.

British lost 157 men killed, 308 wounded, and 186 prisoners. The loss, how heavy soever, was more than compensated next day by the arrival of two new regiments from Lower Canada; but notwithstanding this, General Drummond did not deem himself in sufficient strength to hazard a second assault, but contented himself with drawing closer the investment, and cooping the large American army up in a corner of the British territory, where they were rendered perfectly useless during the remainder of the campaign.*

Operations in Chesapeake Bay.

The operations of the British armament, on the southern coasts of America, had hitherto been on a small scale, calculated rather to irritate than alarm; but the termination of the war in Europe having rendered the whole navy and great part of the army of Great Britain disposable, it was resolved to prosecute hostilities there and in Canada with much vigour, and on a scale commensurate to the strength and reputation of the Empire. Three regiments of Wellington's army, the 4th, 44th, and 85th, were embarked at Bordeaux, on the 2d of June, on board the Royal Oak, seventy-four, and Dictator and Diadem of sixty-four guns each, and on the 24th arrived at Bermuda, where they were joined by the fusiliers, and three regiments from the Mediterranean in six frigates, forming altogether a force of three thousand five hundred men, which arrived in Chesapeake Bay in the middle of August. General Ross commanded the land-forces, Admiral Cockburn the fleet; and no two officers could have been found whose vigour, judgment, and daring were better calculated to effect great things with small means. Their first measure was to take possession of Tangier's Island, where they erected fortifications, built storehouses, and hoisted the British flag; inviting, at the same time, the negroes in the adjoining provinces to join the British force in the island, and offering them emancipation in the event of their doing so. Seventeen hundred speedily appeared, were enrolled and disciplined, and proved of no small service in subsequent operations. This incitement of the negro population to revolt was a step of very questionable morality in a political point of view, and it, in the end, cost the British no small sum as a compensation to the injured proprietors;† but it marked, in an unequivocal manner, the perilous foundation on which society in the southern provinces of the United States is rested, and the heedlessness of the people who, placed on the edge of such a volcano, urged on the war which might at once lead to its explosion.‡pp

June 2.

June 24.

The chief approach to Washington is by the River Potomac, which discharges itself into the upper extremity of the Bay of Chesapeake. It may also be reached by the Patuxent from the town of Benedict, on which river there is a good road to the metropolis. After much deliberation, it was determined by the British commander to make a dash at this capital, and to approach it by the latter river, partly on account of the greater facility of access which it afforded, partly in order to accomplish the destruction of Commodore Barney's powerful flotilla of gunboats, which had taken refuge in creeks in the upper parts of its course. The latter part of this service was speedily and effectually performed: the ships of war having ascended the stream as far as Benedict, beyond which there is not sufficient draught of water for large vessels, the boats of the fleet were despatched after the flotilla; and the Americans, finding escape impossible, committed it to the flames, which consumed in a few hours fifteen fine gunboats; another, which resisted the conflagration, was brought away, with thirteen merchant schooners which had sought protection under cover of the armed vessels. This brilliant stroke having at once destroyed the enemy's whole naval force in the river, it was determined immediately to make an attack on the capital. The troops were accordingly disembarked at Benedict, and, with the addition of some marines, amounted in all to three thousand five hundred combatants, with two hundred sailors to draw the guns; and with this handful of men, carrying with them two three-pounders and provisions for three days, the British general commenced his march against the capital of a republic which numbered eight millions of inhabitants, and boasted of having eight hundred thousand men in arms.*

Preparations for the attack on Washington.

Aug. 20.

Aug. 21.

The American government were far from being unprepared for this attack. From some hints imprudently dropped by the British commissioners who at this period were negotiating with those of America at Ghent, they had become aware that an attempt on the capital was in contemplation; and nearly a month before Ross landed in the Patuxent, measures had been taken for placing, in case of invasion, sixteen thousand six hundred men at the disposal of General Winder to cover the capital, while a requisition for the whole militia of Pennsylvania and Virginia, ninety-three thousand strong, was made and cheerfully answered. But the result soon showed what reliance is to be placed on the nominal paper-musters of such militia arrays when real danger is to be faced. Of the ninety-three thousand combatants of Pennsylvania and Virginia, nothing was heard when the day of trial approached; of the sixteen thousand active troops placed at the disposal of General Winder, not one half appeared at the place of muster; and when the British troops were within five miles of Washington, only six thousand five hundred bayonets, three hundred horse, and six hundred seamen to work the guns, were assembled round the standards of the American general. He had, however, twenty-six guns to the British two; and with this force, about double that of the British, he took post at BLADENSBERG, a small village on the left bank of the eastern branch of the Potomac, and commanding the only bridge by which that

Preparations for the defence of Washington.

July 18.

* General Drummond's Official Account, Aug. 15, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, 209. Christie, 132, 133. Armstrong, ii., 99, 100.

† James, vi., 304, 305. Brenton, ii., 521. Armstrong, ii., 124, 125. Ann. Reg., 1814, 183.

‡ By the treaty of Ghent, the compensation to be paid to the injured proprietors was referred to the Emperor of Russia; and that prince, influenced doubtless in some degree by the danger of a similar mode of hostility in his own dominions, awarded the enormous sum of £250,000, or nearly £150 a head for each negro that gained his freedom. —See Mr. ROBINSON'S *Speech, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 28th of February*, 1825, *Parl. Deb.*

pp XXXIX. This is a very exceptionable passage. Mr. Alison should have branded with his sternest condemnation the flagitious conduct of Admirals Cochrane and Cockburn, whose entire course of action, when on their freebooting expedition in the Chesapeake, indicated only the dispositions of West India bucaniers.

* Armstrong, ii., 125, 127. James, vi., 308, 309. Ann. Reg., 1814, 183, 184. General Ross's Official Account, Aug. 30, 1814. App. to Chron., 219.

river could be crossed. The great road ran straight through the centre of his position, and the artillery was placed so as to enfilade all the approaches to the bridge.*

Battle of Bladensberg. August 24.

Ross's decision was soon taken. Forming his troops into two columns, the one under the command of Colonel Thornton, the other of Colonel Brooke, he immediately gave orders for the attack. Thornton's men advanced in double-quick time, in the finest order, through the fire of the guns, dashed across the bridge, carried a fortified house at the other end, which was occupied and loopholed, and being quickly followed by the other division, spread out their sharp-shooters on either flank, and moved direct against the American batteries. So vigorous was the attack, so feeble the defence, that they were all carried, and the first line thrown back in confusion on the second by the first division alone, not more than fifteen hundred strong, aided by the fire of a few rockets, before the second could get across the bridge. Ten guns were taken, and the whole army, totally routed, took to flight, and reached Washington in the utmost confusion, where they tarried not an instant, but hurried through to the heights of Georgetown to the westward. Hardly any pursuit was attempted by the British, partly from having no cavalry, partly from the extraordinary heat of the day having so exhausted the troops, that even the stoutest men in the army were unable to proceed till it was somewhat abated by the approach of evening. Their loss was surprisingly small, being only sixty-one killed and a hundred and eighty-five wounded. After two hours' rest, however, the march was resumed, and the troops arrived within a mile of Washington at eight at night, where two thousand of them were halted, and the remainder accompanied General Ross and Admiral Cockburn into the city. A proposition was then made to the American authorities to ransom the public buildings, by paying a sum of money. This having been refused, the British general, on the following morning, applied the torch not only to the arsenals and storehouses, but to the public buildings of every description. In a few hours the Capitol, including the Senate House and House of Representatives, the arsenal, dockyard, treasury, war-office, President's palace, rope-walk, and the great bridge across the Potomac, were consumed. The navy-yard and arsenal, with immense magazines of powder, were set on fire by the Americans, and destroyed before they retired, and with them twenty thousand stand of arms were consumed. A fine frigate, of sixteen hundred tons, nearly finished, and a sloop, the Argus, of twenty guns, already afloat, were burned by them before evacuating the city. Immense stores of ammunition, two hundred and six pieces of cannon, and one hundred thousand rounds of ball cartridge, were taken by the British, and destroyed; and having completed the ruin of all the warlike establishments in the place, they leisurely retired on the evening of the 25th, and reached Benedict by easy marches on the 29th, where they embarked next day without being disquieted by the enemy.†

The capture of the American capital, notwithstanding all their preparations for above a month to avert the danger, by so inconsiderable a British force, and the immense importance of the blow thus struck at the naval and military resources of the enemy, render this expedition one of the most brilliant ever carried into execution by any nation. As such, it excited at the time a prodigious sensation in the United States; and it has hardly done less service to future times, and the cause of historic truth, by demonstrating in a decisive manner the extreme feebleness of the means for national protection which Democratic institutions afford, when not coerced by military or despotic power. Yet it is to be regretted that the lustre of the victory has been much tarnished to the British arms, by the unusual, and, in the circumstances, unwarrantable extension, which they made of the ravages of war to the *pacific* or ornamental edifices of the capital. The usages of war, alike in ancient and modern times, have usually saved from destruction, even in towns taken by storm, edifices which are dedicated to the purposes of religion or embellishment; the Parthenon, after having stood two thousand years, and been the prey alternately of the Goth, the crusader, and the Saracen, was still entire, when it was accidentally blown up by a bomb at the siege by the Venitians of the Acropolis in 1689; the majestic edifices of Rome were really wasted away, not by the torches of Alaric or Genseric, but the selfish cupidity of its unworthy inhabitants, who employed them in the construction of modern buildings. It is no small reproach to Napoleon, that he wantonly extended the ravages of war as well as the hand of the spoiler, into these hitherto untouched domains; and in the destruction of the bastions of Vienna, and the Kremlin of Moscow, gave proof at once of a little and malevolent spirit, unworthy of so great a man. The cruel devastation by the Americans on the Canadian frontier is no adequate excuse; they had been amply and rightly avenged by the flames of Buffalo and Black Rock; and Alexander had recently given proof of the noblest revenge for such outrages by saving Paris. It would appear, that as the contest between Great Britain and America resembled in more points than one a civil war, so it partook occasionally of the well-known inveterate character of that species of hostility; and the British historian, in recounting the transaction, will best discharge his duty by acknowledging the error of his country, and rejoice that it was in some degree redeemed by the strict discipline observed by the troops, and the complete protection afforded to the persons and property of the inhabitants during their occupation of the American capital.*

Reflections on this expedition.

* Ross's Official Account, Aug. 30, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, 219. App. to Chron. James, vi., 308. Armstrong, ii., 128, 130. British Camp. of Washington, 96, 102.

† General Ross's Account, August 30, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, 219. App. to Chron. James, vi., 310, 311. Armstrong, ii., 130, 131. Camp. of Washington, 117, 129.

* "The British officers pay inviolable respect to private property, and no peaceable citizen is molested."—*National Intelligencer*, 25th August 1814, quoted in JAMES, vi., 311. "The value of the public property destroyed was 1,624,280 dollars, or £365,463 sterling."—*Ibid.*

It is but justice to the gallant officers employed in this expedition to observe, not only that they are noways responsible for the destruction of the public buildings of Washington, as they acted under distinct orders from their own government, but that they deserve the highest credit for carrying those barbarous instructions into execution in the most forbearing and considerate manner, confining the destruction to *public* edifices, and observing the strictest discipline in relation to private life and property. On the 14th of August, 1814, Admiral Cochrane officially announced to Mr. Monroe, "that, under the *new and imperative* character of his orders, it became his duty to destroy and lay waste all towns and districts of the United States found accessible to the attack of British armaments." What a contrast to

Capture of Fort Washington and Alexandria.

The capture of Washington was immediately succeeded by an exploit of inferior magnitude, but equally vigorous and successful, in the Potomac River. Captain Gordon, in the Seahorse frigate, with the Euryalis brig, and several bomb vessels, skilfully overcame the intricacies of the passage leading by that river to the metropolis, and on the evening of the 27th arrived abreast of Fort Washington, constructed to command the river, as Fort Lillo does the Scheldt. It was immediately bombarded; and the powder magazine having soon after exploded, the place was abandoned, and taken possession of, with all its guns, by the British. From thence they proceeded to Alexandria, and the bomb vessels having assumed such a position as effectually commanded the shipping, the enemy were compelled to capitulate, and give up all their vessels, two-and-twenty in number, including several armed schooners, which were brought away in triumph. On returning down the river, heavily laden with their numerous prizes, the British squadron had a very serious danger to encounter from some American batteries which had been erected to cut off their retreat, and which were manned by the crews of the Baltimore flotilla: but such was the skill with which the vessels were navigated, that none went aground, and the shells from the bombs were thrown with such precision, that the Americans were driven from their guns, and the whole squadron emerged safely with its prizes from the Potomac.*

Aug. 27.

Sept. 5.

The successful issue of these attacks naturally suggested a similar expedition against Baltimore; and, after some deliberation, the British naval and military commanders agreed to undertake it. The fleet, accordingly, moved in that direction, and reached the mouth of the Patapsco, which leads to Baltimore, on the 11th of September. Next day the troops were landed, and marched directly towards the city, while the ships moved up to co-operate in the attack that was contemplated. No opposition was attempted for the first six miles, though several intrenchments, newly thrown up, were passed, which had been abandoned; but when they approached Baltimore, a detachment of light troops was observed occupying a thick wood through which the road passed. General Ross, impelled by the daring courage by which he was distinguished, immediately advanced with the skirmishers to the front, and soon received a mortal wound in the breast. He survived only to recommend his young and unprovided family to his king and country. Colonel Brooke, however, immediately assumed the command; and the light troops coming up, the enemy fell back, still skirmishing from behind the trees, with which the country abounded, to a fortified position, running across a narrow neck of land which separated the Patapsco and Back Rivers. Six thousand infantry, with four hundred horse and six guns, were here drawn up in a line across the road, with either flank placed in a thick wood, and a strong wooden paling covering their front. Brooke, however, gave orders for an immediate attack; and it was made with such vigour, that in less than fifteen minutes the enemy were routed, and fled in every direction, leaving six hundred killed and wounded on the field of battle, besides three hundred prisoners and two guns in the hands of the British. Early on the following morning the march was resumed, and Brooke arrived within a mile and a half of Baltimore, where he found a body of fifteen thousand men, with a large train of artillery, manned by the sailors of the frigates lying at Baltimore, strongly posted on a series of fortified heights which encircle the town. The magnitude of this force rendered it imprudent to hazard an immediate attack with three thousand bayonets; but Brooke, relying on the admirable spirit of his troops, determined on a night assault, when the enemy's artillery would be of little avail, and the whole dispositions were made for that purpose. At nightfall, however, and when the troops were just taking up their ground for the attack, advices were received from Admiral Cochrane, stating that the enemy, by sinking twenty vessels in the river, had prevented all farther access to the ships, and rendered naval co-operation impossible. Brooke, in these circumstances, wisely judged that the loss likely to be incurred in storming the intrenchments would more than counterbalance the prospect of advantage from the reduction of the town, and withdrew, without molestation, to his ships. The commanders of the Severn, Euryalus, Havannah, and Hebrus frigates had offered to lighten their ships, and lay them alongside of Fort M'Henry, which commanded the passage, and the possession of which would have left Baltimore at their mercy; and it is to be regretted that any view to ulterior operations should have led to this offer not being accepted, as it probably would have led to the destruction of the Java frigate, and Erie and Ontario brigs, which lay at Baltimore; and have prevented the land-troops from being deprived of the fruit of their gallant victory.*

Sept. 11.

Sept. 12.

Sept. 13.

A naval expedition, crowned with complete success, took place at this time under Sir John Sherbrooke and Admiral Griffith, in the Penobscot River. They sailed from Halifax on the 1st of September, and on their approach, the Fort of Custine, which commands the entrance of the river, was evacuated by the enemy and blown up. An American frigate, the John Adams, having run up the river for safety, as high as the town of Hampden, where her guns were taken out and placed in battery, a detachment of sailors and marines was landed from the ships, which attacked and stormed the batteries, manned by double their force, upon which the frigate was set on fire, and totally destroyed. The expedition then pushed on to Bangor, which surrendered without resistance, with twenty-two guns; and hence to Machias, which also surrendered by capitulation, the whole militia of the county of Washington being put on their parole not to serve again during the war. Formal possession was then taken of the whole country between the Penobscot and the British frontier of New-Brunswick, a district a hundred miles broad, and a provisional government established, to rule it till the conclusion of the

Lesser accessions on the coast.

Sept. 3.

Sept. 5.

the glorious, and, withal, politic forbearance of Wellington in the south of France! And both had their reward—Wellington, in the capture of Toulouse and surrender of Bordeaux; the "new and imperative system," in the failure at Baltimore and defeat at New-Orleans.—See ARMSTRONG, ii., 155.

* James, vi., 313, 315. Armstrong, ii., 131, 134. Brenton, ii., 522.

* James, vi., 320, 321. Colonel Brooke's Official Account, Sept. 17, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, 229. App. to Chron. Armstrong, ii., 134, 135. Admiral Cochrane's Official Account, Sept. 15, 237.

war. This success was not only important in itself, but still more so, as giving practical demonstration of the dispositions of the inhabitants of that part of the State of Maine, and evincing the ease with which, in the event of the continuance of hostilities, it might be severed from the United States.*

Sir George Prevost's expedition against Plattsburg.

Meanwhile, a great expedition was preparing in Lower Canada, intended to co-operate with that of Sherbrooke and Griffith on the coast. Prevost's force had been progressively augmented by the successive arrival of brigades, detached, after the close of hostilities, from the army in the south of France; so that, in the end of August, he had in all sixteen thousand regular troops in the two Canadas under his command, of whom twelve thousand were in the lower province. A force so considerable not only removed all danger of successful invasion from the American forces, but rendered feasible a serious inroad upon the adjoining provinces of Maine and New-York from those of the British. Such an attempt was also advisable in itself, in order to make the enemy feel, in their own territory, the weight of that power whose hostility they had so needlessly provoked. A body of eleven thousand men, accordingly, was collected on the frontier of Lower Canada, with a formidable train of artillery, and commanned, under Prevost, by several generals and officers who had acquired durable renown in the Peninsular campaigns. If anything could have added to the well-founded expectations entertained of this noble force, it was the circumstance of its being in great part composed of the veterans who had served with Wellington in Spain and France, and the remainder of the not less heroic band which had so gloriously struggled against overwhelming superiority of numbers in the two preceding campaigns, and who burned with anxiety to emulate the deeds of their brethren who had gained their laurels in the fields of European fame. But, unfortunately, the naval part of the expedition, upon which, as in all Canadian warfare, the success of the land-forces in a great measure depended, was by no means equally well provided. By a strange remissness on the part both of the British Admiralty and the local authorities, the flotilla on Lake Champlain, though consisting of a frigate, a brig, and twelve gunboats, was wretchedly equipped, and the crews, not a fifth part of whom were British sailors, were made up of a strange medley of English soldiers and Canadian militia.†

Success of the expedition in the outset.

The first operations of the armament were attended with complete success. The American general, Izzard, had sailed from Sackett's Harbour, on Lake Ontario, towards the upper part of the lake, with four thousand men, on the 10th of August, to reenforce the troops in Fort Erie; so that the only forces which remained to resist Prevost on the banks of Lake Champlain were fifteen hundred regulars and as many militia, under General Macomb. Prevost's advance, accordingly, met with no interruption; and on the 6th his powerful army appeared before Plattsburg, then defended by three redoubts and two blockhouses, strongly fortified. So inconsiderable had been the resistance made by the Americans to the British advance, that General Macomb says the latter "did not deign to fire upon them." The three following days were employed in bringing up the heavy artillery, and it had all arrived by the 10th; but still the English general did not deem it expedient to make the attack till the flotilla came up; and so backward was the state of its preparations, that it only hove in sight on the morning of the 11th; and the shipwrights, as she moved through the water, were still busy at work on the hull of the Confiance, which bore the British commodore's flag.*

The relative strength of the squadrons on this, as in every other naval action during the war where the British were defeated, was decisively in favour of the Americans;† but this disparity, already great in the number of vessels and men, and weight of metal, was rendered overwhelming by the wretched condition of the British crews, not a fourth of whom were sailors, and the unfinished state of the commodore's vessel. Sir George Prevost's solicitations, however, were so pressing for the squadron to advance, that on the 11th, while the clank of the builders' hammers was still heard on board the Confiance, Captain Downie gave the signal to weigh anchor. He relied upon the assurance given, that the troops should commence an assault on the redoubts at the same time that the squadron attacked the flotilla in the bay, and it was not doubted that the early capture of the forts, by depriving the enemy's ships of the support of their batteries, would lead to their defeat, and the final decision of the naval contest on the lake. The moment, accordingly, that the Confiance, which led the British flotilla, rounded Cumberland head at a quarter to eight, Downie scaled his guns, as had been agreed on; but, instead of answering the signal by an order to prepare for action, Prevost ordered his men to cook their breakfasts—a judicious step in general before a battle, but unfortunate in this instance, as it postponed the military co-operation till it was too late. Meanwhile, Downie gallantly led his little squadron into action; the American fleet, under its brave and skilful commander, Captain M'Donough, being moored in line in the bay, the Saratoga of twenty-six guns, bearing his flag, in the centre, and the brigs Eagle of twenty guns, Ticonderoga of seventeen guns, and Pride of seven guns, and ten gunboats, lying on either flank.‡

Commencement of the action between the two squadrons.

As the Confiance mounted thirty-seven guns, she was greatly superior to any single vessel in the American flotilla; and if the British gunboats had all followed the example set them by their commander, the combat might, notwithstanding the Americans' great superiority on the whole, have been not altogether unequal.

* Ann. Register, 1814, 198, 199. Armstrong, ii., 139. James, vi., 329, 331.

† James, vi., 339. Armstrong, ii., 110, 111. Ann. Reg., 1814, 190. Christie, 140. Brenton, ii., 525.

* Prevost's Official Account, Sept. 11, 1814, Ann. Reg., 213. App. to Chron. James, vi., 341. Armstrong, ii., 111, 112. Christie, 140, 141. Cooper, ii., 489.

† Comparative force of the combatants:

	British squadron.	American.
Vessels*	8	14
Broadside guns	38	52
Weight of metal, lbs.	765	1194
Aggregate of crews	537	950
Tons	1426	2540

—James, vi., 346; and Cooper, ii., 495, 497.

‡ Cooper, ii., 495, 496. James, ii., 341, 342. Christie, 141, 142. Captain Pring's Account, Sept. 1, 1814, Ann. Reg., 215. App. to Chron.

* The Finch, a British brig, grounded out of shot, and did not engage; and five of the gunboats disappeared and never fired a shot, so these vessels are excluded from the comparison, as are the two American sloops which were not engaged.

But while the Confiance was gallantly leading into action, amid a tremendous fire from the American line, the whole gunboats, except three, and one of the cutters, took to flight, leaving Downie in the midst of the hostile fleet, with his own frigate, brig, and sloop wholly unsupported either by the land-forces or his own smaller vessels. Undaunted, however, by this shameful defection, the British commander held steadily on without returning a shot, while his rigging and spars were fast falling under the well-directed fire of the American fleet; but the wind failing just as he was on the point of breaking their line, he was under the necessity of casting anchor within two cables' distance, and bringing his broadside to bear on the enemy. Instantly the Confiance appeared a sheet of fire; all her guns were discharged at once, aimed at the Saratoga, which bore Captain M'Donough's flag; and such was the effect of the broadside, that nearly half the crew of the American vessel were struck down, and the accumulation of dead on her deck was so great that it became necessary to remove the fastenings and pass them below. The Linnet and Chubb now came up, and took up their appointed stations; but in a short time the latter was so crippled that she became unmanageable, drifted within the American line, and was obliged to surrender, while the Finch struck on a reef of rocks, and could not get into action.*

Total defeat of the British squadron.

The whole guns of the American flotilla were now directed against the Confiance, which, enveloped by enemies, still maintained a gallant fight; broadside after broadside came from her, until at length the Saratoga, against which her fire was almost entirely directed, had all her long guns dismounted, and her carronades so disabled that she had not a single available piece of ordnance left. Nothing was now wanting but one or two of the gunboats to have given the British a decisive victory. But they had all fled; the Confiance herself was suffering severely from the concentric fire of the brigs and gunboats which clustered round her in every direction, some raking, some astern, as well as under her bows, and Captain Downie had fallen early in the action; while her antagonist, the Saratoga, which she had completely silenced, lay at such a distance that she could not be taken possession of. So destructive, however, was the fire which the Confiance still kept up, that the Saratoga was on the point of surrendering, when, as a last resource, M'Donough made an effort to wind the ship round, so as to bring her larboard side, hitherto untouched, to bear upon the British vessel. This skilful movement was successfully performed; the Confiance strove to do the same, but, from the inexperience of her motley crew, the attempt failed, and the larboard guns of the Saratoga, almost all untouched, now spoke out like giants, and soon compelled the Confiance to strike. The only remaining British vessel was now the Linnet; and against her the whole guns of the American squadron were immediately directed, and after a quarter of an hour's heroic resistance, she too was compelled to surrender. Captain M'Donough, on receiving the sword of Lieutenant Robertson, who commanded the Confiance after Downie had fallen, said, with the magnanimity which is ever the accompaniment of true valour, "You owe it, sir, to the shameful conduct of your gunboats and cutters that you are not performing this office to me; for, had they done their duty, you must have perceived, from the situation of the Saratoga, that I could hold out no longer; and, indeed, nothing induced me to keep up her colours but my seeing, from the united fire of all the rest of my squadron on the Confiance, and her unsupported situation, that she must ultimately surrender."*†

Retreat of Sir George Prevost.

While this desperate battle was raging on the lake, the greater part of the army ashore, agreeably to Prevost's orders, continued inactive, though the guns of the batteries opened on the American squadron as soon as the firing commenced, but too far off to have any effect. At length the signal to attack was given, and one column, under General Robinson, advanced to ford the Saranac, and attack the works in front, while another column, led by General Brisbane, was to make a circuit, and assault them in rear. Robinson's troops, however, were led astray by their guides, and did not reach the point of attack till the shouts from the American works announced that the fleet had surrendered. To have carried the works when the troops did get up would have been a matter of ease, and would have formed a set-off, at least, to the naval disaster; but Sir George Prevost being of opinion that, after the command of the lake was lost, no farther advance into the American territory was practicable, and, consequently, that the men lost in storming the redoubts would prove an unavailing sacrifice, gave the signal to draw off, and soon after commenced his retreat. Such was the indignation which this order excited among the British officers, inured in Spain to a long course of victory, that several of them broke their swords, declaring they could never serve again; and the army, in mournful submission, leisurely wound its way back to the Canadian frontier, without being disquieted by the enemy.‡

Reflections on this expedition.

The actual casualties in this ill-fated expedition were under two hundred men, though four hundred were lost by desertion during the depression and facilities of the retreat. But the murmurs of the troops and of the people of Canada were loud and long at such a termination of the operations of an armament composed, so far as the military force was concerned, of such materials, and from which so much had been expected; and the result was, that Sir George Prevost resigned, and demanded a court-martial. He was accused, accordingly, at the instance of Sir James Yeo, upon the charges of having unduly hurried the squadron on the lake into action, at a time when the Confiance was as yet unprepared for it; and, when the combat did begin, having neglected to storm the batteries, as had been agreed on, so as to have occasioned the destruction of the flotilla and the failure of the expedition.

* James, vi., 344, 345. Cooper, ii., 504, 505. Christie, 142, 143. Captain Pring's Official Account, Sept. 12, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, 215.

* Cooper, ii., 505, 507. James, vi., 341, 345. Captain Pring's Official Account, Ann. Reg., 1814, 215, 217. Christie, 143.

† In this desperate conflict, the Confiance had forty-one killed, including the lamented Captain Downie, and sixty wounded; the total loss of the British squadron was fifty-seven killed and ninety-two wounded: the Americans lost on board the Saratoga, twenty-eight killed and twenty-nine wounded; their total loss was fifty-two killed and fifty-nine wounded.—JAMES, vi., 346; and COOPER, ii., 507, 508.

‡ Sir George Prevost's Official Account, Sept. 2, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, 214. App. to Chron. James, vi., 348. Christie, 144, 145. Armstrong, ii., 112, 113.

The death of that ill-fated commander before the court-martial commenced, prevented these charges from being judicially investigated; but historic truth compels the expression of an opinion that, though proceeding from a laudable motive—the desire of preventing a needless effusion of human blood—the measures of Sir George Prevost were ill-judged and calamitous. His personal courage was undoubted; his character amiable in the highest degree; the mildness and conciliatory spirit of his government had justly endeared him to the Canadians; and the prudence and judgment which he had evinced, in struggling successfully with very scanty means against the formidable invasion of 1813, had gained for him general applause. From an equitable sense of these important services, the prince regent, after Sir George Prevost's death, publicly expressed his high sense of his conduct, and, in testimony of it, conferred additional armorial bearings on his family. Even in the campaign of 1813, however, it had become evident that his moral resolution was not equal to his personal courage; and the failure to prosecute his advantages at Sackett's Harbour had evinced a character little qualified for the actual direction of warlike operations.* The same defects appeared still more clearly on occasion of the attack on Plattsburg; and with every possible wish to extenuate the failing of a public servant, whom grief, perhaps, brought to an untimely grave, it is necessary to point out the disastrous effects of such ill-judged economy, even of human blood, on the future fortunes of his country. By delaying, and finally countermanding the attack on the American redoubts, at the same time that he urged the flotilla into action, he at once contributed to the naval disaster, and prevented a military triumph which would have counterbalanced it; and the saving of two or three hundred lives on that occasion has, in its ultimate effects, perhaps, bequeathed to his country a disastrous future war, in which two or three hundred thousand will be sacrificed.†

Sortie from Fort Erie, and its evacuation by the Americans. Sept. 17.

The British were, in some degree, consoled for this discomfiture by the repulse of a very formidable sortie made from Fort Erie. In the outset, the Americans gained considerable advantages, and having succeeded, during a thick mist and heavy rain, in turning, unperceived, the right of the British pickets, they made themselves masters of two batteries, and did great damage to the British works. Speedily, however, the besiegers collected their troops, and the enemy were driven back to their works with great slaughter. The loss on each side was about equal: that of the British being six hundred, of whom one half were prisoners; that of the Americans five hundred and eleven. Both parties after this became weary of this destructive warfare, carried on in a corner of Upper Canada, and attended with no sensible influence on the fate of the campaign.

Sept. 21. On the 21st, as the low grounds around Fort Erie had become unhealthy, Drummond retired to higher and better quarters in the neighbourhood of Chippewa, after in vain endeavouring to provoke the American general to accept battle; and soon after, General Izzard,

Nov. 5. who had come up from Sackett's Harbour to Fort Erie, with four thousand additional troops, so far from prosecuting the advantages which so considerable an accumulation of force at that point promised, blew up Fort Erie, recrossed the Niagara, and withdrew with his whole troops into the American territory. "Thus," says Armstrong, the American war secretary, "literally fulfilling his own prediction, that the expedition would terminate in disappointment and disgrace."*

The British acquire the superiority on Lake Ontario.

This total evacuation of the British territory, after so much bloodshed, and such formidable preparations of the Americans for its conquest, was mainly owing to the British having at length acquired a decisive superiority on Lake Ontario. During some months in autumn, Commodore Chauncey had the advantage both in the number and weight of his vessels; and while Sir James Yeo was taking the most active measures to turn the balance the other way, he had the virtue—for to a British seaman it was a virtue—of meantime submitting to be blockaded in Kingston by the American squadron. At length the St. Lawrence, a noble three-decker of 100 guns, was launched: Chauncey instantly withdrew, and was blockaded in his turn in Sackett's Harbour, and the British acquired an entire command of the lake for the remainder of the war. Sir James Yeo immediately availed himself of this advantage to convey a large quantity of stores and considerable re-enforcements of troops to the upper end of the lake, and preparations were making for an active campaign in the ensuing year on both sides, the Americans having laid down two line-of-battle ships, and the British two frigates, on the stocks, when hostilities were terminated by the conclusion of peace between the two countries.†

Oct. 10.

Oct. 16.

Expedition against New-Orleans.

To conclude this history of the American war, it only remains to notice the attack on New-Orleans, which terminated in so calamitous a manner to the British arms. This rising town, which then numbered seventeen thousand inhabitants, was not a place of warlike preparations; but it was the great emporium of the cotton trade of the Southern States, and it was supposed, not without reason, that the capture of a city which commanded the whole navigation of the Mississippi would prove the most sensible blow to the resources of the American government, as well as furnish a rich booty to the captors. The expedition, accordingly, which had been baffled at Baltimore, was sent in this direction, and it was the dread of crippling it for this important stroke which paralyzed its efforts on the former occasion. The troops and squadron arrived off the shoals of the Mississippi on the 8th of December; but there they found a flotilla of gunboats prepared to dispute with the boats of the fleet the landing of the troops. Immediately a detachment of seamen and marines was put under the command of Captain Lockyer, and, after a hard chase of six-and-thirty hours, he succeeded in coming up with and destroying the whole, six in number, manned by two hundred and forty men. This pursuit, however, had taken the boats thirty miles from their ships; adverse winds, a tempestuous sea, and intricate shoals impeded their return; and it was not till the 12th that they could get back, nor till the 15th that the landing of the troops

Dec. 8.

Dec. 15.

* *Ante*, iv., 464. † See Christie's Postscript, 150.

* Armstrong, ii., 100, 108. De Watteville's Official Account, Sept. 17, 1814, Ann. Reg., 1814, 259, 260. Christie, 146, 147. † Cooper, ii., 486, 490. Christie, 149.

commenced. Incredible difficulties were undergone, both by the soldiers and sailors, in effecting the disembarcation and conducting the march at that inclement season; and, what is very remarkable in that latitude, nothing retarded them more than the excessive cold, from which the troops, and in particular the blacks, suffered most severely. At length, however, by the united and indefatigable efforts of both services, these obstacles were overcome; the troops, Dec. 23. in number about four thousand five hundred combatants, and a considerable quantity of heavy guns and stores, were landed; an attack of the American militia was repulsed with ease the same evening; Sir Edward Pakenham arrived next day, and the army advanced in two columns to within six miles of New-Orleans, where preparations for defence had been made.*

Description of the American position, and preparatory movements.

GENERAL JACKSON, an officer since become celebrated both in the military and political history of his country, commanded a military force destined for the defence of the city, which amounted to above twelve thousand men. He had turned to good account the long delays which the formidable obstacles that opposed the disembarcation of the British troops had occasioned, and the fortified position in which he now awaited an attack was all but impregnable. The American army was posted behind an intrenchment about a thousand yards long, stretching from the Mississippi on the right to a dense and impassable wood on the left. This line was strengthened by a ditch about four feet deep, which ran along its front, and was defended by flank bastions which enfiladed its whole extent, and on which a formidable array of heavy cannon was placed. On the opposite bank of the Mississippi, which is there about eight hundred yards across, a battery of twenty guns was erected, which also flanked the whole front of the parapet. Some attempts were made, for some days, to commence regular approaches against this formidable line of intrenchments, which was evidently much too strong to be carried by a *coup de main*; but it was soon found that the enemy's guns were so superior in weight and numbers, that nothing was to be expected from that species of attack. All hands were therefore set to deepen a canal in the rear of the British position, by which boats might be brought up to the Mississippi, and troops ferried across to carry the battery on the right bank of the river; but this proved a work Jan. 6. of such extraordinary labour, that it was not till the evening of the 6th of January that the cut was declared passable. The boats were immediately brought up and secreted near the river, wholly unknown to the enemy, and dispositions for an assault made at five o'clock on the morning of the 8th. Colonel Thornton, with fourteen hundred men, was to cross the river in the night, storm the battery, and advance up the right bank till he came abreast of New-Orleans; while the main attack on the intrenchments in front was to be made in two columns, the first under the command of General Gibbs, the second led by General Keane. Including seamen and marines, about six thousand combatants on the British side were in the field: a slender force to attack double their number, intrenched to the teeth in works bristling with bayonets, and loaded with heavy artillery.*

Dreadful slaughter, and repulse of the British.

Unexpected delays, principally owing to the rapid falling of the river, hindered the boats, fifty in number, which were to convey Thornton's men across, from reaching their destination at the appointed hour; and this, by preventing the attacks on the opposite banks being simultaneous, had a most prejudicial effect upon the issue of the operations. The patience of Pakenham being at length exhausted, the assault on the left bank was ordered, even before it was known whether the troops had been got across, and Gibbs's column advanced to the works. By this time, however, the wintry dawn had begun to break, and the dark mass was discerned from the American batteries moving over the plain. Instantly a tremendous fire of grape and round shot was opened on both sides from the bastions upon it; but, nevertheless, the column, consisting of the 4th, 21st, and 44th, moved steadily forward, and reached the edge of the glacis. There, however, it was found that, through some neglect on the part of the commander of the 44th regiment, the scaling-ladders and fascines had been forgotten, so that it was impossible to mount the parapet. This necessarily occasioned a stoppage at the foot of the works, just under the enemy's guns, while the ladders were sent for in all possible haste; but the fire was soon so terrible, that the head of the column, riddled through and through, fell back in disorder. Pakenham, whose buoyant courage ever led him to the scene of danger, thinking they were now fairly in for it, and must go on, rode to the front, rallied the troops again, led them to the slope of the glacis, and was in the act, with his hat off, of cheering on his followers, when he fell, mortally wounded, pierced at the same moment by two balls. General Gibbs also was soon struck down; Keane, who led on the reserve, headed by the 93d, shared the same fate; but that noble regiment, composed entirely of Sutherland Highlanders, a thousand strong, instead of being daunted by the carnage, rushed on with frantic valour through the throng, and with such fury pressed the leading files on, that, without either fascines or ladders, they fairly found their way, by mounting on each other's shoulders, into the work. So close and deadly, however, was the fire of the riflemen when they got in, that the successful assailants were cut off to a man. At the same time, Colonel Ranney on the left also penetrated into the intrenchments; but the companies which carried them, not being supported, were mowed down by grapeshot, as at Bergen-op-Zoom. Finally, General Lambert, upon whom the command had now devolved, from the death of Pakenham and the wounds of Gibbs and Keane, finding that to carry the works was impossible, and that the slaughter was tremendous, drew off his troops, who by this time had been thrown into great confusion.†

While this sanguinary repulse, which cost the British two thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners, was taking place on the left bank of the Mississippi, Colonel Thornton, with his division, had gained the most decisive success

* Breton, ii., 531, 533. James, vi., 357, 359. Ann. Reg., 1814, 122, 123. Armstrong, ii., 159, 165.

* General Lambert's Official Account, January 10, 1815, Ann. Reg., 1815, 141, 142. App. to Chron. Breton, ii., 533. British Camp. in New-Orleans, 147, 161. Armstrong, ii., 167, 170.

† Lambert's Official Account, Jan. 10, 1815, 142, 143, Ann. Reg. App. to Chron. James's Military Occurrences, ii., 355. Armstrong, ii., 170, 171.

Success of Thornton on the other bank, but which leads to nothing.

on the right. This able officer, with his fourteen hundred men, had repaired to the point assigned to him on the evening of the 7th, but found the boats not yet arrived; and it was not till near midnight that a number, barely sufficient to transport a third part of his troops across, were brought up. Deeming it, however, of essential importance to co-operate at the appointed time in the proposed attack, he moved over with a third of his men, and by a sudden charge, at the head of part of the 85th and a body of seamen, headed by himself, on the flank of the works, succeeded in making himself master of the redoubt with very little loss, though defended by twenty-two guns and seventeen hundred men, and amply stored with supplies of all sorts. He was just preparing, when the daylight broke, to turn these guns on the enemy's flank, which lay entirely exposed to their fire, when advices were received from General Lambert of the defeat of the attack on the left bank of the river. Colonel Dickson was sent over to examine the situation of the battery which had been won, and report whether it was tenable; but he did not deem it defensible but with a larger force than Lambert could dispose of for that purpose, and, therefore, this detachment was withdrawn back to the left bank of the river, and the troops at all points returned to their camp.*

Re-embarcation of the troops, and capture of Fort Boyer, near Mobile.

The British troops, after this bloody defeat, were in a very critical position, far advanced into the enemy's country, with a victorious army, double their own strength, in their front, and a desert country, fourteen miles broad, to traverse in their rear, before they reached their ships. Lambert, not deeming himself in sufficient strength to renew the attack, retreated on the night of the 18th, and effected the movement with such ability, that the whole field artillery, ammunition, and stores of every description were brought away, excepting eight heavy guns, which were destroyed. The whole wounded also were removed, except eighty of the worst cases, with whom movement would have been dangerous, who were left to the humanity of the enemy: a duty which General Jackson discharged with a zeal and attention worthy of the ability and gallantry he had displayed in the action. The British troops were safely re-embarked on the 27th, and soon after in some degree consoled for their disasters by the capture of Fort Boyer, near Mobile, commanding one of the mouths of the Mississippi, which yielded, with its garrison of three hundred and sixty men and twenty-two guns, to a combined attack of the land and sea forces on the 12th of February. On the very next day intelligence was received of the conclusion of peace between the United States and Great Britain at Ghent.†

Feb. 12.

Conclusion of peace at Ghent.

Conferences had for some time been going on at that city in the Netherlands, between the British and American commissioners; and as the termination of the Continental war had entirely set at rest, at least for the present, the question of neutral flags, and the United States were in no condition to sustain a war singly with Great Britain, for the mere assertion of sailors' privileges against the right of search to apprehend deserters, there was no difficulty in coming to an accommodation. Accordingly, on the 24th of December a treaty was concluded at Ghent, on terms highly honourable to Great Britain.qq A general restitution of conquests and acquisitions on both sides was stipulated, with the exception of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, which were to remain, as to possession, *in statu quo* until the decision of the commissioners appointed by the two governments, and in the event of their differing in opinion, the decision of some friendly sovereign, whose judgment was to be final. The more important point of the boundary between the American state of Maine and the British province of New-Brunswick, which has since become the subject of such angry contention, both between the governments and inhabitants of the two countries, was in like manner referred to two commissioners, one to be appointed by each party; and failing their decision, or in the event of their differing in opinion, to the decision of "some friendly sovereign or state, whose judgment shall be final and conclusive."* A similar provision was made for the ascertainment of the disputed boundary, through the Lakes Ontario, Erie, Superior, and the Lake of the Woods. All hostilities with the Indian tribes were forthwith to cease on the part of both the contracting parties; and it was farther provided, "that, whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both his majesty and the United States

Dec. 24, 1814.

* Thornton's Official Account, Ann. Reg., 147. App. to Chron. for 1815. James's Military Occurrences, ii., 356, 361.

† General Lambert's Official Account, Feb. 14, 1815, Ann. Reg., 1815, 159, 161. App. to Chron., and Jan. 28, 1815; Ibid., 149. James's Military Occurrences, ii., 364, 371. Armstrong, ii., 174.

qq XL. It is difficult to perceive how this treaty was so highly honourable to Great Britain, especially when we recollect the lofty pretensions of the British negotiators at first, from which they afterward receded. Mr. Alison himself thus writes concerning it in the next paragraph: "The great questions at issue in the war were rather adjourned than decided, and the treaty itself is to be regarded rather as a long truce than a final pacification."

The treaty of Ghent was acceptable to the American people, because the general peace in Europe had terminated, for the time, the impressment of our seamen and paper blockades, the two causes which had forced them into the war. As the European pacification promised to be durable, it would have been unwise on the part of America to continue the war in order to secure by treaty stipulations rights in no immediate danger of violation, and which were already secure, so far, at least, as depended upon the laws of nations.

With respect to the British people, a large portion of them were desirous of peace with America, although multitudes were not satisfied with the terms on which it was concluded. The treaty was loudly denounced, as it was thought that nothing but the probability of a new war in Europe could have made the British government consent to such terms.

* "Whereas neither that part of the highlands lying due north from the source of the River St. Croix, designated in the former treaty of peace between the two powers as the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, nor the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut River, have yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary-line between the dominions of the two powers which extends from the source of the River St. Croix directly north to the above-mentioned northwest angle of Nova Scotia; thence along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the River St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River; thence down along the middle of that river, to the 45th degree of north latitude; thence by a line due west on said latitude till it strikes the River Iroquois or Cataraguy, has not yet been surveyed—it is agreed that, for these several purposes, two commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, and authorized to examine and decide upon the said claims, according to such evidence as shall be laid before them by his Britannic majesty and the United States respectively; and in the event of their differing, both parties agree to abide by the decision of such friendly sovereign or state as shall be mutually chosen."—See *Ann. Reg.*, 1815, 354; *State Papers*.

are desirous of continuing their efforts to procure its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavours to accomplish so desirable an object." Nothing was said either on the flag covering the merchandise, or on the right of search for seamen, claimed and exercised by Great Britain.*

Such was the treaty of Ghent, which put an end to the bloody and costly war between Great Britain and America. That it was advantageous to England, and that the United States emerged, upon the whole, worsted from the fight, is evident from the consideration that neither their ostensible nor their real objects in engaging in the contest were attained. The ostensible objects were establishing the principles, that the flag covers the merchandise, and that the right of search for seamen who have deserted is inadmissible. The real objects were to wrest from Great Britain the Canadas, and, in conjunction with Napoleon, extinguish its maritime and colonial empire. Neither object was attained, for peace was concluded without one word being said about neutral rights; and so far from losing her North American possessions, Great Britain retained every part of them, and emerged from the contest with a much stronger and more defensible colonial dominion than she went into it. Yet were the great questions really at issue in the war rather adjourned than decided; and the treaty itself is to be regarded rather as a long truce than a final pacification. The Maine frontier remained undecided; a territory as large as all England, and part of which is of vital importance to the security of our American possessions, was left in dispute between the parties; the commissioners of the two powers, as might have been expected, adhered to the views of their respective cabinets; the award of the King of the Netherlands, given in 1834, who was chosen umpire, which divided the disputed territory between the parties, satisfied neither side, and by common consent was repudiated; the right claimed by Great Britain of searching merchant vessels remained untouched, and was therefore virtually conceded; the important duty of searching for slaves, left unsettled, threatens, at no distant period, to render it again the subject of angry contention between the two nations; and the triumphs of Plattsburg and New-Orleans, with which the war terminated, have so elated the inhabitants of the United States, and blinded them to the real weakness of their situation, that little doubt remains, that out of this premature and incomplete pacification, the germes of a future and calamitous war between the two countries will spring.

Reflections on this treaty.

The heroic valour displayed by Sir Edward Pakenham, General Keane, and their brave comrades, in the attempt to carry by storm the lines before New-Orleans, must not make us shut our eyes to the gallant and honourable, but still imprudent, hardihood which made them unduly despise their enemy, and seek to gain by force what might have been achieved by combination. When we recollect that Colonel Thornton, with his column, carried the battery on the right bank of the river with hardly any loss, thereby completely turning the enemy's position, rendering it untenable against any considerable force cannonading from that side, and exposing the city to an immediate attack from a quarter where it had no defence, it is impossible not to regret the imprudent and needless display of valour which was attended with so grievous a loss, and caused to miscarry an enterprise so well conceived, and, up to that point, so ably executed. True, various unforeseen accidents conspired to mar the assault; the boats did not get through the canal so soon as had been expected, so that Thornton's co-operation on the right came too late to retrieve affairs on the left bank; and the unhappy oblivion of, or delay in bringing up, the fascines and scaling-ladders, converted what might have been a successful assault there into a bloody repulse: but still these accidents are the usual attendants o a night assault, especially where the columns of attack are combined from different quarters; and the point is, might the risk of incurring them not have been avoided by throwing the whole troops on the right bank of the river as soon as the boats were got up and launched on its waters, and thereby rendering unavailing, as Napoleon did by the passage of the Danube at Entzersdorff, all the formidable intrenchments erected at so great a cost of labour by the Austrians in front of Essling? It would appear that the rapid and brilliant success of a small British force at Bladensberg, as well as on many occasions in Canada, when they met the troops of the United States in the open field, had rendered the British general insensible to the dangers of attacking them when behind formidable intrenchments, and caused him to forget that the American rifle, though unable to withstand the shock of the English bayonet in regular combat, is a most formidable weapon when wielded by gallant hands behind trees, or under shelter of the redoubts, which so rapidly, and often fatally, equalize the veteran and inexperienced soldier.

Reflections on the battle at New-Orleans.

Perhaps no nation ever suffered so severely as the Americans did from this war, in their external and commercial relations. Their foreign trade, anterior to the estrangement from Great Britain, so flourishing as to amount to £22,000,000 of exports, and £28,000,000 of imports, carried on in 1,300,000 tons of shipping, was, literally speaking, and by no figure of speech, *annihilated;* for the official returns show that the former had sunk, in 1814, to £1,400,000, or little more than an eighteenth part of their former amount; the latter to less than three millions.* The capture of no less than fourteen hundred American vessels of war and merchandise appeared in the London Gazette during the two years and a half of its continuance,† besides probably an equal number which were too inconsiderable to enter that register; and although, no doubt, they retaliated actively and effectively by their ships of war and privateers on British commerce, yet their number was too small to produce any considerable set-off to such immense losses; and the rapid growth of British

Immense losses of the Americans during the war.

* See the treaty in Ann. Reg., 1815, 352, 358. State Papers; and Martin's Sup., ii., 76.

* Total of American exports and imports during three years before the rupture with Great Britain, and during the three years of its continuance. Dollars converted at 4*s.* 2*d.* to the dollar.

	Exports.	Imports.
1805	£19,909,589	£25,125,000
1806	21,153,552	26,978,416
1807	22,571,488	28,869,765
1812	8,026,506	16,047,916
1813	5,813,322	4,584,375
1814	1,443,216	2,701,041

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii., 191.

† Brenton, ii., 539.

commerce,* when placed in juxtaposition to the almost total extinction of that of the United States, demonstrates decisively, that while the contest lasted, the sinews of war were increasing in the one country as rapidly as they were drying up in the other. In truth, the ordinary American revenue, almost entirely derived from custom-house duties, nearly vanished during the continuance of the war, and the deficit required to be made up by excise and direct taxes levied in the interior, and loans, which in the year 1814 amounted to no less than 20,500,000 dollars, or above £4,000,000 sterling; an immense sum for a state the annual income of which in ordinary times was only 23,000,000 dollars, or £4,600,000. Two thirds of the mercantile and trading classes in all the states of the Union became insolvent during these disastrous years; and such was the suffering and public discontent in the Northern States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New-England, that it altogether overcame their sentiments of nationality, and the inhabitants, when peace arrived, were formally taking steps to break off from the Union, assert their national independence, and make peace with Great Britain, the future protector of their republic.†††

A war fraught with such disasters to the United States was not without its evils also to the inhabitants of Great Britain. In ordinary times, the cessation of the North American market, which at that period took off, on an average of years, twelve millions' worth of British produce and manufactures, would have been most severely felt, and it was mainly to its stoppage that the great distresses in England in 1811 and the first months of 1812 had been owing. But this market had, from the operations of the American Embargo and Non-intercourse Act, been long in abeyance: commerce had discovered new channels; and an ample compensation for its loss, for the time at least, had been found in the markets of Russia, Germany, and Italy, now suddenly thrown open to British enterprise by the triumphs of the allied arms. But a lasting effect, fraught with consequences injurious to British manufacturing interests, was found in the forcible direction of a large portion of the capital, and no inconsiderable part of the industry, of the United States to manufacturing employment, an effect which has survived the temporary causes which gave it birth, and, by permanently investing large capitals in that species of industry, has rendered the subsequent exports of Great Britain, if the vast increase of population in the United States is taken into account, by no means so considerable as they were before the war. When the great and growing extent of the British colonies, and the prodigious market they have opened and are opening to British manufacturing industry, both in the Eastern and Western Hemisphere, are considered, this dependance for the sale of so large a portion of our manufactures on any foreign nation whatever may possibly appear to be fraught with serious danger, and its curtailment rather a benefit than an injury; but an unmixed evil has arisen from the jealousy of British manufactures, which has necessarily grown up, especially in the Northern States of the Union, from the growing importance of their own fabrics, and the animosity against this country, which has, in consequence, arisen in those states which, when the war commenced, were most firmly attached to our alliance.

Pernicious effects of this war to the manufacturing interests of Great Britain.

When we consider the vast evils to both countries which must inevitably arise from a renewal of hostilities between America and Great Britain; when we recollect that our exports to the United States are still, on an average, nine millions annually; when we call to mind that England is the great market for the cotton of the Southern States, and that the intercourse between the two countries is so immense, that out of 2,096,000 tons which now constitute the foreign trade of the United States, no less than 754,000 are employed in conducting the traffic between the two countries;* while the connexion between them is so close, that failures to any great extent in the American provinces never fail to produce stagnation and distress in the manufacturing districts of Great Britain; and

Evils which a rupture with the United States would produce.

* Table showing the official value of British exports and imports in the same year as in the preceding table.

	Exports.			
	Foreign and Colonial.	British Manufactures.	Total.	Imports.
1805	7,643,120	23,376,941	£31,020,061	£28,561,270
1806	7,717,555	25,861,879	33 379,424	26,899,658
1807	7,624,312	23,391,214	31,015,526	26,734,425
1812	9,533,065	29,508,508	38,041,573	26,163,431
1813	Records	destroyed	by fire.	....
1814	19,365,981	34,207,253	53,573,234	335,264

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii., 98.

† Tocq., i., 289. Ann. Reg., 1814, 193. Ante, x., 714.

††† XLI. In perusing the writings of Anglican authors, nothing often is more ludicrous than the ignorance of the geography and topography of the United States which they so generally display. Thus, Mr. Alison, in his paragraph on the "Symptoms of a breaking up of the Union," speaks of "the two States of Massachusetts and New-England;" and again, with the above details, he enumerates the "Northern States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New-England," demonstrating, therefore, that he has not learned that New-England is a generic name for the six North-eastern States of the American Federal Republic.

Exclusive of that gross absurdity, a condensed statement of the proceedings of the Hartford Convention will not be irrelevant. It is derived from Palmer's Historical Register, volume iv., chapter viii.

"The Massachusetts Legislature, considering the exposed and unprotected situation of this state, from the neglect of the General Government to provide a sufficient regular force for that purpose, and its refusal to pay the militia unless they were called for by an officer of the regular army, and the expense incurred under his direction, recommend the appointment of delegates to meet and confer with delegates from the other New-England States upon their grievances, and for the best means of preserving their resources for their own defence. Also to take measures, if they shall think proper, for procuring a convention of delegates from all the United States for a revisal of the Constitution. Massachusetts having appointed her own delegates, invited the other New-England States to do the same. The Legislature of Vermont *unanimously* refused to send delegates. The Executive of New-Hampshire refused to call together the Legislature to consider the Massachusetts resolutions. Rhode Island appointed delegates to confer on the common dangers, upon the best means for co-operating for mutual defence of the country, and upon the measures which it may be in the power of the New-England States, *consistently with their obligations*, to restore and secure to the people their rights and privileges under the Constitution of the United States."

Connecticut appointed delegates to "consult upon what measures it may be expedient for the New-England States to adopt, in the present situation of the country, *which shall not be inconsistent with the duty which they owe to the government of the United States*."—*Palmer's Historical Register*, vol. iv., chap. viii.

Could any rational man apprehend danger to the Union from a convention of those states, thus rebuked by their sister states, and acting under those instructions? But the historian asserts that the New-England States proposed to place themselves under British protection! If Mr. Alison counts the revolving years as a sojourner of earth, until New-England constitutes a separate republic, with Britain for their protector, he will live, most assuredly, until the morning of the Millennium.

* Porter's Parl. Tables, ix., 591, 592

two consecutive bad harvests in the British islands, by the strain on the money-market of London which they occasioned, caused the whole banks of the Southern States of America, including the National Bank of the United States, to fail in 1839, it will appear hardly possible that human folly could go so far as to produce hostilities between the two nations. This will appear the more improbable when it is recollected how strenuously and laudably the supreme government, in both countries, have laboured to remove or soften, of late years, all causes of discord between them, and how clearly the leading men in the United States, as well as in this country, are impressed with the indissoluble union which subsists between their interests, and the disastrous effect which a rupture could not fail to have upon them. Nevertheless, nothing is more certain than that hostilities with the United States are yet not only probable, but imminent; that the deep wounds they will inflict upon either country will furnish no security against their occurrence; and that, however much the patriots of both may lament, it is their duty to provide against them. The solution of this apparent paradox is easy, if the nature of the two governments is taken into consideration.

What is the real cause of the danger?

Democracy is universally and necessarily *expansive*; for the superabundant energy which it generates at home can only find vent in foreign acquisition. Whether it is *aggressive* or not, depends upon the situation of the Democratic power, and the means it enjoys of finding vent, either in the pacific establishment of colonies, or warlike conquests with the sword. Carthage and Tyre in ancient, Genoa, Venice, and Great Britain in modern times, have chiefly poured forth their superfluous numbers and energy in colonization: Sparta, Athens, and Rome in antiquity, and Republican France in modern times, have forced their way into the adjoining states, not with the olive-branch of colonial industry, but the sword of ruthless conquest. If we would judge how rapidly and certainly Democratic institutions render a powerful nation aggressive, we have only to look to the numerous wars of conquest which have been undertaken by Great Britain in the East, especially since the great Democratic convulsion of 1832. America shared to the full in these spreading propensities of all Republican communities; and such is the growth of its population, that expansion is to it the condition of existence. It is impossible that two such communities, brought in so many points in contact, and having so many subjects of national as well as individual rivalry, should not, ere long, be brought into collision. Large as it is, the New World is not, at least in their own opinion, large enough for both.

Aggressive disposition of the Americans, as of all Democratic states.

The pretensions the Americans have set up to an immense portion of the British possessions in Maine, and which a glance at the map must convince every unprejudiced mind are wholly unfounded, arise from this expansive and aggressive propensity of Democracy; they would willingly shoulder off the white man in the North, as they have done the red man in the West, or the effeminate Spaniard in the South. No dangers, no ultimate consequences, will deter; no wisdom on the part of government will be able to restrain them: the question will not be, what do Mr. Webster, or the enlightened patriots of Washington desire, but what have the ardent Democrats of Maine, the Ohio, and the Mississippi determined? It is there that the ruling power of America is to be found: it is in their dispositions and passions that the spring of its future fortunes is placed. That they are essentially both expansive and aggressive, can be doubted by none who have watched the systematic efforts which they have made along the Canadian frontier for several years past to bring on a war with Great Britain. They would suffer little, at least in the first instance, from such a contest, for their connexions are all inland, and their main dependance is on agricultural labour; and if they derive no other satisfaction from hostilities, they will at least be sure of this, to them no small one, of seeing the commercial wealth and paper aristocracy of New-York, Pennsylvania, and the great cities on the coast, the object of their undying jealousy, destroyed by the first convulsion consequent on a rupture.

Regarding, then, hostilities with the United States as not only probable, but, it is to be feared, unavoidable, it is of importance to gather such lessons from the past as may best avoid disaster in the future.

Weakness of America in the outset, and vigour in the end.

I. Democracy in war is just the reverse of paper credit: it is weakness in the outset, but strength in the end. Its uniform want of preparation, and resistance to present burdens for the sake of future advantages, induce the former: its inherent energy and inexhaustible resources, when fully roused, occasion the latter. It will be wisdom in British statesmen to calculate on both these occurrences. They should recollect that in 1812 the Americans rushed into long-meditated war with Great Britain with four frigates, eight sloops, and six thousand men; but they should recollect, also, that with these tiny forces they achieved a greater number of victories over the British at sea than the French did during the whole course of the Revolutionary war, and baffled at land the veterans of the Peninsular campaigns. In a contest with America, therefore, more than any other power, it is of the highest importance to strike hard and successfully in the outset. The superior military and naval establishment, more ample revenue, and larger share of patrician direction of Great Britain, give her the means of inflicting the most serious blows on America in the commencement of the war; while the extraordinary vigour of the American people, and their native courage, render it all but certain that success will come to be more nearly balanced in the end. Everything, therefore, will depend on the energy with which hostilities are *at first* conducted, and the skilful direction of the strokes which are first delivered.

Necessity of concentrating the British force in such a war.

II. In such a contest, it is more than probable that England will, in the first instance, assume the offensive, and strive to make the United States feel the weight of her fleets and armies before they have assembled any considerable or experienced forces for their defence. Towards success in such a warfare, however, it is indispensable that adequate forces should from the very outset be placed at the disposal of her military commanders, and the wretched system of starving the war in the beginning be from the beginning abandoned. Every shilling saved then will cost a pound before hostilities are over. The deplorable plan of sending out a seventy-four gun ship, four or five frigates, and three

thousand soldiers, to keep the coasts of the United States in a state of alarm, must be never again renewed. If it is, a repetition of the failure at Baltimore, and the disaster at New-Orleans, may with confidence be anticipated. A squadron of ships of the line and armed steamers, such as that which tore down the ramparts of Acre, should at once be equipped and kept together; not less than ten, if possible fifteen thousand land troops, should be put on board. Such a force, if directed by able officers, would, with the powerful aid of war steamers, and the present gunnery of the British marine, destroy the whole naval establishments of the United States in a single campaign. The employment of a few thousand men, merely to land here and there, as we did at Baltimore, and as we have recently done in China, would infallibly terminate, after great expense, in disappointment and defeat.

Military force by which we are likely to be opposed.

III. The military resources of the United States to resist such a system of warfare are perfectly trifling; and there is no likelihood, as long as the Democratic *régime* continues in that country, of their consenting during peace to such assessment as is necessary to give them anything like a respectable military force at the commencement of hostilities. The militia, which is established in every part of the country, cannot be considered as affording a considerable addition at any one point to the military force of the United States; for it cannot be removed far from home, and therefore the defence of each place must rest on its own immediate neighbourhood; and being exercised only three days in the year, and for the most part destitute even of uniform, it cannot be relied on for proper military operations in the field. But the experience of the last war demonstrates what, *a priori*, might have been readily anticipated, that behind intrenchments or stockades, or in the defence of woody positions, this species of force may often be extremely formidable; and the example of the contest in Tyrol in 1809 is not required to demonstrate that in such a warfare, skilful marksmen, well acquainted with the localities of the country they are employed to defend, may often succeed in defeating the best-disciplined regular forces. It will be the wisdom of England, therefore, in any future hostilities, to make no attempt on the American coast but with a very powerful military force; and if such is not at her disposal, to confine her efforts to a close blockade of the harbours of the United States, and bombardment of such towns as appear to be accessible to that species of attack.

All attack on private property should be avoided.

IV. In such a warfare, it is of the last importance that hostilities should be directed against *public* property or merchandise *afloat* only; and that the piratical system recently adopted in China, of threatening a city not fortified with destruction if it does not redeem itself by a large contribution, should, above all things, be avoided. That was just Napoleon's system of war, which ultimately occasioned his ruin; and it was by steadily resisting any retaliation even of such a system upon him, that Wellington avoided lighting up a national war of resistance in the south of France. The conflagration of the public buildings, other than the arsenals at Washington, was as injudicious as it was unwarranted; it was that unhappy step which produced the vigorous resistance at Baltimore, and manned the redoubts at New-Orleans. The open announcement of "Beauty and Booty" as the object of that expedition,* was the mode of all others best calculated to awaken a vigorous spirit of opposition. In every mercantile community where opulence has made any progress, the great object of the citizens is to extricate their property without serious injury from the perils of war; and when the public defence has come to depend mainly on their exertions, it is seldom that they may not be paralyzed by an offer of security to private property, and hostility only against the armaments of the state. On the other hand, a sense of danger to their own possessions, from the city falling into the hands of the enemy, is more likely than anything to rouse its burghers to an energetic defence; and the examples of Baltimore and New-Orleans may show at what a cost the resistance even of such urban militia can only be overcome.

Absolute necessity of maintaining a superiority on the lakes.

V. The last war has clearly demonstrated that the command of the lakes is decisive of a campaign in the Canadian frontier; and that, without it, the best-laid plans of defence may fail. Both the discomfitures sustained at land in our North American possessions—the defeat of Proctor at the Moravian village, the retreat of Prevost from Plattsburg—were the immediate consequences of the disasters on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain. The movement of Chauncey gained the ascendency on Lake Ontario. Toronto was taken; and the serious invasion, which was arrested only by the heroism at Chippewa, was commenced. Knowing, then, where the danger lies, and where the means of averting it are to be found, it is the duty of the British government to be at all times prepared for hostilities, and in an especial manner ready at a moment's warning to equip or prepare a formidable naval force alike on Champlain, Erie, and Ontario. And on this subject it will be well to bear in mind two facts demonstrated by the experience of the last war, attention to which will prove of vital importance on the first renewal of hostilities. 1. That such are the facilities for shipbuilding on the lakes which the United States enjoy, partly from being at home on their shores, partly from the woods in their neighbourhood not having been felled to any considerable extent, that the American government had entered into a contract with shipbuilders at Sackett's Harbour in December, 1814, to have two sail of the line of 100 guns each ready for sea on Lake Ontario within *sixty days* of the time when the timber was standing in the forest.† 2. That the rapidity of shipbuilding is much impaired on the British side, by the older civilization of the country, and the extent to which the forests near the waters on the Canadian shores have been felled for the market of Great Britain. In consequence, preparation and foresight are more imperatively required on the English than the American part; and let it be recollected, that early success, important in all wars, will probably prove decisive in the next contest with America, from the ardent passion which it will awaken in their Democratic community, and the wide extent of defenceless shores which a superiority on the lakes will at once expose to their incursions. Have we, then, an adequate supply of seasoned wood, and an ample stock of naval stores ready to turn instantly to the purposes of shipbuilding, as soon as hostilities break out, or

* Armstrong, ii., 174. † Cooper, ii., 520.

appear imminent with the United States; and are these stores so well secured by fortifications as to be beyond the reach of a *coup-de-main?* These are questions upon which it well becomes the British government and nation to reflect; for upon the answer to them our preservation of Canada, our retention with it of one fourth of our commercial marine, and consequent maintenance of our maritime superiority and national existence, are indissolubly wound up.

Errors of the British government in the late war.

VI. It must be evident to every observer, that the British government were much in error in many particulars connected with the late war with America. Undue contempt for their adversaries—ignorance of the peculiar style of frigates which they had constructed—imperfect and hasty manning of vessels—neglect in providing adequate crews of seamen for the vessels on the lakes, lie at the root of all the disasters which were incurred. The extraordinary pressure of the latter years of the war, the wants of a navy which had then six hundred ships of war in commission, and the absolute necessity of turning every spare hand and guinea to the prosecution of the contest with Napoleon, may excuse this neglect previous to the taking of Paris, but they furnish no apology for its continuance after that period; and it was precisely then that the greatest disasters were incurred. No excuse will remain for a repetition of the errors in any future contest. We know to what causes our past reverses have been owing, and we will have ourselves to blame if they are again incurred. And of all the necessities of such a contest, there is none so urgent as that of providing in its very *outset* adequate crews of skilled seamen, both for the squadrons on the lakes, and the single vessels which are to combat the detached frigates which the Americans will certainly send out to cruise against our marine. Unless this is attended to, it is next to certain that disaster will be incurred: for they will man a few frigates at sea, and squadrons on the lakes, with the choice of fifty thousand seamen, thrown idle by the blockade of their harbours, and having one half of their number English sailors.

There is little danger of Canada being conquered by America.

VII. If due attention be paid to these measures of provident defence, it does not appear that any apprehension need be entertained that America will succeed, by force of arms, in wresting Canada from the British crown. It is vain for the United States to refer to their fifteen hundred thousand militia in arms: these local forces, for the most part wretchedly disciplined, and spread over an extent of territory equal to all Europe, can add little to the strength of an invading army. Such an irruption, if it is to be carried beyond the burning a few towns or arsenals on the frontier, must be conducted by means of regular forces, and the American Democracy will never tax themselves, during peace, for the establishment of a powerful standing army. If, indeed, they could make war maintain war, and, like Napoleon, quarter half their troops permanently on other countries; or like the Romans, after the subjugation of Macedonia, proclaim a universal liberation from imposts to themselves as the result of their conquests, there can be no doubt that they would gladly accede to any augmentation of their standing army. But as there is no chance of their effecting such a transference of burdens to the shoulders of the vanquished by the conquest of their only neighbours, the Mexicans and savages, taxation, to be effective, must begin at home, and, therefore, while the present Constitution lasts, it never will be attempted, at least for prospective objects. The militia of the North American provinces of Great Britain amount now to above a hundred thousand; and, from a population of seventeen hundred thousand souls, they are capable of being raised to double that amount. Such a force, though of little service from the difficulty of moving it in offensive operations, is, with the aid of twenty thousand regular British soldiers, amply sufficient, especially in a woody country, to repel any invasion which the United States, with an army in peace of only twelve thousand men, could bring against it.

The Americans are not likely to become a great naval power.

VIII. Notwithstanding the brilliant exploits of the American navy in the late war, and the serious conflicts which always will await the British in contending with them on that element, it may well be doubted whether the United States are ever destined to become a great naval power. Their reluctance to submit to any heavy or direct taxation during peace, with a view to secure the contingent benefits of war, must permanently prevent them from equipping an adequate number of ships. They have now a population of seventeen millions, being just the population of the British islands at the close of the war with Napoleon: Great Britain had then two hundred and forty ships of the line, and eight hundred frigates and smaller vessels in the navy;* and America has now, including all building, just eleven ships of the line, seventeen frigates, and thirty-three brigs and sloops.† The prodigious outlet for population and industry in the basin of the Mississippi, the great fortunes to be realized there, and the evident determination of the inhabitants of the United States in that direction, leaves little doubt that agricultural industry will form the staple of the country for a course of ages. America, with its population of seventeen millions, has now only fifty-six thousand sailors in her commercial marine:‡ Great Britain, with its population of twenty-seven millions, has two hundred thousand. Of the fifty-six thousand sailors in the United States, it is understood no less than thirty-three thousand are of British origin.§ And what decisively proves that the situation of Britain is better adapted for seafaring employment than that of America, it appears from the parliamentary returns that while the reciprocity system, during the twenty years of its continuance, has nearly extinguished the British trade with the Baltic powers, and augmented theirs with England in a similar proportion, alone of all other countries it has led to the increase of British in a much greater ratio than of American shipping in carrying on the trade of the United States.‖ And

* *Ante*, iv., 32. † Stat. Alm. of America, 77.
‡ Census, 1840. § Captain Marryatt's America.

‖ Table showing the comparative progress of British and American tonnage in conducting the trade with the United States:

	British Tons.	American Tons.
1821	35,188	765,098
1822	70,669	787,961
1823	89,553	775,271
1824	67,351	850,033
1825	63,036	880,754
1826	69,295	942,206
1827	99,114	918,361
1828	104.167	868.381
1829	86,377	872,949
1830	87,231	967,227

although, therefore, her tonnage is now very considerable, yet above a third of it is employed in the trade with Great Britain or her colonial possessions; while of the total tonnage of the British islands, not a ninth part is employed in conducting the commercial intercourse with the American Republic.*

Danger from colonial defection.

IX. After all that can be done to secure our North American possessions by the prudence and foresight of the mother-country, their maintenance must always chiefly depend on the attachment and support of their inhabitants. Much as all must lament the effect which the unprincipled acts and criminal ambition of the revolutionists of Lower Canada have had in alienating the affections of the simple-minded and industrious, and once loyal and devoted inhabitants of the lower province from the British government, the evil done is not yet irremediable; and, if taken in the right spirit, it may be rendered, as passing evils often are, of lasting benefit. It will bring to light and force into notice many evils that otherwise might have lain unobserved, and clearly suggest the necessity of their removal. The vast increase of the British inhabitants of Upper Canada, the province of our North American possessions most exposed to incursion from the United States, is an additional ground for security. But the attachment and co-operation even of that gallant and loyal race can be permanently relied on only in one way, and that is, by the adoption and steady prosecution of a good system of colonial government.ss

	British Tons.	American Tons.
1831	215,887	922,952
1832	288,841	949,622
1833	383,487	1,111,441
1834	453,495	1,074,670
1835	529,922	1,352,653

British shipping has, during these fifteen years, increased 860 per cent.; American, 77.—PORTER's *Progress of the Nation*, ii., 167.

* Total American and British tonnage in the year 1838:

	Tons.
American	1,477,928
Foreign	624,814
Total	2,102,742
Of which to Great Britain and Ireland	269,466
" " North American colonies	385,506
" " East Indies	10,557
" " West Indies	76,749
" " Guiana	4,392
" " Honduras	6,434
" " Australia	1,053
Total tonnage to British Empire	754,157

Tonnage of Great Britain in 1838:

	Tons.
British	2,876,236
Foreign	1,222,803
Total	4,099,039
Of which to America—British	109,951
" " American	373,810
Total to United States	483,761

—PORTER's *Parl. Tables*, ix., 591, 592; and 43, 44.

ss XLII. It is impossible to condemn, in sufficiently energetic language, the entire disquisition commencing with the paragraph on the "Evils of a rupture with the United States," and continued throughout the sections numbered I. to IX., with the exception of that marked IV., which maintains that, in all warfare, attacks "on private property should be avoided;" and that the announcement of "BEAUTY AND BOOTY," at New-Orleans, is "the mode, of all others, best calculated to awaken a vigorous spirit of opposition" and unconquerable resistance even in "urban militia."

The wild assumption that "hostilities between the United States and Britain are not only probable, but imminent and unavoidable," announced in this imposing work, which is translated and published in several different languages, is so mischievous in its effects, that all Mr. Alison's "Corrections and Addenda" are insignificant, compared with the evil of retaining in the text of these volumes these warlike developments. That whole catalogue of combustibles should have been removed from public cognizance! A more disgraceful characteristic cannot be uttered of the United States of America and Britain, two countries who are peculiarly allied by so many natural bonds, and whom both secular interests, and the religion which is professed by their citizens, enjoin to "dwell together in unity," than the imputation which Mr. Alison has made, that the governments and people of the United States and Britain are so incurably deranged, or so incorrigibly vicious, that they cannot continue in the state of peace.

What should be the leading principle of such a government is no longer a matter of doubt; it was announced eighteen hundred years ago as the rule of all intercourse between man and man; and subsequent experience has only tended to demonstrate its universal application. It is simply to do as we would be done by. Consider the colonies as distant provinces of the Empire; regard them in the same light as Yorkshire or Middlesex; treat them accordingly, and it will be long, indeed, ere they will seek to throw off the British connexion. Legislate for them as you would wish they should legislate for you, if Quebec or Calcutta were the seat of the central government, and Great Britain and Ireland the remote dependances. Seek no profit of them which you are not willing that they should make of you; subject them to no burdens for your own advantage which you are not willing to bear for theirs; give them, in so far as distance and circumstances will admit, the same privileges and rights which you yourselves enjoy. It was neglect of these first principles, so easy to see, so hard to practise, which lost the British the United States in North, and the Spaniards the whole of South America; it is in their observance that the only secure foundation for our present magnificent colonial empire is to be found. And this affords another example of the all-important truth, which so many other passages of contemporary history tend to illustrate, that the laws of morality are not less applicable to social or political than private conduct, and that the only secure foundation for national prosperity is to be found in the observance of that system of combined justice and good-will in the concerns of nations, which the Gospel has prescribed as the rule for private life.

True principle of colonial government.

CHAPTER LXXVII.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA, AND HUNDRED DAYS.

ARGUMENT.

Universal Transports in England at the Conclusion of the War.—Anticipations of the Friends of Freedom on its Results.—Different Issue of Events.—Honours and Rewards conferred upon the Generals engaged.—Thanks of the House of Commons returned to Wellington in Person.—The Norwegian Question, and Commencement of the Coercion of that Country.—Argument on the Subject by the Opposition in Parliament.—Answer of the Administration.—Continued Resistance of the Norwegians.—Failure of all Attempts at a Negotiation.—Conquest of Norway by Sweden.—Reflections on this Subject, and the true Grounds on which the Conduct of the Allies is to be rested.—The English Corn-Laws.—Historical Sketch of them.—Progress of Exportation and Importation during the last hundred Years.—Pressing Reasons for a Protection to the Native Agriculture.—Debates on this Subject in Parliament.—Mr. Huskisson and the Government's Argument in favour of the Corn-Laws.—Argument on the other Side by Mr. Rose and its Opponents.—Progress of the Bill, which is at length carried.—Reflections on this Subject.—Great Benefit which Protection to Home Agriculture affords to Home Manufactures.—Extraordinary Difficulties which beset Louis XVIII. in France.—Commencement of Divisions in his Councils.—Views of the King, and Formation of the Constitution.—Injudicious Expressions used by the King's Ministers in the Legislative Body.—Leading Articles of the Charter.—Its Provisions in favour of Public Freedom.—Its obvious Defects.—Real Difficulties of the Restoration.—Penury and Embarrassment of Government.—System which the Cabinet of the Bourbons pursued.—Their great Errors, especially in regard to the Army.—Faults of their Civil Administration.—Injudicious Regulations concerning the Troops.—Character of the Ministers of Louis XVIII.—General Causes of Complaint alleged against the Government.—Commencement of the Congress of Vienna.—Points on which the great Powers were united.—Alexander demands the whole of Poland on behalf of Russia.—Views of Austria, France, and England on this Point.—Division on the Question of Saxony, and mutual Understanding of France, Austria, and England.—Great Displeasure of the Emperor Alexander, and his Intimacy with Prince Eugene.—Triple Alliance of Austria, France, and England, against Russia and Prussia.—Affairs of Switzerland, of the Netherlands, and of Italy.—Consternation in the Congress of Vienna at the Landing of Napoleon.—Unanimity and Vigour of the Resolutions of the Allied Sovereigns.—Declarations of the 12th of March.—Enthusiasm of the German People.—General Coalition against France.—Commencement of a Conspiracy in France in favour of Napoleon.—Its vast Ramifications in the Army.—Secret Correspondence of Napoleon with Murat.—Napoleon's Life in Elba, and Conversations with Sir Neil Campbell.—His profound Dissimulation.—Preparations for embarking.—Leaves Elba and lands in the Gulf of Juan.—His first Proclamation and Bivouac on the French Soil.—His Line of March by Gap towards Grenoble.—Prodigious Fermentation in France.—Defection of Labedoyere, and memorable Meeting of Napoleon with his Troops.—His Entry into Grenoble, and Decrees there.—Measures taken at Paris on this Intelligence being received.—Dismissal of Soult, and the Count d'Artois sent to Lyons.—Ineffectual Attempts to stimulate a Royalist Resistance.—Advance of Napoleon to Lyons, and general Defection of the Army.—Dissolution of the Chambers, and last Measures of the Court.—Departure of Marshal Ney for the Army, and his flagrant Treason.—Conduct of the Court in the last Extremity.—The King retires from Paris and goes to Ghent.—Napoleon arrives at Fontainebleau, and makes his Entry at Night into Paris.—Transports of Joy among the Imperial Party there.—His Civil and Military Appointments.—General Stupor of the People over France.—Efforts of the Duke d'Angoulême to organize a Resistance in the South.—The Duchess d'Angoulême at Bordeaux.—Termination of the Civil War in the Southern Provinces.—Military Treaties between the Allies, and immense Force which was at their Disposal.—Preparations of the British Government for the War.—Finances and Budget of Great Britain for 1815.—Napoleon's prodigious Activity in Military Preparations.—Measures for the Restoration of the Army, and Force which he collected for the Campaign.—Carnot, Fouché, and the Republicans.—Their great Influence with Government.—Financial Measures.—Formation of a Constitution.—Ineffectual Attempts of the French Diplomacy to open a Negotiation with the Allied Powers.—Murat commences Hostilities, and advances to the Po.—Rapid March of the Austrians, and his total Defeat at Tolentino.—Restoration of the Bourbons to the Throne of Naples.—State of the Court of Louis XVIII. at Ghent.—M. Chateaubriand and his able Writings.—Commencement of an Insurrection in La Vendée.—Measures of Napoleon to crush it, and Pacification of that Province.—The Champ de Mai at Paris.—Speech of Napoleon on the Occasion.—Great Division of Opinion at Paris.—Napoleon's Plan of the Campaign.—Formation of a Government for his Absence.—Commencement of the Campaign.—Force and Position of the Allied Armies.—Disposition of the French Soldiers.—Defensive Preparations of Blucher and Wellington.—Their effective Forces.—Description of the Field of Ligny.—Battle of Ligny.—Desperate Conflict between the two Armies.—Their mutual Exasperation.—Defeat of the Prussians.—Battle of Quatre Bras.—Desperate Resistance of the British.—Their great Losses, but ultimately repulse the Enemy.—Retreat of Wellington to WATERLOO.—He resolves to give Battle, in concert with Blucher.—Description of the Field of Battle.—Night before the Battle, and Feelings in the two Armies.—Forces on both Sides.—Commencement of the Battle.—Defeat of the French Attack under D'Erlon.—Capture of La Haye Sainte.—Desperate Charges of Cavalry in the Centre.—Arrival of Bulow's Corps of Prussians at Planchenois.—Their Repulse.—Frightful Carnage in both Armies.—Last Attack of the Imperial Guard.—Its Defeat.—Arrival of another Prussian Corps on the Field.—Advance of the British, and Overthrow of the Old Guard.—Total Rout of the French.—Flight of Napoleon.—His Arrival at Paris.—Consternation in the Chambers.—Vehemence of Lafayette and the Republicans against the Emperor.—Intrigues to force him to Abdicate.—His second Abdication.—Advance of the British and Prussians to Paris.—Stormy Scenes in the Chamber of Peers.—Attempts to defend Paris.—Their entire Failure, and its Capitulation.—Entrance of the English and Prussians into the French Capital.—Journey of Napoleon to Rochfort.—He delivers himself up, and is taken on Board the Bellerophon.—Letter to the Prince Regent.—Removal to St. Helena.—Melancholy Condition of Paris after the Second Restoration.—The Bridge of Jena is saved by Wellington.—Restoration of the Objects of Art in the Museum to their rightful Owners.—Treaty of Peace.—Severe Measures of Government.—Trial and Execution of Labedoyere and of Marshal Ney.—Reflections on this Event.—Seizure and Execution of Murat.—Napoleon at St. Helena.—Conduct of the British Government towards him.—His last Illness and Death.—Interment at St. Helena.—Parallel between him and Wellington.—Subsequent Translation of his Bones to Paris, and final Deposite of them in the Church of the Invalides.

THE glorious termination of the war excited a degree of enthusiastic joy in the British dominions of which it is impossible to give an adequate idea, and of which subsequent ages will scarcely be able to form a conception. A great proportion of the people had grown into existence during the continuance of the contest, and inhaled with their earliest breath an ardent desire for its success: all capable of reflection felt that, whatever opinion they might have entertained as to policy in the outset, the fate and character of the British Empire had been irrevocably staked upon the throw, and that their own and their children's freedom depended upon its result. The progress of the struggle had been watched with intense, and often hopeless anxiety: its conclusion was marked by a splendour as unlooked for as it was unexampled. With whatever diversity of feelings its commencement had been regarded by the great parties who divided the nation, its long continuance had united their wishes: the bloody triumphs of the French Revolutionists had alarmed even the warmest vota-

Extraordinary and unanimous enthusiasm in Great Britain after the peace.

ries of liberty: the stern despotism of Napoleon had alienated their affections; his unrelenting war against freedom terrified their adherents. The patriots rejoiced in the result, because it secured the glory and independence of their country; the partisans of the aristocracy, because it closed a gulf which threatened to swallow up all ancient institutions; the friends of liberty, because it had been achieved by the united efforts of the European people, and appeared likely to terminate in the establishment of lasting freedom in France. The former anticipated the commencement of an era of unexampled prosperity from the sacrifices which had been made: the latter beheld, in the necessities to which the Continental sovereigns had been reduced, and the spirit which they had been compelled to call forth, the dawn of a brighter day in the annals of freedom. The visit of the allied sovereigns to England in the summer of 1814, wound up these feelings to the very highest pitch. All ranks, from the throne to the cottage, shared in the general enthusiasm. In the anxiety and animation of public events, the distresses and the joys of private life were for a time forgotten: misery itself lost its poignancy in the contagion of general exultation. No other subject was spoken of in the streets, no other canvassed in company, hardly any other thought of in private. The feelings of the whole British nation resembled those of a crowded audience in a theatre, when the genius of the actor, and the enthusiasm of a multitude, break down the barriers of individual restraint, and draw from assembled thousands one simultaneous burst of common emotion.

Anticipations of the friends of freedom on the results of the Revolution.

Even after "the festive cities' blaze" was no longer seen, and the roar of artillery had ceased to cause the heart to throb, more thoughtful observers reflected, with feelings of extraordinary thankfulness for the past, and sanguine anticipations for the future, on the marvellous events of the war. There seemed a poetical justice in its result, an equity in the retribution which had befallen the great and guilty nation, which spoke at once the present God. Anticipations the most sanguine on the future progress of liberty in France itself were formed by its most zealous supporters in this country. "Deplorable as have been the excesses," it was said, "bloodstained the hands of the first apostles of freedom in that country, their labours have not been in vain. A constitutional monarchy has at last been erected: guarantees of liberty established: compared with the freedom she will enjoy under the restoration, her condition under the old monarchy was slavery itself. The blood of Robespierre was but for a season: the carnage of Napoleon has passed away; but the glorious fabric of freedom has emerged unsullied even from the sanguinary hands of its founders, and a brighter era opened on the human race, from the very crimes which appeared to overcast its prospects."

Very different was the real issue of events.

Such hopes are the dream of the poet; they constitute the charm of the melodrame, but they are not the history of man. A constant struggle with evil, a perpetual contest for the mastery with the powers of sin, is his destiny from the cradle to the grave of nations. The crimes committed during the Revolution had been too great, the breaches formed too wide, the blood shed too profuse, the injuries inflicted too serious, to admit of a pacific and prosperous society being built up out of the ruins they had produced. Human passions do not subside like the waves of the ocean when the winds are stilled; human iniquity, once let loose, cannot be restrained as soon as the original actors in it have been destroyed. The winged words spoken, the immortal thoughts written, the irreparable deeds done, must work out their appropriate effect; for good or for evil they are committed to the stream of time, and generations yet unborn must reap their fruits. Irreligion, passion, the thirst for illicit gratification, are easily let in to a nation; they find a ready entrance in the deceitful desires of the human heart; they are admitted amid a chorus of joyous hopes and sanguine anticipations; ages must elapse, generations unborn descend to their tomb, possibly a new dominant race be introduced from distant and uncorrupted states, before they can be extirpated. The effect of noble thoughts, of just principles, of elevated conceptions, is never lost; it is more durable upon the human race, and often finally improves its fortunes; but in the first instance it is incomparably more slow in the purification of mankind than the passions of vice are in corrupting them. He knew the destiny of mortals, and the laws of the moral world better, who said, "For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, and visit the sins of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and show mercy unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments."

Munificent grant to the Duke of Wellington and his chief generals, July 7.

The peace with France formed the subject of universal thought throughout the nation; but its conditions were so glorious to this country, that they could hardly form the subject of debate in Parliament, and mere congratulatory addresses are hardly worthy of a place in history. Munificent provision, though not beyond his deserts, was made for testifying the national gratitude to the Duke of Wellington. It was proposed by government that £300,000 should be voted to that illustrious commander, in addition to the £100,000 already bestowed on him by Parliament; but when the subject was brought forward in the House of Commons, it was proposed by Mr. Whitbread and Mr. Ponsonby, highly to their honour, considering the persevering resistance they had made to the war, that it should be increased to £400,000, making half a million, in all, which he had received from the gratitude of his country. The enlarged sum was voted without a dissentient voice; so completely had the transcendent services of the British hero stifled the voice of envy and stilled the passions of political hostility. Sir Thomas Graham was raised to the peerage by the title of Lord Lynedoch, with a pension of £2000 a year to himself and his next two surviving heirs: a similar honour and pension were bestowed on Marshal Beresford and Sir Rowland Hill, who obtained the dignities of Lords Beresford and Hill. All these grants were in like manner passed unanimously; and the gratitude of the crown was appropriately evinced by raising all his principal officers, including Picton, Cole, Leith, Clinton, and almost all the names which have now acquired a durable place in history, to the honours of knighthood; while ribands and stars were profusely scattered among their less elevated brethren in arms. Wellington himself, with the unanimous approbation of the nation, was elevated to the rank of duke.*

April 12.

* Parl. Deb., xxvii., 826, 834. Ann. Reg., 1814, 137, 139.

A striking and impressive scene occurred when the British hero was presented to the House of Commons, to receive publicly the thanks of the House for the achievements which had shed such lustre on his country. He was received with loud cheers, all the members standing; and the speaker addressed him in the following eloquent and dignified terms: "My lord, since I last had the honour of addressing you from this place, a series of eventful years has elapsed, but none without some mark and note of your rising glory. The military triumphs which your valour has achieved upon the banks of the Douro and the Tagus, of the Ebro and the Garonne, have called forth the spontaneous shouts of admiring nations. Their names have been written by your conquering sword in the annals of Europe, and we shall hand them down with exultation to our children's children. It is not, however, the grandeur of military success which has alone fixed our admiration, or commanded our applause; it has been that generous and lofty spirit which inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and taught them to know that the day of battle was always a day of victory; that moral courage and enduring fortitude, which in perilous times, when gloom and doubt had beset ordinary minds, stood, nevertheless, unshaken; and that ascendency of character, which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled you to wield at will the fate and fortunes of mighty empires. For the repeated thanks and grants bestowed upon you by this House, in gratitude for your eminent services, you have thought fit this day to offer us your acknowledgments; but this nation well knows that it is still largely your debtor. It owes to you the proud satisfaction that, amid the constellation of illustrious warriors who have recently visited your country, we could present to them a leader of our own, to whom all common acclamation conceded the pre-eminence; and when the will of Heaven and the common destinies of our nature shall have swept away the present generation, you will have left your great name — an imperishable monument — exciting others to like deeds of glory; and serving at once to adorn, defend, and perpetuate the existence of this country among the ruling nations of the earth."*

Wellington's reception by the House of Commons, and the speaker's address.

Indescribable was the enthusiasm which these eloquent and characteristic words excited in all who listened to them, and rapturous the applause which ensued, when Lord Castlereagh moved that they be entered on the journals of the House. The Duke of Wellington replied in modest and suitable terms, in which, without pretending to disclaim all merit himself, he ascribed the success which had been achieved mainly to the persevering support he had received from the government, and the fortitude and discipline of the troops under his command. A few days afterward a solemn thanksgiving was returned in St. Paul's by the prince regent and whole royal family, accompanied by the whole ministers and privy council, the houses of Lords and Commons, the lord-mayor, aldermen, and functionaries in London, and the principal persons of the British Empire who were then assembled in London. The multitude were deeply impressed when the august procession, decked out with all the splendour of royalty, passed through the streets; and when the Duke of Wellington, with the sword presented to him by the state before him, sat down on the right hand of the prince regent in the Cathedral, one burst of almost overpowering emotion thrilled through every bosom in its immense extent. But who can rely on the permanent affection of the ever-changing multitude? Could the eye of prophecy have pierced the depths of futurity, it would have beheld the hero of England, then "the observed of all observers," and almost sinking under "the electric shock of a nation's gratitude," reviled by the majority of his countrymen, execrated by the mob, and narrowly escaping death from their infuriated hands, in the vicinity of that very spot, on the anniversary of his great and crowning victory of Waterloo! Themistocles, the saviour of Athens, was obliged to seek refuge from his countrymen at the court of the great king; Scipio, the conqueror of Carthage, died an exile on a foreign shore; his ungrateful country did not possess his bones.*

Solemn thanksgiving in St. Paul's for peace.

An important discussion, alike interesting from the simple character of the people whose fate was at issue, and the principles in regard to the future settlement of Europe which it involved, took place in Parliament on the subject of Norway. It has been already mentioned, that it was part of the secret engagements contracted by Alexander to Bernadotte, at Abo in 1812, that he should receive that kingdom, in exchange for the Continental possessions of the Swedish crown which were ceded to Denmark, and that, by the subsequent treaty with Great Britain, not only had the consent of the cabinet of St. James been obtained to their arrangement, but his Britannic majesty engaged, if necessary, to assist in an active manner with his fleet to carry the treaty into effect.† The period had now arrived when Bernadotte claimed the performance of these stipulations, and when it became necessary for Great Britain to perform her engagements for the coercion of the Norwegians into obedience to this transfer. The court of Denmark had acceded to it, by the treaty which admitted them into the Grand Alliance,‡ as, indeed, it was impossible for them to do otherwise, after the overthrow of the external power of France by the battle of Leipsic and evacuation of Germany. But the Norwegians loudly protested against this forcible transfer of a free people to the rule of their hereditary enemies; and not only refused to admit the Swedish authorities, in obedience to the injunctions of the King of Denmark, but made preparations to resist any forcible occupation of their territory, and despatched envoys to Great Britain to interest the English people in their cause. In consequence, a Swedish army assembled under the crown-prince on the frontier, and Great Britain despatched some vessels of war, to commence a blockade of the harbours of Norway. This proceeding excited the liveliest interest in Europe, both from the importance of the questions at issue to the parties, and the indication which it afforded of the intentions of the allied powers in regard to other countries, which, in like manner, it might be deemed expedient to transfer from their ancient dominion to new sovereigns. It became the subject of warm debates in the British Parliament; and the arguments there urged are more worthy of attention, that they were brought forward in the only as-

Interference of Great Britain to force the annexation of Norway to Sweden.

* Ann. Reg., 1814, 139. Parl. Deb., xxviii., 491.

* Ann. Reg., 1814, 58, 59. Chron.
† *Ante*, iii., 537; and iv., 105.
‡ *Ante*, iv., 277.

sembly in existence where the subject could with perfect freedom be discussed.*

Argument on the subject of Norway by the opposition.

On the side of the opposition, it was maintained by Earl Grey, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Wynne: "British policy never sustained a deeper shock, nor British character a deeper stain, than in the conduct which has recently been pursued in regard to Norway. If, indeed, it were incumbent on this country, on a fair construction of the treaty with Sweden, to assist by the co-operation of force in the reduction of Norway, it might fairly be urged that the evil, how great soever, was beyond the reach of remedy, and that even oppressions must be enforced, rather than breach of faith incurred. But are we bound by the treaty to employ force to compel the Norwegians to submit to a forcible junction with Sweden? Nothing can be clearer than that we are not. It is merely stipulated 'that we are to use our good offices to obtain the annexation, and even to employ force, if necessary.' But force was not to be employed, unless the King of Denmark refused to join the northern alliance. If, then, force had been already employed to compel that junction, we had done all that we engaged, and are liberated from any farther obligations. Now, when were we called on to interpose force to compel this junction? When Denmark had joined the northern alliance—when her troops have marched in support of the common cause—and when she has not only ceded Norway, but has expressly fulfilled that condition, upon the refusal of which the employment of force was made to depend.

"We are clearly, therefore, not bound to cooperate by force, either by the letter or the spirit of the treaty; and if not, are we called upon to interpose by the nature of the transaction, or the merits of the hostility to which we have chosen to make ourselves a party? Here the argument is, if possible, still stronger. The King of Denmark had no right to transfer the people of Norway against their will. He might withdraw himself from their protection; he might absolve them from their allegiance to him; but he had no right to transfer that allegiance to another state: it became then the right of the people to determine to whom their allegiance should be transferred. Authority is not necessary to support a position so plain, so entirely in unison with the first principles of natural justice. If it were necessary to quote authority on such a point, our greatest international lawyers, Grotius, Puffendorf, and Vattel, are unanimous upon it. They state that a sovereign may, in case of necessity, withdraw his garrisons from their towns, but that this being done, it rests with the people themselves to select the state to whom they will transfer their allegiance. Provinces of an empire, indeed, such as Franche-Comté and Lorraine, have often been transferred without the consent of the inhabitants; but that does not apply to the cession of an integral independent state, such as Norway. And whenever such a stretch has been attempted, as in the subjugation of Corsica by France, or the transfer of Scotland by Baliol to Edward I., the iniquitous measure has met with the unanimous condemnation of subsequent times, and the heroes who strove to resist it have been the admiration of the historian, the theme of the poet, in every subsequent age. If a more recent example is required, look at Spain. Ferdinand VII. ceded his people to Napoleon by the treaty of Bayonne; but instead of acquiescing in the transfer, they strenuously resisted it, and for the last six years our whole efforts have been directed to aid them in withstanding that usurpation which we are now with as little justice about to force on the Norwegians.

"Have the services of Sweden in the common cause been so important, the fidelity of the crown prince to his engagements so conspicuous, as to call for such an act on the part of Great Britain? It is notorious that the very reverse is the case. Have Sir C. Stewart and Mr. Thornton never stated in their despatches, that Sweden was backward in aiding the common cause? Have her troops ever taken the part assigned to them in the combined operations? Even at the battle of Leipsic, Sir C. Stewart has loudly complained that Sweden hung back, and that the utmost efforts were necessary to bring her troops into action. Subsequently, instead of directing his troops to the theatre of war in Flanders, the crown prince employed them entirely against Denmark; and during the campaign in France, his inactivity became so conspicuous, that the Hanseatic Legion, intended to have been under his direction, was transferred to that of General Bulow, and two entire corps of his army were at once withdrawn from his orders, and placed under the directions of Marshal Blucher. Is it, then, for such a lukewarm, suspicious ally that we are to incur the odium of concurring in the subjugation of a free-born and gallant people?

"The policy of this co-operation is as mistaken as its principle is unjust. Sweden is attached to France, because it may be aided, and cannot be injured by it: it is jealous of Russia, because it may be injured, and cannot be benefited by it. The crown prince will never lose his attachment to the land of his birth; in his case, national partiality, old recollections, will conspire with new interests and acquired desires to attach him to the French alliance. Rather than see Norway annexed to Sweden, it would be incomparably better to see it erected into an independent power. And as such a power, if independent, would necessarily be closely connected with this country, it would prove of essential service in furnishing materials for our navy from a quarter from whence the supplies are never likely to fail. But fail they unquestionably will if this annexation is persisted in; for on the first general war in Europe, Sweden will join with France, from inevitable and well-founded dread of the power of Russia."*

And of the administration.

On the other hand, it was argued by Lord Castlereagh, Lord Harrowby, and Lord Liverpool: "This question is to be determined, not by the general considerations which have been brought forward with such glowing eloquence on the opposite side, but the necessities of the case when the treaty with Sweden was concluded, and the plain meaning of that treaty itself. It was the anxious desire of this country, at the time when the co-operation of Sweden was essential to the interests of Europe, to obtain the assistance of that power against the common enemy; and to that end we engaged to put Sweden in possession of Norway, which, being in possession of a hostile state, rendered it impossible for its government to send forces to any considerable amount to the Continent until it was secured from attack on that vul-

* Ann. Reg., 1814, 118, 119.

* Parl. Deb., xxviii., 768, 783.

nerable side. The Emperor of Russia, accordingly, by his treaty with Sweden, bound himself to secure to the latter power the crown of Norway; and Great Britain pledged itself by its treaty to the same effect, by using its good offices with Denmark, and, if necessary, by naval co-operation. It was certainly provided that we should not employ force without making an attempt to induce Denmark to join the general confederacy, and that power had done so. But unless there was something illegal in the original treaty, can it be maintained that we are bound to stop short at the nominal cession, and do nothing to put our ally in possession of the territory which we had expressly agreed he should possess?

"As to the justice of the treaty itself, that was a different question, which it was too late to discuss, as it had been concluded, and acted upon, and formed part of the public convention of Europe. But even if that question were to be again opened up, nothing could be clearer than that the treaty with Sweden might be defended on the best principles of justice and expedience. Many weighty authorities, indeed, have laid it down, that a sovereign cannot, without the consent of the inhabitants, alienate his *whole* dominions; but they also state, what common sense sufficiently demonstrates, that a particular town or province may be validly ceded without such consent. By all the treaties which have terminated the great wars of Europe, large cessions of territory have been made; they were, in fact, the price of the pacification, and without them that blessing could not have been obtained. In particular, this was done by the treaties of Westphalia, of Amiens, and of Utrecht; and by all concluded by Napoleon, large provinces were ceded without any complaint being made by the gentlemen opposite. Sicily, Naples, Flanders, and almost all the smaller states of Italy, as much independent states as Norway, have at different times been ceded. Did not Lord Chatham boast that he would conquer Germany in America? a saying which, according to the doctrine now advanced, would be founded in gross injustice. If the consent of the people to their cession were requisite to the legal validity of their transfer, treaties would be nugatory; every attempt at pacification would lead only to a difficult, and often ineffectual, negotiation with the subjects of the territory proposed to be ceded; and wars would be interminable, from the impossibility of guarantying to the victorious party any advantage which might induce him to terminate his hostility. The obligation on the part of subjects to submit to such transfers is but a part of the general result of the social union, by which the original liberty of each citizen is to a certain degree impaired for the public good.

"Whether or not the crown prince has in every instance exerted himself with the greatest vigour for the prosecution of hostilities against the common enemy, is not now the question. Suffice it to say, that his co-operation, on the whole, has been of the most essential service, and such as fully entitles him to his stipulated reward. Had he not, by his accession to the alliance, created a formidable diversion in the rear of the French army which penetrated into Russia, we might have been at this moment occupied, instead of discussing the *minutiæ* of our engagements with Sweden, in anxiously deliberating on the means of averting invasion from our own shores. The policy of strengthening Sweden is equally clear: the great evil of modern Europe, which has hitherto led to such frequent wars of ambition by the greater powers, has been the number of lesser states with which they are surrounded, at once a field for their hostility and a prey to their cupidity. It is our wisdom, therefore, so to strengthen the second-rate powers as may render the balance more even, and prevent their dominions from becoming, as heretofore, the mere battle-field in which the greater powers find an arena for their contests and the prize of their hostility. The resistance of the Norwegians to this projected union with Sweden has been entirely fomented by the Danes, who, having secured their equivalent in Pomerania, are now striving also to retain Norway: it has been consequent on a journey of the heir-presumptive of the crown of Denmark, who went from Copenhagen to Norway, and was declared king of that country. The terms of the proposed union were studiously concealed from the Norwegians; but when they come to be known, all opposition on their part will cease, as it has already done in a large portion of the most respectable and enlightened inhabitants."*

Upon a division, Parliament supported ministers in the course they had adopted on this subject in both houses: the majority in the Peers being 81, in the Commons, two days afterward, no less than 158. The resistance of the Norwegians, however, still continued; and it became necessary for the Swedish government to have recourse to actual hostilities to effect the occupation of this much-coveted acquisition. Continued resistance of the Norwegians.

Feb. 24. A proclamation of the King of Sweden, containing an engagement to leave to the nation the power of establishing a constitution on the footing of national representation, to leave to its inhabitants the power of taxing themselves, and not to consolidate the finances of the two countries, met with very little attention, as did a letter addressed to them by the King of Denmark, two months afterward, in which he counselled them to submit, disavowed the act of Prince Christian, who had gone to Norway and been proclaimed king of that country, and forbade all the officers in his service to remain in the country in its present state. Prince Christian, however, was not discouraged; he traversed the mountains between Sweden and Drontheim, and was everywhere met by crowds of peasants, shouting with enthusiastic ardour, "We will live or die for old Norway's freedom;" and when at the monument in the pass of Gutbrandsthal, famous for the destruction of a band of Swedish invaders, he read the inscription, "Wo to the Norwegian whose blood does not boil in his veins at the sight of this monument!" thousands of voices rent the sky with the exclamation, "Thou shalt not leave us!"

April 13.

Continuing his journey to Drontheim, he was unanimously saluted as regent: the Danish flag was taken down to the sound of a funeral dirge; the Norwegian banner hoisted amid shouts of acclamation; Norway was declared independent; peace was declared with Great Britain; a deputation appointed to wait on the British government to deprecate the proposed coercion; and Count Axel Rosen, the Swedish envoy, who came commissioned to receive execution of the treaty from the government of Stockholm, was informed that, till the declaration of independence was

Feb. 19.

Feb. 21.

* Parl. Deb., xxviii., 783, 807.

communicated to the powers of Europe, no answer to his requisitions could be made.*

Failure of all attempts at a negotiation.

The engagements of the allied powers, however, towards Sweden, were too strin-gent to permit of any attention being paid even to these touching appeals of a gallant people struggling for their independence. Mr. Anker, the Norwegian envoy to the court of London, was informed by Lord Liverpool of the situation and obligations of the British government, and desired to return to Norway; but still the Norwegians were un-

April 19. dismayed, and on the 19th of April, the Diet, by a considerable majority, conferred the crown on Prince Christian and his male heirs.

July 10. M. Morier was afterward despatched by the British government to endeavour to effect a pacific settlement of the differences, and

July 26. soon after the envoys from all the allied powers arrived in Norway with a similar intention, but all their efforts were fruitless;

Aug. 17. they departed from Drontheim without having induced either Christian or the Diet to submit, and preparations on both sides were immediately made for war.†

Conquest of Norway by Sweden. July 26.

It belongs to the northern historians to relate in detail the circumstances of the brief but interesting campaign which followed. Suffice it to say, that the Norwegian flotilla was defeated near the Hualorn islands, with hardly any loss to the Swedish squadron, and that Bernadotte having put himself at the head of the invading army, twenty thousand strong, the frontier was immediately crossed; and although General Gahn was,

Aug. 2. in the first instance, defeated in an attempt to force the mountain passes, yet Fred-

Aug. 4. erickstadt was captured two days after; the strong position of Isebro was soon after forced, with considerable loss to the Nor-

Aug. 10. wegians; General Vegesack defeated a body of 6000 gallant mountaineers; Sleswick was abandoned, and taken possession of by the invaders; the passage of the Glomman was forced; preparations were made for the bombardment of Frederickstein, before which Charles XII.

Aug. 11. lost his life; the ridge of the Kgolberg was carried, after a brave resistance, and

Aug. 12. preparations were made for surrounding, with a very superior force, the army of Prince Christian, situated near Moss. Farther resistance would now have been hopeless; the match was evidently unequal; and, therefore, Prince

Aug. 14. Christian made proposals to the crown prince, which were accepted. By this convention the Danish prince resigned all pretensions to the crown of Norway; and, on the other hand, the crown prince accepted the constitution for Norway which had been fixed by the Diet of Eswold, and engaged to govern it with no other changes than were necessary to the union of the two kingdoms. After some local disturbances and great heartburnings among the peasantry, this convention was submitted to;

Oct. 5. the Diet at Christiania, by a majority of 74 to 5, agreed to accept their new king, and consent to the union of the two kingdoms; the terms arranged were in the highest degree favourable to the Norwegians, who preserved the substance, though not the form, of independence, and a degree of popular power which would be inconsistent with good government in a less primitive state of society. Bernadotte has since ruled them with leniency and judgment; and though many old patriots still mourn over the loss of their political independence, Norway has had no real reason, from its subsequent government, to regret its union with the Swedish monarchy.*

Reflections on this subject.

Although the military events of this miniature contest are of little importance, yet the moral and political questions which it involves are of the highest interest, and by much the most material which arose for the consideration of the statesmen of Europe upon the overthrow of the French Empire. By that great event, dominions which had been incorporated with it under the sceptre of Napoleon, containing thirteen millions of souls, besides states embracing a still greater number, forming part of his allied dependances, had been in great part bereft of their former government, and lay at the disposal of the allied powers. It became, therefore, a matter at once of the highest importance, and of no small difficulty, to provide properly for the political distribution of the conquered or rescued states; for, on the one hand, the general interests of Europe imperatively required that the old arrangements should not in every instance be specifically resumed, as experience had demonstrated that, if they were so, the weakness of the intermediate states rendered them an immediate prey to the ambition of the greater; and, on the other, the attachment of the people to their old sovereigns and form of government was often strong, always respectable; and it ill became the champions of European independence to terminate their work of deliverance by an act of injustice which might be paralleled to any to terminate which they had taken up arms.

And the true ground on which it is to be rested.

In these difficult circumstances, where state necessity and insurmountable expedience pointed to one course, and a sense of justice and regard to the rights of man appeared to demand another, it is not surprising that the decision of the allied powers should have been the subject of impassioned declamation, and that the annexation of Norway to Sweden, of great part of Saxony to Prussia, of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw to Russia, the Milanese to Austria, and Genoa to the kingdom of Piedmont, should have been represented as acts of violence and spoliation, equal to any which had stained the arms of Napoleon. Without pretending to vindicate all those measures, and fully admitting the principle that the end will not justify the means, there is yet this important fact to be observed, which draws a broad and clear line of distinction between all these acts of incorporation, and those which were so loudly complained of under the government of the French emperor. All these states, which were disposed of, some against their will, by the Congress of Vienna, were at the close of hostilities *at war* with the allied powers; they were part of the French Empire, or of its allied dependances; and if they were allotted to some of the conquering powers, they underwent no more than the stern rule of war, the sad lot of the vanquished from the beginning of the world. The contest, moreover, on the termination of which they were partitioned, was one of the grossest aggression on their

* Ann. Reg., 1814, 40, 41. Parl. Deb., xxvii., 807, 864.
† Ann. Reg., 1814, 43, 44. Mém. de Charles Jean, ii., 156, 161.

* Ann. Reg., 1814, 41, 48. Mém. de Charles Jean, ii., 183, 197. Bulletin of Bernadotte, Aug. 6, 1814, ibid.

part: their forces had all formed part of the vast crusade, at the head of which Napoleon had crossed the Niemen, and carried the sword and the firebrand into the heart of Russia; and if they in the end found the scales of fortune turned against them, and lamented their forcible transference to the rule of another, they underwent no other fate than the just law of retribution; they experienced no more than they had inflicted on the Austrians, the Prussians, and the Dutch; than they had attempted to inflict on the Spaniards and the Russians.

The English corn-laws.

Another subject in the highest degree interesting, both to the domestic historian of Great Britain and the general annalist of Europe, which underwent a thorough discussion, and was placed on a new footing at this period, was the English CORN-LAWS.

Historical sketch of the corn-laws.

During the greater part of the eighteenth century, England had been to a certain, though not a large extent, an exporting country; and so great was the influence of the landowners in the Legislature, that they were powerful enough to obtain the granting of a bounty of five shillings a quarter on the exportation of wheat to foreign states. By the 1 statute of William and Mary, c. xii., passed in the year 1688, exportation was allowed when wheat shall be at or under 48*s.* the quarter, and a bounty of 5*s.* a quarter was allowed. The bounty was repeatedly suspended during the next century when grain was high, and a great variety of temporary statutes were passed to alleviate passing distress; but this bounty continued to be the general law of the country till 1765, when, by the 3 Geo. III., c. xxxi., the bounty was entirely abolished, and all import duties repealed. This continued the law till 1791, when, by the 31 Geo. III., c. xxx., the old bounty of 5*s.* was revived when wheat shall be under 44*s.* the quarter; when above 46*s.*, exportation was prohibited. On imported wheat, if prices were under 50*s.*, a duty of 24*s.* 3*d.* was imposed; from 50*s.* to 54*s.*, the duty fell to 2*s.* 6*d.*; and above 54*s.*, the duty was only 6*d.* This scale was to a certain degree modified by the 44 Geo. III., c. cix., passed in 1804, by which act export was allowed when wheat was at and under 48*s.*, with a bounty of 5*s.*; above 54*s.* there was no export; import, if prices were under 63*s.*, was allowed only on payment of a duty of 24*s.* 3*d.*; from 63*s.* to 66*s.*, at a duty of 2*s.* 6*d.*; above 66*s.*, at a duty of 6*d.* The object of these, and an immense number of intermediate temporary or partial acts, was to prevent that grievous evil to which society is subjected in the great fluctuation of the prices of grain, and secure, as far as human foresight could, the advantage of a plentiful supply and steady prices in the article of human subsistence.*

Progress of exportation and importation during the last hundred years.

Under the operation of these statutes, Great Britain long continued an exporting country. From 1697 to 1766, a period of nearly seventy years, the annual amount of exports was, with the exception only of six years, much greater than that of imports, and this excess had, in the middle of the eighteenth century, sometimes reached as high as 900,000 quarters.† From 1766, however, the balance turned the other way, and the amount imported, generally, though not always, exceeded that exported; until, during the dreadful scarcity of 1800 and 1801, and the scarcely less severe season of 1810, the quantity imported had ranged from 1,200,000 to 1,500,000 quarters.* This was a most important change, and that in prices was hardly less so; for, on an average of ten years for the last hundred and fifty years, the price of wheat had doubled, and as compared with the middle of last century, more than tripled.† These facts naturally awakened the anxious solicitude of the Legislature and the country at the close of the war, when the restoration of a general peace exposed the British farmer anew to the competition of the foreign producer, and the vast change of prices consequent on the suspension of cash payments in 1797, and subsequent boundless expenditure of the war, had rendered him so much less qualified to bear it.

Pressing reasons for a protection to native agriculture.

Agriculture had immensely increased under the combined influence of foreign exclusion and domestic encouragement in the latter years of the contest. Capital to the amount of several hundred millions sterling had been invested in land, and was now producing a remunerating return; the home cultivators, notwithstanding an increase of nearly fifty per cent. in the number of the people during the last twenty-five years, had kept pace both with the wants of the people and the rapidly-augmenting luxury of the age; the importation of grain for the three preceding years had been a perfect trifle, and it had become a very grave question, whether these advantages should now be thrown away, and the nation, after having, by a painful process of foreign warfare, been raised to a state of independence of foreign supplies, should now, by the

* Parl. Deb., xxvii., 670, 682.

† Quarters of wheat exported and imported from England:

	Qrs. exported.	Imported.	Price of Wheat per Quarter.
1748	545,387	385	£1 12 10
1749	629,049	382	1 12 10¼
1750	947,602	279	1 8 10
1751	661,416	3	1 14 2
1752	429,279	0	1 17 2¼

—*Parl. Debates*, xxvii., 682.

Wheat.	Qrs. exported.	Qrs. imported.	Price of Wheat.
*1800	22,013	1,264,520	£6 7 0
1801	28,406	1,424,766	6 8 6
1802	149,304	647,664	3 7 2
1803	76,580	373,725	3 0 2
1804	63,073	461,140	3 9 6
1805	77,959	920,834	4 8 0
1806	29,566	310,342	4 3 0
1807	24,365	400,759	3 18 0
1808	77,567	81,466	3 19 2
1809	31,278	448,487	5 6 0
1810	75,785	1,530,691	5 12 0
1811	97,765	292,038	5 8 0
1812	46,224	129,866	6 8 0
1813	Records destroyed by fire.		6 0 0

—*Parl. Deb.*, xxvii., 682, 683.

† Average price of wheat during ten years:

	s.	*d.*
Ending 1655	51	7½
" 1665	50	5½
" 1675	40	11½
" 1685	41	4½
" 1695	39	6½
" 1705	42	11
" 1715	44	2½
" 1725	35	4½
" 1735	35	2
" 1745	32	1
" 1755	33	2½
" 1765	39	3½
" 1775	51	3½
" 1785	47	8½
" 1795	54	3½
" 1805	81	2½
Eight years to 1813	101	9½

—*Report of Committee on Corn-Laws*, 1814; *Parl. Deb.*, xxvii., 687.

inundation of Continental grain, consequent on the expenses and high prices which that very war had occasioned, be reduced to a state of dependance on external powers for the most necessary articles of subsistence.

Mr. Huskisson's and the government's arguments in favour of the corn-laws.

On the one hand, it was argued by Mr. Huskisson, Mr. Vansittart, and Mr. Frankland Lewis: "The two grand objects which the House has to obtain by the proposed measures, are to render the nation independent of foreign supply, and to keep the price of corn as nearly equal as possible. Under the system begun in 1765, which has now been in operation for nearly fifty years, the country has been gradually becoming more and more dependant on foreign countries for a supply of grain, and prices have been kept in a continual state of fluctuation. All this has happened in consequence of deviating from a system which, for nearly sixty years previously, had rendered the country nearly independent of foreign supply, and during which period the fluctuation of prices had never exceeded one third. Instead of which, during the last forty years large importations had taken place, and the fluctuations had risen as high as three to one, instead of one to three. What must be the state of the law which produced these evils, if they have been produced by law, of which there can be no doubt? and is not some remedy necessary?

"It is impossible on temporary fluctuation to raise the price of labour in proportion to the rise in the price of grain; and as the agricultural labourers constitute the largest class, and their earnings approach nearest to what is necessary for mere existence, any temporary rise in the price of grain is more severely felt by them than any others, and this evil has exhibited itself in augmented poor-rates and many other forms. The fluctuation of prices is an evil as much to be guarded against as too high a price: a total prohibition of exportation, it is true, may raise the price; but a medium may be found which will at once keep the price steady, and not unduly elevate it. Notwithstanding all that has been said about the importance of importation of grain, it is well known that in no year has it reached higher than a tenth or twelfth of the annual consumption. If no foreign corn had been imported, the nation would have saved in the last twenty years sixty millions sterling; nor can it be said, that without this importation sixty millions worth of our manufactures would have remained unsold; for what would those sixty millions have effected if they had been invested in land? What improvements would they have effected in our agriculture? what increased means of purchasing our manufactures would they have given to our cultivators? When the law permitting the importation of corn was first passed, there was a violent outcry against it; but what had been its effect? Why, that Ireland had come to supply England with corn, for which she had received several millions which had been employed in improving her soil, which, but for that law, would have gone to Holland or some other country. The importations from Ireland now amount to three millions annually, with a probability of a still greater increase. Are we prepared to throw away that benefit to our own subjects? Circumstances over which we have no control have of late years given an extraordinary impulse to British agriculture, and rendered us again independent of foreign nations. Having paid the price of our independence, would it be wise now to permit the domestic culture of the country to be destroyed, and render us again dependant on foreign nations? Such an advantage would be readily seized on by any power, and used to the annoyance, it might be the subjugation, of any country which should submit itself to such an evil. If the law is left in its present form, agriculture will speedily recede; the low price of corn produced by foreign importation will at once decrease the supply of corn, and throw out of employment a vast multitude of agricultural labourers; and thence will arise a double evil at once to the landowners, the farmers, and the nation—a loss of capital to a prodigious extent will ensue; rents will be immediately lowered; the best market for our manufactures, the home market, will be essentially injured. The true wisdom of the Legislature will be to impose a fluctuating scale of duties, which shall, when prices are high, let in importation from all the world, and gradually rising as prices fall, shall, when they reach a certain point of depression, operate as a prohibition against it—assuming 63*s.* the quarter, then, as the turning point at which the prohibitory duty of 24*s.* 3*d.* should operate, the true principle appears to be to adopt a sliding scale, which shall add a shilling to the duty for every shilling which wheat falls, and take off a shilling for every shilling which it rises; so that at 86*s.* there should be no duty at all; and, at the same time, to lower these duties to one half on grain imported from our own colonies."*

Argument on the other side by Mr. Rose and its opponents.

On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Rose and Mr. Canning: "Taking it for granted that no one entertains the slightest idea of introducing an entirely free importation, the great point is, at what price is importation to be restrained, and exportation permitted. The last average price of wheat at Dantzic is 36*s.*, and the charges thence to the port of London are 26*s.*, which in the war had risen as high as 82*s.* The supply of wheat in times of scarcity is now almost entirely from Poland, and the prices there are chiefly determined by those in this country. Now, if there be no restraint in the way of export, corn may be sent out of the country to such an extent as to be altogether beyond the reach of the artisans and labourers. It is mere legislation in favour of a particular class in society, to make the regulating price for the duties on the importation of corn a very high one, while at the same time free and unrestrained importation is permitted. What, in such a case, becomes of the consumer? The middle and labouring classes have for many years endured, with exemplary patience, such a rise in the price of the necessaries of life as has exposed them to the severest privations. What, then, can be more unjust than now, when they may with confidence look forward, from the return of peace, to a fall of prices, to perpetuate their distresses by such forced measures of legislation as shall permanently retain prices at the war level? The interests of the grower and consumer, when properly understood, are by no means incompatible; but the question is, whether, in the measures recommended by the committee, and now pressed upon the House, the only point considered has not been the interest of the grower?

"The poor-rates must be inevitably and seri-

* Parl. Deb., xxvii., 722, 726.

ously augmented if the present high rate of prices continue; and will not that abstract a large portion of the profits which they will bring to agriculture? This was sorely felt in 1800 and 1801, during which years this burden was in many places doubled. The revenue will be seriously affected by the virtual prohibition in ordinary years of all imports of grain, and consequent cessation of the whole duties obtained on its introduction. We are told the farmer requires protection, and would be ruined by foreign competition. How do the facts tally with this assertion? From 1801 to 1811 the population of England alone has increased 1,448,000; of the whole British islands probably 2,500,000; in that period the average excess of importation over exportation has increased by 586,000 quarters; not a fifth part of the wants of the increased population, at a quarter a head; and even that includes two years of the severest scarcity ever known. This clearly demonstrates that the remainder has been obtained by the additional produce of our own agriculture, and, in fact, the advances made in that branch of industry of late years have been immense, as every part of the country demonstrates. If, then, agriculture is already so flourishing, why seek to prop it up at the expense of the other classes by artificial legislative enactments?

"To one class of society the committee and their supporters in this House hold out an expectation, that by increased cultivation bread will become cheap; to another, that by raising the prices of importation, and lessening those of exportation, corn will become dearer. These propositions cannot both be true; and there appears every reason to believe that the benefit to the landowner and farmer will be incomparably less than the detriment to the consumers. The former have hitherto in one way or other been indemnified for their burdens; but the latter have not; and it will be the height of injustice to pass a law which shall render the price of grain permanently twice as high as it was before the war began. Delay in a question of such importance, and so vital in its consequences to the country, is loudly called for; and during the prorogation of Parliament information may be collected which may be the means of adjusting it more in conformity with the interests of all classes in the nation."*†

Progress of the bill, which is at length carried.

The arguments of Mr. Huskisson and Sir Henry Parnell proved entirely successful in the House of Commons, by whom the resolutions proposed by Sir Henry Parnell, as chairman of the committee, with the modification contended for by Mr. Huskisson, were carried without a division, and the sliding scale, commencing with a duty of 24s. at 63s. the quarter, and declining 1s. with every shilling the price advanced, was agreed to. But the reception of these resolutions by the country was very different. Great alarm arose in the large towns and manufacturing districts, that their interests were about to be sacrificed to those of the landed proprietors; petitions for delay and farther inquiry flowed in from all quarters; Mr. Canning presented one from Liverpool, signed by twenty-two thousand names; and such was the effect of these remonstrances, that after the subject had been repeatedly before the House, it was finally carried by General Gascoigne, by a majority of ten, that the bill should be taken into consideration that day six months; in other words, it was lost. The bill was, however, brought forward again in the next session of Parliament, when it was made the subject of most able debates in the two houses of Parliament; but at length it was carried by large majorities in both houses, that in the Commons being 164, in the Peers 124.* June 6.

Reflections on this subject.

"High prices and plenty," says Adam Smith, "are prosperity: low prices and scarcity are misery." "It is to no purpose," says Dr. Johnson, "to tell me that eggs are a penny the dozen in the Highlands; that is not because eggs are many, but because pence are few." In these profound and caustic sayings is to be found the true principle which, in every old and opulent community, of necessity renders a corn law and heavy duties upon the importation of foreign grain, except during periods of actual scarcity, unavoidable. It is in their very riches, the multitude of their cash transactions, in the weight of their taxes, the magnitude of their debt, the bequest of previous ages of credit, that the reason for this necessity is to be found. The prices of labour, of cultivation, of the implements of husbandry, of horses, of seed corn, are necessarily higher in the old-established community than in the comparatively infant state, for the same reason as they are dearer in the metropolis than in the remote provinces of the same empire, or in the metropolis itself during the season of gayety or fashion than in the other times of the year. This reason being permanent, and founded in the nature of things, is of universal application.

Great benefit which protection to home agriculture affords to home manufactures.

Nor do the manufacturing classes suffer by such regulations as in ordinary seasons confine the supply of the home market to domestic cultivators; for their effect is to augment the riches, and increase the means of purchasing manufactured articles, in the possession of the best consumers of domestic fabrics. It would be a poor compensation to the British manufacturer if a free importation of grain ruined the cultivator of Kent or East Lothian, who consumed at an average seven pounds' worth of British manufactures, to remind him that by so doing you had called into existence the serf of Poland or the Ukraine, who did not consume the amount of sevenpence. The best trade which any nation can carry on, as Adam Smith remarked, is that between the town and the country;† and subsequent experi-

* Parl. Deb., xxvii., 666, 706.

† It is impossible, in such a question as the corn-laws, where details and figures constitute the foundation of the subject, to give any idea, in an abstract of a few pages, of the arguments on either side. This debate, with the report of the committee on which it is founded, will be found to contain more ample information, both on the statute law, regarding the corn-laws, and the influence they had on prices for one hundred and fifty years before 1814, than any other documents in existence.—See *Parl. Debates*, xxvii., 670, 690.

* Parl. Deb., xxx., 123, 149.

† Table showing the exports from Great Britain and Ireland in 1836, with the population, and proportions per head, in the under-mentioned countries, viz.:

	Population.	Exports in 1836.	Proportion per head.
Russia	60,000,000	£1,742,433	£0 0 8½
Prussia	14,000,000	160,472	0 0 3¾
France	32,000,000	1,591,381	0 0 11½
Sweden	3,000,000	113,308	0 0 9
British North American Colo.	1,500,000	2,739,291	1 11 6
British W. Indies	900,000	3,786,453	3 12 6
British Australia	100,000	1,180,000	11 15 0
Great Brit. & Ire.	26,000,000	200,000,000	7 16 9

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, 1836, vi., 102.

ence has amply demonstrated the truth of the observation. No nation can pretend to independence which rests for any sensible portion of its subsistence in ordinary seasons on foreign, who may become hostile, nations. And if we would see a memorable example of the manner in which the greatest and most powerful nation may in the course of ages come to be paralyzed by this cause, we have only to cast our eyes on imperial Rome, when the vast extent of the Empire had practically established a free trade in grain with the whole civilized world; and the result was, that cultivation disappeared from the Italian plains, that the race of Roman agriculturists, the strength of the Empire, became extinct, the legions could no longer be recruited but from foreign bands, vast tracts of pasturage overspread even the fields of Lombardy and the Campagna of Naples, and it was the plaintive confession of the Roman annalist, that the mistress of the world had come to depend for her subsistence on the floods of the Nile.*

Extraordinary difficulties which beset Louis XVIII. in France.

While England was occupied with this momentous subject, forced on its immediate attention by the return of pacific relations with the Continent of Europe, France was painfully emerging from the crisis which had terminated in the overthrow of Napoleon. No task that ever fell to the lot of man to perform was probably more difficult than that which now devolved on the French monarch; for he had at once to restrain passion without power, to satisfy rapacity without funds, and to satiate ambition without glory. During the dreadful struggle which had immediately preceded the fall of the Empire, the evils experienced had been so overwhelming, that they had produced a general oblivion of lesser grievances, and a universal desire for instant deliverance. But now that the terrible conqueror was struck down, and the parties whose coalition had effected his overthrow were called on to remodel the government, to share the power, to nominate the administration, irreconcilable differences appeared among them. Mutual jealousies, as rancorous as those which had rent asunder the Empire at its fall, already severed the monarchy on the first days of its restoration; and opposite pretensions, as conflicting as those which brought about the Revolution, tore the government, even from its cradle. The seeds of the disunion which paralyzed the restoration were beginning to spring even before Louis XVIII. had ascended the throne; and his subsequent reign, till the Hundred Days, was but an amplification of the causes which produced the return of Napoleon.†

Commencement of the divisions in the councils of Louis XVIII.

The Republicans in the Senate, the veterans of the Revolution, the hoary regicides decorated with the titles of the Empire, had joined with Talleyrand and the Royalists to dethrone Napoleon, solely on the promise that their wishes should be attended to in the formation of the new constitution, and that they should individually obtain a large share in the appointments and influence of the monarchy. The most extravagant expectations had in consequence been formed as to the extent to which popular power was to revive with the restoration: the constitution of 1791 was openly talked of as the basis of the restored monarchy: it was declared that the king would only be recalled on condition that he implicitly subscribed the constitution chalked out by the Senate. The Emperor Alexander publicly supported these principles, and used his influence to procure from Louis XVIII., even before he left London, a declaration to that effect: while the Abbé de Montesquieu, who was the most confidential adviser of the king, warmly espoused the opposite side, and counselled the monarch to disregard altogether the restraints sought to be imposed on the royal prerogative. The Count d'Artois, when he arrived at Paris, embraced the same views; and the Abbé de Montesquieu, in repeated memorials, pressed similar advice on the monarch. These divisions soon transpired, parties were formed, leaders took their sides; and to such a length did the dissensions arise, that it required all the influence of Talleyrand and Fouché, who had now come up to the scene of intrigue, to procure the proclamation of Louis XVIII. by the Senate, before its conditions had been formally agreed to.*

Views of the king, and formation of the Constitution.

The ideas of the French king, however, matured by long misfortune and reflection, were completely formed. He was determined to steer a middle course between the Royalists and the Republicans; and hoped, without submitting to such conditions as might alienate the former, to acquiesce in all the reasonable demands of the latter. With these views, he determined to make no terms with his subjects, but simply mount the throne of his ancestors, and when there, grant of his own free-will such a constitution to his subjects as might satisfy even the warmest friends of civil liberty. A commission was accordingly formed, consisting of nine members of the Legislative Body, nine of the Senate, and four commissioners appointed by the king, to frame a constitution. Their labours were not of long duration; they continued only from the 22d to the 27th of May, at the close of which time the celebrated CHARTER was prepared, which was solemnly promulgated with great pomp, to both the Senate and Legislative Body, on the 4th of June, in the Bourbon palace. The king there read a speech which he had composed himself; he addressed the peers and deputies as the representatives of the nation, and announced that he had prepared a charter which would be read to the meeting. He concluded with these words: "A painful recollection mingles with my joy at thus finding myself for the first time in the midst of the representatives of a nation which has given me such numerous proofs of its affection. I was born, I hoped to remain all my life, the most faithful subject of the best of kings—and now I occupy his place. But he yet breathes in that august testament which he intended for the instruction of the august and unhappy infant to whom it has been my lot to succeed. It is with my eyes fixed on that immortal work—it is penetrated with the sentiments which dictated it—it is guided by the experience, and seconded by the counsels of many among you, that I have drawn up the constitutional charter which shall now be read."†

June 4.

These words were received with loud applause from all sides; but a feeling of surprise, a murmer of dissatisfaction, ran through the assembly, when M. d'Ambray, the chancellor, declared that

* Tacit., Annal., xii., 53. Gibbon, vi., 235.
† Cap., Cent. Jours., i., 42, 44 Thib., x., 117, 119.

* Cap., i., 43, 49. Thib., x., 117, 118.
† Moniteur, June 5, 1814. Thib., x., 101, 102. Cap. Hist. de la Rest., ii., 34, 35.

Injudicious expressions used by the king's ministers in the Legislative Body.

"the king, taught by twenty-five years of misfortune, had brought his people an ordinance of reformation, by which he extinguishes all parties, as he maintains all rights. *In full possession of his hereditary rights* over this noble kingdom, the king has no wish but to exercise the authority which he has received from God and his fathers, by himself placing limits to his power. He has no wish but to be the supreme chief of the great family of which he is the father. It is he himself who is about to give to the French a constitutional charter, suited at once to their desires and their wants, and to the respective situation of men and things." It concluded with the words, "Given at Paris in the year of grace 1814, in the nineteenth year of our reign." The veterans of the Revolution, at these expressions, recollected the words of Mirabeau, when Louis XVI., in 1789, announced his concessions to the States-General. "The concessions made by the king would be sufficient for the public good, if the *presents* of despotism were not always dangerous."*

Leading articles of the Charter.

The concessions in favour of freedom contained in the Charter, though ushered in by these injudicious and ominous expressions, were such as might have satisfied, in the outset of revolutionary troubles, the warmest friend of real freedom. The great foundations of civil liberty, liberty of conscience and worship, freedom of the press, equality in the eye of the law, the right of being taxed only by the national representatives, the division of the Legislature into two chambers, and trial by jury, were established. The Chamber of Peers owed its existence to the Charter; it came in place of the Senate of Napoleon, the adulations and tergiversations of which latter body had so degraded it in the public estimation, that its existence could no longer be maintained. The Chamber of Peers, who were all nominated by the king, consisted of six ecclesiastical peers, twenty of the old noblesse, twelve of the dignitaries of the Revolution, ninety-one of the Senate of Napoleon, and six generals of the ancient *régime*. A considerable number of the Senate of Napoleon were by this selection excluded, consisting chiefly of the most dangerous Democratic characters. The powers of the Legislative Body were greatly enlarged by the charter—in fact, it was rendered the depository of nearly the whole pulic authority; and the Constitution was received in consequence by that assembly with sentiments of the most lively gratitude. Yet were there two circumstances connected with the chamber of representatives worthy of notice, and singularly characteristic of the scanty elements for the construction of a really free monarchy which now existed in France. The first was, that an annual pension was secured to every member of it, of the same amount as they had enjoyed under Napoleon; the second, that no person could be elected a deputy unless he paid 1000 francs (£40) of direct taxes annually to government, and that the right of election was limited to persons paying 300 francs (£12) of direct taxes yearly: a restriction which threw the nomination entirely into the hands of the more opulent class of society, and confined it to less than eighty thousand persons out of thirty millions.†

Abstractedly considered, however, the Charter contained, in many points, the elements of true freedom. All public burdens were to be borne equally by all classes in proportion to their fortune: all were declared equally admissible to all civil and military employment; prosecution or imprisonment was forbidden except in cases provided for by the law, and according to its forms; universal liberty of conscience and worship was secured, but the Roman Catholic ministers were alone to be entitled to support from the state; publication of thoughts was permitted, provided the laws were attended to which guarded against the abuses of the press; a universal amnesty for the past was proclaimed; the conscription abolished; the person of the king declared sacred and inviolable, his ministers alone responsible for his actions; the king was alone invested with the power of proposing laws; he commanded the forces by sea and land; declared war and made peace; concluded all treaties and conventions; nominated to all public employment; civil and military; and "was intrusted with the right of making all the regulations and ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws and the safety of the state."* Laws, in general, might be introduced by authority of the king, either in the first Chamber of Peers or in that of Deputies; but the consent of both was essential to their validity, and those relating to taxes could only be proposed, in the first instance, in the lower House. The Chambers were entitled to petition the king to propose a particular law, and indicate what they desired should be its tenour; but this could only be done after it had been discussed and carried in secret committee. If carried there, and in the chamber itself, it was then, after the lapse of ten days, to be sent to the other chamber; and, if agreed to by it also, the petition was then submitted to the king, who might grant or reject it; but, if rejected, it could not again be brought forward during that session. The king alone was intrusted with sanctioning and promulgating the laws, and the civil list was to be fixed for the whole of each reign during the first session held under it. The cognizance of cases of high treason was confined to the Chamber of Peers; that of ordinary offences, to the courts of law, with the assistance of juries; all judges were to be named by the king, and hold their office for life, except the *juges du paix*, who were subject to removal; and justice, except where privacy was requisite from a regard to public decency, was to be administered with open doors. The Code Napoleon was continued as the ordinary law of France; the ancient noblesse resumed their titles; the new noblesse preserved theirs; the king was declared the sole fountain of honours in future; the legion of honour was kept up; the deputies were elected for five years, but every year a fifth retired, and re-elections to that extent took place.*

Its provisions in favour of public freedom.

Art. 14.

Every one must admit that these changes contained the elements of a wise system of government, and were calculated, so far as they went, to combine the blessings of freedom and equal rights with those of protection to life and property, and stable administration. But what are laws without the

Its obvious defects.

* *Ante*, i., 74. Cap., ibid., ii., 34, 35.

† Charter in Moniteur, June 5, 1814; and Ordonnance of Laws, June 4, 1814.

* An ambiguous and perilous power, the exercise of which, in after times, was made the pretext for chasing the elder branch of the house of Bourbon from the throne, and in its ultimate effects restored the government of the sword.

† Charter in Moniteur, June 5, 1814.

support of public morality? and what the most anxious provisions for the liberty of the subject if the spirit is wanting, in the governors and governed, by which it is maintained? Amid all the numerous and anxious provisions for freedom which the Charter contained, four circumstances were remarkable, which, to the sagacious observer, augured ill both as to the degree of protection to civil liberty which, in the progress of time, the new Constitution might afford, or even the extent to which it was understood in the country, and the stability which the Charter might attain amid the receding waves of the Revolution. 1. No provision was inserted to prevent or restrain arbitrary imprisonment, or limit the period during which a person arrested might be detained before trial. 2. No attempt was made to limit or abolish the oppression of the police—a set of civil functionaries who impose such excessive and unnecessary restraints on human action, in all the Continental States, that it may safely be affirmed real freedom is inconsistent with their existence. 3. The upper House, instead of being composed of great proprietors, hereditary in their functions, respectable from their fortunes, illustrious from their descent, was made up for the most part of salaried officials, nominated by the crown, who enjoyed their seats only during life. 4. No provision was made, more than in Revolutionary times, for the establishment of the Church or public instruction on an adequate basis; but the teachers in both were left to languish in the obscurity and indigence bequeathed to them by the perfidy and rapacity of the Revolution. No blame, it is true, could be attached to the French sovereign or his ministers for these defects; they could not by possibility have been supplied; but that only demonstrates that the crimes of the Revolution had rendered impossible the construction of durable liberty in France.

Real difficulties of the Restoration.

It was comparatively an easy task, however, to frame a constitution which might balance, in form at least, the conflicting powers of the Revolution; the real difficulty was, to reconcile the conflicting interests, calm the furious passions, and provide for the destitute multitudes which its termination had left in France. Restoration is always a work of difficulty; Henry IV. had perished under, James II. fled before it; but in France the difficulties were now of such overwhelming magnitude, that it is not surprising that the feeble dynasty of the Bourbons ere long sunk under them; the only thing to be wondered at is, that they were able at all to keep possession of the throne. The public joy at the Restoration had been as sincere as it was general; it arose from the sense of deliverance from instant and impending evils which had become insupportable. But when these evils had passed away; when the allied armies no longer oppressed the country; when the conscription had ceased to tear the tender youth from their weeping mothers, and France was left alone with its monarch, its losses, and its humiliation, the bitterness of the change sunk into the soul of the nation. Whole classes, and those, too, the most powerful and important, were in secret alarm or sullen discontent. The holders of national domains—an immense body, amounting to several millions—were devoured with anxiety; it was to no purpose that the government had guarantied the possession of their estates; they were a prey to a secret disquietude, because it was not participant in the iniquity by which they had been acquired; they felt the same uneasiness at the restoration of lawful government that the resetters of stolen property do at the approach of the officers of justice. The regicides, and numerous able and powerful men who had been involved in the actual crimes of the Revolution, felt still greater apprehensions: the unqualified amnesty contained in the charter was far from removing their disquietude; conscience told them that they deserved punishment; the fact of the Restoration seemed an act of accusation against them, a condemnation of all they had done since the commencement of the convulsion; and they incessantly demanded fresh guarantees and additional securities. The army was in despair: defeated in the field, driven back into France, humiliated in the sight of Europe, they had now the additional mortification of being in great part disbanded, and universally condemned to inactivity. The wandering life of camps, the excitement of the battle-field, the joys of the bivouac, the terrors of the breach, the contributions from provinces, the plunder of cities, were at an end; and instead, they found themselves dispersed over the provincial towns of France, or sent back to their homes, a prey to ennui, and destitute of either interest or hope in life. The civil and military *employés* who had been fastened by the imperial government on the provinces beyond the Alps and the Rhine, now wrested from France, returned in shoals to the capital, bereft of their employments, cast down from their authority, in great part deprived of subsistence: the marshals and numerous dignitaries of the emperor who had obtained estates or revenues in Germany, France, and Italy, as appendages to their titles, found themselves deprived of half their income by the loss of these possessions, and destitute of all hope of improving their fortunes by fresh conquests.*

Penury and embarrassments of the government.

If these were the sad realities of disaster in war to the most influential and formidable classes of society, the difficulties of government were still greater; and the most profound sagacity, the most fruitful invention, could hardly discover a mode either of appeasing the public discontents, or satisfying the innumerable demands upon the public treasury. The Count d'Artois, in his progress towards Paris, had taken as his watchword, "Plus de droits réunis (excise), plus de conscriptions;" and the latter promise had formed an express article in the Charter. But how was the first to be realized without depriving the crown of a large, and what had now become an indispensable, part of the public revenue;† or the latter without reducing, by at least two thirds, the ranks of the army, and throwing twenty thousand officers, without pay or occupation, back in fearful discontent to their hearths? The Tuileries were besieged from morning to night by clamorous crowds, composed of men as far divided in principle as the poles are asunder, but united in one loud and importunate cry for employment or relief from

* Cap., i., 52, 54. Thib., x., 117, 118.

† The "droits réunis," or excise, had constituted, in latter times, a considerable part of the ordinary revenue of Napoleon. They had amounted, in

1811	127,734,000	francs, or	£5,100,000
1812	144,069,398	" or	5,650,000
1813	146,660,621	" or	5,745,000

And taking the proportion of Old France to the provinces ceded, the abolition of this import would occasion a loss of 100,000,000 francs, or £4,000,000 annually.—See DUC DE GAETA, i., 308, 309.

the government; one half were Royalists, demanding compensation for the losses they had sustained during the Revolution, or a return for the fidelity with which they had adhered to the cause of the exiled monarch, or aided his return; the other, dignitaries or persons in employment under the imperial *régime*, who had been deprived of all by the overthrow of Napoleon, or the contraction of the French Empire to the limits of the ancient monarchy. The wants of the troops were still more pressing, and they were of a kind which could not be resisted. Eight months' pay was due, when the Restoration took place, to the officers and soldiers of the army; ten months' arrears to the commissaries and civil administrators. To meet these accumulated embarrassments, Louis XVIII. had an exhausted treasury, a diminished territory, and a bankrupt people. So excessive had been the taxations, so enormous the requisitions in kind, during the last two years of Napoleon's reign, that the provinces which had been the seat of war were almost wholly unable to bear any taxation; and such was the general exhaustion of the country, that the arrears of the last two years had reached the enormous amount of 1,308,000,000 francs (£55,000,000), of which only 759,000,000 francs (£30,500,000) was deemed recoverable; and while the most rigid economy, and extensive reductions on the part of the government, could do no more than bring down the expenditure to 827,415,000 francs, or £32,250,000, the receipts only reached 520,000,000 francs, or £20,800,000; and even this sum was obtained with the greatest difficulty, and by adding above a third to the direct taxes.*

System of government which the Bourbons pursued.

It would have required the genius of Sully, united to the firmness of Pitt, to have made head with such means against such difficulties; and the capacity of the king and his ministers was far indeed from being equal to the task. Striving to please both parties, they gained the confidence of neither: aiming at a middle course, they incurred its dangers without attaining its security. They left the crown in the midst of pressing perils, without either moral or physical support. The celebrated saying of Napoleon, "Ils n'ont rien appris, ils n'ont rien oubliés," conveyed an accurate idea of the cause to which their errors were owing. They had not power or vigour enough to undertake a decided part, and yet sufficient confidence in their legitimate title to venture on a hazardous one. Their system was to retain all the imperial functionaries, civil and military, in their employment: to displace no one, from the prefect to the humblest court officer; to continue to the military their rank, their titles, and, so far as it was possible, their emoluments; to make no change in the nation, in short, except by the substitution of a king for an emperor, and the introduction of a few leading Royalists into the cabinet. By this conduct, which, so far as it went, was well conceived, they hoped to gain the powers of the Revolution by injuring none of its interests. But they forgot that mankind are governed by desires, passions, and prejudices, as well as selfish consideration; and that Napoleon had so long succeeded in governing the Empire only because, while he sedulously attended in deeds to the interests of the Revolution, he carefully in words and forms flattered its principles. The latter part of his policy was entirely forgotten by the Bourbons, and in nothing more than in their treatment of the army. Their capital error consisted in this, that while they wholly depended on the physical forces of the Revolution, they made no attempt to disguise their aversion to its tenets; and that, without endeavouring to establish any adequate counterpoise to its powers, they irrecoverably alienated its supporters.*

Their great errors, especially in regard to the army.

They abolished the national colours, the object of even superstitious veneration to the whole French soldiers, and substituted in their room the white flag of the monarchy, with which hardly any of the army had any association, and the glories of which, great as they were, had been entirely thrown into the shade by the transcendent glories of the Empire. They altered the numbers of the whole regiments, as well infantry as cavalry, destroying thus the glorious recollections connected with the many fields of fame in which they had signalized themselves, and reducing those which had fought at Rivoli or Austerlitz to a level with a newly-raised levy. The tricolour standards were ordered to be given up; many regiments in preference burned them, in order that they might at least preserve their ashes. The eagles were generally secreted by the officers; the men hid the tricolour cockades in their knapsacks. They altered the whole designations of the superior officers, resuming those, now wholly forgotten, of the old monarchy. Thus generals of brigade were denominated marshals of the camp; generals of division assumed the title of lieutenant-generals. Catholic and Protestant soldiers were alike compelled to go to mass, to confess, to communicate. The Imperial Guard, which in the first instance was intrusted with the service of the Tuileries, was speedily removed, and its place supplied by troops obtained from Switzerland and La Vendée. That noble corps was even removed from Paris, under pretence of avoiding quarrels with the foreign troops in occupation of the capital; the whole officers on half pay were ordained to return to their homes, there to await their ulterior destination; and the most severe orders issued to the troops who had returned from foreign garrisons, to prevent any allusion even to the name of the emperor. Six companies of gardes du corps, several red companies of guards, or military household—in fine, the whole military splendour of Louis XV. was revived, and these new troops, in their yet unsullied uniform, supplanted alike the old troops and the National Guard in the service of the palace. These things were submitted to in silence, but they sunk deep into the heart of the army and the nation.†

Errors of their civil administration.

The civil regulations of the new government, though not so important in themselves as those which related to the military administration, were not less material in their ultimate effects; for they exposed the court to the most fatal of all attacks in Parisian society—the assaults of ridicule. An ordinance of the police forbade ordinary work to proceed on Sunday; this regulation, though expressly enjoined by religion, and loudly called for by the interests of the working classes, became the object of unmeasured

July 14.

* Cap., i., 32, 62. Duc de Gaeta, ii., 16, 26. Thib., x., 167, 168. Finance Report, 1814. Moniteur, Sept. 23, 1814. Moniteur, Sept. 24.

* Cap., i., 58, 64. Thib., x., 127, 130.
† Thib., x., 128, 133. Cap., i., 59, 64.

obloquy, because it abridged the pleasures or the gains of an unbelieving and selfish generation. The restoration of all the services of the Roman Catholic Church, with extraordinary pomp, in the Tuileries, excited the ridicule, and awakened the fears of a revolutionary people, by a great majority of whom these rites were regarded as the remnants only of a wornout and expiring superstition. The ladies of the ancient *régime* indulged in cutting sarcasms against those of the new noblesse; not one of the marshals' wives, or duchesses of the Empire, was placed in the royal household; and female animosity added its bitter venom to the many other causes of jealousy against the court. The restoration of the ancient orders, and especially the order of St. Louis, the crosses of which were distributed with profusion, gave rise to so general a rumour of an intention to supersede or undermine the Legion of Honour, that the king, by an express ordinance, was obliged to clear himself from the imputation. In fine, the civil government of the Restoration, while in all essential particulars favourable to the interests of the Revolution, yet in language, form, and ceremony, had reintroduced the most antiquated and obnoxious traditions of the monarchy; and the French had discernment enough to see that, in the intoxication of success, words and forms betrayed the real thoughts, and that the acts favourable to revolutionary interests were imposed on the government only by state necessity.*

July 19.

The army was reduced, partly from the embarrassment of the finances, partly from the policy of government, to a degree inconsistent with either the safety of the country or the attachment of the troops themselves. The abolition of the conscription, so loudly called for by its ruinous effects, at once revealed the exhaustion of the physical strength of the monarchy. Reduced successively to a hundred and forty thousand, and eighty thousand men, it was still encumbered with officers, and except from La Vendée, the recruits came in with extreme tardiness; above a hundred thousand leaves of absence had been given; and the soldiers, when once they had reached their homes, were in no hurry to return. The dynasty of the Restoration was to the last degree unpopular in the army; the throne had, literally speaking, no armed force on which it could depend, except a few regiments of Guards and Swiss at Paris. The general discontent of the troops was greatly augmented by an ordinance which put every officer not in actual employment on half pay—a reduction hitherto unknown in the French army; and still more by another, which absolutely forbade any officer, of whatever rank, not in actual service, to reside at Paris, if not already domiciled there. These were the circumstances which induced the fall of Louis XVIII., and occasioned the incalculable evils to France of the Hundred Days; the civil errors were of remote consequence, and comparatively little importance—it was the alienation of the affections of the military, before any other force to supply their place had been organized, and when the throne had no moral support in the nation, which was the fatal mistake. And, in fact, such was the discontent of the troops arising from their disasters, that it is more than doubtful whether any human wisdom could have averted the catastrophe.†

Injudicious regulations regarding the army.

* Thib., x., 135, 140. Cap., i., 62, 65. Montg., viii., 60, 68.
† Thib., x., 140, 149. Cap., i., 61, 62

Notwithstanding these obvious and flagrant errors, the cabinet of Louis XVIII. was far from being destitute of men of ability. M. Blacas, the real premier and principal confidant of the king, had an ingenious mind and an upright heart, but his information was limited: he judged of France as he had seen it through the deceitful vision of the emigrants, and was entirely ignorant of the vast, the irremediable changes, both in the opinion of the influential classes, and the distribution of political and physical power, which had taken place during the Revolution. M. d'Ambray, the chancellor, an old lawyer of eminence in Normandy, and M. Ferrand, a monarchical theorist, caused considerable damage to the Restoration, by the long declamations in favour of now antiquated and jealously-received doctrines regarding the authority of legitimate monarchs, with which they prefaced all the royal decrees. The Abbé Montesquieu was inclined to the liberal side: he had embraced the principles of the Constituent Assembly, and shared a large portion of the confidence of the king. Guizot, then little known, had already embraced those doctrines of mingled conservatism and philosophy, to which his genius has subsequently given immortality; the Abbé de Pradt, at the head of the Legion of Honour, and M. de Bourrienne, as postmaster-general, had each brought talents of no ordinary kind to the direction of their several departments. But the ability of the whole cabinet could not stem the difficulties with which they were surrounded; and if they had been gifted with far greater practical sagacity and acquaintance with men than they actually possessed, they would have been shattered by the unpopularity of General Dupont as minister at war; an appointment the most unfortunate that could have been made, for it continually reminded the army of the disaster of Baylen—the first and most humiliating of its reverses. To such a pitch, indeed, did the public discontent on this head arise, that the court were subsequently obliged to remove that ill-fated general, and substitute Marshal Soult in his room; but the army was by this time in such a state of ill-humour, that even his great abilities proved wholly unable to give it a right direction; and his strong leaning to the exiled emperor subsequently proved in no slight degree instrumental in bringing about his return.*

Character of the ministers of the Restoration.

Dec. 5, 1814.

As the restoration of Napoleon was entirely a military movement, and the discontents of the people, founded or unfounded, had scarcely any share in bringing it about, the briefest summary will suffice of the domestic events in France which preceded the Hundred Days. Such was the exasperation of the popular party and the Imperialists at the Bourbons, that by mutual consent they laid aside their whole previous animosities, and combined all their efforts to decry every measure of the government, and misrepresent every step, judicious or injudicious, which they took. A clamour was raised against everything. The celebration of a solemn and most touching funeral service in Nôtre Dame, soon after the return of the royal family, to the memory of Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the Princess Elizabeth,† was set down as the commence-

General cause of complaint alleged against the government.

May 14.

* Cap., i., 66, 67. Thib., x., 146, 150. Montg., viii., 86, 94.
† It was one of the most imposing spectacles ever wit-

ment of persecution against the leaders of the Revolution; the exhumation of the remains of several Vendéan and Chouan leaders, to reinter them in consecrated ground, a proof of the most deplorable superstition; the erection, under the auspices of Marshal Soult, after he had been made minister at war, of a monumental edifice in Quiberon Bay, to the memory of those who had fallen victims there to loyal fidelity and revolutionary perfidy, an indication of a desire to revert to the principles of the Chouans and Vendéans. A solemn ceremony by which, on the anniversary of the death of Louis XVI., his remains and those of Marie Antoinette were removed from their place of sepulture in the garden of Descloseaux, in the Rue Anjou, was regarded as a decided attack on the whole principles of the Revolution.* Few remains of the royal martyrs were to be found; what could be collected, had owed their identification and preservation from insult to the pious care of M. Descloseaux, the proprietor of the garden where they were laid, who worthily received the order of St. Michael and a pension, as the reward of his fidelity. The bones and ashes were carefully enclosed in lead coffins, and translated with extraordinary pomp to the royal mausoleum at St. Denis. The miseries and insolvency entailed on the nation by the ruinous wars of Napoleon† formed a necessary part of the financial *exposé* of the ministers, and constituted the best vindication of the great reductions in all departments which had become unavoidable; this was immediately set down as a direct and scandalous attack on the glory of the Empire. The undisposed-of national domains were, by a just proposition which passed both Chambers, restored to their rightful owners; and this act of justice, joined to a proposition of Marshal Macdonald in the Chamber of Peers to provide an indemnity to the victims of the Revolution,‡ which he called a debt of honour, and to the military men who had been mutilated in the service of their country, which he denominated the debt of blood, though based on the equitable principle of doing even-handed justice to both parties, excited the most general apprehensions. It is unnecessary to go farther: every act of the government of the Restoration —some wise and natural, others injudicious or ill-timed—was misinterpreted, and ascribed to the worst possible motives; and the great party and numerous interests of the Revolution, conscious of their sins, trembled, like Felix in Holy Writ, when the government spoke of a future world, or alluded even to judgment to come.§

Oct. 16.

Jan. 1.

While the French government were thus striving, amid the chaos of revolutionary passions, to close the wounds and mitigate the sufferings of the Revolution, negotiations of the most important character for the general settlement of Europe had commenced, and were already considerably advanced, at Vienna. It had been originally intended that the Congress of Vienna should have commenced its sittings on the 29th of July; but the visit of the allied sovereigns to England, and their subsequent return to their own capitals, necessarily caused it to be adjourned; and it was not till the end of September that the Congress commenced, by the entry of the Emperor Alexander and King of Prussia into the Austrian capital. They were immediately followed by the Kings of Bavaria, Denmark, and Wirtemberg, and a host of lesser princes; while Lord Castlereagh, and subsequently the Duke of Wellington, on the part of England, and M. Talleyrand on that of France, more efficiently than any crowned heads could have done, upheld the dignity and maintained the interests of their respective monarchies. But although the sovereigns and ministers in appearance kept up the most amicable and confidential relations, it was easy to see that their interests and views were widely at variance; and that the removal of common danger and the division of common spoil had produced their usual effect, of sowing dissensions among the victors.*

Commencement of the Congress of Vienna.

Sept. 25.

A preliminary question of precedence first arose as to the rank of the different states assembled, and their representatives; but this was at once terminated by the happy expedient of Alexander, that they should be arranged and sign according to the alphabetical order of the first letter of the name of their respective states. But a more serious difficulty soon after occurred as to the states which should in their own right as principals take part in the deliberations; and it was at first proposed by the ministers of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, that they should, in the first instance, come to an agreement as to the disposal of the territories wrested from France and its allies before they entered into conferences with France and Spain. This proposal was naturally resisted by Talleyrand and the Spanish plenipotentiary; and it was their earnest endeavour, in an energetic note, to show that the treaty of Chaumont, though formally to endure for twenty years, had in reality expired with the attainment of all its objects, and that France, at least, should be admitted into the deliberations. Lord Castlereagh, who early perceived the necessity of a counterpoise to the preponderating influence of Russia in the conferences, supported this note of M. Talleyrand, and Prince Metternich, who was actuated by similar views, did the same; and, in consequence, it was agreed that the committee to whom the questions coming before the Congress should be submitted should be the ministers not only of the four allied powers, but of France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden. The Cardinal Gonzalvi, on the part of the court of Rome, was afterward received, through the personal intercession of the Prince Regent of England: while the plenipotentiaries of Murat, king of Naples,

Commencement of the Congress of Vienna.

Sept. 22.

Oct. 5.

nessed, being attended by all the monarchs, generals, and ministers then in Paris, including the whole marshals of France: the interior of the cathedral was all hung in black, and lighted with a profusion of lamps.—*Personal observation.* * *Ante*, i., 156. † See *Ante*, iv.

‡ For the indemnity of the victims of the Revolution, he submitted the following calculations to the Chamber of Peers:

	Francs.	Sterling.
Value of national property (sold)	4,000,000,000	or £160,000,000
Movable effects (confiscated)	900,000,000	36,000,000
	4,900,000,000	196,000,000
Deduct inscribed on the public funds	300,000,000	
National domains (unsold)	300,000,000	
	600,000,000	24,000,000
Remained to be provided for	4,300,000,000	£172,000,000

—See THIBAUDEAU, x., 199; and BUCHEZ and ROUX, xl., 29, 30.

§ Thib., x., 150, 203. Buchez and Roux, xi., 29, 38.

* Buchez and Roux, xl., 41. Cap., i., 70, 73. Hard., xii., 452, 453.

the Kings of Sicily, of Bavaria, the Low Countries, Saxony, and Denmark, besides the ministers of the Swiss and Genoese Republics, though not admitted to the conferences of the greater powers, were in attendance at Vienna, and had their interests attended to by such of their more powerful neighbours as were disposed to support them.*

Points on which the great powers were united.

This preliminary difficulty, as always occurs in such cases, furnished a key to the course which the different powers were likely to take in the approaching negotiation; but a considerable time elapsed before the real divisions appeared. Much was done, in the first instance, without any difference of opinion taking place. Territories inhabited by 31,691,000 persons were at the disposal of the allied powers, and there was for each enough and to spare. It was once agreed, in conformity with the secret articles of the treaty of Paris, that Belgium, united to Holland, should form a united kingdom, under the title of the Netherlands; that Sweden and Norway should be united; that Hanover, with a considerable accession of territory, taken from the kingdom of Westphalia, should be restored to the King of England; that Lombardy should again be placed under the rule of Austria, and Savoy of Piedmont. So far all was easily arranged; but the question of how Poland, Saxony, and Genoa were to be disposed of, were not so easily adjusted; and the first of them gave rise to dissensions so serious, that they not only completely broke up for the time the grand alliance which had effected the deliverance of Europe, but had it not been for the unexpected, and in that view most opportune, return of Napoleon from Elba, they would, in all probability, have led to the flames of war again breaking out, and the old allied forces being conducted to mutual slaughter.†

Alexander demands the whole of Poland as a separate monarchy, of which he was to be the head.

Alexander loudly insisted that the whole Grand-duchy of Warsaw should be ceded to Russia as an indemnity for the sacrifices she had made, and losses sustained during the war. He represented that, were he to return to St. Petersburg without having obtained some adequate compensation for the sacrifices the nation had undergone, it would be as much as his crown was worth; that Poland was already *de facto* occupied by the Russian troops, and the Poles expected a revival of their nationality solely from a union with the Russian Empire, or their separate establishment under a prince of the Russian imperial family; and that, considering the immense losses which his empire had sustained during the war, and the vast exertions she had made, it was in the highest degree reasonable that she should now obtain a territory essential to her security, and extending along no inconsiderable part of her frontier. These arguments, in themselves by no means destitute of weight, were powerfully supported by the significant hint that he had three hundred thousand men ready to march at a moment's notice; that his troops already occupied the whole of Poland;‡ and that, by representing the Russian alliance as the only means of restoring their lost nationality, the whole warlike force of the Sarmatians would soon be ranged on his side.

Views of Prussia on Saxony.

Prussia, entirely under the influence of Russia, as well from gratitude as situation, entered warmly into these pretensions, and supported them with all her influence at the Congress. She had her own views, independent of the immense debt of gratitude which she owed to Russia for deliverance from the thraldom of Napoleon, in this adhesion. It had been stipulated in the treaty of Kalisch, which formed the basis of the grand alliance, that Prussia was to be "reinstated, at the close of hostilities, in all respects, statistical, financial, and geographical, as it had stood at the commencement of the war of 1806, with such additions as might be deemed practicable."* The Prussians now demanded fulfilment of this promise, and claimed, besides various provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, which were at the disposal of the allies by the dissolution of the French Empire, the whole of Saxony. Prince Hardenberg, the able minister of the court of Berlin, supported this demand in an elaborate note, and insisted that, as Russia claimed a considerable part of Prussian Poland to round her proposed acquisitions on the Vistula, it was indispensably necessary that Prussia should be largely indemnified in Germany; that the interests of Europe imperatively required that a powerful intermediate state should be placed between Russia and France; and that the recent dangers which Europe had escaped clearly pointed to the side on which the necessary additions should be made to her territory. On condition, then, of obtaining Saxony and an indemnity on the Rhine, Prussia proposed to cede to Russia the southern provinces of Poland; and, to appease the jealousy of the German powers at this aggrandizement of Russia, suggested that the fortifications of Thorn and Dantzic should be demolished. In conclusion, he strongly contended that, as so reconstructed, Prussia, with a population of 9,800,000 souls, would not be strengthened in the same degree as Russia would be by the acquisition of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and Austria by Lombardy and the Milanese.†

Oct. 22 and Dec. 2.

Views of England, France, and Austria on the proposals.

The views of France, Austria, and England were decidedly opposed to these sweeping annexations of territory to the Northern powers. Independent of the obvious peril to the security of the other European states, if Russia were augmented by the greater part of Poland, and brought down by means of her outwork Prussia to the Elbe and the Rhine, which was sufficient to range the courts of Paris and Vienna on his side, Lord Castlereagh in an especial manner, and with the most energetic ability, opposed the union of the crowns of Poland and Russia on the same head, or the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, as contrary to the great principles of justice on which the war against Napoleon had been maintained.‡ The conduct of

* Hard., xii., 454, 456. Cap., i., 75, 77. Buchez and Roux, xl., 41.

† Hard., xii., 455, 457. Cap., i., 78, 79.

‡ Note of Russia, Dec. 18, 1814, Cap., i., 87. Hard., xi., 456, 458.

* *Ante*, iv., 46.

† Note, Oct. 22 and Dec. 16, 1814, Schoell, Trait. de Paix. xi., 45, 49. Hard., xii., 458, 463. Cap., i., 81, 84.

‡ Lord Castlereagh declared, in his repeated memorials, "that he opposed firmly, and with all the force in his power, in the name of England, the erection of a kingdom in Poland, the crown of which should be placed on the same head with, or which should form an integral part of, the Empire of Russia; that the wish of his government was to see an independent power more or less extensive established there, under a distinct dynasty, and as an inter-

the British minister on this occasion was worthy of the cause for which he had contended, and the nation which he represented; and he met with a cordial support both in M. Talleyrand and Prince Metternich, who beheld, with undisguised apprehension, these proposed additions to the power of their nearest neighbours. The former of these statesmen, in particular, resisted the annexation of Saxony to Prussia as a measure of severity to a fallen monarch alike inexpedient and unjust. Alexander expected the resistance of Austria and England to his designs, and no serious alienation ensued in consequence between him and their ministers; but he was quite unprepared for the vigorous stand made by France on the occasion. He openly charged Louis XVIII. with black ingratitude, and his displeasure was manifested without disguise to M. Talleyrand; at the same time he contracted close relations with Eugene Beauharnois, who was at Vienna at the time, openly espoused the cause of Murat, in opposition to the Bourbon family, in the contest for the throne of Naples, and spoke of the unfitness of the elder branch of the Bourbons for the throne, and the probability of a revolution similar to that of 1688, which might put the sceptre in the hands of the house of Orleans.*

To such a height, however, did the divisions arise, that they were soon not confined to mere indications of ill-humour at the Congress. Both parties prepared for war. Alexander halted in Poland his whole armies on their return to Russia, where they were kept together and retained in every respect on the war footing. Hardenberg declared that, "as to Prussia, it would not abandon Saxony; that it had conquered it, and would keep it, without either the intention or the inclination of restoration;" and that the cabinet of Berlin, to support the declaration, armed its whole contingents, as if war were on the point of breaking out. At the same time, the Grand-duke Constantine, who commanded the Russian armies, two hundred and eighty thousand strong, in Lithuania and Poland, published an animated address, in which he announced the intention of the emperor his brother to restore to the Poles their lost nationality, and called on them to rally around his standards, as the only means of effecting it.† On the other side the three powers were not idle: Austria put her armies in Galicia on the war footing; France was invited to suspend the disarming, which the ruined state of her finances had rendered unnecessary; British troops in great numbers were sent over to Belgium; the absent forces in America, rendered disposable by the prospect of peace with that country, were destined, on their return, to the same quarter; and, in the midst of a Congress assembled for the general pacification of the world, a million of armed men were retained around their banners, ready for mutual slaughter.‡§

Military preparations on both sides.

Jan. 18.

Matters at length were brought to a crisis by the conclusion of a secret treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Austria, France, and England, at Vienna, on the 3d of February, 1815. By this treaty it was stipulated that the contracting parties should act in concert, and in a disinterested manner, to carry into effect the stipulations of the treaty of Paris. It set out with the preamble that the "high contracting parties, convinced that the powers whom it behooved to carry into effect this treaty, should be maintained in a state of perfect security and independence, to enable them worthily to discharge that important duty, consider it, in consequence, as necessary, with reference to the pretensions recently manifested, to provide against every aggression to which their own possessions, or any of them, might be exposed, from a feeling of resentment at the propositions which they have felt it their duty to submit, and to sustain by a common agreement the principles of justice and equity which they had advanced in carrying out the provisions of the treaty of Paris." On this narrative, the three contracting powers agreed mutually to support each other if one was attacked; and, in order to do so with effect, to maintain severally a hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand should be cavalry; in the event of war breaking out, the views of the allies were to be strictly regulated by the terms of the treaty of Paris, so far as the extent and frontiers of their several possessions were concerned, and a commander-in-chief was to be appointed. The plan of the proposed operations was traced out by Generals Radjewski and Langeron on the part of Austria, Marshal Wrede on that of Bavaria, and General Ricard on that of France; and they were intended to meet the case supposed, that the Russian armies would invade Moravia and move upon Vienna. The Kings of Hanover, Bavaria, and Piedmont were invited to accede to this treaty, which they immediately did; so that, in effect, by it the whole forces of Western and Southern Europe were arrayed against Russia and Prussia.*

Secret treaty between Austria, France, and England. February 3.

What pains soever the principal powers concerned may have taken to prevent this treaty from coming to the knowledge of the other sovereigns at the Congress, it to a certain extent transpired, and produced a considerable modification in the views of the Northern powers. Fortified by this support, Metternich took a bolder tone, and in reply to the menacing note of Hardenberg, transmitted an answer, in which, after representing that the safety of Austria, already compromised in Poland by the increase of Russia, would be destroyed by the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia, he explained in what sense the secret articles of the treaties of Kalisch and Reichenbach, so far as they related to the aggrandizement of the latter power, were to be understood,† and contended that they would be amply carried into effect by the cession to Prussia of a portion of Saxony on the right bank of the Elbe, containing 800,000 souls. The reply to

Effect of this treaty on the negotiations.

Feb. 4.

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mediate state between the three great monarchies."—*Memorial*, 16*th December*, 1814; see CAPEFIGUE, *Cent Jours*, i., 86.

* Cap., i., 87, 88. Hard., xii., 461, 468. Schoell, Trait. de Paix, xi., 50, 56.

† "The emperor, your powerful protector, invokes your aid. Rally around his standards; let your arms be raised for the defence of your country and your political existence."—CONSTANTINE'S *Proclamation*, 11*th Dec.*, 1814, CAPEFIGUE, i., 86.

‡ Hard., xii., 467, 468. Cap., i., 91, 97.

§ Viz., Russia..... Men. 280,000
Prussia 173,000
Austria..... 220,000
Anglo-Belgian 80,000
Piedmont..... 60,000
Lesser German powers 100,000
France 100,000
Total..... 1,013,000

* See the articles in Cap., i., 94, 96; and Hard., xii., 468, 470.

† *Ante*, iii., 396, 452.

Feb. 6. Feb. 8. that note clearly showed that the Northern powers had taken the alarm: for Hardenberg, in the name of Prussia, agreed to relinquish the possession of Thorn, and the district of Tarnapol adjoining it. Several other notes were interchanged; Russia relinquished several districts of Poland; Prussia agreed to be satisfied with a part of Saxony; and it was evident that the high pretensions of these powers had undergone an abatement: but nothing had definitively been fixed on, when an event occurred, which resounded like a thunderbolt from one end of Europe to the other, extinguished all these jealousies, and instantly drew the bonds of the old grand alliance as close together as they had been in the days of Leipsic and Paris.*

Formation of the German Confederacy. One of the most important matters which came under the consideration of the Congress of Vienna, though not so difficult of adjustment, was the reconstruction of the Germanic Confederacy. The old empire and younger confederations of the Rhine having been both swept away by the changes of time, it became necessary to create some new bond of union, which should at once provide for the security, and furnish a shield to the rights of the lesser Germanic States, and prevent that catastrophe which had uniformly occurred in former wars, of the French crossing the Rhine, and finding their battle-field and the sinews of war in the territories of the lesser States of Germany, before the jealousies or foresight of the greater powers would permit them to arm for their relief. The mutual jealousies of Prussia and Austria rendered this no easy matter; but the judgment and tact of Metternich proved equal to the task. He proposed the union of the whole Germanic States into a great confederacy, bound to afford mutual support in case of external attack, and to be directed by a diet, in which Austria and Prussia were each to have two voices, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Hanover, each one; but with the power to these greater powers of making separate war and peace for themselves. The legislative power was to be vested in an assembly composed as well of the representatives of the larger states as of those of the lesser and free towns; but the powers of this assembly had regard only to matters of internal and pacific arrangement, and did not extend to the declaration on their own authority of peace and war. As this constitution subjected the whole of Germany to the political direction of a diet, in which Austria and Prussia had four votes out of seven, it practically gave these states, if they drew together, the entire government, so far as external relations went, of the confederacy; but such was the influence of the greater powers, and such the sense which was still entertained of the necessity of a strong barrier against the aggressions of France, that Talleyrand was unable to stir up any resistance to it, and it was agreed to without opposition.†

Formation of the kingdom of the Netherlands. Austria having renounced all claim to the Low Countries, which had been found by experience to be rather a burden than an advantage to the monarchy, little difficulty was experienced in arranging the affairs and establishing the kingdom of the Netherlands. It had been one of the secret articles of the treaty of Paris,* that the Netherlands and Holland should be united into one kingdom, under a prince of the house of Nassau; and this stipulation was now carried into effect by the reunion of the whole old seventeen provinces into a monarchy, under the title of the kingdom of the Netherlands. The great fortress of Luxemburg, with its adjacent territory, was only excluded, which, from its military importance, was declared to form part of the German Confederation, of which it was one of the frontier bulwarks; but the King of the Netherlands acquired it also as Duke of Luxemburg. By patent, dated 16th of March, 1815, the King of Holland took the title of King of the Netherlands and Grand-duke of Luxemburg, which title was immediately recognised by all the courts of Europe.†

March 16, 1815.

Treaty between England and the kingdom of the Netherlands. Holland ceded to Great Britain by this arrangement the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice; but in return Great Britain restored to the King of the Netherlands the noble island of Java—a colony worth all the other islands in the Eastern Archipelago put together, and which, under British management, since its capture in 1810, had become so flourishing that it promised soon to yield a larger surplus revenue than the whole of our Indian possessions put together. The uncalled-for restitution of this splendid possession, though owing to an honourable generosity, was one of the greatest errors ever committed by the English government, and is the most important political mistake chargeable against Lord Castlereagh; but the attention of that great man, absorbed by Continental interest, was not at that moment sufficiently drawn to the great and growing colonial empire of Great Britain. The dominions thus acquired by the house of Orange embraced the richest and most flourishing provinces in Europe, containing in all, with Holland, no less than 5,424,000 inhabitants, peopled at the rate of 1829 to the square league. It was a condition of its erection, that the new kingdom should be ruled by a representative government, framed very much on the model of that of France, and that the kingdom of the Netherlands, jointly with England, should undertake the burden of a loan of 50,000,000 florins (£4,200,000), formerly borrowed by Russia from the capitalists of Amsterdam.‡

Settlement of the affairs of Switzerland. The affairs of Switzerland, at the same time, occupied the attention of the Congress; but as the desire for aggrandizement on the part of none of the great powers was turned in that direction, they were adjusted with ease and with great impartiality. The confederacy was declared to embrace the whole nineteen cantons, as they stood by the convention of Bâle on the 29th of December, 1813,§ on an equal footing, which effectually excluded the unjust principle, that one state should be subjected to another state. The Valais, Geneva and its territory, with the principality of Neufchatel, were united to Switzerland, and formed so many cantons. The bishopric of Bâle, with the town of Bienne, were restored to the canton of Berne;‖ and a great variety of lesser decisions were adopted to regulate the

* Hard., xii., 469, 470. Cap., i., 177, 178. Schoell, Cong. de Vienne, vi., 121, 124.

† Hard., xii., 473, 475. Schoell, xi., 257, 277. Cong. de Vienne, vi., 147, 213.

* *Ante*, iv., 412. † Schoell, xi., 116, 117.

‡ Treaty, May 19, 1815, Schoell, xi., 119. Malte Brun, viii., 667.

§ *Ante*, iv., 279.

‖ Schoell, xi., 96, 115; and Recueil, viii., 336.

pecuniary concerns of the different cantons, of which these mountaineers were in the highest degree tenacious. This constitution was formally acceded to by the whole cantons on the 27th of May, 1815, and has ever since formed the basis of the Helvetic Confederacy.

May 27.

Italy presented in some respects a more complicated field for diplomacy. The cession, indeed, of Lombardy to Austria, and the Genoese Republic to the kingdom of Piedmont, was at once agreed to without any difficulty, despite the earnest remonstrances of the citizens of the latter commonwealth, who passionately desired the restoration of their ancient form of government; so strongly was the necessity felt of strengthening the states on the French frontier, and, above all, the kingdom of Sardinia, in whose hands the keys of the most important passes from France into Italy were placed. But the conflicting claims of Murat and the old Bourbon family to the throne of Naples excited a warm interest at the Congress; the more especially as Alexander, out of pique at the resistance of the court of France to his views in regard to Poland and Saxony, now openly supported the claims of the former to the throne, grounding his support on the engagement of Austria to maintain him in his throne and enlarge his territory when he joined the Grand Alliance. The other powers, however, were far from sharing these sentiments: the court of Rome felt the utmost alarm at the close proximity of an ambitious prince, who openly coveted, and had more than once attempted to seize, the papal territories; and Austria was little inclined to permit the permanent establishment of a revolutionary throne so near the inflammable materials of her Italian provinces. Murat earnestly appealed, in a laboured memorial, to England to support him in his throne, in terms of the engagement undertaken by Lord William Bentinck and General Nugent; but Lord Castlereagh officially announced to the Congress in the end of February, that Murat had so completely failed in the performance of his own engagements, that he had virtually liberated the allies from theirs, and that they were not bound to maintain him on the throne. Meanwhile, Murat was so far from anticipating any danger to his Neapolitan crown, that he was dreaming of the sceptre of the whole of Italy south of the Po; and with that view, in spite of all the representations of Austria and the court of Rome, kept military possession of the three legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Ravenna, as the frontier provinces of his anticipated dominions. Nay, so far did he carry his extravagance, that on the 15th of February he made a formal demand for the passage of eighty thousand men through the Austrian territories in Italy, to act against France; a proposition which only tended to augment the apprehensions of the cabinet of Vienna, and led to the force of that power, in the Italian Peninsula, being augmented to a hundred and fifty thousand men.*

Affairs of Italy, and alarm of Napoleon's return.

Feb. 25.

Feb. 15.

This military position and demand excited the jealousy of the allied powers; the more especially as, towards the end of February, rumours reached Vienna of constant correspondence between the Isle of Elba and the adjoining shores of Italy, and an intended descent by Napoleon on the coast of France. These rumours soon acquired such consistency, that the propriety of removing him from the neighbourhood of Italy had already been more than once agitated in the Congress; and various places of residence for him, in exchange for Elba, had been proposed: among others, one of the Canary Islands, which was suggested by the Portuguese minister, and St. Helena or St. Lucie, which were proposed by Lord Castlereagh. Alexander, however, still firmly held out for adhering to the treaty of Fontainebleau, and maintaining the fallen emperor in possession of the island of Elba: alleging as a reason, that his personal honour had been pledged to his great antagonist for that asylum, and that he would not be the first to break it. Metternich, however, was so strongly impressed with the impending danger, that he secretly despatched a letter to Fouché at Paris, inquiring "What would happen if Napoleon returned? what if the King of Rome, with a squadron of horse, appeared on the frontier? and what would France do if left to its spontaneous movement?" The sagacious minister of police replied, that if one regiment sent against Napoleon ranged itself on his side, the whole army would follow its example; that if the King of Rome was escorted to the frontiers by an Austrian regiment, the whole nation would instantly hoist his colours; and that, if no external stimulus was applied, the nation would seek refuge in the Orleans dynasty. These dangers, however, were only appreciated by the few who had foresight equal to the Austrian statesman or French revolutionist; and all heads at Vienna were involved in a whirl of gayety, splendour, and dissipation, which gave rise to the witty saying of the Prince de Ligne, "The Congress dances, but it does not advance;" when, on the 7th of March, intelligence was brought to Metternich at a great ball at Vienna, that NAPOLEON HAD SECRETLY LEFT ELBA.*

Conference for the removal of Napoleon from Elba, when he leaves that island.

If a thunderbolt had fallen in the middle of the brilliant circle assembled in the imperial ballroom at Vienna, it could not have excited greater consternation than this simple announcement. It was deemed expedient, nevertheless, to conceal the alarm which all really felt, and next day, Metternich, Wellington, and Talleyrand went to Presburg, to announce to the King of Saxony, as had been previously arranged, the determination come to by the Congress in regard to the cessions of territory which he was required to make, under the pain of losing his crown. The affairs of Saxony, however, were soon adjusted. All minor differences were immediately forgotten: the strides of Russia, the aggrandizement of Prussia, the terrors of Austria, were buried in oblivion: all lesser subjects of alarm were absorbed in the pressing danger arising from the return of Napoleon to the throne of France. Alexander was profoundly irritated at the event. Alone he had for long contended against the other powers at the Congress for the maintenance of Napoleon in the island of Elba, as a thing to which, whether right or wrong, his personal honour was engaged; and he felt it, therefore, as a personal injury,

Prodigious sensation excited in the Congress by this event. March 7.

* Schoell, Trait. de Paix, xi., 189, 195.

* Cap., i., 177, 180. Hard., xii., 475, 476. Schoell, xi., 207, 208.

when the object of his solicitude was the first himself to break his engagement. Much uncertainty at first prevailed as to the place of his destination, and many suspected it was Naples, where Murat was openly preparing for hostilities: but all doubt was soon removed; the posts of the succeeding days brought intelligence by the way of Turin, that he had landed in the Gulf of St. Juan, near Frejus; that he had taken the road for Paris through the mountains of Gap: in fine, that Labedoyère and the garrison of Grenoble had joined him, and he was making an unresisted and triumphant progress towards Lyons.*

Decided measures of the Congress against Napoleon.

As the revolt of the army and approaching downfall of the throne of Louis XVIII. could no longer be doubted, the Congress took the most vigorous measures to provide against the danger. The cabinet of Vienna felt it incumbent on it to take the lead on this occasion; not only as its apprehensions had been the main cause of the late divisions which had prevailed in the deliberations of the allies, but because Napoleon, relying on his family connexion with the imperial house of Hapsburg, had disseminated with profusion, on his road to Grenoble, a proclamation, in which he declared that he had returned to France with the concurrence of Austria, and that he was speedily to be supported by a hundred thousand of the troops of that nation. Metternich, therefore, in the first formal meeting held to deliberate on the course which should be pursued, stated, that "it would be worthy of the allied powers, and of the highest importance in the existing crisis, to express their opinion on an event which could not fail to create a great sensation in every part of Europe; that Napoleon Bonaparte, in quitting the island of Elba, and disembarking in France at the head of an armed force, had openly rendered himself the disturber of the general peace; that as such he could no longer claim the protection of any treaty or law; that the powers who had signed the treaty of Paris felt themselves in an especial manner called upon to declare in the face of Europe in what light they viewed that attempt; that they should add, that they were resolved at all hazards to carry into effect the whole provisions of the treaty of Paris; and that they were all prepared to support the King of France with their whole forces, in the event of circumstances rendering their assistance necessary." These sentiments, which had been previously concerted with Talleyrand, specially in order to detach the cause of Napoleon from that of the independence of the French monarchy, met with the unanimous and cordial concurrence of all present; and, in consequence, a declaration was forthwith drawn up and signed by all the powers, which, in the most rigid terms, proscribed Napoleon as a public enemy, with whom neither peace nor truce could be concluded, and expressed the determination of the powers to employ the whole forces at their disposal, to prevent Europe from being again plunged into the abyss of revolution.†‡

March 12.

This energetic and decisive proclamation was immediately forwarded to Paris by the way of Strasburg, with instructions to the courier intrusted with it to circulate as many copies as possible in the different towns and villages through which he passed in his route from the Rhine to the capital. Nor were the efforts of the allied sovereigns confined to mere denunciations on paper: the most vigorous measures were immediately taken to assemble a powerful force in the field. The Russian troops in Poland, two hundred and eighty thousand strong, were directed to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice; and Alexander declared "that he was ready to throw into the crusade the three hundred thousand men of whom he had the disposal, to put an end to these revolts of Prætorian guards; and that, as he was the most culpable in having retained Napoleon so long at Elba, so he would be the first to repair his fault:" Austria put on the war footing her armies in Italy and Germany, amounting to two hundred and fifty thousand men: Prussia called forth the landwehr in all her dominions, and raised her forces to two hundred thousand men, of whom a hundred and fifty thousand were ordered to march to the Low Countries: the lesser states of Germany all called out their respective contingents, and, amid the songs of triumph and threats of vengeance, moved towards the Rhine: while England, now delivered from the pressure of the American war, exerted extraordinary activity both in pouring troops into Flanders, and providing for the equipment of the newly-raised forces of the Belgians: numerous levies were raised in Hanover, and the old troops already had begun their march for the Flemish frontier: even Denmark and Sweden, forgetting their recent divisions, began to arm, and prepared to join the general coalition of Europe; and the Swiss cantons, departing from the cautious neutrality hitherto preserved, prepared to take an active part in the strife, and assail France on the side where it was most vulnerable; while Spain and Portugal joined in the general league, and slowly prepared their battalions to march towards the Pyrenees. And thus was verified the saying of Chateaubriand, "that if the cocked-hat and surtout of Napoleon were placed on a stick on the shores of Brest, it would cause Europe to run to arms from one end to the other."*

Military preparations of the allied powers.

The imminent danger which the whole pow-

* Sir C. Stuart's Despatch to Lord Castlereagh, March 8, 1815, Cap., i., 179, 185. Thib., x., 224, 225.

† Schoell, Hist. des Trait., xi., 207, 208. Cap., i., 182, 183.

‡ "The powers which signed the treaty of Paris, reassembled in Congress at Vienna, informed of the escape of Napoleon Bonaparte, and of his entry with an armed force into France, owe it to their own dignity, and to the interest of nations, to make a solemn announcement of their sentiments on the occasion. In breaking, after this manner, the convention which had established him in the island of Elba, Bonaparte has destroyed the sole legal title to which his political existence is attached. By reappearing in France, with projects of trouble and overthrow, he has not less deprived himself of the protection of the laws, and made it evident in the face of the universe that there can no longer be either peace or truce with him. The powers, therefore, declare that Bonaparte has placed himself out of the pale of civil and social relations, and that, as the general enemy and disturber of the world, he is abandoned to public justice. They declare, at the same time, that firmly resolved to maintain untouched the treaty of Paris of 30th of May, 1814, and the dispositions sanctioned by that treaty, they will employ the whole means at their disposal to secure the preservation of general peace, the object of all their efforts; and although firmly persuaded that the whole of France will combine to crush this last mad attempt of criminal ambition, yet, if it should prove otherwise, they declare that they are ready to unite all their efforts, and exert all the powers at their disposal, to give the King of France all necessary assistance, and make common cause against all those who shall compromise the public tranquillity.—METTERNICH, TALLEYRAND, WELLINGTON, HARDENBERG, NESSELRODE, LOWENHEIM."—See SCHOELL, *Recueil des Pièces Officielles*, v., 1.

* Cap., i., 194, 196. Schoell, Hist. des Trait. de Paix, xi., 213, 214.

Settlement of the affairs of Poland.

ers ran from the return of Napoleon speedily led to a decision of the long-debated questions of Poland and Saxony. Russia at length agreed to accept of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, without the fortress of Thorn and its dependant territory, with the exception of a portion of it, containing eight hundred thousand souls, which was to be ceded to Prussia; and it was expressly stipulated that Poland should not be incorporated with Russia, but should form a separate kingdom, preserving its own laws, institutions, language, and religion. After a great deal of negotiation, a treaty was concluded on these bases on the 3d of May, between Russia and Saxony; another on the same day, between Prussia and Russia; and a third between Austria, Russia, and Prussia. May 3. By these treaties, Saxony ceded to Russia in perpetuity the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, to be erected into a separate kingdom in favour of the Emperor of Russia, but not incorporated with that empire: the ancient town of Cracow, with a small territory adjacent, was erected into a separate republic, containing in all 61,000 souls, with the shadow, at least, of independence. By this treaty a portion of Poland recovered its long-lost nationality: above four millions of Sarmatians were restored to the rank of a separate people: the Russian viceroy at Warsaw maintained regal state, surrounded by Polish soldiers, Polish uniforms, Polish ministers, and Polish institutions. A constitution, defective, indeed, in some essential particulars establishing the elements of freedom, but still a vast improvement upon its old stormy *comitia*, was guarantied; such was the growth of the nation, and the improvement of its strength under the regular and stable government which followed, that, on occasion of the revolt of 1830, it singly withstood, guided by the genius of Skrynecki, the whole military force of Russia for nine months, and was at length subdued only by the accession of Prussia to the league of its enemies. Such as they were, these blessings were mainly to be ascribed to the philanthropic disposition of the Emperor Alexander, and the determined stand made by Lord Castlereagh: but, in common with many other guarantees of real freedom, they perished fifteen years afterward under the assault of Democracy, roused into frantic activity by the triumph of the barricades, which subverted the throne of Charles X.*

And of Saxony.

The decision of the question regarding Saxony was somewhat more expeditious. The unhappy Frederic Augustus, who, since the fatal overthrow of Leipsic, had inhabited the castle of Fredericksfield as a sort of state prisoner, was invited by the allied sovereigns to approach the vicinity of Vienna, and arrived at Presburg on the 4th of March, just two days before intelligence arrived of the departure of Napoleon from Elba. By the intervention of Great Britain, this intricate and delicate negotiation was adjusted; the share of Saxony devolving to Prussia was reduced to a territory containing 1,100,000 souls; and Hanover was contented with a portion containing 250,000. Prussia accepted these modifications; and the King of Saxony, threatened with the total loss of his dominions in the event of refusal, had no alternative, after long holding out, but compliance. Under protest, therefore, that his consent to the alienation of so large a portion of his dominions was constrained, he submitted to the conditions; the King of Prussia was March 12. authorized, by a note of the Congress, to take possession of the ceded territory; and at length, by a formal treaty concluded on May, 8. the 18th of May, peace was finally concluded between the contending parties. By this treaty, Saxony ceded to Prussia, in perpetuity, the whole of Lower Lusatia, part of Upper Lusatia, the fortress and circle of Wittenberg, the circle of Thuringia, and various other territories on the right bank of the Elbe, containing 1,100,000 souls. Prussia at the same time acquired a portion of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, containing 810,000 inhabitants, in addition to the whole territories which she possessed before the battle of Jena; acquisitions which raised her population to above ten millions of souls, and elevated her to the rank of a first-rate power. Dresden, Leipsic, and not quite two thirds of his old dominions, remained to the King of Saxony; and although Europe deeply sympathized with the cruel partition of the territories of an ancient and respectable house, yet it was impossible to deny that the sovereign had brought the catastrophe upon himself; and that, as he had cast in his lot with Napoleon, largely participated in his conquests, and to the last resisted all the efforts of the allies to detach him from his alliance, so he could not in justice complain if he shared his fall.*

Acts of the Congress for the free navigation of the Rhine, and the abolition of the slave-trade.

It only remains to add, before finally taking leave of the Congress of Vienna, that on two points of importance to the internal interests of Europe, and the general interest of humanity, its deliberations, actuated by philanthropy and guided by wisdom, conferred a lasting benefit on mankind. 1st. Wise regulations were established for securing the free navigation of its great rivers, particularly the Rhine, the Neckar, and the Meuse, without, at the same time, abrogating the just rights of the potentates who were interested in the dues of its passage. Moderate duties were established, to be drawn by a central board, and allotted to each of the proprietors who substantiated titles in proportion to their respective interests. The rents amounted to 511,000 florins, or £42,000 a year. 2d. The great and important subject of the abolition of the slave-trade occupied a considerable portion of the attention of the Congress. The House of Commons had petitioned the King of England to use his endeavours to procure the abolition, by all civilized nations, of this infamous traffic, and several states had concluded treaties with Great Britain, more or less stringent, for its limitation or abolition. In particular, this had Feb. 19, 1810. been done by a treaty with the court of Rio Janeiro in 1810, and Sweden March 3, 1813. in 1813. Denmark had previously set the first example of the great deed of justice, by abolishing the traffic in 1794, by an edict to come into operation after the lapse of Jan. 1, 1794. ten years. Before leaving Paris, Lord Castlereagh had addressed a circular to all the allied powers, earnestly requesting their co-operation in that great object; and not only had they all expressed opinions favourable to the proposed abolition, but the King of the Netherlands, by a

* See the Treaties in Martens's N. R., ii., 236, 251; iv., 127; and abridged in Schoell, Trait. de Paix, xi., 74, 89.

* See the Treaty in Martens's N. R., ii., 272; and Schoell, xi.. 61.

June 15, 1815. decree in June, 1815, abolished it in his dominions. A treaty was also July 5, 1814. concluded between England and Spain, by which the King of Spain engaged to take efficacious measures for abolishing the slave-trade throughout his dominions; Jan. 21 and 22, 1813. and at the Congress of Vienna a great step was made in the same career by a treaty with Portugal, by which the slave-trade was absolutely prohibited to the subjects of Portugal to the north of the equator: no less than £600,000 was the price paid by England for this concession to the principles of humanity. Great resistance, however, was made by France and Spain to the efforts of Lord Castlereagh to procure the consent of their respective courts to the entire abolition of the slave-trade within any Feb. 8, 1815. limited period; and all that he could obtain was a joint declaration, signed by all the powers, of their abhorrence of the traffic, and their desire for its being effectually put an end to, but leaving the period for its entire abolition to be fixed by separate negotiations between the different powers.*

It was not surprising that the European powers strove to reconcile their divisions and accommodate their differences at the Congress of Vienna; for an event had now occurred on the shores of the Mediterranean which again placed the fate of the world at hazard, and loudly called for their united efforts to stem the torrent of evil. This event was the return of Napoleon from Elba.

Return of Napoleon from Elba.

With a blindness to the future and probable course of events, which now appears scarcely conceivable, but of which, at the time of the treaty of Fontainebleau,† Lord Castlereagh had fully appreciated the danger, the unreflecting generosity of the allied sovereigns had assigned to Napoleon, in independent sovereignty, a little island on the Tuscan coast, within sight of Italy, within a few days' sail of France, and in a situation, of all others, the most favourable for carrying on intrigues with both countries. As if, too, they had purposely intended to invite a second descent, he was placed there with an ample revenue; an armed force, which was soon raised, by veterans who flocked to his standard from the adjacent shores, to above a thousand tried and experienced soldiers; and three small vessels of war at his disposal, while there was not a single English line-of-battle ship or frigate to prevent an expedition sailing against the coast of France. Sir Neil Campbell and the other allied commissioners, indeed, were there, and enjoyed a large share of the society of the emperor; but they were merely a species of accredited diplomatists at his court; they could only report to their respective cabinets what was going on, and were neither entitled to restrain his proceedings, nor had they any armed force at their disposal to coerce his attempts. A brig of eighteen guns, indeed, cruised off the island; but it was wholly unable to blockade Porto Ferrajo, or prevent the descent of the emperor at the head of his Guards on the adjacent shores. It was easy to foresee what would be the result of this extraordinary facility afforded to the dethroned conqueror. A constant correspondence was maintained by Napoleon with his adherents in France and Italy: his friends and relatives were continually in communication with, or visiting him; and soon a vast conspiracy was formed, with its centre in Paris, and its ramifications throughout the whole army and a great part of the civil functionaries, and having for its object to overturn the dynasty of the Bourbons, and replace the emperor on the throne.*

Situation of Napoleon at Elba. Commencement of a conspiracy in France in his favour.

The inferior officers and soldiers of the army were in an especial manner the seat of this conspiracy. The marshals and generals, worn out with war, and glad at any price to secure the peaceable possession of their titles and fortunes, had in good faith, for the most part, embraced the party of the Restoration: but though the troops had formally taken the oath to the new government, yet in their hearts they had never renounced their allegiance to the emperor; and their devotion to him was only the more profound, that "distance lent enchantment to the view," and that no present fatigue or sufferings interfered with the charm of old recollections. The snows of Russia, the overthrow of Leipsic, the disasters of France, were forgotten: he appeared only to their recollection as the hero of Rivoli or Austerlitz: the resistless chief who led them, conquering and to conquer, to every capital of Europe. These feelings were all but universal in the troops and in the officers, from the colonels downward; and while the generals and marshals besieged the antechambers of the Tuileries, and signed loyal addresses resounding with the fleurs-de-lys, Henry IV., and the white flag, the poor soldiers, often the last depositaries in a corrupted age of fidelity and attachment, in secret adhered to their old allegiance: they guarded the emperor's eagles as their household gods, kept the tricolour cockades with pious care in their knapsacks, spoke with rapture of his exploits in their barracks, and worshipped his image in their hearts. Various words to signify the beloved object were invented, and, though known to thousands and tens of thousands, the secret was religiously preserved: he was called "Père la Violette," and the "Petit Caporal;" and the rumour spread through the army, "that he would appear with the violet in spring on the Seine, to chase from thence the priests and emigrants who have insulted the national glory."†

Its great ramifications in the army, and Napoleon's correspondence with Murat.

Its close proximity to the Italian shore led naturally to a secret correspondence between the island of Elba and the court of Naples. Murat, ever governed by ambition, and yet destitute of the firmness of purpose requisite to render it successful, now found that his vacillation of conduct had ruined him with the aristocratic, as it had formerly done with the Revolutionary party, and the allies were little disposed to reward his deviation from his engagements by the lasting possession of the throne of Naples. He threw himself once more into the arms of France, and it was arranged that the descent of Napoleon on the coast of Provence should be contemporaneous with the advance of his troops to the Po, and the proclamation of the great principle of Italian unity and independence. At the same time, various illustrious strangers of both sexes visited Napoleon at Elba; among the former was Lord Eb-

Napoleon's correspondence with Murat. Profound dissimulation, and life in Elba.

* Schoell, Hist. des Trait. de Paix, xi., 247, 257, and 173, 189. † *Ante*, iv., 403.

* Sir Neil Campbell's MS. Thib., x., 223, 225. Cap., i., 104. Montg., viii., 98, 99.
† Cap., i., 110, 113. Thib., x., 224, 225.

rington, who has given the world a most interesting account of his conversation with the fallen hero; among the latter, the Polish lady who had fascinated him before the battle of Eylau,* the French countesses who had alleviated his anguish amid the desertions of Fontainebleau.† Amid this varied society, by some of whom the great intrigue which was going forward was conducted, the language of the emperor was always the same, and his profound powers of dissimulation were never more strikingly evinced. To the English, he spoke only of the new constitutions in France, the errors and difficulties of the king; the irretrievable folly of the Bourbons; the inapplicability of British institutions to the present state of French society; the impossibility of finding a Chamber of Deputies not either servile or turbulent; the entire termination of his own political existence, and the calm eye with which he now looked back on the stormy scene in which he had no longer any interest. To Sir Neil Campbell, in particular, he was apparently communicative and confidential in the highest degree; almost every morning he admitted him to his breakfast-table, when the conversation ranged over every subject of history and politics; they then strolled out along the beach, in company with some of the other commissioners, and he not unfrequently embarked with Sir Neil alone in a small boat, under pretence of fishing, and when he got a little way out from the shore, said, "Now we are out of their hearing, ask me anything, and I will tell you." By these means the emperor so far gained upon the confidence of that able officer, that he contented himself with reporting these precious conversations to his cabinet, and, deeming no danger at hand, though not unlikely at some future period to occur, was frequently absent for days together, at Florence or Leghorn, where he had several interesting acquaintances. But even if he had been every day at the emperor's side, it would have been of no avail, for there were no visible preparations going on; if there had, he had no force whatever at his disposal to check them; and his instructions were merely to attend General Bonaparte to Elba, to see him established there, and remain as long as the ex-emperor might desire his presence.‡§

Napoleon's preparations for embarking from Elba.

All things being at length in readiness, and the preparations in France, by means of the inferior officers of the army, the veteran Republicans at Paris, and the old imperial functionaries still retained in office by the government, completed, Napoleon, on the 26th of February, gave a brilliant ball at Porto Ferrajo to the principal persons of the island, over which the grace and beauty of his sister, the Princess Pauline, who presided, threw an unusual lustre. Sir Neil Campbell, unfortunately, was absent, having sailed on the 17th in the Partridge for Leghorn; and so well had the preparations for departure been concealed, that Captain Adige of the Partridge, who was cruising round the island, had no conception that any departure was intended, and sailed from Leghorn the very day of Napoleon's embarcation. Sir Neil was well aware that Napoleon meditated an outbreak, and some recent indications, particularly the arrival of three feluccas from Naples, made him suspect that it would ere long occur; but as he had no force at his disposal, and the single British cruiser, the Partridge of eighteen guns, was wholly unequal to the encounter of the whole flotilla of Napoleon, he contented himself with warning government of the chance of his escape,* and had gone to Leghorn, principally to concert measures with Lord Burghersh, the British envoy at Florence, on the means of averting the danger which appeared approaching, by detaching a line-of-battle ship and frigate which lay at Genoa to cruise off the island, when in his absence it actually occurred.†

Leaves Elba, and steers for the Gulf of Juan.

While Napoleon's mother and sister were doing the honours of the ball, he himself walked around the room, conversing in the most affable manner with the guests; and meanwhile secret orders had been despatched to his Guards to hold themselves in readiness on the quay. At three o'clock in the afternoon they were all drawn up there, in number about eleven hundred, of whom four hundred were of the Old Guard, under the command of Bertrand, Drouot, and Cambronne. Napoleon joined them at half past four, and orders were immediately given for commencing the embarcation. By seven o'clock it was completed, and the emperor stepped on board the Inconstant brig, which contained four hundred of his old comrades in arms. His air was calm and serene; he merely said, in an under voice, to those around him, "The die is now cast." The eyes of Bertrand gleamed with joy; Drouot was pensive and thoughtful; Cambronne seemed entirely occupied with the arrangement of his soldiers. It was dark when the flotilla, which consisted in all of seven small vessels, got under weigh; Napoleon had given out to the inhabitants "that he was going to the coast of Barbary to chastise the pirates, who from time immemorial had infested the coasts of Elba;" and sealed instructions were delivered to the captain of the Inconstant, not to be read till they were at open sea. The night was calm, the wind light from the south; and it was not till they were two leagues from the harbour that the captain opened his instructions, and saw that his destination was the Gulf of Juan, on the coast of Provence. He immediately steered in that direction, and the transports of the soldiers

* *Ante*, ii., 478. † *Ante*, iv., 404.

‡ Sir Neil Campbell's MS., Cap., i., 121, 126. Lord Ebrington's Conversations with Napoleon in Elba, 23, 36.

§ "You will pay every proper respect and attention to Napoleon, to whose secure asylum in Elba it is the wish of his royal highness, the prince regent, to afford every facility and protection; and you will acquaint Napoleon, in suitable terms of attention, that you are directed to reside in the island till farther orders, if he should consider that the presence of a British officer can be of any use in protecting the island and his person against insult or attack." —LORD CASTLEREAGH'S *Instructions to* SIR NEIL CAMPBELL, *Paris, 16th of April*, 1814. SIR NEIL CAMPBELL'S *MS.*

* "If I may venture an opinion upon Bonaparte's plan, I think he will leave General Bertrand to defend Porto Ferrajo, as he has a wife and several children with him, to whom he is extremely attached, and probably will not communicate his intentions to him till the last moment. He will take with him General Drouot, and those of his Guards upon whom he can most depend, embarking General Cambronne (a desperate, uneducated ruffian, who was a drummer with him in Egypt) in the Inconstant, L'Etoile, and the other vessels mentioned in the memorandum; he will go himself, probably a day or two before the troops, with General Drouot in the Caroline, and the place of disembarcation will be Gaeta, on the coast of Naples, or Civita Vecchia, if Murat has previously advanced to Rome."—SIR N. CAMPBELL *to* LORD CASTLEREAGH, *dated Leghorn, 26th of February*, 1815; SIR N. CAMPBELL'S *MS. Papers, Despatch* No. 45.

† Sir N. Campbell's MS. Jour. Captain Adige's Report to Admiral Penrose, March 15, 1815.

could no longer be restrained. "Officers and soldiers of my guard," said Napoleon, "we are going to France." Loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur* immediately burst out on all sides, but after the first transport of enthusiasm was over, sad presentiments filled the breasts of the soldiers; the recollection of Moscow and Leipsic returned to their minds, and even the bravest hesitated as to the result of an expedition, in which the emperor, at the head of a thousand men, set out to brave the military force of all Europe.*

Voyage, and landing there.

During the night the wind fell, and at daybreak they were only six leagues from the nearest point of Elba. Napoleon shut himself up in his cabin, and dictated those proclamations to the people and army, which soon thrilled the breast of France, from Calais to Bayonne. Some of the least resolute on board, seeing the wind fail, suggested that it would be prudent to return to Porto Ferrajo; but the emperor replied, "If the ships are too heavily laden, throw all the baggage overboard; the idea of returning to Elba is pusillanimous; we bear France on the point of our swords." Opposite Leghorn on the 27th, a French frigate was described five leagues to windward, but it did not approach. The Zephyr French brig soon after came within hail; the soldiers took off their caps, and lay flat on deck to avoid discovery; and the captain having asked if they had come from Elba, and how was Napoleon, he himself answered, "Il se porte à merveille." Suspecting nothing, the brig passed on; on the evening of the 29th, the lofty towers of Antibes were descried; and Napoleon, amid loud cheers, read his proclamation to his soldiers, who all mounted the tricolour cockade. Without molestation, the fleet pursued its course; soon the olive-clad slopes of Cannes opened to the view, and at three o'clock on the afternoon of the 1st of March, the whole vessels cast anchor in the Gulf of St. Juan. The Old Guard, under Drouot, was immediately landed without opposition; shortly after, Napoleon himself descended into the long boat of the brig, and approached the shore; on reaching the sand, it was moored to the trunk of an olive-tree. "That is a good omen," cried the emperor, whose mind on momentous occasions was singularly alive to superstitious impressions; and he caused it to be mentioned to his soldiers, who received it with joyfulness. Stepping ashore, he gave a few Napoleons to his officers to buy horses from the neighbouring peasants; spoke cheerfully, and with the magic which he had so wonderfully at his command, to the men; encouraged his officers by animated and varied conversation; and at night the watches were set, and the troops bivouacked, as on the eve of the battles of Austerlitz or Wagram.†

Feb. 27.

Feb. 29.

March 1.

He marches by Gap to Grenoble.

The dangers of the passage were now over; but there remained the perils of the shore, which were sufficient to daunt the most resolute breasts. Though the great conspiracy, having for its object the overthrow of the Bourbons, had ramifications in almost every regiment in the army, yet it was in a few instances only that the superior officers had been gained; and it was as yet uncertain whether or not the men would disobey their orders. The first attempt was unsuccessful; twenty-five of the Old Guard were sent to Antibes to endeavour to seduce the garrison by the name of the emperor, but General Corsin, who commanded in that fortress, arrested the men; and on a second detachment being brought up, which began to read at the foot of the rampart the proclamations issued by Napoleon, he cut the matter short by threatening to discharge the guns. This check spread great discouragement among the soldiers, and induced a moment's hesitation in the mind of the emperor; but he had gone too far to recede; and at four o'clock in the following morning he took the road by Gap to Grenoble, through the mountains. This road, after quitting the Var at Sisteron, ascends into the Alpine range, which it never quits till it arrives in the neighbourhood of the latter town. No district of France could have been selected more favourable to the emperor's designs; for it contains no great towns or wealthy districts, and the inhabitants, strongly imbued with the feelings of Helvetic independence, fearless and active, as are all mountaineers, were in great part holders of national domains, and strongly imbued with the principles of the Revolution. They received him, in consequence, with open arms; and his versatile disposition flattered the prevailing wish wherever he went. Everywhere he spread the announcements most likely to be agreeable to the simple people to whom they were addressed. Sometimes he declared that he was weary of war; that he would be as pacific as the Bourbons; that he would abolish the *droits réunis*, and never revive the conscription; at others, that Austria had engaged to support him with a hundred thousand men; that Murat was following him with eighty thousand; in fine, that the Congress had dethroned Louis XVIII. On all occasions he styled the people citizens, and spoke the language most calculated to revive the revolutionary fervour in their minds: "Why had he come to France? why had he hoisted the tricolour flag? It was to restore the liberty of 1789, to recognise all the privileges conquered by the Revolution, to secure the proprietors of the national domains menaced by the Bourbons, to give equal rights to all." Meanwhile the advance was pressed with extraordinary activity; in the first two days they marched fifty-four miles; at Digne, on the 4th, his proclamations were printed; near Sisteron the troops admired the good fortune which had left the formidable pass of the Saulce, between the Durance and an overhanging precipice, unguarded; at Gap he rested a few hours, and distributed his proclamations, and continuing his march with ceaseless vigour, was already approaching Grenoble, when, on the 6th of March, General Cambronne, at the head of the leading companies, met on the road of Vizille the advanced guard of the troops detached from the garrison of that fortress to arrest his progress.*

March 1.

March 2.

March 4.

Defection of Labedoyère, and his character.

Hitherto the march of Napoleon had been unresisted, and the dispositions of the peasants in the country through which he had passed had been favourable; but nothing was yet decided. It was not by the mountaineers of Dauphiny, but the troops of France, that the contest for the throne was to be determined; in such an enterprise as he was now engaged in, the conduct of the first regiment generally determines

* Sir Neil Campbell's Journal, MS Cap., i., 153, 154. Beauch., iii., 141, 143. Thib., x., 225, 226.

† Fleury de Chaboulon, 23, 26. Cap., i., 139, 141.

* Cap., i., 145, 148. Beauch., iii., 149, 161.

the rest, and everything depended on the issue of the crisis which had now arrived. According to the plan which had been agreed on before Napoleon left Elba, part of the garrison of Grenoble, under the command of Colonel Labedoyère, was to march out to meet him; and from their treason the defection of the whole army was anticipated. Labedoyère was an officer of handsome figure and elegant manners, descended of a respectable family, young, enthusiastic, and daring. He had owed his promotion and appointment to the royal court, but his heart dwelt on the glories of the Empire; he had readily yielded at Paris to the seductions of the salons of the Duchess of St. Leu, one of the most fascinating supporters of Napoleon, and his mind, debased by the chicanery of the Revolution, saw nothing dishonourable in holding a high military command under the Bourbons, and employing the power it gave him to accomplish their destruction. Charity forbids us to stigmatize such conduct by its true appellation. Infidelity and revolution had totally perverted the human heart, and almost dried up the springs of conscience in many breasts. Marlborough himself, in similar circumstances, did the same. It is the strongest proof of the peril of revolution, and the infernal agency at work in its creation, that it overturns the whole principles of virtue in all breasts save those fortified by religion, and converts bravery and honour themselves into treachery and treason.*

Memorable meeting of Napoleon with his troops. March 7.

An accidental circumstance, however, had wellnigh frustrated all these arrangements, and overthrown at its very outset this deep-laid conspiracy. General Marchand, the governor of Grenoble, although an old comrade of Napoleon in Egypt, was a man of honour, and faithful to his trust, and, entirely ignorant of the treason at work in his garrison, he had despatched towards Vizille a battalion of infantry and some guns, not under Labedoyère, with orders to observe the enemy, and retire before them to the ramparts of Grenoble, but on no account to permit any communication with Napoleon's soldiers. It was with these men that Cambronne's advanced guard first came up; and he was filled with consternation upon finding, when he approached, that no signs of defection appeared, that no parleying was permitted between the troops, and that resistance was evidently prepared. He immediately despatched an aid-de-camp to the emperor, with the alarming intelligence. "We have been deceived," said Napoleon to Bertrand, "but it is no matter—forward!" Advancing then to the front of the advanced guard, in the well-known surtout and cocked-hat which had become canonized in the recollection of the soldiers, he said aloud to the opposite rank, in a voice tremulous from emotion, "Comrades, do you know me again?" "Yes, sire!" exclaimed the men. "Do you recognise me, my children?" he added: "I am your emperor; fire on me if you wish; fire on your father; here is my bosom," and with that he bared his breast. At these words the transports of the soldiers could no longer be restrained; as if struck by an electric shock, they all broke their ranks, threw themselves at the feet of the emperor, embraced his knees with tears of joy, and with indescribable fervour again raised the old cry of *Vive l'Empereur!* Hardly had they risen from the ground when the tricolour cockade was seen on every breast; the eagles reappeared on the standards; and the whole detachment sent out to combat the emperor ranged itself with fervent devotion on his side. The spot where this memorable meeting occurred is marked by a tree which overhangs the road, amid those savage alpine solitudes; few more interesting scenes are to be met with, even on the time-bespangled shores of the Mediterranean Sea.*

His entry into Grenoble.

Meanwhile, Labedoyère had assembled his regiment, and, in defiance alike of the commands of General Marchand, and of the injunctions of the prefect, who in vain endeavoured to retain him in his duty, left Grenoble at the head of his men, in the most violent state of excitement. Hardly was he out of the gates when he drew an eagle from his pocket, which he embraced before the soldiers, who shouted *Vive l'Empereur!* and a drum having been opened containing tricolour cockades, which were immediately distributed among the men, the whole, amid tumultuous shouts of joy, advanced and met Napoleon. He bestowed on Labedoyère the most flattering marks of regard, and the united columns, now nearly three thousand strong, in the afternoon approached the fortress. Marchand and the prefect did their utmost to induce the garrison to resist, but all their efforts were in vain: the *prestige* of the emperor was irresistible, and, finding their orders disregarded, they took the part of men of honour, and retired from situations of trust in which they could no longer exercise their functions. Soon after, Napoleon arrived at the gates of Grenoble, behind which an enthusiastic crowd of soldiers and citizens was assembled, in the most vehement state of exultation. The gates were locked; but they were soon forced open, and Napoleon made his entry by torchlight, amid the acclamations of the inhabitants, and took up his abode at the Cheval Blanc, kept by an old veteran of his Guard.†

His decrees from thence. March 8.

Three decrees of great importance were issued by the emperor from Grenoble. The first declared that all the acts of government should henceforth run in his name; this was in effect to resume the throne. By the second, the National Guards of the five neighbouring departments were called out and placed in activity. By the third, the fortress of Grenoble was intrusted to these National Guards. At the same time, he explained, in conversation to M. Champollion, the view which he took of the altered state of his affairs. "The Bourbons," said he, "had accustomed the people to political rights: he was prepared to follow out the same system; in a word, to apply to the cause of the Revolution the results of a constitutional government." In conformity with these ideas, he said, in answer to an address from the authorities and citizens of Grenoble, "I have been too fond of war; I will wage it no longer; I return to restore its rights to the nation; I desire only to be its first citizen." In proclamations drawn in the masculine spirit of ancient oratory, one addressed to the French people, the other to the army, he repudiated the idea of their defeat, ascribed their misfortunes to treachery, and invited them again to range themselves around the tricolour standard. "Soldiers!" said he, "we have not been conquered!

March 1.

* Cap., i., 147, 148.

* Cap., i., 149, 150. Fleury de Chaboulon, i., 210, 213. Personal observation of the scene.

† Fleury de Chaboulon, i., 218, 224. Cap., i., 130, 132.

Two men sprung from our ranks have betrayed our laurels, their country, their prince, their benefactor. Shall those whom we have seen during twenty years fly over every part of Europe to raise up opposition against us; who have passed their lives in the enemies' camps, uttering execrations against our beautiful France; shall they pretend to command us, to enchain our eagles—they who have so often quailed beneath their glance? Shall we suffer them to reap the fruit of our glorious labours; to take possession of our honours, of our effects; to calumniate your glory? Should their reign continue, all would be lost: even to the recollection of your glorious days—with what bitterness do they denounce them! how do they seek to detract from what the world admires! and if any defenders of your glory yet remain, it is among our ancient antagonists on the field of battle. Soldiers! in my exile I have heard your voice: I have come hither through all perils, despite all obstacles: your general, called to the throne by the choice of the people, and elevated on your bucklers, is restored to you. Come and join him; come and range yourselves under the standards of your chief: he has no existence but in yours; his interest, his honour, his glory, are no other than yours. Victory will march at the *pas de charge*; the eagle, with the national colours, will fly from steeple to steeple, till it lights on the towers of Nôtre Dame. There you will be able in safety to boast of what you have done: you will be the deliverers of your country. In your old age, surrounded and respected by your fellow-citizens, you will recount your great deeds; you will say, with pride, 'And I, too, was part of that army which entered twice into the walls of Vienna, which passed twice through those of Rome, of Berlin, of Madrid, of Moscow, which delivered Paris from the stains that treason had affixed to it.' Honour to those brave soldiers, the glory of their country! and shame to the criminal Frenchmen, in what rank soever fortune may have originally placed them, who have combated twenty-five years with the stranger to tear in pieces their country."*

Measures taken at Paris on the news being received.

While Napoleon was thus thundering forth proclamations destined to strike again the strong chord of French nationality, to thrill every patriotic heart with emotion, and in their ultimate effects convulse Europe from end to end, the court of the Tuileries, thunderstruck with the intelligence, vacillated between affected indifference and real apprehension. On the morning of the 3d of March, a telegraphic despatch from the prefect of Toulon announced the landing of Napoleon in the Gulf of Juan, and soon after the full details were received: M. Blacas treated the enterprise with contempt, as the last effort of a madman: Louis XVIII. judged differently: from the outset, he declared that it threatened the most serious consequences. The Duke of Berry, desirous of glory, could not conceal the joy which he felt at an event which he doubted not would add his name to the paladins of the monarchy. Three days after the first news had been received, the confidence of the court continued unabated, and exhaled in an indignant proclamation, which proved a feeble counterpoise to the heart-stirring appeals of Napoleon, which were already beginning to convulse France.† As the unresisted approach of the emperor, however, to Grenoble, and the defection of the garrison of that fortress became known, alarm spread through all classes, and even the most devoted adherents of the Bourbons began to tremble for the result. An indescribable confusion pervaded the court; and while the columns of the *Moniteur* were filled with loyal addresses from the marshals, superior officers, and all the constituted authorities, that general quiver, the invariable precursor of revolution, was distinctly visible in all classes. A royal proclamation convoked the two Chambers with all possible expedition: the Count d'Artois was despatched, in company with the Duke of Orleans and Marshal Macdonald, to Lyons, the former to secure the adhesion of the Constitutionalists, the latter to steady the wavering fidelity of the army; a special messenger was despatched to the Duke d'Angoulême, who, with the duchess, had recently before set off for Bordeaux to celebrate the first anniversary of the raising of the royalist standard in that city, to warn him of the danger, and the necessity of rousing the southern provinces; the Duke de Bourbon was sent down to La Vendée, to endeavour, by the great name of Condé, to revive the devoted fidelity of the peasants of the Bocage; while the command of an army of reserve, to be formed at Essonne and Fontainebleau, destined specially for the defence of the capital, was intrusted to the Duke de Berry.*

March 6.

Ineffectual attempts to stimulate a Royalist resistance.

Great efforts were made by the court to stimulate a Royalist resistance, but they were only partially successful. In Paris, indeed, the young men of the universities, aware that France owed to the Bourbons its first decided step in the path of freedom, which Napoleon would speedily frustrate, and that the conscription and wars would soon decimate their ranks if the imperial *régime* were restored, enrolled themselves with alacrity as volunteers; but the youth of the country, constituting nine tenths of the physical strength of the nation, hung back. They had a latent dread of the resumption of the national domains by the royalist government, because they felt that justice demanded their restitution; they identified Napoleon with their cause and that of the Revolution, because he had risen from their ranks; and they were so thoroughly exhausted by previous wars, that neither for one party nor the other could they be induced to make any movement whatever. The great bulk of the influential citizens in towns were favourable to the government of the Restoration, and entertained a serious dread of the resumption of supreme power by Napoleon; but they were few in number, unarmed, and undisciplined:

* Moniteur, March 21, 1815. Cap., i., 135, 137.

† "Bonaparte has escaped from the island of Elba, where the imprudent magnanimity of the allied sovereigns had given him a sovereignty, in return for the desolations which he had brought into their dominions. That man who, when he abdicated his power, retained all his ambition and his fury; that man, covered with the blood of generations, comes at the end of a year, spent seemingly in apathy, to strive to dispute, in the name of his usurpations and his massacres, the legitimate and mild authority of the King of France. At the head of a few hundred Italians and Piedmontese, he has dared again to set his feet on that land which had banished him forever: he wishes to reopen the wounds, still but half closed, which he had made, and which the hand of the king is healing every day. A few treasonable attempts, some movements in Italy excited by his insane brother-in-law, inflamed the pride of the cowardly warrior of Fontainebleau. He exposes himself, as he imagines, to the death of a hero: he will only die that of a traitor. France has rejected him: he returns: France will devour him."—*Moniteur, 6th March*, 1815.

* Moniteur, March 6, 1815. Cap., i., 155, 162. Thib., x., 226, 227. Beauch., iii., 168, 175.

the rural population regarded the Bourbons with undisguised aversion; but they, too, were apathetic, and desired only to remain with their ploughs: the whole real strength of the nation was placed in the army, and it, with the exception of a few regiments of royal guards at Paris, was unanimous, in all but the superior ranks, in favour of the emperor. It was not difficult to foresee what must be the result of a civil war commenced among a people placed in such circumstances.*

Soult and Ney's protestations of fidelity.

The court, however, was strongly supported, in words at least, by the marshals and dignified functionaries of the Empire. Marshal Soult, as minister at war, issued a vehement proclamation to the troops, in which he stigmatized the ex-emperor's enterprise as the work of an insensate madman, and conjured them by every feeling of honour, patriotism, and fidelity, to abide by the lilied banner.† The columns of the *Moniteur* were loaded for above a fortnight with addresses in the same strain from the municipality of Paris and the other great towns in France, the whole courts of law, universities, and colleges in the kingdom: the marshals and officers in command, whether of armies or garrisons: in fine, the whole authorities and constituted bodies throughout the monarchy. Recollecting what followed, a more melancholy instance of human baseness is not to be found in the annals of mankind. Marshal Ney, in particular, expressed in the loudest terms his indignation at the insane attempt of the emperor; and such faith did the government put in his fidelity, that they intrusted him with the command of the army assembling at Lons-le-Saulnier to stop the progress of the invaders. On the 7th of March, he presented himself at the levée at the Tuileries to take leave of the king, previous to setting out for his command. "Sire," said he, "I will bring back Bonaparte in an iron cage."‡ "Farewell!" replied the monarch: "I trust to your honour and fidelity." These words, coming from so renowned a warrior and brave a man, made a great impression, and nothing was talked of in Paris for some days but Marshal Ney, his fidelity, and the iron cage.§

Dismissal of Soult, and failure of the Count d'Artois at Lyons.

Mortier received the command in the north of France: Augereau was sent to Normandy: full powers were forwarded to Massena at Toulon: Oudinot was at Marseilles; and everything announced the most vigorous resistance. But, meanwhile, the progress of Napoleon was unopposed; defection after defection succeeded in the army, and it was, unhappily, soon apparent that the corps of thirty thousand men, which, by direction of Marshal Soult, had been formed in *echelon* on the frontier, between Besançon and Lyons, to observe the threatened movements of Murat, was giving the most fatal examples of disaffection. This circumstance was immediately ascribed to the treacherous forethought of the war-minister: the clamour daily became louder as the defection of one regiment after another was ascertained, and at length it arose to such a height, that he was publicly denounced in the Chamber of Deputies as a confederate of Napoleon, and obliged to resign his appointment. His successor, Clarke, began in the right spirit, when in his order of the day, announcing his appointment to the army, he said, "No capitulation can be entered into without infamy, and, sooner or later, without punishment. To what a deplorable illusion do those abandon themselves who now yield to the voice of a man who is coming to tear asunder France by the hands of Frenchmen, and abandon it a second time to the fire and sword of strangers!" But though a momentary confidence was restored by the energetic conduct of the new war-minister, the accounts from the south daily added strength to the melancholy conviction that all was lost. The Count d'Artois, with the Duke of Orleans and Marshal Macdonald, had arrived at Lyons, the second city in the kingdom, and the first likely to be exposed to the seduction of Napoleon; and though they were received with enthusiasm by the higher, more opulent, and educated classes, yet the lower orders hardly attempted to conceal their joy at the return of the tricolour standard; the National Guard, as usual in all serious crises, was divided and irresolute, while the disposition of the soldiers was so manifest, that they refused to obey the orders given for putting the city in a state of defence, and already began to murmur because they had not been led out to join the standard of their beloved emperor.*

March 12.

Advance of Napoleon to Lyons, and decrees issued there. March 12.

It was soon apparent, from the agitation among the troops, the ardent enthusiasm of the inferior officers, and the universal disregard of the orders of the superior, that the crisis was approaching, and that Napoleon might soon be expected on the opposite bank of the Rhone. In effect he soon appeared, surrounded by an immense concourse of soldiers, National Guards, and peasants, on the road leading from Beauvoisin. The Count d'Artois, on being informed by the prefect that the case was hopeless, left Lyons, and retired on the road to Paris. Macdonald waited a little longer, but without being able to produce any impression on the troops; and hardly had he left the city, when Napoleon, at the head of his advanced guard, entered the suburb of La Guillotière, and amid the enthusiastic cheers of an immense crowd, composed for the most part of the lowest class of the inhabitants, was conducted to the

* Cap., i., 163, 164. Thib., x., 227, 228.

† "Soldiers! That man who so lately abdicated in the face of all Europe an usurped power of which he made so fatal a use—Bonaparte—has descended on the French soil, which he should never have seen again. What does he desire? Civil war. Whom does he seek? Traitors. Where will he find them? Will it be among the soldiers, whom he has deceived and sacrificed a thousand times, in misleading their valour? Will it be in the bosom of their families, whom his bare name fills with a shudder? Bonaparte despises us enough, to think that we are capable of abandoning a legitimate and beloved monarch, to share the lot of a man who is now but an adventurer. He believes it, madman that he is! And his last act of insanity reveals him entirely. Soldiers! The French army is the bravest army in Europe—it will also be the most faithful. Let us rally round the spotless lilied banner, at the voice of the father of his people, of the worthy inheritor of the virtues of the great Henry. He has himself traced to you the path which you ought to follow: he has put at your head that prince, the model of French chevaliers, whose happy return to his country has chased the usurper from it, and who now sets forth by his presence to destroy his single and last hope."—LE MARESCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE, *Moniteur, 9th March*, 1815; *and* THIBAUDEAU, x., 228, 229. Contrast this with Soult's proclamation to his soldiers on March 14, 1814, *Ante*, iv., 358, and say what is the consistency or fidelity of a revolution.

‡ The truth of this statement is undoubted: Marshal Ney admitted he had said so at his subsequent trial.—See *Procès de* NEY; and CAPEFIGUE, i., 164.

§ Cap., i., 164. Beauch., iii., 172, 173. Moniteur, March 6 to 18, 1815.

* Cap., i., 201, 203. Beauch., iii., 194, 201. Thib., x., 230, 231.

palace of the archbishop, where he received the keys of the city. None of the constituted authorities, however, and few of the respectable citizens, attended his levée. This great success at once gave the emperor the command of the centre of France; emissaries joined him from all quarters, and were despatched by him in all directions; and considering himself as now virtually in possession of the supreme authority, he issued three decrees, the first dissolving the Chambers of Peers and Deputies, enjoining the deputies to return forthwith to their homes, and convoking the electoral colleges for an extraordinary assembly in the May ensuing; the second banishing of new the whole emigrants returned to France who had not already obtained letters of amnesty from the imperial or republican governments; the third abolishing titles of honour and noblesse, and restoring the whole laws of the Constituent Assembly in that respect, under reservation of those who had obtained titles for national services, and which had been verified at the council. By a fourth decree, not less important than the former, the whole emigrant officers in the army, who had received commissions since the 1st of April, 1814, were struck off the list, and the minister at war was absolutely prohibited from granting them any pay, even for past services. These decrees at once indicated the spirit of the government of the Hundred Days, and which was never departed from during the whole of their continuance. It was no longer the imperial conqueror, whose will was law, and who was striving to reconstruct the scattered fragments of monarchical power, who was at the head of affairs; it was the Consul of the Revolution who was now in the ascendant; and the emperor, constrained by misfortune to court the alliance of those who, of all men, he most cordially detested, was glad to purchase the passive acquiescence of the nation, by the adoption of principles which he had spent his life in combating.*

March 13.

Meanwhile, Marshal Ney travelled rapidly, on the way to the army, to Auxerre, where he alighted at the hotel of M. Gamott, the prefect, his brother-in-law, and a warm partisan of Napoleon. Doubts were there, for the first time, instilled into the marshal's mind as to the possibility of upholding the cause of the Bourbons; and these increased as he advanced nearer to Lyons, and perceived the vehement fermentation which was arising in all the towns and among the troops, on the approach of Napoleon. The emperor, well aware of the vacillating and irresolute character of his lieutenant everywhere but on the field of battle, besieged him incessantly with emissaries, who represented the cause of the Bourbons as irrecoverably ruined, appealed to his old recollections, and repeated with warmth, "The emperor has no rancour against you; he stretches out his arms to receive you; he agrees with you as to the stranger: there will be no more war: the national principles are about to triumph." These earnest appeals from his old companion in arms proved too much for the fidelity of the marshal. In charity to so brave an enemy, let the British historian adopt the version of his deplorable and disgraceful treachery which he himself has given: "I had, in truth," said he at his trial, "kissed the hand of the king, his majesty having presented it to me when he wished me a good journey; the descent of Bonaparte appeared to me so extravagant, that I spoke of it with indignation, and made use, in truth, of the expression of the iron cage. In the night of the 13th of March—down to which time I protest my fidelity—I received a proclamation drawn by Napoleon, which I signed. Before reading it to the troops, I read it to General Bourmont, who was of opinion that it was necessary to join Bonaparte, and that the Bourbons had committed such follies that they could no longer be supported." On the 14th, accordingly, the fatal proclamation was published to the troops, which afterward cost him his life, and has forever disgraced his memory.*† France was far, indeed, from the days when the Chevalier Bayard, addressing the Constable de Bourbon with dying voice, when stretched on the wayside in the valley of Aosta, with his eyes fixed on the cross of his sword-hilt, said, "Pity not me; pity those who fight against their king, their country, and their oath."

Flagrant treason of Marshal Ney.

Ney himself read the proclamation to his troops, and as soon as it was over threw his hat in the air, waved his sabre, and cried, *Vive l'Empereur!* The enthusiasm of the soldiers knew no bounds; the privates, drummers, and inferior officers of all the regiments, foot and horse mixed, crowded in ecstasy round the marshal to express their gratitude; caps and sabres were waved aloft in air, with frantic joy; but the superior officers kept aloof, and many honourable men, particularly Lecourbe and Beauregard, openly expressed their detestation at a step which, recalling the shameless treachery of the Prætorian Guards in the lower empire, had forever disgraced the French army. The defection of Ney, which was immediately followed by that of his whole army, proved at once fatal to the royal authority. Not only was there no longer any obstacle whatever to the approach of Napoleon to Paris, but every possible facility was afforded to it; for the troops sent out to oppose him having all joined the imperial standards, he was advancing at the head of a formidable force to the capital. Nor were affairs less menacing in the northern and eastern provinces. In the former, Lefebvre Desnouettes having set out from Paris for that purpose, had penetrated into La Fere, corrupted its garrison, and having been checked by the firmness and fidelity of General Abouville, the

General defection of the army.

* Moniteur, March 21, 1815. Cap., i., 207, 211. Beauch., iii., 205, 215.

* "Officers and soldiers, the cause of the Bourbons is irrevocably lost! The legitimate dynasty which the French nation has adopted is about again to mount upon the throne; it is to the Emperor Napoleon, our sovereign, that it alone belongs to reign over this beautiful country. What care we whether the noblesse of the Bourbons shall determine again to emigrate or remain among us? The sacred cause of liberty and of our independence shall no longer be blasted by their presence. They have sought to wither our military laurels, but they are deceived. Those laurels are the fruit of noble toils, which are forever engraven in our memories. Soldiers! the time has gone past when mankind were to be governed by stifling their voice; liberty triumphs at last, and Napoleon, our august emperor, is about to establish it forever. Let this noble cause henceforth be ours, and that of all Frenchmen; let all the brave men, whom I have the honour to command, be penetrated with that great truth. Soldiers! I have often led you to victory; now I am about to unite you to that immortal phalanx which Napoleon leads to Paris, and which will arrive there in a few days; and there our hopes and our happiness will be forever realized. *Vive l'Empereur.*"—*Le Mareschal d'Empire*, PRINCE DE LA MOSKWA, *Lons le Saulnier, 13th March*, 1815; *Moniteur, 21st March*, 1815; *and* CAPEFIGUE, i., 215.

† Capefigue, i., 211, 215. Procès de Marshal Ney, 32. Beauch., iii., 235, 246.

governor, renewed his attempts on the principal towns of Picardy, the garrisons of which were with difficulty retained in their duty; while D'Erlon, at Lille, led out his troops on the road to Paris to join in the conspiracy; but he was met on the way by Mortier, on his road to take the command in the northern fortresses, sent back to Lille, and arrested. It was by this fortunate event alone that the means of escape were left open to the royal family.*

In this extremity the measures of the government were as vigorous as the exigency of the circumstances required; but all their efforts were rendered unavailing from the want of any armed force to defend the throne. The Chamber of Deputies met, in pursuance of the summons of the king; loyal addresses were carried by a vast majority, thanks in profusion voted to the officers and soldiers who, in this trying crisis, had adhered to their duty and their oaths; the garrisons of Antibes and La Fere were declared to have deserved well of their country; Marshals Macdonald and Mortier received the warmest thanks of both houses; and the court, for a brief season, flattered themselves that by these measures, and the influence of the Legislature on the public mind, the progress of treason in the army and disaffection in the people would be arrested. But the time was past when a vote of the Legislature could make the arms drop from the soldiers' hands; the Revolution had accustomed them to violent changes in the government; the Prætorian Guards laughed at votes of the Chambers, and were resolved to have an emperor of their own selection. The fatal news of the treachery of Marshal Ney, and the defection of his troops, paralyzed every heart; it at once demonstrated that the army had determined to place the emperor on the throne, and that all hope for the Royalists was lost. Driven from every other position, the government endeavoured to stop the movement by frequent and earnest appeals to the Charter, which were carried by great majorities in both Chambers, and Napoleon was denounced as a public enemy; but what was the Charter to an impassioned soldiery, or the denunciation of the conqueror by the Legislature to the ruthless veterans who sighed for the restoration of the glory, license, and plunder to which he had accustomed them? Every post brought accounts of the desertion of fresh bodies of men, and the universal transport which had seized upon the army; the defection of Lyons, and of Ney in Burgundy, determined the troops assembled as the last reserve at Essonne and Fontainebleau; and the despatches of the Duke de Berri and Marshal Oudinot, who commanded them, announced that they could no longer be relied on. As a last resource, the aged king appealed in vain to the honour and loyalty of the French character. "I have pledged myself," said he, "to the allied sovereigns for the fidelity of the army in the face of Europe. If Napoleon triumphs, five hundred thousand strangers will immediately inundate France. You who follow at this moment other standards than mine, I see in you nothing but children led astray: abjure your error; come and throw yourselves into the arms of your father, and I pledge my honour that all shall be forgotten." Vain words! The army rejected with contempt the proffered amnesty; the Chamber of Deputies in vain called on the youth of France to imitate those of Prussia, and enrol themselves for the defence of their country; vain was the promise that the approaching campaign should count triple to the troops, and a national recompense be awarded to those who distinguished themselves by their fidelity; all, all was shattered against the treason and revolt of the army.*

Conduct of the court in the last extremity. March 11. March 16. March 16. March 18.

At length the fatal hour arrived. On the 19th of March a review of the National and Royal Guards took place; but few of the former, and still fewer volunteers, were to be seen; and after it was over, the latter, instead of taking the road to Fontainebleau, as had been announced, to combat the enemy, defiled by that to Beauvais, evidently to cover the retreat of the royal family. At dinner, the king announced to the few faithful friends who still adhered to him, that he was about to abandon the Tuileries. Tears fell from every eye; the mournful prospect of a second exile, of France subjected again to military despotism, vanquished, overrun, and probably partitioned, arose in gloomy perspective to every mind. The king, calm and resigned, addressed a few words of comfort to each, and after making a few necessary arrangements, signed a proclamation dissolving the Chambers, directing the members forthwith to separate, and to assemble again at such place as the king should appoint. This proclamation, drawn on the night of the 19th, appeared in the *Moniteur* of the 20th, when Paris was, literally speaking, without a government; for the king and royal family departed at midnight, taking the road to Beauvais. They travelled rapidly; by noon on the 20th they were at Abbeville, and in the evening at Lille, the capital of French Flanders. There they received proofs of fidelity, to which, in Old France, they had long been strangers; the inhabitants, untouched by the profligacy of the Revolution, crowded round the illustrious exiles with unfeigned enthusiasm, and manifested such sympathy, that the king was induced to establish his residence there for a few days; and more than one royal ordinance bears date from that place. It was soon discovered, however, that the garrison could not be trusted; in vain Marshals Macdonald and Mortier exerted themselves, with an energy worthy of the ancient loyalty and present warlike renown of the French army, to retain the troops in the path of their duty; the contagion was universal; the intelligence that Napoleon had entered Paris rendered the ferment irresistible; the men maintained that it was intended to give them up to the stranger, and loudly declared that they would not imbrue their hands in the blood of their fellow-soldiers. Meanwhile, the royal guard and volunteers who had followed the king into French Flanders, worn out by marching, misled by perfidy, repelled from every fortified gate, melted away or disappeared; and the unhappy Louis, finding treachery and disaffection thickening on all sides around him, was glad to leave Lille, abandon the French territory, and take the road by Ypres to Ghent, where he established his court on the 25th, and remained

The king retires from Paris and goes to Ghent. March 19. March 20. March 21 and 22. March 25.

* Beauch., iii., 205, 223. Cap., i., 218, 221. Thib., x., 232, 236.

* Proclamation, March 18, 1815. Moniteur, March 18, 1815. Cap., i., 223, 255. Thib., x., 239, 241. Beauch., iii., 223, 231. Buchez and Roux, xl., 63, 80.

during the melancholy period of the Hundred Days.*

Napoleon arrives at Fontainebleau, and reaches Paris at night.

Meanwhile, Napoleon travelled so rapidly from Lyons, that his faithful Guard could not keep up with his carriage, and on the 19th reached Fontainebleau. He has himself described the journey from Frejus to Paris as being the happiest period of his life,† and it is not surprising that it was so; for it at once restored his fortunes and penetrated his heart; it was prodigal of enthusiasm and redolent of joy; it banished melancholy and revived hope. During that marvellous journey, the emperor seemed to tread on air; borne aloft on the enthusiasm of the soldiers, and the ardour of a portion of the people, he literally flew to empire: the throne of the Bourbons sank before his approach, the glories of the Empire seemed to redescend upon his brows. Such was the rapture which this marvellous resurrection inspired in his mind, that it was not even for a moment damped by the sight of Fontainebleau, and the spot where he had addressed his faithful Guard:‡ with almost infantine joy he wandered over the splendid apartments of the palace, the successive scene of his festivity and wretchedness, and conversed familiarly with his attendants on the beauty of the undulated outline of the forest, and the vast marble basins where the swans exhibited their stately plumage. It was not surprising that such all-absorbing transports had seized the mind of the emperor, for the intelligence from Paris exceeded his most sanguine expectations. Couriers from Lavalette, the postmaster, who had long secretly, and now openly espoused his cause, announced, early on the morning of the 20th, that the king and royal family had left the Tuileries the night before, and that the emperor's arrival was anxiously expected. He set out, in consequence, at two o'clock in the afternoon, but purposely delayed his progress, so that it was a quarter to nine at night before his carriage entered the court of the Tuileries.§

Universal transports among the Imperial party.

This was done in order that the population of the capital, with the majority of whom the emperor was well aware he was not popular, should not be made acquainted with his arrival, which accordingly was the case. But the doors of the palace, and the whole inner court of the Carrousel, from the triumphal arch to the foot of the great staircase, was filled with a crowd of generals, officers, and soldiers, who were in the secret, and who received their beloved chief with the most unbounded transports of joy. The moment that the carriage stopped, he was seized by those next the door, borne aloft in their arms, amid deafening cheers, through a dense and brilliant crowd of epaulettes, hurried literally above the heads of the throng up the great stair into the salon of reception, where a splendid array of the ladies of the imperial court, adorned with a profusion of violet bouquets, half concealed in the richest laces, received him with transports, and imprinted fervent kisses on his cheeks, his hands, and even his dress. Never was such a scene witnessed in history: it was more personally gratifying than the English joy at the return of Charles II.; for it was not the gratitude of a nation for the restoration of a government, but the transports of a party for the return of a man.*

Napoleon might well have asked on this night, like Voltaire on his last return to Paris, whether they meant to make him die of joy; and he has, without doubt, truly described this day as the most delightful of his life, but it was also his last of unmixed satisfaction. After the transports of the first reception were over, and he retired to rest in the imperial apartments of the Tuileries, he had leisure to reflect on the situation in which he was placed, and the means he possessed of maintaining his position on the dizzy pinnacle on which he was again elevated. On landing in the Gulf of St. Juan, his first words had been, "Voilà le Congres dissous;" but he had too much penetration not to be aware that the effect would be just the reverse: that his return would at once terminate all the divisions, and still all the jealousies, which were beginning to alienate the European sovereigns, and that legions as formidable as those beneath which he had already sunk would ere long inundate his dominions. To meet the forces of coalesced Europe, the means at his disposal were fearfully diminished. Nothing, indeed, could exceed the ardour and enthusiasm of the army and of the imperial functionaries, and he could reckon with certainty on their cordial support; but the troops under arms did not exceed a hundred thousand, and even if the whole veterans were recalled to his standards, their number would not be more than doubled; the civil *employés* were incapable of forming a corps in the field; and amid all the transports of his journey from St. Juan, he had perceived, with secret disquietude, that his supporters were chiefly to be found in the very lowest classes, and that the more respectable peasants in the country, and citizens in the towns, gazed with silent wonder on his progress. General support from the physical strength of the nation he could not hope for; the recollection of the conscription was too recent, the horror at war too strong, the exhaustion of the military population too complete, to permit any effectual aid; and, strange to say, the mighty conqueror who had been borne to the throne on the shoulders of the army, found his chief embarrassment from the want of military resources.†

His civil and military appointments.

His great difficulty in filling up his appointments.

The very next morning showed on what an altered and precarious footing his authority was now placed. The whole troops in Paris, indeed, assembled with tumultuous joy in the court of the Tuileries; enthusiastic cheers burst from them when the emperor appeared, and they received with rapture the veterans of the Old Guard, who had now been forwarded by post-horses from Lyons, and whose sunburned visages, worn shoes, and dirty garments, showed the fatigues they had undergone in keeping up with the rapid advance of Napoleon. But when he came to make his appointments for the imperial government, a very different disposition manifested itself. The imperial party were all in raptures at the emperor's return, but very few among them were willing to accept the perilous honour of a situation of responsibility in his government. A secret sense of their shameful tergiversations; a feeling that they were disgraced in the eyes of Europe, equally by their

* Buchez and Roux, xl., 80, 81. Cap., i., 243, 249. Beauch., iii., 249, 255, 325, 340.
† Las Casas, iv., 242. ‡ *Ante*, iv., 405.
§ Moniteur, March 21, 1815. Buchez and Roux, xl., 86, 87. Cap., i., 251, 253. Thib., x., 251, 353.

* Cap., i., 253, 254. Thib., x., 252, 253.
† Cap., i., 255, 256. Thib., x., 253, 257.

treachery to the Empire and the Restoration; a clear perception of the danger with which any prominent situation would be attended under this second Revolutionary dynasty, kept almost all the leading men at first aloof from his service. Fouché was the first person he sent for: it was a signal proof to what straits the emperor was reduced, when he was obliged to commence with the old bloodstained regicide, for whose treachery to himself he had formerly said, with truth, that the scaffold would have been the appropriate punishment.*†

His civil and military appointments.

Fouché, aware of his importance as the head of the old Republican party, upon whose temporary alliance with the army the emperor's power was entirely founded, made his own terms. He at first desired to be minister of foreign affairs; but Napoleon was desirous for him to return to his old situation as the head of the police, to which he at length acceded, from a belief, which the event proved to be well founded, that it would give him the entire command of the interior. Cambacéres was offered the situation of minister of justice; he at once declined it, and was only prevailed on to accept on the engagement that he should not be called on to take a part in any political measures. Even Caulaincourt refused the portfolio of minister of foreign affairs; he was too well aware of the ban under which he would be laid by the potentates of Europe, to undertake its responsibility. M. Molé resolutely declined the same office, and frankly avowed to the emperor that he thought the drama was concluded; that the dead could not be resuscitated. Napoleon admitted the immense difficulties of his situation, and that they proceeded chiefly from the impracticable character of the party with which he was linked in the interior. As a pledge of his adoption of their principles, he appointed Carnot minister of the interior, with direction of the whole organization of the National Guard; Caulaincourt, by his positive command, was compelled to accept the portfolio of foreign affairs, as Maret, by a similar compulsion, was forced to take that of secretary of state; while Davoust, who had been in disgrace during the whole of the Restoration, without difficulty accepted the situation of minister at war.‡

General stupor of the people over France.

The same disinclination for office—a most unusual and ominous circumstance in France—was manifested in all the inferior departments of government. The situation of prefect, formerly solicited with such eagerness, and accepted with such gratitude, became now so much the object of aversion, that it was bestowed on persons who would never have been deemed competent, or who had been actually disgraced under the imperial government; among the rest, M. Frochet, who had been so severely stigmatized by the emperor for his weakness in the conspiracy of Malet, reappeared as prefect of the departments of the Rhone. A general stupor prevailed in all the provinces; even those of which the inhabitants had in the first instance manifested the greatest joy at the emperor's return. The people of the eastern provinces in particular, among whom the Revolutionary spirit had always been most ardent, and who, from their localities having been the theatre of war during the last invasion, were most exasperated against the allies, were thunderstruck by the declaration of the Congress of Vienna of the 13th of March, and contemplated with undisguised apprehension a return of the innumerable hordes of Cossacks and Calmucks to ravage their fields. A general stupor pervaded the whole of France, the result partly of shame, partly of distrust, partly of terror. It was evident that the once colossal power of the emperor had been irrevocably shaken by his first overthrow, and consequent abdication; confidence at once in his good fortune and stability of character was at an end; while the efficiency and vigour of his administration was essentially impaired by the alliance, evidently forced, which had taken place between him and the Jacobins, and the admission of many of the most dangerous of their faction into the most important offices of government.*

Efforts of the Duke d'Angoulême to stimulate a Royalist resistance in the south.

The march of Napoleon to Paris had been so rapid, that the provinces were in great part ignorant of his having advanced beyond Grenoble, when they were informed of his arrival at Paris. Thus their inhabitants were stupefied by this portentous event; and in the southern and western provinces, at least, far from being disposed to transfer their allegiance, and trample under feet their oaths, at the beck of the Prætorian Guard of the capital, Guienne, Languedoc, Provence, and Bordeaux spontaneously took up arms; the Duke d'Angoulême, in the southern provinces, actively commenced the organization and direction of the new levies; while the presence of the duchess at Bourdeaux, whither she had gone, as already noticed, to be present at the anniversary of the 12th of March, when the Royalist standard was first hoisted in that city, roused to the highest pitch the loyal enthusiasm of the inhabitants. Such was the ardour which her character and the chivalrous gallantry of her bearing excited, that fifteen thousand National Guards, in that city and its department alone, declared for her; and even the troops of the line in the adjoining forts of Blaye and Chateau-Trompette, whom she passed in review, seemed to have caught the generous flame, and to incline at least to support her cause. At Toulon, the Duke d'Angoulême was most favourably received, both by the troops of the line and the National Guards; Marshal Massena, who commanded there, remained firm in his allegiance; and so unanimous was the desire to resist the imperial government, that the old Republicans stood side by side in the volunteer ranks with the young Royalists. Encouraged by these favourable appearances, a vast, but withal skilfully-combined, plan of operations was concerted. It was agreed that the army of the south, fifteen thousand strong, should march in two divisions, the one by Avignon and Valence, and the other by Gap and Grenoble, on Lyons, the common centre of their operations; while the army of Bordeaux, of equal strength, should move towards La Vendée and Britanny, and awaken the dormant, but inextinguishable loyalty of the western provinces.†

March 14.

March 18.

How formidable, wide-spread, and well-com-

* Cap., i., 256, 264. Thib., x., 260, 261.

† "Duc d'Otranto, votre tête doit tomber sur l'echhafaud."—FOUCHE, *Memoirs*, i., 417, 418; and *Ante*, iii., 336.

‡ Thib., x., 260, 261. Cap., i., 259, 261. Buchez and Roux, xl., 87, 88.

* Cap., i., 264, 272. Thib., x., 261, 266. Beauch., iii., 371, 384.

† Cap., i., 275, 280. Thib., x., 269, 275. Beauch., iii., 384, 400.

Termination of the civil war in the southern provinces.

bined soever this movement undoubtedly was, it was soon shattered against the treason of the army, the magic of the emperor's name, and the deplorable subjection of the provinces to Paris, which had resulted from the centralization of the Revolution. Grouchy, whose former zeal for the Bourbons, and recent desertion of their cause, was a sufficient guarantee for his fidelity, was sent with all the troops he could collect at Lyons against the Duke d'Angoulême; while Clauzel, whose Republican principles had long kept him in comparative disgrace with the emperor at the zenith of his fortunes, was sent with a large body of men, collected in the central provinces, against the Duchess d'Angoulême. The instructions of both officers were brief and simple: "to put an end, at any sacrifice, to the civil war." The unbounded sway of the emperor with the soldiers rendered this a more easy task than had been anticipated. Marching through the central provinces, and distributing everywhere the emperor's proclamations, Clauzel soon rallied the whole regular troops there to his standard, and approached the Gironde with so formidable a force, that the regular soldiers in the forts of Bordeaux were entirely paralyzed; and they declared that, although they would not permit any injury to be done to the Duchess d'Angoulême, they would not combat against their comrades in arms. In vain, with the spirit of Maria Theresa, she appealed to their loyalty, their oaths, their patriotism, and every feeling which could rouse men of honour; she addressed not the simple and loyal Hungarians, but the corrupted and demoralized French. A mournful silence, interrupted only by isolated demonstrations of attachment, met all her heroic appeals; and with a heart penetrated with grief, she was obliged to leave the city and embark on board a British vessel, which soon conveyed her far from the treason of her country to the more faithful shores of England.*

May 29.

April 3.

Progress and termination of the war in the south. April 3.

The efforts of the Duke d'Angoulême in the southern provinces, though attended in the end with no better success, were, in the outset, of a more serious description. The chief Royalist army there, under the command of the duke in person, advanced in the beginning of April from Toulouse, eight thousand strong, composed for the most part of National Guards, towards Valence, and defeated a body of regular soldiers at the bridge of La Drome. Encouraged by the successful result of this action, in which he displayed equal courage and conduct, the prince advanced to Valence and threatened Lyons. This was a very serious matter, and Napoleon was no sooner informed of it by telegraph, than he despatched Grouchy to that city, with full powers to combat or negotiate, but with the most positive instructions, at all hazards, to terminate the civil war. This soon became no difficult matter. While the principal army, which advanced by Valence, was gaining this success, the second Royalist corps, under General Ernouf, occupied Sisteron, and advanced to Gap, on the same road which Napoleon had so recently traversed. But there the men were so moved by the accounts which they received from the peasants of his marvellous progress, and the proclamations from his nervous pen which they saw placarded on the walls, that the regular soldiers all mounted the tricolour cockade, and declared for the cause of Napoleon.*

By this defection the right flank of the Duke d'Angoulême was uncovered: Grouchy was advancing with a powerful force in front from Lyons; and, at the same time, intelligence arrived that General Gilly, with another body of regular troops, was marching from Nismes upon the Pont St. Esprit, to cut off his retreat. In these circumstances, to retire became unavoidable; and no sooner had the retrograde movement commenced, than the hatred of the peasants of Dauphiny to the Royalist cause, and their ancient enemies the Provençals, broke out on all sides with such vehemence, that the situation of the prince became extremely critical. The obvious danger of a prince of the bloodroyal falling into the hands of Napoleon, now induced the duke's generals to urge him in the strongest manner to provide for his individual safety, which he might easily have done by escaping into the adjoining provinces of Piedmont; but he positively refused, with true honour, to separate from his brave companions in arms. A convention was therefore proposed to General Gilly at Pont St. Esprit, and at once agreed to, by which it was stipulated that the royal army should lay down its arms and be disbanded, and an entire amnesty be awarded to all persons engaged in it. Grouchy, however, would not ratify the capitulation, and retained the duke in captivity, in defiance of its provisions. The first telegraphic despatch announced the conclusion of the capitulation, and Maret prevailed on Napoleon to ratify it. A few hours after, a second telegraphic despatch declared that Grouchy had not ratified the convention; but Monnier, the under-secretary of state, did not communicate it to the emperor till the evening, by which time, in consequence of the answer to the first, the prince was already free. A violent ebullition of the imperial wrath immediately took place; but it was soon over, and Napoleon was secretly rejoiced, in the end, that he was saved the necessity of acting with severity to a descendant of Henry IV. Soon after, the Duke de Bourbon retired from La Vendée, where he had failed in exciting any insurrection: resistance speedily disappeared on all sides, and on the 20th of April a hundred guns, discharged from the Invalides, and re-echoed from all the fortresses of France, announced that the civil war was terminated, and the imperial authority everywhere re-established. To the honour of Napoleon, it must be added, that no executions or bloodshed stained his restoration, and that, with the exception of a few measures of police against the emigrants and Royal Guards, and the vigorous application of the laws against the Bourbons, no measures of severity marked the commencement of the Hundred Days.†

Termination of the civil war in the southern provinces. April 4.

April 5.

Napoleon's authority was now fully established in France; but it was not in France that the real obstacles to his sovereignty were to be found. It was at Vienna that the enemies alone capable of overturning his empire existed; and intelligence of his marvellous success, by revealing

Military treaties between the allies.

† Cap., i., 275, 294. Beauch., iii., 484, 499. Thib., x., 283, 284.

* Cap., i., 293, 295. Beauch., iii., 393, 433.

† Thib., x., 264, 885. Cap., i., 293, 305. Beauch., iii., 483, 521.

the hitherto unsuspected extent of the sway which he still had over the French army, only rendered to them more apparent the necessity of the most vigorous measures for his overthrow. The powers in this crisis acted with a vigour and unanimity worthy of the highest praise, and which, in the end, proved the salvation of Europe. Calmly measuring with prophetic eye the extent of the danger, they saw, in the elevation of Napoleon to the throne on the bucklers of the troops, the clearest proof that he would infallibly be driven to war; that a rapacious soldiery, which hailed his return as the restoration of the days of their glory, would never be at rest till again plunged into conquest; and that, even if the Ethiopian had changed his skin and the leopard his spots, and the emperor were really desirous of peace, he would inevitably be forced into hostilities by the passions and necessities of his followers. Proceeding on these principles, the declaration of 13th of March was not allowed to remain a dead letter; and on the 25th of March a treaty was concluded, which in effect revived the treaty of Chaumont, for the preservation of Europe from the renewed dangers which now menaced it. By it the cabinets of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain "engaged to unite their forces against Bonaparte and his faction, in order to prevent him from again troubling the peace of Europe; they agreed to furnish a hundred and eighty thousand men each for the prosecution of the war, of which a tenth was to be cavalry, and, if necessary, to draw forth their whole military forces of every description." By a secret treaty concluded on the same day, it was solemnly stipulated that the contracting parties should not lay down their arms till they had effected the complete destruction of Napoleon. The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged on the 25th of April; and, within a fortnight after, it was acceded to by all the lesser powers in Europe. The contingent of Bavaria was fixed at sixty thousand men; that of Piedemont at thirty thousand; that of Hanover at twenty-six thousand.*

March 25.

The forces at the disposal of the coalition were immense. According to the returns which were laid before the Congress, in their secret sittings, of the military resources of the European states banded in this alliance, the number of troops which they could dispose of for active operations, without unduly diminishing the garrison and other services in their respective interiors, amounted to the enormous number of 986,000 men.† Germany, arrayed in the Germanic Confederation, was to take a part in this great alliance worthy of its vast strength and ancient renown; and the forces of its lesser powers, animated by experienced wrongs, and inspired by recent victory, promised to be of a very different mould from the old and unwilling contingents of the Empire. After making every reasonable deduction for the sick, absent, and non-efficient, it was calculated that six hundred thousand effective men might be brought to bear on the Rhine, the Alps, and the Flemish frontier. In a secret meeting, held at Vienna on the 31st of March, it was resolved forthwith to form three great armies, by which active operations were to be commenced as soon as possible; the first, of two hundred and sixty-five thousand, chiefly Austrians and Bavarians, on the Upper Rhine, under Schwartzenberg; the second, of a hundred and fifty-five thousand Prussians, on the Lower Rhine, under Blucher; the third, of an equal number of English, Hanoverians, and Belgians, in the Low Countries. It was resolved that military operations should be commenced early in June; before which time it was hoped that the great Russian army, a hundred and seventy thousand strong, could be on the Upper Rhine from Poland, and entering France by Strasburg and Besançon, form a reserve to the invading armies from the eastward. In addition to these great armies, lesser diversions, but still of no inconsiderable importance, were to be attempted on the side of Switzerland, which had declared for the allies, and the Pyrenees; the former by a united force of Austrians, British, and Piedmontese, the latter by the Spaniards and Portuguese; while England was also to send succours to organize the formidable strength of La Vendée in the cause of loyalty and religion.*

And immense force at their disposal.

March 31.

From these arrangements, as well as the geographical position of the country which they occupied, it was evident that the British troops in Flanders would be first exposed to the shock of war; while, at the same time, it was of the highest importance to the general cause not to lose the vantage ground which they there possessed, or to permit, as had so often previously been done, the advanced work of Europe against France to be converted into the advanced post of France against Europe. The preparations of the newly-erected monarchy of Belgium could not be expected to be in any state of forwardness; the Hanoverian levies were as yet not raised; and the flower of the British army was in Canada, or scattered over the American coast. In these circumstances, everything depended on the vigour of the British cabinet and the unanimity of the British people, and neither were wanting on the occasion. On the 6th of April, a message from the prince regent formally announced to both houses of Parliament the events which had recently occurred in France, in direct contravention of the treaty of Paris, the communications entered into with his allies on the subject, and the necessity of augmenting the military forces by sea and land. The address, which, as usual, was an echo of the message, was moved in the House of Lords by the Earl of Liverpool, and in the Commons by Lord Castlereagh; and so strongly were the members of both houses impressed with the awful nature of the crisis, and the necessity of making a vigorous effort in the outset to meet it, that the address in the House of

Preparations of the British government for the war.

April 6.

* See the Treaty in Martens's N. R., ii., 112, 116; and Cap., i., 321. Schoell, Trait. de Paix, xi., 218, 221.

† The composition of the principal armies of this immense host was as follows:

I. Army of Upper Rhine, Schwartzenberg, viz.:		
Austrians	150,000	
Bavarians	65,000	
Wirtemberg	25,000	
Baden	16,000	
Hessians, &c.	8,000	
		264,000
II. Army of Lower Rhine, Blucher, Prussians, Saxons, &c.		155,000
III. Army of Flanders—British, Belgians, Hanoverians, Brunswickers		155,000
IV. Russian Reserve, Barclay de Tolly		168,000
		743,000

—PLOTHO, iv., *Appendix*, p. 62; *and* CAPEFIGUE, i., 330, 331.

* Conferences, 623. Mem. and Protocol, March 31, 1815. Schoell, Congr. de Vienne, iv., 170. Cap., i., 328, 331; and Schoell, Trait. de Paix, xi., 213, 215.

Peers was carried without a dissenting voice; and in the Commons by a majority of 183, the numbers being 220 to 37. Lord Castlereagh put the matter upon its true footing in the concluding sentence of his speech: "Some may think that an armed peace would be preferable to a state of war; but the danger must be fairly looked at; and knowing that good faith was opposite to the system of the party to be treated with—knowing that the rule of his conduct was self-interest, regardless of every other consideration, whatever decision they come to must rest on the principle of power, and not that of reliance on the man."*

Finances and budget of Great Britain.

Nor were the financial, naval, and military preparations of Great Britain on a scale incommensurate to the magnitude of the undertaking in which she was engaged, and the engagements she had contracted with foreign powers. On the 19th of April, the House of Commons, by a majority of 125, the numbers being 183 to 58, renewed the property-tax, producing now fully £15,000,000 annually, for another year—a decisive proof that they were in earnest in supporting government. The whole war-taxes were continued, and supplies to an unprecedented extent voted; those for the navy being £18,000,000, while those for the army rose to the enormous amount of £24,000,000, besides £3,800,000 for the ordnance. With these large sums, two hundred and seven thousand regular soldiers were maintained, besides eighty thousand militia, and three hundred and forty thousand local militia; in all, six hundred and fifty thousand men in arms, and the ships of the line placed in commission were fifty-eight. The subsidies to foreign powers amounted to no less than £11,000,000; and the whole expenditure of the year, when all was paid, reached the unparallelled sum of £110,000,000. To provide for this enormous expenditure, the permanent and war taxes produced £80,000,000, and loans to the amount of £39,000,000 were raised for the service of Great Britain and Ireland; but these sums, great as they were, proved unequal to the charges of the year, and when the whole expenditure of the war was wound up at the close of the year, the unfunded or floating debt had risen to £48,725,000; the capital of the funded debt was £792,000,000; the annual charge of the debt was £42,000,000; but of that sum no less than £12,968,000 was for the support of the sinking fund. If that noble establishment had been kept up by maintaining the indirect taxes set apart by the wisdom of former times for its maintenance, it would have paid off the whole national debt by the year 1845; and the nation, from the effects of the long peace, purchased by the sacrifices of the war, would have discharged the whole burdens contracted during its continuance.*†

Subsidies granted to foreign powers by England.

In addition to these immense military and naval preparations, the subsidies which Great Britain became bound to advance to foreign powers were so considerable, that it might truly be said that the whole military force of Europe was in this year arrayed in British pay against France. Such was the exhaustion of the finances of the greater powers, from the unparalleled efforts they had made during the two preceding years, that they were wholly unable to put their armies in motion without this pecuniary assistance. By a treaty concluded at Vienna, between England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, the former of these powers agreed to furnish to the three latter a subsidy of £5,000,000, to be paid by monthly instalments to the ministers of these three powers in equal proportions; and if peace was concluded within the year, they were to receive after its signature, Russia four months', and Austria and Prussia two months' subsidy each, to provide for the return of the troops to their own dominions. Sweden obtained £521,000, Hanover £206,000, the lesser German powers £1,724,000: the stipulated sums paid to the greater powers required to be enlarged; and the total sum paid by Great Britain in the year to foreign powers exceeded £11,000,000.*† April 30

Napoleon's difficulties, and military preparations.

Nothing which vigour and activity could do was wanting on the part of Napoleon to provide the means of defence against this prodigious phalanx of enemies ready to overwhelm him; but such was the exhaustion of the military strength of the country in consequence of his preceding wars, and the apathy or despair of the people from the effects of long-continued disaster, that all his efforts were unable to raise anything like an adequate force. The arsenals and fortresses were nearly empty, especially on the eastern frontier, which was most exposed to danger, from the exhaustion of the preceding campaign or the abstractions of the allied armies; twelve thousand pieces of cannon in fifty-three fortresses had been ceded by the treaties at Paris; and the regular force in arms did not amount to a hundred thousand men. The treasury, after the first six weeks' expenditure, was exhausted; arrears of taxes were almost irrecoverable; national credit was equal to nothing. To provide forces for withstanding the hostility of combined Europe, with such means and in such a country, was indeed an Herculean task; but the genius of Napoleon was equal to the undertaking, and but for the surpassing firmness of Wellington, and the gallantry of the British troops, his efforts would in all probability have proved successful. His first step was to restore, with their eagles, their numbers to the old regiments, ennobled by so many heroic deeds, and so unwisely taken away by the late government; and those precious memorials of past glory were given back to the regiments with every pomp and circumstance most likely to reanimate the spirits of the soldiers. The skeletons of three additional battalions were next organized for each regiment; and to provide men to fill their ranks, the whole retired veterans were by proclamation invited to join their respective corps. Two additional

* Parl. Deb., xxx., 356, 371, and 418, 463. Ann. Reg., 1815, 12, 13.

† Finance Accounts, 1816. Ann. Reg., 1816, 435. Parl. Deb., xxxi., 795, 814. James, vi., App., No. 23.

‡ See Appendix A, chap. lxxvii., where the details, finances, and public debt of the Empire in the year 1815 are fully given.

* See the Treaty, April 30, 1815, Martens, N. R., 121; and Ann. Reg., 1815, 377. State Papers.

† The subsidies paid were,

Austria	£1,796,220
Russia	3,241,919
Prussia	2,382,823
Hanover	206,590
Spain	147,333
Portugal	100,000
Sweden	521,061
Italy and Netherlands	78,152
Minor Powers	1,724,000
Miscellaneous	837,134
Total	£11,035,232

—*Finance Accounts*, 1816; *Ann. Reg.*, 1816, 430

squadrons were in like manner added to each regiment of cavalry; and thirty new battalions of artillery, raised chiefly from the sailors of Cherburg, Brest, and Toulon; forty battalions, in twenty regiments, were added to the Young Guard, entirely drawn from veterans who had served six campaigns; and two hundred battalions of the National Guard were organized, so as to be capable of taking the duty of the garrison towns and interior, and thus permit the whole regular troops to be moved to the frontier. By these means the emperor calculated that the effective strength of the army, by the 1st of June, would be raised to four hundred thousand men, of which one half might be disposable for active operations in the field; and by the 1st of September his sanguine temperament led him to hope that he would have five hundred battalions of troops of the line and fifty-two of the Guards, mustering six hundred thousand combatants, besides sixty thousand admirable horse.*

His efforts to obtain arms and replenish the arsenals, and forces which he collected for the campaign.

To provide arms and the muniments of war for so prodigious a multitude out of the exhausted arsenals, and with the worn-out finances of the Empire, was a still more difficult matter; but the ardent genius of the emperor, appealing to the generous feelings, and rousing the national spirit of the people, was here, too, attended with surprising success. The whole workmen in all the manufactories of arms in the country were doubled: twenty thousand muskets a month were thus obtained; but this was far from meeting the exigencies of the moment. To procure additional supplies, bodies of permanent workmen were established in many places, in imitation of the corps of workmen on the plains of Grenoble during the Revolution: the old arms were everywhere called in by proclamation, repaired, and served out to the young soldiers: the foundries were everywhere set to work with the utmost vigour to replenish the arsenals with guns: purchases of horses, to a vast extent, made in all the fairs of the Empire: all those of the gendarmerie were taken, and requisitions made from the peasants of draught horses for the use of the artillery and wagon train. Great part of these purchases were not, as may well be believed, paid for in ready money: orders on the treasury, at distant dates, were lavishly given, and, under military government, could not be refused; and they constituted no small part of the embarrassment of the government of the second Restoration. But, in the mean time, the things were got: the arming of the troops and equipment of the guns went on with extraordinary rapidity; and an order on the different communes to furnish each a certain portion of the clothing of a battalion, soon provided them with uniforms. Before the beginning of June, two hundred and twenty thousand men, almost all veteran soldiers, were completely armed, equipped, clothed, and in readiness to take the field: an astonishing proof of the patriotic spirit of the people, and the enthusiastic ardour with which, in the last struggle of their country, the old soldiers had thrown themselves into the breach.†

In military arrangements, the power of the emperor was unfettered, and his genius and prodigious activity appeared in their highest lustre; but in civil administration he was entirely in the hands of Fouché and the Republicans; and they steadily pursued one object, which was to provide a counterpoise to his power in the revival of the Republican spirit of the people. Carnot, entirely engrossed in the Herculean task of reorganizing the National Guard, left the direction of civil affairs entirely to Fouché, and he made such skilful use of his unbounded power and influence as head of the police, that the old regicides and Jacobins were everywhere called up again into activity, and the election for the approaching Chamber of Deputies, summoned for the Champ de Mars, had almost entirely fallen into their hands. His language in this respect was undisguised to his Republican allies. "If that man there," said he, "shall attempt to curb the Jacobin ideas, we will overturn him at once and forever." Napoleon knew and deeply resented this conduct; but his precarious situation compelled him to dissemble, and continue Fouché in power: for he had no hold of the nation, apart from the army, but through the medium of the Republicans. Meanwhile, such was the address of the emperor and the charm of his conversation, that he succeeded in detaching many of the leading men of talent in Paris, who had formerly taken a prominent part against him, from the Royalist cause. Among the rest, M. Sismondi, the great historian, and Benjamin Constant, the able supporter of constitutional freedom, were entirely won over to his side; and they were intrusted with the arduous duty of aiding in the formation of a Constitution. One of the most extraordinary of the many extraordinary gifts with which this wonderful man was endowed, was the power he possessed of subduing the minds of men, and the faculty he had acquired of dazzling penetration the most acute, and winning over hostile prepossessions the most confirmed, by the mere magic of his fascinating conversation.*

Fouché, Carnot, and other Republicans: their great influence.

The financial difficulties of the Hundred Days were singularly lessened by the comparatively prosperous condition in which the treasury had been left, from the diminished expenditure and increased economy of the Bourbon government. Nearly forty millions of francs (£1,600,000) were left by Louis XVIII. in the treasury, or in the balance due by the receivers-general; and an equal sum fell in shortly after, at stated periods, from the sale of national wood, which they had previously made, but for which the bills were not yet all due. It was from these resources that the first and indispensable expenses of the imperial government were defrayed, but they were soon exhausted by the vast purchases for the army; and, as the capitalists had no confidence whatever in the dynasty of Napoleon, it became a very difficult matter to say how the treasury was to be replenished. As a last resource, the sinking fund, hitherto invariably respected, was offered as a security to a company of bankers, and at first refused; but their consent was at length purchased by such exorbitant interest, that the four millions of francs to which it amounted annually, produced only thirty-one millions of francs: in other words, the government borrowed at twelve per cent. The bills due by the receivers-general were discounted at the rate of seventeen and eighteen per cent.; and by these extraordinary resources, and forestalling the

Financial measures of Napoleon.

* Jom., iv., 614, 615. Cap., i., 358, 359. Thib., x., 364, 365.
† Archives de la Guerre; and Cap., i., 359, 360. Thib. x., 365 366

* Cap., i., 384, 385. Constant, Cent Jours, 23, 41.

ordinary revenue, eighty millions of francs (£3,200,000) were raised in April and May, which kept the treasury afloat till the battle of Waterloo terminated at once the difficulties and political existence of Napoleon.*

Formation of a Constitution.

The task of framing a Constitution, in a country so long habituated to that species of manufacture as France had been since the Revolution, proved much less difficult than that of restoring the finances. The commission to whom this duty had been devolved, presided over by Benjamin Constant, consisted chiefly of the old patriots of 1789 who had survived the Revolution; and it was governed, accordingly, by the visionary ideas of perfectibility which had characterized that dreamy period. The first draft of a Constitution which they submitted to the emperor was accordingly so Democratic, that even in his present necessities it was at once rejected by him: "I will never," said he, "subscribe to such conditions: I have the army on my side, and after what it has done on the 20th of March, it will know how to defend France and its emperor." Defeated in this attempt, the Liberal party in the commission drew up another Constitution; and this one, styled the "Additional Act," the work of Constant and Regnaud de St. Angely, was little different from the Charter of Louis XVIII. Two Chambers, one of Peers and one of Commons, were established on nearly the same footing as they had been by the former government. But three particulars in this new Constitution were very remarkable, and demonstrated how much more clearly Napoleon saw the exigencies of the times, and the necessity of bulwarks to power, than the Bourbons had done. 1. The peerage was declared to be *hereditary*—not for life only: a provision which at once announced the intention of reviving a feudal nobility. 2. The punishment of confiscation of property, a penalty so well known in the dark ages, abolished by the Charter, was restored in cases of high treason. 3. The family of the Bourbons was forever proscribed, and even the power of recalling them denied to the people. It was in vain to disguise, that while these articles indicated in the strongest manner an intention to prevent a second restoration of the royal family, they pointed not less unequivocally to the practical abrogation of the power of self-government, and the construction of a strong monarchy for the family of the emperor; and thus the publication of the "*Acte additionel*," on the 25th of April, excited unbounded opposition in both the parties which now divided the nation, and left the emperor in reality no support but in the soldiers of the army.†

April 25.

Violent opposition which it excites.

The public feeling appeared in an article which was inserted in the *Censeur Européen*, the very existence of which demonstrated how the emperor's authority had declined from the palmy days of the Empire. It was entitled, "On the Influence of the Mustache on the Reason, and the Necessity of the Sabre in Government." "What," exclaimed the fearless writer, "is glory? Has a lion, which makes all the animals of the surrounding country tremble, glory? Has a miserable people, which knows not how to govern itself, and is to its neighbours an object only of terror and hatred, glory? If glory is the sole attribute of men who have done good to their race, where is the glory of a conquering people?" So vehement did the clamour become, especially among the Republicans, that Carnot, who felt himself compromised with his party by the *Acte additionel*, wrote to the emperor, strongly representing that "dissatisfaction was universal, civil war on the point of breaking out, and that it was indispensable to publish a decree forthwith, authorizing the Chambers to modify the Constitution in the next session, and to submit the modification to the primary assemblies of the people." But Napoleon replied, "With you, Carnot, I have no need of disguise: you are a strong-headed man, with sagacious intellect. Let us save France, and after that we will arrange everything. Let us not sow the seeds of discord, when the closest union is required to save the country." To the honour of Carnot it must be added, that from that moment he made no opposition to a dictatorial power being for the time placed in the hands of the emperor.*

April 28.

April 29.

Ineffectual attempt of the French diplomacy to open a negotiation with the allied powers.

While Napoleon was vainly striving to blend into one united whole the fervent passions and wounded interests of Revolutionary France, Caulaincourt was strenuously endeavouring to open up a diplomatic intercourse with the allied powers. In this vital matter everything depended on the success or failure of the first step; for if the allies had consented to a negotiation of any kind with the emperor, it would have been a recognition of his authority, and a virtual revocation of the decree of the 13th of March. But all his efforts were ineffectual; and what is remarkable, the Emperor Alexander, who, in 1814, had most warmly espoused his cause, was now the most decided against him. "We can have no peace," said he, with energy, to a secret agent who approached him with overtures from the Emperor Napoleon; "it is a mortal duel betwixt us—he has broken his word. I am freed from my engagement: Europe requires an example." "Europe," said Metternich, in an official article from Vienna, in the *European Observer*, "has declared war against Bonaparte. France can, and ought to prove to Europe, that it knows its dignity sufficiently not to submit to the domination of one man. The French nation is powerful and free; its power and freedom are essential to the equilibrium of Europe. France has but to deliver itself from its oppressor, and return to the principles on which the social order reposes, to be in peace with Europe." The spirit of Germany was hourly more and more exalted by those declarations: already the ferment was as wide-spread, the enthusiasm as universal, as when the allied armies first approached the Rhine. Thus all attempts of Caulaincourt to open a negotiation, all the declarations of Napoleon that he aspired now only to be the first in peace, proved ineffectual. His insincerity was universally known, the necessities of his situation universally appreciated. Napoleon, on the 1st of April, addressed a circular to all the sovereigns, commencing, in the usual style from one sovereign to another, "Sir, my brother," and concluding with the strongest protestations of his desire to commence a new strife in the arena of peace.† But all his efforts were ineffectual:

April 26.

April 1.

* Cap., i., 377, 380.

† Acte additionel, Moniteur, April 25, 1815. Goldsmith's Recueil, vi. Cap., i., 384, 396.

* Carnot to Napoleon, April 29, 1815, Cap., i., 395, 396.

† "The true nature of the events which have taken

none of M. Caulaincourt's couriers could reach their destined point: one was stopped at Kehl, another at Mayence, and a third near Turin. At the same time, Caulaincourt was informed, in a confidential communication with Baron Vincent, that it was no longer possible to make the allied sovereigns swerve from their determination, or separate them from each other.*

Murat commences hostilities, and advances to the Po. His defeat and overthrow.

Murat was the first who raised the standard of war. Anxious to deprive Napoleon of such an ally, and prevent the distraction of his forces by an Italian war, when it was necessary to combine every effort for the overthrow of Napoleon, Austria had offered to guaranty to him the disputed marches, and procure for him the recognition of all the sovereigns at Vienna of his right to the throne of Naples if he would declare for the allies; when the brave but infatuated king, transported by the intelligence of the success of Napoleon in France, and deeming the time had arrived when he might strike with effect for the independence of Italy and the throne of that beautiful peninsula, suddenly commenced hostilities. On the 31st of March he crossed the Po, and published from Rimini a sonorous proclamation, in which he called on the Italians to unite with him in asserting their independence. "The moment," said he, "is arrived when great destinies are about to be accomplished: Providence at length has called us to become an independent people. From the summit of the Alps to the extremity of Sicily one cry is heard—the independence of Italy." But although these sentiments found a responsive echo in the general breast, yet the event soon proved on what a sandy foundation all projects for Italian independence were rested which were based on the military operations of the Italian people. Although the King of Naples was at the head of a well-disciplined, splendidly-equipped, and beautifully-dressed army of fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand advanced to the Po, the remainder being left in reserve in his own dominions, yet was his overthrow so easily effected, that it could hardly be called a war. The Neapolitan troops, in the first instance, gained a slight success; but the Austrian generals, Bellegarde, Bianchi, and Frimont, quickly united their forces and attacked Murat at Tolentino. The Neapolitans fled like a flock of sheep at the first fire; a second engagement completed their rout, and dispersed the fugitives through the Roman States, from whence, in the utmost terror, they regained their own frontier; Murat himself, wholly deserted by his troops, was glad to embark at Naples for Toulon, which he reached in safety; while his queen, Caroline, escaped on board an English merchant vessel, and was conveyed to Austria. Thus fell the throne of the Bonaparte family in Naples; and thus was accomplished the prophecy of Napoleon, who, when he heard of his commencing hostilities, said that his brother-in-law would ruin himself by taking up arms in 1815, as in 1814 he had ruined him by failing to do so. Nothing now remained to prevent the Sicilian family from resuming their ancient throne of Naples, which they accordingly immediately did, and were recognised by all Europe.*

March 31. April 9 and 11. April 30.

While these important events were in progress in Europe, the monarch whose fall had occasioned them all, and around whom this terrible conflagration was breaking forth, was living in seclusion, but yet not forgotten, at Ghent. Louis XVIII. kept up in that ancient city the state of a sovereign; M. Blacas, General Clarke, and Chateaubriand had followed him in his exile, and kept up diplomatic communications with foreign courts, the ambassadors of all of whom, still in exile, waited on the dethroned monarch. Ambition and intrigue were not wanting; Ghent had its salons and coteries as well as either Paris or Vienna. But what contributed most of all to give the court there consideration in the eyes of Europe, was the nomination of M. Lally Tollendal and Viscount Chateaubriand to the offices of ministers of state, and the powerful declamations which they soon began to launch out against the usurper of the French throne. The Duke of Wellington visited the king in his seclusion, and he had the satisfaction of hearing from the duke the assurance that "he regarded the restoration of the Bourbons as essential to the equilibrium of Europe." Clarke furnished valuable information in regard to the situation and strength of the French army when he left the ministry of war at Paris; while Chateaubriand, in the *Moniteur de Gand*, which appeared daily, combated the proclamations and state papers of Napoleon, published in the *Moniteur* at Paris, with such ability, and inveighed with such impassioned eloquence against his government, that he contributed in a powerful manner to uphold the spirit of the European alliance.†

Louis XVIII. at Ghent. Chateaubriand and his writings.

La Vendée had in the first instance disappointed the expectations of the Duke de Bourbon and the French Royalists; but the course of events in that province proved in the end eminently serviceable to the restoration of the monarchy. The Duke de Bourbon was personally unknown to the Vendéans; his name had never figured in their heart-stirring annals; but in the beginning of May, when the Marquis Louis de La Rochejaquelein made his appearance on their coast, the glorious name at once produced a general insurrection among them, and an animated proclamation from him drew thousands to the royal standard. M. de Suzannet was soon at the head of four thousand armed peasants in the Bocage; M. d'Auti-

May 1.

place must now be fully known to your majesty. They were the result of an irresistible power; the work of the unanimous wish of a great nation, which knows its duties and its rights. The dynasty which force had imposed upon the country was not suited to it; the Bourbons were neither associated with its sentiments nor its habits. France required to separate from them. France has recalled a liberator; the inducement which had led me to the greatest of sacrifices no longer existed. I returned; and, from the moment when I landed on the shore, the love of my people has borne me to the capital. The first wish of my heart is to repay so much affection by an honourable tranquillity; my sweetest hope is to render the re-establishment of the Imperial throne a guarantee for the peace of Europe. Enough of glory has illustrated, in their turn, the standards of all nations; the vicissitudes of fate have sufficiently often made great reverses succeed the most glorious success. A nobler arena is now opened to sovereigns; I will be the first to descend into it. After having exhibited to the world the spectacle of great combating, it will be now sweeter to exhibit henceforth no other rivalry but that of the advantages of peace—no other strife but that of the felicity of nations."—NAPOLEON *to the Allied Sovereigns, April* 1, 1815, *Moniteur, April* 2; and CAPEFIGUE, i., 311, 312.

* Cap., i., 304, 313. Thib., x, 286, 295. Napoleon to the Allied Sovereigns, April 1, 1815, Cap., i., 311.

* Thib., x., 319, 322. Cap., ii., 15, 17. Bot., iv., 417 419. † Cap. ii., 41, 63. Thib., x., 311, 315.

champ raised a still larger number; M. de Sapineau was placed at the head of a third, five thousand strong; and Auguste de La Rochejaquelein led a fourth. The presence of twenty thousand armed men in the thickets of La Vendée produced no small uneasiness in the mind of the emperor; and he despatched Generals Lamarque and Travot to command a formidable army of twenty thousaad men for their subjugation, while Fouché opened in secret a negotiation with their chiefs. The astute minister, foreseeing a second restoration, and having already commenced measures to secure his ascendency in the event of it, despatched two able emissaries—M. de Malarbic and De la Berandière—with instructions, by the most conclusive of all arguments, to put an end to the civil war. "Why," said he, "should the Vendéans go to war; French blood will soon flow in sufficient streams without theirs being mingled with it? Let them wait a month or two, and all will be over. Above all, let not the English interfere in the business, for they come only to profit by our divisions. Conclude an armistice till the inevitable restoration. La Vendée is but an incident in the great European war about to break out in the plains of Belgium. The contest between the Blues and the Whites is henceforth without an object." By these means, which were entirely in accordance with his whole policy throughout the Hundred Days, Fouché hoped to have the merit, in the eyes of Napoleon, of terminating the contest in La Vendée; in those of the Bourbons, of detaching twenty thousand men from his standard at the most critical period of his fortunes; and of the nation, of closing the frightful gulf of civil war.*

Measures of Napoleon to crush it, and pacification of the province.

These deep-laid schemes proved entirely successful, and their favourable result was much aided by the divisions which prevailed among the Vendéan chiefs themselves. Louis de la Rochejaquelein aspired to the supreme command; and his great name and family influence, as well as the support of the English government, with which he was in close communication, fully entitled him to the honour. But his pretensions were contested by the other chiefs, particularly D'Autichamp and Suzannet, not from any distrust of his qualifications for the lead, but a secret and not unnatural jealousy of external influence, and, above all, of British co-operation. Thus there was no cordial union among them, and this appeared in the outset of operations; for La Rochejaquelein, buoyant with courage, and ardent to enrol his name in the records of Vendéan fame, was desirous at once to commence hostilities, while the other chiefs were inclined to follow Fouché's advice, and wait, at any rate till the war broke out on the frontier, before they declared themselves. La Rochejaquelein, however, who deemed his honour pledged to follow out his engagements with the British government, and whose heroic spirit could brook no delay, took up arms, and moved to the seacoast, to cover the disembarcation of military stores and equipments which had commenced from the British vessels. He was followed by Lamarque at the head of eight thousand men, and several inconsiderable actions took place, in which the Vendéans displayed their accustomed valour, and reached in safety Croix de Vie on the seacoast, where the English vessels were lying, and the disembarcation was continued under their protection. But there the effect of Fouché's ambiguous counsels appeared: D'Autichamp, Suzannet, and Sapineau determined not to enter into communication with the British, withdrew with their divisions, and disbanded their men. Thus La Rochejaquelein, with his division, five thousand strong, was left alone to withstand eight thousand veteran soldiers who pressed upon him; yet with this handful of men he was not discouraged, but with a heart swelling with indignation at the desertion of his countrymen, and the glorious recollections of his race, marched to meet the enemy. He sought only what he soon found—a glorious death. The Vendéans fought with their accustomed gallantry, but the loss of their chiefs spread a fatal discouragement among their ranks: the Marquis de la Rochejaquelein, impelled by a generous ardour, spurred his charger out of the line, reached an eminence close to the enemy's line to reconnoitre a body of men which he saw approaching, belonging to the troops of the Marais, fell mortally wounded, breathed a short prayer for his king and country, and expired. Auguste de la Rochejaquelein soon after was severely wounded; and the Vendéans, despairing of the combat after the loss of their chiefs, gave way and dispersed. This action terminated the war in La Vendée, as the other leaders had all gone into Fouché's plan of awaiting the issue of events. But the heroic Louis de la Rochejaquelein did not die in vain: his firmness retained at a critical time twenty thousand veteran French in the western provinces, when the campaign was just beginning in Flanders; and who can say what effect they might have had if thrown into the scale when the beam quivered on the field of Waterloo?*

May 29.

Meanwhile, Napoleon was engaged with the meeting of the deputies at Paris, and the preparation of the great fête of the Champ de Mai, on a scale of magnificence which might at once captivate the people of the capital, and recall to the Republican party the popular demonstrations of the Revolution. On the 30th of April a decree was passed convoking the electoral colleges for the nomination of the deputies to the Chamber of Representatives, and ordaining that the deputies named should repair to Paris, to be present at the assembly of the Champ de Mai, and to form the Chamber, to which the "Acte additionel" should be submitted. The election of deputies was everywhere a vain formality, and did not afford the smallest indication of the real state of the public mind. In most of the departments not a tenth part of the qualified persons came forward to the vote; in some, particularly those of Bouches du Rhone and La Vendée, the deputies were appointed by five electors; in twenty-nine no election whatever took place. The respectable citizens everywhere kept aloof from contests conducted under the auspices of Fouché, Carnot, and the violent Republicans; the men of property deemed it unnecessary to mix themselves up with an ephemeral Legislature, or to make any effort for a cause which would soon be determined by the bayonets of the allies. Thus the elections fell into the hands, as in the commencement of the Revolution, of a mere knot of noisy orators, ignorant

Composition of the Chamber of Deputies.

April 30

* Cap., ii., 70, 81. Fouché, Mem., ii., 332, 333. Beauch., iv., 157, 163.

* Beauch., iv., 180, 185. Thib., x., 367, 368. Cap., ii., 81, 82.

declaimers, and salaried agents of administration; and a Legislature was returned in which the great majority was composed of needy, unprincipled adventurers, base, worn-out hacks of the police, and furious Jacobins, whose presumption, as usual, was equalled only by their ignorance. Nothing could be expected but rashness and imbecility from such a Legislature, and yet it was to be called to duties requiring above all others the soundest judgment, the purest patriotism, the most exalted courage.*

The Champ de Mai at Paris.

Aware, however, how strongly the French are influenced by theatrical representations, no pains were spared by the emperor to render the approaching ceremony in the Champ de Mai as imposing as possible. For above a month workmen had been engaged in preparing for it; the most glowing descriptions of its probable magnificence had been frequently given in the public journals, and the preparations were on a scale which recalled the famous assembly on the same spot on the 14th of July, 1790.† A cardinal, two archbishops, and several bishops, presided over the religious part of the ceremony: the emperor appeared surrounded by his chamberlains, his pages, and all the pomp of the Empire; the marshals, the generals, the great officers of state were there, attended by brilliant staffs and retinues, and all the circumstances of military and civil splendour: four thousand electors chosen by the electoral colleges throughout France were assembled, deputations from all the regiments around Paris attended, and the presence of thirty thousand National Guards of the metropolis added to the imposing aspect of the ceremony. The day was fine; above two hundred thousand spectators crowded round the benches, arranged in the form of an amphitheatre, where the persons appointed to take part in the ceremony were stationed; and the commencement of the votes of the electors in their primary assemblies, when announced, showed that the "Acte additionel" was approved by an immense majority of the electors; the numbers being fifteen hundred thousand to five thousand.‡ It is a striking proof of the vanity of all such references to the popular voice, that of the immense number of votes which appeared in the majority, certainly not one in a thousand knew what they were voting about; and not one in ten thousand, if they had, would, in all probability, have approved of the new Constitution.§

Napoleon's speech on the occasion.

Napoleon addressed the electors in these words: "Gentlemen, deputies of the army and navy in the Champ de Mai—emperor, consul, soldier, I owe everything to the people. In prosperity, in adversity, in the field of battle, in council, on the throne, in exile, France has been the only object of my thoughts and actions. Like the King of Athens, I have sacrificed myself for the people, in the hope of seeing the promise realized, of thereby securing to France its natural frontiers, its honours, its rights. Indignation at beholding those sacred rights, the fruit of twenty-five years of victory, disregarded or lost; the cry of withered honour, the wishes of the nation, have brought me back to the throne which is dear to me, because it is the palladium of the independence, the rights, and honour of the French people. Frenchmen! in traversing amid the public joy the different provinces of the Empire to arrive in my capital, I trusted I could reckon on a long peace; nations are bound by treaties concluded by their governments, whatever they may be. My whole thoughts were then turned to the means of founding our liberty on a constitution resting on the wishes and interests of the people. Therefore it is that I have convoked the assembly of the Champ de Mai. I soon learned, however, that the princes who resist all popular rights, and disregard the wishes and interests of so many nations, were resolved on war. They intend to extend the kingdom of the Low Countries, by giving it for a barrier all our frontier places in the north, and to reconcile all their differences by sharing among them Lorraine and Alsace. We must prepare for war! Frenchmen, you are about to return into your departments. Tell your fellow-citizens that the circumstances are perilous! but that, with the aid of union, energy, and perseverance, we shall emerge victorious out of this struggle of a great people against its oppressors; that future generations will severely scrutinize our conduct; that a nation has lost all when it has lost its independence. Tell them that the stranger kings whom I have placed on their thrones, or who owe to me the preservation of their crowns, and who in the days of my prosperity have courted my alliance and that of the French people, now direct all their strokes against my person. Did I not know it is against our country they are aimed, I would sacrifice myself to their hatred. But my wishes, my rights, are those of the people: my prosperity, my honour, my glory, can be no other than the prosperity, the honour, and the glory of France." At the conclusion of these eloquent words, Napoleon took the oath on the Gospels to observe the Constitution, which was immediately taken by the officers of state, marshals, deputies, and soldiers present; and the eagles were, at the same time, delivered with extraordinary pomp to the regiments.*

Great division of opinion at Paris.

But in the midst of all this seeming unanimity and enthusiasm, opinion at Paris was extremely divided; a formidable opposition against the emperor was organized in the bosom of the Chamber of Deputies, and some of his principal ministers were engaged in such secret correspondence with his enemies, that he was on the point of making them lose their heads. From the very outset of their sittings the hostility of the Chamber of Deputies to the emperor was unequivocally evinced, and mutual ill-humour appeared on both sides. When the choice of M. Lanjuinais, the old Girondist, to be president, was announced to the emperor, instead of his brother Lucien, whom he had designed for that dignity, his first impulse was to refuse to confirm the appointment, and he coldly answered, "I will return my answer by one of my chamberlains." When this expression was repeated, it raised a perfect storm in the Chambers. To return an answer by a chamberlain was a direct insult, it was

* Cap., i., 397, 398. Thib., x., 332, 333. Fouché, Mem., ii., 337, 338. Montg., viii., 170, 171.

† *Ante*, i., 99.

‡ The numbers were,

	Ayes.	Noes.
64 Departments .	1,288,357 .	4207
Army . .	222,100 .	320
Navy . .	22,000 .	275
Total,	1,532,457 .	4802

—*Moniteur*, 2*d June*, 1815; and THIBAUDEAU, x., 334.

§ Thib., x., 332, 335. Cap., ii., 94, 99. Montg., viii., 167, 169. Moniteur, June 2, 1815.

* Moniteur, June 2, 1815. Cap., ii., 99. Thib., x., 337, 338.

said, to the national representatives. The emperor, however, was obliged to submit, and all the influence of the court failed in the appointment of the vice-presidents; M. Flarequerguis, Dupont de l'Eure, Lafayette, and Grenier, all known for their extreme popular principles, were elected. Napoleon opened the Chamber of Deputies in person; his speech, though abundantly liberal, was coldly received. A great review of the forty-eight battalions of the National Guard was still more unsatisfactory; hardly any cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were heard from the ranks, and it was followed by a procession of the *fédérés* of the suburbs, so hideous and disorderly, that it recalled the worst days of the Revolution, and excited no small apprehensions in the minds of those around the emperor. Everything announced that the reign of lawyers, adventurers, and democracy was returning in the Chambers, and with it the ascendency of Jacobins, massacre, and revolution in the metropolis.*

June 6.

Napoleon sets out for the army. June 7.

The spirit of the Chamber of Peers, named by the emperor, was abundantly pliant; but that of the Deputies, daily more refractory, soon became so hostile, that the emperor, to avoid the pain of witnessing its absurdities, was glad of an excuse for setting out for the army. A proposition to declare him the "saviour of the country" was almost unanimously rejected; in the midst of the most pressing external dangers, their attention was exclusively occupied with the means of propagating liberal principles, and rendering more popular the Constitution. The "Acte additionel," so recently sworn to with such solemnity, was already ridiculed as an unworthy compromise, which would not for a moment bear the lights of the age. Everything showed that the Chambers contemplated the speedy seizure of the supreme power. The answer of Napoleon to their address, on the eve of his departure, evinced the disquietude which filled his mind, and contained the words of true patriotic wisdom: "This night," said he, "I shall set out for the army; the movements of the enemies' corps render my presence indispensable. During my absence, I shall learn with pleasure that a committee of the Chamber is meditating on the Constitution. The Constitution is our rallying-point; it should be the sole polar star in moments of storm. Every political discussion which should tend, directly or indirectly, to diminish the confidence which we feel in our institutions, would be a misfortune for the state; we should find ourselves in the midst of shoals without rudder or compass. The crisis in which we are engaged is a terrible one: let us not imitate the Greeks of the lower empire, who, pressed on all sides by barbarians, rendered themselves the laughing-stock of posterity, by occupying themselves with abstract discussions at the moment that the battering-ram was thundering at their gates."†

June 4.

Formation of a government for the emperor's absence.

To direct public affairs during his absence, the emperor appointed a provisional government, consisting of fourteen persons, viz., his brother Joseph, who was the president, and Lucien, his eight ministers, Cambacéres, Davoust, Caulaincourt, Fouché, Carnot, Gaudin, Mollière, and Decrès; with Regnaud de St. Angely, Boulay de la Meurthe, Desermont, and Merlin, who were admitted into the council, though not holding office on account of their talents for public speaking, and the consideration they enjoyed with the popular party, so powerful in the Representative Chamber. In truth, however, Carnot and Fouché were the only persons in this large number who were really in communication with influential parties in the state; so that the power was substantially in their hands. And though both old regicides and Republicans, they were very far indeed from being united now in regard to the course which should be pursued, and both had a cordial hatred and utter distrust of each other. Fouché regarded Carnot as an obstinate old mule, who would any day sacrifice himself and his party to the maintenance of a principle. Carnot, with more justice, looked on Fouché as a supple villain, who had never any principle at all, but was at all times ready to elevate himself on the shoulders of whatever party appeared likely to gain the ascendant. Yet was his influence such that Napoleon, though well aware of his treachery, did not venture to dismiss him from the ministry. Shortly before his departure, a secret despatch from Metternich to the minister of police came to the knowledge of the emperor; and the messenger who conveyed it, in his terror, revealed various important details of the correspondence. Napoleon was no sooner informed of it than he ordered Fouché to be sent for, openly charged him before the council with being a traitor, and declared he would have him shot next morning. But Carnot calmly replied, "You have it in your power to shoot Fouché, but to-morrow, at the hour he suffers, your power is annihilated." "How so?" cried Napoleon. "Yes, sire," said Carnot, "this is not a time for dissembling. The men of the Revolution only allow you to reign because they believe that you will respect their liberties. If you destroy Fouché, whom they regard as one of their most powerful guarantees, to-morrow you will no longer have a shadow of power." The council agreed with Carnot; the idea of a military execution was abandoned; and Fouché was not a man to let any legal evidence of his secret treasons exist, so that the affair blew over. Napoleon's suspicions, however, were not allayed, although he could not convict his minister in legal form, and his last words to him before leaving Paris were these: "Like all persons who are ready to die, we have nothing to conceal from each other; if I fall, the patriots fall with me; you will play your game ill if you betray me. With me, all you Revolutionists will perish under the Bourbons; I am your last dictator; reflect on that." It is a striking proof of the ascendency which guilt acquires in revolutions, that this arch-intriguer, who, while directing the ministry of the interior under Napoleon, was on the one hand secretly corresponding with Metternich and Wellington, and on the other with D'Autichamp and the Vendéans, and who was, at the same time, rousing into fearful activity the old Jacobin party over all France, though known to be a traitor by all parties, could not be dispensed with by any.*

Napoleon's plan of the campaign was in a great measure based on the fortification of Paris, which, by the indefatigable efforts of General Haxo and the

Napoleon's plan of the campaign.

* Buchez and Roux, xl., 147, 152. Cap., ii., 103, 111. Thib., x., 352, 354. Fouché, ii., 340, 341.

† Buchez and Roux, xl., 164, 165.

* Fouché, ii., 329, 331. Cap., ii., 154, 156. Thib., x., 364, 369.

engineers, had by this time acquired a considerable degree of consistency. No one knew better than the emperor the value of such central fortifications; he felt that it was mainly owing to their want that all his efforts had proved abortive in the preceding year. Under Haxo's able direction, the whole heights to the north of Paris, from Montmartre to Charonne, were covered with redoubts; the canal of Ourcq was finished so as to cover the plain between La Villette and St. Denis, and the latter town was retrenched, and covered with the inundations of the Rouillon and the Crow. To the west of Montmartre, which formed the most elevated point of the line, was erected a series of intrenchments, which extended as far as the Seine at Clinchy; and the space at the other extremity, between Vincennes and Charenton, was also strengthened with redoubts. These works were nearly completed, and armed with seven hundred pieces of cannon: they rendered Paris almost impregnable, even to the greatest force, on the whole northern semicircle. Lyons also was strongly fortified with field intrenchments, mounting three hundred and fifty guns; and relying on the strength of these two important points to retard any decisive success on the part of the allies, Napoleon resolved to act with the main body of his forces, which amounted to a hundred and twenty-five thousand men, with three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, on the offensive in Flanders, on the frontiers of which that formidable force was already collected between the Meuse and the Sambre. Other lesser armies were stationed at other points on the frontier, with instructions to retire if outnumbered, and retard the enemy as much as possible; Suchet commanded two divisions, numbering twenty-two thousand combatants, on the frontiers of Savoy; a small corps of observation of ten thousand was placed at Befort, under Lecourbe; while Rapp, with three divisions, amounting to seventeen thousand, was stationed in Alsace, with his headquarters at Strasburg. Twenty thousand men were detained in distant and necessary inactivity on the frontiers of La Vendée and Brittany; while small divisions were at Marseilles, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, to overawe the Royalists in these cities. In all, not more than a hundred thousand men were arrayed in these lesser corps to resist not less than four hundred thousand enemies, preparing to invade France on the south and east; but they were merely regarded as the nucleus of so many armies, numbering three times the present amount of combatants, which might be assembled before the distant allied hosts could be brought together. Everything depended on the Grand Army under the immediate command of Napoleon.*†

Wellington's plan of the campaign.

Wellington, on his side, had profoundly meditated on the plan of the approaching campaign, and, after much reflection, he had resolved to invade France direct from Flanders, between the Marne and the Oise; but in order to conceal this design from the enemy, he suggested that the Austrians and Russians should invade, in the first instance, by Befort and Huningen, in order to attract the enemy's principal forces to that quarter; and as soon as this was done, the British and Prussians, united, were to march direct upon Paris from Mons and Namur. He had eighty thousand effective men under his orders; Blucher a hundred and ten thousand; but of the large host clustered around the British standards, a considerable part were raw Belgian and Hanoverian levies, upon whom little reliance could be placed; and for the actual shock of war, Wellington could only rest on the British and King's German Legion, about forty-six thousand strong, and the old Hanoverians and Brunswickers, fourteen thousand more. The British army was far from being equal, in composition or discipline, to that which crossed the Pyrenees, a large part of which was absent in Canada; and their place was supplied by a number of second battalions, and troops which had never seen service or acted together. But several of the most distinguished Peninsular regiments were there; the foot and horse guards appeared in splendid array; nine thousand noble horse seemed confident against the world in arms; a hundred and eighty guns, admirably equipped, were in the field: Picton, Hill, Clinton, Cole, Pack, and many of his old comrades, surrounded Wellington; the spirit of the army was at the highest point, and the troops possessed that confidence in themselves and their leader, which is the most important element in military success. Blucher's army was of a less heterogeneous character; his troops, almost all veterans of one nation, and inspired with the strongest hatred against the French, were filled with a well-founded confidence in themselves and their gallant commander; and having acted together in two previous campaigns, they had acquired that most valuable quality in soldiers, a thorough knowledge of their duties, and a firm reliance, founded on experience, on each other.*

Napoleon's plan of operations.

Napoleon's plan of operations was based on the necessities of his situation, and the vast advantages likely to be gained by a decisive success in the outset. He determined to collect all his forces into one mass, and boldly interposing between the British and Prussian armies, separate them from each other, and strike with the utmost vigour, first on the right hand, and then on the left. It was thus that, with a force not exceeding sixty thousand men, he had so long kept at bay the united armies of Blucher and Schwartzenberg, two hundred thousand strong, on the plains of Champagne; and what might not be expected, when he had a hundred and twenty thousand admirable troops, all veterans, and animated with the highest spirit, and not more than a hundred and ninety thousand in the field to combat? "The force of the two armies," says Napoleon, "could not be estimated by a mere comparison of the numbers, because the allied army was composed of troops more or less efficient, so that *one Englishman might be counted for one Frenchman*, but *two Dutchmen, Prussians, or soldiers of the Confederation*, were required to make up one Frenchman; and their armies were under the command of two different generals, and formed of nations divided not less by their sentiments than their interests."†

Disposition of the French troops, and Napoleon's address to them.

Soult was, on the 2d of June, appointed major-general of the army, and he immediately took the command, and issued a proclamation,‡ which contrasted strangely with that which, not three months before, he had

* Vict. et Conq., xxiv., 159, 160. Vaud., iii., 110. Jom., iv., 624. Cap., ii., 123, 124. Nap., Camp. of Waterloo, 49, 52. † See Appendix B, chap. lxxvii.

* Cap., ii., 149, 155. Mem. of Wellington to Allied Sovereigns, Plotho, iv., 247, 254. † Nap., ix, book 60, 61.

‡ "All the efforts of an impious league can no longer

thundered forth as minister at war to the Bourbons.* Napoleon left Paris at one o'clock in the morning of the 12th, breakfasted at Soissons, slept at Laon, and arrived at Avesnes on the 13th. He there found his army all concentrated between the Sambre and Philipville, and the returns on the evening of the 14th gave a hundred and twenty-two thousand four hundred men present, under arms.† The camp was placed behind small hills, just a league from the frontier, in such a situation as to be screened from the enemy's view; and it contained three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. The arrival of the emperor raised the spirit of the soldiers, already elevated by their great strength, to the very highest pitch; and the following proclamation was issued to the troops: "Soldiers! This is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland. Then, as after Austerlitz and Wagram, we were too generous; we gave credit to the oaths and protestations of princes whom we allowed to remain on their thrones. Now, however, coalesced among themselves, they aim at the independence and the most sacred rights of France. They have commenced the most unjust of aggressions. Are we not, then, the same men? Soldiers! at Jena, when fighting against those same Prussians, now so arrogant, you were as one to two: at Montmirail as one to three. Let those among you who have been in England recite the story of their prison-ships, and the evils they have suffered in them. The Saxons, Belgians, and Hanoverians, the soldiers of the Rhenish Confederacy, groan at the thought of being obliged to lend their arms to the cause of princes, enemies of justice, and of the rights of nations. They know that the coalition is insatiable; that after having devoured twelve millions of Poles, twelve millions of Italians, six millions of Belgians, a million of Saxons, it will also devour the lesser states of Germany. Fools that they are! a moment of prosperity blinds them. If they enter France, they will find in it their tomb! Soldiers! we have forced marches to make, battles to fight, perils to encounter; but with constancy the victory will be ours; the rights, the honours of the country, will be reconquered. For every Frenchman who has a heart, the moment has arrived to conquer or die."‡

Inactivity of Wellington and Blucher.

Wellington and Blucher, at this critical period, were relying almost entirely upon secret intelligence, which was to be forwarded to them by Fouché. The most rigorous measures had been adopted by the French to prevent any intelligence crossing the frontier; but notwithstanding that, Wellington knew on the 6th of June that Napoleon was expected to be in Laon on that day, and that the number of troops collected in Maubeuge and the adjoining towns was immense; and in consequence, orders had been given to declare Antwerp, Ypres, Tournay, Ath, Mons, and Ghent in a state of siege, the moment that the enemy crossed the frontier. On the 10th he received intelligence, which proved to be premature, that the emperor had arrived in Maubeuge on the preceding day; but notwithstanding the alarming proximity of such a man at the head of such a force, no steps were taken to concentrate either army; and when the French troops, a hundred and twenty thousand strong, crossed the frontier in front of Fleurus on the morning of the 15th, Wellington's men yet lay in their cantonments, from the Scheldt to Brussels, and Blucher's scattered over the frontier, from thence to Namur. This extraordinary delay in collecting the troops, when the enemy, under so daring a leader, was close at hand, cannot be altogether vindicated, and it was wellnigh attended with fatal consequences; but the secret cause which led to it is explained in Fouché's memoirs.*

June 6. June 7. June 10.

Fouché's unparalleled duplicity.

That unparalleled intriguer, who had been in communication with Wellington and Metternich all the time he was chief minister under Napoleon, had promised to furnish the English general not only with the exact moment of attack, but with the plan of the campaign. Wellington was hourly in expectation of this intelligence, which would have enabled him to know in what direction he should concentrate his forces; and thence it was that he lay motionless in his cantonments. How he did not receive it must be given in Fouché's own words: "My agents with Metternich and Lord Wellington had promised marvels and mountains; the English generalissimo expected that I should at the very least give him the plan of the campaign. I knew for certain that the unforeseen attack would take place on the 16th or 18th at latest. Napoleon intended to give battle on the 17th to the English army, after having marched right over the Prussians on the preceding day. He had the more reason to trust to the success of that plan, that Wellington, deceived by false reports, believed the opening of the campaign might be deferred till the beginning of July. The success of Napoleon, therefore, depended on a surprise, and I arranged my plans in conformity. On the very day of the departure of Napoleon, I despatched Madame D——, furnished with notes written in cipher containing the whole plan of the campaign. But at the same time I privately *despatched orders for such obstacles at the frontier*, where she was to pass, that she could not arrive at the headquarters of Wellington till after the event. This was the real explanation of the inconceivable security of the generalissimo, which at the time excited such universal astonishment."†

The French army crosses the frontiers.

At daybreak on the 15th the French army crossed the frontier and moved on Charleroi. The Prussian army, which occupied that town, evacuated it at their approach, and retired to Fleurus. The French army passed the Sambre at Marchiennes, Charleroi, and Chatelet. It was evident that the enemy were taken by surprise, and Napoleon conceived sanguine hopes of being able to separate the British and Prussian armies. With this view, Ney was despatched with the left wing, forty-six thousand strong, to Quatre-Bras; an important position, situated at the point of intersection of the roads of Brussels,

separate the interests of the great people and of the hero whose brilliant triumphs have attracted the admiration of the universe. It is at the moment when the national will manifests itself with such energy that cries of war are heard, and foreign armies advance to our frontiers. What are the hopes of this new coalition? Does it wish to extirpate France from the rank of nations, to plunge twenty-eight millions of Frenchmen into a degrading servitude? The struggle in which we are engaged is not above the genius of Napoleon, nor beyond our strength. Soldiers! Napoleon guides our steps—we fight for the independence of our beautiful country—we are invincible!"—See Napoleon's *Memoirs*, book ix., p. 65, 66.

* *Ante*, ii., 514.

† See Appendix B, chap. lxxvii.

‡ Nap., ix., book 70, 73, 74. Vict. et Conq., xxiv., 161, 162; Jom., iv., 625.

* Gurw., xii., 449, 457. † Fouché, Mem., ii., 340, 342.

Nivelles, Charleroi, and Namur. By the possession of this decisive post, the French would have entirely cut off the communication between the British and Prussian armies, and have been in a situation to fall with a preponderating force on either at pleasure. Meanwhile, Napoleon himself, with seventy-two thousand men, marched towards Fleurus, right against the Prussian army, which was concentrating with all imaginable expedition, and falling back towards LIGNY. It was in the evening of the 15th, at half past seven, that Wellington received this intelligence at Brussels; orders were immediately despatched to the troops in every direction to concentrate at Quartre-Bras; and after they had been sent off, he dressed and went to a ball at the Duchess of Richmond's, where his manner was so undisturbed, that no one discovered that any intelligence of importance had arrived; many brave men were there assembled amid the scenes of festivity, and surrounded by the smiles of beauty, who were, ere long, locked in the arms of death.*

Description of the field of Ligny, and Napoleon's plan of attack.

Blucher's army, with the exception of the fourth corps, which, being stationed between Liege and Hannut, had not yet come up, was concentrated on the 16th on the heights between Brie and Sombref, with the villages of St. Amand and Ligny strongly occupied in its front. This position was good and well chosen; for the villages in front afforded an admirable shelter to the troops, and the artillery, placed on the semicircular convex ridge between them, commanded the whole field of battle, while the slope behind, surmounted by the windmill of Bussy, formed a strong *point d'appui* in case of disaster. Although the fourth corps had not yet come up, the Prussian field-marshal had assembled eighty thousand men, of whom twelve thousand were cavalry, with two hundred and eighty-eight guns. Napoleon's force was less numerous; it consisted of seventy-two thousand men, of whom eight thousand were cavalry, with two hundred and forty-eight guns. The emperor's orders to Ney had been to move early in the morning, and occupy Quatre-Bras before the English army were assembled, and having left a strong detachment there, move with half his forces on Brie, so as to fall on the rear of the Prussians and complete their destruction. The attack in front was not to commence till Ney's guns, in the rear, showed that he had reached his destined point; and Napoleon waited impatiently, with his army ready drawn up, till three o'clock in the afternoon, expecting the much-wished-for signal; but not a sound was heard in that direction, while the loud and increasing cannonade on the side of Quatre-Bras, which was only three miles and a half distant, told clearly that a desperate combat was going on there. There was now not a moment to lose, if the Prussian army was to be attacked before the fourth corps under Bulow came up; and Napoleon at four o'clock gave the signal for attack.†

Battle of Ligny. Desperate conflict. June 16.

The better to conceal his real designs, Napoleon made great demonstrations against St. Amand on his left; but meanwhile he collected his principal force, concealed from the enemy, opposite the Prussian centre at Ligny, which was to be the real point of attack. St. Amand was carried, after a vigorous resistance, by the French corps under Vandamme; and no sooner was the enemy's attention fixed on that quarter, whither re-enforcements were directed by Blucher, than Napoleon's centre, thirty thousand strong, commanded by Gerard, issued from its concealment, crossed the streamlet of Ligny, and, pushing up the opposite bank, commenced a furious assault on the village of the same name. But if the attack was vehement, the resistance was not less obstinate; three times Ligny was taken by the impetuous assault of the French grenadiers, and three times the Prussians, with invincible resolution, returned to the charge, and with desperate valour regained the post at the point of the bayonet. Each army had behind its own side of the village immense masses of men, with which the combat was constantly fed; and at length the conflict became so desperate that neither party could completely, by bringing up fresh columns, expel the enemy, but they fought hand to hand in the streets and houses with unconquerable resolution; while the fire of two hundred pieces of cannon, directed on the two sides against the village, spread death equally among friend and foe. At seven o'clock, after three hours' furious combat, nothing was yet decided, and Blucher, by directing in person a fresh corps against St. Amand, had retaken part of that village and an important height adjoining, commanding a large part of the field of battle.*

By degrees, all Blucher's reserves were engaged, and his position became very critical; for the attack of the French centre continued with unparalleled vigour, and neither Bulow's corps had come up on the one flank, nor the much-wished-for British succours on the other. Both parties, almost equally exhausted, despatched the most urgent orders to their other corps or allies to join them: that of Napoleon at this juncture was so pressing, that he declared to Ney that the fate of France depended on his instantly obeying it.† Ney, however, so far from being in a condition to make the prescribed movement, was himself with difficulty contending against defeat at Quatre-Bras: but a happy accident almost supplied his place. At seven o'clock, D'Erlon's corps, part of Ney's force, which had been stationed by that marshal in reserve two leagues from Quatre-Bras, withdrawn from there by the positive orders of the emperor, made its appearance on the extreme Prussian right, beyond St. Amand. They were at first taken for Prussians, and excited no small alarm in the French army; but no sooner was the mistake discovered than fear gave place to confidence, and Napoleon, now entirely relieved, brought forward his Guards and reserves for a decisive attack on the centre. Milhaud's terrible cuirassiers advanced at the gallop, shaking their sabres in the air; the artillery of the Guard under Drouot moved up, pouring forth, with extraordinary rapidity, its dreadful fire; and in the rear of all, the dense columns of the Old Guard were seen moving

* Jom., iv., 625, 626. Vict. et Conq., xxiv., 175, 178. Wellington's Orders, June 15, 1815, Gurw., xii., 472, 476.

† Nap., ix., 96, 97. Blucher's Official Account, June 16, 1815, Jom., iv., 626, 627. Plotho, iv., 36, 38. Gourg., Bat. de Waterloo, 50, 51.

* Gourg., 51, 52. Nap., 97, 98. Blucher's Official Account, Plotho, iv., 38, 39. Jom., iv., 628. Vaud., iv., 143, 144.

† "At this moment, marshal, the armies are warmly engaged. His majesty commands me to direct you instantly to envelop the right of the enemy and fall on his rear; his army is lost if you act vigorously: the fate of France is in your hands. Do not lose a moment in making the prescribed movement, and march direct on the heights of Brie and St. Amand, to contribute to a victory which will probably prove decisive."—SOULT *to* NEY, *16th June*, 1815, *a quarter past three*, CAPEFIGUE, ii., 481, 482.

forward with a swift pace and unbroken array. This attack, supported by D'Erlon's infantry and a charge of twenty squadrons of his cuirassiers, on the Prussian right flank, proved decisive; the infantry posted behind Ligny began to retire, the bloodstained street of the village fell into the enemy's hands; and in the confusion of a retreat commenced just as darkness began to overspread the field, the troops naturally fell into some degree of confusion. The cannon, in retiring through the narrow lanes behind Ligny, got entangled, and twenty-one pieces fell into the enemy's hands. The veteran Blucher himself, charging at the head of a body of cavalry, to retard the enemy's pursuit, had his horse shot under him; the Prussian horse, overpowered by the French cuirassiers, were driven back, and the victorious French rode straight over the Prussian marshal as he lay entangled below his dying steed. A second charge of Prussian horse repulsed the cuirassiers; but they, too, in the dark, passed the marshal without seeing him, and it was not till they were returning that he was recognised, and with some difficulty extricated from the dead horse, and mounted on a stray dragoon trooper. The loss of the French in the battle was six thousand eight hundred men; the Prussians were weakened by fifteen thousand, four standards, and twenty-one pieces of cannon, but ten thousand more dispersed after the action, and were lost to the allied cause.*

Movements before the battle of Quatre-Bras.

While this desperate conflict was raging on the left of the allied position, an encounter, on a less extensive scale, but equally bloody and more successful, took place between Wellington and Ney at Quatre-Bras. At midnight on the 15th, the drums beat and the trumpets sounded in every quarter of Brussels: at daylight the troops assembled at their several rallying-points, and were rapidly marched off to meet the enemy. The Highland regiments, the 42d and 92d, which had their rallying-point in the Park and Place Royal, were particularly remarked for the earliness of their muster, the discipline and precision of their movements, and the air, at once grave and undaunted, with which they marched out of the town. Quatre-Bras was the point of union assigned to the whole army; but as its distance from Brussels was not above sixteen miles, and other corps of the army, particularly the cavalry and artillery, had, some twenty, some thirty miles to march, they came up at different times, and Picton's division, with the Brunswickers, were first on the ground. A brigade of the Belgian troops had been assailed the evening before by Ney's advanced guard at Frasnes, and retreated to Quatre-Bras, where ten thousand of their countrymen were assembled under the Prince of Orange. Had Ney attacked early and with vigour, he would probably have made himself master of this important point before the British troops arrived from Brussels; but he moved with such circumspection, that it was not till noon that he advanced from Gosselies, where he had passed the night, and it was half past two before he had collected any considerable force in front of Quatre-Bras, by which time Picton's division and the Brunswickers were on the ground; but their whole force, with the Belgians, did not exceed at that time twenty thousand, all infantry, and Ney had more than double the number of troops, of whom five thousand were cavalry, with a hundred and sixteen guns.*

Battle of Quatre-Bras. June 16.

It was well for the British corps that the French marshal did not concentrate his whole army together, and commence his attack with his united force; for if so, they must inevitably have been crushed. But Napoleon's orders to him, to reserve a large body in hand to strike the decisive blow against the Prussians at Ligny, led him to leave D'Erlon, with twenty thousand men in reserve, near Gosselies, to be at hand to support the emperor at Ligny; and in effect it was the approach of that corps which won that battle. Ney himself, with twenty-two thousand men, including three thousand cavalry and forty-six guns, commenced the attack at Quatre-Bras. The Belgians were soon overthrown; but, as they were retiring from the field, Picton's division and the Duke of Brunswick's men came up in great haste and some disorder; instantly forming with precision when they got in sight of the enemy, they prepared to receive their attack. The allies were equal in number to the French, both being somewhat above twenty thousand; but they had not a single gun or horseman, which gave the French at first a decided advantage. Encouraged by this circumstance, the French cuirassiers rode with the utmost gallantry close up to the British infantry, and charged them with such rapidity, that the sabres were upon more than one regiment of infantry before they had time to form square. The 42d, in particular, were charged in the middle of a field of tall rye; two companies had not fallen back into the square when the cuirassiers were upon them, and these companies were almost cut to pieces, with their brave colonel, Sir Robert Macara, who was killed on the spot. The French horsemen, however, paid dear for their success, for a well-directed volley from the remainder of the regiment stretched the greater part of them on the plain. Meanwhile, Pack's brigade, consisting of the 44th, 79th, and 92d, succeeded, after an arduous conflict, in repulsing the French on the right of the high road, while the Royal Scots, 28th, and 95th, maintained their ground on its left; and although the French troops, both cavalry and infantry, fought with the utmost fury, and repeatedly rode up to the very bayonets of the soldiers, calling out, "Down with the English—no quarter—no quarter!" and the enemy's cannon, with unresisted fire, made dreadful havoc in the British squares, yet no ground was gained, and Quatre-Bras was still in the hands of the allied troops.†

Desperate resistance of the British.

Wellington arrived in person at four o'clock, and with him the first and third divisions under General Cook and Sir Charles Alten, in all nearly ten thousand men, which raised the allies on the field to thirty-six thousand. Still the artillery and cavalry had not appeared, and Ney, with Reille's corps and the cuirassiers, was making the most desperate efforts to force the English from their position. But such was the rapidity and precision of the British fire, that all his efforts proved ineffectual; and towards evening, when the guns came up, it became evident that the weight of force had inclined to the British

* Jom., iv., 627, 628. Gneiseneau's Official Account, June 19, 1815, Gourg., 51, 54. Nap., 100, 101. Vaud., iv., 147, 151. Plotho, iv., 40, 43. Kausler, 679, 680.

* Nap., ix., book 103, 104. Gourg., 55. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815, Gurw., xii., 479.

† Near Observer, 10, 11. Nap., ix., 104, 106. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815, Gurw., xii., 479. Jom., iv., 629, 630. Gourg., 55, 56.

side. The French marshal, however, accustomed to victory, and trusting to the support of D'Erlon's corps, which he every moment expected to arrive on the field, continued his attacks with the utmost impetuosity. They were all repulsed with great loss; and at last, finding that D'Erlon had not come up, he sent a positive order for him to retrace his steps from Ligny, where he had produced such an impression on the flank of the Prussians, but he did not arrive till after it was dark, and when the battle was already lost. Ney at nightfall retired to Frasnes, a mile from the field of battle; and Wellington's men, wearied alike with marching and fighting, lay on the ground on which they had fought at Quatre-Bras, surrounded by the dead and the dying.*

Loss on both sides.

In this bloody combat the British and Hanoverians had 350 killed, 2380 wounded, and 172 made prisoners; and the loss of the Belgians and Brunswickers was 1300 more—in all, 5200 men. The French loss amounted to 4140; and the fact of the repulsed army sustaining a smaller loss than the victorious one, is easily explained by the fact, that during the greater part of the day the British infantry, without cavalry or artillery, combated against the French, who had forty-six guns and three thousand admirable horsemen in their ranks. Among the killed was the gallant Duke of Brunswick, who nobly fell while heading a charge of his Death's-head hussars in the latter part of the day. No guns, and few prisoners, were taken on either side; for the French having commenced the combat with giving no quarter, and evinced unparalleled exasperation during the whole day, the British troops were driven into a sanguinary species of combat, alike foreign to their previous habits and present inclinations.†

Retreat of Wellington to Waterloo.

During the night of the 16th, Wellington received intelligence of the defeat of the Prussians at Ligny, and that they were retreating in great confusion in the direction of Wavres. The English general at once saw that he could not maintain his position at Brussels, when his left flank was uncovered by the retreat of the Prussians. Accordingly, at ten o'clock next morning, the British army, which was now in great part concentrated at Quatre-Bras, retreated through Genappe to Waterloo. Napoleon, according to his usual custom, rode over the ghastly field of battle at Ligny on the morning after the conflict, and observed with satisfaction the great proportion which the Prussian dead, lying around that village, bore to the loss of the French. From that he moved with his staff and Guards to Quatre-Bras, from which Wellington had recently before retired on his road to Waterloo. So rudely, however, had the French been handled on the field of battle on the preceding day, that no attempt was made by them to disturb the retreat of either army, excepting by a body of French cuirassiers, which, about four o'clock in the afternoon, charged the English cavalry who were covering the retreat between Genappe and Waterloo. The French cuirassiers and lancers in the first instance overthrew the British light horse (the 7th hussars) which covered the rear, as, in spite of the gallantry of that distinguished corps, its light horses were no match for the ponderous cuirassiers of France. Lord Uxbridge, now the Marquis of Anglesea, no sooner perceived this, than he charged in person at the head of the first Life Guards. These magnificent troops, albeit unprotected by armour, bore down upon the French horsemen with such vigour that the shock was irresistible, and in a few minutes the cuirassiers were totally defeated, and no farther serious attempt was made by the enemy to disquiet the retreat. Wellington retired with his whole troops to the front of the forest of Soignies, where he took up his position on either side, in front of the village of Waterloo, which he had already selected as the theatre of a decisive battle. Napoleon followed with the great bulk of his forces, and arranged them nearly opposite to the English, on both sides of the high road leading from Charleroi to Brussels, with headquarters at La Belle Alliance. Thirty-one thousand had been detached, under Grouchy, to observe the Prussians who were retiring towards Wavres, and the troops which had assembled at nightfall amounted to about eighty thousand men. Wellington was not equal in point of numerical amount, but he was still more inferior in artillery and in the quality of part of his troops. His cannon amounted to only one hundred and eighty pieces, while the French had two hundred and forty; and the British, Hanoverians, and Brunswickers alone, in number about fifty-eight thousand, could be relied on for the shock of war; the remainder being composed of Belgians, or recently-raised Hanoverian levies, upon whom little dependance could be placed in any serious conflict.*†

Night before the battle, and feelings of the soldiers on both sides.

Never was a more melancholy night passed by soldiers than that which followed the halt of the two armies in their respective positions on the night of the 17th. The whole of that day had been wet and cloudy; but towards evening the rain fell in torrents, insomuch that, in traversing the road from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo, the soldiers were often ankle deep in water. When the troops arrived at their ground, the passage of the artillery, horse, and wagons over the drenched surface had so completely cut it up, that it was almost everywhere reduced to a state of mud, interspersed in every hollow with large pools of water. Cheerless and dripping as was the condition of the soldiers, who had to lie down for the night in such a situation, it was preferable to that of those battalions who were stationed in the rye-fields, where the grain was for the most part three or four feet high, and soaking wet from top to bottom. The ground occupied by the French soldiers was not less drenched and uncomfortable. But how melancholy soever may have been their physical situation, not one feeling of despondency pervaded the breasts either of the British or French soldiers. Such was the interest of the moment, the magnitude of the stake at issue, and the intensity of the feelings in either army, that the soldiers were almost insensible to physical suffering. Every man in both armies was aware that the retreat was stopped, and that a decisive battle would be fought on the following day. The great contest of two-and-twenty years' du-

* Wellington to Earl Bathurst, June 19, 1815, Gurw., xii., 479, 480.

† Vict. et Conq., xxiv., 180, 181. Gurw., xii., 485. Near Observer, xi., 11. Belgian Official Account, June 17, 1815, Jones's Battle of Waterloo, 198. Ney's Official Account, June 26, 1815, ib., 262.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815, Gurw., xii., 479, 480, 481. Gourg., 70, 71. Nap., ix., 112, 114. Jom., iv., 631, 632. † See Appendix B, chap. lxxvii.

ration was now to be brought to a final issue: retreat after disaster would be difficult, if not impossible, to the British army, through the narrow defile of the forest of Soignies: overthrow was ruin to the French. The two great commanders, who had severally overthrown every antagonist, were now for the first time to be brought into collision; the conqueror of Europe was to measure swords with the deliverer of Spain. Nor were sanguine hopes and the grounds of well-founded confidence wanting to the troops of either army. The French relied with reason on the extraordinary military talents of their chief, on his long and glorious career, and on the unbroken series of triumphs which had carried their standards to every capital in Europe. Nor had recent disasters weakened this undoubting trust, for the men who now stood side by side were almost all veterans tried in a hundred combats; the English prisons had restored the conquerors of Continental Europe to his standard, and for the first time since the Russian retreat, the soldiers of Austerlitz and Wagram were again assembled round his eagles. The British soldiers had not all the same mutual dependance from tried experience, for a large part of them had never seen a shot fired in anger. But they were not on that account the less confident. They relied on the talent and firmness of their chief, who, they knew, had never been conquered, and whose resources the veterans in their ranks told them would prove equal to any emergency. They looked back with animated pride to the unbroken career of victory which had attended the British arms since they first landed in Portugal, and anticipated the keystone to their arch of fame from the approaching conflict with Napoleon in person. They were sanguine as to the result; but, come what may, they were resolute not to be conquered. Never were two armies of such fame, under leaders of such renown, and animated by such heroic feelings, brought into contact in modern Europe, and never were interests so momentous at issue in the strife.

Description of the field of battle.

The field of Waterloo, rendered immortal by the battle which was fought on the following day, extends about two miles in length from the old chateau, walled garden, and enclosures of Hougoumont on the right, to the extremity of the hedge of La Haye Sainte on the left. The great *chaussée* from Brussels to Charleroi runs through the centre of the position, which is situated somewhat less than three quarters of a mile to the south of the village of Waterloo, and three hundred yards in front of the farmhouse of Mount St. Jean. This road, after passing through the centre of the British line, goes through La Belle Alliance and the hamlet of Rossomme, where Napoleon spent the night. The position occupied by the British army followed very nearly the crest of a range of gentle eminences, cutting the high road at right angles, two hundred yards behind the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, which adjoins the highway, and formed the centre of the position. An unpaved country road ran along this great summit, forming nearly the line occupied by the British troops, and which proved of great use in the course of the battle. Their position had this great advantage, that the infantry could rest on the reverse of the crest of the ridge, in a situation in great measure screened from the fire of the French artillery; while their own guns on the crest swept the whole slope, or natural glacis, which descended to the valley in their front. The French army occupied a corresponding line of ridges, nearly parallel, on the opposite side of the valley, stretching on either side of the hamlet of La Belle Alliance. The summit of these ridges afforded a splendid position for the French artillery to fire upon the English guns; but their attacking columns, in descending the one hill and mounting the other, would of necessity be exposed to a very severe cannonade from the opposite batteries. The French army had an open country to retreat over in case of disaster; while the British, if defeated, would in all probability lose their whole artillery in the defiles of the forest of Soignies, although the intricacies of that wood afforded an admirable defensive position for a broken array of foot-soldiers. The French right rested on the village of Planchenois, which is of considerable extent, and afforded a very strong defensive position to resist the Prussians, in case they should so far recover from the disaster of the preceding day as to be able to assume offensive operations and menace the extreme French right. The whole field of battle between the two armies was unenclosed, and the declivities and hollows extremely gentle; but the rugged hedge of La Haye Sainte, which ran for half a mile to the left of the village of the same name on the crest of the ridge, afforded great support to that part of the British line, and the thick wood which surrounded the orchard and garden of Hougoumont was impervious to artillery, and proved of essential service in impeding the attack of the French columns.*

Wellington resolves to give battle, in concert with Blucher.

Wellington had stationed General Hill, with nearly seven thousand men, at Hal, six miles on the right, in order to cover the great road from Mons to Brussels; and he despatched letters to Louis XVIII. at Ghent, early on the morning of the 18th, recommending him, in the event of the enemy attempting to turn him by that town, to retire to Antwerp. Orders were at the same time sent to the governor of that fortress to open the inundations on the side of Tête de Flandre, and to the person in charge of the magazines in the rear, to remove them to Antwerp. These precautionary measures, with the long trains of wounded which were brought in from Quatre-Bras, and the exaggerated reports of the disaster sustained at Ligny, produced such consternation at Brussels, that all the English who could get away were taking measures for their departure; the road to Antwerp was already covered with fugitives of all descriptions, and the partisans of Napoleon joyfully looked forward to his entering on the following day. Wellington, however, was resolved to stand firm: his whole army, with the exception of the detachment under Hill, near Hal, was now assembled; and Blucher, with whom he had communicated during the night, had promised to support him, not merely with two corps, as he had requested, but with his whole army. He promised to be on the ground by one o'clock; and his line of march was to be in two columns, by St. Lambert and Ohain upon Planchenois, so as to fall perpendicularly on the French flank after the combat was fully engaged.†

The morning of the 18th opened with a driz-

* Personal observation. Cap., ii., 189, 190. Vict. et Conq., xxiv., 201, 292. Vaud., iv., 3, 7.

† Wellington to the Duke de Berri, June 18, 1815, Gurw., xii., 477, 478. Gneisenau's Official Account, 204, Near Observer.

Appearance of the two armies on the morning of the battle.

zling rain; but the clouds were lighter, and the sun occasionally broke in fleeting glimpses through the hazy atmosphere. Eagerly the men in both armies started from their dripping beds; at once they awoke to a rapid consciousness; but numbers were so stiff that it was with difficulty they could rise out of the water in which they had passed the night. But the sight which presented itself when they arose soon riveted every eye, and moved every heart even in the most unthinking breasts in those vast arrays. Never was a nobler spectacle witnessed than both armies now exhibited; its magnificence struck even the Peninsular and Imperial veterans with a feeling of awe. On the French side, eleven columns deployed simultaneously to take up their ground; like huge serpents clad in glittering scales, they wound slowly over the opposite hills, amid an incessant clang of trumpets and rolling of drums, from the bands of a hundred and fourteen battalions and a hundred and twelve squadrons, which played the Marseillaise, the Chant de Départ, the Veillons au Salut de l'Empire, and other popular French airs. Soon order appeared to arise out of chaos: four of the columns formed the first line, four the second, three the third. The formidable forces of France were seen in splendid array, and the British soldiers contemplated with admiration their noble antagonists. Two hundred and fifty guns, arrayed along the crest of the ridge in front, with matches lighted and equipment complete, gave an awful presage of the conflict which was approaching. The infantry in the first and second lines, flanked by dense masses of cavalry, stood in perfect order; four-and-twenty squadrons of cuirassiers, behind either extremity of the second, were already resplendent in the rays of the sun; the grenadiers and lancers of the Guard in the third line, were conspicuous from their brilliant uniforms and dazzling arms; while in the rear of all, the four-and-twenty battalions of the Old Guard, dark and massy, occupied each side of the road near La Belle Alliance, as if to terminate the contest. The British army, though little less numerous, did not present so imposing a spectacle to either army, from their being in great part concealed by the swell of the ridge on which they stood. They were drawn up, for the most part, in squares, with the cavalry in rear, and the guns in front skilfully disposed along the summit of the swell. No clang of trumpets or rolling of drums was heard from their ranks; silently, like the Greeks of old, the men took up their ground, and hardly any sound was heard from the vast array but the rolling of the guns and occasional word of command from the officers. Napoleon had been afraid that the English would retreat during the night, and expressed the utmost joy when their squares appeared in steady array next morning, evidently with the design of giving battle. "I have them, these English!" said he. "Nine chances out of ten are in our favour." "Sire," replied Soult, "I know these English; they will die on the ground on which they stand before they lose it."*

Disposition of the troops on either side.

The British army on the ground amounted to 72,000 men, the French to 80,000;† but the superiority in artillery, and the quality of all the troops, except the British, King's German Legion, and Brunswickers, was still greater. Napoleon had 252 guns, Wellington 186, of which 124 were English. The allied army was drawn up in the following order: The chateau, garden, and wood of Hougoumont were strongly occupied by General Byng's brigade of guards, as was the farm of La Haye Sainte by a battalion of the King's German Legion; Picton's division and Clinton's stood on the left of La Haye Sainte, along the line of the ragged hedge; Coles's, the Brunswickers, Hanoverians, and Belgians, were in the centre. The cavalry were all in the rear, behind the second line. The left was uncovered except by a deep ditch impassable for artillery, which, however, proved such an impediment that no serious attack was made on that extremity. The artillery was arranged along the whole front of the positions, and swept the gentle slope which descended from it to the low ground which separated the two armies, wholly unbroken by enclosures or impediments of any kind. The French artillery was in like manner placed along the summit of their ridge in a semicircular form, directly fronting the British guns, at the distance of from half to three quarters of a mile; and their army was divided into the eleven columns already mentioned. D'Erlon, with the first corps, was on the right of the *chaussée* of La Belle Alliance: Reille and Foy in the centre: Jerome on the left, in front of Hougoumont. Ney was destined for the serious attacks of the reserve and Old Guard in the centre. The cavalry, both light and heavy, was behind the infantry, the Guards in reserve. "Never," says Napoleon, "had the troops been animated with such spirit, or taken up their ground with such precision; the earth seemed proud of being trod by such combatants."*

Commencement of the battle.

The village clock of Nivelles was striking eleven when the first gun was fired from the French centre, and immediately followed by a quick rattle of musketry from the left, as the weighty column commanded by Jerome, six thousand strong, approached the enclosures of Hougoumont. The English light troops fought stoutly in the wood, and slowly falling back, contested every tree, every bush, every sapling, until the fire became so warm that every branch was cut through by numerous, some as many as twenty, shot. Thirty British guns opened their fire upon the wood; Napoleon immediately advanced Reille's and Kellerman's guns in reply, and supported Jerome by Foy's division. Gradually, in spite of their utmost efforts, the wood around the chateau was carried by the assailants; but the garden and castle, defended by a high brick wall, in which a double tier of loopholes had been struck out, presented an invincible resistance. Six companies of English, and a Brunswick and Nassau battalion, soon after regained the orchard, which they held for the rest of the day. Napoleon, upon this, ordered a battery of howitzers to play upon the building, which soon set it on fire: the flames burst forth with unquenchable fury, and the chateau was entirely consumed; but the first and second Foot Guards, under Colonel Macdonell, Colonel Home, and Lord Saltoun, still held the courtyard with unconquerable resolution; and the former of these brave officers, when a vehement onset had burst open the gate of the courtyard, actually, by a

* Cap., ii., 189, 191. Tém. Ocul., 6, 7. Gourg., 75, 76. Nap., ix., book 127, 128.

† See Appendix B, chap. lxxvii.

* Nap., 132, 135. Vaud., iv., 25, 29. Gurw., xii., 481. Kausler, 676, 677.

great exertion of personal strength, closed it in the face of the French bayonets!*

Grand attack of D'Erlon on the left.

This assault, how vehement soever, was but a feint to conceal the real point of attack, which was in the right centre, and was intrusted to Marshal Ney, with D'Erlon's corps, full twenty thousand strong, arrayed in four massy columns. Already the corps had moved to the front, when the emperor perceived on his extreme right, in the direction of St. Lambert, a dark mass in the openings of the wood. All glasses were immediately turned in that direction: "I think," said Soult, "it is five or six thousand men, probably part of Grouchy's army." Napoleon thought otherwise; he never doubted they were Prussians. Three thousand horse were detached to observe this corps, two divisions of infantry followed, and an order was soon after despatched to Grouchy to hasten to the field of action. Meanwhile the cannonade had grown extremely warm along the whole line; four hundred and fifty guns kept up an incessant fire; the tirailleurs along the front were warmly engaged on both sides; and in the midst of it, Ney received orders to direct his attack on the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, and the line on its left, in order to force back the British left and interpose between it and the Prussians, who still remained stationary in the wood. It was now noon. Ney pushed forward his batteries to the most advanced heights on his own side of the valley, and his troops in four weighty columns advanced to the attack. D'Erlon's men were on the right, and moved against the British left, stationed along the hedge of La Haye Sainte; Ney himself directed the attack on the centre, and marched against the farm of the same name; and powerful bodies of cavalry advanced in the flank or rear of either column, to take advantage of any opening which might be effected.†

Defeat of that attack, and brilliant cavalry charge on the British left.

Wellington no sooner perceived the formidable attack preparing against his left centre than he drew up the noble brigade of horse, under Sir William Ponsonby, consisting of the Scotch Greys, Enniskillens, and Queen's Bays, close in the rear of Picton's division, and stationed Vandeleur's light brigade of cavalry on the extreme left. A brigade of Belgians formed the first line; they, however, speedily gave way before the formidable mass of the French columns, and D'Erlon's men, sustaining with undaunted resolution the heavy fire which the British cannon and infantry opened upon their front, still pressed up the slope till they were within twenty yards of the British line. Here they halted, and a murderous fire commenced, which soon fearfully thinned the first British line under Kempt, which began to yield. Picton, upon this, ordered up Pack's brigade, consisting of the 42d, 92d, 1st, or Royal Scots, and 44th; and these noble veterans, as on the brow of the Mont Rave at Toulouse,‡ advanced with a loud shout, and poured in so close and well-directed a fire, that the French columns broke and recoiled in disorder. At this instant, the heroic Picton, as he was waving his troops on with his sword, was pierced through the head with a musket-ball, and fell dead.* Kempt immediately took the command; the rush of horse was heard, and Ponsonby's brigade, bursting through or leaping over the hedge which had concealed them from the enemy, dashed through the openings of the infantry, and fell headlong on the wavering column. The shock was irresistible; in a few seconds the whole mass was pierced through, rode over, and dispersed; the soldiers in despair fell on their faces on the ground and called for quarter, and in five minutes two thousand prisoners and two eagles were taken, and the column utterly destroyed. Transported with ardour, the victorious horse, supported by Vandeleur's brigade of light cavalry on their left, charged on against a battery of D'Erlon's guns, consisting of twenty-four pieces, which was quickly carried. The Highland foot-soldiers, vehemently excited, breaking their ranks, and catching hold of the stirrups of the Scots Grays, joined in the charge, shouting, "Scotland forever!" Unsatisfied even by this second triumph, these gallant horsemen, amid loud shouts, charged a third line of cannon and lancers, and here also they were triumphant. So forcibly was Napoleon struck by this charge, that he said to Lacoste, the Belgian guide, who stood beside him, "Ces terribles chevaux gris; comme ils travaillent!" He instantly ordered Milhaud's cuirassiers from the second line to charge the victorious British; and these fresh troops, clad in their steel armour, easily overthrew the English horsemen, now much disordered, and entirely blown by their unparalleled effort. In the hurried retreat to their own position, Ponsonby was killed, and the brigade hardly brought back a fifth of its numbers; but never perhaps had a charge of an equal body of horse achieved such success, for, besides destroying a column five thousand strong, and taking two thousand prisoners, we have the authority of the great military historian of Napoleon for the fact, that they carried, cut the traces, and rendered useless for the remainder of the day, no less than eighty pieces of cannon.††

Capture of La Haye Sainte, and defeat of the Cuirassiers by the Guards.

By this great disaster Ney had lost his whole artillery, one of his columns of attack was totally destroyed, and another repulsed in disorder. Napoleon, however, immediately moved forward the batteries in the centre to his support, the centre columns advanced, and twenty thousand men speedily enveloped La Haye Sainte. The brave Hanoverians of the King's German Legion, who formed its garrison, three hundred and eighty in number, long maintained their ground against the surging multitude; but their ammunition having been at length exhausted, and all communication with the British line, of which that farmhouse was the advanced post, cut off, the gates were forced open, and they were nearly all put to death, bravely combating to the last.

* Nap., ix., book 142, 143. Cap., ii., 192, 193. Gourg., 78, 79. Kausler, 678. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815, Gurw., xii., 481. Scott's Nap., vii., 484.

† Kausler, 679. Jom., iv., 634. Nap., ix., book 150, 151. Picton's Mem., ii., 357. ‡ *Ante*, iv., 365.

* He had been severely wounded at Quatre-Bras, and had two of his ribs broken, but his ardent spirit led him to conceal an injury which had already, as was afterward discovered, left a mortal wound.—ROBINSON'S *Memoirs of* PICTON, ii., 362.

† Vaud., iv., 34, 36. Jom., iv., 634, 635. Nap., book ix., 150, 151. Robinson's Mem. of Picton, ii., 361, 362. Jom., Atlas Port., 73. Tém. Ocul., 7, 8. Kausler, 679. Personal information from officers engaged.

‡ "By this charge some battalions were cut to pieces; the eighty guns of Ney were seized, or, rather, the English dragoons, after sabring the drivers, cut the traces and the throats of the horses, and rendered them totally useless."—JOMINI, *Vie de Napoleon*, iv., 634, 635.

Encouraged by this success, which he thought would prove decisive, Napoleon ordered a brigade of Milhaud's cuirassiers to advance up the great road, right against the British centre, where Wellington stood on the right of the *chaussée* at the foot of a tree, while Ney's columns pressed on round La Haye Sainte, under cover of which they now formed to pierce the centre of the allied position. The weighty columns of horsemen soon mounted the slope above La Haye Sainte, and the infantry pushed on almost to the very foot of Wellington's tree. There, however, the British general ordered the 79th Highlanders to advance; and these steady veterans, led by their brave colonel, Douglas,* cheered loudly, fired, and, advancing steadily, forced back the column. Wellington at this instant advanced with a Hanoverian battalion on one flank, while two others moved up on the other side; and they were driving the column in disorder down the hill before them, when Milhaud's cuirassiers fell upon one of the Hanoverian battalions before it could form square, which was almost destroyed. But Wellington soon had his revenge. He instantly ordered up the heavy brigade of Lord Edward Somerset, consisting of the Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, and 1st Dragoon Guards; and these splendid troops, overflowing with strength, bore down with such vigour on the French cuirassiers, that they were fairly rode over by the weight of man and horse, and a considerable number, driven headlong over a precipice into a gravel pit, were killed by the fall, while the remainder, trod under foot and crushed by the wheels of some artillery and wagons, which at the moment were coming up, perished miserably.†

Progress of the battle on the British right.

During this terrible strife, Wellington remained at his position at the foot of his tree, calmly observing the progress of the enemy, occasionally throwing himself into a square, or directing the advance of a line when the circumstances appeared critical. So heavy was the fire of cannon-shot to which he was exposed, that nearly all his suite were soon killed or wounded by his side, and he was obliged, in the close of the day, to the casual assistance of a Portuguese who stood near to carry the most necessary orders. "That's good practice," said he, as the cannon-shot struck the branches above his head; "they did not fire so well in Spain." At length, however, all the attacks of infantry in the centre were repulsed; but Napoleon, still persisting in the effort to carry that part of the field, brought up his whole light cavalry to the attack, and supported them by the cuirassiers in the second line. Such was the ardour of the French horse, however, that many of the reserve brigades followed without orders, and soon the whole cavalry was engaged. Their attacks were directed on both sides of the great road by La Haye Sainte, and also round Hougoumont, now entirely surrounded by multitudes of foot and horse, though still held by the Guards and Brunswickers, to turn the right flank of the British. So great was the pressure in that quarter, that Wellington was obliged to bring up General Chasse's brigade of Dutch troops, and his whole reserve, from Braine-la-Leude, where they had been stationed, to prevent that flank being turned; and a Belgian regiment, the Cumberland Hussars, a thousand strong, which were ordered to charge the French horse in that quarter, were received with so dreadful a fire on crossing the ridge, that they turned about and fled, never drawing bridle till they reached Brussels, where their unexpected entry created the utmost alarm. Chasse's brigade, however, with the 52d and the Brunswickers, on the right, stood firm, and forming in a semicircle facing outward, with their batteries in front, not only opposed an invincible barrier to the progress of the enemy, but regained the orchard of Hougoumont, which had been carried in the earlier part of the day.*

Desperate charges of cavalry in the centre.

Meanwhile the British centre continued for nearly three hours to be the theatre of the most extraordinary conflict which had occurred during the whole Revolutionary war. The French horse, twelve thousand strong, in great part clad in glittering armour, streamed up the slope in front of the English line, and, with loud cries, and unparalled enthusiasm, threw themselves on the squares. Napoleon rode through the lines, both of infantry and cavalry, and harangued the men; General Devaux, who commanded the artillery of the Guard, was killed by his side; never had the French soldiers been known to exhibit such enthusiasm. Reille's corps, in two columns, advanced against Wellington's right centre, while the remains of D'Erlon's men reformed again and assailed the left; and the whole French guns, brought as far forward as possible, sent a storm of shot and shells through the British squares. The charge of the horsemen in the centre was irresistible; disregarding the terrible fire of the British batteries, which, firing grape and canister pointblank, made frightful chasms in their ranks, the cuirassiers rode steadily forward, carried the guns amid cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" and dashing on, swept round the squares within pistol-shot, often coming to the very muzzles of the British muskets. But vain were all attempts to break that heroic infantry, which seemed, as it were, rooted in the earth. Lying down to avoid the driving shot which swept over the field, the men, in silence, beheld their ranks torn by bombs and ricochet shot without once moving; but no sooner did the cuirassiers appear, than the whole, instantly starting up, threw in such a volley that half of the proud horsemen were stretched on the plain, and the remainder recoiled in disorder out of the frightful strife. Repeatedly the British guns, which stood in front, forty in number, fell into the hands of the cuirassiers, whose valour, always great, was now roused to the most enthusiastic pitch of daring; the gunners took refuge in the nearest squares; the horsemen rode round them, anxiously looking for an opening, until the rolling fire of the infantry repelled the charge; and as soon as the horsemen turned about, the gunners issued forth, quickly loaded their pieces, and sent a destructive storm of grape after the retiring squadrons. During this unparalleled struggle, Wellington and the Prince of Orange threw themselves into the steady squares, and the latter received a severe wound while animating a corps of his men. "Stand fast, 95th," said the British chief, "we must not be beat; what would they say of us in England?" "Never fear, sir," they replied; "we know our duty."†

* Now Sir Neil Douglas.

† Kausler, 679. Jom., Atl. Mil., 73. Vaud., iv., 35, 36. Beamish, ii., 355, 366. Jones's Waterloo, 111.

* Kausler, 680, 681. Beamish, ii., 358. Vaud., iv., 37, 39. Jom., Atl. Mil., 73.

† Vaud., iv., 45, 47. Cap., ii., 193, 194. Beamish, ii.,

During this terrible struggle in front of Mont St. Jean and around La Haye Sainte, Blucher's troops, pressing on with unparalleled ardour, were doing their utmost to clear the defiles through the woods behind Frischermont; but such were the difficulties of the passage, owing to the horrible state of the roads, that it was not till half past four that Bulow, who led the advanced guard, was able to deploy from the woods. He then appeared, however, at the head of sixteen thousand men, and marching in *echelon*, the centre in front, fell perpendicularly on the French flank. General Mouton, who commanded there, was soon driven back, but he retired in squares in excellent order; and Napoleon, seeing the progress of the Prussians, detached Count Lobau with seven thousand infantry to arrest their advance. Lobau's men, in their turn, drove back the Prussians; but Bulow, rallying on his two other divisions, which had now come up, again returned to the charge. The artillery cleared the wood, and arranged themselves on its skirts; sixty Prussian guns opened their fire, and their balls fell on the *chaussée* of Charleroi, in the very line of the French communications, and Planchenois, the bulwark of the French right flank, was carried. Napoleon, upon this, detached first Duhesme with two brigades of infantry, and twenty-four guns of the Young Guard, who retook Planchenois; the Prussians again carried it; and at last Morand, with four battalions of the Old Guard and sixteen guns, was pushed forward to support Lobau and retake the village. These redoubted veterans restored the combat; Planchenois was regained; Bulow was driven back into the wood; the balls ceased to fall on the *chaussée*, and the French flank appeared to be sufficiently secured.*

Arrival of Bulow's corps at Planchenois; their repulse.

But although Napoleon's flank was thus protected for the time, yet as he had intelligence that another corps of Prussians, under Zeithen, was coming up by Ohain on the right, and notwithstanding repeated orders sent, no advices had been received of Grouchy to oppose them, he resolved to make a grand effort with his Young and Old Guard, supported by the whole remaining cuirassiers against the British centre, in hopes of piercing it through, and destroying Wellington before the bulk of the Prussian forces came up. With this view he recalled several of the battalions and batteries of the Guard which had been detached to Planchenois, and Drouot received orders to arrange the eight battalions of the Old Guard on the *chaussée* beside La Belle Alliance. The cavalry on the heights, who saw this movement, and beheld at the same time the retreat of Bulow's corps, now deemed the battle gained, and loudly cheered; it was universally thought that the final charge of the Old Guard, as on all former occasions, would decide the victory. Uneasiness prevailed in the British line; Halket's brigade had sustained eleven charges of horse; the 69th had been partially broken; many of the regiments were reduced to mere skeletons; Picton's Highland brigade could not muster six hundred bayonets; multitudes of wounded had crawled to the rear; and the wagon-drivers and Belgian fugitives, crowding along the road through the forest of Soignies, spread the report that all was lost. One general officer was compelled to state that his brigade was reduced to a third of its numbers, and that the survivers were so exhausted with fatigue, that a temporary relief was indispensable: "Tell him," said the duke, "what he asks is impossible. He and I, and every Englishman on the field, must die on the spot which we now occupy." "Enough," returned the general: "I, and every man under my command, will share his fate." The duke, however, though calm, was anxious; all his orders were given with his usual quick, decided manner; but he repeatedly looked at his watch, and expressed afterward the satisfaction he felt as one hour of daylight after another slipped away, and the position was still maintained. He still felt, however, and expressed to all the troops whom he addressed, confidence in the final result. "Hard pounding this, gentlemen," said he to a square into which he had thrown himself when the cuirassiers swept past; "but we will pound the longest."*

State of the two armies at the beginning of the last charge.

The Imperial Guard was divided into two columns, which, advancing from different parts of the field, were to converge to the decisive point on the British right centre, about midway between La Haye Sainte and the nearest enclosures of Hougoumont. Reille commanded the first column, which was supported by all the infantry and cavalry which remained of his corps on either flank, and advanced up the hill in a slanting direction, beside the orchard of Hougoumont. The second was headed by Ney in person, and moving down the *chaussée* of Charleroi to the bottom of the slope, it then inclined to the left, and leaving La Haye Sainte to the right, mounted the slope, also in a slanting direction, converging towards the same point whither the other column was directing its steps. Napoleon went with this column as far as the place where it left the hollow of the high road, and spoke a few words—the last he ever addressed to his soldiers—to each battalion in passing. The men moved on with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur*, so loud as to be heard along the whole British line above the roar of artillery, and it was universally thought the emperor himself was heading the attack. But, meanwhile, Wellington had not been idle. Sir Frederic Adam's brigade, consisting of the 52d, 71st, and 95th, and General Maitland's brigade of Guards, which had been drawn from Hougoumont, with Chasse's Dutch troops, yet fresh, were ordered to bring up their right shoulders, and wheel inward, with their guns in front, towards the edge of the ridge; and the whole batteries in that quarter inclined to the left, so as to expose the advancing columns coming up to a concentric fire on either flank: the central point, where the attack seemed likely to fall, was strengthened by nine heavy guns: the troops at that point were drawn up four deep, in the form of an interior angle: the Guards forming one side, the 73d and 30th the other;† while the light cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur was brought

Grand attack of the Old Guard.

359, 361. Kausler, 680. Vict. et Conq., xxiv., 217, 218. Nap., book ix., 158, 159. Tém. Ocul., 134, 135. Jones's Battle of Waterloo, 134. Scott's Paul's Letters, 147.

* Nap., book ix., 154, 155. Gourg., 84, 85. Kausler, 681. Vict. et Conq., xxiv., 218, 219. Beamish, ii., 374, 375. Cap., ii., 195, 196. Plotho, iv., 59, 62.

* Vaud., iv., 46, 47. Scott's Paul's Letters, 149, 150. Nap., book ix., 166, 167.

† Vaud., iv., 53, 54. Kausler, 681. Nap., book ix., 167, 168. Beamish, ii., 375, 376. Cap., ii., 195, 196. Gourg., 88, 89. Tém. Ocul. Jones's Waterloo, 138. Scott's Paul's Letters, 157, 158.

up behind the line, at the back of La Haye Sainte, and stationed close in the rear, so as to be ready to make the most of any advantage which might occur.

It was a quarter past seven when the first column of the Old Guard, under Reille, advanced to the attack; but the effect of the artillery on its flank was such, that the cavalry were quickly dispersed; and the French battalions uncovered, showed their long flank to Adam's guns, which opened on them a fire so terrible, that the head of the column, constantly pushed on by the mass in rear, never advanced, but melted away as it came into the scene of carnage. Shortly after, Ney's column approached with an intrepid step: the veterans of Wagram and Austerlitz were there; no force on earth seemed capable of resisting them: they had decided every former battle. Drouot was beside the marshal, who repeatedly said to him they were about to gain a glorious victory. General Friant was killed by Ney's side: the marshal's own horse was shot under him; but bravely advancing on foot, with his drawn sabre in his hand, he sought death from the enemy's volleys. The impulse of this massy column was at first irresistible; the guns were forced back, and the Imperial Guard came up to within forty paces of the English Foot Guards, and the 73d and 30th regiments. These men were lying down, four deep, in a small ditch behind the rough road which there goes along the summit of the ridge. "UP, GUARDS, AND AT THEM!" cried the duke, who had repaired to the spot; and the whole, on both sides of the angle into which the French were advancing, springing up, moved forward a few paces, and poured in a volley so close and well directed, that nearly the whole first two ranks of the French fell at once. Gradually advancing, they now pushed the immense column, yet bravely combating, down the slope; and Wellington, at that decisive instant, ordered Vivian's brigade to charge the retiring body on one flank, while Adam's foot advanced against it on the other. The effect of this triple attack, at once in front and on both flanks, was decisive: the 52d and 71st, swiftly converging inward, threw in so terrible a volley on their left flank, that the Imperial Guard swerved in disorder to the right; and at that very instant the 10th, 18th, and 21st dragoons, under Vivian, bore down with irresistible fury, and piercing right through the body, threw it into irrecoverable confusion. The cry, "Tout est perdu—la Garde recule!" arose in the French ranks, and the enormous mass, driven headlong down the hill, overwhelmed everything which came in its way, and spread disorder through the whole French centre.*†

Defeat of the last attack of the French Guards.

From morning till night on this eventful day, the British squares had stood as if rooted in the earth, enduring every loss and repelling every attack with unparalleled fortitude. But the moment of victory had now arrived; the last hour of Napoleon's empire had struck. At the very moment that Ney's column of the Old Guard was recoiling in disorder down the hill, with their flanks reeling under the fire of infantry and the charges of horse on either side, Wellington beheld Blucher's standards in the wood beyond Ohain; and the fire of guns from thence to Frischermont showed that Zeithen had come up, and that the Prussians, in great strength and in good earnest, were now about to take a part in the fight. He instantly ordered a general advance, in the formation in which they stood—the British in line, four deep, the Germans and Belgians in column or square; and himself, with his hat in his hand, rode to the front and waved on the troops. Like an electric shock, the heart-stirring order was communicated along the line; confidence immediately revived: wounds received and dead comrades were forgotten; one only feeling, that of joyous exultation, filled every breast. With joyful step, the whole line pressed forward as one man at the command of their chief; and the last rays of the sun glanced on fifty thousand men, who, with a shout which caused the very earth to shake, streamed over the summit of the hill. The French, who had believed that the British infantry was wholly destroyed, from not having seen them for so long a period on the crest of the ridge, were thunderstruck when they beheld this immense body advance majestically in line, driving before them the last column of the Imperial Guard, who had made the attack. At the same time, Bulow's and Zeithen's corps of Prussians, of whom six-and-thirty thousand had already come up, emerged entirely from the wood, and advanced with a swift step, and in the finest order, in the double-necked column then peculiar to their country, to join in the attack. A hundred guns, arranged in the form of an amphitheatre on the skirts of the wood, opened a tremendous fire over their heads, and the balls soon began to fall in the midst of the French army, on the *chaussée* of La Belle Alliance. Despair now seized upon the French soldiers; they saw at once that all was lost, and horse, foot, and cannon, breaking their ranks, fled tumultuously towards the rear; while the British cavalry, 8000 strong, streamed in every direction down the slope, cutting down those who attempted to resist, and driving before them the mass of fugitives who still attempted to keep their ranks.*

Arrival of another Prussian corps on the field.

Napoleon witnessed this terrible reverse with feelings which it is impossible to describe; but he still preserved his calm demeanour, till the Old Guard recoiled in disorder, with the British cavalry mingled with their bayonets. He then became as pale as death, and observed to the guide, "Ils sont melés ensemble." There was not a moment, however, to lose; for the English horsemen, sweeping up the French side of the slope in great masses, already threatened to envelop him on either flank, and the rapid advance of Bulow, who had now carried Planchenois after a violent struggle, would very soon cut off his retreat. The emperor then ascended a small elevation, with the squadrons on service as the guard, and there directed the fire of four pieces of cannon, which were worked to the last, and one of the discharges of which carried away

Advance of the British, and overthrow of the Old Guard.

* Crisis at Waterloo. United Service Gazette. Nap., book ix., 168, 169. Beamish, ii., 377. Scott's Paul's Letters, 159, 160. Cap., ii., 196, 197. Gourg., 90, 91. Vict. et Conq., xxiv., 217, 218. Vaud., iv., 53, 54.

† In the preceding account of the repulse of the Old Guard at Waterloo, I have, in addition to the authorities quoted in the margin, availed myself of the information of two gallant officers who combated at the spot: Colonel Warrington of the 10th hussars, who rode through the Imperial Guard, and Captain Ross of the 73d, the fire of whose company, with that of the Guards, brought down their leading files.

* Nap., ix., 168, 169. Tém. Ocul. Jones's Waterloo, 138, 139. Vaud., iv., 55, 56. Jom., iv., 637. Ney's Account to Fouché, June 26, 1815. Gneisenau's Account. Jones, i., 206.

Lord Uxbridge's leg. The rapid approach of the English and Prussians, however, soon rendered this last post untenable. Turning, then, to Bertrand, he said, "Tout à présent c'est fini! Sauvons-nous!" and turning his noble horse round, fled across the fields in great haste, attended only by a few followers. The emperor was already several miles from the field of battle, when the Old Guard, disdaining to fly, formed themselves into four great squares, and strove to stem the tide of disorder. But it was all in vain. The British cavalry charged their flanks; the mass of fugitives overwhelmed their front, and prevented their firing; in a few minutes they were pierced through in every direction, cut down, or made prisoners, with their generals, Duhesme, Lobau, and Cambronne. After the Guard was broken, all resistance ceased. Blucher, assembling all his superior officers, gave orders to send the last horse and the last man in pursuit of the enemy. The whole French army became one mass of inextricable confusion. The *chaussée* presented the appearance of an immense shipwreck, covered with an innumerable quantity of cannon, caissons, carriages, baggage, arms, and wrecks of every kind. Wellington rode constantly with the advanced posts, regardless of the balls from both friends and foes which were falling around them. When urged by some of the officers in attendance not to expose himself so much, he replied, "Never mind, let them fire away; the battle's gained." A noble sentiment, coming from such a man at such a time! Before the pursuit of the British ceased, from the men through absolute exhaustion being unable to carry it on farther, a little beyond La Belle Alliance, a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, three hundred and fifty caissons, and six thousand prisoners, had already fallen into their hands; and of the vast army which, in the morning, had borne so splendid an aspect, not two companies were to be found together!*

Total rout of the French.

Blucher and Wellington, by a singular chance, met at the farmhouse of La Belle Alliance, and mutually saluted each other as victors. After cordially shaking hands, the English general represented to the Prussian that his men were so exhausted with fighting the whole day, that they were hardly able to continue the pursuit. "Leave that to me," replied Blucher; "I will send every man after the enemy." And in effect, Zeithen continued the pursuit without intermission during the whole night. Nine times the wearied French, ready to drop down, tried to form bivouacs; nine times they were roused by the dreadful sound of the Prussian trumpet, and obliged to continue their flight without intermission. Such was their fatigue, that the greater part of the foot-soldiers threw away their arms; and the cavalry, entirely dispersing, rode every man for his life across the country. The dejection was universal and extreme. At Genappe some resistance was attempted, and a brisk fire of musketry was kept up for a few minutes from behind a barricade of overturned cannon and carriages. But a few shots from the Prussian horse artillery soon dispersed the enemy, and the town was taken amid loud cheers, and with it Napoleon's travelling-carriage, private papers, hat, and sword. It was in a field near Quatre-Bras that the emperor first drew bridle, and rested for a few minutes to take a slight refreshment, the first that he had tasted since the morning, and immediately after, mounting his horse again, rode all night, and reached Charleroi at six in the morning. The fugitives were already pouring over the bridge, and after stopping an hour he continued his flight to Philipville. The torrent—horse, foot, and artillerymen all intermingled—continued to defile over the bridge at Charleroi during the whole day; but scarce forty thousand passed the Sambre, and they carried with them only twenty-seven guns. The whole remainder of their artillery fell into the hands of the English on the field of battle, or of the Prussians in the pursuit.*

The loss of the allies was immense in this battle. That of the British and Hanoverians alone amounted to 10,686, of whom 2047 were killed, exclusive of the Prussians, who lost 6000 more. The Prussian loss on the 16th and 18th, including the action at Wavres on the latter of these days, was 33,132. Of the French army, it is sufficient to say that its loss was at least 40,000; but, in effect, it was totally destroyed, and scarce any of the men who fought at Waterloo ever again appeared in arms. After they had passed the Sambre and regained their own country, the troops became utterly desperate; the infantry dispersing in the villages, the cavalry and artillery selling their horses, and making the best of their way to their respective homes.†

Action of Grouchy at Wavres.

While this terrible battle was raging at Waterloo, Marshal Grouchy, with his corps, was actively engaged with Thielman in the neighbourhood of Wavres. Napoleon's orders to that marshal were to march upon Sombref, and there take a position; and similar instructions had been given to Count Gerard and Vandamme, who were placed under his orders. Napoleon had also verbally directed him, when he assumed the command, to follow the Prussians, to attack them, and never to lose sight of them. In pursuance of these orders, Grouchy, early on the morning of the 18th, began to press upon Thielman's corps, which was opposed to him; and, after an obstinate resistance, the Prussians were driven back in the direction of Wavres. At noon the cannonade at Waterloo was distinctly heard in Grouchy's army: Count Gerard strongly urged the marshal to abandon the pursuit of the Prussians, and move towards Waterloo, where it was evident the decisive struggle was going forward. But Grouchy was too well aware of the implicit obedience to orders which the emperor exacted to adopt these suggestions; for he had just received instructions from Soult, dated ten o'clock on the 18th of June, *to continue* his movements on Wavres.‡ He continued, accordingly, implicitly to obey his orders, and moved direct upon Wavres till five o'clock; when a second de-

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815, Gurw., xi., 482, 483. Kaus., 681, 682. Nap., 171, 172. Vaud., 55, 59. Gourg., 94, 97. Beam., ii., 378, 379. Scott, in Paul's Letters, 163, 165. Jom., iv., 637, 638.

* Gneiseneau's Account, 206, 207. Jones's Waterloo. Nap., 174, 177. Gourg., 112, 113. Plotho, 62, 70.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815, Gurw., xii., 483, 485. Kaus., 683. Plotho, App., 97, 98.

‡ "The emperor desires me to inform you that at this moment he is about to attack the English army, which has taken a position in front of the forest of Soignies. His majesty *desires that you should direct your movements upon Wavres*, in order to approach us, and conduct our operations in concert, driving before you all the Prussian corps who have taken that direction, or who might stop at Wavres, where you should endeavour to arrive as soon as possible."—SOULT *to* GROUCHY, *18th June*, 1815, *ten o'clock*, GROUCHY, p. 21.

spatch from Soult, dated one o'clock afternoon, enjoined him to manœuvre on St. Lambert, where Bulow's columns had begun to appear. He immediately did so; Gerard, at the head of his corps, forced the passage of the Dyle; while twelve thousand more, under Pajol, also passed the Dyle, won the opposite heights after severe fighting, and repulsed the rear-guard of Bulow, as they had been directed. On the following morning Thielman attacked Grouchy at daybreak, but was vigorously repulsed; and Grouchy was preparing to follow up his success and march upon Brussels, when the fatal news arrived of the rout of Waterloo on the preceding day, with orders from the emperor for Grouchy to retreat upon Laon, and effect a junction there with the remainder of the army. He faithfully obeyed his instructions, and reached that town on the 26th, with thirty-two thousand men and a hundred and eight cannons, having more than repaired his losses by the stragglers whom he picked up during the retreat. It augments the admiration which all must feel at the noble conduct of Marshal Blucher and General Gneiseneau on the eventful day of Waterloo, that when they adopted the resolution to unite their whole force, except Thielman's corps, to bear on the decisive point at Waterloo, they were aware of the disaster which that general had sustained at Wavres, but resolved, with equal spirit and generalship, to sacrifice all minor objects, and even endanger their communications, in order to achieve the destruction of Napoleon's great army at Waterloo.*

Flight of Napoleon, and his arrival at Paris.

With such rapidity did Napoleon continue his flight, that he was himself the first man who brought to the French capital authentic accounts of his own defeat. The telegraph had announced in exaggerated terms the victory of Ligny, and the Imperial partisans immediately expected the total overthrow of the British army; when, on the morning of the 19th, sinister rumours began to circulate in the capital that a great battle had been fought near Mount St. Jean, and that the army had been destroyed. These reports increased in strength and minuteness during the remainder of the day; and while the partisans of Napoleon, and the workmen in the suburbs, were thrown into despair, the shopkeepers and wealthier classes of the citizens recovered confidence, and the public funds of all descriptions rose with surprising rapidity. The opinion soon became universal that the cause of the emperor was desperate; that he had staked his last throw on victory at Waterloo, and that overthrow there was irrecoverable ruin. From Charleroi, he had written in the most encouraging terms to the government, adding, that courage and firmness was all that was necessary to re-establish affairs. He was far, however, from feeling the confidence which he expressed in his letter; Labedoyère and the officers around him were in the deepest dejection, and already began to anticipate that punishment for their treachery to the royal government which they were well aware they richly deserved. Meanwhile, Fouché, who had got the earliest intelligence of the disaster, was straining every nerve to secure his own interest in the approaching revolution, when Napoleon, at four o'clock in the morning of the 21st, arrived at Paris, and alighted at the Elyssée Bourbons.†

* Nap., 179, 180. Gourg., 118, 119. Grouchy, 53, 54.
† Buchez et Roux, xl., 201. Cap., 210, 217. Montg., viii., 218, 219. Fouché, ii., 343, 345. Thib., 392, 393.

Vehemence of Lafayette and the Republicans against the emperor.

His first step, on arrival, was to send for Caulaincourt; his agitation was such that he could hardly articulate. "The army," said he, has "performed prodigies; but a sudden panic seized it, and all has been lost. Ney conducted himself like a madman; he made my cavalry be massacred. I can do no more. I must have two hours of repose and a warm bath, before I can attend to business." After he had taken the bath he became more collected, and spoke with anxiety of the Chambers, insisting that a dictatorship alone could save the country; that he would not seize it, but he hoped the Chambers would offer it. "I have no longer an army," added he; "they are but a set of fugitives: I may find men, but how shall I arm them? I have no muskets. Nothing but a dictatorship can save the country." He had altogether miscalculated, however, the temper of the Chambers. The utmost agitation prevailed in the Deputies, to whom the emperor's bulletin, giving an account of the fatal battle of Waterloo, had just been read; and the Chamber was inundated with officers from the army, who even exaggerated the extent of the calamity, great as it was. Already the parties were formed: Carnot and Lucien strongly supported a dictatorship being conferred on Napoleon; but Fouché, Lafayette, Dupin, and the leaders of the popular party there, had entered into a coalition, the object of which was to erect, as in 1789, the National Assembly into absolute sovereignty, and amid the wreck of the national fortunes, establish the vain dogma of the sovereignty of the people. "The House of Representatives," said Lafayette, "declares that the independence of the nation is menaced. The Chamber declares its sittings permanent. Every attempt to dissolve it is declared high treason. The troops of the line and the National Guards, who have combated, and do combat, to defend the liberty and the independence of France, have deserved well of their country; the minister of the interior is invited to unite to the general staff the commanders of the National Guard at Paris, and to consider the means of augmenting to the greatest amount that civil force, which, during six-and-twenty years, has been the only protection of the tranquillity of the country, and the inviolability of the representatives of the nation." This resolution, which at once destroyed the emperor's power, was carried by acclamation; Prince Lucien accused Lafayette of ingratitude to Napoleon. "You accuse me of wanting gratitude towards Napoleon!" replied Lafayette; "have you forgot what we have done for him? Have you forgotten that the bones of our children, of our brothers, everywhere attest our fidelity, in the sands of Africa, on the shores of the Guadalquiver and the Tagus, on the banks of the Vistula, and in the frozen deserts of Muscovy? During more than ten years, three millions of Frenchmen have perished for a man who wishes still to struggle against all Europe. We have done enough for him. Now our duty is to save the country."*

June 21.

Measures to force the emperor to abdicate.

It was evident, from the profound sensation which these sentiments made upon the Deputies, that the cause of the emperor was lost; already the fatal words, "Let him abdicate! let him abdicate!" were heard on the benches;

* Buchez et Roux, xl., 207, 215. Thib., x., 398, 400. Cap., 223, 224, 229.

and, what was still more alarming, the National Guards mustered in strength and ranged themselves round the Hall of Assembly, and there was scarcely any armed force in the capital to support his cause. The Chamber appointed a commission of five persons, including Lafayette, Lanjuinais, Dupont de l'Eure, Grenier, all decided enemies of Napoleon, who were to confer with two other committees, appointed by the Council of State and the Peers, on the measures necessary to save the country. Meanwhile, the Chamber resumed its sittings in the evening, and the cry for the abdication of the emperor became universal. "I demand," said General Solignac, "that a deputation of five persons shall wait upon the emperor, and inform him of the necessity of an immediate decision." "Let us wait an hour," cried Lucien. "An hour, but no more," replied Solignac. "If the answer is not then returned," added Lafayette, "I will move his dethronement." When Lucien went with this commission to Napoleon, he found him in the utmost agitation, sometimes proposing to dissolve the Chambers by military force, at others to blow out his brains. Lucien openly told him that there was no alternative but to dismiss the Chambers, seize the supreme power, or abdicate; and, with his usual boldness, he strongly advised him to adopt the former alternative. Maret and Caulaincourt, on the other hand, strongly counselled an abdication, insisting that the times were very different from the 18th Brumaire, and that the national representatives were now strongly founded in the opinion of the people. "The Chamber," said Napoleon, "is composed of Jacobins, of madmen, who wish power and disorder; I should have denounced them to the nation, and chased them from their places. Dethrone me! they would not dare." "In an hour," replied Regnaud de St. Angely, "your dethronement, on the motion of Lafayette, will be irrevocably pronounced: they have given you only an hour's grace—do you hear? Only an hour." Napoleon then turned with a bitter smile to Fouché and said, "Write to these gentlemen to keep themselves quiet—they shall be satisfied." Fouché immediately wrote to the Deputies that the emperor was about to abdicate. The intelligence diffused universal joy among the Deputies, who exclaimed, "The emperor has abdicated—no Bourbons—no imperial prince!" as if the days of the Revolution had returned, and they had only to proclaim the sovereignty of the people.*†

While these decisive measures were going on at Paris, Wellington and Blucher were advancing with the utmost expedition through the French territory. The former advanced by Quesnoi and Valenciennes, the latter by Landrecy and Maubeuge. In conformity with his former conduct on crossing the Pyrenees, the English general issued the most peremptory orders to his troops to abstain from pillage of every description, and to observe the strictest discipline, reminding the soldiers that the people of France were the subjects of a friendly sovereign, and that no pillage or contributions of any kind were to be permitted. In spite of all his efforts, however, many disorders occurred, especially among the Belgian regiments; for the soldiers had only recently begun to act together, and long habits of discipline are necessary to prevent a victorious army from indulging in depredation. He wrote, in consequence, in the sternest language to the Belgian generals, declaring that he would hold the officers of corps personally responsible for any pillage by the men under their command. Blucher took hardly any pains to prevent plundering, but pushed on with the utmost energy direct towards Paris. The important fortress of Cambray was surprised and carried by escalade, by Sir Neil Campbell and Colonel Mitchell, on the night of the 24th of June, with the loss of only thirty-five men. Peronne, styled La Pucelle from its never having been taken, was carried by storm in the most gallant manner by the Guards on the evening of the 26th. Excepting in these instances, no opposition whatever was experienced on the march; and with such expedition did both armies move, that on the 28th Blucher's advanced guard defeated the rear-guard of Grouchy, with the loss of six pieces of cannon and a thousand prisoners, on the road from Soissons, at Villars Cotteret; on the 29th the advanced guard of the British crossed the Oise, and on the day following occupied the wood of Bondy, close to Paris; while Blucher moved to the right, crossed the Seine at St. Germain, and established his right at Plessis, his left at St. Cloud, and his reserve at Versailles. The object of these movements was to turn the strong line of fortifications, erected by Napoleon to the north of Paris, by the south and left bank of the Seine, where no fieldworks had yet been erected for its protection.*

Advance of the English and Prussians to Paris, June 20.

Meanwhile, the Imperial party in the Chamber of Peers, headed by Lucien, Labedoyère, and Count Flahault, made the most energetic efforts to sustain the imperial dynasty in the person of the young Napoleon. Davoust had just read a report of the military resources that yet remained to France in the most favourable point of view; and Carnot was commencing a commentary in the same strain, when Ney, who had just arrived, vehemently interrupting him, said, "That is false! That is false! They are deceiving you: they are deceiving you in every respect. The enemy are victorious at all points. I have seen the disorder since I commanded under the eyes of the emperor. It is a mere illusion to suppose that sixty thousand men can be collected. It is well if Marshal Grouchy can rally ten or fifteen thousand men; and we have been beaten too thoroughly for them to make any resistance to the enemy. Here is our true state. Wellington is at Nivelles with eighty thousand men. The Prussians are far from being beaten. In six or seven days the enemy will be at the gates of the capital." Vehement agitation followed

Stormy scene in the Chamber of Peers.

* Thib., x., 403, 405. Buchez et Roux, xl., 221, 222. Cap., 234, 235.

† Napoleon's abdication was in these terms: "In commencing the war to sustain the national independence, I counted on the union of all efforts, of all inclinations, and of all the national authorities. I had good reason to hope for success, and I had braved all the declarations of the powers against me. The circumstances appear changed, and I offer myself as a sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they be sincere in their declarations, and direct their hostility only against my person. My political life is ended; and I proclaim my son, under the title of Napoleon the Second, emperor of the French. The existing ministers will form the council of government. The interest which I feel in my son induces me to invite the Chambers to organize without delay the regency by law. Let all unite for the public safety, and the maintenance of the national independence."—CAPEFIGUE, ii., 236.

* Wellington's General Orders, June 20, 1815, Gurw., xii., 493. Ibid., xii., 503, 532; and Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Gurw., xii., 507. Plotho, 124, 136. Jom., iv., 642.

this announcement, and soon after, Lucien, Joseph, Labedoyère, and the whole Imperial party, entered with plumed hats and in full dress, and Lucien exclaimed with a loud voice, "The emperor is politically dead. Long live the Emperor Napoleon the Second!" Many voices opposed this proposition. "Who opposes it?" said Labedoyère. "A few base individuals, constant in the worship of power, and who show themselves as skilful in detaching themselves from it in misfortune, as in flattering it in prosperity. I have seen them around the throne—at the foot of the sovereign, in the days of his greatness; they fly from it at the approach of danger; they reject Napoleon the Second, because they wish to receive the laws of the strangers, whom they already call their allies, possibly their friends. Is it then, great God! decided that nothing is ever to be heard in this Chamber but the voice of baseness? What other voice has been heard here for ten years?" And, with these words, he rushed out of the assembly. But these violent sallies determined nothing, and at length the Peers adopted unanimously a middle course, and appointed a commission of five persons to carry on the government, consisting of Caulaincourt and Quenett, with Fouché, Carnot, and Grenier. Such was the address of Fouché, that he contrived to get himself named the president of the commission, and soon obtained its entire direction.*

Attempts to defend Paris. Their failure, and its capitulation.

It was not, however, by any debates in the Chamber of Peers or Deputies that the government of France was to be decided; an overwhelming foreign force was advancing with rapid strides, and everything depended on the negotiations with the allied generals, and the means that would be taken to defend the capital. Carnot exerted himself to the utmost to strengthen it on the left bank of the Seine, where it was obviously to be attacked; and in a laboured speech, on the 2d of July, to the councils of government, endeavoured to show that resistance was yet practicable. Soult, however, expressed a decided opinion that Paris was so weak on the left bank of the Seine, that it was in vain to think of prolonging its defence; that there were not at the utmost more than forty-five thousand men in the capital, and that he could not answer for the result of a combat. Massena supported this opinion, and after referring to his defence of Genoa as a proof that he was not disposed lightly to surrender a fortified place, declared that he would not engage to defend Paris an hour. The matter was ultimately referred to a commission of all the marshals and military men in the capital, and they unanimously declared that the city could not be defended. It was determined, therefore, to enter into a capitulation; and, in fact, Wellington had been in close communication with commissioners of the government ever since his arrival in the vicinity of Paris, on the

July 2. 29th of June. Meanwhile, Zeithen, after a short conflict, succeeded in establishing himself on the heights of Meudon, and in the

July 3. village of Issy. On the following day the French attacked him in the latter village in considerable force, but they were repulsed with the loss of a thousand men. A bridge was begun to be erected at Argenteuil, to establish the communication between the British and Prussian armies, and an English corps moved to the left bank of the Seine by the bridge Neuilly. Davoust, upon this, sent to propose an armistice for the conclusion of a convention; but some difficulty was at first experienced from Blucher positively insisting upon the whole French army laying down their arms, to which the French marshals declared they never would be brought to submit. At length, Fouché, who was doing everything to pave the way for the return of the Bourbons, persuaded them that the restoration of Louis XVIII. would be much facilitated, both with the populace and the army, if a capitulation were granted to the troops; and the terms were at length agreed upon on the evening of the 3d of July. It was stipulated that the French army should, on the following day, commence the evacuation of the capital, with their arms, artillery, caissons, and whole personal property; that, within eight days, they should be entirely established to the south of the Loire; that private property of every description should be respected, as well as public, except in so far as it was of a warlike character. The twelfth article, which acquired a melancholy interest from the tragedy which followed, was in these terms: "Individual persons and property shall be respected; and, in general, all the individuals who are at present in the capital shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties, without being disquieted or prosecuted in any respect, in regard to the functions which they occupy, or may have occupied, or to their political conduct or opinions."*

It is impossible for any language to convey an idea of the universal interest excited in the British Empire by the brief but stirring campaign of Waterloo, or the unbounded transports which were felt at the glorious victory which terminated it. Although the official accounts of the battles of Quatre-Bras and Waterloo were received together, yet intelligence had been received two days before of Napoleon having crossed the frontier and attacked the Prussian troops, and the utmost anxiety pervaded all classes at the result of the impending conflict. No one who was then of an age to understand what was going on, can ever forget the entrancing joy which thrilled the British heart when the thunder of artillery proclaimed the joyous news, and when Wellington's letter was read aloud to crowds with beating hearts in every street, by whoever was fortunate enough to have obtained first a copy of the *London Gazette*. Even those who had lost sons or brothers in the conflict, and they were many, shared in the general exultation; grief was almost overwhelmed amid the universal joy; it was felt that life could not have been so well sacrificed as for the advancement of such a cause. Spontaneous illumination was seen in every city; exultation beamed in every eye; a general thanksgiving appointed by government met with a responsive echo in every heart; both houses of Parliament unanimously voted their thanks to the Duke of Wellington and the soldiers who had fought at Waterloo; and a medal was struck by government, which was given to every officer and man who had borne arms on the eventful day, and was preserved by them and their descendants with religious care to the latest hour of their lives. Yet was the most touching proof of the universal sympathy of the nation afforded by the general subscription, spontaneous-

* Cap., ii., 267, 277. Buchez et Roux, xl., 238, 247. Thib., x., 410, 412.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 4, 1815, Gurw., xii., 541. Convention, July 3, 1815, ibid., 542, 544. Plotho, iv., 153, 170. Vaud., 235, 246. Cap., ii., 296, 354.

ly entered into in every chapel and parish in the kingdom, for the widows and orphans of those who had fallen at Waterloo, or the relief of those who had been maimed in the fight, and which soon amounted to the immense sum of five hundred thousand pounds sterling.

Entry of the English and Prussians, and Louis XVIII., into the French capital.

The 7th of July was the proudest day in the annals of England. On that day her victorious army, headed by Wellington, made their public entry, along with the Prussians, into Paris, where an English drum had not been heard for above four hundred years. They entered by the barrier of Neuilly, and spreading on either side round the boulevards, took military possession of all the principal points in the capital. The English established themselves in the Bois de Boulogne in a regular camp; the Prussians bivouacked in the churches, on the quays, and in the principal streets. The aspect of the troops was in the highest degree interesting, and the Highland regiments, in particular, attracted universal admiration. But it was a very different spectacle from the former entry of the allies on the 31st of March, 1814. Joy then beamed in every eye, hope was buoyant in every heart; all felt as if rescued from death. The reality of subjugation was now felt: the crime of the nation had been unpardonable; its punishment was unknown. With a proud step and beating hearts, to the triumphant sound of military music, the British troops defiled through the capital; but the French regarded them with melancholy and anxious looks. Few persons were to be seen in the streets; hardly any sound but the clang of the horses' hoofs was heard when they marched through the city. On the following day, Louis the XVIII., who had followed in the rear of the English army from Ghent, made his public entrance, escorted by the National Guard. But his entry was still more melancholy, and of sinister augury to the future stability of his dynasty. Even the Royalists were downcast; their patriotic feelings were deeply wounded by the defeat of France; they augured ill of the restoration of the king in the rear of the English bayonets. On the same day Fouché announced to the commission, which had hitherto carried on the government, its dissolution, as the English and Prussian armies had occupied the capital, and their deliberations were no longer free. The wily minister shortly afterward received the reward of his treacherous conduct, by being appointed minister of police under the new government.*

July 8.

After his abdication of the imperial authority, Napoleon had retired to Malmaison, the scene of his early happiness with Josephine, and of his first triumphs "in life's morning march, when his bosom was young." It had been irrevocably determined by the allied sovereigns that they would no longer either recognise Napoleon as a crowned head, or suffer him to remain in Europe; and that his residence, wherever it was, should be under such restrictions as should effectually prevent his again breaking loose to desolate the world. Napoleon himself, however, was anxious to embark for America, and the provisional government did everything in their power to facilitate that object. During his residence at Malmaison, he offered, if the government would give him the command of the army, even for a single day, to attack the Prussians, who had incautiously thrown themselves to the south of the Seine without any proper communication with the English on the north, and assured them that there could be no doubt of the success of the enterprise; but they deemed this, probably justly, too hazardous, and likely to injure the negotiations in which they were engaged with the allied generals. After a melancholy sojourn of six days at Malmaison, Napoleon set out for Rochefort, with an immense number of carriages laden with all the most precious articles which he could collect from palaces within his reach, and travelled with all the pomp and circumstance of an emperor to that harbour, where he arrived on the morning of the 3d of July. His resolution, however, finally to quit the scene of his greatness was not yet taken; for during the course of his journey, and after his arrival at Rochefort, he had various communications with the troops at Paris, and on their march to the Loire, which continued down to the moment of his embarking on the 14th. But he found that the blockade of the English cruisers was so vigilant that there was no possible chance of avoiding them; and after ten days' vacillation, and having considered every possible project of escape, he at length adopted the resolution of throwing himself on the generosity of the British government; and sent to Captain Maitland, of the Bellerophon, the following letter, addressed to the prince regent: "Exposed to the factions which divide my country, and to the hostility of the great powers of Europe, I have terminated my political career, and I come, like Themistocles, to seat myself by the hearth of the British people. I put myself under the protection of its laws, and claim it from your royal highness as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies." On the following day he embarked on board the Bellerophon, and was received with the honours due to his rank, as a general, by Captain Maitland, who immediately set sail with his noble prisoner for the British shores.*

June 29.

July 13.

July 14.

Journey of Napoleon to Rochefort. He delivers up himself to the English.

Had the British government been acting alone in this transaction, they might have had some difficulty how to conduct themselves on the occasion; for certainly never was a more touching appeal made to the humanity of a great nation, and never was there an occasion on which a generous heart would have felt a more ardent desire to act in a manner worthy of the splendid testimony to their character, thus borne by their great antagonist. But England was but a single power in the alliance; their whole measures were taken in concert; the power of Napoleon over his troops had recently been evinced in a manner so striking, and his disregard of the obligation of treaties was so universally known, and had been so recently exemplified by his return from Elba, that it was obviously altogether impossible to think of keeping him in Europe. It was politely, therefore, but firmly, intimated to him by the British government, that the determination of the allied sovereigns was irrevocably taken, and that he must be removed to St. Helena. Napoleon vehemently protested against this measure, which he alleged was a breach of the understanding on which he had delivered himself up to Captain

Removal of Napoleon to St. Helena.

July 19.

* Thib., x., 485, 487. Cap., ii., 340, 341.

* Cap., ii., 545, 552. Thib., x., 495, 498. Scott's Napoleon, ix., 61, 72.

Maitland; although nothing could be clearer than that he had made no terms with that officer, and that, if he had any claim at all, it was only on the generosity of the British government. After remaining a fortnight in Plymouth Roads, during which time he was the object of the most flattering curiosity and attention, from all who could get a glimpse of him from the neighbouring towns, he was removed on board the Northumberland, and set sail for St. Helena, which he reached on the 16th of October. Both during the voyage out, and while on board the Bellerophon, the charm of his conversation and fascination of his manner won the hearts of the sailors, as the acuteness of his remarks and depth of his reflections excited the admiration of the officers. With his accustomed mental activity, he inquired into the minutest particulars, into the discipline of the ships, and was particularly struck with the silence and order which always prevailed. "What could you not do with a hundred thousand such men?" said he; "I now cease to wonder that the English were always victorious at sea. There was more noise on board the Epervier schooner, which conveyed me from Isle d'Aix to Basque Roads, than on board the Bellerophon, with a crew of six hundred men, between Rochefort and Plymouth."*

Aug. 3.

Oct. 16.

Paris exhibited a melancholy aspect after the second restoration of Louis the Eighteenth. The whole charm of the Restoration, in the eyes even of the Royalists, was gone; its hopes to the nation were at an end. The bridges, and all the principal points of the town, were occupied by strong bodies of infantry and artillery; patroles of cavalry were to be seen at every step; the reality of subjugation was before their eyes. Blucher kept aloof from all intercourse with the court, and haughtily demanded a contribution of a hundred million of francs (£4,000,000 sterling) for the pay of his troops, as Napoleon had done from the Prussians at Berlin. Already the Prussian soldiers insisted with loud cries that the pillar of Austerlitz should be pulled down, as Napoleon had destroyed the pillar of Rosbach; and Blucher was so resolute to destroy the bridge of Jena, that he had actually begun operations by running mines under the arches for blowing it up. A long negotiation ensued on the subject between him and Wellington; and it was only by the latter placing a sentinel on the bridge, and declaring that, if it was blown up, he would consider it as a rupture with Great Britain, that the destruction of that beautiful monument was prevented. The manner of the Prussian officers and soldiers was often rude and harsh, and beyond the limits of Paris their troops indulged in every species of pillage. It was not that they were naturally fierce, or wanted generosity of feeling, but that they were profoundly wounded by the injuries of their country, and determined, now that they had the power, to avenge them.†

Melancholy condition of Paris after the Restoration. The Bridge of Jena saved by Wellington.

But a more melancholy humiliation awaited the French nation. The allied sovereigns now arrived in Paris, and insisted upon the restoration of the objects of art in the Museum of the Louvre, which had been pillaged from their respective states by the orders of Napoleon. The justice of this demand could not be contested; it was only wresting the prey from the robber. Talleyrand, who had now resumed his functions as minister of foreign affairs, appealed to the article in the capitulation of Paris, which provided for the preservation of public and private property, if not of a military description; but to this it was replied with justice, that these objects of art, seized, contrary to the law of nations, by Napoleon, could not be regarded as rightly the property of the French nation, and that, even if they were so, it was beyond the power of the allied generals to tie up the hands of absent and independent sovereigns, who took no benefit by the capitulation, by any stipulations of their own. The restitution of the objects of art, accordingly, was resolved on, and forthwith commenced, under the care of British and Prussian soldiers, who occupied the Place de Carrousel during the time the removal was going forward. Nothing wounded the French so profoundly as this breaking up of the trophies of the war. It told them, in language not to be misunderstood, that conquest had now reached their doors; the iron went into the soul of the nation. The bronzed horses brought from Corinth to Rome, from thence transported to Constantinople by the great founder of that city, and from thence to Venice by the Doge Dandolo, were restored to their old station in the front of the Church of St. Mark. The Transfiguration and the Last Communion of St. Jerome resumed their place in the halls of the Vatican; the Apollo and the Laocoon again adorned the precincts of St. Peter's; the Venus was enshrined anew amid beauty in the tribune of Florence; and the Descent from the Cross, by Rubens, was restored to the devout worship of the Flemings in the Cathedral of Antwerp. Whoever has witnessed the magnificent gallery of the Louvre, when yet untouched in 1814, and again visited the paintings it contained in their native seats, will rejoice that this restoration took place; for the accumulation of beauty in that great museum fatigued the mind; its enchanting objects had been transplanted among a nation who could little appreciate their beauty, though infinitely proud of their possession; they had been withdrawn from the people to whom they formed the proudest inheritance, and had become the trophy of angry strife and vehement passion, which "to party gave up what was meant for mankind." Impartial justice must admire the dignified restraint which confined the restitution to the removal of objects illegally seized by Napoleon during his conquests, and abstained, when it had the power, from following his bad example, by the seizure of any which belonged to the French nation.*

Restoration of the works of art from the Museum of the Louvre.

The breaking up of the museum was an ominous event to the French nation, for the neighbouring powers had territories as well as paintings to reclaim; and the spirit of conquest as well as revenge loudly demanded the cession of many of the most important provinces which had been added by the Bourbon princes to the monarchy of Clovis. Austria insisted upon getting back Lorraine and Alsace; Spain put in a claim to the Basque provinces; Prussia alleged that her security would be incomplete unless Mayence, Luxemburg, and all the frontier provinces of

Excessive demands of the allied powers.

* Maitland's Narrative, 74, 82. Scott's Napoleon, ix., 75, 105. Cap., i., 355, 364.

† Cap., ii., 362, 366. Wellington to Blucher, July 8, 1815, Gurw. xii., 318, 518.

* Cap., Hist. de la Restauration, iii., 86, 89. Scott's Paris Revisited, 242, 256.

France adjoining her territory, were ceded to her; and the King of the Netherlands claimed the whole of the French fortresses of the Flemish barrier. It was with no small difficulty, and more from the jealousy of the different powers among each other than any other cause, that these natural reprisals on French rapacity were prevented from taking place. The negotiation was protracted at Paris till late in autumn; Russia, which had nothing to gain by the proposed partition, supported France throughout its whole continuance; and the different powers, to support their pretensions in this debate, maintained their armies, who had entered on all sides, on the French soil; so that above eight hundred thousand foreign troops were quartered on its inhabitants for several months. At length, however, by the persevering efforts of Lord Castlereagh, M. Nesselrode, and M. Talleyrand, all difficulties were adjusted, and the second Treaty of Paris was concluded in November, 1815, between France and the whole allied powers.*

Nov. 20, 1815.

By this treaty, and the relative conventions which were signed the same day, conditions of a very onerous kind were imposed upon the French government. The French frontier was restored to the state in which it stood in 1790, by which means the whole of the territory, far from inconsiderable, gained by the treaty of 1814, was resumed by the allies. In consequence of this, France lost the fortresses of Landau, Sarre-Louis, Philipville, and Marienburg, with the adjacent territory of each. Versoix, with a small district round it, was ceded to the canton of Geneva; the fortress of Huningen was to be demolished; but the little county of Venaisin, the first conquest of the Revolution, was ceded to France. Seven hundred millions of francs (£28,000,000 sterling) was to be paid to the allied powers for the expenses of the war; in addition to which, it was stipulated that an army of 150,000 men, composed of 30,000 from each of the great powers of England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and the lesser powers of Germany, was to occupy, for a period not less than three nor more than five years, the whole frontier fortresses of France, from Cambray to Fort Louis, including Valenciennes and Quesnois, Maubeuge and Landrecy; and this large force was to be maintained entirely at the expense of the French government. In addition to this, the different powers obtained indemnities for the spoliations inflicted on them by France during the Revolution, which amounted to the enormous sum of seven hundred and thirty-five millions of francs more (£29,500,000 sterling). A hundred millions of francs were also provided to the smaller powers, as an indemnity for the expenses of the war; so that the total sums which France had to pay, besides maintaining the army of occupation, was no less than fifteen hundred and thirty-five millions of francs, or £61,500,000 sterling. Truly, France now underwent the severe but just law of retaliation; she was made to feel what she had formerly inflicted on Germany, Italy, and Spain. Great Britain, in a worthy spirit, gave up the whole sum falling to her out of the indemnity for the war, amounting to nearly £5,000,000 sterling, to the King of the Netherlands, to erect the famous barrier against France which Joseph II. had so insanely demolished; and the allied powers unanimously gave the highest proof of their sense of Wellington being the first of European generals, by conferring upon him the command of the Army of Occupation.*

Terms of the treaty.

Two magnificent events followed the long occupation of the French territory by the allied armies previous to the signature of this treaty. The first was a review of all the British troops in the presence of the whole allied powers, which took place in the plain of St. Denis. The British army before this time had been greatly strengthened by the arrival of the troops from Canada, and by the recovery of a great part of the wounded who had suffered at Waterloo, and they mustered sixty thousand red-coats. Never had such an array of native British troops been seen, and probably never will be seen again. The soldiers, as if by enchantment, went through with admirable precision, under the orders of their chief, the whole manœuvres that had won the battle of Salamanca. The other was a great review of all the Russian troops that were in France, on the plains of Vertus, on the 10th of September, 1815. This review conveyed an awful impression of the strength of the Russian Empire when fairly roused; for a hundred and sixty thousand men, including eight-and-twenty thousand cavalry, were under arms on the field, with five hundred and forty pieces of cannon. The day was sultry, but clear, and from a small hill in the centre of a large plain, at a short distance from Chalons, the whole immense lines were visible. The eye had scarcely time to comprehend so vast a spectacle, when a single gun, fired from a height, was the signal for three cheers from the troops. Even at this distance of time, those cheers sound, as it were, fresh in the ears of all who heard them; their sublimity, like the roar of the ocean when near, and gradually melting away in the distance, was altogether overpowering. A general salute was then given by a rolling fire along the line from right to left; the Russians then broke from their lines into grand columns of regiments, and marched past the sovereigns in splendid array. "Well, Charles," said the Duke of Wellington to Sir Charles Stuart, now Marquis of Londonderry, after the review was over, "you and I never saw such a sight before, and never shall again; the precision of the movements of these troops was more like the arrangements of a theatre than those of such an army; but still I think my little army would move round them in any direction while they were effecting a single change."†

Review of the British and Russian troops. September 15.

Sept. 10.

But the pomp and splendour of military display did not alone terminate the war in France. The muffled drum is in prospect. The allied powers, irritated beyond endurance by the treachery and defection of the whole French army, and the perfidy with which the partisans of Napoleon had revolted to his side, insisted peremptorily upon measures of severity being adopted by the French government. A very long list of proscriptions was at first rendered by the European powers, and it was with the utmost difficulty that they were reduced, by the efforts of Talleyrand, supported by Lord Castlereagh, to fifty-eight, of

Trial and execution of Labedoyère and Ney.

* Cap., ii., 567, 582. Martens, Sup., ii., 682. Hard., xii., 540, 544.

* See Treaty in Martens, ii., 682; and Schoell., xi., 501, 518.

† Londonderry's War in Germany, 334, 335.

persons to be banished. But banishment was not enough; the flagrant treason of the Hundred Days demanded the blood of some of the principal offenders, and Ney, Labedoyère, and Lavalette were selected to bear the penalty. They were brought to trial, accordingly, and all three convicted, upon the clearest evidence, of high treason. The life of Lavalette was saved by the heroic devotion of his wife, who, in visiting him in prison, changed dresses with her husband, and thus effected his escape; but Ney and Labedoyère were both executed, and met their fate with that heroic courage which never fails deeply to impress mankind. They both themselves gave the order to the soldiers to fire; but in Ney's case it was deeply affecting. Being brought in a carriage to the place selected in the gardens of the Luxemburg, near a wall, the marshal stood erect, with his hat in his left hand, and his right on his heart, and facing the soldiers, exclaimed, "My comrades, fire on me!" He fell, pierced by ten balls. The place of his execution is still to be seen in the gardens of the Luxemburg; and few spots in Europe will excite more melancholy emotions in the mind of the traveller.*

Reflections on this event.

The death of Ney is a subject which the English historian cannot dismiss without painful feelings. His guilt was self-evident; and never, perhaps, was the penalty of the law inflicted upon one for a political offence who more richly deserved his fate. But the question of difficulty is, Whether or not he was protected by the capitulation of Paris? The clause in that treaty has been already given, which expressly declares that no person should be molested for his political opinions or conduct during the Hundred Days; and it is very difficult to see how this clause could be held as not protecting Ney, who was within the city at the time of the treaty. Wellington and Blucher concluded the capitulation: their sovereigns ratified it: Louis XVIII. took benefit from it. He entered Paris the very day after the English army, and established himself in the Tuileries, under the protection of their guns. How, then, can it be said that he, as well as the allied sovereigns, were not bound by the treaty, especially in so vital and irreparable a matter as human life, and that the life of such a man as Marshal Ney? It is very true a great example was required; true, Ney's treason was beyond that of any other man; true, the Revolutionists required to be shown that the government could venture to punish. But all that will not justify the breach of a capitulation. The very time when justice requires to interpose is when great interests or state necessity are urgent on the one hand, and an unprotected criminal exists on the other. To say that Louis XVIII. was not bound by the capitulation; that it was made by the English general without his authority; and that no foreign officer could tie up the hands of an independent sovereign, is a quibble unworthy of a generous mind, and which it is the duty of the historian invariably to condemn. This was what Nelson said at Naples, and what Schwartzenberg said at Dresden; and subsequent times have unanimously spoken out against the violation of these two capitulations. Banished from France, with his double treason affixed to his forehead, Ney's character was irrecoverably withered; but to the end of the world his guilt will be forgotten in the tragic interest and noble heroism of his death.

* Cap., Hist. de la Rest., 370, 484.

Seizure and execution of Murat.

Another of the paladins of the French Empire perished not long after, under circumstances to which the most fastidious sense of justice can take no exception. Tormented with the thirst for power, and the desire to regain his dominions, Murat was foolhardy enough to make a descent on the coast of Naples with a few followers, in order to excite a revolt among his former subjects against the Bourbon government. He was seized, tried by a military commission, under a law which he himself had introduced, condemned, and executed. He met his fate with the courage that might have been expected from so brave a soldier; but however humanity may mourn his doom, reason must admit its justice; for he suffered the penalty which, seven years before, he had inflicted on so many noble patriots, striving to rescue their country from foreign thraldom, in the squares of Madrid.*

Napoleon at St. Helena. Conduct of the British government towards him.

Napoleon did not long survive his old companions in arms. Although he was subjected to no restraint at St. Helena, was permitted to ride over nearly the whole island, and enjoyed a degree of luxury and comfort both in his habitation and in the society with which he was surrounded, which bore a striking contrast to the stern severity with which he had treated state prisoners, yet his proud spirit chafed against the coercion of being confined at all to an island. The British government had given the most express instructions that he should be treated with all the respect due to his rank as a general, and with all the indulgence consistent with security against his escape; but Sir Hudson Lowe, who was appointed to the military command of the island, proved an unhappy selection. His manner was rigid and unaccommodating, and his temper of mind was not such as to soften the distress which the emperor endured during his detention. A great impression, accordingly, was made upon the world by the publication of the St. Helena Memoirs, in which were interwoven exaggerated statements of the indignities to which he was said to have been subjected, with the interesting disquisitions and profound reflections, which will, perhaps, add as much to his fame with the thinking portion of mankind as his great military achievements will with the enthusiastic and enterprising. But while all must regret that it should have been necessary, under any circumstances, to act with even seeming harshness towards so great a man, yet justice can see nothing to condemn in the conduct of the British government in this particular, whatever it may do as to want of courtesy in the governor of the island. It was indispensable to the peace of the world to prevent his escape; and the expedition from Elba had shown that no reliance could be placed either on his professions or his treaties. Detention and secure custody, therefore, were unavoidable, and every comfort consistent with these objects was afforded him by the British government. He was allowed the society of the friends who had accompanied him in his exile; he had books in abundance to amuse his leisure hours; saddle-horses in profusion were at his command; he was permitted to ride several miles in one direction; Champagne and Burgundy were his daily

* Biog. Univ., *Voce* Murat. *Ante*, iii., 583.

beverage; and the bill of fare of his table, which is given by Las Casas as a proof of the severity of the British government, would be thought the height of luxury by most persons in a state of liberty. If the English government had acted towards Napoleon as he did to others who opposed him, they would have shot him in the first fortress, as he did the Duke d'Enghien or Hofer, or shut him up in an Alpine fortress, as he did the Cardinal Pacca.

His last illness, and death.

But his mortal career in the scene of his exile and suffering was not destined to be of long duration. The vexation which he experienced at finding all the plans frustrated which had been formed for his escape, the fretting which he suffered from the sight of the English sentries round his dwelling, the recollection of his lost greatness, the prospect of endless detention, combined, with a hereditary malady, to produce severe stomach complaints. He suffered much from this cause, but it was at first hoped that they would yield to the skill of his medical attendants. Gradually, however, the affections became more severe; and they at length assumed the decided symptoms of cancer in the stomach, to which his father had fallen a victim at a still earlier age. In February, 1821, he became so rapidly worse, that, by the special directions of the prince regent, Lord Bathurst wrote to Sir Hudson Lowe to express his royal highness's sympathy with his sufferings, and his wish, if possible, to relieve them. This mark of regard, however, came too late: towards the end of March his strength sunk rapidly: he dictated his will, with a great variety of minute bequests; but obstinately refused to take medicine, to which he had a great aversion. "All that is to happen," said he, "is written down: our hour is marked: we cannot prolong it a minute beyond what fate has predestined." He directed that his heart should be sent to the Empress Marie Louise at Parma, and his stomach examined, to see if he had died of his hereditary malady. At two o'clock on the 3d of May he received extreme unction, declared that he died in the Roman Catholic faith, which had been that of his fathers, and gave minute directions for his body being laid in state in a *chapelle ardente*, according to the form of the Catholic worship. "Can you not," said he to Antomarchi, his physician, "believe in God, whose existence everything proclaims, and in whom the greatest minds have believed?" On the 5th, a violent storm of wind and rain arose: the last struggles of Napoleon took place during its fury; and the last words he was heard to utter were, "*Tête d'armée.*" He breathed his last at eleven minutes before six in the evening. In his will, which contained a vast number of bequests, were two very remarkable: the one was, a request "that his body might repose on the banks of the Seine, among the people whom he had loved so well;" the other, a legacy of 10,000 francs to the assassin Cantillon, who had attempted recently before to murder the Duke of Wellington.*

May 5, 1821.

His interment at St. Helena.

Napoleon had himself indicated the place in St. Helena where he wished his remains to be interred. It was in a small hollow called Slane's Valley, where a fountain, shaded with weeping willows, had long been a favourite spot for his meditation. The body, after lying in state as he had directed, was carried to the place of interment on the 8th of May. The whole members of his household, including the noble-hearted Bertrand, Count Montholon, and all the other faithful friends who had shared his exile, and all the officers, naval and military, in the island, attended on the occasion. He was laid in the coffin in his three-cornered hat, military surtout, leather under dress, and boots, as he appeared on the field of battle. As the hearse could not get up to the place of sepulture, a detachment of British grenadiers bore him to the spot. The coffin was lowered amid the speechless emotion and tears of all present; three successive volleys of musketry and artillery announced that the mighty conqueror was laid in his grave; a simple stone of great size was placed over his remains; and the solitary willow wept over the tomb of him for whom the earth itself had once hardly seemed a fitting mausoleum.*

May 8.

Reflections on the campaign of Waterloo.

The campaign of Waterloo having been the immediate cause of the overthrow of Napoleon, has been made, as may well be believed, the subject of unbounded discussion and criticism both on the Continent and Great Britain, and equally on the part of the allied writers as the French. The latter have, as was very natural, strained every nerve to palliate their defeat, partly by exaggerating the forces of their opponents, partly by diminishing their own, and partly by misrepresenting the nature of Marshal Grouchy's operations, and unduly magnifying the effect which would have followed from his having disobeyed his orders, and come up to the field of battle before the conclusion of the fight. The Continental writers, on the other hand, and particularly the Prussians, have endeavoured to arrogate to themselves a larger share than was really due to them in the honours of the conflict, and to underrate what should in fairness be ascribed to the unconquerable firmness of the British troops. The English writers also have not been a whit behind their Continental brethren in exaggeration; and by seeking to ascribe everything to their own countrymen, and endeavouring to keep out of view altogether the necessary effect of Prussian co-operation, have gone far to make the Continental readers distrust what really is authentic and undoubted in the exploits of the British troops on that glorious day. A very few observations, conceived in a European spirit, will be sufficient to show where the truth really lies amid these conflicting statements.

Wellington and Blucher were surprised.

1. In the first place, it is evident, whatever the English writers may say to the contrary, that both Blucher and the Duke of Wellington were surprised by Napoleon's invasion of Belgium on the 15th of June, and it is impossible to hold either of them entirely blameless for that circumstance. It has been already seen from the duke's despatches, that on the 9th of June, that is, six days before the invasion took place, he was aware that Napoleon was collecting a great force on the frontier, and that hostilities might immediately be expected.† Why, then, were the two armies not immediately concentrated, and placed in such a situation that they might mutually, if attacked, lend each other the necessary assistance? Their united force was full one hundred and ninety thousand effective men; while Napoleon's was not more than one hun-

* Napoleon's Testament. Antomarchi, ii., 229. App. No. Scott, ix., 296, 301. Antomarchi, ii., 246, 312.

* Scott's Nap., ix., 294, 302. Antom., ii., 180, 192.

† *Ante*, iv., 521.

dred and twenty, or, at the utmost, one hundred and forty thousand. Why, then, was Blucher attacked unawares and isolated at Ligny, and the British infantry, unsupported either by cavalry or artillery, exposed to the attack of a superior force of French, composed of all the three arms, at Quartre-Bras? It is in vain to say that they could not provide for their troops if they had been concentrated, and that it was necessary to watch every by-road which led to Brussels. Men do not eat more when drawn together than when scattered over a hundred miles of country. Marlborough and Eugene had long ago maintained armies of one hundred thousand men for months together in Flanders; and Blucher and Wellington had no difficulty in feeding one hundred and seventy thousand men drawn close together after the campaign did commence. It is not by a cordon of troops scattered over a hundred miles that the attack of one hundred and twenty thousand French is to be arrested. If the British army had from the first been concentrated at Waterloo, and Blucher near Wavres, Napoleon would never have ventured to pass them on any road, however unguarded. Those who, in their anxiety to uphold the English general from the charge of having been assailed unawares, assert that he was not taken by surprise in the outset of the Waterloo campaign, do not perceive that in so doing they bring against him the much more serious charge of having so disposed his troops, when he knew they were about to be assailed, that infantry alone, without either cavalry or artillery, were exposed to the attack of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in superior numbers, contrary not only to the plainest rules of the military art, but of common sense on the subject.

2. It results from these considerations, that in the outset of the Waterloo campaign, Wellington and Blucher were outmanœuvred by Napoleon. Being superior, by at least seventy thousand troops, to those at the command of the French emperor, it was their business never to have fought at a disadvantage, and not made a final stand till their two great armies were in a situation mutually to assist and support each other. There seems no reason why this should not have been done by their mutually converging from the frontier to Waterloo without abandoning Brussels. But, even if it had been necessary to evacuate that capital before the union was effected, prudence suggests that it would have been better to have done so, even with all its moral consequences, than to have exposed either army to the chance of serious defeat in consequence of being singly assailed by greatly superior forces. Nevertheless, Napoleon so managed matters, in the outset of the campaign, that though inferior, upon the whole, by full seventy thousand men, to the allied armies taken together, he was superior to either at the points of attack at Ligny and Quatre-Bras. That is the most decisive test of superior generalship.

And outgeneralled at first.

3. It results from the same principles, that, as clearly as the allied generals were outgeneralled in the outset, Napoleon was outgeneralled by them in the close of the campaign. His favourite military manœuvre, of interposing between his adversaries, and striking with a superior force first on the right hand and then on the left, was now met and conquered by the method of resistance obviously appropriate to it, viz., the concentric retreat of the two allied armies into such close proximity, that, in the event of a general battle, they could mutually support and assist each other. Napoleon committed a flagrant military error when, with the Prussian army, repulsed only, but still unbroken, on his flank, he hazarded all on the desperate chance of defeating the British army before its arrival on the ridge of Waterloo. Wellington acted with true military skill when he resolved to give battle in front of the forest of Soignies, with a promise from Blucher that he would assist him by mid-day with two corps. That was precisely retaliating upon Napoleon the brilliant attack of Ney on the flank of the allied armies, by which he had gained the battle of Bautzen.* In resisting his furious onset, it is hard to say whether we have most cause to admire the ardent spirit and quick determination which prompted Blucher, so soon after his own defeat, to strain every nerve in order to bring up his troops to the decisive point at Waterloo, or the incomparable constancy and unshaken determination which led Wellington, amid a sea of carnage, to maintain his ground immoveable till the glancing of the Prussian standards announced the signal of decisive victory. Prudence should have counselled Napoleon to have retreated, rather than incurred the desperate hazard of being assailed, either in the moment of victory or defeat, by fifty thousand fresh troops. A just appreciation of the advantages of their situation, equally with their own heroic spirit, prompted Wellington and Blucher to act as they did on this memorable field; and it is very remarkable that their success would probably have been comparatively incomplete, had it not been for the success gained by Napoleon, on the 16th, over the Prussians, at Ligny; for, it was that which led Napoleon to believe that the Prussian army was entirely put *hors de combat*, at least for some days, and that he might with safety, even to the eleventh hour, hurl his whole forces, with almost desperate energy, against the British legions in front of Waterloo.

Napoleon was outgeneralled in the end.

4. It is impossible to estimate too highly the military ability of the Duke of Wellington, both in his selection of the field of battle, in the disposition which he gave to his troops, and the admirable firmness with which he maintained his ground till the promised succour arrived. The slightest inspection of the field of Waterloo must be sufficient to convince every observer that it was in a singular manner adapted for a great defensive stand; being furnished with a gentle slope along its whole front, which, like a regular glacis, exposed the attacking columns to a fire from the summit every step that they advanced; having the farmhouses and enclosures of La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont, like so many outworks, to retard the enemy's advance, and the reverse of the hill affording a gentle slope and hollow to the other side, where the troops, invisible to those who stood on the opposite ridge, where the French army bivouacked, might be at once, in a great measure, sheltered from the fire of the enemy's artillery, and at the same time ready to repel the assault of his columns, if, after braving the fire of the British, they had reached the summit of the ridge. But the advantages of this position, great as they were, would have been as nothing without the invincible tenacity, heroic courage, and admirable steadiness with which Wellington maintained his ground against

Admirable conduct of Wellington on the field.

* *Ante*, iv., p. 340.

greatly superior forces during the terrible conflict, and gained time, at the moment when the fate of Europe quivered in the balance, for the Prussian corps to come up and effect a decisive overthrow. Constancy less immovable, moral courage less unconquerable, would have led to the abandonment of the field when the Prussian troops had not arrived at one o'clock, the hour appointed, and the great superiority of the enemy in effective troops had become apparent, and thus postponed to an indefinite period, perhaps forever, Napoleon's final destruction. The annals of war do not afford a more striking, perhaps not so striking, an example of the intuitive glance of true military genius, as that which led Wellington to resist, even to the death, in his defensive position, down to the very last moment, and then suddenly hurl his whole troops, with the ocean's mighty sweep, upon the foe.

Comparative merits of the English and Prussians at Waterloo.

5. In considering the comparative shares which the British and Prussian armies had in the achievement of this glorious victory, an impartial judgment must award by far the highest part to the British troops. When it is recollected that the English and the King's German Legion soldiers in the field did not exceed thirty-seven thousand, and that, including the Hanoverians, the whole troops on whom reliance could be placed were little more than fifty thousand, and that they were assailed, for above five hours, by continual attacks from eighty thousand veteran French, before even Bulow's Prussians arrived in the field at four o'clock, it must be admitted that this day must ever be reckoned as the proudest of the many proud days of English glory. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the arrival of Bulow's corps at that hour, which compelled Napoleon to detach eleven thousand of his Young and Old Guard to maintain Planchenois against them, and, consequently, withdrew them from the field of battle as against the English, went far to diminish the superiority, and bring nearer to an equality the military forces of the contending armies. No official account of the Prussian loss has ever been published, although it is stated by their military writers to have amounted to 6000; so that it is impossible to say with precision what their share in the fight actually was. Had they not appeared on the field as they did in force at half past seven at night, there can be no doubt that the French army would have been repulsed, because their last attack actually was so, and their Old Guard routed before Blucher's standards were seen in the wood issuing from St. Lambert, or the Prussians had taken any part farther than in drawing off the eleven thousand of the Guard to Planchenois, from the fight, by Bulow's vigorous attack at four o'clock. The victory, however, would have been incomplete, and probably little more than a bloody repulse, without their co-operation; and possibly the superiority of the French, if there had been no other army in the field, might have enabled Napoleon to compel the British to retreat, by menacing their flank next day, as he did that of the Russians after the terrible fight of Borodino. It was unquestionably the arrival of the Prussians which rendered the victory complete, and converted a bloody repulse into a total overthrow; and probably but for the prospect of their co-operation, Wellington would never, with a force so inferior in military strength, have hazarded the risk of so dreadful a conflict.

6. The effect of Grouchy's not coming up, and the circumstances of his share in the campaign, has been made the subject of great exaggeration on the part of the French writers. Without doubt, if two-and-thirty thousand French troops had come upon the flank of the British army, without being followed by any Prussians, they might have exposed them to a defeat as signal as Napoleon himself experienced, from a similar attack being made upon him when exhausted by the fight. But *were* Grouchy's troops in a situation to do this? Was he not fully matched by the Prussians under Thielman, whom he combated at Wavres? Had not the Prussian general strict orders to follow Grouchy closely? And what would it have availed the French if the latter had come up to their succour with 32,000 men, if the former, with 35,000, at the same time re-enforced Blucher and joined Wellington? It is by entirely keeping out of view this important fact of Grouchy being fully matched at Wavres, and the impossibility of his joining Napoleon, without Thielman at the same time, with a superior force, joining Wellington, that the French have been at all able to elevate into a degree of importance the alleged failure of this marshal appearing in the field at the decisive moment. And whether he did right or wrong in acting as he did, nothing is more certain than that he strictly obeyed his orders; and that, if there was any fault in the case, Napoleon could in justice ascribe it to no one but himself.

Parallel of Napoleon and Wellington.

Napoleon and Wellington have risen, by the common consent of men, to the highest rank on their respective sides in the great revolutionary contest, and the awful strife having been finally determined under their guidance on a single field, like that between Rome and Carthage under the banners of Scipio and Hannibal, the attention of men, to the end of the world, will be forcibly drawn to their characters. We know, after the lapse of two thousand years, with what eagerness we yet dwell on those of the Roman and Carthaginian leaders who met at Zama; and we may anticipate with confidence a similar undying interest in the comparison between the British and French heroes who combated at Waterloo. Happy, indeed, if the pen of the historian could keep pace with the greatness of the subject, and the English language would afford the means of painting, in a few touches, with the hand of Livy or Tacitus, the salient points in the minds of those whose deeds are forever engraven on the records of mankind!

Their points of difference.

Napoleon and Wellington were not merely individual characters: they were the types of the powers which they respectively headed in the contest. Napoleon had more genius, Wellington more judgment; the former combated with greater energy, the latter with greater perseverance. Rapid in design, instant in execution, the strokes of the French hero fell like the burning thunderbolt: cautious in counsel, yet firm in action, the resources of the British champion multiplied, like the vigour of vegetation, after the withering stroke had fallen. No campaign of Wellington's equals in genius and activity those of Napoleon in Italy and in France; none of Napoleon's approaches in foresight and wisdom that of Wellington's at Torres Vedras. The vehemence of the French emperor would have exhausted in a single campaign the whole resources which during the war were at the disposal of the Eng-

lish general; the caution of Wellington would have alienated in the very beginning the troops which overflowed with the passions of the Revolution. Ardour and onset were alike imposed on the former by his situation, and suggested by his disposition: foresight and perseverance were equally dictated to the latter by his necessities, and in unison with his character. The one wielded at pleasure the military resources of the half of Europe, and governed a nation heedless of consequences, covetous of glory, reckless of slaughter: the other led the forces of a people distrustful of its prowess, avaricious of its blood, but invincible in its determination. And the result, both in the general war and final struggle, was in entire conformity with this distinction: Wellington retired in the outset before the fierce assault of the French legions, but he saw them, for the first time since the Revolution, recoil in defeat from the rocks of Torres Vedras: he was at first repeatedly expelled from Spain, but at last he drove the invaders with disgrace across the Pyrenees: he was in the beginning surprised, and wellnigh overpowered in Flanders, but in the end he baffled all Napoleon's efforts, and rising up with the strength of a giant, crushed at once his army and his empire on the field of Waterloo.

Contrast of their moral characters.

The personal and moral character of the two chiefs was still more strikingly opposed, and characteristic of the sides they severally led. Both were distinguished by the unwearied perseverance, the steady purpose, the magnanimous soul, which are essential to glorious achievements: both were provident in council, and vigorous in execution: both possessed personal intrepidity in the highest degree: both were indefatigable in activity, and iron in constitution: both enjoyed the rarer qualities of moral courage and fearless determination. But, in other respects, their minds were as opposite as the poles are asunder. Napoleon was covetous of glory, Wellington was impressed with duty: Napoleon was reckless of slaughter, Wellington was sparing of blood: Napoleon was careless of his word, Wellington was inviolate in faith. Treaties were regarded by the former as binding only when expedient—alliances valid only when useful: obligations were regarded by the latter as obligatory, though ruinous; conventions sacred, even when open to objection. Napoleon's wasting warfare converted allies into enemies: Wellington's protecting discipline changed enemies into friends: the former fell, because all Europe rose up against his oppression; the latter triumphed, because all Europe joined to share in his protection. There is not a proclamation of Napoleon to his soldiers in which glory is not mentioned and duty forgotten: there is not an order of Wellington to his troops in which duty is not inculcated, nor one in which glory is alluded to. Singleness of heart was the great characteristic of the British hero, a sense of duty his ruling principle: falsehood pervaded the French conqueror, the thirst for glory was his invariable motive. The former proceeded on the belief that the means, if justifiable, would finally work out the end: the latter, on the maxim that the end would in every case justify the means. Napoleon placed himself at the head of Europe, and desolated it for fifteen years with his warfare; Europe placed Wellington at the head of its armies, and he gave it thirty years of unbroken peace. The one exhibited the most shining example of splendid talents devoted to temporal ambition: the other, the noblest instance of moral influence directed to exalted purposes. The former was in the end led to ruin, while blindly following the phantom of wordly greatness: the latter was unambitiously conducted to final greatness, while only following the star of public duty. The struggle between them was the same at bottom as that which, anterior to the creation of man, shook the powers of heaven; and never was such an example of moral government afforded as the final result of their immortal contest.

Time rolled on, and brought its usual changes on its wings. The dynasty of the Restoration proved unequal to the arduous task of coercing the desires of the Revolution, weakened, but not extinguished, by the overthrow of Napoleon: a new generation arose, teeming with the passions and forgetful of the sufferings of former times; and the revolt of the barricades restored the tricoloured flag, and established a semi-revolutionary dynasty on the French throne. England shared in the renewed convulsion consequent on these momentous events: a great organic change in the Constitution placed the popular party for a course of years in power; a temporary alliance, founded on political passion, not national interest, for a time united its government with that of France; and under the auspices of M. Thiers's administration, a request was made to the British to restore the remains of their great emperor to the French people. This request, received in a worthy spirit by the English administration, was immediately complied with, in the hope, as it was eloquently, though fallaciously said at the time, "that these two great nations would henceforth bury their discord in the tomb of Napoleon." The solitary grave in St. Helena was disturbed: the lonely willow no longer wept over the remains of the emperor: the sepulchre was opened in presence of all the officers of the island, and many of his faithful followers; and the winding-sheet, rolled back with pious care, revealed to the entranced spectators the well-known features of the immortal hero, serene, undecayed, in his now canonized military dress, as when he stood on the fields of Austerlitz or Jena. The body was removed from its resting-place with the highest military honours: the British army and navy in the island, with generous sympathy, vied with each other in doing honour to their great antagonist; and when it was lowered amid the thunder of artillery into the French frigate, England felt that she had voluntarily, but in a right spirit, relinquished the proudest trophy of her national glory.

Removal of Napoleon's remains from St. Helena.

Sept., 1840.

The remains of the emperor were conveyed in safety to Europe on board the Belle Poule frigate, and landed, with appropriate honours, at Havre de Grace. From thence they were removed to Paris, with a view to their being interred, with the other illustrious warriors of France, in the Church of the Invalides. The reinterment, which awakened the deepest interest in France and over Europe, took place on the 6th of December, 1840. The day was fine, though piercingly cold; but such was the interest excited, that six hundred thousand persons were assembled to witness the ceremony. The procession approached Paris by the road from St. Cloud, so often traversed by the emperor in the days of his glory; it passed

And their final interment in the Church of the Invalides.

Dec. 6, 1840.

through the now finished and stupendous arch erected to the Grand Army at the barrier of Neuilly, and slowly moving through the Elysian Fields, reached the Invalides by the bridge of La Concorde. Louis Philippe and all his court officiated at the august ceremony, which was performed with extraordinary pomp in the splendid church of the edifice; but nothing awakened such deep feeling as a band of the mutilated veterans of the Old Guard, who with mournful visages, but a yet military air, attended the remains of their beloved chief to his last resting-place. An aged charger, once rode by the emperor on his fields of fame, survived to follow the colossal hearse to the grave. The place of interment was worthy of the hero who was now placed beneath its roof: it contained the remains of Turenne and Vauban, and the paladins of France: enchanting music thrilled every heart as the coffin was lowered into the tomb: the thunders of the artillery, so often vocal to his triumphs, now gave him the last honours of mortality: the genius of Marochetti was selected to erect a fitting monument to his memory; and the bones of Napoleon finally reposed on the banks of the Seine, amid the "people whom he had loved so well." Yet will future ages perhaps regret the ocean-girt isle, the solitary stone, the willow-tree. Napoleon will live when Paris is in ruins: his deeds will survive the dome of the Invalides—no man can show the tomb of Alexander!

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.

ARGUMENT.

Importance of Historical Review to Mankind.—Perpetual Alternation of Progress and Decline in human Affairs.—Error in supposing that any one State of Things is to continue Permanent.—General Progress of Mankind notwithstanding these Vicissitudes.—Steady Growth of Improvement through them all.—Failure of all Attempts to introduce any lasting Improvement in the Condition of Men by mere Changes in the Form of their Government.—Expectations of the World at the breaking out of the French Revolution.—Demonstration of their Fallacy which that Convulsion has afforded.—Entire Disappointment of these Expectations in its external Relations.—Their subsequent Failure during the Restoration.—Subsequently in the Revolutions of Southern Europe.—In the Results of American Equality, and in the Effects of Reform in the British Islands.—This all flows from the general Corruption of Mankind.—What is meant by this Principle.—Necessary Consequences of the Principle of Perfectibility.—Opposite Effects of the Christian Doctrine of general Corruption.—Views of the Popular Party on the intellectual Character of Men.—Opposite Conclusions of Experience on this Subject.—These opposite Views will forever divide Mankind.—Explanation which this affords of the Hostility of the Revolutionary Party to Christianity.—Apparent Support which the Christian Religion gives to Republican Equality.—And Causes of Democratic Hostility to it.—General Results as to the Corruption of all Classes.—Individuals in all Ranks are equally inclined to Evil.—Whence the Difference in the Effect of Civil Government on Mankind.—Advantages of Monarchical Government.—Advantages and Evils of Aristocratic Government.—Great Powers of Democracy as a Spring.—Its Evils.—Why Democratic Evils are less generally complained of than Aristocratic.—What has led to the speedy Destruction of all Democratic Communities.—Causes of the different Tendency of Aristocratic and Democratic Institutions.—Permanence of the Interests of the Holders of Property.—Training of the Higher Class to Government as a Profession.—Interests of Holders of Property lead them to look forward to the Future.—Grievous Want of this Quality in the great Body of Mankind.—Security which this Form of Government affords against the Corruptions of Power.—Cause of the Prevalence of virtuous Moral Opinion in a rightly-organized Community, and of the rapid Corruption of Opinion in Democratic States.—Example of this Difference afforded in a public Theatre.—Cause of the general Cruelty of Democracy.—Want of all Responsibility in the real Rulers of Republican Societies.—It is an open, not a close Aristocracy, which is attended with these Advantages.—Evils of the former Species of Government.—Contention of Aristocracy and Democracy in all free States.—Great Effects, and brief Endurance, of combined Aristocratic Direction and Democratic Vigour.—Reasons of this moral Law.—To what Cause is the general Tendency to Decay in Mankind to be ascribed.—Increased Principles of Vitality in Modern Times.—But they still have the Seeds of Decay in their Bosoms.—Final Cause of the Prevalence of War among Mankind.—Its apparent unmitigated Evils.—But real Tendency to stifle the Selfish by the generous Passions.—Striking Example of this which the History of the Revolutionary War affords.—Remarkable physical Conformation of Asia in this Respect, and its Difference from Europe or America.—Effects of this Difference in the continual Regeneration of the Asiatic States.—Which was unnecessary in Europe and America from the internal Efforts of the Democratic Principle.—Continual Alternations of Action and Reaction which are in consequence exhibited in European Communities.—Examples of this from the Reformation and French Revolution.—Ultimate Danger which threatens to destroy this vital Principle.—Combination of this Provision for human Progress with Justice dealt out to individual Nations.—Agency by which this Administration of Affairs is effected.—And its Consistency with the perfect Freedom of human Actions.—Democracy is the great moving Power in Mankind, and the principal Cause of the dispersion of the Human Race.—Aristocracy is the controlling and regulating Power.—Irreparable Evil is only to be dreaded when either has destroyed the Other.—Which was what was effected in France by the Revolution.—Its vast Effect on the Spread of the Christian Religion.—By the Colonies of England and the Conquests of Russia.—General Conclusion.

"HISTORY," says Bolingbroke, "is philosophy teaching by examples;" and it would have been well for mankind in past times if they had more generally acted upon the experience and information to be derived from the annals of their forefathers. Society, it is true, is ever changing; the human race is continually advancing, and never recedes; and it is rarely indeed that a combination of circumstances occurs again precisely similar to any which had preceded it. But amid the infinite diversity of human affairs, and the increasing progress of the human race, there are certain general principles which are of universal application, and the neglect or observance of which, in all ages, has been attended with the same consequences. It is in the discovery of those principles, hidden from the ordinary gaze amid the multiplicity of human events, that the great use of history consists; it is in their general diffusion through all the thinking classes of the community that the only sure foundation either for social prosperity or national security is to be found. "Man," says Sir Walter Scott, "only differs from birds and beasts because he has the means of availing himself of the knowledge acquired by his predecessors. The swallow builds the same nest which its father and mother built: the sparrow does not improve by the experience of its parents. Our ancestors lodged in caves and wigwams, where we construct palaces for the rich, and comfortable dwellings for the poor; and why is this? Because our eye is able to look back upon the past, to improve upon our ancestors' improvements, to avoid their errors. This can

Importance of historical review to mankind.

only be done by studying history and comparing it with passing events."* The more widely that the people are admitted into a share of government—the more direct the influence which they exercise upon the decision of the Legislature has become—the more indispensable is it that these principles should be generally inculcated and understood; for without wisdom in the direction of government, no security can exist either for national or individual welfare; and without general information on historical subjects among the people, they will rarely, except under the pressure of immediate necessity, either submit to the sacrifices, or acquiesce in the course which wisdom requires.

Perpetual alternation of progress and decline in human affairs.

"Whatever," says Dr. Johnson, "makes the past or the future predominate over the present, exalts us in the scale of thinking beings." The words are familiar to every one till they have become trite; but the thought is often far removed, even from the most contemplative breasts. To rise superior to the pressure of existing events, to generalize at once from the past and the present, and to draw inferences in regard to the future, which shall be just even in the ever-changeful current of human affairs, is perhaps the highest effort of philosophical power; yet it is not sufficient to do so that the observer is imbued with the spirit of his own times, and that he is deeply impressed with the progress among mankind, and vast changes in society that he sees around him. If he limits his observation to them alone, he will be led as widely astray as if he regarded only the past, and cast aside all observation of the present. At one period, and in some countries, mankind appear to make the most rapid progress; their numbers multiply with incredible rapidity; they expand in every direction, and come to exercise a great, sometimes a durable influence on human affairs. At other times, nations become stationary, or even retrograde; their energies seem exhausted, their fire is burned out; and centuries elapse without their giving birth to one original thought, or achieving a single action worthy of being recorded in the annals of mankind. In the first period, the thoughtful observer is apt to be unduly influenced by the strength of the current in which he finds himself placed; he sees everything around him in rapid motion; institutions changing, new powers rising into action, old influences sinking or forgotten. He not unnaturally imagines that this violent current is to continue forever the same, when, in fact, the very rapidity of its motion is only accelerating the period when it is to be followed by a calm. He forgets that the rapids of Niagara are succeeded by the calm expanse of Lake Ontario. In the latter situation, the observer is often led unduly to despair of the fortunes of his species; indignant at the corruption or selfishness with which he is surrounded; unable to arouse his countrymen to activity or public virtue; desponding, from observing the community to which he belongs sinking in the scale of nations, he becomes hopeless of the improvement of mankind, and vents his discontent in cutting satires on the prevailing vices, and which appear to form the melancholy termination of national exaltation. He forgets that such a state of things is not eternal; that a remedy, and an effectual remedy, is provided against its evils in the rise of other states, the advent of fiercer passions, or the inroad of braver nations; and that as certainly as the bursting vegetation of spring succeeds the torpid vitality of winter, so surely will the energy and powers of mankind come to revive the decaying spirit of nations.

Error in supposing that any one state of things is to continue permanent.

It is a common subject of complaint with the writers of the present age, which is in a peculiar degree a period of progress, that a portion of the community, considerable in number and powerful from the possession of property, fix their eyes with undue partiality on the institutions of their ancestors; that they are blind to the lights of the age, solicitous to perpetuate the now worn-out and expiring system of society, and insensible to the continual and rapidly-increasing influence of new elements and agents upon the fabric of society. There is, without doubt, often much foundation for this complaint; and many of the most calamitous convulsions which have agitated mankind have arisen from blindness to this progress, and the attempt to perpetuate in one generation institutions which arose in, and were adapted to another. But the error is not the less manifest, though now it is the more general, of those who imagine that the progress of one period is to be continual; that human thought and human wishes are invariably to run in one channel and in one direction; and that the ultimate destiny of society in the civilized world may, with confidence, be predicted from the tendency of its movement at a particular period. The greatest political writers of the present age are not exempt from this delusion. When M. de Tocqueville asserts that the evident tendency of mankind, both in the Old and New World, is everywhere to establish Democratic ascendency; that the current of popular ambition, and the increasing strength of popular power, is such as to be altogther irresistible; and that, for good or for evil, Republican institutions are the evident destiny of mankind, he is disregarding the caution of the sage, and not permitting the past and the future to predominate over the present. He forgets what was the termination of Grecian democracy, what the end of the Roman Republic; he overlooks the vast reaction which over great part of modern Europe succeeded the first burst of the Protestant Reformation; he shuts his eyes to the transports of joy which in England marked the restoration of the Stuarts, and the unanimous efforts of Europe in our own times to throw off the dreadful oppression of the French Revolution. The Eastern sage had a far deeper insight into human affairs who desired the sultan to inscribe on his ring, as the moral alike for adverse and prosperous fortune, "And this too shall pass away."

General progress of mankind notwithstanding these vicissitudes.

So strongly has this perpetual recurrence of action and reaction impressed itself upon the most profound observers of mankind, that a few deep thinkers in every age have held that human affairs proceed not in a straight line, but in a circle; that, literally speaking, the aphorism is true, that there is nothing new under the sun; and that what is supposed to be the infusion of fresh elements into society, and the advent of a new age in the world, is, in reality, nothing more than the repetition to another state or generation of the same eternal round of valour, effort, greatness, discord, degeneracy, and decline, which from the earliest periods, like

* Lockhart's Life of Scott, v., 147.

the seven ages of individual man, has marked the progress of nations from their nativity to their grave. It must be confessed that an attentive consideration of the course of human affairs, as they are exhibited, not in one country or one age, but in an extended survey of mankind at all times, affords, with reference to individual states, much reason for believing that this disheartening view is well founded. But they are widely mistaken who anticipate from that circumstance a corresponding succession of progress and decline in the general fortunes of *mankind*. Nothing seems better established, from the most extensive survey of the history of mankind, than the fact, that an unceasing progress may be observed throughout all its changes and vicissitudes; that although individual nations seem liable to the common lot of mortality, yet the fortunes of the human race partake of the immortality of the works of nature; and that, amid all the successive rise and fall of individual states, a vast system for the extension and improvement of the species is to be discerned. And if a fanciful analogy to physical motion or mathematical figures is to be admitted to illustrate such a progress, perhaps the nearest approximation that can be made to it is, to assimilate the advance of mankind to the movement ascribed by the Ptolemaic astronomers, anterior to the days of Copernicus, to the planetary bodies; and to hold, that while each state performs in due season its own separate revolution, yet the centre round which it revolves sustained by the arm of Omnipotence, is continually advancing.

Steady growth of improvement through all these changes.

If we compare the extent of civilization, the diffusion of knowledge, and the scene of human happiness in the first ages recorded in authentic history, in the days of Herodotus, with that which now obtains, when the light, then faintly glimmering along the shores of the Mediterranean, has spread over the whole world as far as the waters of the ocean extend; and the freedom for which the Grecian republics then heroically contended, has extended over great part of Europe, and into another hemisphere; ample ground for the most cheering anticipations, in regard to the future destiny of the human race, will be found to exist. The Greek, the Carthaginian, the Roman, the Persian Empires have successively fallen, but the human race has survived all the catastrophes which for a time appeared to darken its prospects; and the sacred fire transmitted in the human breast from one age to another, has on every successive occasion gleamed forth with additional lustre, and now illuminates the whole world with its beams.

Failure of all attempts to introduce any lasting improvement in the condition of mankind by forms of government.

A nearer examination, however, of the progress of nations, and still more, perhaps, a practical acquaintance with mankind, under any circumstances or stage of advancement, will probably suggest an important modification of this evident law of social progress, and unfold the principal cause to which the continued failure of all attempts, by changes in the form of government, or social condition of the people, either to elevate their character, increase their happiness, or avert the numerous evils incident to their situation, is to be attributed. The treasures of knowledge, the powers of art, the triumphs of science, constitute a permanent addition to the inheritance of mankind; and the art of printing has apparently given them a durable existence, and forever preserved for future generations the acquisitions of the past. But a very slight acquaintance with men is sufficient to show that it is neither in these acquisitions, nor the powers that they confer, that the secret either of national strength or individual elevation is to be found. Intellectual cultivation is unhappily proved, by all history, to be but too consistent with moral neglect; the spread of knowledge with the diffusion of corruption; the triumphs of art with degradation of character. Nay, so uniformly has this melancholy progress, hitherto at least, attended the greatest intellectual efforts of mankind, that, till within the last sixty years, it had long passed into a maxim with the wisest philosophers and the most experienced observers, that moral elevation and national greatness were inconsistent with great advancement in arts and sciences; and that, in the words of Bacon, "in the infancy of a state, arms do prevail; in its maturity, arms and learning for a *short season;* in its decline, commerce and the mechanical arts."

Expectations of the world at the breaking out of the French Revolution.

At the breaking out of the French Revolution, it was almost universally imagined by philosophers that the extension of knowledge, the humanizing of manners, and the diffusion of education, had provided an effectual antidote to this tendency to decay hitherto always observable in human affairs, and, at the same time, discovered a remedy for almost all the moral, and even the physical evils of humanity. The more that the writings of Voltaire, Rousseau, Raynal, and all that school of philosophers, are examined, the more clearly will it appear that this position formed the corner-stone of their whole system, and that it was to illustrate it that all their efforts were directed. Condorcet expressly states, in his Life of Voltaire, that that was the cardinal point of his philosophy.* Nor are such doctrines confined to that age or to that country. The doctrine of human perfectibility—the principle that there is an indefinite progress in human affairs, not only in mechanical or scientific acquisition, but in moral elevation and social happiness—is so agreeable to the human heart, so flattering to human vanity, and, withal, so nearly allied to the generous affections, that it will, in all probability, to the end of the world, constitute the basis on which all the efforts of the popular party will be rested, and all the visions of social amelioration justified. It is already the prevailing, in fact almost universal, creed in America, which hardly any writer, even of the highest class, in that land of freedom ventures to gainsay; and

* "Error and ignorance are the sole causes of the misfortunes of the human race; and superstitious errors are the most fatal, because they corrupt the sources of reason, and their fatal enthusiasm leads to the commission of crimes without remorse. The more men are enlightened, the freer will they be, and the less will it cost them to become so. What, in those circumstances, is the duty of a philosopher? To attack superstition; to demonstrate to governments peace, riches, power, as the infallible reward of laws which secure religious freedom. He will enlighten them on all that they have to fear from the priests, whose secret influence will ever menace the repose of nations if entire liberty of writing is not guarantied; for, perhaps, before the discovery of printing, it was impossible to extricate mankind from a yoke as shameful as it is fatal; and as long as the sacerdotal power is not destroyed by reason, there is no medium between absolute debasement and dangerous disturbances."—*Vie de* VOLTAIRE, *par* CONDORCET; *Œuvres de* VOLTAIRE, i., 150.

it is a doctrine which will be found to lie at the root of the principles of all those numerous parties in Great Britain who aim at ameliorating the condition of mankind by merely altering their political institutions. It is of the highest importance, therefore, to inquire to what extent this principle is well founded; to examine how far it is consistent with the experience of human nature; and in what degree it is warranted by the past annals of mankind.

Demonstration of this fallacy which the French Revolution affords.

The French Revolution affords the most decisive demonstration which the history of the world has yet exhibited of the entire fallacy of this opinion. It was avowedly based by all its authors, both philosophical and political, upon the principle of the perfectibility of mankind; this doctrine was repeated in all their writings and speeches, till it had passed into a sort of universal maxim; it was the ground on which they at once rested their legislation, and justified their cruelties. "You can never," it was said, "give the people too much power; there is not the slightest danger of their abusing it. Tyranny in former ages has arisen entirely from the vices of kings, the ambition of ministers, and the arts of priests; when the great and virtuous mass of the people are admitted into the direction of affairs, these evils will at once cease, because those will become the governors whose interest it is to be well governed. Gentleness, philanthropy, wisdom, may be expected universally to prevail when the sovereignty is vested in those who are all equally to be blessed by the establishment of these virtues. Possibly much suffering may have been inflicted, some injustice may doubtless have been committed, on the part of the people, in the effort to secure for themselves these blessings; but these evils are temporary, and not worthy to be for a moment weighed against the permanent blessings of Republican institutions." We may conceive what must have been the anguish of the persons, who, after promulgating and acting upon these principles, found themselves and their country involved in unheard-of miseries from their effects; when they saw the people whom they had represented, and whom they believed to be so innocent, instantly, on the acquisition of power, steeped in atrocities infinitely greater than had ever disgraced the government of kings or the councils of priests; and found that the middle class, whom they had always held out as the secure depositaries of public virtue, were themselves taking the lead in the commission of every species of political atrocity. It is not surprising that anxiety to avoid witnessing such fruits from their efforts should have led numbers even of the most enlightened to commit suicide; that Roland should have been found dead on the wayside, with a writing in his pocket, testifying that he "cared not to live in a world stained by so many crimes;" and that Condorcet, who had carried his dreams of human perfectibility so far as to have anticipated, from the combined discoveries of science, and stilling of the angry passions of the human breast through the spread of freedom, an extension of human life through indefinite ages, should have been led to shorten his own existence by poison administered by his own hand.

Entire disappointment of these expectations in the foreign wars of the Revolution.

The external conquests of the French during the Revolutionary wars, and the brilliant but devastating and disastrous career of Napoleon, were nothing but the application of these principles to the external concerns of the world. This observation has already been made more than once in the course of this work; but it is one of such vast importance that it never can be sufficiently enforced, and illustrations of it will be found to arise in almost every page of this history. Of all the dangers to be anticipated from the establishment of popular power, probably that which was least anticipated was, that it would lead to a general passion for war and foreign conquest; for these evils, so severely felt in every age, had for long, by the common consent of philosophers, been set down to the ambition of kings, the cruelty of priests, or the rivalry of ministers. Yet was this effect immediately found to follow from it, and that, too, with such fury and violence, that for twenty years it deluged Europe with blood, and all but prostrated the whole military powers of the Continent before the Republican bayonets. To any one, however, who considers the principles of human nature, the immediate effects of a revolution, and the passions which it awakens among the people, it must at once appear that such a result was not only probable, but unavoidable. The dreams of philosophers, and the visions of philanthropists, anticipated from the establishment of government upon a highly Democratic basis, the immediate and entire cessation of wars and tumults, and the advent of a general period of philanthropy, benevolence, and mutual charity among mankind. But what was the effect which actually occurred? Precisely that which any man practically acquainted with human nature would have anticipated, which the experience of every age had demonstrated, and which a few of the profoundest thinkers had foretold, viz., that the working classes were immediately thrown out of employment by the total cessation of trade, and the universal terrors of the capitalists; that the expectations of the middle ranks became unbounded; that the wicked passions of the human heart immediately burst into overwhelming activity; and that a universal stoppage of employment and starvation among the poor were found to coincide with the anticipated social resurrection of the state. At the same time, the government, from the failure of the revenue, became utterly insolvent; all the methods that were tried of restoring the finances, by confiscation of the property of the Church, seizure of the estates of the emigrants, and issue of assignats, proved entirely illusory, and in their ultimate effects became the greatest possible aggravation instead of an alleviation of the public distress, by the overwhelming ruin which they brought upon private families, and the total destruction of capital and credit which they occasioned. Thus the Republican French were driven into the career of foreign conquest alike by financial necessity, Democratic ambition, and popular misery; and in its excitement and glories they found a transient compensation for their sufferings, until the oppression and wretchedness which it had brought on other nations roused a unanimous feeling of resistance throughout Europe, and brought on their dreadful overthrow.

Their failure during the Restoration.

After the fall of Napoleon, it was confidently hoped by the friends of popular institutions, that, notwithstanding all her crimes and all her sufferings, France at length was about to receive a reward

for the strenuous efforts she had made in the cause of freedom, and that, under the sway of a constitutional monarch, the glorious fabric of civil liberty would be permanently established in that great country. If the material prosperity of the government of the Restoration is alone considered, there appeared good reason for supposing that this expectation was about to be realized. During the fifteen years of its weak but gentle government, peace was preserved; the carnage of Napoleon was in great part repaired by the vivifying powers of population; industry and wealth increased to an incredible degree; the freedom of the press, and the guarantees of constitutional liberty, were established to an extent altogether unknown in Continental Europe; and the general well-being of the people indicated the existence of a salutary administration of public affairs. But all this was as nothing to the Revolutionists, "as long as Mordecai the Jew sat at the king's gate." The government of the Restoration was obnoxious, for it reminded them, how innocently soever on the part of the royal family, of the days of their humiliation; the passions of the Revolution, long pent up, came at last to require a vent; the restraints of morality, law, and order were felt as insupportable by a people accustomed to the license of anarchy and the splendours of military conquests; and the imbecile hands of a race of pacific monarchs proved unequal to the task of restraining the fiery coursers of a Revolution. Thus the dynasty of the Restoration fell, and with it all the hopes of governing France by the powers of a constitutional monarchy, and the moral influences of religion, morality, and public spirit. In the vigorous hands of Louis Philippe, a very different and far more suitable mode of government to the spirit of the nation has been established. The forms of a constitutional monarchy were retained, but its spirit was annihilated; the army was immensely augmented; the public expenditure increased a half; the ordonnances which had occasioned the fall of Charles X. were re-enacted with additional severity; formidable fortifications erected round Paris; an army of sixty thousand men permanently quartered in its neighbourhood, and the reality of military government established.

Still, the advocates of Democratic equality, and the believers in human perfectibility, were not discouraged. They looked for a realization of their dreams in the efforts of the Carbonari of Naples, of the patriots of Piedmont, and of the ultra-liberals of Spain. Disheartening indeed was the results of all these expectations. In the two former countries, the efforts of the Republicans were overthrown with hardly any resistance; in the latter, the attempts of the Revolutionists, after occasioning a dreadful civil war, which for eight years bathed the Peninsula in blood, have terminated in the prostration of the crown, the ruin of the country, the destruction of freedom, and the establishment of a military despotism, rivalling in severity, as the previous efforts of its supporters had equalled in atrocity, that which formed the termination and punishment of the French Revolution.

And in the revolutions of the South of Europe.

Even then, the sanguine hopes of the believers in the innocence of mankind and the doctrine of human perfectibility were not altogether cast down. "These calamitous results, it was said, were the consequences only of the corruptive oppressions and vices of the Old World: the reaction against ages of former misrule has been so violent as to have defeated its object, and thence the general failure of all attempts to establish liberty and equality in the Old World. But in the New, a very different result may be anticipated; there the human race have begun their career unmanacled by the fetters of former despotism; no pre-existing evils exist to avenge; the career of freedom will be unstained by blood, and amid the untrodden riches, and unbounded capabilities of its forests, the glorious fabric of liberty will be founded on the basis of universal education and equality." How have these expectations been realized? Why, in no other way than that, amid all the unbounded room for expansion which the human race there enjoys, the innate propensities of the human heart have been not less conspicuous than on the old theatre of European contention; that even the boundless riches of the Far West have not been able to furnish an adequate vent for the selfish and angry passions of the human breast; that all the attempts to ameliorate the condition of their millions of slaves have been strenuously resisted in one part of the country, while in another the most violent attacks have been made upon the national establishments, on which the credit and even the existence of the mercantile classes were dependant; that bankruptcy and ruin, to an unheard of extent, have prostrated commercial wealth, and popular injustice has already begun to proclaim the necessity of abolishing the national debt; that independence of thought, and dignity of character, have been crushed by the overwhelming power of numbers; and that deeds of violence have been perpetrated in many parts of the United States by the tyrant majority, with entire impunity, of so frightful a character, that they exceed in cruelty all the savage atrocity of the French Revolution, and have made the Americans fain to seek a parallel for them in the hideous persecutions and iniquities which have forever disgraced the Roman Catholic religion.

And in the results of American equality.

Great hopes were at one time entertained in the British islands that the vast organic change which convulsed the country in 1832 would terminate in such an improved frame of government as would in this asylum of constitutional freedom at last realize the hopes of so many of the ardent friends of humanity. Hitherto, however, the result has certainly not been such as to justify the opinion that this country is destined to form any exception to the inferences deducible from so many previous examples of anticipated success and realized failure. It will be the province of some future historian to point out with pride the superior moderation and order which have distinguished the English Revolution from the more sanguinary convulsions by which it has been surrounded, and the greater ease with which its inhabitants have fallen back, after the contest was over, into habits of peace, and the established channels of constitutional warfare. Yet must he at the same time record, that symptoms of no unequivocal kind have appeared, of as dangerous a spirit in the lower classes of the English people, as in the most violently-excited portions of the French population; that the flames of Bristol, of Nottingham, and of Birmingham, have demonstrated that the torch can be wielded with as infuriated hands in Great Britain as either in France or America; that the dreams of the Socialists, and the projects of

Failure of their hopes in the British islands.

the Chartists, tend to a demoralization of society as thorough, and spoliation of property as complete, as were contemplated by the followers of Babœuff or the partisans of Chaumette; that the complaint of the working classes now is, that none of their grievances have been removed by the diffusion of more popular power into the Legislature, while the relief of the destitute has, by Democratic selfishness, been grievously abridged; that the comparatively bloodless termination of the strife in Great Britain, on the whole, is to be ascribed rather to the patriotic conduct and bold front of the holders of property than to the greater gentleness or sense of justice in its enemies; and that, in external affairs, the spirit of Democratic government, at once parsimonious at home and aggressive abroad, has not only induced the most formidable financial embarrassments in the state, but involved the nation in disasters greater than it had ever before experienced, and which have shaken to its foundation the solid fabric of the British Empire.

This all flows from the general corruption of mankind.

Consequences so uniform, and yet so unexpected by the advocates of human perfectibility, evidently point to the operation of some great law of nature, against which all these efforts for social amelioration have been so signally shattered, and which in every age has led to the speedy discomfiture of every project formed for the improvement of human institutions, based on Democratic principles. It is not difficult to see what it is that has occasioned all these results, and so often blasted the hopes of so many of the warmest friends of humanity. It is no new or unknown principle that has had this effect; it is announced in the earliest records of humanity, and stands proclaimed in every subsequent page of history; but it is a doctrine which the self-love of mankind will, to the end of the world, always render the last to be generally received. It is the principle of HUMAN CORRUPTION.

What is meant by this principle?

In referring to this principle, it is not meant to assert, as has been sometimes erroneously imagined by divines, that any inherent taint has descended to the human race from the fall of our first parents, like an hereditary physical disease, *independent of their own actings* as free agents. For such a position no authority can be found in any passage of Scripture when properly considered; nor is any countenance given to it, either by our innate sense of justice, or observation of the Divine administration. What is meant is a different position, equally consonant to the Divine justice and to the experience of mankind, viz., that every individual is *born innocent, but with dispositions to evil*, and dispositions so strong, that in no instance whatever is their effect altogether avoided; and that, without the most sedulous care and incessant efforts, aided by all the influence of religion, every person will inevitably be led, under the guidance of his passions, into criminal actions. Whether such a doctrine is consistent with human nature, may be left to the innate consciousness of every human breast. Let him that feels himself innocent throw the first stone. Whether it is consistent with the experience of mankind in private life, may be determined by every one from the conduct of the persons with whom he is acquainted, and the more extensive and practical that acquaintance is, the more strong will be his convictions on the subject; and in social affairs and the contests of nations its truth is loudly proclaimed in every page of history, from the origin of the human race to the present hour. Nevertheless, it is probably the last doctrine that ever will be embraced by the great body of mankind; and the insensibility to it, or determination to resist it, is the real cause of the whole innumerable disasters which, in every age, have made Democratic ascendency terminate in misery, bloodshed, and ruin. Superficial observers will ask, What has social amelioration, or political discussion to do with theological disputes, or questions of original sin? they might as well ask what has population to do with the passion of sex, or warlike triumphs with military courage.

Necessary consequences of the principles of perfectibility.

Concede to the popular party and the advocates of human perfectibility the principles with which they uniformly set out, and which they hold out as axioms which lie at the foundation of all political philosophy, and it is utterly impossible to resist the conclusions for Republican institutions and self-government, for which they contend. Admit, with them, that the human mind is naturally inclined to gentleness, benevolence, and philanthropy; that the savage or the hunter is a model of every virtue; that angry passions are instilled into the breast of man in subsequent times by the tyranny of kings, the delusions of priests, and the oppression of wealth; concede the dogma that the light of knowledge and the progress of education are fitted to extirpate all the cruel and savage propensities of mankind, and prepare the world for the general reign of innocence and peace; admit that the many, if permitted to govern, will avoid the passions, iniquities, and cupidity of the few, and the argument for self-government becomes irresistible. *Ut cives feliciter vivant*, is unquestionably the object both of legislation and political philosophy; and if it be once discovered that the principles of the majority of mankind will always be inclined to the side of moderation, virtue, and wisdom, it is impossible too soon to commence, by universal Democratic institutions, the advent of the second age of gold.

Opposite effects of the Christian doctrine of general corruption.

Concede, on the other hand, to the Christan philosopher, or the experienced observer of mankind, the conclusions at which they both arrive; admit, with them, that the human heart contains the spring at once of good and of bad actions; that the former, though often predominant in the end, by the influence of religion, effort, and cultivation, are uniformly weaker in the outset than the latter; admit, what few experienced in the ways of man will be inclined to deny, that the "heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked;" admit, with them, that the temptations to sin are powerful, immediate, and such as instantly strike and captivate the senses, while the inducements to virtue are remote, slow of growth, and difficult of execution; that *immediate* gratification and pleasure are the rewards held out by the former, and labour, effort, and self-denial the sacrifices required in the commencement by the latter; admit, farther, that these opposite sets of motives to action are placed before beings universally desirous of immediate enjoyment, and in comparatively few instances accessible to the influence of remote or distant considerations; admit these things, and it will at once appear that the idea of self-government is an entire delusion; that the great

body of mankind, if left to themselves, will plunge headlong into the career which promises immediate gratification to their interests or their passions, without any regard to ultimate consequences, whether in this world or the next; and that violence, injustice, and ultimate bloodshed, must inevitably result from opening the floodgates which admit the unrestrained passions of the human heart to bear upon the direction of public affairs.

View of the popular party on the intellectual character of man.

Discrepancies, not less irreconcilable, separate the two parties which now divide mankind, in regard to the intellectual powers of the majority of men in all ages. The advocates of human perfectibility admit that in times past the majority of men in most countries have been unfit to be intrusted with the work of legislation, and that they have been, in a great measure, of necessity subjected to the government of a few. But this, they allege, was owing entirely to the want of education and intellectual cultivation; that a totally different result may be anticipated from the diffusion of knowledge, the spread of education, and the habit of political discussion; and that, great as have been the dangers of suddenly admitting benighted man into the exercise of political rights, they would all vanish, like the shades of night, before the rising sun of knowledge.

Opposite conclusions of experience on this subject.

The more experienced observers of human affairs reason after a different manner. They maintain that the great distinction between the mass of mankind and the small body of thinking men to be found among them consists in the different degrees by which they are influenced by distant consequences; that in all assemblies of men, of whatever rank, if at all numerous, there is nothing so difficult as to induce the majority to take into view *remote* consequences; that present relief, present gratification, or present advantage, constitute the motives which universally sway the great majority; and that these dispositions are even more conspicuous among the middle and working classes of society than in those possessed of property, and having had the advantage of a moral and refined education. If this proposition be conceded, it at once strikes at the root of the possibility of successfully intrusting the management of public affairs to a mere majority of men, independent of the qualification of property or education, since the very first requisite of government is to foresee and guard against dangers which are not visible to, or are disregarded by, the majority of men; and the very derivation of the epithet applied to the Supreme Being—*Providence*—implies that the quality of foresight is the one which forms the leading characteristic of government in the Supreme Ruler of the universe.

These opposite views will forever divide mankind.

These two subjects of the general corrupt tendencies of the human heart, and of the universal want of foresight among the majority of men, constitute the fundamental points of difference between the two parties which now divide the world; and neither will ever be able to maintain a successful combat against the other, either by reason or force of arms, but by constantly basing their arguments upon one or the other of these grounds. Sanguine visions of the future, exalted conceptions of the capacity and virtue of human nature, warm anticipations of the ultimate destinies of the species, ever have and ever will constitute the strength of the popular party, and will in every age not fail to enlist on their side, not only the selfish and the vicious, who aim at the destruction of every restraint, human and Divine, but also a considerable, and, sometimes, an overwhelming portion of the philanthropic, the enthusiastic, and the benevolent in all classes. A constant recurrence, on the other hand, to human iniquity, a loud denunciation of the extent to which it pervades all ranks and all classes, a sedulous inculcating of the principle that virtue can be attained only by exertion and religious influence, and that the direction of affairs can be intrusted only to those whose habits of foresight, moral and mental qualifications, entitle them to assume the lead, must be the basis on which the principles of the opposite party must be rested. As oblivion of the past, and anticipation only of the future, constitute the strength of the one party, so actual experience and historical authority furnish the strength of the other. Hence the one alleges that history is an old almanac; the other, that it is the great basis on which all political knowledge must be reared. But the latter principles will never be placed on a proper foundation, nor will those who hold them ever assume a position from which they cannot by possibility be forced, until they fairly take their stand on this ground, and boldly front all the obloquy to which it will expose them; but if they do so, their principles, however disagreeable to human vanity, can never be overthrown; for experience will ever demonstrate their universal application, and the very men who are most loud in declaiming against their falsehood will, in general, by their conduct, afford the most signal proof of their truth.

This explains how Christianity is obnoxious to Democracy.

These considerations explain a fact which would otherwise be wholly inexplicable, but the illustrations of which may, nevertheless, be observed in every page of history, viz., that the popular and Democratic party, so far from resting on the principles of the Christian religion, in general evince the most deadly hostility to its tenets, and that its principles form the corner-stone of the opposite body, who endeavour to maintain the ascendency of property and education. During the first fervour of the Reformation, indeed, the stubborn supporters of religious freedom formed a temporary alliance with political enthusiasts, and the Puritans of Cromwell stood side by side with the Republicans and fifth monarchy-men; but that was a temporary union, arising from mutual necessity, which did not long survive the circumstances which gave it birth. Religious freedom, in truth, was the object for which the Protestants fought in the sixteenth century; civil liberty was regarded only so far as it might prove conducive to spiritual independence. It was in the eighteenth century that the real Democratic spirit was first fully developed, and then it was at once rested on the dogma of human perfectibility: its advocates loudly proclaimed the native innocence of man, and inculcated a total separation from all restraints of religion; and, before the close of the contest, the contending parties had universally hoisted their true colours, and liberty, philosophy, indulgence, were inscribed on the banners on the one side; and religion, self-denial, duty, on those of the other.

If we consider, however, the principles of the Christian religion, such a result must appear, at first sight, not a little surprising. More than

Apparent consistency of Christian with popular principles.

any religion that ever existed, the religion of the Gospel provides for the poor, and enjoins duties on the great among mankind. Alone of all other faiths, it from the outset proclaims the universal equality of mankind in the sight of Heaven; it preaches, in an especial manner, the Gospel to the poor; it denounces greater risks of ultimate punishment to the rich than to the indigent, and incessantly inculcates the duty of charity to the unfortunate as the first of Christian graces, and which will alone cover a multitude of sins. How, then, has it happened that a faith of this description, inculcating doctrines so eminently favourable to the poorer ranks, and so subversive of all distinction in the different classes of men, at least in moral responsibility, has not been universally seized upon as the very corner-stone of the popular party throughout the globe?

Causes of the hostility of Democracy to it.

Simply because it at the same time inculcates the doctrine of human corruption; because, if it announces the universal equality of men in the sight of Heaven, it as loudly proclaims their universal tendency to guilty indulgence; because it gives no countenance to the idea that alterations in the form of government, how important soever in themselves, will be of the least effect in remedying human evils, unless accompanied or preceded by a corresponding change in the active dispositions of men; and that the only reform which is likely to be of the least efficacy is the reform of the human heart. Sedulously avoiding the mention of external things, hardly ever alluding to the forms either of civil or ecclesiastical government, except to inculcate obedience to existing authority, it as uniformly proclaims the equal responsibility of the governors and the governed, and imposes upon both, under equal sanctions, the duty of integrity in conduct and charity in feeling. It loudly proclaims the iniquity of the world and the miseries of mankind; it tells us that a remedy exists for these multifarious evils; but it tells us, at the same time, that that remedy does not consist in substituting the government of the many for the government of the few, but in the adoption by all, whether in or out of authority, of the golden rule, to do to others as they would that they should do unto them. Thence it is that the religion of the Gospel is so generally obnoxious to the Democratic party all the world over; for it at once strikes at the root of their dreams of human perfectibility, and announces, as the only remedy for existing evils, the extirpation of existing and wide-spread wickedness. It prescribes a contest to the many as well as to the few; but it is not a contest with temporal power, but with spiritual temptation; its theatre is not the arena of politics, but the recesses of the breast. And yet few experienced observers, either of the streams of human events, or mankind as they exist around them, will probably doubt that it is there only that a really efficacious reform can be adopted; and that, if the one thing needful is generally done, then it is of comparatively little importance what is effected elsewhere.

General result as to the corruption of all classes.

Instead, therefore, of arriving at the conclusion that alterations in the form of government should be the great object of patriotic effort, and that important social benefits may be effected by such changes, unattended with moral improvement, the precepts of religion, equally with the results of experience, point to the conclusion that the only secure foundation that can be laid for general amelioration is in private rectitude; that the heart is, literally speaking, the fountain from which the issues both of individual and social improvement must flow; and that, unless moral and religious cultivation have preceded the acquisition of political power, it will speedily be converted into an engine merely for indulging all the worst passions of the human breast. And this explains how it happens that in some simple and remote countries, such as the Swiss cantons, even a pure Democracy has been found to exist for centuries without inducing any public calamities; while in others, more advanced in civilization, no sooner have political privileges been given to the people, than they instantly applied them to the worst purposes, fell under the dominion of the most selfish characters in the community, and, like victorious soldiers after the storm of a town, broke out into the most unbridled excesses of rapine, lust, and social conflagration. It is the want of moral restraint which lets in all this flood of evils; and, generally speaking, the danger of their overwhelming society upon the acquisition of power by the people is just in proportion to the absence of religious influence, the age, and corrupted state of the community.

The individuals in all ranks are equally inclined to evil.

It cannot be said that any class of society is exempt from this inherent weakness; or that in any hands, whether few or many, the possession of power is not likely to lead to its abuses. All have equal need of the internal restraint of moral principle; and all, to improve that principle, require external coercion. Whoever asserts that the absolute government of kings is the best form of civil society, and that they may be safely intrusted with the uncontrolled direction of human affairs, is a mere flatterer of courts, and his opinion is belied by every page of history. Whoever asserts that an oligarchy or an aristocracy stand in need of no restraint, because their interests are identified with those of the people on their estates, and because the greatest efforts of nations have been achieved by their means, is not less insensible to the evidence of facts, or less apt, if his opinions are implicitly followed, to mislead the world. Whoever asserts that the great body of mankind are capable of the arduous duty of self-government, that Democratic institutions are the only true foundation for good administration, and that abuse of power need never be apprehended in their hands, because they are at once beyond its seductions and exposed to its evils, is not less a sycophant of power than the eulogist of courts or the minion of aristocracy; and his flatteries are only the more dangerous that they are addressed to a larger, a more impassioned, and a less enlightened circle than is to be found either in the halls of princes or the precincts of nobles.

Whence the difference in the effect of civil government on mankind.

How, then, has it happened, if all mankind are thus equally corrupt, and disposed to farm out political power for no other purpose but self-aggrandizement, that so marked a distinction is to be observed in the different effects of different forms of government upon human society; and whence the astonishing variety in the progress and elevation of mankind at different periods of the world, and under the influenee of different forms of government? The question is a natural one, and, if

the foregoing principles are well founded, it must meet with a solution in consistency with them. And a very slight consideration must be sufficient to explain, not only how this great diversity has happened, but to point in the most decisive manner to the form of government which promises the greatest social happiness and public elevation.

Monarchical government: its advantages.

Since the creation of man, a vast majority, probably at least nine tenths, of the human race have existed under the government of single monarchs or chiefs, exercising nearly absolute power within their separate principalities. Not to mention other examples that must be familiar to every reader, the whole of Asia, embracing six hundred millions of inhabitants, or nearly two thirds of the whole human race, has, from the earliest period to the present hour, been uniformly governed by the absolute power of a single individual. Certain restraints upon the uncontrolled exercise of human power have no doubt existed in Asia, as well as in other parts of the world; but they consist not in any limitation of power in the sultan, or chief, but in his occasional dethronement: the remedy against the evils of oppression is not the limitation of authority, but the murder of the despot. Great as have been the evils which, in every age, have flowed from the selfishness, the rapacity, and iniquities of these arbitrary governors of their species, it is yet evident that there must be some general and substantial benefits which have resulted from their rule, or it would long ago have been terminated by the common consent of mankind. Lightly as European independence may think of Asiatic despotism, philosophy will not despise a system of government under which two thirds of the human race have subsisted from the beginning of time; and which is so firmly rooted in universal consent, that no amount of tyranny on the part of individual sovereigns, and no changes resulting from religion or conquest, have ever made them for one moment think of altering it. Whatever is found to have existed to a great extent among mankind for a very long period, must necessarily have been attended with great practical advantages which have overbalanced its evils; and the sagacious observer of such institutions, if he cannot discover their utility, will rather suspect that his powers of observation have been defective, than that mankind, for so long a period, and over so great a surface, have obstinately persisted in what was destructive to themselves. But it is evident what has occasioned this uniformity of government in the East; the advantages of despotism are as clearly marked as its evils. They consist in the rude, but effective coercion of human passion by the vigorous hand of single administration; the substitution, it may be, of the oppression of one for what certainly would be the licentiousness of all.

Aristocratic government: its evils and advantages.

Aristocratic societies are those which, in every age, have made the most durable impression on human affairs; and, where patrician rule has been combined with a certain development of democratic energy in society, they have led to the greatest and the most splendid of human achievements. The Empires of Carthage and Rome in ancient, and of Great Britain in modern times, are sufficient to demonstrate that under no other form of government is it possible to combine such great and heroic achievements with such steady and durable progress. Its evils, as those of all earthly things, are many, and they consist chiefly in the uniform tendency of all holders of aristocratic power to consider it as a patrimony for themselves and their dependants, instead of a trust to be exercised for the public good, and the consequent restriction of office and power to a limited circle of society. But, amid many and evident evils, these examples decisively demonstrate that such a form of government is at least a move in the right direction. No community need be afraid of going far astray which treads in the footsteps of Rome and England. The secret of the prodigious ascendency that this form of government has given to the nations that have embraced it consists in the combination of fixity of purpose, arising from the durability of interest on the part of the holders of property, who constitute the ruling power, with courage and energy in the lower classes, springing from the facilities given them of rising in society. It is the power of steam restrained from its frightful devastation, and subjected to the guidance of firm and experienced hands.

Great powers of Democracy as a spring.

Democratic government has produced, at different times, effects so opposite and contradictory, that it is not surprising that the opinions of men should be divided as far as the poles are asunder in regard to its merits. Examined in one view, it exhibits the examples of the brightest eras on which the eye of the historian can rest. The arts of Greece, the arms of Rome, the navy of England, the peopling of America, have arisen from its exertions. All the greatest achievements of the human mind have been effected under the influence of its fervour; whatever may have been the suffering and agony with which the convulsions it produced have been accompanied, they have led to the most splendid exertions of human genius, and the widest spread of the human race; and no one can contemplate the shores of the Mediterranean, studded with the successive colonies of Greece, Carthage, and Rome, or the shores of the ocean, now beginning to glitter with those of England, without seeing that to this social agent of transcendent power it is given to effect the greatest and the most momentous changes in the destiny of man. The Roman Empire itself was built up of the colonial settlements formed by its Democratic citizens, or those of the Grecian Republics on the adjoining coasts of Europe and Asia. Its conquests were but the bursting of the bands of armed and disciplined Democracy into the savage tribes or enfeebled monarchies by which it was surrounded. If the French Revolution was to that great country a source of lasting evil, it gave it also a brief period of surpassing glory; and if we would seek the latent spring which, at an interval of two hundred years, has implanted the British race in the Western and Southern hemisphere, we shall find it in the efforts of the sturdy Puritans in the days of Charles the First, and the visions of social regeneration in those of William the Fourth.

Its evils.

If we examine Democracy in another view, it appears the most biting scourge that the justice of Heaven ever let loose upon guilty man. At no other periods than when it was in the ascendant, and by no other agents than its conquests or oppression, has such intense suffering been inflicted on the human race. To the surrounding nations Rome appeared a

vast fountain of evil, always streaming over, yet always full, from which devastating floods incessantly issued to overwhelm and destroy mankind. We may judge how far and wide it laid waste the neighbouring states, from the nervous expression which Tacitus put into the mouth of the Caledonian chief, "*Ubi solitudinem fecerunt, pacem appellant;*" and if any doubt could exist as to the piercing nature of the evils which Republican ambition brings upon mankind, they would be established by the fact, that in twenty years it occasioned a slaughter of not less than ten millions of human beings on the two sides during the French Revolutionary war; and that such was the acute suffering which was produced throughout Europe by its triumph, that it overcame all the jealousy of nations, and all the rivalry of cabinets, and induced a universal combination of mankind to effect its overthrow.

Why are Democratic evils less generally complained of than aristocratic?

The reasonings of the learned, the declamations of the ardent, the visions of the philanthropic, have generally been rather directed against the oppressions of sovereigns or nobles than the madness of the people. This affords the most decisive demonstration that the evils flowing from the latter are much greater, and more acute, than those which have originated with the former; for it proves that the former have been so tolerable as to have long existed, and, therefore, have been long complained of; whereas those springing from the latter have been intolerable, and speedily led to their own abolition. The evils of Democracy, when intrusted with the direction of public affairs, have in every age been found to be so excessive, that they have immediately produced its overthrow; and thus the experience of individuals does not in every age present the same numerous examples of Democratic that it does of aristocratic oppression; just because the former species of government is so dreadful that it *invariably, in every old community, destroys itself* in a single generation, while the latter often maintains its dominion for hundreds, or even thousands of years. History, indeed, is full of warnings of the terrible conflagration which Democracy never fails to light up in society; and it is a secret consciousness of the damning force with which it overturns their doctrines, that makes the popular party everywhere treat its records with such contempt. But how many of the great body of the people, even in the best-informed community, make themselves masters of historical information? Not one in a hundred. Thus, in periods of political convulsion, history points in vain to the awful beacons of former ruin to warn mankind of the near approach of shipwreck; while perfidious Democracy, ever alive to the force of falsehood, or misled by the deceitfulness of sin, again, for the hundredth time, allures the unsuspecting multitude by the exhibition of the forbidden fruit; and popular change is eagerly longed for by the simple masses, just because its evils are so excessive that they invariably quickly terminate the Republican régime; and actual personal experience can rarely be appealed to as to the effect of a contagion which almost always consigns its victim to the grave. And thus it is that the strength of revolution consists in the very magnitude of the falsehoods on which its promises are founded, and the universally-felt impossibility of bringing them, for any considerable time, to the test of actual experience.

What has led to the speedy destruction of all Democratic communities?

A system of government founded on principles utterly subversive of order, security, and property, cannot by any possibility maintain itself for any length of time. It must either destroy the community or be destroyed itself. Democracy, accordingly, in an old community cannot by possibility exist for any lengthened period. It must either overthrow national freedom, and pave the way for the government of the sword, or be itself subverted by the aroused indignation of all the better classes of mankind. The near advent of the one or other of these two results is inevitable in every old community in which popular passion has once obtained a legislative triumph. Which of the two results is to obtain, depends entirely on the degree of moral rectitude and public spirit which pervades the community where it has arisen. In ancient Greece, the Democratic Republicans, after a brief space of glorious existence, sank under the inherent evils of the form of government which prevailed; the liberties of Rome, rudely torn by the ambition of the Gracchi, soon perished under the contending swords of Cæsar and Pompey; the dreams of French equality were speedily extinguished by the guillotine of Robespierre and the sword of Napoleon—for in all these communities the majority were essentially selfish and corrupt. But in Great Britain, the heart of the nations, amid all its convulsions, has still been sound; and though it has been often dazzled for a time by the false glare of the revolutionary meteor, it has ever in the end fixed its steady gaze again upon the principles of order and the precepts of religion.

Causes of the different tendency of Democracy and aristocracy.

The reason why, in every age of the world, the triumph of Democracy has immediately, or at least shortly, been followed by the destruction of all the best interests of society, and the total ruin, in particular, of the whole principles of freedom for which itself contended, is clearly illustrated by experience; and the moment it is stated, it must be seen to be one of universal application. It is not that the working classes of the community are in themselves more depraved or more corrupted than the classes who possess property, and have acquired information. It is probable that all men, in every rank of life, when exposed to the influence of the same temptations, are pretty nearly the same. But there is this difference between them, and it is an essential one in its ultimate effects upon the interests of mankind, that though the dispositions of the Aristocratic or Conservative party may be just as selfish at bottom as those of the Democratic, there are several causes which permanently retain them in a comparatively fixed, safe, and beneficial course of government, and which, as they depend on general principles, may be expected to be of universal application. And these causes are the following:

The interests of the holders of property are permanent.

1. In the first place, the interest of the holders of property is permanently to protect that property from injury or spoliation; whereas the interest of the Democratic body, who are for the most part destitute of funds, is to advocate such measures as, by trenching upon or ultimately inducing a division of property, may, as they hope, have the effect of securing for them the advantages which at present they do not enjoy. Accordingly, it has uniformly been found,

in all ages, that the holders of property advocate measures to protect that property; while the destitute masses are perpetually impelled to those likely to induce revolutionary spoliation. "*Egestas cupida novarum rerum*," is the most prolific source in troubled times of public ruin. This, however, is a matter of the very highest importance; for experience has now abundantly proved, what reason, from the beginning of the world, had asserted, not only that the security of property in every class of society, from the lowest to the highest, is the mainspring of all prosperity and happiness, both public and private, but that freedom itself is never so much endangered as by measures having a tendency to induce the division of property; and by the success of those measures, is immediately and irrevocably destroyed. To be satisfied of this, we have only to look to the condition of France, where measures of the most revolutionary and Democratic character, directed against the aristocracy of land, of wealth, and of industry, were pursued with the most insatiate thirst, and crowned with the most entire success; and, in consequence, there are now no less than *ten millions eight hundred and sixty-two thousand separate landed properties in that kingdom*, divided among at least six millions of different owners, while the territorial and commercial aristocracy is almost totally destroyed. And what has been the result? Simply this, that the establishment or preservation of freedom has been rendered utterly impracticable in the country, because no power remains in the state capable of counterbalancing the influence and authority of the central government, resting on the armed force and universal patronage of the nation.

The higher classes become trained to government as a profession.

2. In the next place, although no man who is acquainted with human nature would claim, either for the higher ranks or more educated classes in the community, any natural superiority in talent over their humble but not less useful brethren, yet, on the other hand, nothing can be more consonant to reason, than to assert that those classes in society who from their affluence possess leisure, and from their station have received the education requisite for acquiring extensive information, are more likely in the long run to acquire and exhibit the powers necessary for beneficial legislation, than those who, from the necessities of their situation, are chained to daily toil, and from the limited extent of their funds have been disabled from acquiring a thorough education. In claiming for the higher, and, above all, the more highly-educated ranks, a superiority in the art of government to the other classes of the community, it is only meant to assert a principle of universal application, and which has not only been recognised and acted upon from the beginning of the world, but is perfectly familiar to every person practically acquainted with the affairs of life in every department. All the professions and all the trades into which men are divided require a long education, and no inconsiderable amount of actual practice; and with the exception of those rare individuals to whom nature has given the power of mastering various branches of science or art at once, success is, in general, only to be acquired by constant and undivided attention to one. No person of a different profession would think of competing with a physician in the treatment of a person afflicted with a dangerous disease, or with a lawyer in the management of an intricate or difficult lawsuit; and probably the most vehement supporter of popular rights would hesitate before he gave an order to a committee of electors to make a coat for him, or intrusted the building of his house to delegates from many different trades, instead of a master tailor or builder who had acquired proficiency in one them. In asserting and maintaining the proposition, therefore, that the classes who enjoy property and have received an extensive education, mainly directed to that end as the profession to which they are called, are better fitted to discharge with advantage to the public the intricate and difficult science of government, than the classes which, though endowed with equal natural talents, have not had them directed to the same objects or matured in the same manner, we only assert a fact of universal notoriety among mankind, and apply to the most difficult branch of knowledge the principles by which alone success ever has or can be attained in the easiest. And it would be surprising indeed if the science of government—a branch of knowledge which requires, more than any other, a course of unremitting study during a whole lifetime, and which can never be mastered but by those whose minds have acquired extensive information on a vast variety of subjects—could be as successfully pursued by those classes whose time is almost wholly absorbed in other pursuits, as by those who had made it the undivided object and study of their life.

Interest of holders of property leads them to look forward to the future.

3. In the third place, the interest of the holders of property naturally and unavoidably leads them not only to resist measures of aggression on it, but to adopt those steps which, although attended with a present burden, promise to produce ultimate advantage. Experience every day proves that insensibility to the future is, with very rare exceptions, the accompaniment of excessive poverty, and that the power of foresight, and of submitting to present burdens from a sense of ultimate advantage, exists very nearly in proportion to the extent to which that advantage is to be enjoyed by the individual or his descendants. Hence the excessive anxiety for the acquisition or increase of wealth which is so general among those who have attained a certain degree of affluence, and the total disregard of the most pressing evils of present poverty and future destitution, which may invariably be observed among those to whom indigence has long been familiar. The common proverb, wherever extraordinary care is conspicuous in a domain, that "the eye of a master may be seen there," shows how uniformly the experience of mankind has proved that, generally speaking, it is in vain to look for attention to the future but among those whose interest property has wound up with its changes. But what is true of individuals is true also of nations; for what is a nation but an aggregate of the individuals who compose it? When the Grecian sage said to the enthusiastic declaimer in favour of popular goverment, "You admire Democracy; go home and try it in your own family," he expressed a truth not less applicable to the domestic than the social concerns of men.

Whoever has closely observed the dispositions of large bodies of men, whether in social or political life, must have become sensible that the most uniform and lasting feature by which they are distinguished, is that of insensibility to the future.

Grievous want of this quality in the great body of mankind.

They often make the greatest sacrifices at the moment when their passions are strongly roused, or their feelings thoroughly awakened; and perhaps the most heroic deeds recorded in the annals of mankind have been performed under the influence of such excitement. But it is always present emotion, passion, or interest, which is with them the moving power; future consequences, remote interests, the fate of unborn generations, are, to the great bulk of mankind, matter of hardly any concern. The reason is, that the power of looking forward to the future and resisting present allurement, from a regard to its interests, is a gift which is bestowed by Providence only on a limited portion of mankind, and never is generally developed, unless among those who are either endowed with remarkable powers of thought, or have had their attention forcibly drawn to the future by the durable interests of property. Hence it is that Democratic societies have been distinguished in every age of the world by such extraordinary want of foresight, often redeemed, it is true, when danger was pressing, by the most transcendent exertions. Hence it was that the Carthaginians at one time refused to send succours to Hannibal, when a few thousand men would have enabled him to overturn the Roman Republic, and at another consented to purchase a temporary respite from hostility, by giving up the arms of the Republic to that inveterate enemy. Hence it was that all the eloquence of Demosthenes failed in rousing the Athenians to a sense of the danger arising from the ambition of Philip, and that, in the midst of his most splendid orations against that ambitious sovereign, they passed a law, not only appropriating the whole funds of the navy to the support of the public theatres, but denouncing the punishment of death against any one who should presume to propose even that that portion of the revenue should be restored to its former destination. Thence it was that America urged on a naval war with great Britain when she had only four frigates and eight sloops to protect her vast defenceless and commercial navy; and thence it was that England, under the pressure of undue popular influence, during the long peace which followed the battle of Waterloo, went on, without any necessity, taking off one indirect tax after another, till she had fairly annihilated the noble fabric of the sinking fund, and rendered the national debt a hopeless burden upon the nation. Thence, too, it was that Polish Democracy obstinately resisted all the efforts of John Sobieski to establish durable institutions and a regular army, and fell at last under the swords of the surrounding nations, which they had taken no means whatever to avert. On the other hand, the long and glorious existence of Rome, Venice, and Great Britain, clearly demonstrate, that where the energy of Democracy is duly restrained and coerced by the foresight of patrician power, a lasting and glorious existence is secured for the state, by the constant effort of its rulers to guard against ultimate and remote dangers.

Security which this form of government affords against the corruption of power.

4. In the fourth place, there arises in the ascendency of the classes possessed of property and education, provided always that they are duly restrained and watched by the more numerous, but less educated classes of society, the best security which human weakness has ever yet devised against the corruption of government, and the selfish dispositions of those intrusted with the reins of power. This is one of the most important observations which can be made with reference to the science of government, and it explains at once the universal failure of all attempts to establish permanent good government on a Democratic basis, and the greater chance of its enjoyment under a well-tempered and checked aristocracy. The reason is not apparent at first sight, but when stated it is sufficiently convincing, and deserves the serious consideration of every reflecting mind.

Causes of the prevalence of virtuous opinions in a rightly-organized community.

"It has been often observed," says Mr. Hume, "that there is a wide difference between the judgment which befalls the conduct of others, and that which we ourselves pursue when placed in similar circumstances. The reason is obvious: in judging of others, we are influenced by our reason and our feelings; in acting for ourselves, we are directed by our reason, our feelings, *and our desires*." In this simple observation is to be found the key, both to the fatal corruption which Democratic ascendency never fails to produce in the state, and to the more effectual check which, in Conservative ascendency, is provided at once against its own tendency to selfish projects, and the dangerous encroachments of the other classes of society. When the holders of property are in power, and the masses are in vigilant, but restrained opposition, the majority of the community, who give the tone to public thought, necessarily incline to the support of virtuous and patriotic principles, because they have no interest to do otherwise. Hence, although doubtless in such communities some abuses do prevail, and will prevail to the end of the world, from the universal tendency to corruption in mankind when acting for themselves, and actuated by their own interests, yet, upon the whole, the administration of affairs is comparatively pure and virtuous, and the community obtains a larger share of good government than has ever yet been obtained under any other form of human institutions. Above all, in such circumstances, the public mind is preserved untainted; public spirit is general, and forms the mainspring of national action; and this invaluable temper of mind, more precious far than all laws or political institutions, not only preserves the heart of the nation entire, and forms a salutary control upon the measures of the holders of power, but by influencing the very atmosphere which they breathe, imparts a large share of its glorious spirit to those in possession of its reins, and open to its seductions. And hence the long-continued public spirit and greatness of the British and Roman Empires, and of all communities in which power has been for a long period in possession of the holders of property, and the general thought has been directed by the aristocracy of intellect.

And of the rapid corruption of opinion in Democratic states.

But all this is totally reversed when the popular leaders get themselves installed in power, and the Democratic party are in possession of an irresistible preponderance in the state. The moment that this fatal change occurs, a total revolution takes places, not merely in the conduct of government, but in the vigilance with which they are guarded and watched by the great body of the people. The holders of power, and the dispensers of influence, find themselves surrounded by a host of hungry dependants, to whom ne-

cessity is law; and who, impelled by a secret consciousness that their political ascendency is not destined to be of long duration, because they are disqualified to maintain it, strive only to make the best use of their time, by providing for themselves and their relations at the public expense, without the slightest regard to any consideration of the public advantage. On the other hand, the great body of the people, formerly so loud in their clamours against corruption, and their demand for a virtuous and patriotic administration of public affairs, now quietly pass by on the other side, and either openly and with shameless effrontery defend every species of abuse, because they profit by it, or preserve a studious silence, and endeavour to huddle up those nefarious, and to them beneficial excesses, under the cry of a reformation of the state in some other department, or a wider extension of the power from which their leaders derive such considerable benefit. Thus, not only is the power and influence of government immediately directed to the most corrupt and selfish purposes, but legislation itself becomes tainted with the same inherent and universal vice. In the general scramble, where every one seems on the look-out for himself, no other object is attended to but the promotion of separate interests, or class elevation; the public press seldom denounces, in general cordially supports all such abuses, because their leaders and the writers in its columns are benefited by them; and, what is worst of all, public feeling becomes universally and irrevocably corrupted, because the great body of the people profit, or hope to profit, by the abuses in which the leaders of their party indulge.

Example of this difference afforded in a theatre.

The clearest proofs of the truth of these principles, and of the extraordinary difference between the conduct and sentiments of mankind, when judging of the actions of others, and when acting for themselves, may be every day witnessed in the public theatres. Observe the conduct of the people, and, most of all, the humblest classes of the community, when their feelings are roused by the performance of a noble tragedy, and the enunciation of exalted sentiments, clothed in the colours of poetry, and enforced by the energy or genius of theatrical representation. How loudly are generous sentiments applauded; how enthusiastic is the ardour produced by patriotic emotion; how strongly does the very air of the theatre seem impregnated with the most generous and patriotic sentiments! How many inexperienced observers have been led to imagine, when witnessing those bursts of lofty enthusiasm, and seeing how uniformly they commence with the humblest classes of society—how many have been led to conclude that human nature is at bottom virtuous and pure; that selfishness and vice are the growth only of riches and palaces; and that ample security for a pure and salutary administration of affairs will be found in the admission of the masses of men into the uncontrolled direction of public affairs! Follow out the assembled multitude who have been swayed by such generous emotions in the theatre, and see who they are, and what they do, when exposed to the separate influence of the sins which most easily beset them. Among the so recently generous and elevated crowd will be found the profligate husband and the faithless wife—the hardhearted creditor and the fraudulent debtor—the reckless prodigal and the depraved libertine—the besotted drunkard and the abandoned sensualist—the cruel enemy and the perfidious friend—the hardhearted egotist and the rancorous foe. Among the many who but the evening before seemed animated only with the most pure and generous sentiments, will be found every form and variety of human wickedness, and by them will be practised every deed by which man can inflict misery on man. Such and so different is man when judging of others according to his reason and feelings, and man when acting for himself, under the influence of his reason, his feelings, and his passions. Hence it is that, during the worst periods of the French Revolution, the sanguinary mob, who had been entranced in the evening by the noble and elevating sentiments of Racine or Corneille, arose in the morning with fresh vigour to pursue their career of selfishness and their work of blood; and hence it is that the enthusiastic masses, whose sentiments appeared so pure, and their feelings so exalted, in the commencement of that convulsion, when declaiming against the corruptions of power, that their hearts might be thought to have opened within them the springs of heaven, became so utterly selfish, corrupt, and cruel, when exposed themselves to its temptations, that they appeared to have been steeped in hell.

Causes of the cruelty of Democracy.

5. If the influences of these combined circumstances are taken into consideration, it will not appear surprising that cruelty has in so remarkable a manner been in every age the characteristic of Democratic government; and that the excess of the populace in that particular has, in general, been the circumstance that has most contributed to the overthrow of their power. Generally speaking, cruelty is more the result, at least in civilized society, of fear, than of any settled savage disposition: men massacre others when they are apprehensive of punishment or death themselves. It is in the secret dread which a Democracy always entertains that its position in power is forced and unnatural, and that it is destined, ere long, to fall under the government of property and intelligence, that the true cause of the persevering energy with which it attacks both the possessions and the lives of the wealthier classes is to be found. It is not that the lower classes are by nature more bloodthirsty than the higher, but that they entertain a constant apprehension of falling again under their influence, and possibly, in that event, undergoing the punishment which their crimes may have deserved. Thence the saying of Marat, which so well expressed the feelings of the Jacobins of Paris, "that there was no hope for France till two hundred and eighty thousand heads had fallen;" thence the cry, "Down with the bank," which destroyed three fourths of the commercial wealth of America; and thence the clamour which, during a period of Revolutionary convulsion, caused eighteen hundred thousand pounds, in three days, to be drawn out of the coffers of the Bank of England; "To stop the duke, go for gold." In all these cases it is not any absolute *pleasure* in the destruction of life or property which leads to these extreme and terrible measures, fraught with such awful results on the part of the Democracy. It is the *terror* of losing a power which they are conscious they are unfit to exercise which, in reality, is the motive of their proceedings. They are aware that, if their opponents exist, they will, in the long run, fall under their government, and, therefore, they see no chance of safety but in their total destruction.

Want of all responsibility in the real rulers of Democratic society.

6. There is another most material point of distinction between the government of property and education and that of numbers, which is, that in the former case the persons intrusted with the direction of affairs are comparatively *fixed* and few in number, and, consequently, the invaluable checks of individual responsibility and public observation attach to them; while in the latter the real ruling power is a multitude of perpetually-changing persons, upon no one of whom can the responsibility of any measures originating in public opinion be fixed; and at the same time the rulers and magistrates are so continually changed, that *they* avoid also all responsibility for the measures in which they have had only a temporary share. It was long ago observed by Sallust, in the inimitable declamation against aristocracy, which he puts into the mouth of Marius, that the condition of Patricians is so prominent, and the light shining on them so bright, that even their smallest faults are perpetually exposed to the public gaze;* and it is the consciousness of this perpetual responsibility attaching to them which, in a free community, where the opinion of the middle classes has a material weight in public affairs, constitutes the greatest check on their conduct. On the other hand, it is the obscurity which numbers throw over any individual of the multitude, and the consequent, not merely impunity, but liberation from all moral control which they enjoy, which constitutes one main source of the danger of their proceedings. "In the multitude of counsellors," says Solomon, "there is safety." "Yes," said Dr. Gregory, "but it is safety to the *counsellors*, not the *counselled*, for each lays the blame upon the other." In a Democratic community, the greatest measures are often *forced* upon government by an insurgent pressure from below, without any man being able to tell either who were its authors, how it was begun, or where it is to end. Thus the state may be ultimately ruined, no one knows how, or by whom. In the officers also, whether of the executive or judicial department, the jealousy of the people at any one possessing power which does not flow from and frequently revert to themselves, is such, that it very soon becomes impossible either to maintain any stable system for the public government, or to retain experienced ability for any length of time in the direction of affairs. Rotation of office is the principle on which all their appointments are rested. Hence the proverbially short duration of ministerial existence in all countries during periods of Democratic ascendency; and hence the appointment even of *judicial* officers in France during the Revolution, and in America at this time, during the pleasure of the people, or for a period only of a few years. Not the least evils of Democratic ascendency will be found to have originated from this cause, and it affords the true solution of many of the catastrophes, both social and national, which have been traced in the preceding pages.

In contrasting thus the opposite effects of an aristocratic and Democratic government on human affairs, it is an *open* aristocracy that is in view; that is to say, an aristocracy blending with, and open to, the intermixture of the most prominent and deserving of the middle classes of the community. If this is not the case—if the ruling power of the state is an aristocracy, like that of Venice, which excludes all admission into its ranks of the most eminent and deserving of the inferior classes of society, and has obtained such power in the state as to be able to stifle or extinguish the voice of public opinion, experience warrants the assertion, that, though the evils which have now been stated are avoided, their place is supplied by others of a different description, less acute, but more lasting. Such a government is abundantly stable in its purposes and judicious in its councils; but is it equally favourable to the development of industry, the growth of freedom, or the advancing of social progress? Have the brightest pages of history arisen under its influence?

It is an open, not a close aristocracy, which is attended with these advantages.

Evils of the latter species of government.

Is not its invariable tendency to limit power, patronage, and office to its own order; to treat the middle and working classes of society as an inferior species of creation, and rule the state for the exclusive and peculiar advantage of its own members? Are not genius, intellect, energy in the middle ranks, studiously depressed; and talent encouraged and rewarded, only so far as it is exerted in their service, and directed by their will? Is not office chiefly bestowed upon inferior birth as the reward of servility? is not an instinctive horror felt for independent character, and pliant ability the great object at once of search and promotion? Experience unequivocally demonstrates that these questions must be answered in the affirmative, and renders it evident that, though the evils with which it is attended are far from being of so piercing and terrible a kind as those which flow from Democratic ascendency, yet they are far more enduring in their operation, and are greatly more difficult of removal.

Contention of aristocracy and Democracy in all free states.

The ruling power in such a society is not, as in the ever-shifting wheel of popular ascendency, withdrawn from responsibility, but it is relieved from its effects; it is not unknown to public opinion, but it is able to set its verdict at defiance. Resting on the support of a limited class in the state, the interests of whose members are the same, it is often able to disregard entirely alike the advantage and wishes of every inferior rank in society. Of all the possessions of mankind, there is none which they at once so universally desire, and so tenaciously retain, as power. Property itself has not been found to be, in general, so vehement an object of contention; though unquestionably its advantages are more substantial, and its loss attended with greater evils. The reason is, that the contest, even for these advantages, has generally taken place on the preliminary question of political influence; like the ramparts of a fortress, worthless in themselves, but commanding all that is valuable within their circuit, it is there that the deadly battle in the breach has been fought. Aristocracy has invariably been found to be to the last degree jealous of any encroachments on this its most highly-prized inheritance; and if not the bloodiest, at least the most long-continued feuds which have desolated the world, have arisen from the obstinate and skilful resistance which it has invariably made to the efforts of commercial wealth or popular

* "Nam quanto vita illorum præclarior, tanto horum socordia flagitiosior. Et profecto ita si res habet, majorum gloria posteris lumen est; neque bona neque mala eorum in occulto patitur."—SALLUST, *Bell. Jug.*

ambition to be admitted to a share of its influence. From the days when the contests of the patricians and plebeians convulsed Rome during three centuries, and Sylla and Marius, at the head of the military force of their rival factions, drenched the Republic with blood, and disgraced it by proscriptions, to those when the whole world was involved in the conflict of the Tiers-Etat of France with the property of Europe, and the British Empire was shaken to its centre by the fierce conflict of the aristocratic and Democratic parties on the arena of parliamentary reform, this has been the most lasting object of contention among mankind. And so vehement has been the discord which it has occasioned, and so furious the passions developed during its continuance, that England is the only example recorded in history in which they have not led quickly to the total destruction of freedom, either by the despotism invariably following on Democratic triumph, or the binding fetters which proclaim the victory of aristocratic power.

Great effects and brief endurance of combined aristocratic direction and Democratic vigour.

It was the plaintive conclusion of the Roman Annalist, that liberty is slow of growth, difficult of maintenance, quick of decay. Subsequent experience has added fresh proofs of the observation of Tacitus, and yet illustrated not less forcibly the incomparable energy which is communicated to mankind during the brief period which elapses between the first expansion and last triumph of Democratic vigour. The Roman Empire in ancient, the British in modern times, have forever demonstrated this important truth. The first conquered the world by its arms, and humanized it by its wisdom; the second subjected the waves to its dominion, and spread along its shores the light of knowledge, the institutions of civilization, the blessings of religion. But it is but a brief period of such transcendent brightness which Providence allows to any nation. Its advent marks the efflorescence of civilization, and is generally contemporary with the highest point of national fortunes; its decline is followed by a total decay of social vegetation, and a speedy termination of national existence. This is not a mere fanciful analogy suggested by the oft-observed resemblance between individual and national growth, but a part of that mysterious unity of design which runs through every part of the creation, and unites in one harmonious system the minutest object in the material and the grandest revolutions in the moral world.

Reasons of this moral law.

Nor is the reason difficult to be discerned which has led to the establishment of this moral law. Such is the surpassing force of the power which, during this brief period, is brought to bear on human affairs, and such the energy which, during its continuance, it communicates to mankind, that it is inconsistent with the independent existence of nations. Democratic vigour guided by aristocratic direction is invincible. If to any nation were given, for a series of ages, the combined wisdom and energy of Rome, from the days of Hannibal to those of Gracchus, or of England, from those of Chatham to those of Wellington, it would infallibly acquire the empire of the world. As Providence, therefore, in its wisdom, has established the diversity of nations, and allotted to each the performance of its appropriate part on the general theatre, it has wisely ordained that to none an immortal existence should be assigned; but that each, after its part has been performed, should be removed from the scene, and make way for its destined successors on the stage. National vanity, social partiality, may contest this progress, and contend, on the principle of perfectibility, for the perpetual endurance of particular communities; but experience gives no countenance to these ideas, and probably an attentive observer of the signs of the times in those nations where such expectations are most generally indulged, will discover no unequivocal indications of its approach to the common charnel-house of mortality.

To what cause is this general tendency to decay in mankind to be ascribed?

Observation readily suggests the cause to which the invariable tendency to decay in human institutions is owing. In this, as in many other cases, we see the operation of the same principle in the path of private life as the general fate of nations. It is sin which has brought death to nations as well as individuals. It is the multiplication of selfish desires, artificial enjoyments, indolent or luxurious habits, consequent upon the increase of wealth and the long continuance of civilization, which proves fatal to the virtue, patriotism, and self-denial which are essential to national prosperity. Wealth accumulates in immense masses, fatal to its possessors, on the one hand, and indigence multiplies with fearful rapidity, destructive to public security, on the other. The state becomes poor, and its members rich; selfish opulence ceases to be patriotic, destitute misery becomes ungovernable. "Pro his nos habemus luxuriam atque avaritiam; publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam; laudamus divitias, sequimur inertiam; inter bonos et malos nullum discernimus; omnia virtutis præmia ambitio possidit."* Happy the nation which sees in its internal conditions none of the effects of greatness which Cato observed and Sallust has recorded! Such a state may anticipate prolonged, possibly immortal existence; but where are we to find it, amid the passions, the vices, and the follies of the world?

Increased principle of vitality in modern nations.

That the religion and institutions of modern times have given a much longer lease of life to the nations of Europe than were enjoyed by those of antiquity, must be obvious to the most superficial observer.

Nothing is so remarkable or so uniform in every age as the rapid corruption of victorious and barbarous nations, when they are first brought in contact with the enjoyments of opulence. In Asia, the vigour of the chief who seizes the diadem rarely descends to his successor who inherits it; and even the hardihood of a new race of Northern conquerors is found, after a few generations, to be irrecoverably merged in the effeminacy of their subjects. Hence the extraordinary facility with which they are overturned, and the perpetual alternation of external conquest and internal corruption which marks every age of Asiatic history. In Europe, on the other hand, it is at once evident that a more durable order of things has been induced with the free spirit which, from the days of Agamemnon, seems to have been the distinctive mark of the race of Japhet; and that though the seeds of evil are not less generally implanted

* Sall., de Bell. Cat.

in them than elsewhere among mankind, yet they are combated with a vigour, and counteracted by a salient principle of life unknown in any other quarter of the globe. This was apparent in the glorious achievements, immortal genius, and long duration of the Grecian and Roman Republics; and it is still more conspicuous in the states of modern times, which have already attained, without any decisive symptoms of decrepitude, a length of existence exceeding that allotted even to the enduring fortitude of ancient Rome.

But they still have the seeds of decay in their bosom.

But nothing warrants the assertion, that these superior powers of vitality have extinguished the seeds of mortality, or that the communities of Europe have attained such a degree of stability as to be able to defy alike the shock of external disaster and the mouldering of internal decay. The strife of faction, the growth of luxury, the private wealth, the public poverty, the selfishness of the few, the profligacy of the many, which were marked as the premonitory symptoms of decline in the states of antiquity, are equally conspicuous in modern times. The southern states of Europe appear to be irrevocably entangled in the meshes of private enjoyment; possibly the northern are not yet fully immersed, only because they were longer of tasting its sweets. There is nothing in the civilization around us which authorizes either the belief or the wish that it should be perpetual; and this may at least be confidently affirmed, that length of life is given to us, equally as to our predecessors, just in proportion to the duration of public and private virtue; and that the only elixir of life which can be given to empires, is to be found in the virtue and resolution of their inhabitants.

Final cause of war among men. Its apparently unmitigated evils.

And this illustrates the final cause of a peculiarity in the condition of the species, which has long been the subject of mistake or lamentation. This is the universal prevalence of WAR among mankind. If the effect of war in itself be considered upon the immediate happiness or misery of the human race, it must appear the most unmitigated evil which the justice or wrath of Heaven has let loose upon guilty men. If we reflect that its object is to train mankind up to mutual slaughter, and to direct the whole energies and powers of the human mind to the destruction of the species, it is impossible to deny that it appears at first sight in no other light than a devastating scourge. Philosophers and philanthropists, accordingly, have concurred from the earliest times in regarding it in this light; in deprecating mutual hostility and national passions as the most dreadful evils which can afflict the world, and earnestly endeavouring by all means in their power to diminish the frequency of this dreadful scourge of humanity. Sanguine hopes were entertained at the commencement of the French Revolution that a new era in this important particular had opened upon the species; that former wars, stimulated by the ambition of kings and the rivalry of ministers, would cease; and that, by the accession to power of the class who were the principal sufferers by hostilities, the disposition to wage them would at once be terminated. It had come to pass as a general axiom, that war was the consequence of monarchical and aristocratic governments, and would disappear with their removal; and general applause followed the humane sentiment of the poet,

> "War is a game, which, were the people wise,
> Kings should not play at."

But when the matter was put to the test, experience soon demonstrated what had long been known to the few observers of historical facts, that these expectations were entirely illusory, and that not only was the tendency to war noways diminished, but it was fearfully increased by the augmentation of popular power. Angry passions, it was now found, came to agitate not only the rulers, but the masses of men; the interests of whole classes in one community came to be arranged against those of the corresponding ones in another; and the *multis utile bellum* was found to meet with innumerable advocates in a period of revolutionary excitement and distress. Accordingly, the warlike passions never appeared so strong as in the newly-emancipated French people; and the longest, the bloodiest, and the most devastating war recorded in modern annals, was the immediate consequence of the pacific dreams of the authors of the French Revolution.

Necessity of war for the purification of mankind.

If this world were the final resting-place of man; if it were intended to be the seat of unbroken happiness, and the human mind was so innocent, and so deserving, as to be capable of enjoying unmixed felicity, such a marked and irretrievable tendency in human affairs might well be a subject of unmingled regret. But if the real condition of mankind be reflected on, and the necessity of suffering to the purification of the human heart taken into consideration, the observer will take a very different view of the matter. That war is an unbounded source of human suffering to those engaged in, or affected by it, can be doubted by none; and if any were disposed to be skeptical on the subject, his hesitation would probably be removed by a consideration of the wars that followed the French Revolution. But is not suffering necessary to the purification of the human heart? Is it not in that ordeal that its selfishness, its corruptions, and its stains are washed out? Have we not been told by the highest authority, that man is made perfect by suffering? Is not misfortune, anxiety, and distress, the severe but salutary school of individual improvement? And what is war but anxiety, distress, and often agony to nations? Its great and lasting effect is, to counteract the concentration of human interests upon self, to awaken the patriotic and generous affections, to rouse that generous ardour which, spreading from breast to breast, obliterates for a time the selfishness of private interest, and leads to the general admission of great and heroic feelings. Peace exhibits the enchanting prospect of rich fields, flourishing cities, spacious harbours, growing wealth, and undisturbed tranquillity; but beneath that smiling surface are to be found the rankest and most dangerous passions of the human breast. There it is that pleasure spreads its lures, and interest its attractions, and cupidity its selfishness. There are to be found the hardhearted master and the reckless servant, the princely landlord and the destitute tenant, the profligate husband and the faithless wife, "*et corrumpere et corrumpi seculum vocatur.*" Amid war are to be seen the ravaged field and sacked city, the slaughtered multitude and famished group, the tear of the widow and the groans of the fatherless; but amid all that scene of unutterable wo, the generous and noble affections often acquire extraordinary force; selfishness gives place to patriotism, cupidity to disin-

terestedness, luxury to self-denial, and heroic virtue arises out of suffering. Even the poignancy of individual distress is alleviated by the numbers who simultaneously share it. Misery ceases to be overwhelming when it is no longer solitary; individual loss is drowned in the feeling of common sympathy. Peace may give men a larger share of the enjoyments and comforts of this world, but war often renders them fitter for a future state of existence; and it is by the alternation of both that they are best fitted for the duties of the one, and destiny of the other.

Striking example of this which the history of the Revolutionary war affords.

Whoever has surveyed, either in the annals of mankind or in the observation of society around him, the effects of peace, opulence, and long-continued prosperity upon human character, and the heroic virtues which are called forth in mankind by the advent of times pregnant with disaster and alarm, will probably have little doubt of the truth of these observations. But they are demonstrated in a way that must bring conviction home to the most incredulous, by the result of the wars of the French Revolution. At the commencement of the period, selfishness, irresolution, and cupidity distinguished all the measures of cabinets; languor, inertness, and proneness to delusion, characterized the people; mildness and toleration were daily becoming more prevalent in the administration of government, and a general pacific spirit characterized the age. Thence it was that Gibbon then lamented that the world would never again see the vast convulsions, the moving incidents which had occurred in ancient times, and which furnished so many subjects for the immortal historic pencils of Greece and Rome. But amid all this seeming philanthropy and happiness, selfishness, that grand source of human corruption, was daily extending its influence through every rank; and the human mind, enervated by repose, was losing its manly virtues amid the unbroken spread of enjoyments. We may judge of the subtle poison which was then debasing European society, and especially the boasted centre of its civilization in France, from the corresponding evils which we now, from a similar cause, see around us. And the effect of it appeared in the clearest manner in the measures alike of government and the people over all Europe, for self-aggrandizement and selfishness characterized them all.

Universal selfishness at the commencement of the French Revolution.

The selfishness of the French aristocracy first induced the evils which brought about the Revolution; the selfishness of the privileged classes postponed till it was too late that equalization of public burdens which might have averted its evils; the selfishness of the Church, that just and beneficent system of religion which could alone have combated its horrors. Nor was the influence of the same evil principle less evident in the conduct of all the nations who were successively called into the field to combat the power of wickedness. Great Britain, from a selfish passion for economy in her people, was in the beginning powerless at land to maintain the conflict: the forces she did put forth were wasted in the prosecution of "British objects" at Dunkirk, when they might, by co-operating with the allies, have marched to Paris, and crushed the hydra in its cradle: Prussia starved the war on the Rhine, and at length withdrew from the alliance to prosecute her schemes of ambition, and secure her ill-gotten gains in Poland: Austria abandoned Flanders, the gate of Europe, to France, in order to concentrate her force in Italy, and obtain in the spoliation of Venice a compensation for the surrender of Belgium: Russia halted her armies on the Vistula, and stained her standards by the massacres at Prague, when they might have been ennobled by the capture of Paris. In all these instances, each of which singly was attended with disastrous effects to the cause of freedom, and which, taken together, induced unheard-of calamities, it was the selfish interests of the different classes of society, or nations who were successively called on to make sacrifices for the public good, which was the secret spring that induced the evil; and such is ever the tendency of man in prosperous and pacific times.

Noble and generous deeds of all classes and nations during the war.

Turn now to the deeds of heroism and disinterestedness which have forever signalized the annals of the French Revolution, and say whether or not it is good for nations, as well as individuals, to be in affliction. Where was the selfishness of the French nobility when they were led out to the scaffold by the Jacobins? where the corruptions of the court, when Louis XVI. was immured in the Temple? Can the annals of humanity exhibit more glorious deeds of devotion, heroism, and magnanimity, than were exhibited even by the corrupted circles of Paris during the Reign of Terror, or by the clergy of France, both dignified and rural, in the days of their suffering? What would the Democratic party over the world give to be able to tear the deathless pages of La Vendée out of the volumes of history? The selfishness of Prussia, punished by the disaster of Jena and six years of bondage, was gloriously expiated by the resurrection of 1813, and triumph of the Katzbach; the ambition of Russia by the carnage of Borodino, and the devotion of Leipsic. Can peace, with all its charities, produce so sublime an instance of generous spirit as that which fired the torches of Moscow? or so illustrious an example of patriotic fervour as manned the ramparts of Saragossa? Even nations the most calculating, and empires the most stable, caught the generous flame, and were in the end dignified by deeds of heroism, to which nothing superior is to be found in the annals of mankind. Who could recognise the tenacious rule of the Austrian aristocracy in the devotion of Aspern, or the money-seeking German mountaineer in the enthusiasm of Tyrol? If Great Britain blasted the prospects of European deliverance by the niggardly parsimony of former times, which paralyzed her efforts in the commencement of the war, and the selfish direction which she so long gave to her efforts, she washed out her national sins by suffering; and the annals of the world cannot present so glorious an example of generous ardour and persevering constancy as was exhibited by all classes in the British islands before its termination. Thus, while the subtle poison of human corruption spreads with fatal rapidity during the tranquillity and enjoyment of peace, the manly feelings, the generous affections, are nursed amid the tumult and horrors of war; and although the actual agents in it may become habituated to bloodshed and rapine, a compensation, and more than a compensation, arises in the noble and disinterested feelings which are generally drawn

forth in the community. Perpetual war would transform men into beasts of prey—perpetual peace reduce them to beasts of burden; the alternation of both is indispensable to the mixed tendencies to good and evil which exist in mankind; and mutual slaughter may be dispensed with when the seeds of corruption are extirpated from the human breast, but not till then.

Remarkable physical conformation of Asia, and its difference from Europe and America.

It is observed by Montesquieu, that the great peculiarity of the physical conformation of Asia is, that the steppes or deserts, which must forever form the abode only of pastoral nations, are brought into close proximity with the alluvial plains, which speedly become the scenes of agricultural riches and the abode of commercial opulence; and that this is the true reason of the violent revolutions, not merely of dynasties, but of empires, which, in every age, have distinguished the history of that great portion of the globe. There can be no doubt that the observation is well founded; and, it may be added, that another peculiarity, not less important, is to be found in the vast extent of those pastoral districts, and the consequent facility of transporting large bodies of men from one part of the continent to another, how distant soever. This circumstance at once provides for the easy dispersion of the nomad races of mankind, even from the confines of China to the shores of the Atlantic, in early ages, and the occasional accumulation of their armed forces, under popular leaders, at later times, in such multitudes, and animated with such fervour, as to be altogether irresistible.

Europe and America, again, have an entirely different physical conformation. No arid deserts there retain the children of Japhet in every successive generation in the rude habits and mingled virtues and vices of their fathers: no table-lands or boundless steppes bring the warriors of the desert into close proximity with the cities of the plain, or the riches and vices of civilization. The level face of the greater part of the country renders it susceptible of the labour of agriculture; mineral riches at once invite and reward the toils of the artisan: the deep indentations of the coast, and numerous inland seas, let in, to the very heart of the continents, the wealth and interests of commerce. The savage exists, but he is only the feeble and isolated hunter of the forest, who flies and perishes before the advance of civilization. External danger, therefore, is comparatively unknown: the riches of civilization need no longer fear the rapine of the desert; the contests of nations lead only to mutual improvement in the military art, and a more decided superiority over the other families of mankind; boundless facilities for the multiplication and extension of this race are afforded; and the race of Japhet can securely perform its destined mission of overspreading and subduing the earth.

Effects of this difference in the continual regeneration of the Asiatic States.

Historians in all ages have exerted their powers in painting the dreadful devastations produced by the periodical irruptions of the Tartar tribes into the smiling plains of Southern Asia; the pyramids of heads which marked where their sabre had been, and the sack, conflagration, and ruin which have ever attended their footsteps. But admitting the terrible nature of the whirlwinds which have thus passed over the earth, it is the height of error to consider them as pernicious in their ultimate effects; they resemble the tempest, which is often necessary to restore the purity of the physical atmosphere, or the wintry storms which clear away the decayed riches of summer vegetation; and, accordingly, it was ever under the powerful, though transient vigour of Northern dynasties, that society under the Asiatic rule has risen to greatness, or passing felicity been communicated to mankind. All its great nations, the Medes, the Persians, the Assyrians, the Parthians, the Monguls, have sprung from the intermixture of barbarian energy with civilized opulence; and when greatness had corrupted even the majesty of Rome, "the giants of the North," in Gibbon's words, "broke in and amended the puny breed." Either a physical or moral regeneration seems necessary in the later stages of civilized life in all countries; if no means for producing the former, from internal energy or virtue, exist, the latter is necessary. And the reflecting observer, who has witnessed the innumerable evils which have followed in the wake of riches and long-established civilization, even with all the means of combating them which a purer religion and the free spirit of Europe have afforded in modern times, will probably hesitate to characterize even the inroads of Timour or Genghis Khan as unmixed evil, and doubt whether they are not the severe but necessary means of purifying and reforming mankind, when corrupted by the vices of a society which has no salient and living principle of energy within its own bosom.

Which was unnecessary in Europe and America, from the internal effects of the Democratic principle.

It is the existence of this spirit which essentially distinguishes, and has ever distinguished, European from Asiatic society, and perhaps rendered unnecessary, and certainly less frequent, in the nations of its family, the awful catastrophes which have always in the East preceded the regeneration of nations. Europe has, and has ever had, its commotions, and often have they terminated in bloodshed, devastation, and ruin; but they have in general proceeded, not from external conquest, but internal energy; the moving principle which has occasioned them has been, not the lust of foreign rapine, but the passion for internal power. The annals of the French Revolution, and the wars to which it has given rise in Europe, may well suggest a doubt whether the latter principle is not sometimes productive at the time of devastation as widespread, and misery as acute, as the most terrible inroads of barbarian power; but the effect of it has been to revive the energy of the species from the restoration of internal strength, not the infusion of extraneous valour; and it brings hardy poverty into action, not from the fields of Northern conquest, but the workshop of laborious industry. Whoever has studied the working of the Democratic principle in human affairs, cannot entertain a doubt that, with whatever evils it may be followed when it acquires the mastery of the other interests of society, it is at least attended with this important effect—that it produces a degree of energy in all classes, while it subsists in vigour and is duly coerced, to which there is nothing comparable under other forms of government; and that it infuses the elements of strength and vitality into the social system to such a degree as to prolong to a period much beyond that assigned to it, in ancient times, the life of nations.

But it is not only by its effect upon the social

Democracy is the great moving power among mankind.

system within the state that Democracy is one of the most important elements which works out the progress of the moral world and general government of Providence; consequences equally important, and still more lasting in their effects, flow from its tendency to produce the dispersion of mankind. It is, in truth, the great *expansive power* of nature. Under various forms, it has produced the chief migrations and settlements which have occurred in the history of the species. The Cimbri, the Celts, and the Goths, who, at successive periods, commencing with the first dawn of authentic profane history, spread from Central Asia to the farthest extremities of Europe, were impelled from their native seats by this insatiable passion. Equality appeared even in the days of Tacitus, in the woods of Germany; and the free spirit of our Gothic ancestors has produced the whole peculiar features and glories of modern society. In Southern Europe it has appeared in a different, but not less important character. Spreading there, not from the energy of the desert, but the turbulence of the forum, it diffused the Republican colonies of Greece, Tyre, and Carthage over the whole shores of the Mediterranean. Rome itself sprang, in its infancy, from emigrants; enterprise was nourished, in its maturity, by colonial wealth; and its extension around the shores of that inland sea clearly demonstrates from what element the strength of the Empire had been derived.

In modern times the marvels of this expansive power have been not less conspicuous. From the republics of Genoa and Venice, the Democratic spirit again penetrated, with their mercantile establishments, as far as the waters of the Mediterranean extend; from the shores of Holland it drove an industrious brood into the Eastern Archipelago; with the fervour of the Puritans, it implanted the Anglo-Saxon race in a new hemisphere. Amid the wilds of America, it unceasingly impels the hardy woodsman into the solitudes of the Far West. England itself is now in the midst of a similar parturition; amid the mingled wealth and misery, glory and shame, hope and disappointment of the last fifteen years, nearly a hundred thousand active citizens have annually migrated from the British isles to the Western or Southern hemispheres; attempted political regeneration, producing terror in some classes, disappointment in others, restlessness in all, has greatly strengthened this inherent tendency; and the augmented vehemence of the Democratic action in the heart of the Empire has uniformly appeared in an enlarged stream of ardent emigrants, which it has sent forth to people the distant places of the earth. Great Britain may well be in travail, for a new world is springing from her loins.

And the principal cause of the dispersion of the human race.

The manner in which the Democratic spirit brings about this transplantation of the human race is very apparent. It is the combination of visions of perfectibility with realities of degradation which effects the object. The mind, warmed by boundless anticipations of elevation and improvement to be effected by social or political innovation, feels insupportable disappointment at the failure of its long-cherished projects, and the increasing indigence and profligacy of the great body of mankind, amid all the efforts made for their elevation. In disgust, numbers leave the abode of ancient corruption, and seek the realization of their visions amid the supposed innocence of early society, and the real advantages of plentiful employment. A general passion for change seizes all classes; and such anticipations are formed, and often realized, of the advantage to be derived from a change of situation, as effectually extinguishes in great numbers the love of home, in other circumstances one of the strongest affections of the human heart. It is this principle which, in every age, has prompted civilized men to forego all the pleasures of home and kindred, to sever all the bonds of filial or patriotic love, and seek in distant lands those means of elevation which the contracted sphere of their native seats will not afford. The love of power, the desire of distinction, the passion for wealth, envy of superiors, jealousy of equals, contempt of inferiors, combine, in these circumstances, to raise such a tempest in the human breast as roots man up from his native seats, obliterates his oldest recollections, extinguishes his strongest attachments, and sends forth the burning enthusiast, ardent for the equality of rights and the regeneration of society, into distant lands—where his expectations are too often blasted by the stern realities of his new situation, but from whence return is impossible—where he implants his seed in the soil, and leaves behind him in the wilderness the foundation of an extended and prosperous society.*

Manner in which this change is effected.

As Democracy and the lust of conquest are the moving, so aristocracy and attachment to property are the steadying powers of nature. Without some counterbalancing weight to restrain and regulate the violence of this expansive force—this moral steam-power—it would tear society in pieces, and counteract by its explosion the whole ends of the social union. This counteracting weight is found in the influence of property, and the desires with which it is attended. The habits it induces, the foresight and self-denial which it awakens, the local attachments to which it gives rise, constitute the steadying power of nature, and the great counterpoise to the moving power of Democracy. Society appears in its most favourable form, the progress of improvement is most rapid, the steps of the human race are the greatest, when the energy of the moving and expanding is duly regulated by the steadying and controlling power. To restrain it altogether is often impossible, always pernicious; to give it free scope is to expose society to utter ruin, and defeat the very objects for which it was implanted in the human breast. Its due direction and effectual regulation is the great desideratum. At particular periods, and by a mysterious agency, extraordinary force is communicated to the moving power; a restless desire for change becomes universal; old and important interests are overthrown; society at home is convulsed; the human race is violently impelled abroad, either in the channels of pacific colonization, or the inroads of ruthless conquest; and, in a short time, a vast change in the condition and destinies of mankind is effected. But such violent ebullitions are ever of short duration; the explosion of revolution, though often as devastating in its course, is as brief in its endurance as the eruption of the volcano; and the central heat, according as it is or is not regulated by the direction of property, and

Aristocracy is the controlling and regulating power.

* Alison on Population, i., 31.

restrained by the principles of religion, becomes the beneficent central force which impels light and civilization to the desert places of the earth, or the source of the fiery lava, which, after consuming whatever it has touched, is itself cooled down by external influence, and leaves a track which can be discerned only by the foul devastation which it has made.

Constant action and reaction in the European communities.

The external balance of nature in the physical world is almost entirely preserved by the counteracting impulse of opposite forces, either simultaneously acting in opposition to each other, or mutually succeeding when their separate agency is required. It is the same in the moral world: action and reaction is the universal law of human affairs, and the chief instrument of the Divine government of men. In the Asiatic Empires, as there is no internal spring giving rise to this alternation, it is provided for by foreign conquest: in Europe—at least in modern times—the source of it is found in the prevailing impulse, which, under opposite circumstances, is communicated to the human mind. The provision made for this in the original constitution of man consists in two principles, which will be found to be of universal application, viz., that the great bulk of men blindly follow any impulse which is communicated to them by minds of superior intelligence, or the force of individual interest; and that really original thinkers, the lights of their own, the rulers of the next age, almost invariably exert their powers in direct *opposition* to the prevailing evils with which they are surrounded. Hence it is that the strong intellects in a despotic community are almost always loud in praise of popular institutions and the principles of self-government, and those in Democratic states equally decided in support of the principles of order and the control of property; that freedom of opinion constituted the grand deliverance for which the religious Reformers of the sixteenth century contended, and unity of religious faith has become the object of devout aspiration in the nineteenth. The reason is obvious: creative minds in both periods were impressed with the evils with which they were brought in contact; and in both, instead of yielding, strove to counteract them. The great majority in every age go with the stream, and think they are enlightened when they are merely impregnated with the mental atmosphere with which they are surrounded; the thinking few at once break off from the multitude, and, for good or for evil, give a new direction to the current of thought. A generation must, in general, descend to its grave before the conversion takes place; but, though slow, the effect is not the less certain. "Show me what one or two great men, in the solitude of their chambers, are thinking in this age, and I will show you what will be the theme of the orator, the vision of the poet, the staple of the hustings, the declamation of the press, the guide of the statesman, in the next."

Example of this from the Reformation and French Revolution.

The two great convulsions of modern times, the religious Reformation and French Revolution, demonstrate, in the clearest manner, the agency of the opposite powers of action and reaction on general thought, and, through it, on the fate of nations. When the Catholic Church, strong in the consciousness of universal power, and tainted by the belief of supposed infallibility, revolted the growing intelligence of mankind by the open prostitution and sale of indulgences, the giant strength of Luther arose, and, Samson-like, threw down the pillars of the corrupted edifice. The Protestant nations fondly anticipated the total destruction of the papal power from the shock, and the rapid progress of the Reformation at its commencement seemed in a great measure to justify the expectation. But human passion and ambition, as usual in such cases, got possession of the stream: crimes and violence were committed by the popular party; intellect and interest combined their efforts to resist it; the torrent was rolled back in Southern Europe as rapidly as it had advanced; and for two subsequent centuries the frontiers of the opposite opinions have been observed in Northern Christendom, without any sensible advantage being gained on either side. The abuses of the Catholic Church, the selfishness of the noblesse, the extravagance of the monarchy, induced, in a subsequent age, the terrible convulsion of the French Revolution; the force of genius, the powers of intellect, the weapons of ridicule, were directed for half a century to the emancipation of thought; and an interminable era of progress and felicity was anticipated from the liberation of mankind from the fetters which had hitherto restrained and directed them. Here again, however, human wickedness soon obtained the mastery of the current: selfishness, ambition, rapacity, veiled under the successive names of liberty, patriotism, and glory, directed the movement: Europe was deluged with blood; the original devil was expelled, but straightway he returned with seven other devils more wicked than himself, and the last state of that nation was worse than the first. Humanity sunk and wept in silence, philanthropy trembled at the prospect of the race during that long night of suffering; but all this time the salient energy of thought was unceasingly in activity. Reaction arose out of suffering, heroism out of calamity; and the successive overthrow of the Democracy of France and the power of Napoleon has afforded an eternal monument, at once of the justice of the Divine administration and the system of human affairs by which, through the acts of free agents, the mighty deliverance was accomplished.

The revocation of the Edict of Nantes was the chief remote cause of the French Revolution; and the terrible evils it brought upon the nobility and the government, the natural consequence and just retribution of that abominable act of religious oppression. Though the overthrow of the nobility was the grand object, when the contest was fairly engaged, to which the popular efforts were turned, it was not there that the Revolutionary passion commenced, nor was it to a liberation from temporal restraints that the first advances of thought were directed. It was spiritual dominion which was the real incubus sought to be thrown off: it was the fetters of the Church which intellect strove to strike from the human soul. In the writings of Voltaire there is little to be found on change of institutions, amendment of laws, the blessings of self-government; but much on spiritual tyranny, the arts of priests, the benightment of superstition. Even Rousseau was not a political reformer; his visions of perfectibility and the social contract had no practical bearing on existing institutions; it was still the chains of the Roman Catholic Church which he

The revocation of the Edict of Nantes was the remote cause of the French Revolution.

endeavoured to remove, by the antagonist principle of original and primeval innocence. Whence was it that these giants of thought so vehemently directed their efforts against a religion which in England had so long been supported by the greatest and most profound intellects? Simply because the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, while it sent eight hundred thousand innocent citizens into exile, had removed all restraint on the Established Church in France; because spiritual tyranny had, in consequence, become insupportable, and spiritual intolerance universal; because religion, confident in the support of government, had disdained the aid of intellect; and patrician selfishness, engrossed with self-aggrandizement, had seized upon the Church as its own appanage, not the patrimony of the poor. These evils not only were the principal circumstances which originally stirred up the mental ferment which brought about the Revolution, but they paralyzed the only power which could successfully combat it; for they deprived order of the aid of principle, religion of the support of mind, and the poor of the only bond which could unite them with property.

Ultimate danger which threatens to destroy this vital principle.

The ultimate danger which threatens France, and every country that embraces revolutionary principles, is the annihilation of the only elements out of which a durable free constitution can be constructed. Little as this peril may be considered by the popular party in the days of their success, it is by far the most durable evil with which they have to contend; and it may safely be affirmed that their complete triumph renders it irremediable. It is this which has rendered the formation of a free constitution impossible in France, and blasted the whole objects for which the popular party so long and strenuously contended. There are but two ways by which mankind in the long run can be governed—by the influence of property, or the will of a sovereign; the third method, so much the object of desire to the advocates of Democracy all the world over, viz., by self-government, is soon found to be impracticable. The difficulty which proves fatal to it, is the impossibility of getting proper functionaries elected by the multitude, and the ungovernable passions which spring up in the human heart with the enjoyment of uncontrolled power. But if property has been destroyed by previous convulsions, and the influence of aristocracy, in consequence, is at an end, there remains no alternative but the appointment to all offices, and the entire direction of affairs, by the executive. This was what took place in Rome from the destruction of the old patricians during the civil wars of Sylla and Marius, and in France from the confiscations of the Revolution; and, accordingly, the frame of subsequent government which necessity imposed upon both these countries has been extremely similar, and has remained unaltered through every subsequent change of dynasty: the institutions of the Roman emperors are substantially the same as those of Napoleon's government; and the French people, since the termination of Democratic rule in 1795, have never, except during the weakness of the Restoration, enjoyed a larger practical direction of affairs than the populace did in ancient times in the Byzantine Empire.

The consequences flowing from the substitution of the government of functionaries for that of property deserves the serious consideration of every reflecting mind, because it is the evident issue in which the Revolutionary fervour of modern Europe is to terminate. Experience has now abundantly proved what reason *à priori* might have anticipated, that the unavoidable effect of the overthrow of the influence of property is, after a brief period, during which the theory of self-government is weighed in the balance and found wanting, to establish universally the system of government functionaries. That this system is productive of a much more regular and orderly, and, in some respects, beneficial administration, than any modification of popular election, is evident from this consideration, that all nations have taken refuge in it to avoid the intolerable evils of real self-government. But it is by no means equally apparent that it is as favourable to the development of mental energy, or the training of the human mind to its highest character or its noblest duties.

Substitution of government of functionaries for that of property.

Government functionaries are all stamped with one image and superscription; they all move, like automatons, by the direction of one hand; original thought, independence of character, are unknown among them. That such public servants are, in general, in the highest degree useful, nay, that they are often more serviceable in their several departments than those whose more lofty qualifications render them less manageable, may at once be admitted. But what is the destiny of a nation which has the easy meshes of a vast net of government functionaries thrown around it, and in which original thought in all departments is chilled, if persisted in, by the certainty of neglect? Prussia and France—in the former of which monarchies the whole system, not merely of government, but of education both civil and religious, is in the hands of the *employés* of administration; while in the latter, a hundred and thirty-eight thousand civil functionaries, appointed by the Tuileries, carry on the whole internal direction of the state*—may convince us how vast a machine for the government of mankind is provided in such a state of society; and how inextricable may be the fetters of a despotism, which, instead of opposing the spread of education or injuring the security of property, carefully supports the former and maintains the latter, and strives only to confine the attention of the people to their private affairs, by at once guiding their thoughts and attending to their interests.

Advantages and evils of the former system.

Good government depends upon the due intermixture, in public functionaries, of government appointment, aristocratic influence, and popular control. Irreparable evil is only to be apprehended when one of these interests has destroyed the others: for so long as the interests remain entire, they will, in the end, force their way into a due share in the direction of affairs. But when, by the triumph of Democracy, the aristocracy is destroyed, or by the victory of aristocracy the Democracy is overthrown, or by the dexterity of the crown both are debased, the balance essential to good government is at an end, and it becomes impossible to preserve the equipoise of freedom. It is by the destruction of the property of the aristocracy, and consequent ruin of their influence, either by actual violence, or the pa-

Irreparable evil is only to be dreaded when one interest has destroyed the others.

* Tocq., i., 209.

cific working of equal succession, that this lamentable change is most certainly effected; and, accordingly, Montesquieu long ago observed, that "the most durable and debasing despotisms recorded in history have arisen upon the ruin of aristocratic power through the triumph of Revolutionary principles." Hence it is that Democratic ambition—the most keen and searching element which is known in society, productive of so much good when duly coerced, of such irreparable evil when unrestrained—will ever be the object of such jealousy and apprehension to the real friends of liberty; for in its triumphs the far-seeing mind anticipates the destruction of the very elements of freedom, and the enclosing the whole energies of the human mind in the inextricable fetters of a centralized despotism.

Great sin of the French Revolution.

The great sin of the French Revolution was the confiscation of the estates of the Church and the aristocracy; it is that which has produced effects which can never be repaired. It is commonly said, indeed, in regard to individual violence, that restitution can be made of property, but who can restore human life? But the aphorism does not hold good in communities: wasted life is repaired by the vivifying powers of nature, but divided property can never be restored. A new generation will supply the place of that which has been destroyed; new smiles will arise on young cheeks, and banish the tears of former days; but who can replace ancient possessions alienated, colossal estates divided, old influences extinguished? The transference of property, and with it political influence, to a different class of society, supplants the old by new dominant powers; another balance is thus induced in the state, unalterable save by a fresh revolution. Power never yet was yielded up but to force. Had Cromwell confiscated the estates of the Church and divided those of the nobility, the whole subsequent history of England would have been changed; for how could our tempered Constitution have existed without political weight attached to property, and religious impressions prevalent among the people? The great moral lesson to be deduced from every page of the French Revolution is, that the destruction of these classes by the early triumphs and unbridled excesses of the Democratic party has proved forever fatal to the reconstruction of freedom, by destroying at once the moral influence which might supersede the necessity of despotism, and the balance of power which might restrain its excesses.

Great sin of the Reformation.

The great sin of the Reformation was the confiscation of so large a portion of the property of the Church for the aggrandizement of temporal ambition, and the enriching of the nobility who had taken a part in the struggle. When that great convulsion broke out, nearly a third of the whole landed estates in the countries which it embraced was in the hands of the regular or parochial clergy of the Roman Catholic Church. What a noble fund was this for the moral and religious instruction of the people, for the promulgation of truth, the healing of sickness, the assuaging of suffering! Had it been kept together, and set apart for such sacred purposes, what incalculable and never-ending blessings would it have conferred upon society! Expanding and increasing with the growth of population, the augmentation of wealth, the swell of pauperism, it would have kept the instruction and fortunes of the poor abreast of the progress and fortunes of society, and prevented, in a great measure, that fatal effect, so well known in Great Britain in subsequent times, of the National Church falling behind the wants of the inhabitants, and a mass of civilized heathenism arising in the very heart of a Christian land. Almost all the social evils under which Great Britain is now labouring may be traced to this fatal and most iniquitous spoliation, under the mask of religion, of the patrimony of the poor on occasion of the Reformation. But for that robbery, the state would have been possessed of lands amply sufficient to have extended its religious instruction for any possible increase of the people; to have superseded the necessity of any assessment for parochial relief or general instruction; and to have provided, without burdening any one, for the whole spiritual and temporal wants of the community. When we reflect on the magnitude of the injustice committed by the temporal nobility in the seizure at that period of so large a portion of the funds of the Church, and observe how completely all the evils which now threaten the social system in Great Britain would have been obviated if that noble patrimony had still been preserved for the poor, it is impossible to avoid feeling that we too are subject to the same just dispensation which has doomed France to Oriental slavery for the enormous sins of its Revolution; and that, if our punishment is not equally severe, it is only because the confiscation of the Reformation was not so complete, nor the inroads on property so irretrievable.

Example this affords of moral retribution.

This is but another example of the all-important truth, which a right consideration of history so uniformly demonstrates, that communities and nations are subject to moral laws; and that, although inconsiderable deviations from rectitude may be overlooked as unavoidable to humanity, yet outrageous sin and irreparable evil never fail to bring upon their authors condign punishment even in this world. Individuals have souls to receive retribution in a future state of existence, but nations have no immortality; and that just retribution which, in the former case, is often postponed, in appearance at least, to another world, in the latter is brought down with unerring certainty upon the third and fourth generation. How this mysterious system is worked out by Supreme Power, and yet the freedom of human action, and the entire moral responsibility of each individual are preserved, will never be fully understood in this world. Yet that there is no inconsistency between them is self-evident, for every one feels that he is free; and the history of every nation, as well as the general progress of mankind, demonstrate the reality both of the moral retribution of nations, and a general system for the direction of human affairs. And without pretending entirely to solve the difficulty, the mysteries of which, in all its parts, is probably beyond the reach of the human faculties, a very little consideration must be sufficient to show what in general is the system pursued, and how the Divine superintendence is rendered perfectly reconcilable with justice to individual men and nations.

Agency by which this administration of affairs is effected.

The method by which this mysterious system is carried into execution, and yet rendered consistent with the perfect freedom of human actions, is this. The active propensities of men—that is, their desires and passions—

are so calculated and adapted to the ever-varying current of human affairs, that, in acting upon the whole in conformity with them, the individual free agents are made unconsciously to forward both the general plan of the Divine administration, and the separate justice dealt out to particular men and nations. When Shakspeare put into the mouth of Lear the striking sentiment—

> The gods are just, and of our pleasant vices
> Make whips to scourge us—

he did but express the conviction of mankind, founded alike upon observation and experience, that, how agreeable and enticing soever the paths of sin may be in the outset, they terminate, alike to communities and individuals, in disappointment and ruin. Providence in the end is found to be just; and the early, and often long-continued triumph of wickedness, is but the ordeal appointed for the trial and purification of virtue, and the preparation, in the very success of the unjust, for their final and deserved retribution. And the means by which this dispensation is effected is not the special interposition of the avenging angel, so much as the natural effect of the triumph of wickedness, in the indignation it excites, the misery it occasions, the reaction to which it gives rise. The laws of Providence have doomed signal wickedness, whether in individuals or nations, to ultimate and condign punishment, and the reality of the existence of these laws may be clearly discerned in the calamitous consequences which invariably, in the end, attend any flagrant violation of the rules of virtue; but it is not the less apparent that the agents in this retribution are men themselves; that it is in their feelings that the moving power in this vast and complicated machine is to be found; and that the long-continued delay which often takes place in the chastisement of the wicked arises from the protracted period during which the reaction is preparing, in the increased suffering, enlarged experience, or aroused indignation of mankind.

And its consistency with the perfect freedom of mankind.

Nor is there anything in this agency inconsistent with the perfect freedom of human actions, and the entire responsibility of every individual by whom it is conducted. There is a difficulty, doubtless, in discerning how a general system, at once of progress and retribution, is conducted by the voluntary acts of a multitude of detached individuals; but this is only one of the many instances in which the human intellect, with all its power, is shattered against the simplest cases of the agency of Supreme Mind upon terrestrial affairs. It is just as difficult to tell how a plant grows, or an infant is formed, or the vital spark communicated, or a stone falls to the ground, or the system of worlds coheres by the mutual attraction of an infinity of particles. And although each individual mind, in the vast system, is a free agent, yet is there nothing in the whole administration inconsistent with such unrestrained agency, or, in the general result, incompatible with the simultaneous operation of a multitude of actors. Every one feels that he is master of his own actions; yet these actions upon the whole, and on an average of men, lead to certain known results; and the great social functions connected with individual existence, the continuance of the species, the coherence of society, and the progress of the world, are securely provided for by the independent actings of an innumerable multitude of separate agents, each obeying the impulse of his active propensities, directed by his free choice. Moreau expressed a fact of general application, explained according to the irreligious ideas of the French Revolution, when he said that "Providence was always on the side of dense battalions;" but he forgot to add, what experience soon taught his country, that it is the moral laws of nature which, in the end, determine on which side the dense battalions are to be found.

Vast effects of the French Revolution in the spread of the Christian religion.

No more striking instance is to be found of the manner in which the ultimate effects of the actions of men are made to deviate from, and sometimes defeat, the original intentions of their authors, than in the final result of the French Revolution upon the progress of the Christian faith. It was begun to throw off the fetters of the Roman Catholic religion, with which its deluded leaders confounded the whole precepts and doctrines of Christianity; and its first triumphs were accordingly signalized by the entire confiscation of the property of the Church, and overthrow of the institutions, and even forms, of religion in the whole of France. What were its final effects on this, the grand object of philosophic ambition, utilitarian industry, and Jacobin revenge? They were to give an impulse to Christianity, unknown since the days when it mounted with Constantine the throne of Rome, to diffuse its blessings over an extent unparalleled in any former age; to extend the Gospel in a purer form, and under brighter auspices, over the remotest parts of the earth; and rear up two powers, each irresistible on its own element, whose forces, specially adapted to the theatres on which they were destined to act, have now given it an irresistible ascendency in human affairs. Voltaire said that "he was tired of hearing how twelve men had established the Christian religion, and he was resolved to show that one could pull it down;" but no man since the days of the apostles has done so much, without intending it, for its establishment and propagation, as Voltaire himself.

By the colonies of England.

The great effect of the wars of the French Revolution was the aggrandizement of the colonial empire of England, and the territorial conquests of Russia. If we contemplate the manner in which, during the early years of the contest, the strength of England was paralyzed by the miserable parsimony which had starved down its military and naval forces in former years, we may well feel astonishment at the blindness of the Democratic principle which had occasioned so lamentable a result. But though this circumstance unquestionably protracted the war for eighteen years after it might have been otherwise terminated, and added at least six hundred millions to the national debt, its effect upon the extension of the British Empire into the remote parts of the world was immense. During the course of this long-continued struggle, the colonies of all the European States successively fell into the hands of England: the British navy obtained a decisive supremacy in every sea, and British commerce gradually acquired an extension unparalleled in any former age of the world. The effect of this prodigious expansion, unobserved during the dangers and animation of the conflict, appeared in the most decisive manner on the termination of hostilities. British commerce, the object of jealous rivalry and anxious

exclusion to all the Continental States, was forcibly turned into new channels, in spite of all the erroneous policy of government, which aimed, by the reciprocity system, at the extension of the markets of the Old World; colonization, invigorated alike by the riches, the poverty, the virtues, the vices, the ambition and luxury, the enjoyments and sufferings, of the mother-country, went on with the steps of a giant; the great development of the Democratic principle consequent on a long course of pacific extensions, impelled the British race, in prodigious multitudes, alike into the Western and the Southern hemispheres; and a hundred thousand emigrants* now annually leave the British islands, to carry into distant lands the power of European art and the blessings of Christian civilization. No such migration of mankind has taken place since the Goths and the Huns overthrew the Roman Empire; no such step in the spread of civilization and the diffusion of the Gospel has been made since it first appeared on the shores of Palestine. To such marvellous and unforeseen results has an overruling Providence conducted the convulsions consequent on the skepticism of Voltaire, the changes emanating from the dreams of Rousseau!

And the conquests of Russia.

But the British navy can reach only maritime shores; British colonization can people only the desert, or the forest inhabited by the savage or the hunter. Great as its powers, when suffered to develop themselves, undoubtedly become, they have need of peace for their extension, and they would at once perish before the efforts of semi-barbarous valour. England may call a new world into existence in the woods of America or the isles of Australasia, but pacific colonists would speedily perish under the sabre of the Tartar: her descendants will never effect a settlement in the interior of Asia. But here, too, the irreligion of the French Revolution has developed a power as irresistible at land as the British navy is at sea, and which, perfectly adapted to the element on which it was intended to prevail, has given to the arms of civilization a decisive superiority in Asia over the forces of barbarism. The military strength of Russia, long restrained by the unwieldy extent of its empire, acquired a surprising extension during the wars of the French Revolution; but it was the invasion of Napoleon, the flames of Moscow, which gave it its full development. When the forces of irreligion had reached the Kremlin, the last hour at once of European infidelity and Mohammedan supremacy had struck. Rolled back with unheard-of rapidity from the Moskwa to the Seine, Revolutionary infidelity perished with the overthrow of its leader: overwhelmed by the might of civilized energy, the squadrons of the Crescent ere long fled before the soldiers of the Cross. Turkey and Persia now drag on a precarious, dependant existence, solely at the pleasure of the Moscovite autocrat: combated with its own weapons, pierced by its own lances, trod down by its own cavalry, the forces of Asia now recoil before the ascending might of Russia. Placed on the frontiers of Europe and Asia, this vast empire unites the forces of both hemispheres, for it has the solid infantry, military skill, and enduring valour of Europe, joined to the powerful multitudes, incomparable horse, and enthusiastic daring of Asia. And both of these great powers, which have sprung up from the effects of the French Revolution, are in the clearest manner adapted to the giant task they are called to perform in the advance of mankind; for British Democracy and colonization could have effected nothing against the Asiatic sabres, and Russian despotism and conquest would have turned aside, of necessity, from the steril and uninviting fields of transatlantic and Australian settlement.

* In the year 1841, the British emigrants amounted to one hundred and six thousand.—LORD STANLEY'S *Speech, Feb. 9th*, 1842, *Parl. Deb.*

Simultaneous rise of steam navigation.

Contemporary with this great development of civilized energy, this awful heave of the human race, has arisen a new power communicated to man, calculated, in an immeasurable manner, to aid the extension of civilization and religion through the desert or barbarous portions of the earth. At the moment when Napoleon's armies were approaching Moscow, when Wellington's legions were combating on the Tormes, STEAM NAVIGATION arose into existence, and a new power was let into human affairs, before which at once the forces of barbarism and the seclusion of the desert must yield. In January, 1812, not one steamboat existed in the world; now, on the rivers beyond the Alleghany Mountains alone, there are five hundred. Even the death-bestridden gales of the Niger will in the end yield to the force of scientific enterprise, and the fountains of the Nile themselves emerge from the solemn obscurity of six thousand years. The great rivers of the world have now become the highways of civilization and religion. The Russian battalions will securely commit themselves to the waves of the Euphrates, and waft again to the plains of Shinar the blessings of regular government and a beneficent faith: remounting the St. Lawrence and the Missouri, the British emigrants will carry into the solitudes of the Far West the Bible and the wonders of European civilization. Such have been the final results of the second revolt of Lucifer, the Prince of the Morning. Was a great and durable impression made on human affairs by the infidel race? No! It was overruled by Almighty Power; on either side it found the brazen walls which it could not pass. In defiance of all its efforts, the British navy and the Russian army rose invincible above its arms; the champions of Christianity in the East, and the leaders of religious freedom in the West, came forth like giants refreshed with wine from the termination of the fight. The infidel race, which aimed at the dominion of the world, served only by their efforts to augment the strength of its destined rulers; and from amid the ruins of its power emerged the ark which was to carry the stream of religion to the Western, and the invincible host which was to spread the glad tidings of the Gospel through the Eastern world.*

General conclusion.

How sin first came into this world, or the creatures of the Divine bounty were permitted to deviate from his precepts and incur his justice, will forever remain a mystery to finite beings. But taking man as he is, variously compounded of great and noble, with base and selfish propensities, with a natural tendency to evil, and yet a perpetual desire to regain his more elevated destiny, the system of the Divine administration is very apparent, and nowhere more conspicuous than in the history of Europe during the French Rev-

* Alison on Population, ii., 526, 527.

olution. It clearly appears that, resting on this basis, assuming as its agents those mingled virtuous and vicious propensities, using the moving power of the active passions and desires of men, there is a system established for the moral government of the world. Provision is made both for the righteous retribution of nations and the general advancement of the species; and it is evident that while signal wickedness or strenuous performance of duty seldom fail, even in this world, to work out their appropriate reward or punishment, the Great Architect of the universe overrules both to the ultimate good at once of the individual, the nation, and the species; and builds up alike from the wisdom and folly, the virtues and vices, the greatness and weakness of men, amid the chastisement and reward, the elevation and destruction of nations, the mighty fabric of general and progressive improvement. Distrusting all plans of social improvement which are not founded on individual reformation, recognising no hope for man but in the subjugation of the wicked propensities of the human heart, acknowledging the necessity of Divine assistance in that Herculean task, the reflecting observer will not, even amid the greatest evils arising from general iniquity, despair of the fortunes of the species; he will recognise in these evils the provision mercifully made for the extirpation of sin by an early experience of its effects; he will observe that there is established in the consequences of these iniquities an unseen agency, destined for their ultimate removal or punishment, and acknowledge that, amid the infinite maze of events, the only sure guide which can be followed is that which is founded on the eternal principles of Supreme Wisdom, human Corruption, spiritual Regeneration, and Christian Charity.

APPENDIX.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

Note A, p. 31.

STATISTICS of the French Empire on the 27th of February, 1813, from Montalivet's *Exposé of the Empire*.

Population of the whole Empire..... 42,700,000 souls.

I. VALUE OF PRODUCTIONS IN AGRICULTURE.

	Francs.	L.
230,000,000 quintals of grain.	2,300,000,000 or	92,000,000
4,000,000 hectolitres of wine.	800,000,000 ..	32,000,000
Woods	100,000,000 ..	4,000,000
Lint	80,000,000 ..	3,200,000
Oil	250,000,000 ..	10,000,000
Tobacco	12,000,000 ..	480,000
Silk	30,000,000 ..	1,200,000
Wool, 120,000,000 lbs., equal to	120,000,000 ..	5,200,000
Carcasses of sheep	56,000,000 ..	2,300,000
Annual increment on 3,500,000 horses, viz., 280,000 four year old horses	75,000,000 ..	3,000,000
Annual consumption of horned cattle, viz., 250,000 cows and oxen, 2,500,000 calves	161,000,000 ..	6,400,000
Skins of these animals	36,000,000 ..	1,500,000
Milk, butter, and cheese	150,000,000 ..	6,000,000
4,900,000 pigs annually consumed	274,000,000 ..	11,000,000
Minerals	50,000,000 ..	2,000,000
Coals	50,000,000 ..	2,000,000
560,000,000 of pounds of salt.	28,000,000 ..	1,120,000
Fruits, vegetables, &c., &c.	450,000,000 ..	18,000,000
Totals	5,032,000,000 ..	201,400,000

II. MANUFACTURES.

	Francs.	L.
Silk manufactures	84,000,000 or	3,360,000
Woollen do.	210,000,000 ..	8,400,000
Linens and lace do.	139,000,000 ..	5,600,000
Cotton goods	235,000,000 ..	9,400,000
Iron manufactures	70,000,000 ..	2,800,000
Glass, coarse linen, &c.	82,000,000 ..	3,280,000
Beer brewed	40,000,000 ..	1,600,000
Cider	60,000,000 ..	2,400,000
New branches of industry, with various lesser articles	65,000,000 ..	2,600,000
	985,000,000 ..	39,440,000
Operations on the rude material, as linen, cotton, cloth.	639,600,000 ..	25,600,000
Total manufacturing industry	1,624,600,000 ..	65,000,000

III. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE.

Foreign and domestic commerce	378,000,000 ..	14,700,000

Summary.

Total agriculture	5,032,000,000 ..	201,400,000
Do. manufactures	1,624,600,000 ..	65,000,000
Foreign commerce and lesser branches	378,000,000 ..	14,700,000
Grand total	7,034,600,000 .	281,400,000
Exports in 1810	376,000,000 ..	15,040,000
Imports	336,000,000 ..	13,500,000

—*Report of* MONTALIVET, *27th of Feb.*, 1813. GOLDSMITH'S *Recueil*, vi., 77, 84, 144.

Note B, p. 31.

The following account of the estimated cost of, and sums actually expended on, the principal great works and architectural structures of Napoleon from 1800 to 1813, will be not a little interesting to the lovers of public improvements and the fine arts :

	Estimate of Total Cost. Francs.	L.	Sums expended from 1800 to 1831. Francs.	L.
Road over the Simplon	9,200,000 or	368,000	6,100,000 or	244,000
" over Mont Cenis	16,000,000 ..	640,000	13,500,000 ..	240,000
" over the Corniche	15,500,000 ..	620,000	6,500,000 ..	260,000
" over Mont Genevre	5,400,000 ..	216,000	2,800,000 ..	112,000
" from Paris to Amsterdam	6,300,000 ..	252,000	4,300,000 ..	172,000
" from Paris to Madrid	8,000,000 ..	320,000	4,200,000 ..	168,000
" from Paris to Hamburg	9,800,000 ..	392,000	6,000,000 ..	240,000
" from Lyons to Chambery	4,000,000 ..	160,000	100,000 ..	4,000
Harbour of Cherbourg			26,000,000 ..	1,240,000
" of Antwerp			18,000,000 ..	720,000
" of Flushing	131,000,000 ..	5,240,000	5,600,000 ..	230,000
" of Havre			252,000 ..	10,500
" of Dunkirk			4,500,000 ..	180,000
Canal of Ourcq at Paris	38,000,000 ..	1,520,000	19,500,000 ..	680,000
" of St. Quintin	11,000,000 ..	440,000	10,000,000 ..	400,000
" of the Seine and Aube	15,000,000 ..	600,000	6,000,000 ..	240,000
" Napoleon	17,000,000 ..	680,000	10,500,000 ..	420,000
" of Burgundy	24,000,000 ..	960,000	6,800,000 ..	272,000
" from Nantes to Brest	28,000,000 ..	1,120,000	1,200,000 ..	48,000
Draining of Rochefort	7,000,000 ..	280,000	3,000,000 ..	120,000
" of Larentan	4,500,000 ..	260,000	2,600,000 ..	104,000
Quays of Paris	15,000,000 ..	600,000	11,000,000 ..	440,000
Church of the Madelaine	8,000,000 ..	320,000	2,000,000 ..	80,000
Bourse	6,000,000 ..	240,000	2,500,000 ..	100,000
Palace of the Legislative Body	3,000,000 ..	120,000	3,000,000 ..	120,000
Palace of the Archives	20,000,000 ..	800,000	1,000,000 ..	40,000
Column in the Place Vendôme	1,500,000 ..	60,000	1,500,000 ..	60,000
Arch of Etoile	9,000,000 ..	360,000	4,500,000 ..	180,000
Jardin des Plantes	3,000,000 ..	120,000	800,000 ..	32,000
Slaughter Houses	13,500,000 ..	530,000	6,700,000 ..	274,000
Markets	8,500,000 ..	340,000	4,000,000 ..	160,000
Halle aux Vins	12,000,000 ..	480,000	4,000,000 ..	160,000
Grande Halle	12,000,000 ..	480,000	2,600,000 ..	104,000
Bridge of Austerlitz	3,000,000 ..	120,000	3,000,000 ..	120,000
" of Jena	6,200,000 ..	248,000	4,800,000 ..	192,000
" of the Arts	900,000 ..	36,000	900,000 ..	36,000
Pantheon at Genevieve	2,500,000 ..	100,000	2,000,000 ..	80,000
Louvre	14,000,000 ..	560,000	11,100,000 ..	440,000
Musée Napoleon	36,000,000 ..	1,440,000	10,300,000 ..	412,000
Arch of the Carrousal	1,400,000 ..	52,000	1,400,000 ..	52,000
Palace of the King of Rome	30,000,000 ..	1,200,000	2,500,000 ..	100,000

—See *Rapport de* MONTALIVET, *25th Feb.*, 1813, *Moniteur*, *26th Feb.*, 1813 ; and GOLDSMITH'S *Recueil*, vi., 77, 120 ; and FAIN, *Guerre de* 1813, i., 80, 91.

Note C, p. 31.

French Finances for the Year 1812.

I. RECEIPTS.

	Receipts to 1st of Jan., 1813. Francs.
Direct Contribution	336,715,106
Regie de l'enregistrement:	
Droits ordinaires	135,162,256
Bois	2,706,387
Administration de douanes:	
Droits ordinaires	64,991,621
Droits extraordinaires	25,474,574
Droits sur le sel	38,779,887
Regie de droits rèunis:	
Droits ordinaires, Tabacs	115,335,770
Loterie	10,058,084
Postes	4,708,656
Sels et tabacs au de là des Alpes	3,881,076
Salines de l'est	3,000,000
Monnaies	1,000,000
Poudres et salpètres:	
Illyrie	7,445,034
Recettes diverses et accidentelles	1,701,396
Recettes extérieures	30,000,000
Total receipts	780,959,847 or £31,238,000

II. EXPENDITURE.

Dette publique et pensions	142,046,343
Liste civile, y compris les princes Français	28,000,000
Grand juge, ministere de la justice	25,683 246
Relations extérieures	8,364,295
Interieur	58,540,028
Finances	23,367,943
Tresor imperial	8,367,889
Guerre (ministère)	295,764,866
Guerre (administration)	187,742,915
Marine (y compris le supplément accordé par le decret du 5 Avril, 1812)	149,022,182
Cultes	16,627,824
Police générale	1,631,341
Frais de negotiations	8,500,000
Fonds de reserve	
Total	953,658,772 or £38,146,000

—*Exercise*, 1812, *au 1st Jan.*, 1813, GOLDSMITH, vi., 144, 145.

CHAPTER LXIX.

Note A, p. 59.

Allied and French Forces at the opening of the Campaign on the Elbe.

I. Allied Troops at the Battle of Lutzen.

RUSSIANS.

Corps of Lieutenant-general Berg	7,450
Corps of Lieutenant-general Winzingerode	10,525
Corps of reserve of General Tormassoff	17,350
Artillery sent to the aid of Blucher	450
Total	35,775

PRUSSIANS.

Corps of Blucher	23,350
Corps of General York	10,000
Detached corps of St. Priest	2,800
Total	36,150
Total, Russians	35,775
Grand total, Allies	71,925

—PLOTHO, vol. i., App., 114.

II. French Troops at the Battle of Lutzen.

Infantry of the Guard	10,000
Cavalry of the Guard	5,000
3 Corps of Marshal Ney	40,000
4 Corps of General Bertrand	20,000
6 Corps of Marshal Marmont	25,000
11 Corps of Marshal Macdonald	15,000
Grand total	115,000

—SCHOELL, *Traités de Paix*, vol. x., p. 213.

Total French Forces in Germany at the opening of the Campaign.

Infantry of the Guard	10,000
Cavalry of the Guard	5,000
2d Corps, Victor	7,400
3d Corps, Ney	40,000
4th Corps, Bertrand	20,000
5th Corps, Lauriston	15,000
Carried forward	97,400
Brought forward	97,400
6th Corps, Marmont	25,000
7th Corps, Regnier	14,000
11th Corps, Macdonald	15,000
12th Corps, Oudinot	25,000
1st Corps of Cavalry, Latour Maubourg	10,000
2d Corps of Cavalry, Sebastiani	6,210
1st Corps, Davoust, detached	10,000
Grand total	202,610
Total cannon	350

—PLOTHO, vol. i., Appendix.

Total Allied Forces in Germany at the opening of the Campaign.

RUSSIANS.—DETACHED CORPS ON THE ELBE.

	Men.	Horses.
Detachment of Tettenborn	1,579	1,685
Detachment of Dorenberg	1,844	505
Detachment of Chernicheff	1,985	1,992
Corps of Woronzow	5,450	
Detachment of Harpe	2,200	
Detachment of Roth	3,000	
Corps of Milaradowitch	11,599	
Free Corps	3,000	
Total	30,657	4,182

RUSSIANS THAT FOUGHT AT LUTZEN—VIZ.

	Men.
Corps of Lieutenant-general Berg	7,450
Corps of Lieutenant-general Winzingerode	10,525
Reserve under Genoral Tormazoff	17,350
Battery sent to the assistance of Blucher	450
Total	35,775

RUSSIANS BETWEEN THE ELBE AND THE VISTULA.

Corps of Barclay de Tolly	13,450
Corps of Sacken	9,800
Army of reserve of Doctoroff	50,000
Blockading Zamosc, General Rowtt	3,000
Blockading force before Dantzig, the Prince of Wirtemberg	15,000
Blockading force before Glogau	1,500
Total	92,750

Summary.

Russians detached on the Elbe	30,657
Russians who fought at Lutzen	35,775
Russians between the Elbe and the Vistula	92,750
Russians—Grand total	159,182

—PLOTHO, vol. i., App., 99.

PRUSSIANS.

Blucher's Corps	16,700
D'York and Kleist's Corps	7,600
Reserve under Stutterheim	3,700
In the field	28,000
Blockading the fortresses, about	37,000
Total—Prussians	65,000
Do. —Russians	159,182
Grand total of Allies	224,182

—PLOTHO, vol. i., App., 126.

Note B, p. 59.

French Force at the Battle of Bautzen.

The Guards under Marshal Mortier	20,000
3d Corps, Ney	20,000
4th Corps, Bertrand	15,000
5th Corps, Lauriston	12,000
6th Corps, Marshal Marmont	20,000
7th Corps, Regnier	14,000
11th Corps, Marshal Macdonald	12,000
12th Corps, Marshal Oudinot	25,000
The Corps of Cavalry under General Latour Maubourg	10,000
Grand total	148,000

Russians and Prussians at the Battle of Bautzen.

RUSSIANS.

The Third Army of the West, under General Barclay de Tolly	13,550
The Advanced Guard of General Milaradowitch	7,550
The Corps-de-bataille of Prince Gorchakoff, the 11th	15,050
The reserve of the Grand-duke Constantine	19,600
The Russian Corps of Lieutenant-general Kleist	2,950
Detached Corps	9,300
Total	68,000

PRUSSIANS.

The Corps of Cavalry under Blucher	16,700
The Corps of Lieutenant-general York and Kleist	7,600
Carried forward	24,300

Brought forward	24,300
The Battalions of Reserve under Lieutenant-colonel Stutterheim	3,700
Total—Prussians	28,000
Do. —Russians	68,000
Grand total	96,000

—SCHOELL, vol. x., p. 211.

CHAPTER LXX.

Note A, p. 119.

Total French Army in Germany at the resumption of Hostilities on the 15th of August, 1813.

Imperial Guard, Infantry.—Marshal the Duke of TREVISO.

Divisions.—*Old Guard.*

	Bats.	Squads.	Infan.	Cav.
Friant, grenadiers	4		6,000	
Curial, chasseurs	4			
Young Guard.				
Dumoutier	8			
Barrois	8			
Boyeldieu	8		22,400	
Roguet	8			
Cavalry.—General NANSOUTY.				
Guyot, grenadiers		6		
Ornano, dragoons		6		
Lefevre Desnouettes, chasseurs		6		5,000
Krazinski, lancers		8		
Guards of Honour		10		
1st Corps.—General VANDAMME at Zittau.				
1 Dumonceau	8			
12 Philippon	8		13,000	
23 Dufour	8			
Brigade Corbineau				1,000
2d Corps.—VICTOR at Zittau.				
4 Teste	8			
5 Corbineau	8			
6 Monton Duverney	8		22,400	
7 Bis	8			
3d Corps.—NEY at Leignitz.				
8 Souham	15			
9 Delmas	13			
10 Albert	13		33,800	
11 Ricard	13			
Brigade Bourmaun		10		1,300
4th Corps.—General BERTRAND at Sprottau.				
12 Morand	8			
15 Fontanelli, Italians	12		20,000	
18 Franquemont, Wirtembergers	8			
5th Corps.—General LAURISTON at Goldberg.				
16 Maison	12			
17 Puthod	10		23,800	
19 Rochambeau	12			
6th Corps.—MARMONT at Bunztlau.				
20 Compans	10			
21 Bonnet	8		18,200	
22 Friedrichs	8			
7th Corps.—General REGNIER at Goerlitz.				
32 Dunette	10			
37 Zecoq (Saxons)	8		24,000	
38 Sahrer (ib.)	8			
39 Marchant (Hessians)	10			
8th Corps (Poles).—PONIATOWSKI at Zittau.				
25 Dombrowsky	8		12,000	
27 Roznietyky	8			
A brigade		6		800
11th Corps.—MACDONALD at Zoewenberg.				
31 Gerard	10			
35 Fressinet	8		18,200	
36 Charpentier	8			
A brigade				1,000
12th Corps.—OUDINOT at Dahme.				
13 Gruyère	10			
14 Guilleminot	14		21,000	
Raglowich (Bavarians)	6			
A brigade		6		800
Carried forward	346	72	234,800	9,900

Division.	Bats.	Squads.	Infan.	Cav.
Brought forward	346	72	234,800	9,900
14th Corps.—ST. CYR at Pirna.				
43 Claparede	9			
44	3		13,500	
45 Rayout	9			
Total	367	72	248,300	9,900
Reserve of Cavalry.—THE KING OF NAPLES.				
1st Corps.—LATOUR MAUBOURG at Goerlitz.				
Light Cavalry, Andenarde		24		
Do. Castex		30		12,000
Cuirassiers, Doumerc		18		
Do. St. Germain		24		
2d Corps.—SEBASTIANI at Leignitz.				
Light Cavalry, Excelmans		28		
Do. Defrance		21		8,300
Cuirassiers, Bordesoult		18		
3d Corps.—ARRIGHI at Leipzic.				
Chasseurs, Jacquinot		24		
Do. Fournier		24		
Dragoons, Lorge		30		6,000
Do.		33		
4th Corps.—KELLERMAN at Zittau.				
Sokolnitzki (Poles)		15		
Ulminski		14		6,000
Sulkonzky		16		
Total Grand Army	367	391	248,300	42,200
Detached Divisions.				
13th corps.—DAVOUST at Hamburg.				
3d, Loison	8			
40th, Pecheux	8		18,000	
41st, Thiebault	8			
A brigade				1,200
AUGEREAU at Wurtzburg, Bamberg, and Bayreuth.				
42d	9			
51st	8		21,000	
52d	13			
5th Corps of Cavalry, MILHAUD.				
Light Cavalry, Piré		12		
Dragoons, Berkhaim		16		3,000
Ib. L'Heiritier		18		
Danes under Davoust			15,000	900
Bavarian Army of Observation on the Inn			22,200	1,800
Total detached	54	54	76,200	6,900
Summary.				
Total of French Grand Army	367	391	248,300	42,200
Total of detached divisions of French Army in Germany	54	54	76,200	6,900
Grand total of French in Germany	421	445	324,500	49,100

—VANDONCOURT, vol. i., p. 128.

PRINCE EUGENE'S Army in Italy, viz.:

	Bats.	Guns.	Men.
1st Division, Quesnel	12	18	7,777
2d Division, Gratien	11	16	8,200
3d Division, Verdier	11	18	7,486
4th Division, Marcognet	11	20	7,189
5th Division, Palombini	12	16	9,562
6th Division, Lecchi	12	16	7,891
RESERVE.			
Three Battalions			2,469
CAVALRY.			
Twelve Squadrons, Mermet			1,800
CANNON.			
Reserve, 12 guns, 6 bombs		18	
Great Parc, 6 guns, 5 bombs		11	
Total	69	133	52,374

—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, xxii., p. 192.

French Blockaded Forces.

The Garrison of Dantzig	20,000
Garrison of Zamosc	4,000
Garrison of Modlin	3,000
Garrison of Stettin	10,000
Carried forward	37,000

	Men.
Brought forward	37,000
The Garrison of Austria	5,000
Garrison of Glogau	6,000
Garrison of Torgau	8,000
Garrison of Wittenberg	5,000
Garrison of Magdebourg	10,000
Garrison of Wurtzburg	1,500
Garrison of Dresden	5,000
Garrison of Freiberg	800
Garrison of Erfurth	2,000
Total	80,300

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App., 90.

Summary of French Forces in Germany and Italy.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
In the field	260,000	42,200
Detached	39,000	4,200
Prince Eugene's army in Italy	50,574	1,800
Blockaded garrisons	80,300	
Danes	15,000	900
Bavarian Army of Observation	22,200	1,800
Total	467,074	50,900
Grand total	517,974	

Allied Forces in Germany and Italy on the Resumption of Hostilities on the 15th of August, 1813.

ALLIED FORCE.	Men.	Cannon.
The Grand Army of Bohemia, under Prince Schwartzenberg	237,770	698
The Army of Silesia, under Blucher	93,322	356
The Army of the North, under the Crown-prince	154,012	387
The Russian Reserve, under Benningsen	57,329	198
The Corps d'Armée of the Prince of Reus	24,750	42
The Austrian Army of Reserve	50,000	120
Total in the field	617,183	1,801
BLOCKADING FORCES.		
Before Dantzig	35,000	
Before Zamosc	14,700	
Before Glogau	29,450	
Before Custrin	8,450	
Before Stettin	14,600	
Total Blockading Force	102,200	
Total in the field	617,183	
Grand total	719,383	

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App., 72.

The composition of this immense force was as follows:

I. AUSTRIANS.

The Grand Army of Bohemia, under Prince Schwartzenberg	130,000
Army under the Prince of Reus on the Inn	24,750
Army of Italy, under Field-marshal Hiller	50,000
Army of Reserve, under the Archduke Ferdinand and the Prince of Wirtemberg	60,000
Total of Austrians	264,750

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App., 26.

II. RUSSIANS.

Russian Troops in the Grand Army of Bohemia.

	Battal.	Squads.	Batteries.	Cossack Regts.	Men.
1. Corps of Wittgenstein	39	36	7	4	22,400
2. Guards under the Grand-duke Constantine	46	72	21½	20	36,020
Total	85	108	28½	24	58,420

Russian Troops in the Silesian Army.

1. Corps of Langeron	46	49	11	7	27,600
2. Corps of Sacken	24	20	5	8	15,000
3. Corps of St. Priest	21	4	3	0	9,400
Total	91	73	19	15	52,000

Russian Troops in the Army of the North.

1. Corps of Winzingerode	11	8	3	8	8,826
2. Corps of Worowzof	7	15	4	8	8,667
3. Corps of Walmoden	11	12	1	18	8,056
Total	29	35	8	34	25,549
The Russian Army of Reserve, under Benningsen	75	68	15	8	57,329
Total in the field	270	284	99½	81	193,298
Infantry					121,092
Cavalry					31,272
Artillery					14,691
Cossacks					26,243
Total Men					193,298
Cannon					834

Army of Reserve under Benningsen.

	Bat.	Squad.	Guns.	Men.
1. Corps of Markow	14	70	38	16,467
2. Corps of Doctoroff	29	25	120	26,571
3. Corps of Count Osterman Tolstoi	30	27	40	17,045
Total	73	122	198	60,083

Effective in the Field.

Infantry	40,449
Cavalry and Cossacks	12,886
Artillery and Pioneers	3,944
Total Men	57,477
Cannon	198

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App., 8.

Army of the Prince of Reus on the Inn.

Infantry	16,450
Cavalry	7,250
Artillery	1,050
Total	24,750

Corps in Italy under Hiller. 50,000

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App., 70.

CHAPTER LXXI.

Note A, p. 161.

Number of different persons who were quartered in Dresden and its suburbs during the periods undermentioned, viz.:

	New Town.	Old Town.	Suburbs.	Frederichstadt.	Total.
From the 26th of February to the 25th of March, 1813	117,338	67,250	43,832	8,385	236,805
From the 26th of March to the 7th of May	208,600	95,862	49,128	21,137	374,727
From the 8th of May to the 14th of June	499,146	274,709	273,832	90,513	1,088,293
From the 15th of June to the 15th of November	1,635,275	1,270,457	1,523,595	633,344	5,062,871
From the 16th of November to the 31st of December	280,375	162,646	110,068	61,160	614,249
From the 1st of January to the 31st of December, 1814	1,346,971	463,465	724,735	177,174	2,712,345
	4,087,705	2,334,389	2,725,190	991,713	10,089,290

—ODELEBEN, *Campagne de* 1813 EN SAXE, vol. ii., p., 287.

Note B, p. 161.

Three different approximative statements of the force of the French army received at the headquarters of the allies:

Assembled in front of Dresden, and opposed to the great Allied Army.

	Aug. 13th.	Sept. 20th.	Sept. 24th.
Old Guard	6,607	4,000	25,000
Young Guard	32,000	24,000	3,000
Cavalry of the Guard	10,500	6,000	
Vandamme	25,000	4,000	6,000
Victor	21,000	18,000	14,000
Marmont	30,000	20,000	18,000
Poniatowsky	15,000	10,000	11,000
St. Cyr	31,000	20,000	20,000
Latour Maubourg's Cavalry	10,000	6,000	7,000
Total	181,107	112,000	104,000

Opposed to the Northern Army, under the Crown-prince.

	Aug. 13.	Sept. 20.	Sept. 24.
Bertrand	21,000	14,000	15,000
Regnier	20,000	8,000	6,000
Oudinot	24,000	10,000	18,000
Arrighi and Kellerman (Cavalry)	10,000	7,000	6,000
Total	75,000	39,000	45,000

Opposed to Blucher in Silesia.

Souham	32,000	22,000	18,000
Lauriston	35,000	10,000	3,000
Macdonald	21,000	14,000	12,000
Sebastiani and Milhaud (Cavalry)	13,000	3,000	5,000
Total on the right	101,000	49,000	38,000
Grand total	357,107	200,000	187,000

—BURGHERSH'S *War in Germany in* 1813, p. 316.

Note C, p. 163.

HOLOGRAPH NOTES OF NAPOLEON ON PLANS OF THE CAMPAIGN AT DRESDEN.

First Note.—Position of the Enemy.

"It appears certain that the enemy's army of Silesia will move on Wittemberg, and that the grand army of Tœplitz will make a movement to its left.

"The enemy's army of Silesia cannot be considered less than sixty thousand men, with the corps of York, of Blucher, and of Langeron.

"The army of Berlin, composed of a Swedish corps, a Russian corps, and the corps of Bulow and of Tauenzien, ought not to be less.

"There will be then upon the Lower Elbe an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men: it is doubtful whether it has not detached a body towards Hamburg.

"The army of Tœplitz—composed of Austrians, of a Prussian corps, and of a Russian corps—cannot be considered less than a hundred and twenty thousand men. The project of the allies, then, will be to march two large armies, one by the right, the other by the left, and to oblige the emperor to quit Dresden."

Second Note.—Position of the French Army.

"The fourth and seventh corps, under the orders of the Prince of Moskwa, are on the Lower Elbe.

"The Duke of Ragusa, with the first corps of cavalry and the third of infantry, on Eilenburg and Torgau. These two armies form, together, a force of eighty thousand men, covering the left.

"The first, the fourteenth, the second, the fifth, and the eighth, form a force of seventy thousand men, covering the right.

"*Enfin*, the eleventh, the Guard, and the second corps of cavalry, forming a force of sixty thousand men, are in the centre."

Third Note.—What should be done.

"It will be ascertained this evening if all the army of Silesia, or only a part of it, has marched on Wittemberg.

"In the one or the other hypothesis, one may retake the offensive by the right bank, and move upon Torgau with the Guard and the eleventh corps; there join the second and third; and thus, with an army of a hundred thousand men, debouch from Torgau by the right bank, on the bridges of the enemy.

"All the corps which cover the right will retire before the enemy upon Dresden as soon as they shall have perceived the movement, and, if necessary, give up Dresden to move upon Torgau."

Another Project.

"This project will consist in moving all the forces on Leipsic in entirely giving up Dresden.

"For that object, the eleventh, the Guards, and the second corps of cavalry will set out for Wurtzen; the third and fifth will move upon Coblentz; the first and the fourteenth will move upon Dresden.

"Having thus sacrificed the magazines, the fortifications, and the hospitals, we will try to beat the right wing of the enemy; and if we succeed, we will return to Dresden.

"If we do not succeed in beating the right wing of the enemy because they get out of our reach, we will evidently be obliged to take the line of the Saale."

Third Project.

"Fortify the left wing of the eleventh corps, and await the course of events in that position.

"*Dresden, 5th of October*, 1813."

Other Notes on the Situation of the Army.

"It is impossible to enter winter-quarters at Dresden without a battle. There are two plans to follow:

"The one, to watch Dresden, and to seek an engagement; *enfin*, to return there, and to find all things in the same position, if we conquer.

"The other, to leave Dresden entirely; endeavour to give battle; and, if we gain it, to return to Dresden, in beating the Austrian army in Bohemia. We will then not arrive but accidentally at Dresden; because, even after we have gained the battle, there is no Elbe during the winter, and it is hardly possible to carry on offensive operations; and then Dresden cannot be the centre of operations. It would much more naturally be at Leipsic, or at Magdebourg."

Movements on the first Plan.

"If we wish to preserve Dresden, it will be necessary to act in the following manner:

"To intrust the guard of Dresden to the first and fifteenth corps.

"To leave the second, the fifth, and the eighth in observation at Chemnitz and Freyberg, and to give battle with the sixth, the third, the fourth, the seventh, the eleventh, and the Guard."

Movements on the second Plan.

"It will be necessary to place, the day after to-morrow, the second, the fifth, and the eighth corps, the last on Altenburg, and not move on Dresden, holding Chemnitz, but as if they came from Leipsic; to march the first and the fourteenth on Dresden, to follow up the movement; or, perhaps, to bring up the first and the fourteenth, and to place them in like manner on the road from Nossen, near the heights of Waldheino, having their rear at Leipsic."

Difference of the two Plans.

"In the first plan, being obliged to leave the second and the fifth corps, the rear, at Dresden, they may be reached by the enemy, who may move on Altenburg, and from thence may advance so quickly on Leipsic that that town will find itself exposed; and that the troops which will be left at Dresden can, by the slightest fault, be compromised, and, in place of evacuating Dresden, be driven from it.

"In the second plan, as they may form in the end two armies, which one may place in the natural order in which they find themselves, preserve the central position, to march either to the right or left.

"The emperor having gone from Dresden, the first and fourteenth corps, the second and fifteenth, may not understand their position, and be unable to combine their operations, and may find themselves cut off.

"In the first plan, I have left the corps to guard Dresden; it is then necessary that his majesty should undertake that business, and that he should remain either in Dresden or the environs. In that case they lose many opportunities on the left; it is even doubtful that his majesty not being present in person, it is advantageous to give battle. If we chance to lose it, the position will become such that it will be necessary to save ourselves from the Elbe on the Saale."
—NORVIN'S *Portefeuille de* 1813, ii., p. 570.

Note D, p. 169.

French Army at Leipsic.

Right Wing.—Under the command of the KING OF NAPLES.

	Infantry	Cavalry.
8th Corps, Prince Poniatowsky	8,000	
2d Corps, Victor	16,000	
4th Corps of Cavalry, Kellerman		3,000
Centre.		
Corps of	10,000	
5th Corps, General Lauriston	9,000	
11th Corps, Macdonald	15,000	
1st Corps of Cavalry, General Latour Maubourg		4,500
2d Corps of Cavalry, General Sebastiani		4,500
5th Corps of Cavalry, General Milhaud		3,000
Left Wing.—Under the command of NEY.		
6th Corps, Marmont	18,000	
3d Corps, General Souham	15,000	
7th Corps, General Regnier	8,000	
3d Corps of Cavalry, Arrighi		3,000
Total	99,000	18,000
Behind Leipsic.		
4th Corps, General Bertrand	15,000	
Reserve.		
Old Guard, Mortier	4,000	
Young Guard, Oudinot	26,000	
Cavalry of the Guard, General Nansouty		4,800
Grand total	144,000	22,800
	166,800	

Not taken in.

The first and fourteenth Corps, at Dresden.
The thirteenth Corps, at Hamburg.
—VAUDONCOURT, *Campagne de* 1813, p. 201.

N.B.—Plotho, Kausler, and the German writers, make the French forces 140,000 infantry and 35,000 cavalry; or, in all, 175,000, which is probably nearly the truth.—KAUSLER, 932.

Allied Army at Leipsic.

	Men.
Austrians under Schwartzenberg:	
Hesse-Homberg	20,000
Meerfeldt	20,000
Klenau	15,000
Total	55,000
Russians:	
Wittgenstein	20,000
Barclay de Tolly	35,000
Total	55,000
Carried forward	110,000

	Men.	
Brought forward		110,000
Prussians:		
Kleist	20,000	
Ziethen	5,000	
Platow	5,000	
Total		30,000
Army of Blucher:		
Langeron	30,000	
York	25,000	
Sacken	15,000	
Total		70,000
Corps de Giulay		20,000
Total in the field on the first day		230,000

Number of the Allies who fought on the 18th.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Men.	Guns.
Army of Bohemia, Schwartzenberg	128,850	29,550	158,400	626
Army of Reserve, Benningsen	23,000	5,000	28,000	132
Army of Silesia, Blucher	46,000	10,600	56,600	356
Army of the North, Prince Royal of Sweden	36,450	11,000	47,450	270
Grand total	234,300	56,150	290,450	1,384

—KAUSLER, p. 931.

Blockading Forces.

	Men.
Corps at Dantzig	29,100
" at Zamosc	10,300
" at Glogau	12,600
" at Modlin	4,000
Total	56,000

Total Russian Force in Germany.

In the field	193,298
Blockading force	56,000
Grand total of Russians	249,298

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App., 32.

III. PRUSSIANS.

	Battalions of the line.	Battalions of landwehr.	Jager Companies.	Squadrons of the line.	Squadrons of landwehr.	Batteries.
Royal Guard	6	..	2	8	..	2
1 Corps	20	24	4	28	16	13
2 Corps	24	16	4	28	14	16
3 Corps	28	12	2	29	16	10
4 Corps	11	69	..	..	58	11
Corps of Walmoden	5	..	..	5	..	1
Blockading force before Glogau	..	..	..	..	4	2
Blockading force before Dantzic	..	..	..	..	6	1
Total	94	121	12	98	114	56

Infantry of the Line	72,200
Landwehr Infantry	112,000
Jager Infantry	2,400
Pioneers	700
Cavalry of the line	14,700
Landwehr Cavalry	17,400
Artillery	8,100
Total	227,500

Summary.

Infantry	190,300
Cavalry	32,100
Artillery	8,100
Grand total of Prussians	230,500

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App., 23.

IV. SWEDES AND ENGLISH TROOPS FROM THE NORTH OF GERMANY.

	Battal.	Squad.	Batter.	Gunners.	Men.
Swedes	35	32	9	62	24,018
English	4	6		6	3,000
Swedes and English					27,018

Composition and Strength of the different Armies employed.

ARMY OF SILESIA.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Cossacks.
Corps of D'York	29,783	6,033	1,917	
Corps of Sacken	9,600	2,000	1,000	3,600
Corps of Langeron	18,464	2,800	2,600	4,400
Corps of St. Priest	8,400	2,920	600	1,200
Total	66,247	13,753	6,117	9,200

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App., 51.

Infantry	66,247
Cavalry	13,753
Artillery	6,117
Cossacks	9,200
Total	95,317
Cannon	536

ARMY OF THE NORTH.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Cossacks.
Swedish Army	18,573	3,742	1,703	
Corps of Winzingerode	5,465	834	583	2,214
Corps of Woronzof	4,262	2,910	883	4,197
Corps of Walmoden	19,635	3,850	561	1,350
Corps of Bulow	32,000	6,350	1,800	1,200
Corps of Tauenzien	33,000	5,200	700	
Total	112,935	22,886	6,230	8,961

Infantry	112,936
Cavalry	22,886
Artillery	6,230
Cossacks	8,961
English Troops	3,000
Grand total	154,013

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App., 62.

GRAND ARMY OF BOHEMIA.

	Battal.	Squad.	Batteries.	Cossack Regim.	Men.
Austrians	112	124	45		130,850
Russians:					
Wittgenstein	39	36	5	4	58,420
Reserve and Guards	46½	72	21½	21	
Prussians:					
Kleist	41	44	14		48,500
Guards	6½	8	2		
Total	245	284	87½	25	237,770

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Cossacks.
Austrians	99,300	24,800	6,750	
Russians	34,600	10,900	5,750	7,200
Prussians	38,300	7,800	2,400	
Total	172,200	43,500	14,900	7,200

Infantry	172,200
Cavalry	43,500
Artillery	14,900
Cossacks	7,200
Grand total, Men	237,770
Cannon	698

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App., 44.

CHAPTER LXXII.

Note A, p. 206.

Military Force of Great Britain, and its Cost, in the year 1813.

	Men.	Great Britain. Charge.	Ireland. Charge.
Land-forces (including various contingencies)	227,442	£3,196,188	£331,012
British regiments in the East Indies	28,009	836,649	..
Troops and companies for recruiting do	533	30,236	..
Imbodied militia	93,210	1,983,961	1,098,529
Staff and garrisons	..	513,792	109,226
Full pay to supernumerary officers	..	32,088	940
Public departments	..	308,201	11,960
Half-pay	..	206,250	25,443
In-pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham hospitals	..	39,284	18,332
Out-pensioners of ditto	..	432,695	91,239
Widows' pensions	..	50,011	8,103
Volunteer corps, cavalry	68,000	209,237	266,123
Local militia	304,000	636,623	..
Foreign corps	32,163	1,174,019	31,623
Royal Military College	..	38,993	..
Royal Military Asylum	..	23,096	..
Allowance to retired chaplains	..	19,394	1,923
Medicines and hospital expenses	..	105,000	22,061
Compassionate list	..	30,055	..
Barrack department (Ireland)	..	..	460,583
Commissariat department (Ireland)	..	..	295,605
Superannuated allowances	..	11,630	4,334
Total military force	753,357		
Carried forward	753,357	13,921,494	3,213,063

	Men.	Great Britain. Charge.	Ireland. Charge.
Brought forward ..	753,357	£13,921,494	£3,213,063
Deduct Local M. and Volunt.....	372,000		
Total regulars and militia.....	381,357	13,921,494	3,213,063
Deduct regts. in the East Indies	28,009	836,649	..
Remain to be provided for, 1813.....	353,348	13,044,844	3,213,063
Regulars and militia, exclusive of the native troops in the East Indies, who were	201,000		

—*Parliamentary Debates*, vol. xxiv., p. 346.

Note B, p. 207.

Public Income of Great Britain for the year 1813, *ending January* 5, 1814.

Permanent Revenue.

	Nett Produce.
Customs	£8,086,313
Excise.....	18,526,839
Stamps.....	5,552,460
Land and assessed taxes.....	7,803,459
Postoffice.....	1,619,136
Pensions, 1*s.* in the pound	20,423
Salaries, 6*d.* in the pound	12,151
Hackney-coaches.....	22,245
Hawkers and pedlers.....	18,201
Total permanent and annual duties.....	41,661,227

Small Branches of the Hereditary Revenue.

Alienation fines.....	£8,392
Post fines.....	3,953
Seizures	22,638
Composition and proffers.....	586
Crown lands.....	83,303

Extraordinary Resources and War-taxes.

Customs.....	£3,235,358
Excise.....	6,113,853
Property-tax.....	14,588,286
Arrears of income-duty.....	1,593
Lottery, nett profit (of which one third part is for the service of Ireland).....	238,666
Moneys paid on account of the interest of loans raised for the service of Ireland...	3,198,956
On account of the balance due by Ireland on joint expenditure of the United Kingdom	3,956,286
On account of the commissioners for issuing exchequer bills for Grenada.....	54,200
On account of the commissioners for issuing commercial exchequer bills	490,591
On account of the interest of a loan, &c., granted to the Prince-regent of Portugal	53,130
Surplus fees of regulated public offices.....	107,355
Interest money repaid by sundry public accountants, &c., including interest	56,504
Other moneys paid to the public	65,660
Total, independent of loans	£73,940,537
Loans paid into the exchequer, including £6,000,000 for the service of Ireland....	35,050,534
Grand total	£108,991,071

—*Annual Register for* 1814, page 367.

Public Expenditure of Great Britain for the year 1813, *ending January 5th*, 1814.

I. For interest on the public debt of Great Britain unredeemed, including annuities for lives and terms of years			£39,815,846
II. Interest on exchequer bills.....			2,081,529
III. Civil list.....		£1,028,000	
IV. Other charges on the Consolidated Fund, viz:			
Courts of justice		69,992	
Mint.....		13,333	
Allowance to royal family		332,412	
Salaries and allowances.....		67,955	
Bounties.....		79,956	
			1,591,648
V. Civil government of Scotland.....			133,176
VI. Other payments in anticipation of the exchequer receipts, bounties for fisheries, manufactures, corn, &c.....		228,341	
Pensions on the hereditary revenue.....		2,770	
Militia and deserters' warrants.....		134,614	
			365,725
VII. Navy.....		11,372,513	
The victualling department.....		6,568,320	
The transport service.....	£3,565,790		
Miscellaneous service.....	490,000		
		4,055,790	
			21,996,623
VIII. Ordinance.....			3,404,527
IX. Army, viz.:—Ordinary services.....		18,500,790	
Extraordinary services and subsidies.....		22,262,951	
		40,763,741	
Deduct the remittances and advances to other countries.....		11,294,416	
			29,469,325
X. Loans, &c., to other countries, viz.:			
Ireland		4,700,416	
Sicily	600,000		
Portugal.....	2,000,000		
Spain.....	1,697,136		
Sweden.....	1,563,804		
Russia	1,758,436		
Prussia	1,757,669		
Austria	545,612		
Hanover	15,166		
Holland.....	419,996		
North of Europe.....	963,174		
Emperor of Morocco.....	14,419		
		11,335,412	
			16,035,828
Total expenditure.....			£114,761,000
XI. Miscellaneous services:			
At home		3,507,934	
Abroad.....		497,890	
			4,005,824
			£118,766,875
Deduct sums which, although included in this account, form no part of the expenditure of Great Britain, viz.:			
Loan for Ireland.....		4,300,416	
Interest at 1 per cent., and management on Portuguese loan.....		57,170	
Principal, interest, &c. of commercial exchequer bills		4,525	
Sinking Fund on loan to the East India Company.....		141,091	
			4,503,202
			£114,263,673

—*Annual Register for* 1814, p. 374.

Note C, p. 211.

TABLE I. *Exhibiting the Progress of the Sinking Fund from its commencement, in* 1786, *to* 1813.

	Stock redeemed.	Money applied to redemption of debt in Sinking Fund.
At 1st Feb., 1787	£662,750	
.. 1788	1,503,054	£1,000,000
.. 1789	1,506,350	150,000
.. 1790	1,558,850	152,250
.. 1791	1,587,500	157,367
.. 1792	1,507,100	162,479
.. 1793	1,962,650	1,834,281
.. 1794	2,174,405	1,634,615
.. 1795	2,804,945	1,872,957
.. 1796	3,083,455	2,143,596
.. 1797	4,390,670	2,639,724
.. 1798	6,790,023	3,369,218
.. 1799	8,102,875	4,294,325
.. 1800	10,550,094	4,649,871
.. 1801	10,713,168	4,767,992
.. 1802	10,491,325	5,310,511
.. 1803	9,436,389	5,922,979
.. 1804	13,181,667	6,287,940
.. 1805	12,860,629	6,851,200
.. 1806	13,759,697	7,615,167
.. 1807	15,341,799	8,323,329
.. 1808	16,064,962	9,479,165
.. 1809	16,181,689	10,188,607
.. 1810	16,656,643	10,904,451
.. 1811	17,884,234	11,660,601
.. 1812	20,733,354	12,502,860
.. 1813	24,246,059	13,483,160
.. 1814	27,522,230	15,379,262

—MOREAU'S *Tables given in* PEBRER, p. 154 and 247.

TABLE II. *Showing the progressive Diminution of the Sinking Fund and Growth of the Deficit from* 1813 *to* 1840—*year ending*

	Deficit of Revenue.	Stock redeemed.	Money applied to redemption of debt in Sinking Fund.
1st Feb., 1814	..	£27,522,230	£15,379,262
.. 1815	..	22,559,683	14,120,963
.. 1816	..	24,001,083	13,452,096
.. 1817	..	23,117,841	1,826,814
5th Jan., 1818	..	19,460,982	1,624,606
.. 1819	..	19,648,469	3,163,130
.. 1820	..	31,191,702	1,918,019
.. 1821	..	24,518,885	4,104,457
.. 1822	..	23,605,981	2,962,564
.. 1823	..	17,966,680	5,261,725
.. 1824	..	4,828,530	6,456,559
.. 1825	..	10,583,132	9,900,725
.. 1826	..	3,313,834	1,195,531
.. 1827	..	2,886,528	2,023,028
.. 1828	..	7,281,414	4,667,965
.. 1829	..	4,964,807	2,670,093
.. 1830	..	2,732,162	1,935,465
.. 1831	..	3,469,216	2,763,858
.. 1832	..	7,364	5,696
.. 1833	..	1,439,261	1,023,784
.. 1834	..	2,561,866	1,776,378
.. 1835	..	1,942,111	1,270,050
.. 1836	..	2,232,142	1,590,727
.. 1837	..	1,932,671	1,252,041
.. 1838	£1,428,000	..	..
.. 1839	430,000	..	..
.. 1840	1,457,000	..	..
.. 1841	1,851,000	..	..
.. 1842	2,456,000	..	..

—MOREAU'S *Tables*, and PEBRER, 247, and *Parl. Papers*, *May* 18, 1841, and *Finance Accounts for* 1837–39, and 1841.

Note D, p. 216.

Imperial Muster Rolls of the Armies in Spain, March 15, 1813.

	Present under Arms.		Detached.			Total.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospitals.	Men.	Cavalry.	Train.
Army of the South	36,605	6,602	2,060	1,617	7,144	45,809	8,650	2,601
Army of the Centre	16,227	1,966	940	76	2,401	19,568	2,790	451
Army of Portugal	34,825	3,654	157	—	7,731	42,713	6,726	2,141
Army of Arragon	36,315	3,852	55	—	2,442	38,812	6,123	1,799
Army of Catalonia	27,323	1,109	110	—	2,013	29,446	1,884	635
Army of the North	40,476	1,978	41	—	8,032	48,547	3,171	830
Army of Bayonne	3,877	55	80	—	634	6,591	78	21
Total	195,648	19,216	3,443	1,693	30,397	231,486	29,422	8,478

—NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, vol. v., p. 618. *Imperial Muster Rolls.*

Note E, p. 224.

Morning State of the Anglo-Portuguese Army, June 21, 1813.

	Present.		Total.	
	Under Arms.	On Command.	Present.	On Command.
British Cavalry	7,791	851		
Portuguese Cavalry	1,452	225		
Total Cavalry			9,243	1,076
British Infantry	23,658	1,771		
Portuguese Infantry	23,905	1,038		
Total Infantry			47,563	2,809
Sabres and bayonets			56,806	3,885
Deduct the 6th Division, left at Medina de Pomar			6,320	
Total sabres and bayonets			50,486	3,885

Spanish Auxiliaries.

	Men.
Infantry:	
Murillo's Division, about	3,000
Giron's Division, about	12,000
Carlos d'Espagna's Division, about	3,000
Longa's Division, about	3,000
Cavalry:	
Renne Villemur, about	1,000
Julian Sanchey, about	1,000
Total Spanish	23,000
Total Anglo-Portuguese	50,486
Grand total	73,486
Cannon	90

—NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, vol. v., p. 622.

Note F, p. 231.

Detailed State of the Spanish Army, July, 1813, *when Soult took the command.*

Right Wing.—Lieutenant-general REILLE.

	Effective Men.	Horses.	Total Effective Men.	Total Horses.	Effective and Non-effective Men.	Grand Total.
1st Division, Foy, 9 battalions	5,922	189			6,748	
7th Division, Maucune, 7 battalions	4,186	110	17,235	450	5,676	21,330
9th Division, La Martiniere, 11 battalions	7,127	151			8,906	
Centre.—DROUET, Count D'ERLON.						
2d Division, D'Armagnac, 8 battalions	6,961	116			8,580	
3d Division, Arbé, 9 battalions	8,030	285	20,959	624	8,728	23,935
6th Division, Daricau, 8 battalions	5,968	223			6,627	
Left Wing.—Lieutenant-general CLAUSEL.						
4th Division, Conroux, 9 battalions	7,056	150			7,477	
5th Division, Vandermoeren, 7 battalions	4,181	141	17,218	432	5,201	20,265
8th Division, Taupin, 10 battalions	5,981	141			7,587	
Carried forward			55,412	1,506		65,530

	Effective Men.	Horses.	Total Effective Men.	Total Horses.	Effective and Non-effective Men.	Grand Total.
Brought forward			55,412	1,506		65,530
Reserve.—General VILLATTE.						
French	14,959	2,091	14,959			17,929
Foreign, 4 battalions of the Rhine 4 battalions of Italians, General St. Pol 4 battalions of Spaniards, General Casabianca	Strength of these not given.					
Cavalry.—PIERRE SOULT.						
22 Squadrons	4,723	4,416	7,081	6,691	5,098	7,621
Ditto Trielhard	2,358	2,275			2,523	
Total, according to the organization in the field, exclusive of the foreign battalions			77,452	10,288		91,080

Detached.	Men under Arms.	Effective and Non-effective Men.
Troops not in the field	14,938	16,946
General Rey, garrison of St. Sebastian, 1st of July, forming part of this number	2,731	3,086
Cassan, ditto, of Pampeluna, 1st of July	2,951	3,121
Lammette, ditto, of Santona, 1st of May	1,045	1,674
Second Reserve, not in the above	5,595	6,103

SUMMARY.

Grand total: Effective men, 104,710. Horses, 10,676. Effective and Non-effective men, 122,016.

Note G, p. 246.

Detailed State of the French Army in Spain, Sept. 16, 1813.

Right Wing.

	Men.	Present under Arms.	Effective and Non-effective Men.
Foy	5,002		
Maucune	4,166		
Mene	5,707		
		14,875	
Centre.			
D'Armagnac	4,358		
Abbé	5,903		
Maransin	4,842		
		15,103	
Left Wing.			
Conrad	4,736		
Roguet	5,982		
Taupin	5,071		
		15,789	
			45,767
Reserve.			
Villatte	8,256		
The Italian brigade, about 2000, ordered to Milan	2,000		
Carried forward	10,256		45,767

	Men.	Present under Arms.	Effective and Non-effective Men.
Brought forward	10,256		45,767
Provisional troops of the Right Wing, destined to re-enforce the garrison of Bayonne	2,168		12,424
Cavalry.			
Pierre Soult	4,456	4,617	
Trielhard, ditto	2,368	2,583	
Gens d'armes, mounted	291		
" " dismounted	1,210		
			8,325
Detached.	Men.	Horses.	
Parc	895	885	
Engineers	504	127	
GARRISONS.			
Pampeluna	3,805	191	
San Sebastian, prisoners of war	2,366		
Santona	1,633		
Bayonne	4,631	137	
St. Jean Pied de Port	1,786		
Navarens	842		
Castle of Lourdes	107		
	16,569		
Deduct garrison of San Sebastian	2,366		
			14,203
Grand total present under arms			80,719

—NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, vol. vi., p. 708.

No. 1.—*General State of the French Armies under Soult and Suchet, extracted from the Imperial Muster Rolls, July*, 1813.

	Present under Arms.		Detached.			Total.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospitals.	Men.	Horses.
Army of Spain	97,983	12,676	2,110	392	14,074	114,167	13,028
Army of Arragon	32,362	4,919	3,621	551	3,201	39,184	5,470
Army of Catalonia	25,910	1,869	168	..	1,374	27.457	1,774
Grand total	156,255	19,464	5,899	943	18,654	180,808	20,242

No. 2.—*September* 15, 1813.

Army of Spain	81,351	11,159	4,004	1,438	22,488	107,843	11,272
Army of Arragon	32,476	4,447	2,721	320	3,616	38,813	6,305
Army of Catalonia	24,026	1,670	120	..	2,137	26,283	2,497
Grand total	137,853	17,276	6,845	1,758	28,241	172,939	20,074

Note H, p. 232.

No. 1.—*Force of the Anglo-Portuguese Army under Wellington, from the original Morning State for July* 24, 1813.

	Officers, Serg'ts, &c.	Rank and File.	Total. Men.	Horses.
British and German Cavalry present under arms	916	5,834	6,750	5,834
Ditto Infantry	4,665	29,926	34,581	..
Portuguese Cavalry	251	1,241	1,492	1,178
Ditto Infantry	2,849	20,565	23,495	..
Total sabres and bayonets, exclusive of sick and absent	8,726	57,566	66,282	7,012
Artillerymen and drivers			4,000	
Grand total			70,282	14,024

No. 2.—*Anglo-Portuguese Force, extracted from the original Morning State, 15th of October*, 1813.

	Officers, Serg'ts, &c.	Rank and File.	Total.
British and German Cavalry and Infantry	5,859	37,250	43,109
Portuguese ditto	4,253	21,274	25,526
Total sabres and bayonets, exclusive of sick and absent	10,112	58,524	68,635
Brought forward	10,112	58,524	68,635
Artillerymen and drivers			4,000
Grand total			72,635

Anglo-Portuguese Force, from the original Morning State, 16th of October, 1813.

British and German Cavalry and Infantry	5,356	39,687	45,043
Portuguese ditto	2,990	22,237	25,227
Total sabres and bayonets, exclusive of sick and absent on command	8,346	61,924	70,270
Artillerymen and drivers			4,000
Grand total			74,270

Sir Rowland Hill's Force at the Battle of St. Pierre, extracted from the original Morning State of December 13, 1813.

SECOND DIVISION.

British	802	5,371	6,173
Portuguese	277	2,331	2,608
Lecor's Portuguese Division	507	4,163	4,670
Total under arms, exclusive of Artillerymen		11,865	13,451

—NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, vol.

Note I, p. 244.

No. 1.—*Extracted from the official State of the Allied Army, commanded by Lieutenant-general Sir John Murray, at the Col di Balaguer, June 17, 1813, exclusive of Officers, Sergeants, and Drummers.*

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total Men.
British and German Cavalry	739	12	6	733	...	757
British, Portuguese and Sicilian Artillery	783	8	197	362	604	990
British Engineers and Staff Corps	78	5	36	...	...	119
British and German Infantry	7,226	830	637	...	...	8,693
Whittingham's Infantry	4,370	503	316	...	...	5,189
Sicilian Infantry	935	121	272	...	...	1,378
Grand total	14,181	1,479	1,466	1,095	604	17,126

No. 2.—*Extract from the original weekly State of the Anglo-Sicilian Force, commanded by Sir William Clinton, Headquarters, Taragona, September 25, 1813, exclusive of Officers, Sergeants, and Drummers.*

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total Men.
Cavalry	663	61	215	875	40	939
Artillery, Engineers, and Staff Corps	997	67	58	507	896	1,122
Infantry	9,124	1,390	1,019	115	429	11,533
Grand total	10,784	1,518	1,292	1,497	1,365	13,594

—NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, vol. vi., p. 704.

Note K, p. 233.

The following is the state of the 92d Regiment at the time of the battle in the Puerta de Mayas.—Return of the number of each country composing the 1st Battalion of the 92d Highland Regiment, taken from the Prize List, Vittoria, 1813:

Country.	Serg'ts.	Corp.	Drum.	Priv.	Total.
Scotland	56	47	8	784	895
England	..	..	2	34	36
Ireland	..	2	1	58	61
Foreign	1	..	3	..	4
Unknown	..	3	..	14	17
Grand total	57	52	14	890	1,013

Copy extracted from Inspection Report, 1st Battalion, 92d Highland Regiment, 15th of October, 1813.

Scotland	62	45	13	702	822
England	..	..	2	32	34
Ireland	..	2	1	59	62
Foreign	..	..	..	1	1
Grand total	62	47	16	794	919

For these, to Scotchmen, interesting details, the author is indebted to the kindness of Lieutenant-colonel Macdonald, the present commander of that distinguished corps, to whom he is happy to make this public acknowledgment.

CHAPTER LXXIII.

Appendix A, p. 269.

Public Income of Great Britain for the year 1814, *ending January 5th*, 1815.

Permanent Revenue.

Customs	£8,689,068	
Excise	19,451,102	
Stamps	5,826,363	
Land and assessed taxes	7,889,084	
Postoffice	1,799,206	
Pensions, one shilling in the pound	19,504	
Salaries, sixpence in the pound	11,992	
Hackney-coaches	24,081	
Hawkers and pedlers	15,910	
Total permanent and annual duties		£43,726,210
Small branches of the hereditary revenue		128,666

Extraordinary Resources.

Customs	£3,345,670	
Excise	6,401,097	
Property-tax	14,814,101	
Arrears of income duty	1,205	
Lottery nett profit (of which one third part is for the service of Ireland)	334,853	
		£43,854,876
Carried forward	24,896,926	
Brought forward	24,896,926	£43,854,876
Moneys paid on account of the interest of loans raised for the service of Ireland	3,534,255	
On account of balance due by Ireland on joint expenditure of the United Kingdom	2,770,000	
On account of the commissioners for issuing Exchequer bills for Grenada	60,200	
On account of the interest of a loan granted to the Prince Regent of Portugal	57,170	
Surplus fees of regulated public offices	119,226	
Imprest money repaid by sundry public accountants, and other moneys paid to the public	121,220	31,558,997
Total, independent of loans		£75,413,873
Loans paid into Exchequer, including the amount of those raised for the service of Ireland		36,078,047
Grand total		£111,491,920

—ANNUAL REGISTER for 1815, p. 322.

Public Expenditure.

1. For interest, &c., on the permanent debt of Great Britain unredeemed, including annuities for lives and terms of years		£40,776,530
2. Interest on Exchequer bills		2,256,707
3. Civil list	£1,028,000	
4. Other charges on the consolidated fund, viz.:		
Courts of justice	74,437	
Mint	16,923	
Allowances to royal family	368,048	
Salaries and allowances	67,559	
Bounties	6,158	
		1,561,125
5. Civil government of Scotland		114,032
6. Other payments in anticipation of Exchequer receipts—		
Bounties for fisheries, manufactures, corn, &c.	244,308	
Pensions on the hereditary revenue	27,700	
Militia and deserters' warrants	138,494	
		410,502
7. The navy	11,334,907	
Victualling department	5,774,585	
The transport service	4,852,074	
		21,961,566
8. Ordnance		4,480,729
9. The army, viz.:		
Ordinary services	16,532,945	
Extraordinary services and subsidies	27,287,234	
	43,820,179	
Deduct the amount of remittances and advances to other countries	10,024,623	
		33,795,556
10. Loans, &c., to other countries, viz.:		
Ireland	8,723,985	
Austria	1,475,632	
Denmark	121,917	
France	231,931	
Hanover	739,879	
Holland	267,759	
Oldenburg	10,007	
Portugal	1,500,000	
Prussia	1,330,171	
Russia	2,555,473	
Sicily	316,666	
Spain	586,338	
Sweden	800,000	
Miscellaneous	88,845	
		18,748,603
11. Miscellaneous services, viz.:		
At home	1,937,018	
Abroad	447,573	
		2,384,591
		126,489,941
Deduct sums which, although included in this account, form no part of the expenditure of Great Britain, viz.:		
Loan for Ireland	8,723,985	
Interest at one per cent. and management, Portuguese loan	57,170	
Sinking fund on loan to the East India Company	120,807	
		8,901,962
		£117,587,979

—ANNUAL REGISTER for 1815, page 342.

Appendix B, p. 278.

Troops furnished by the Confederation of the Rhine to the Allies.

Second Corps.

Oldenburg	1,500
Hanover	20,000
Brunswick	6,000
Bremen	8,000
	35,500

Third Corps.

Kingdom of Saxony	20,000
Duke of Saxe-Weimar	2,800
Schwartzburg	650
Anhalt	800
	24,250

Fourth Corps.

Hesse-Cassel	12,000
Berg	5,000
Waldeck	400
Lippe	650
	18,050

Fifth Corps.

Wurzburg	2,000
Darmstadt	4,000
Frankfort and Isenburg	2,800
Reuss	450
Nassau	1,680
	10,930

Sixth Corps.

Wirtemberg	12,000

Seventh Corps.

Baden	8,000
Hohenzollern	250
Lichtenstein	40
	8,290

—Koch, *Abrégé de Traités de Paix*, x., 357, 358.

Appendix C, p. 281.

Composition and Strength of the Allied Armies who invaded France.

Grand Army of Schwartzenberg.

I. *Austrians.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Cossack Regiments.	Cannon.
1. The 1st light division of Count Bubna	5	30	3	..	24
2. The 2d light division of Lichtenstein	5	18	2	..	16
3. The 1st corps of Colloredo	27	12	8	..	64
4. The 2d corps of Lichtenstein	21	12	8	..	64
5. The 3d corps of Giulay	25	13	7	..	56
6. The corps of Frimmont	11	20	6	..	48
7. The corps de Reserve of Prince Hesse-Homburg	26	40	26	..	100
8.	8				
Total	128	151	60	..	372

II. *Russians and other Allies.*

9. The 1st allied corps, or the 5th corps d'Armée of Wrede	30	30	12	..	76
10. The 7th allied corps, or the 4th corps d'Armée of Prince of Wirtemberg	15	12	4	..	24
11. The Russian, or 6th corps d'Armée of Wittgenstein	23	20	7	5	72
12. The Russian reserve of the Archduke Constantine	35	72	15	21	116
13. The Prussian Guard	8	8	3	..	24
Total	239	293	101	26	684

—Plotho, iii., *Appendix*, p. 13, 14, 15.

Force of the above.

	Men.
Austrians	130,000
Bavarians	25,000
Wirtembergers	14,000
Russians: Wittgenstein's corps	19,350
Russians: Reserve	32,200
Prussian guard	7,100
Guards of the Grand-duke of Baden	1,000
The 6th allied corps	13,000
The 8th allied corps	10,000
Wirtemberg's reserve	10,000
Total of the Grand Army	261,650

II. The Army of the North.

Under the Command of the Crown-prince of Sweden.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Cannon.	Pioneer Companies.	Cossack Regiments.	Men.
1. The 3d Prussian corps of Bulow	45	50	12	96	2	..	30,000
2. The Russian corps of Winzingerode	35	30	14	162	..	19	30,000
3. The 3d German corps d'Armée	32	15	..	56	..	2	30,000
4. Walmoden's corps	..	..	..	..	..	..	15,000
5. The Swedish army	28	32	9	62	..	..	20,000
6. The 2d German allied corps	32	16	4	..	..	..	30,000
Total of the army of the North							155,000
7. Dutch troops							10,000
8. English troops under Graham							9,000
9. Danish infantry							10,000
							184,000

—Plotho, iii., *Appendix*, p. 29, 40.

III. The Army of Silesia.

	Men.	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Cannon.	Pioneer Companies.	Cossack Regiments.
1. The 1st Prussian corps d'Armée of York	18,931	31½	44	13	104	2	..
2. The 2d Prussian corps d'Armée of Kleist	20,000	37	44	14	112	2	..
3. The Russian corps d'Armée of Langeron	33,310	43	28	12	136	5	7
4. The Russian corps d'Armée of Sacken	21,150	26	24	7	84	1	8
Total	93,391	137½	140	46	436	10	15
5. The 4th German or Hessian corps d'Armée	20,000	25	12	4	32	..	..
6. The 5th German or Duke of Coburg's corps	24,000	20	11	5	40	..	3½
Grand total	137,391	182½	163	55	508	10	18½

	Men.
Prussian troops	38,931
Russian troops	54,460
German allied troops	44,000
Total	137,391

—Plotho, iii., *Appendix*, p. 26.

IV. The Army of Reserve.

	Men.	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Cannon.	Pioneer Companies.	Cossack Regiments.
1. Russian reserves under Benningsen	50,000	63	74	13½	156	5	10
2. The 4th Prussian corps d'Armée under Tauenzien	50,000	64	58	17½	100	..	..
3. Prussian corps of reserve in Westphalia, under Prince Hesse-Homberg	20,000	21	12	2	..	1	..
4. The Russian army of reserve under Prince Labanow	80,000	..	..	..	..	..	..
5. Blockading corps before Glogau	15,000	..	..	..	..	..	..
6. Austrian reserve under the Grand-duke of Wirtemberg	20,000	..	..	..	..	..	..
Total of the army of reserve	235,000	148	144	33	256	6	10

—Plotho, iii., *Appendix*, p. 41–50.

Summary of the whole Allied Armies.

	Men.
1. The Grand Army under Marshal Schwartzenberg	261,000
2. The army of Silesia under Marshal Blucher	137,000
3. The army of the North under the Crown-prince of Sweden	174,000
4. The Italian army under Marshal Bellegarde	80,000
5. The army of reserve	235,000
Grand total	887,000

Of which there were,

		Men.
230,000 Germans	In the first line	210,000
	In the second line	20,000
278,000 Russians	In the first line	136,000
	In the second line	62,000
	In the third line	80,000
162,000 Prussians	In the first line	76,000
	In reserve	86,000
197,000 German allied troops.		
20,000 Swedes.		
Total, 887,000		

This does not include the Danish infantry, 10,000 strong. —PLOTHO, iii., *Appendix*, p. 50.

Appendix D, p. 282.

Composition and Strength of the French Army.

	Artil.	Infant.	Cav.
I. Guard under Marshal Mortier—			
1. Old Guard—			
One division of infantry under General Frenant		6,000	
One division of cavalry under General Desnouettes			2,400
2. Young Guard—			
Infantry—Division, Christiani		3,500	
" —Division, Rothenburg		6,000	
" —Division, Boildieu		6,000	
Cavalry—Division, Ségur			1,600
" —Division, Colbert			1,600
" —Division, Nansouty			1,600
II. Infantry—			
The second corps, Victor		8,000	
The third corps, Ney		8,000	
The sixth corps, Marmont		7,000	
The seventh corps, Oudinot		12,000	
The eleventh corps, Macdonald		7,000	
The first reserve division, Charpentier		3,000	
The second reserve division, Laval (from Spain)		3,000	
The third reserve division, Amey		3,000	
The fourth reserve division, Payol (National Guard)		3,000	
III. Cavalry—			
The first corps, Grouchy			3,000
The second corps, Sebastiani			3,000
The fifth corps, Milhaud			3,000
The eleventh corps, Ecceimans			3,000
Dragoon division, Briche (from Spain)			3,000
IV. Artillery under Drouot	8,000		
Grand total	8,000	75,500	22,200

SUMMARY.

1. Guard—28,700 men		21,500	7,200
2. Infantry		54,000	
3. Cavalry			15,000
4. Artillery	8,000		
Total	8,000	75,500	22,200

Grand total, 105,700 men, with 300 cannon.

Detached.

	Men.
1. The first corps under Maison in Belgium	20,000
2. The army of the South under Marshal Augereau at Lyons	30,000
3. The thirteen corps under Marshal Davoust in Hamburg	20,000
4. The army of Italy on the Adige, under Beauharnois	50,000
5. The army of the Pyrenees and of Arragon, under Soult and Suchet	90,000

I. *Garrisons in France.*

		Men.
1.	Garrison of Besançon	4,000
2.	" of Auxonne	3,500
3.	" of Auxerre	3,000
4.	" of Mayence	20,000
5.	" of Strasburg	10,000
6.	" of Feltzberg	1,500
7.	" of Landau	2,000
8.	" of Befort	3,000
9.	" of Huningen	4,000
10.	" of Brisac	1,500
11.	" of Schelestadt	2,000
12.	" of Metz	10,000
	Carried forward	64,500
	Brought forward	64,500
13.	Garrison of Thionville	4,000
14.	" of Luxemburg	5,000
15.	" of Saarlouis	1,500
16.	" of Toul	3,000
17	" of Verdun	2,000
	Total	80,000

II. *Garrisons in Holland and the Netherlands.*

		Men.
1.	Garrison of Antwerp	8,000
2.	" of Gorcum	4,000
3.	" of Bergen-op-Zoom	5,000
4.	" of Maestricht	3,000
5.	" of Flushing	3,000
6.	" of Naerden	2,000
7.	" of Luxemburg	10,000
8.	" in Namur, Maubeuge, Valenciennes, Lille, and others	15,000
	Total	50,000

III. *Garrisons in Germany.*

1.	Garrison of Wesel	10,000
2.	" of Marienburg	1,500
3.	" of Petersburg	2,000
4.	" of Custrin	4,000
5.	" of Glogau	10,000
6.	" of Wittenberg	3,000
7.	" of Magdebourg	20,000
	Total	50,500

GENERAL SUMMARY.

I. In France—	
The Grand Army under Napoleon	105,700
The army of the South under Augereau	30,000
The army of the Pyrenees and of Arragon, under Soult and Suchet	90,000
Garrisons in France	80,000
II. In Holland and the Netherlands—	
The first corps under Maison	20,000
Garrisons in Holland and the Netherlands	50,500
III. In Germany—	
The thirteenth corps under Davoust	20,000
Garrisons in Germany	50,500
IV. In Italy—	
The army of Italy under Beauharnois	50,000
Grand total of French forces	496,200

—PLOTHO, iii., *Appendix*, 65, 68.

CHAPTER LXXV.

Appendix A, p. 351.

State of the French Army of Spain, Sept. 16, 1813.

	Effective and Non-effective.
Right wing—	
Foy	5,022
Maucune	4,166
Menou	5,707
Centre—	
D'Armagnac	4,353
Abbé	5,903
Maransin	4,842
Couroux	4,736
Left wing—	
Roguet	5,982
Taupin	5,071
Reserve—	
Villatte	8,256
Total infantry	54,038
Cavalry—Pierre Soult	4,456
" —Trielhard	2,368
" —Gens d'armes (mounted)	291
" — " (dismounted)	1,210
Total cavalry	8,325
Artillery	895
Engineers	504
Grand total.	
Infantry	54,038
Cavalry	8,325
Artillery	895
Engineers	504
Total	63,762

—*Muster Roll, in* NAPIER, vi., 708, 709.

CHAPTER LXXVII.

Appendix A, p. 521.

Public Income of Great Britain for the year ending January 5, 1816.

HEADS OF REVENUE.

Ordinary Revenue. Permanent and Annual Taxes.	Gross Produce.	Nett Produce.
Customs	£11,807,322 12 1¾	£9,070,554 13 7
Excise	23,370,055 8 3¼	20,539,028 14 11
Stamps	6,492,804 14 10	6,139,585 8 9¼
Land and assessed taxes	7,911,938 4 9¾	7,609,016 10 11
Postoffice	2,349,519 0 10	1,755,898 2 1
Pensions and 1s. in the pound	20,280 19 1	19,908 15 2
Salaries 6d. "	11,776 6 6	11,138 0 3
Hackney-coaches	29,283 14 10	24,721 9 8
Hawkers and pedlers	21,591 10 2	18,516 9 0
Total permanent and annual duties	£51,014,572 11 5¾	£45,188,368 4 4¼
Small Branches of the Hereditary Revenue.		
Alienation fines	£11,769 15 5	£10,620 7 5
Post fines	6,380 4 6	6,284 15 2
Seizures	9,445 7 2	9,445 7 2
Compositions and proffers	626 15 4	626 15 4
Crown lands	145,146 13 6	142,761 9 2
Extraordinary Resources.		
War Taxes.		
Customs	£2,841,406 1 7	£2,280,634 17 8
Excise	6,737,028 19 0	6,667,776 18 6
Property-tax	15,277,499 9 4	14,978,248 18 2
Arrears of income, duty, &c.	313 19 1	308 5 9
Lottery, nett profit (one third for the service of Ireland)	327,906 13 4	304,651 10 6
Moneys paid on account of the interest of loans raised for the service of Ireland	3,981,783 6 2	3,981,783 6 2
On account of balance due by Ireland on joint-expenditure of the United Kingdom	6,107,986 12 3	6,107,986 12 3
On account of the commissioners for Grenada Exchequer bills	25,000 0 0	25,000 0 0
On account of the interest, &c., of a loan granted to the Prince Regent of Portugal	28,585 1 6	28,585 1 6
Surplus fees of regulated public offices	98,750 13 2¾	98,750 13 2¾
Imprest moneys repaid by sundry public accountants, and other moneys paid to the public	107,836 16 10	107,836 16 10
Total, independent of loans	£86,722,038 19 10½	£79,939,669 19 2
Loans paid into the Exchequer (including the amount raised for the service of Ireland)	39,421,959 2 0	39,421,959 2 0
Grand total	£126,143,998 1 10½	£119,361,629 1 2¾

—*Annual Register for* 1816, p. 420.

Public Expenditure of Great Britain for the year ending January 5, 1816.

1. For interest of the national debt, and charges of the sinking fund			£41,015,527 10 0
2. Interest on Exchequer bills			3,014,003 3 8
3. Civil list, courts of justice, mint, allowance to royal family, salaries and allowances, bounties			1,555,408 6 4
4. Civil government of Scotland			126,613 11 9
5. Other payments in anticipation of the Exchequer receipts, viz., bounties for fisheries, manufactures, corn, pensions on the hereditary revenue, militia, and deserters' warrants			364,117 14 5
6. The navy			16,371,870 7 5
7. Ordnance			3,736,424 17 3
8. Army, viz.:			
Ordinary services	£21,333,831 10 8		
Extraordinary services	1,843,992 16 10		
		23,177,824 17 6	
9. Loans, &c., to other countries, viz.:			
Ireland	7,277,032 8 8		
Austria	1,796,229 8 8		
Russia	3,241,919 7 0		
Prussia	2,382,823 14 8		
Hanover	206,590 6 4		
Spain	147,333 19 10		
Portugal	100,000 0 0		
Sweden	521,061 17 1		
France, Canton of Berne, Italy, and Netherlands	78,152 14 2		
Minor powers, under engagements with the Duke of Wellington	1,724,001 8 4		
Miscellaneous	837,134 17 0		
		18,312,280 1 9	
10. Miscellaneous services			3,371,178 13 8
Total			111,045,249 3 9
Deduct sums which, although included in this account, form no part of the expenditure of Great Britain, viz., loans, &c., for Ireland, interest £1 per cent., and management on Portuguese loan, sinking fund on loan to the East India Company, &c.			7,460,734 4 8
Total			£103,584,514 19 1

—*Annual Register for* 1816, p. 429, 430.

Table showing the State of the National Debt of Great Britain on the 1st of February, 1816.

I. *Funded Debt.*

	Total Capitals.	Annual Interest.	Total of Annual Expenses.
Total debt of Great Britain	£724,092,611	£25,091,785	£37,203,412
Total debt of Ireland, payable in Great Britain	103,032,750	3,194,966	4,393,715
Carried forward	£827,125,361	£28,286,751	£41,597,127

	Total Capitals.	Annual Interest.	Total of Annual Expenses.
Brought forward	£827,125,361	£28,286,751	£41,597,127
Total amount of loans to the Emperor of Germany, payable in Great Britain	7,502,633	225,079	495,675
Total amount of loans to the Prince Regent of Portugal, payable in ditto	895,522	26,865	57,047
	£835,523,516	£28,538,695	£42,149,849
In the hands of the commissioners for the reduction of debt	40,392,540	1,211,776	..
	£795,130,976	£27,326,919	..
Transferred to the commissioners by purchasers of life annuities, pursuant to Act 48, George III., c. 142	3,097,551	92,926	..
Total charge for debt, British and Irish, payable in Great Britain	£792,033,425	£27,233,993	£42,149,849

II. *Unfunded Debt.*

	Amount.	Outstanding.
Exchequer—		
Exchequer bills provided for	£19,772,800	
" " unprovided for	21,669,100	
		£41,441,900
Treasury—		
Miscellaneous services	530,535	
Warrants for army service	20,615	
Treasury bills	1,005,514	
		1,556,664
Army		1,030,109
Barracks		125,005
Ordnance		876,857
Navy		3,694,821
Civil list advances		..
		£48,725,356

Summary.

Total funded debt	792,033,425
Total unfunded debt	48,725,356
Grand total of national debt at the close of the war	£840,758,781

—*Annual Register for the year* 1816, p. 434, 435.

Public Funded Debt of Great Britain on the 1st of February, 1816.

An account of the progress made in the redemption of the public funded debt of Great Britain at the 1st of February, 1816:

Funds.	Capitals.	Redeemed by Commissioners from 1st of Aug., 1786, to 1st of Feb., 1816.	Total sums paid by Commissioners.
Total stock created for sums borrowed	£1,000,986,526	£273,418,402	£172,009,352
Transferred to the commissioners on account of land-tax redeemed	25,155,056		
	£975,831,470		
Ditto for purchase of life annuities, per 48 George III.	3,097,551		
	£972,733,919		
Redeemed by the commissioners	273,418,402		
Debt of Great Britain, exclusive of Ireland, unredeemed at the 1st of February, 1816	£699 315,517		

—*Annual Register for* 1816, p. 431.

Appendix B, p. 528, 529, 532, 534.

I. *Wellington's whole Army at the opening of the Campaign.*

	Men.
British and King's German Legion	43,236
Hanoverians	10,447
Brunswickers	8,000
Belgian and Nassau troops	28,387
Total	90,070
Under Wellington's orders, but who had not arrived at the opening of the campaign:	
Hanse troops	4,000
Danes	12,000
Grand total	106,070

—PLOTHO, iv., *App.* 45.

II. *Wellington's Army at Waterloo.*

1. British and King's German Legion:	
Infantry, viz.:	
Officers	1,077
Sergeants, &c.	1,189
Trumpeters, &c.	500
Rank and file	17,895
	20,661
Cavalry, viz.:	
Officers	521
Sergeants, &c.	641
Trumpeters, &c.	125
Rank and file	7,448
	8,735
Artillery, engineers, &c., viz.:	
Officers	291
Sergeants, &c.	231
Trumpeters, &c.	75
Rank and file	6,280
	6,877
General summary, viz.:	
English infantry	20,661
" cavalry	8,735
Carried forward	29,396
Brought forward	29,396
English artillery and engineers	6,877
British and King's German Legion, Total	36,273
2. Hanoverians, viz.:	
Infantry	6,312
Cavalry (Estorff's brigade)	1,135
Total	7,447
3. Brunswickers	8,000
4. Belgian and Nassau troops	21,000
Total amount of Wellington's army that fought at Waterloo, viz.:	
British and King's German Legion	36,273
Hanoverians	7,447
Brunswickers	8,000
Belgian and Nassau troops	21,000
	72,720

III. *For the Tabular Statement showing the Strength of the British Army on the Morning of the Battle of Waterloo, June* 18, 1815, *see page* 16.

IV. *Prussian troops under Blucher who took part in the Campaign.*

	Men.	Bat.	Esq.	Battrs.	Can.
The 1st corps d'Armée under General Ziethen	34,800	34	32	12	96
The 2d corps d'Armée under General Kleist	36,000	36	36	12	96
The 3d corps d'Armée under General Thielman	33,000	33	32	12	96
The 4th corps d'Armée under General Bulow	37,800	36	48	12	96
	141,600	139	148	48	384

V. *Prussian force that advanced upon Waterloo, after deducting the loss at Ligny.*

	Men.	Bat.	Esq.	Battrs.	Can.
The 1st corps d'Armée under General Ziethen	27,000	34	32	12	91
Carried forward	27,000	34	32	12	91

	Men.	Bat.	Esq.	Battrs.	Can.
Brought forward	27,000	34	32	12	91
The 2d corps d'Armée under General Kleist	29,000	36	36	12	91
The 4th corps d'Armée under General Bulow	30,000	36	48	12	91
Total	86,000	106	116	36	273
Deduct one half of the 2d corps, which did not come into action	14,000	18	18	6	45
Total Prussian corps which advanced to Waterloo, of whom about 40,000 were actually under fire	72,000	88	98	30	228

—PLOTHO, iv., *Appendix*, p. 36, 55.

VI. *French Force.*

Army with which Napoleon entered Flanders on the 15th of June, 1815.

Corps, Commanders, and Divisions.	Force of each Division. Inf.	Cav.	Art. men.	Guns.
1st corps—Count d'Erlon.				
1st division	4,120	..	160	8
2d "	4,100	..	160	8
3d "	4,000	..	160	8
4th "	4,000	..	160	8
1st division of cavalry	..	1,500	120	6
Reserve of artillery	..	..	160	8
Force of 1st corps: men, 18,640; cannon, 46.				
2d corps—Count Reille.				
5th division	5,000	..	160	8
6th "	6,100	..	160	8
7th "	5,000	..	160	8
9th "	5,000	..	160	8
2d division of cavalry	..	1,500	120	6
Reserve of artillery	..	..	170	8
Force of 2d corps: men, 23,530; cannon, 46.				
3d corps—Count Vandamme.				
10th division	4,430	..	160	8
11th "	4,300	..	160	8
8th "	4,300	..	160	8
3d division of cavalry	..	1,500	120	6
Reserve of artillery	..	..	180	8
Force of 3d corps: men, 15,290; cannon, 38.				
4th corps—Count Gerard.				
12th division	4,000	..	160	8
13th "	4,000	..	160	8
14th "	4,000	..	160	8
6th division of cavalry	..	1,500	120	6
Reserve of artillery	..	..	160	8
Force of 4th corps: men, 14,260; cannon, 38.				
6th corps—Count Lobau.				
19th division	3,500	..	170	8
20th "	3,500	..	160	8
21st "	4,000	..	160	8
Reserve of artillery	..	..	280	14
Force of 6th corps: men, 11,770; cannon, 38.				
Imperial Guard:				
Young Guard	3,800	..	320	16
Chasseurs	4,250	..	320	16
Grenadiers	4,420	..	320	16
Light cavalry	..	2,120	240	12
Cavalry of reserve	..	2,010	240	12
Artillery of reserve	..	..	480	24
Reserve cavalry under Marshal Grouchy:				
1. corps—Count Pajol { 4th	..	1,820	120	6
5th	..	1,420	120	6
2. Corps—Count Excelmans { 9th	..	1,300	120	6
10th	..	1,300	120	6
3. Corps—Count Kellerman { 11th	..	1,310	120	6
12th	..	1,300	120	6
4. Corps—Count Milhaud { 13th	..	1,300	120	6
14th	..	1,300	120	6
Total	85,820	20,460	7,020	350
Engineers, pontoons, sappers, drivers, &c.			9,184	
Grand total				122,464

—GOURGAUD, *Campagne de* 1815, p. 150; VAUDONCOURT, iv., 108; PLOTHO, iv., Appendix, p. 8, 9; and NAPOLEON, ix., book 71.

VII. *Force commanded by Napoleon and Ney at Ligny and Quatre Bras on March 16th.*

At Ligny.		At Quatre Bras.	
Infantry	53,500	Infantry	32,320
Cavalry	12,730	Cavalry	7,710
Artillery	4,850	Artillery	2,170
	71,080		42,200
With 242 guns.		With 108 guns.	

VIII. *French Force which fought at Waterloo.*

	Inf.	Cav.	Artillery. Men.	Can.
1st Corps—Erlon.				
4 divisions of infantry	16,220	..	..	..
1 division of cavalry	..	1,400	..	..
Artillery	..	..	900	46
3 divisions of infantry	12,640	..	..	..
2d Corps—Reille.				
1 division of cavalry	..	1,300	..	..
Artillery	..	..	710	38
3d Corps.				
1 division (Dumont) attached to 6 corps	..	1,370	..	..
6th Corps—Lobau.				
2 divisions of infantry	7,000	..	..	..
Artillery	..	..	610	30
Imperial Guard.				
Young Guard (Duhesme)	3,800	..	..	..
Middle Guard	4,200	..	..	..
Old Guard	4,400	..	..	..
Cavalry of reserve	..	2,100	..	..
Cavalry (grenadiers and dragoons)	..	2,000	..	..
Artillery	..	..	1,920	96
Cuirassiers—Kellerman.				
2 divisions	..	2,330	..	..
Artillery	..	..	220	12
Cuirassiers—Milhaud.				
2 divisions	..	2,530	..	..
Artillery	..	..	210	12
Corps of Pajol.				
1 division (Subervich)	..	1,130	..	..
Artillery	..	..	110	6
	48,260	14,160	4,680	240
Men			67,100	
Sappers, drivers, engineers, &c.			7,000	
Total			74,100	
Cannon				240

Force under Marshal Grouchy at Wavres.

Infantry	25,520	
Cavalry	4,870	
Artillery	1,830	
Men	32,220	with 110 guns.

General Abstract.

	Men.	Guns.
Army under Napoleon at Waterloo	74,100	240
With Grouchy at Wavres	32,220	110
Lost at Ligny	6,800	..
At Quafre-Bras	4,140	..
	117,260	350

—GOURGAUD, *Camp. de* 1815, *Tables*, p. 150, and p. 71, 72.

This is the statement given by Gourgaud; but there can be no doubt it is below the truth, as Ney's corps set down here (the first) as only 18,640 men, was stated by Ney himself, shortly after the battle, to have amounted to between 25,000 and 30,000.—See NEY'S *Letter to* FOUCHE, *June* 26, 1815, *given in* JONES'S *Battle of Waterloo*, 262.

III. STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE MORNING OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO,

18TH JUNE, 1815.

Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Stations.	Officers.				Troop Quartermasters and Sergeants.					Trumpeters or Drummers.					Rank and File.						
				Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Staff.	Present.	Sick. Present.	Sick. Absent.	Command.	Total.	Present.	Sick. Present.	Sick. Absent.	Command.	Total.	Present.	Sick. Present.	Sick. Absent.	Command.	Prisoners of War, and Missing.	Total Rank and File.
Artillery, Engineers, &c.,		Royal Artillery	Position in front of Waterloo.	8	50	91	26	152	9	—	—	161	44	—	—	—	44	4573	306	17	9	9	4914
		Artillery, K.G.L.		2	5	12	6	20	—	—	1	21	6	—	—	—	6	520	73	—	29	—	622
		Royal Engineers		1	17	29	—	33	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		" Sappers and Miners		—	—	10	—	—	—	—	2	35	19	—	—	—	19	683	10	8	17	—	718
		" Wagon Train		1	2	9	4	17	—	—	3	20	2	—	—	—	2	266	—	3	10	—	279
		" Staff Corps		1	4	11	2	9	—	—	—	9	4	—	—	—	4	238	5	—	—	—	243
		Total Artillery,		13	78	162	38	231	9	—	6	96	75	—	—	—	75	6280	394	28	65	9	6776
Cavalry.	1st. Lord E. Somerset.	1st Life Guards		1	3	4	4	19	—	—	3	18	14	—	—	—	4	210	10	1	7	—	228
		2d "		1	4	8	3	19	—	—	2	17	3	—	1	—	4	197	—	4	30	—	231
		Royal Horse Guards		2	4	7	1	46	—	1	4	20	4	—	—	—	4	213	—	9	15	—	237
		1st Dragoon Guards		1	9	14	4	20	—	—	2	47	8	—	—	—	8	515	12	—	3	—	530
	2d. Ponsonby.	1st Dragoons		2	5	15	6	30	—	—	—	28	6	—	—	—	6	364	7	1	22	—	394
		2d "		3	6	13	6	33	1	—	—	34	6	—	—	—	6	375	1	5	10	—	391
		6th "		2	6	12	6	29	1	—	—	30	6	—	—	—	6	384	7	—	5	—	396
	3d. Dornberg.	1st Light Dragoons, K.G.L.		2	9	15	7	48	—	2	5	54	10	—	—	—	10	443	6	20	27	15	511
		2d "		4	8	14	6	30	1	9	2	41	10	—	—	—	10	433	14	37	31	13	528
		23d Light Dragoons		3	7	12	6	22	—	1	3	26	4	—	2	—	6	287	—	39	16	45	387
	4th. Vandeleur.	11th "		2	6	14	5	34	—	—	—	34	6	—	—	1	7	368	7	1	14	—	390
		12th "		2	7	12	5	34	—	—	—	34	4	—	—	—	4	363	3	—	22	—	388
		16th "		2	6	17	6	36	—	—	—	36	5	1	—	—	6	362	5	1	25	—	393
	5th. Grant.	7th Hussars		1	4	9	4	23	—	5	6	34	5	—	—	1	6	316	—	16	34	14	380
		15th "		2	7	13	6	30	—	—	—	30	6	—	—	—	6	383	3	—	6	—	392
	6th. Vivian.	1st " K.G.L.		2	9	17	7	44	2	—	8	33	9	1	—	—	10	498	16	6	93	—	613
		10th "		3	7	11	5	31	—	—	1	32	6	—	—	—	6	389	—	—	1	—	390
		18th "		1	4	14	6	33	—	—	—	33	6	—	—	—	6	378	5	5	8	—	396
	7th. Arentschildt.	3d " K.G.L.		2	10	20	5	46	2	1	14	63	11	—	—	—	11	590	26	22	149	—	787
		13th Light Dragoons		1	7	15	5	34	—	—	—	34	6	—	—	—	6	380	7	1	1	1	390
		Total Cavalry,		38	128	252	103	641	7	19	50	498	125	2	3	2	132	7448	129	168	519	88	8352

Infantry.	1st. Cooke.	1st British	1st Guards, 2d Battalion	Position in front of Waterloo.	—	4	21	4	43	—	8	5	56	21	—	1	—	22	688	—	276	12	—	976
			1st " 3d "		—	7	17	5	40	—	8	5	58	20	—	2	—	22	758	—	255	8	—	1021
		2d "	Colds. " 2d "		1	5	25	5	55	3	1	6	65	15	1	—	6	22	939	49	4	11	—	1003
			3d " 2d "		1	5	26	3	55	2	—	10	67	9	1	—	7	17	957	41	6	57	—	1061
	2d. Clinton.	3d "	52d Regiment, 1st Battalion		2	10	41	6	65	1	1	2	69	22	—	—	—	22	1002	18	12	6	—	1038
			71st " 1st "		3	9	32	6	61	—	—	1	62	21	—	—	—	21	798	6	4	2	—	810
			95th " Prov. "		1	2	5	2	11	—	—	1	12	6	—	—	—	6	176	2	2	8	—	188
			95th " 2d "		2	6	20	6	37	1	—	3	41	17	—	—	—	17	567	10	3	5	—	585
		1st K.G.L.	1st Line Battalion, K.G.L.		2	6	16	5	25	3	2	18	48	12	—	—	—	12	389	20	27	17	5	458
			2d " "		1	6	17	5	30	1	3	16	50	12	1	1	—	14	423	25	32	13	18	511
			3d " "		3	4	17	6	32	—	2	13	47	13	—	—	—	13	508	6	30	11	—	555
			4th " "		2	5	17	6	26	—	4	3	33	9	—	—	1	10	413	—	38	11	—	462
	3d. Alten.	5th British	30th Regiment, 2d Battalion		3	5	26	6	33	—	5	5	43	14	—	—	—	14	548	—	45	9	13	615
			33d "		1	4	21	5	22	—	4	10	36	12	—	2	4	18	501	10	14	6	30	561
			69th " 2d "		2	6	17	5	28	1	1	4	34	19	—	—	—	19	464	23	16	8	5	516
			73d " 2d "		2	5	12	4	32	—	5	5	42	17	—	—	1	18	426	—	102	34	—	562
		2d K.G.L.	5th Line Battalion, K.G.L.		2	4	20	5	30	—	1	16	47	16	—	—	—	16	394	32	21	10	—	457
			8th " "		2	6	18	6	31	—	—	15	46	15	—	—	1	16	436	11	3	95	—	545
			1st Light Battalion, "		3	5	18	6	23	3	7	20	53	12	—	1	1	14	382	26	57	20	—	485
			2d " "		1	5	19	6	24	3	4	19	50	14	—	1	—	15	382	28	59	12	—	431
	4th. Colville.	4th British	14th Regiment, 3d Battalion		2	8	23	5	33	1	—	2	36	11	—	—	—	11	548	9	7	7	—	571
			23d " 1st "		3	10	25	6	35	—	—	3	38	23	—	—	—	23	639	—	5	3	—	647
			51st "		2	9	28	6	39	—	—	2	41	14	2	2	—	18	521	5	17	6	—	549
	5th. Picton.	8th "	28th " 1st "		2	8	20	5	36	1	2	1	40	27	—	1	—	28	458	—	88	9	2	557
			32d " 1st "		2	4	14	6	36	—	6	2	44	14	—	1	—	15	427	—	218	17	—	662
			79th " 1st "		—	4	17	5	33	—	12	3	45	10	—	2	1	13	374	5	290	34	—	703
			95th " 1st "		1	3	7	6	27	—	11	—	38	10	—	2	—	12	364	—	185	—	—	549
		9th "	1st " 3d "		1	5	23	7	34	—	14	—	48	17	—	3	—	20	366	—	236	2	—	604
			42d " 1st "		—	1	13	3	25	—	12	1	38	15	—	1	—	16	272	9	220	25	—	526
			44th " 2d "		2	4	18	6	39	2	2	3	46	15	—	1	—	16	396	12	32	15	—	455
			92d " 1st "		1	2	15	4	27	—	16	1	44	12	—	3	1	16	361	—	217	10	—	588
	6th.	10th "	4th " 1st "		1	2	20	4	36	—	2	2	40	11	1	—	—	12	596	6	55	12	—	669
			27th " 1st "		—	3	15	3	34	—	1	1	36	8	—	—	—	8	687	—	10	1	—	698
			40th " 1st "		2	9	27	5	55	—	2	1	58	17	—	—	—	17	747	—	11	3	—	761
			Total Infantry,		53	181	670	173	1189	22	136	199	1546	500	6	24	23	553	17,895	353	2599	499	73	21,359
			Total at Waterloo,		104	387	1084	314	2061	38	155	255	2140	700	8	27	25	760	31,623	966	2775	1036	170	36,487
	4th.	6th "	35th Regiment, 2d Battalion		2	5	23	6	31	—	1	2	34	16	—	2	—	18	481	6	69	14	—	570
			54th " 1st "	NearBraine le Comte.	2	5	29	5	38	—	3	3	44	19	—	—	—	19	497	—	37	7	—	541
			59th " 2d "		3	6	21	6	38	1	—	1	40	15	—	—	—	15	432	18	10	7	—	481
			91st " 1st "		1	8	27	6	48	1	3	1	53	21	—	—	—	21	774	18	31	1	—	824
		10th "	81st " 2d "	Bruxelles.	2	9	22	5	26	—	1	1	28	9	2	1	—	12	406	17	16	—	—	439
	7th.	7th "	25th " 2d "	Antwerp.	3	5	16	5	29	—	—	3	32	12	1	—	1	14	354	21	5	8	—	388
			37th " 2d "		1	9	19	6	34	2	—	1	37	13	2	—	—	15	387	34	62	8	—	491
			78th " 2d "	Nieuport.	2	7	19	5	22	1	—	2	25	10	—	—	—	10	313	16	5	3	—	337
			13th Royal Veteran Batt.	Ostend.	1	7	19	6	27	4	—	4	35	5	—	—	—	5	649	24	—	10	—	683
			1st Foreign.	Antwerp.	2	6	9	5	32	2	1	—	35	12	—	—	—	12	536	40	1	18	—	595
			2d Garrison Battalion.	Ostend.	2	7	21	4	38	3	—	—	41	14	—	—	—	14	696	43	—	—	—	739
Cavalry.			2d Hussars, K.G.L.	Courtrai.	3	8	17	7	49	1	—	4	53	6	—	—	—	6	493	15	17	33	—	558
			Total detached,		24	82	242	66	412	15	9	22	457	152	5	3	1	161	6018	252	259	103	—	6646
			Grand total at Waterloo and detached,		129	469	1330	380	2473	53	164	277	2947	852	13	30	26	921	37,603	1128	3046	1186	170	43,133

INDEX.

Explanation.—The following Index has been compiled with the design to include the necessary reference to the prominent *Discussions*, *Facts*, *Persons*, and *Places* of which record is made in the History. The first figures which immediately succeed the article stated, advert to the year, the numerals show the volume, and the figures which follow indicate the page of the volume. By attending to this rule, it is believed that the place of any important circumstance in Alison's History can be readily ascertained.

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